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The New Police Corps

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The incidence and public perception of crime are issues which have assumed a permanent place in local, state and national policy debate. Given current political and fiscal realities, one traditional approach to combatting crime—social programs aimed at alleviating poverty—is subject to official disdain. In the near future, therefore, policymakers will most likely look toward the expansion of police forces as a means of assuaging public anxiety in this area. Adam Walinsky and his colleagues present an innovative and potentially cost-effective proposal for achieving this objective: the use of college scholarships to create a state "Police Corps" whose participants agree to serve as police officers for three years after graduation. The program would be funded primarily by existing financial aid programs and additional government appropriations. It would attempt to tap a public spirit reserved in earlier years for programs like its namesake, the Peace Corps. Jack Wenik's reply examines the assumptions underlying this proposal and recommends questions which policymakers must address to formulate a coherent legislative effort.

Ed.

I. Introduction

With each passing year a dwindling number of New Yorkers can recall the time when the cities of this State were considered safe places to live. New York City in particular has always been notable for excitement, noise, corruption and rackets. Violence, crime and discontent are
not strangers to our streets; the New York City riots of 1863, 1943, 1963
and 1977 are proof. We have always had street thieves, prostitutes and
pimps, hijackers and hustlers. Nevertheless even New York was a city
where the ordinary citizen felt safe, and was. As late as 1948, the City
had the lowest violent crime rate of any major American city. But since
that time, a menacing criminality has emerged and taken root.

Neither the violence nor the greed and rebelliousness in this criminal-
ity are unique. What is distinctive are its destructiveness, its wanton
viciousness and seeming irrationality. The lust for other people's prop-
erty is accompanied by an indifference to life and to the future that
terrifies the law-abiding.

This new criminality is accompanied by public degradation and in-
difference to the consequences of destruction. Buildings are gutted and
burned. The symbols of public life are compromised and ruined. Many
city parks can be used only by masses of people; subways and buses are
dangerous and defaced; too many city public schools are menacing
places from which learning has long since fled. Unchecked, this new
criminality has fed on its own actions, and is causing disorder and fear
that constantly overhang our way of life. Larger and larger areas of our
cities are afflicted with the stigmata of urban despair—the petty vandal-
ism, graffiti, broken windows and petty arson that have come to be nor-
mal, the first steps toward destruction and dissolution. Meanwhile
burglary and housebreaking, the first signs of similar crime and disorder,
spread to wide areas of suburban and rural New York, once considered
sanctuaries of peace.

More distressing even than the physical damage of crime are its social
consequences. Fear of crime becomes fear of the stranger. Relations
between the races are poisoned. We retreat further and further from
self-respect, and enmity comes to rule our public life.

During an era of unprecedented criminality not a single new idea for
policing cities has been proposed. Study groups, commissions, profes-
sors, politicians and judges have issued thundering warnings about
crime, proposed new penalties for its commission and used it as a justifi-
cation for vast new schemes of social improvement. Meanwhile, the
police themselves have been repeatedly subject to scrutiny, investiga-
tion, reform and reorganization intended to make them more representa-
tive, more honest, more lawful and less forceful. Nevertheless the force
is weaker, less spirited and less disciplined. It is less able to provide the
people with even the illusions of public peace. It has been able to assure
only that the destruction of large parts of our cities proceeds in a rela-
tively orderly fashion.
II. Background
A. The Crippling of Police Strength

Public order has collapsed in large part because the police have not grown in numbers nearly commensurate with the exploding rate of crime. In 1948 for every violent crime reported in an American city there were 3.22 police officers. Put another way, a city with a police force of two thousand men might expect to deal with about seven hundred violent crimes a year. Thirty years later, in 1978, the ratio of police officers to violent crimes was 0.5 to 1. Thus a police force of two thousand would be confronted with four thousand violent crimes a year. We are allocating to each violent crime one-sixth of the police power that we allocated thirty years ago.

This sixfold effective reduction in our police forces is typical of New York cities such as Rochester, where a force barely larger than the five hundred men of thirty years ago must now cope with about 2,500 violent crimes—as opposed to less then 400 in the late 1940’s. But in many areas of New York the case is worse. In Buffalo, in 1951, a force of 1,229 men was faced with 361 reported violent felonies. By 1981 a force reduced to 1,053 men had to cope with 3,277 reported violent felonies, nine times the figure of thirty years before.

In New York City the facts are even more crushing. The City is the nerve center of the State; it is the City that places us at the center of the world. What we have allowed to happen in New York City defies description. In 1951, a City police force of over 19,000 was asked to cope with 15,812 violent crimes—less than one per serving officer. But in 1981, a police force of barely 22,000 was confronted with the incredible total of 157,026 violent crimes—more than seven violent crimes for every serving officer. Indeed, these numbers are a dramatic understatement of the problem. We had 157,026 reported violent crimes. But as our people have lost faith, more and more crimes are not reported. A recent Gannett poll indicates that one out of every four City households has been the victim of a street robbery within the last year.1

1. These statistics also dramatically understate the deterioration in police resources allocated to crime, and the growing viciousness of crimes. In 1951, there were only 244 homicides in the City, 7,004 robberies and 902 rapes; thus these most violent crimes were only 51.5 percent of all violent crimes, with assaults the remainder. In 1981, there were 1,826 homicides, 107,495 robberies and 3,862 rapes; thus these crimes were 72.1 percent of all violent crimes. Moreover, if the crimes of 1981 were being treated with the medical technology of 1951, the homicide total for 1981 would certainly have been at least double what it was.

The bare statistics also do not reflect the fact that thirty years ago, before the unionization of police forces and the attendant reduction in the work week, policemen commonly worked a "wheel" of fifty hours a week. Today's patrolmen work an average of about 37 patrol hours. Two policemen in 1951 were, in service hours, the equivalent of 3 patrolmen today.
For thirty years, the people of New York have been under increasingly violent assault. But in the very midst of this savage war, our public officials have engaged in unilateral disarmament.

B. The Need for Great Increases in the Police

The relative decline of the police presence is insufficient to explain all of the rise in crime over the last three decades; indeed, there are many reasons. That the causes of crime are various requires that measures to reduce it be of many kinds. But no other measures can hope to be effective unless we immediately strengthen our police forces on a scale dramatically greater than any thus far proposed. There are three reasons why we need more police.

First. Without a vastly increased police force, we cannot hope to catch more than a fraction of the many active criminals who have already adopted crime as a way of life. Clearance rates for most crimes have declined sharply. Most police forces do not even have the manpower to investigate thefts of less than many thousands of dollars. Thus the few goods of the poor, and the middle class, are at constant hazard. There are now outstanding in the City of New York over 80,000 felony warrants. These represent criminal defendants who have walked away from their obligation to appear for arraignment, trial, sentencing or jail. The police do not have the resources to search out any but the most dangerous. For most, the outstanding warrant is not served unless they are caught committing another crime. Because of longer sentences and lower parole rates, New York prisons hold twice the number of inmates of ten years ago. Imprisoning more felons has not checked the rise in crime; for despite the increased cost of getting caught, the risk of capture has not risen to match the rising rewards of crime. In these conditions, the threat of drastic punishments for the few unlucky criminals we catch—however harsh—will never be more than it now is: a charlatan’s promise, a politician’s false hope.

Second. Only police on patrol can uphold community peace and order. Police patrol is the key to the very survival of neighborhoods. Professor James Q. Wilson\(^2\) has recently reminded us that disorder, vandalism and perceived danger can destroy a community more quickly than the activities of professional criminals. With disorder and vandalism come insecurity, fear and abandonment of the streets. Desolation leads inexorably to physical flight from the neighborhood. Without the authority and security of a visible police presence, ordinary citizens are reluctant to correct or speak up against disruptive behavior or to assist

\(^2\) James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, 249 ATL. MONTHLY 29 (March, 1982).
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others who are threatened; such public-spirited action has too often brought a violent response.

More than this, disorder and neighborhood deterioration are forerunners of violent crime, for they invite the vandalism and antisocial behavior that are to crime what soil is to crops. Almost without exception, a felon's first violent crime has been preceded by perhaps a dozen lesser crimes, on a gradually escalating scale from petty vandalism to thefts to robbery and worse. Many of us remember when patrolmen commonly intervened at the start of this process, often informally, with no more than a warning; often the effect was to turn a young person away from a path that might lead to more and worse crime. But today's police, drowning in the tide of criminal violence, cannot even pay attention to petty offenses. Still less, in their radio cars, running from one urgent call to another, can they stand guard as effective symbols of community purpose, strength and order. For that vital task, we need more police, in the community and on the beat. Nothing else will do.

Third. More police will merely by their presence significantly reduce the present level of crime. There are irrational people who will commit crimes no matter what the risk of police action and probability of punishment. Just as certainly, however, many potential criminals will weigh the rewards against the likely costs of crime. These criminals will either commit fewer crimes or forgo crime entirely as the probability of effective police action increases. Even in today's chaos, most poor people do not commit crimes, but strive to build lives as honest and productive citizens. Increasing the costs of crime makes it easier to resist temptation and peer pressure to engage in criminal acts.

We do know that there has been a direct correlation between the reduction of police and increased crime. A New York City police official recently told us that:

This city is, in effect, conducting a vast social experiment. The experiment is, how far can you cut back your police force before crime runs rampant? New York should never have been such a laboratory, but we now know the answer to the experiment. The results are in, and they represent a disaster without precedent in the modern life of this society. The experiment must be reversed immediately. We must begin to increase the number of police throughout the state of New York and continue building up these forces until we achieve an acceptable level of public order and security.

C. What Must be Done

To return to the ratio of police officers to crime which existed thirty
Many have argued that crime can be more effectively reduced by social programs, to some of which in this emergency of public order we assign a lesser priority. This argument is associated with the commonplace assertion that poverty causes crime. But the explosion of crime in America has coincided with vastly increased affluence and significant reductions in the number of people living below the poverty line. Welfare, redistribution and the extension of opportunity have significantly reduced poverty in barely twenty years. Given our experience it might be more accurate to say that crime causes poverty, for we know that it destroys neighborhoods, discourages commerce and investment and dissipates wealth. Crime has accelerated the rate at which whole urban districts have been abandoned, not only wrecking the homes which they contain but uprooting the jobs they once offered. Crime is not, we believe, merely one cause of community destruction: it is the primary cause. Once proud and relatively flourishing neighborhoods like New York’s Central Harlem have been decimated by the crime and disorder that have been allowed to govern there. Too often the honest and struggling poor and minorities have been abandoned to the ravages of crime. That their neighborhoods are routinely victimized by violence, theft and unconstrained trading in narcotics is one of the great municipal scandals of this century. Moreover, the failure to provide sufficient police manpower has been a false economy of the worst kind. How much of the flight from New York City—and indeed, from other cities of New York State—has been the result of fear of crime and distaste for disorder?

It is true that some areas of New York City are improving despite crime and disorder. This is a testament to New Yorkers, to their often indomitable spirit and courage. But we should not expect citizens, particularly the old or defenseless, to run an urban gauntlet. And if New York’s spirit has survived the tide of criminal violence, what a flowering might we hope for if we can assure substantial improvements in police protection and community security.

During each of the next six to eight years the number of police in New York State should be increased, so as to achieve a total increase of 30,000
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in this decade. Twenty thousand officers must be added in New York City, 7,000 in other city and suburban areas, and the remaining 3,000 should be assigned to the rural areas of the state. The goal must be to double the effective police presence in every area of the state with a serious crime problem.

III. The New Police Corps

We must have a police force throughout New York State that is large and effective enough to check and reverse the current surge of criminality. But we must also re-think the purpose and organization of the police, essentially unchanged since the Civil War. If we act with determination and as if our way of life depended on it, as it does, we can establish a system of police and justice that will restore civic peace. But we must accept the fact that we live in an emergency of our own making that will require our special resolve.

The rebirth of civic order originates in the central principle of a free people, that public life is the responsibility of every citizen. Our duty is not to the government, for in a democracy the government serves the people. Our responsibility for civic order is a duty we freely owe each other as fellow citizens. It is a shared responsibility for the welfare of our families and our posterity. It is a commitment to ourselves and to our self-respect. And the policing of civic order begins with the recognition that in a democracy, the police are neither an alien force nor a corps of mercenaries. They cannot do for us what we are not willing to do for ourselves. In the deepest sense, the police are us.

For this reason, and for others that we will set forth below, the new police must be recruited, and must serve, on a new basis. Our aim is rapidly to draw large numbers of our most committed and qualified young men and women into police service. We have an historical precedent of national service in time of national emergency that will serve well as a model for our own needs in a time of civic peril. In times of military need we have drawn the majority of our officers from the public at large. Most have been volunteers, to whom we have offered a free higher education as an inducement and a reward for their service. Today need and opportunity merge once again.

We can and should attract many of our finest young people to police service, by offering them a completely free college or professional education in return for a three-year term of service with the police.

A. How the Police Corps Would Work

We propose the following plan. The State of New York would create
a program in its outlines similar to the military Reserve Officers Training Corps. Students qualifying for the program, on a competitive basis, would receive from the state a full four-year scholarship covering tuition, room, board and books, up to $8,000 a year, at any accredited college or university within the State of New York. There they would pursue any course of study they desire. In return, these students would agree to serve three years as members of the New York State Police. They would then be assigned to serve under the line command of local police forces in their home communities throughout the state. Just as with ROTC or the GI Bill, scholarships would be available to qualified applicants regardless of family income. Assisted students who are unable, or choose not, to complete their service obligation, would have their scholarships treated as loans to be repaid.

We believe that such a program, on a strictly voluntary basis, would attract the best of New York’s young people, of both sexes and every ethnic background. America’s young people have repeatedly demonstrated their eagerness to serve the highest public purposes of the nation. Nor has their service always been military. Tens of thousands have served in the Peace Corps, in VISTA, and in hundreds of less-publicized efforts to improve American life. We can offer young New Yorkers a voluntary public service alternative to the military. Police Corps service would be an opportunity at once to meet the most vital need of their home communities, and to acquire the education of their choice, free of financial burdens on themselves and their families.

B. New York College Scholarships and the Police Corps

New York State now provides one-third of the entire national total of college scholarships, and more direct aid to private colleges than all other states in the nation combined. Our commitment of two billion dollars to open access and diversity in higher education is one of the most impressive achievements of state government. In a time of fiscal stringency, and when the very future of our society is in jeopardy, we must now ensure that at least a portion of this support goes to young people who are willing to help us restore the public order and self-respect that are vital to our survival. Let it be plain that we do not suggest that any student now eligible for assistance because of financial need should or will be denied that assistance, regardless of whether he or she volunteers to serve. We propose only that those who do volunteer should receive additional recognition and assistance.

If we begin immediately, we can have in six to eight years’ time 30,000 additional police, who will have joined the State Police after
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their graduation from college and completion of training at the police academy. The program would begin with the senior class, most of whom of course will have already paid for their education, usually by student loans. Seniors with loans outstanding, who satisfactorily complete a term of service in the Police Corps, would have their entire loan burden assumed by the state. Those without outstanding loans would be offered full support for graduate or professional study (up to four years at a limit of $8,000 a year) at the completion of their police service. Juniors and sophomores would be offered a combination of pickup of existing debts, and scholarships for the remainder of their study. Entering freshmen would be eligible for full scholarship support throughout their four years of study. For all our new police, we should actively seek the cooperation of private industry to assure them employment, and of graduate and professional schools to admit them for study, at the conclusion of their service.

The student police would spend the summers of their sophomore and junior years training as police cadets. After graduation from college the cadets would undergo final training at a police academy, with several located in different parts of the state. Upon completion of their course and satisfaction of all tests and legal requirements they would be sworn into the State Police and assigned for their local service. At the conclusion of their period of service they might elect to continue with a realistic prospect of rapid advancement. Along with members of the State Police now serving, they should be offered additional educational support and leaves to do graduate work in return for additional service. The best of the volunteers who wish to remain should be directed into a police executive development program which will combine formal police experience with management and other specialized training. Their presence would gradually supply the police with a generation of superior and devoted commanders. Many might also elect to serve in other branches of the public service as a career.

Most volunteers no doubt would resign at the end of their terms, to be replaced by the class of the graduating year. But even if they were to perform no additional service, their presence in society would gradually have a positive effect on public life. Decency and order depend on both the police and citizens. The professionalization and insulation of the police have often severed them from the communities they serve. Voluntary efforts within communities to provide more security have often met with hostility or indifference from police. Civilian patrols by groups as diverse as the Guardian Angels and the Hasidim are civic responses that must be amalgamated with police patrol work to give communities
aggressive, community-preserving police service. The presence in society of well-trained, experienced former police officers in ever-increasing numbers would greatly aid efforts to mobilize the entire community to fight the criminality that is undermining our way of life.

An effort to harness this civilian spirit must be initiated immediately. Police corps members who resign after three years should be asked, on a purely voluntary but paid basis, to serve for several years of week-ends and summers as members of a newly created Civilian Police Reserve. These experienced officers could provide the professional leadership of a revamped auxiliary police that would bring a police presence to neighborhoods throughout the state. The professional training and experience of the former volunteers could be the vital ingredient to overcome the traditional resistance of police to every previous effort to make serious use of police auxiliaries.

C. **Minorities and the Police Corps**

   Particularly in large cities, the Police Corps would have special meaning and appeal for racial minorities. As blacks and Hispanics are the principal victims of crime, the extension of police protection would have special effect in their neighborhoods. Service in the Police Corps would open up new opportunities for many who are unable to afford a college education for which they are otherwise qualified. Moreover, the Police Corps is a means by which substantial numbers of the most qualified young blacks and Hispanics could be brought into police service. Present police hiring of minorities is largely subject to court orders either invalidating traditional police tests, or commanding that a certain percentage of minorities be hired notwithstanding test results. We believe the Police Corps would attract more than a sufficient number of minority applicants as qualified as any others to pass traditional tests and serve as police officers. Every part of the community would benefit from their service.

D. **Working With Local Authorities**

   The Penal Laws proscribing criminal conduct are laws of the State. The government of New York State is ultimately responsible for their enforcement. Nevertheless local policing has always and properly been understood to be a local function, best directed by local elected officials. The Police Corps is an attempt not to supplant these officials but to assist them in a time of crisis. As members of the State Police the volunteers would have full police powers throughout the State of New York. The three thousand serving in rural areas would be under the direct
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command of their superiors in the State Police. For the bulk who would be assigned to the major cities of the state, and to county and town forces, it would be necessary to work out agreements by which they would operate under the line command of local police authorities, fully integrated with existing departments. This agreement is one for which there are precedents. State Police already exercise concurrent authority, and work in cooperation with local police forces in many areas of the state. Four major police forces now operate in New York City, each with its own command and administrative structure. With careful planning, full discussion with local elected officials and police commanders, and a common will to meet our problems, we believe that the volunteers could be successfully integrated with local forces everywhere in the state.

E. Why Not Just Give Money to Localities

It may be asked why it is necessary to enlist the new Police Corps in the State Police, rather than give money to localities for the expansion of their existing forces. The reasons are as follows.

First, the program of scholarships, and the enforcement of the service obligations, require central administration.

Second, this program is a trade-off: free educational opportunity for public service. It is neither necessary nor proper to pay the new police at the wage and benefit levels of local police officers. And at prevailing pay scales for most local police, we could provide only a fraction of the additional police we need.3

Third, there is unfortunately no assurance that money directly given to local authorities will in fact be used to increase the numbers of police. The record of New York City in this regard is particularly troubling. In recent years, the police have not received an adequate share of the municipal budget. Moreover, whatever increased appropriations have been made available to police have been used principally for large overtime payments rather than for increases in the force. We must assure that our new police will in fact add to the patrol force. The Police Corps must not be used as substitutes for existing forces by local authorities seeking to avoid difficult budget choices. Fourth, by this new form of recruitment we can assure that the vast numbers of new police we require will be men and women of high quality. Only once before have we added police in numbers such as we propose. That was in 1968-69, when the New York City Police Department increased its numbers by about 5,000 in a single year. To secure such numbers, standards were

3. See the cost comparison set forth below in "Paying for the Program".
lowered drastically: one class had an average I.Q. of 93.19, and some of its members scored in the range of 70-79.\(^4\) We believe that the kind of program we propose is the only way to quickly attract large numbers of highly qualified young people, of both sexes and all ethnic groups, to police service.

Fifth, we must ensure that many of the new police are trained and serve as foot patrol. Existing police departments and municipalities have consistently and increasingly mechanized police functions. The police as a result have become more mobile. But they have also become more and more separated from the communities it is their duty to protect. Mobility was a natural response to their need to respond, with thinning ranks, to more crimes committed. But they have become virtually ineffective in their principal task, which is the preservation of public order and the prevention of crimes. Except for those who would serve in rural and suburban areas where foot patrol is impractical, the new police would be specifically trained to act as foot patrol, directly serving and interacting with local communities and neighborhoods throughout the state.

F. Why Not An Expansion of the Regular State Police

It may also be asked why we should not simply expand the regular State Police force by 30,000, and assign the new troopers to local areas. Recruiting large numbers of regular troopers would have the advantage of lower turnover, and over time would assure more experienced forces. However, the advantages of the Police Corps are greater.

First, regular troopers could not serve an extended period of time in metropolitan areas. State Police salaries are not adequate to raise a family in a high-cost area.

Second, the Police Corps, with its limited term of service, assures us long-term control over costs without interference with existing labor contracts. Were the new police recruited for career service, their cost would rise inexorably as they accumulated seniority, and we would in addition face an enormous cost in pension benefits.

Third, our aim is to recruit local police to supplement existing local forces. We enroll the Police Corps as members of the State Police in

\(^4\) This was not because the classes in question contained any large proportion of minorities. A representative class of 1968 was 81 percent white, 12 percent black and 7 percent Hispanic. There was no correlation between race and measured I.Q. The problem was not that standards were lowered for minorities, but that they were lowered for all applicants. Similar though less extreme results were obtained in other forces undergoing rapid expansion, where lists normally “creamed” were exhausted, and virtually all applicants meeting minimal standards were accepted rather than only those at the top of the list.
order to control costs, provide necessary central administration and ensure that the new resources made available by the state will in fact be used for police. But we place these new police under the line command of local authority, fully integrated with local departments, because we do not want to subvert the traditional and proper authority of local elected officials over local police policy and action. If the new police were state troopers, the likely result would be to create instead a permanent conflict between state and local authority. This we must and can avoid.

Fourth and perhaps most important, we do not want to create vast new permanent police forces. Rather we seek to involve ordinary citizens in the vital effort to recover civil peace. Thousands of unpaid volunteers now contribute their part-time efforts to assist local departments throughout the state. But these volunteers are not trained as regular officers, are without the status of peace officers, and neither carry firearms nor have powers of arrest. Regular police have understandable reservations about their utility and effectiveness. The Police Corps, by contrast, would bring fully-trained young officers with full police powers directly under the command of existing forces. Thus it would at once allow us to greatly expand the force and effectiveness of the police by engaging large numbers of ordinary citizens in police work, while assuring that they have the training, powers, discipline and command necessary to make them fully effective officers for the full term of their service.

IV. Paying for the Program

No program can be proposed without a full recognition of its costs, and the sources of its funding. The program we have proposed can be implemented well within New York's existing fiscal constraints.

The State now supports higher education in six major ways:

—The State University system provides low-cost education at a cost of about $1 billion a year;
—The City University receives $510 million to assist in providing low-cost education;
—The Tuition Assistance Program (TAP) provides grants of $302 million to New York students on a basis of financial need;
—Regents scholarships of $19 million are given to students regardless of need;
—So-called “Bundy money” provides $92 million in direct assistance to private colleges and universities, and $13 million in similar aid to medical and dental colleges;
—The State administers about $543 million in guaranteed student loans.
Our plans would over time use a small portion of these funds, together with available Federal funds and some new appropriations, as the inducement for police service by Police Corps volunteers. Eligibility for the existing TAP program would be broadened in two ways:

- Family income limits would be ignored for all students participating in the program, and
- Also for participants in the program, benefits would be extended beyond tuition, to cover room, board and books, up to the limit of $8,000 a year.

It is important to repeat that this would not diminish in any way the eligibility of any low-or moderate-income student for TAP grants on the present basis. TAP is an entitlement program, which is funded by the Legislature in accordance with the needs of all eligible students.

Students in the police program would attend both private colleges and units of the State University system. Given the upper limit of $8,000 a year, the average cost of a year's support for each student should be approximately $6,000. The maximum enrollment of volunteers in any one year would be about 40,000 at a total cost of $240 million. However, this does not represent additional cost. First, many of the volunteers would be eligible for the Federal "Pell Grants," which are made on the basis of need and average about $1,000 a year per student. This would reduce our program cost by about $14 million. Second, many students in the program would also be eligible for federally-assisted student loans. All eligible enrollees would take out such loans. Of course, in return for their service, the state would assume the entire burden of repayment. However, since interest is not due on such loans until the student graduates, and is at a subsidized rate thereafter with payment of principal deferred, the state would by this device receive an indirect subsidy from the Federal government that we estimate conservatively at $15 million a year.

Perhaps even more important is the fact that this funding method defers the full amount of the loan for an average period of three years. Thus for each of the first three program years, the cost to New York State will be $40 million lower than actual program expenditures would indicate.

Third, it is estimated that over one-third of the volunteers would have received TAP grants (albeit of much smaller amount) simply by attending college. At least $20 million of our program’s cost to TAP should therefore be subtracted as a duplication. Put another way, the true annual cost to the state will be about $150 million.

This amount can be met by reallocation of existing funds, much of it
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by reallocation of existing higher education spending. The so-called "Bundy Money" alone, for example, is now $105 million. As we point out, this program has no parallels in the rest of the country. The "Bundy Money" pays universities $4,500 each to produce PhDs who often then require immediate job retraining. We are paying medical and dental schools—some not even in this state—to turn out doctors and dentists for whom there is no demand. We believe such programs are less important than the program we have outlined. Moreover, we believe that the Legislature, which has always been willing to assure full support for higher education in New York, will ensure that our program can be implemented without undue hardship to any institution or student.

Paying for the service of the new police would also require an increase in expenditure. It is, however, modest in relation to the need, and in relation to the cost of existing police services. At present, for example, the total cost for a rookie police officer in New York City or Suffolk County is about $32,000 in wages, benefits and pensions. It rises to $40,000 after the second year of service, and the average police officer costs $50,000 a year. The new police, by contrast, would be enrolled as members of the New York State Police. Their salaries would average, over their three years' service, about $15,000, and their fringe benefits another $5,000. As short-term officers, they would incur no costs for their pension. If we were successful in recruiting 5,000 new officers in the first year, the cost of their service would be approximately $100 million.

That sum can be made up by the elimination of small programs—such as the State Liquor Authority, an unnecessary expenditure of $10 million—and savings from larger wasteful programs, such as New York State Welfare-Home Relief, which presently supports many persons able to work at a state and local budget cost of $500 million. These examples are only illustrative, not exhaustive.

The maximum cost of the program would not be reached until at least the sixth year, when it would reach a level (in current dollars) of about $600 million yearly. It is important to understand that any conceivable alternative would be far more costly. For example, consider the employment of just twenty thousand additional New York City police officers on the present basis. In another five years, allowing for a modest...
increase in pay and benefits of five percent annually, the average yearly cost of each patrolman will be almost $55,000. Twenty thousand additional officers would thus cost $1.1 billion, without allowing for any assistance to a single community elsewhere in the state. Nor does even this enormous sum allow fully for the pension cost of additional career police. Even ten thousand regular police, a number inadequate for New York City alone, would cost virtually as much as the thirty thousand we project for service throughout the state.\(^7\) Moreover, the relatively modest cost of the Police Corps, even at its projected maximum of $600 million, can be met without the enactment of new or additional taxes.

The five-year financial projection for New York State is that under current law, with no new taxes, the state’s revenues will increase at a rate of over $1 billion annually. Revenues for 1988 will be at least $5 billion, perhaps $7 billion, greater than today. Thus we have allocated less than one-fifth of that increased revenue to the preservation of fundamental public order throughout the state. We believe that the preservation of peace and justice is the first purpose of government. Less than one-fifth of our new revenues is a small price to pay for the safety of our families, the integrity of our communities and our children’s future.

Nor have we here offset, against the program cost, its obvious financial benefits. Nevertheless they are real. Public order is the foundation-stone of any effort to rebuild New York’s economy. Restoring safety and order in the subways, for example, would immediately increase off-hours revenues, thus reducing the transit deficit. Restoring order in communities would prevent further deterioration of the tax base, stabilize the population and employment, and eventually lead to renewal. The value of increased security and self-respect for every citizen we put beyond price.

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\(^7\) Some might suggest the Police Corps, which will result in an increased number of arrests, will also require increased expenditures for courts, prosecutors and jails. Our aim is not merely to catch more criminals. It is to prevent crime. The fact is that many crimes are committed because there is an opportunity, and a feeling that something can be gotten away with. Our aim is to change that calculation for the large numbers of people who commit crimes just because it is easy, and without significant risk. We believe the additional police will deter a lot of crime before it begins.

As to violent crimes, there are some who will commit these crimes no matter what the risk. Such people have to be locked up and punished with the full force of law. However, the evidence is that almost all perpetrators of violent crimes begin by committing an escalating string of property crimes. Typically, someone arrested for a violent crime such as a robbery will have committed, and been arrested for, numerous burglaries. In many cases, if we stop the pattern at the beginning, we believe that we can prevent the escalation to violent crime. Thus we can both decrease crime and the need for new jails.

Our purpose is also to keep order. Prosecutors and judges have only the most indirect and marginal effect on order in the street. That requires police, and under the present circumstances, more police.
The New Police Corps

V. Conclusion

The creation and effective use of the Police Corps will require above all else a determination to reassert our commitment to our values and beliefs. Our proposed effort in New York City is intended not only to provide desperately needed protection to city-dwellers, but as evidence to persuade the people of this state that it is once again possible for us to control our fate by our own efforts. When we have begun to demonstrate this we can then mobilize the voluntary spirit to revitalize government services in many areas: that we might develop other ways in which citizens can have the opportunity to share in the provision and management of these services on a voluntary basis; and that contribution might be recognized by the state in the allocation and distribution of benefits. For example, once this urgent program is underway, it may be that we would want to extend it to other young people who could assist in the school system, particularly in securing the attendance at school of tens of thousands of those who are now chronically truant. Our juvenile justice system is in disarray: partly because those who commit serious, violent crimes are not punished enough, but also because there is a terrible lack of effective aid and counseling to many young people at the outset, before they have committed a major offense. This latter problem can be solved, if at all, only by direct personal involvement of concerned and caring citizens.

The restoration of public peace must not wait the three decades that it has taken to create urban chaos. Nor is this program a complete answer. Rather it is a starting point, albeit an indispensable one. We must begin an unstinting effort to organize the voluntary spirit of a great people in order to take back our streets. In the coming decade we can tap the strength, commitment and hope of thousands of New Yorkers who, because of their values and in exchange for a free college education, want to give us the help we need to regain control not only of our communities, but of our lives together as citizens, comrades and countrymen.

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