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CARING FOR DECONSTRUCTION

Katherine C. Sheehan

Come on, would anyone ever have talked or heard talk of deconstruction for more than ten minutes if it came down to such derisory dogmas or such stupid monoliths as these? . . . . One shows considerable contempt for many colleagues or students if one believes they are silly enough or credulous enough to interest themselves in such simple and pitiful discourses.

Jacques Derrida, Biodegradables: Seven Diary Fragments

I. INTRODUCTION

Displaying an uncharacteristic lack of grace, Robin West states in her recent book, Caring for Justice, that “for feminist reformers concerned with doing something with law to end patriarchy, as a tool of analysis deconstruction has all the usefulness of an unhinged steering wheel in avoiding a collision with a wall.” West is wrong about deconstruction, but she is wrong in an interesting way, and it is interesting that she goes so far out of her way to be wrong about deconstruction. In an oeuvre otherwise marked by attentive and careful readings of texts by all sorts of authors, from Franz Kafka to Richard Posner and the United States Supreme Court, and from Pauline Reage to Northrop Frye, West’s offerings on deconstruction have

† Associate Professor, Southwestern University School of Law. A shorter version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Working Group on Law, Culture, and the Humanities, March 10-12, 2000. I would like to thank Robin West, Eric Blumenson, and George Wright for their helpful comments, and Mark Cammack, Craig Christensen, Isabelle Gunning, Anne Lombard, and Henry Sheehan for their help and encouragement.

1. 15 CRITICAL INQUIRY 812, 827 (Peggy Kamuf trans., 1989).
2. ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997).
3. Id. at 204. The remark follows and imitates Catharine MacKinnon’s assertion that “legal doctrine has ‘all the indeterminacy of a bridge abutment hit at sixty miles per hour.’” Id. ((mis)quoting CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 123 (1989)). MacKinnon’s remark referred not to legal doctrine but to the world outside the self, the existence of which Descartes, but no woman, could doubt: “Epistemologically speaking, women know the male world is out there because it hits them in the face. No matter . . . what they think or do, they cannot get out of it. It has all the indeterminacy of a bridge abutment hit at sixty miles per hour.” CATHERINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 123 (1989) (emphasis added).
5. See chapter nine, entitled Narrative, Responsibility, and Death, of WEST, supra note 4, at 419 (discussing judicial use of the narrative voice in writing opinions); Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1990) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s work of the 1990 Term).
6. To be precise, West reads PAULINE REAGE, THE STORY OF O (1965) through other readings of that

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amounted to little more than careless potshots.

Like many outspoken critics of deconstruction, post-structuralism or postmodernism⁸, Robin West does not always make clear what she is disparaging. She uses a number of terms—postmodernism, critical legal studies, critical social theory, deconstruction⁹—more or less interchangeably,¹⁰ as if they all referred to the same cluster of concepts, methods, or thinkers and could all be tarred with the same broad “postmodern” brush. Judith Butler wonders whether the confusion displayed by postmodernism’s foes is strategic:

A number of positions are ascribed to postmodernism, as if it were the kind of thing that could be the bearer of a set of positions: discourse is all there is . . . ; the subject is dead, I can never say “I”


⁹ See chapter eight, entitled Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, of WEST, supra note 4, at 345 (analyzing jurisprudential theory using categories developed in NORTHROP FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRITICISM: FOUR ESSAYS (1957)).

¹⁰ As will become clear, the position defended in this Article against West’s criticism is drawn from the work of Jacques Derrida. This Article does not undertake to answer the question whether such a thing as “postmodernism” exists as anything other than a target of criticism or, if it does, whether Derrida’s work is a part of that thing. According to Derrida, “postmodernism or poststructuralism . . . are catch-all notions into which the most poorly informed public (and, most often, the mass-circulation press) stuffs nearly everything it does not like or understand, starting with ‘deconstruction.’ I do not consider myself either a poststructuralist or a postmodernist.” Jacques Derrida, Marx & Sons, in GHOSTLY DEMARCATIONS: A SYMPOSIUM ON JACQUES DERRIDA’S SPECTERS OF MARX 213, 228-29 (Michael Sprinker ed. & G.M. Goshgarian trans., 1999). Derrida and deconstruction, however, are commonly included within the scope of what is called “postmodernism” by both hostile and friendly surveyors of contemporary legal theory. See, e.g., GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S END 116-22 (1995) (including a discussion of deconstruction as a “postmodern legal movement”); Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of Postmodern Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 166 (1996) (discussing Derrida as a “postmodern interpretivist”); Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2514 (describing Derrida, along with Roland Barthes, Jean Baudrillard, Jacques Lacan, and Jean-Francois Lyotard as principal representatives of poststructuralism, one of the “two major strains” of postmodernism). But see Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 262-79, 313-14 & n.276 (1992) (arguing that Derrida is not postmodern). Schanck considers Patterson’s failure to include Derrida in his discussion of postmodern legal thought “questionable.” Schanck, supra, at 2508 n.5.

⁹ At some points, West seems to use “deconstruction” as another name for what postmodernists are doing when they are doing postmodernism. See, e.g., WEST, supra note 2, at 16-17 (describing a luxury car commercial making use the Shaker hymn Simple Gifts and images of the Statue of Liberty as “postmodern” and calling it a “deconstruction of the representations of simplicity and compassion that had once been, but are no longer, essentially embedded within the Shaker hymnal [sic] and the national symbol.”). With respect to deconstruction in the legal academy, Jacques Derrida has remarked that the word deconstruction “gives rise to so many misunderstandings that one wouldn’t want to add to them by reducing all the styles of Critical Legal Studies to one or by making them examples or extensions of Deconstruction with a capital “D.” Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority,” 11 CARDozo L. REV. 919, 933 (Mary Quintaine trans., 1990).
again; there is no reality, only representations. These characterizations are variously imputed to postmodernism or poststructuralism, which are conflated with each other and sometimes conflated with deconstruction . . . .

. . . Lyotard's work is, for instance, seriously at odds with that of Derrida, who does not affirm the notion of "the postmodern," and with others for whom Lyotard is made to stand. Is he paradigmatic? Do all these theories have the same structure (a comforting notion to the critic who would dispense with them all at once)? . . . For if Lyotard uses the term, and if he can be conveniently grouped with a set of writers, and if some problematic quotation can be found in his work, then can that quotation serve as an "example" of postmodernism, symptomatic of the whole?\(^{11}\)

West is by no means alone, even among authors writing more or less as feminists, in dismissing postmodern or poststructuralist contributions without displaying her usual careful attention. Martha C. Nussbaum, for example, in the course of a recent essay taking Judith Butler and other unidentified feminist theorists to task for doubting that large-scale social change could be achieved without subversion of the dominant structures of power, undertook to rewrite a passage by Butler that had been declared by the journal *Philosophy and Literature* to be the winner of its 1998 "Bad Writing Contest."\(^{12}\) Nussbaum's "correction" of the passage in question, however, not only truncated and oversimplified Butler's thesis, a problem evident from an examination of the grammatical structures of the two passages,\(^{13}\) but also got Butler's point wrong in substance.\(^{14}\)

\(^{11}\) Judith Butler, *Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of "Postmodernism,"* in *FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE POLITICAL*, 3, 4-5 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds., 1992). Chantal Mouffe has further noted that, "If by 'postmodernism' one wants to designate only the very specific form that such a critique takes in authors such as Lyotard and Baudrillard, there is absolutely no justification for putting in that category people like Derrida, Lacan, or Foucault." Chantal Mouffe, *Feminism, Citizenship and Radical Democratic Politics*, in *FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE POLITICAL*, supra, at 369, 370. If instead one wants to refer to thinkers who have, for example, critiqued essentialism or taken issue with the category of the subject, the category should include thinkers not ordinarily considered "postmodern": Wittgenstein, Dewey, and Freud, for example. *See id.*


\(^{13}\) Text appearing as a given in a subordinate clause in Butler's passage became the point of the passage in Nussbaum's rewrite. *See Nussbaum, supra* note 12, at 37.

\(^{14}\) Nussbaum's version erroneously assigns to Althusserian theory a position Butler's passage offered as a contrast to that theory. *See id.* Surely Nussbaum would not have become Ernst Freund Professor of Law & Ethics at The University of Chicago if this effort were typical of her scholarship. In rushing her comments into print, Nussbaum seems to have succumbed to what Derrida calls the "temptation of the media," the "compulsion to misuse the privilege of public declaration in a social space that extends far beyond the normal circuits of intellectual discussion." Jacques Derrida, *Honorius Causa: This is also extremely funny, in POINTS... : INTERVIEWS, 1974-1994*, at 399, 401 (Susan Weber ed. & Peggy Kamuf trans., 1995) (1992).
Vivian Curran has also remarked on the lack of intellectual rigor displayed by ordinarily careful scholars when they take on deconstruction:

Those who oppose it in the legal field are among the most brilliant of thinkers. Their readiness to condemn deconstruction without engaging in a debate on its merits is just the sort of "point of rupture" which signals to a deconstructionist that more is at stake than what appears on the surface. . . . In my opinion, the anti-deconstructionist analysis, i.e., the notable absence of attempts to demonstrate logical fallacies in deconstructionist analyses, stems from a wish to deny the sobering conclusion that . . . our jurisprudential system cannot reliably ensure our future safety. The anti-deconstructionist charge that deconstruction is a philosophy of despair is a normative statement, neither establishing its own truth nor justifying the conclusion that deconstruction is invalid.  

The peculiar passion with which postmodernism generally is attacked also provoked Jane Flax to speculate about the emotional investment of postmodernism's foes. Flax argued that postmodernism enhances intellectual and political anxiety:

Postmodernism calls into question the belief (or hope) that there is some form of innocent knowledge to be had. This hope recurs throughout the history of Western philosophy (including much of feminist theory). . . .

By innocent knowledge I mean the discovery of some sort of truth which can tell us how to act in the world in ways that benefit or are for the (at least ultimate) good of all. Those whose actions are grounded in or informed by such truth will also have their innocence guaranteed. They can only do good, not harm to others.  

Flax evidently found even this source of anxiety insufficient fully to account for extreme feminist reactions to postmodernism:

I am trying to make sense of part of the emotional vehemence with
which some feminists reject [postmodern] writings, sometimes with only minimal knowledge of them. The intensity of the emotional response is puzzling, especially among people who generally respond to ideas in a much more complex and nuanced manner.\textsuperscript{17}

Noting that postmodern critiques of the concepts of “woman” and “gender” had emerged at about the same time as the recognition that these categories depended for their coherence on the exclusion of “the experiences of women of color, . . . women outside the overdeveloped world, poor women and lesbians,”\textsuperscript{18} the emotional quality of the reaction led Flax to speculate:

Since the projects of postmodernism and women of color overlap here, I wonder whether there is a racial subtext at work that requires more attention. Since directly attacking women of color or voicing our resentment of them (in public) would be politically unthinkable, is it easier and more acceptable for white women to express our discomfort with difference discourses and the politics of knowledge claims by categorically rejecting postmodernism and branding it politically incorrect?\textsuperscript{19}

It is not entirely clear why West, Nussbaum, and other disapproving feminists bother to concern themselves with postmodernism or deconstruction at all, much less to attack them with the vehemence sometimes displayed. The fashion these days is to consider deconstruction, at least, a thing of the past,\textsuperscript{20} a literary fad that enjoyed some currency in the eighties but quickly revealed its inadequacy and was soon displaced by the new historicism, culture studies, queer studies, or some other trend.\textsuperscript{21} Indeed, judging from the citations in \textit{Caring for Justice}, West has based her understanding of postmodern thought entirely on the work of Michel Foucault,\textsuperscript{22} who died in 1984, and on the first wave of work by the Conference on Critical Legal Studies.\textsuperscript{23} Yet West’s

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Id. at 463 n.22.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Id. at 459.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{21} See, e.g., Richard Rorty, \textit{Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism}, in DECONSTRUCTION AND PRAGMATISM 13, 15 (Chantal Mouffe ed., 1996) (describing deconstruction as a “school of literary criticism which was briefly (before the advent of "cultural studies") dominant in the U.S”).
\item \textsuperscript{22} See WEST, supra note 2, at 259-76.
\item \textsuperscript{23} When West does get specific about her postmodern targets she tends to identify them as the critical legal studies scholars who, while they have not ceased to publish, made their biggest impact in the mid- to
objections to what she calls postmodernism seem to become more pressing as
time goes by—not only is Caring for Justice more dismissive than West's
earlier work, but the portions of Caring for Justice most hostile toward
postmodernism are the portions written specially for that book as opposed to
those chapters and sections reprinted from earlier publications.24

West's identification of deconstruction with the early work of the critical
legal scholars is unfortunate because, until fairly recently, Derrida's
potentially important contributions to feminist legal theory have been
thoroughly obscured by the peculiar reception his work received when first
introduced into the United States. Perhaps as a tribute to the fecundity of the
ideas drifting across the Atlantic from France in the late sixties and seventies,
the most fleeting exposure to this thought inspired American scholars,
especially in law, to produce work of powerful insight and critical acuity.25
That this work was inspired by Derrida, however, does not make it
decomposition, any more than a poem inspired by sight of the Seine is on that
basis in French.26 As Rodolphe Gasch6 said: "Undoubtedly deconstructive

25. According to Rodolphe Gasch6, Paul de Man, the leading "deconstructionist" critic at Yale, was
well aware of the fundamental differences between his critical practices and Derrida's work. See Rodolphe
Gasch6, In Difference to Philosophy: De Man on Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche, in Reading DeMan Reading
(Wlad Godzich & Lindsay Waters eds., 1987). For various perspectives on the history of deconstruction in
criticism has greatly profited from Derrida's thought, both thematically and methodologically. But to quarry from Derrida's writings is not automatically to become deconstructive in the eminent sense."  

One of Derrida and deconstruction's most prolific self-appointed spokesmen in law has been J.M. Balkin. In a series of articles, Balkin has undertaken to explain deconstruction to readers of law journals, to make clear its utility for legal scholars, and to defend it from its critics. Although superficially faithful to the letter of deconstruction, Balkin's accounts entirely miss the spirit of Derrida's work, and in the process obscure those implications of Derrida's thought of most interest to the work of feminist legal scholars.

Derrida himself has delivered an ambivalent evaluation of the so-called deconstructive efforts in Critical Legal Studies:

However unfamiliar they may be to me, I know that these efforts in Critical Legal Studies have their history, their context, and their proper idiom, and that in relation to such a philosophico-deconstructive questioning they are often (shall we say for the sake of brevity) uneven, timid, approximating or schematic, not to mention belated, although their specialization and the acuity of their technical competence puts them, on the other hand, very much in advance of whatever state deconstruction finds itself in a more literary or philosophical field.
West's persistent misunderstanding of deconstruction is particularly unfortunate because her recent work on the need to incorporate an ethic of care into judging bears striking similarities to Derrida's recent writing on responsibility and justice. Both share a concern with the intersection of general rules and singular circumstances, and both exhibit an asymmetric, non-reciprocal structure presenting both stimulating opportunities and puzzling problems for progressive legal theory.

This Article will begin to tear down the wall that prevents West from appreciating Derrida's work. Part II will examine West's objections to postmodernism as set forth in the introduction to *Caring for Justice*, where West answers questions she expects postmodernists to raise against her idea of justice tempered with essentially female caring. Part II will conclude that West's response to postmodernism is neither well-founded nor particularly just. Part III will then look at West's jurisprudential project in light of Derrida's work on language and meaning, identifying areas where West's failure to acknowledge the implications of her own work has entangled her thought in contradiction and difficulty. To a surprising extent, the theoretical weaknesses of West's feminist essentialism resemble misunderstandings of Derrida's work at large among "deconstructionists" in the United States. Part IV of this Article will attempt to correct some of these misunderstandings, in particular identifying features of J.M. Balkin's explanatory work on deconstruction that have obscured its value for feminists, while highlighting other aspects of Balkin's work that demonstrate deconstruction's liberatory potential. With some of the obstructions identified as such, if not entirely cleared away, Part V will compare West's work on justice and care with Derrida's work on responsibility, ethics, and justice, exploring both the striking parallels and the fundamental differences between these ideas. Finally, once it is shown that Derrida and West share basic attitudes toward justice, it can also be seen that their approaches face similar problems. The Article therefore concludes in Part VI where, but for all the confusion, it might have begun, suggesting that West's passion for a caring justice demands that she care for deconstruction as well.

Before beginning—or, more accurately, continuing—this project, a few preliminary words about approach are in order. Despite its "anything goes" reputation, Derridean deconstruction is, perhaps above all, careful and respectful attention to particular texts. The "moves" or terms that have come to be identified with the deconstructive method were each originally found to be an infrastructure\(^ {32} \) or a quasi-transcendental structure\(^ {33} \) shaping a singular text being read by Derrida. A project exploring the objections of "feminists" to "postmodernism" would be entirely alien to deconstruction, which could

\(^{32}\) See Gasché, *supra* note 25, at 7 (using the word "infrastructure" in connection with Derrida's work).

\(^{33}\) See Beardsworth, *supra* note 25, at 19 (using the phrase "quasi-transcendental structure" in connection with Derrida's work).
only proceed by reading singular texts with or against each other. As much as possible, therefore, the focus of this Article will be restricted to particular works by particular authors, primarily Robin West, J.M. Balkin, and Jacques Derrida.

II. POSTMODERNISM IS BAD FOR CHILDREN AND OTHER LIVING THINGS: WEST’S OBJECTIONS TO POSTMODERNISM

West’s dispute with what she calls postmodernism derives from her commitment to “difference” feminism or feminist essentialism. West contends that women share important qualities with each other related to women’s responsibility in all known cultures and ages for bearing and raising children. Whether West believes these qualities are innate, learned, or the result of patriarchal coercion is never made clear, although the difference is one that would seem to matter. Because the law has historically been dominated by men to the near exclusion of women, the law neither protects nor values qualities characteristic of women. A major part of West’s project, therefore, “is to tell true stories of women’s lives.” Most important, we need to tell stories, and give voice to the stories of others. “[F]eminist legal theorists need to show through stories the value of intimacy—not just to women, but to the community—and the damage done—again, not just to women, but to the community—by the law’s refusal to reflect that value.”

Telling these stories, according to West, will both open up mental space for new understandings of women’s lives and help men and the law appreciate them.

West perceives postmodernism to be a threat to her project for two reasons: First, she understands postmodernists to deny that any self, female or otherwise, exists in a form stable enough to have her true story told; and second, West attributes to postmodernists the contention that, because, like everything else, women are inessential, they can neither have essential

34. See West, supra note 2, at 10-21.
35. See id. at 13-14 (conceding the possibility that male violence against women might be rooted in biology, but arguing that law should nevertheless prohibit such violence).
36. See id. at 18 (noting that it would be “extremely odd” if the facts that we are all born by women, that most of us are raised by women, and that the majority of women the world over give birth, were to “have no effect, and lend to women’s perspectives no unifying and distinguishing threads.”).
37. See id. at 123 (attempting to distinguish female altruism rooted in care from female altruism rooted in fear).
38. See Cornell, Beyond Accommodation, supra note 31, at 25-26 (noting a tension in West’s work as to the role of biology in the formation of female identity, and outlining the problems this tension causes for West’s theory).
39. West, supra note 24, at 64.
40. West, supra note 2, at 275.
41. Id. at 65.
42. See id. at 215 (borrowing the notion of mental space from Milner Ball, The Word and the Law (1993)).
43. See West, supra note 4, at 179-85.
44. See West, supra note 2, at 5-6.
qualities nor share them with other women.\textsuperscript{45}

\textit{A. Taking Care of the Self}

West contends that the law’s neglect of the caring connections between people “is reflected in and amplified by—and partly explained by”\textsuperscript{46} current ideas about the self. The law, like liberal and economic legal theory, presupposes a self antithetical to connection and caring, “an individual who prides himself on his autonomy and on his self-chosen life projects, including, of course, his voluntary, willful decisions to interact, on a limited basis and toward self-defined ends, with others.”\textsuperscript{47} However, West warns, it is not liberal legalism or law and economics but postmodernism that poses “the greatest contemporary ideological threat to any conception of selfhood that asserts either the moral importance of the self’s connections with others, or the seriousness of the harms those connections sometimes occasion.”\textsuperscript{48}

West does not explain what it can mean for an ideology to threaten a conception of the self. The notion that actual selves are endangered by postmodernism seems far-fetched, but West’s urgency and passion express more than a fear that her idea of the self might simply be shown to be theoretically inadequate or even politically regressive. West’s tone is more appropriate for the conclusion that postmodernists beat their children or, perhaps worse, cannot remember or do not care which children are theirs. If this analogy seems exaggerated, it is no more so than West’s—she begins the introduction to \textit{Caring for Justice} by invoking the fear of losing one’s children\textsuperscript{49} and by the end has equated “the parent’s foundational and utterly healthy fear of losing her children\textsuperscript{50} with the “inhuman” postmodern disconnection of text and meaning.\textsuperscript{51}

The reason why the postmodern self is such a moral threat, according to West,

is simply this: both economic and liberal legalism . . . rest on a contingent, tentative, empirically grounded, and therefore changeable conception of the individual. The radically individuated and unconnected individual at the heart of their jurisprudential perspective is radically individuated because that is how these theorists see him as being: they are asserting a descriptive and empirical—and hence falsifiable—claim, not a metaphysical or transcendent one. Should that

\textsuperscript{45} See id. at 11.
\textsuperscript{46} Id., at 4.
\textsuperscript{47} Id.
\textsuperscript{48} Id. at 5.
\textsuperscript{49} See id. at 1. The first line of the introduction is “Children and their parents, different as they are, share one powerful emotion: they are terrified at the prospect of losing each other.” Id.
\textsuperscript{50} Id. at 17.
\textsuperscript{51} Id.
tentative description of human nature turn out to be wrong, there is
nothing in either the logic or the politics of economic or liberal
legalism that forecloses either from shifting ground.\textsuperscript{52}

The notion that the bizarre description of the individual presupposed by
Richard Posner’s jurisprudence\textsuperscript{53} might have been the product of empirical
observation does not encourage one to hope that further observation will soon
produce a better account. After all, nearly a century of psychological research
following Freud’s investigations into the unconscious has rendered any
account of economic man sagely weighing costs and benefits as he busily
pursues his chosen projects a cartoonish oversimplification, at best. Surely no
such individual is observable in the world without the assistance of strong
ideological lenses, and the task of persuading investigators to change these
lenses is an ideological, not an evidentiary, one. West nevertheless considers
the liberal concept of the self to be a work-in-progress, capable of correction.

The same cannot be said, however, of the purportedly fractured,
unstable, disconnected and inessential self, or lack of self, at the heart
of the new postmodern legal scholarship. . . . [A]ll its connections as
well as all other attributes it may be thought to possess, are accidental,
contingent, or random, and furthermore, they are so essentially. This is
not an empirical, descriptive, tentative claim about our modern nature,
it is a transcendental claim about the nature of nature. . . . [T]he
postmodern self so dear to the heart of postmodern theorists is . . . as
changing, unstable, and unpredictable as the wind. . . . To repeat, that
inessential self is . . . not a hypothetical description, subject to
modification or amendment as new evidence presents itself. It is a
metaphysically transcendent truth.\textsuperscript{54}

It is very difficult to see what sort of idea West is describing here.\textsuperscript{55} At

\textsuperscript{52} Id. at 5.

\textsuperscript{53} See West, Kafka and Posner, supra note 4; see also Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Posner, Prisoners,
and Pragmatism, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1117 (1992) (pointing out that Posner’s purportedly empirical
observations about the lives and motivations of prisoners rest on little or no empirical bases); Mark M.
(1991) (examining, inter alia Posner’s view of the connections between rich and poor); Ian Shapiro, Richard
Posner’s Praxis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 999 (1987) (criticizing Posner’s views as both empirically and
economically unsound).

\textsuperscript{54} West, supra note 2, at 6.

\textsuperscript{55} It would be helpful if West would attribute this particular conception of the self to some
postmodern scholar whose work could then be consulted for clarification—although the idea is said to be “at
the heart” of postmodern legal theory, no author is cited. See id. at 5. Postmodernism generally displays
more interest in the “subject” than the “self.” “The ‘self’ implies a center, a potentially autonomous
individual; the ‘subject’ is a place in language, a signifier that is already alienated in an intersubjective
network.” Jane Gallop & Carolyn Burke, Psychoanalysis and Feminism in France, in The Future of
Difference 106, 106 (Hester Eisenstein & Alice Jardine eds., 1980). The question of whether a stable self
exists is of less interest to postmodernism than the question of how such a self could be known or described
given the contingent nature of reference and meaning in language.
times West seems to regard this postmodern self, like the liberal self, as a
description of an empirical entity—a claim about "the nature of nature," albeit one that the postmodernists dogmatically refuse to allow to be contested or corrected by contrary evidence. Confusingly, West depicts the postmodern self as "unstable, and unpredictable as the wind," implying that, like the weather, the postmodern self has a real existence in the world, if one that is sometimes hard to keep track of. West's declaration that the postmodern self is essentially inessential is the sort of glib verbal manipulation feminists have always had to endure in arguments with the patriarchy. It seems unlikely that a postmodern theorist would agree with West's ponderous conclusion that the postmodern self "is a metaphysically transcendent truth," and, while such a proposition might be established through rigorous argument, West offers none in its support. This treatment stands in marked contrast to the careful consideration West ordinarily gives other writers, whether or not she agrees with their work.

Plainly, essentially inessential selves, whose connections are all "accidental, contingent or random," can have no essences in common. West, however, believes it is important to connect her justice of care with gender differences. West denounces as "anti-scientific" what she calls "the seductive postmodern claim that gender roles and attributes bear only an incidental, contingent, or socially constructed connection to sex, and that what we should therefore do is shake things up and 'play' with the disconnections so as all the better to shatter the stereotypical pedestal."
West here attributes to postmodernism the position that investigating human nature will not improve the lot of the oppressed. Granted, a fairly unremarkable postmodern position on this question might be that the outcome of any investigation into human nature undertaken by modern Western science would be so overdetermined by the logic of scientific discourse—a metanarrative, one might say, which would define the object to be studied, the questions to be asked, the evidence to be considered, and the potential findings to be recognized—that the result could have no beneficial impact on oppression. Either (1) the dominant scientific discourse would prevent the articulation of any radically new or different understanding of human nature, instead producing results that merely reinforce current concepts and all the cultural inequities dependent on or justified by these concepts; or (2) if the dominant discourse did not rule out radically new or different understandings of human nature, its failure to do so would have to be the result of an alteration in the discourse so dramatic as to have a greater impact on oppression than any findings it might make possible.

Because West does not inquire into the details of various postmodern positions before rejecting them all, she does not make clear why she believes postmodernism can offer no insight into how the lot of the oppressed has proved so resistant to change. West’s analogy between creationists and postmodernists is therefore misperceived, or even misdirected. West views postmodernists as sharing with creationists a belief that nature has nothing to tell us about ourselves. It would be more accurate to say that some postmodernists view some scientists as sharing with creationists an inability, based on unquestioned beliefs about the world, to draw certain conclusions about nature. Ironically, up to a point this postmodern position is also West’s: West is not engaged in the scientific investigation of human nature or natural gender differences, but rather she is engaged in the attempt to intervene in the discourse that determines which questions should be investigated and why.

B. Taking Meaning Apart

West also expresses concern that postmodernism’s “dismantling of the connections between sex and gender both rests on, and resembles, the postmodern dismantling of the connection between word and meaning, or

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61. For a cogent critique of postmodern pragmatist relativism in science and other areas, see Christopher Norris, Right You Are (If You Think So): Stanley Fish and the Rhetoric of Assent, in What’s Wrong with Postmodernism 77 (1990) (reviewing STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989)).
signifier and signified. 62

The dismantling of the connection between text and meaning and between author and text reflects among much else the ugly truth that the meaning of words, texts, songs, or documents, whether or not up for grabs in postmodern society, is certainly up for sale. Put differently, the postmodern dismantling of the connections of meaning upon which we must rely to communicate, reflects in part simply the advances of the forces of commodification: we have alienated meaning from texts because we have so thoroughly commodified both texts and meanings, and we have done so smugly aware that by so doing we have dislodged meaning from text and text from author. 63

It is not clear whether West blames postmodernists for actually divorcing words from meanings that otherwise would have remained fixed to them or merely for recognizing that the separation has already happened. West's example of the pernicious effect of the disconnection and commodification of words and meanings makes her meaning no clearer: She describes a television advertising campaign that connects the Shaker hymn Simple Gifts and images of the Statue of Liberty welcoming immigrants to America with the importation of luxury cars.

West expects us to “rage against this dismantling of the meaning of the Shaker hymn, to say nothing of the symbolic meaning of the Statue of Liberty,” 64 and to do so because, “[l]ike the parent’s foundational and utterly healthy fear of losing her children, our outrage at these assaults on meaning is premised on an understanding of the importance of connections to our inner lives: in this case, the connection between text and meaning.” 65 Even accepting that the commercial is outrageous and somehow on a par with the loss of one’s children, West has not explained how postmodern theory—in this case, poststructuralist or deconstructive theory—might be responsible, either for the commercial or for the conditions that make it possible. At worst, postmodern theory might help to explain how the perpetrators of the offending commercial are able to exploit the meanings of words and images in the manner described.

Indeed, West is far too pessimistic in believing that the commercial she describes demonstrates that meaning has been detached from either the hymn or the statue. She treats the ad as if it must be read to celebrate imported

62. West, supra note 2, at 16-17. West’s reference to "signifier and signified" here indicates that she may have in mind the discovery, made by Saussure and elaborated upon by other structuralists (and not, strictly speaking, by postmodernists), that the relations between signifier, signified, and referent in any language are arbitrary. See Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics 67 (Wade Baskin trans., 1959).
63. West, supra note 2, at 17.
64. Id. at 16.
65. Id.
luxury cars as the fulfillment of the dream of all who sought their liberty in America, perhaps because this is the meaning presumably intended by the corporate “author” who paid for the ad. However, as West, herself a practiced and critical reader of literature, must surely realize, this text cries out to be read in other, more complicated and interesting ways: as a critique of the commercial trivialization of the American dream or, perhaps, as a comment on the degree to which America’s “golden door” ever was or still remains open to the “wretched refuse” of other lands. These alternative meanings are made possible, not by the disconnection, but by the strong connection—perhaps initially contingent and arbitrary but now indestructible—between image and meaning, as well as by the inability of any author to restrict a text to his or her (or, in the case of the commercial, its) intended meaning.

Here, then, is another version of the creationist analogy: West believes, or wants to believe, that she lives in a world in which words can and should remain connected to their meanings, so she closes her ears to postmodern theorists who persist in bedeviling her with “seductive” arguments to the contrary. Like the creationists, West evidently believes there is nothing to be lost by cutting off inquiry into things she does not want to believe.

III. DECONSTRUCTING ROBIN WEST

It is particularly ironic that West chose to attack postmodernism as a threat to her essentialist position in connection with her call for a justice of care. Although West considers her essentialism to be a critical part of her jurisprudential theory, there is no reason why this should be so. West’s call for the mitigation of justice with particularized care does not depend on showing that women share essential qualities with each other. Indeed, West’s essentialism, premised on the notion that individuals share essential qualities by virtue of their gender, is inconsistent with her demand that justice respect each litigant in his or her particularity. West’s refusal to attend to postmodernism because of its threat to her essentialist position, moreover, undermines the strength of her case for a justice of care by preventing her from recognizing and dealing with important obstacles that such a notion of justice must overcome, obstacles with which Derrida’s work has long been concerned.

66. See id.
67. Much of Paul de Man’s work concerned the resistance that rhetoric is always able to raise against the intended, consensual, or “true” meaning of a text. See, e.g., PAUL DE MAN, THE RESISTANCE TO THEORY (1986).
68. See CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION, supra note 31, at 62-63 (arguing that West’s essentialism is not only unnecessary but also harmful to her feminist theory in that it seems to rule out the possibility that men would or could ever cease to oppress women).
A. Language and Meaning

Derrida’s earliest work concerned the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. In 1962, Derrida published a translation and introduction to Husserl’s *The Origin of Geometry.* As described by Christina Howells, this work was “an exceptionally close reading of a text he knows inside out having undertaken its translation, in which, under the guise of exposition, he unravels and unpicks all the stitchings and patchings that have gone towards making an apparently seamless surface from a tangled web of philosophical conflicts.” Very briefly, Husserl’s phenomenology was an effort to strip consciousness of all personal, empirical, and contingent influences in order to reveal universal structures and ideal essences. Derrida’s work on Husserl demonstrated that consciousness is only accessible through linguistic representation—there can be no pure unmediated presence of the self to itself—and that this conclusion is compelled by the logic of Husserl’s own arguments. While West’s phenomenological method is substantially different from Husserl’s, her effort to bring women’s true experiences to the attention of the law is subject to the same critique Derrida levels against Husserl.

The fact that knowledge is always mediated through language means that it cannot be stripped of accidental, contingent, and empirical aspects, for language itself is contaminated with—indeed, constituted by—these features. As Ferdinand de Saussure demonstrated long ago, language is a system of signifiers without positive terms, only differences among the signifiers. Thus, neither the letter “M” nor the sound associated with it has any meaning apart from its recognizable difference from “B,” “N,” and other signifiers. Meaning does not inhere in any signifier (“MAN” bears no resemblance to or natural connection with the concepts speakers of English associate with this word), nor can the meaning of any signifier or signified concept be divined by studying it without reference to all others. The connection between any one signifier and its signified concept is arbitrary, as is the relationship between signified concepts and their referents, if any, in the “real” world—not, as is so often misunderstood by deconstruction’s critics and adherents alike, “up for grabs,” but unmotivated by any feature inherent in either the signifier or the signified:

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72. On the susceptibility of West’s work to Derrida’s deconstruction of Husserl, see CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION, supra note 31, at 21-36.


74. WEST, supra note 2, at 17.
The instituted trace is “unmotivated” but not capricious. Like the word “arbitrary” according to Saussure, it “should not imply that the choice of the signifier is left entirely to the speaker.” Simply, it has no “natural attachment” to the signified within reality. For us, the rupture of that “natural attachment” puts in question the idea of naturalness rather than that of attachment.

Indeed, far from being detached from meaning, each signifier must already be meaningful—that is, it must already have a place in the system of differences—before it can signify at all. Even if it were possible to conceive wholly novel pre-linguistic essences, these could only be understood by others through the use of language already generally recognized as meaningful. To be recognized as meaningful, a signifier must be “iterable,” that is, capable of repetition. Each new utterance must be understood as in some sense “the same” as a signifier to which significance has already, by convention, been attached. The idea of iterability goes beyond the unremarkable notion that the meaning of an utterance may change when it is repeated or re-read in a new context. Iterability prevents a signifier from ever having an undivided meaning fully present to the speaker, even if it is uttered only once:

The iterability of an element divides its own identity a priori, even without taking into account the fact that this identity can only determine or delimit itself through differential relations to other elements and that it hence bears the mark of this difference. It is because this iterability is differential, within each individual “element” as well as between the “elements,” because it splits each element while constituting it.

As a consequence of the structure of iteration:

[T]he intention animating the utterance will never be through and through present to itself and to its content. The iteration structuring it a priori introduces into it a dehiscence and a cleft [brisure] which are

75. DERRIDA, supra note 73, at 46 (quoting SAUSSURE, supra note 62, at 68-69).
76. The idea of iterability is often oversimplified. J.M. Balkin, for example, confuses iterability, the possibility of repetition, with repetition itself:
   [I]terability, or the capacity to be repeated in new contexts, results in change. Nevertheless, in examining how repetition is linked to change, we must always keep in mind two possible explanations, two different paths of explanation. The first claims that what we understand later really is different from the original and is consequently an improvement or a falling away. The second claims that this repeated think has really always been the same; the new context has merely altered our understanding of it, with a consequent improvement or falling away of that understanding.
   Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, supra note 29, at 1133.
essential.... Above all, this essential absence of intending the actuality of utterance, this structural unconsciousness, if you like, prohibits any saturation of the context.78

Thus, no user of language can ever fully control the meaning of any utterance. Not only do words take on new meanings in new contexts, but they are always already associated with meanings that may or may not be known or intended by the speaker. Freud, moreover, has amply demonstrated that unintended meaning is by no means random but rather is often the product of significant associations made by the unconscious.

B. Her Master's Voice

Iterability has important consequences for West's effort to bring women's lives to the attention of the law. As Drucilla Cornell has pointed out, West's aim to "reveal Woman for what she truly is"79 depends for its success on "language as a pure medium that transposes sense by bringing it to conceptual form."80 The requirement of iterability prevents language from being a transparent medium able to "communicate" or transport81 pre-linguistic concepts or feelings from inside to outside. West cannot express a feeling or a meaning new to men, law, and the dominant discourse by using entirely new language untainted by its role in repressing that meaning. West cannot and has contributed to the proliferation of meaning by using language in new ways in new combinations, but she cannot escape the patriarchal structure of language itself.

Despite the fact that West's project of telling women's true stories is plainly a discursive one, West impatiently dismisses postmodern work on discourse, particularly that of Michel Foucault,82 as excessively concerned with "speechifying."83 Instead, West hopes to recover the voices and stories of women who have been silenced by patriarchal discourse over the centuries. "We need archaeologies of the discourses patriarchy has silenced, of the selves it has not allowed to be, of the subjectivities it has denied, of what it has forbidden, and what it has destroyed."84 However, when West calls for "archaeologies of the discourses patriarchy has silenced," she demands what Foucault, in Madness and Civilization, attempted to provide. Although Foucault may not have been particularly interested in women,85 he was, at

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78. Id. at 18.
79. CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION, supra note 31, at 29.
80. Id.
81. See DERRIDA, supra note 77, at 1-3 (investigating the various meanings of "communicate").
82. See WEST, supra note 2, at 264-76.
83. Id. at 274.
84. Id. at 262 (footnote omitted).
85. Catharine MacKinnon remarks that, for Foucault, "Women are simply beneath significant notice." MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 288 n.80; see also Linda R. Hirshman, Was There Sex Before Calvin Klein?, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 929, 935 (1996).
least at some points in his intellectual career,\textsuperscript{86} intently interested in silence\textsuperscript{87} and in the difficult task of permitting the silenced to speak. \textquotedblleft The language of psychiatry, which is a monologue of reason about madness, has been established only on the basis of such a silence. I have not tried to write the history of that language, but rather the archaeology of that silence.\textsuperscript{88} \textsuperscript{86} Instead, West calls for a study of the production of women's silence,\textsuperscript{89} referring to such problems as market censorship of women writers; the exclusion of women from professional, literary, and academic life; and society's refusal to hear the voices of women who do speak.\textsuperscript{90}

West oversimplifies the problem of silence and thus necessarily undervalues the contribution postmodern work might make to feminism.\textsuperscript{91} To be sure, like every other topic of importance to women, the question of how women's voices have been muzzled by prejudice and adversity has received too little attention from mainstream scholars.\textsuperscript{92} It is not, however, a

\begin{quote}
[Foucault] wrote his whole story of the modern construction of sexuality without women. Or, where women appear, it is without any of the will that characterizes his other players. In Foucault's world of sex, men act and women are acted upon. And accordingly, because the actors are roughly equal, Foucault and the other social constructionists miss the threatening, scary, preemptive, and chilling centrality for women of the one universal characteristic Foucault does recognize: the will to power, or as we feminists put it, to dominance.
\end{quote}

\textit{Id.} However, the fact that Foucault, like Freud, gave little attention to women does not mean that his ideas cannot productively be applied to our concerns. \textit{See, e.g.}, Wendy Brown, \textit{In the 'Folds of Our Own Discourse': The Pleasures and Freedoms of Silence}, 3 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 185 (1996) (drawing on the work of Foucault to examine women's silence). Feminist theorists who restrict their reading to thinkers interested in women will not find much to read.

\begin{quote}
86. [Foucault] persistently revises and reworks a set of themes which emerges and re-emerges throughout his writings, without there ever being clear or unambiguous breaks. . . . He does not elaborate a general theoretical perspective or pretend that his concepts are exact or precise. . . . One particularly important consequence is that there is no 'real Foucault' who can be summoned. Rather, we argue that it is a useful strategy to insist that there are many 'Foucaults' who coexist and interact with one another.
\end{quote}

\textsc{Alan Hunt & Gary Wickham, Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance} 3 (1994).

\begin{quote}
87. West's single footnote acknowledging this point (and thanking a graduate student for bringing it to her attention) fails to explain why Foucault's work on silence is of no use to feminism. \textit{See West, supra note 2, at 322 n.45.}
88. \textsc{Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization} xi (Richard Howard trans., 1965).
89. \textit{See West, supra note 2, at 265-66.}
90. \textit{See id.; see also id. at 111-12} (attributing the "relative silence of women in the literary and visual arts" to the harmful consequences of bearing a disproportionate share of household labor).
91. Some feminists have, in fact, found Foucault's insights very productive. \textit{See, e.g.}, \textsc{Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity} (1990); \textsc{Zillah Eisenstein, The Female Body and the Law} (1988); \textsc{Jana Sawicki, Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power, and the Body} (1991); \textsc{Marie Ashe, Mind's Opportunity: Birthing a Poststructuralist Feminist Jurisprudence, in Legal Studies as Cultural Studies: A Reader in (Post) Modern Critical Theory} 85 (Jerry Leonard ed., 1995); \textsc{Sandrea Lee Bartky, Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power, in Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression} 63 (1990). West's attack here on the value of Foucault for feminism has been called "insightful if somewhat overdrawn." \textsc{Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle}, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1431, 1479 n.174 (1992).
92. Feminist poet Adrienne Rich shares West's concern with the historical silencing of women and her suspicion that postmodern theorizing can lose sight of women's pain. \textit{See, e.g.}, \textsc{Adrienne Rich, Divisions of Labor, in Time's Power: Poems 1985-1988}, at 45 (1989) ("an old magazine polishes up its act/with deconstructions of the prose of Malcolm X/The women in the back rows of politics/are still licking thread to slip into the needle's/eye, trading bones for plastic, splitting pods/for necklaces to sell to the cruise-ships"). Rich is also aware, however, of the difficulty of reading and breaking silence. "Rich has been concerned
particularly difficult theoretical question: Given the social, economic, political, physical, and psychological burdens women have been forced to bear over the centuries, it takes no great feminist insight to understand why women have produced only "one out of twelve" of the world's modern literary classics. Non-feminists may still need to be told that women's comparative lack of lasting creative output is attributable more to our lack of time than to a lack of talent, but this is no longer the cutting edge of feminist theory.

A far more interesting and difficult theoretical question is how the silencing of women has shaped language to render it unfit to express women's point of view, and how this language might nevertheless be used to reclaim the history of the women whose silencing has shaped it. This task is analogous to Foucault's effort to write a history of madness: Women, like madness, have been defined as reason's other, yet the language in which our history must be written, if it is to be written at all, is the language of reason—the language of men. Derrida has aptly described the madness of this project:

Foucault wanted to write a history of madness itself, that is madness speaking on the basis of its own experience and under its own authority, and not a history of madness described from within the language of reason, the language of psychiatry on madness . . . on madness already crushed beneath psychiatry, dominated, beaten to the ground, interned, that is to say, madness made into an object and exiled as the other of a language and a historical meaning which have been confused with logos itself.

West at one time recognized that her own project was equally mad:

The goal of reconstructive feminist jurisprudence is to render feminist reform rational. We must change the fact that, from a mainstream point of view, arguments for feminist legal reform efforts are (or appear to be) invariably irrational. The moral questions feminist reforms pose are always incommensurable with dominant moral and legal categories.

throughout her career with the ethical imperative of breaking personal and cultural silences, and with the epistemological difficulties of doing so." Jane Hoogestraat, "Unnamable by Choice": Multivalent Silences in Adrienne Rich's Time's Power, in VIOLENCE, SILENCE, AND ANGER: WOMEN'S WRITING AS TRANSGRESSION 25, 28 (Deirdre Lashgari ed., 1995). The value of poetry for Rich lies in part in its greater openness to the unconscious and, therefore, its greater potential for expressing the repressed feminine. See ADRIENNE RICH, ADRIENNE RICH'S POETRY 113 (Barbara Charlesworth Gelpi & Albert Gelpi eds., 1975) [hereinafter RICH, ADRIENNE RICH'S POETRY].

93. RICH, ADRIENNE RICH'S POETRY, supra note 92, at 266 (quoting TILLIE OLSEN, One Out of Twelve: Writers Who are Women in Our Century, in SILENCES 41, 41 (1978)).

94. The same must be said for other economically and socially disadvantaged classes of people; an inventory of great classics in any art would be unlikely to include more than a handful produced by persons who had to work for a living.

95. JACQUES DERRIDA, Cogito and the History of Madness, in WRITING AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 71. at 31. 34.
Let me put it this way: given present moral categories, women's issues are crazy issues.96

The problems encountered in writing women's stories into the law have been examined by a number of French feminists, some of them influenced in important ways by the work of Jacques Derrida, and all of them generally regarded as postmodern. Luce Irigaray,97 for example, wonders how woman is to gain access to a symbolic order to which she is “other”:

Given that, once again, the “reasonable” words—to which in any case she has access only through mimicry—are powerless to translate all that pulses, clamors, and hangs hazily in the cryptic passages of hysterical suffering-latency. Then... Turn everything upside down, inside out, back to front. Rack it with radical convulsions, carry back, reimport, those crises that her “body” suffers in her impotence to say what disturbs her. Insist also on those blanks in discourse which recall the places of her exclusion and which, by their silent plasticity, ensure the cohesion, the articulation, the coherent expansion of established forms. Reinscribe them hither and thither as divergencies, otherwise and elsewhere than they are expected, in ellipses and eclipses that deconstruct the logical grid of the reader-writer, drive him out of his mind, trouble his vision to the point of incurable diplopia at least.98

Hélène Cixous also has argued that women's sexuality cannot be expressed in current symbolic systems because the only position available from which to write within those systems is that of the male. Even male sexuality cannot be expressed within this system because it too has been forced into the limiting framework of binary oppositions (active/passive, masculine/feminine) that alienates men from their own bodies and forces them into relationships with the feared other.

Nevertheless, both Irigaray and Cixous call for the inscription of the female in what Cixous calls l’écriture féminine. “Woman must write herself: it

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96. West, supra note 24, at 68.
97. Oddly, West concludes her chapter of Caring for Justice by warning feminists away from postmodernism with several extended quotations from Irigaray offered as a description of an aspect of women's internality threatened by the destructivity of patriarchal power. See West, supra note 2, at 289-90. According to West: [Irigaray] contends that patriarchal society destroys, excludes, negates, and renders fantastic women's internal, prelingual, and even presymbolic sense of ourselves as witness to the truth that the violence done upon the world by discursive categorization—this breaking into subjects, objects, principles, rights, and wrongs—is false, is wrong, and is not all. Id. As is her practice, West cites two entire books by Irigaray as the source of this contention so it is difficult to comment on its accuracy. See id. at 324 n.83. However, Irigaray's work is generally concerned with language, psychoanalysis, and the possibility of a feminine discourse, and not with the effects of patriarchal violence.
is the essential act by which she can mark 'her shattering entry into history which has always been based on her suppression.' Doing so, however, may be possible only in poetry, which is closer to the unconscious and celebrates rather than represses multiplicity and mobility of meaning. These theorists would applaud West's project, that of filling the air with women's stories—when women write themselves, their bodies, their joys and sorrows, they will alter the structure of language and bring about liberating change. But they would regard West's largely unexamined use of patriarchy-soaked language to do so, repeating women's stories without heeding the degree to which language makes them mere reflections of symbolically male stories, as doomed to reconfirm the dominant discourse.

1. Just Like Men, Only Different

Indeed, West's writing reveals the obstacles language places in the way of her project in a number of ways. For example, in discussing the law's failure to adequately address and redress women's distinctive harms, West argues at length that injuries suffered by women are not adequately described by legal terms derived from the experience of men. The harm suffered by a woman who has been raped, for example, is not fully captured by claims that "rape is a crime of violence, not sex," or that "the real harm done by rape is the threat to women's autonomy, or that the real harm done is the residue of fear that the threat of rape leaves in all women, both survivors and others." West notes that "these accounts omit... those aspects of the experience of rape which are, in a word, gendered: the aspects of the experience of rape which simply have no correlate in (most) men's lives." West therefore undertakes to categorize and describe the gendered harms experienced by women. Despite her determination to break free of male descriptive categories, however, West explains women's harms in terms of the damage done to a distinctively male notion of the self. West describes the obstacles abuse and fear place in the way of a woman's ability to enjoy life according to the "liberal idea of a healthy, assertive individualism" which assumes that "we desire what pleases us, and we act on the basis of our desires: this is largely what it means in this culture to be a self-possessed individual." Thus:

The girl or woman in whom these hedonic connections are severed because of repeated or long-term sexual assault, is not going to be capable of a robust, autonomous individualism. . . . [S]he becomes

100. WEST, supra note 2, at 101.
101. Id. (footnote omitted).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 103.
104. Id.
incapable of the quintessentially individualistic act of positioning, asserting, or thrusting herself into the world, thereby changing the world with a felt presence.\textsuperscript{105}

In the case of the gendered harm of unwanted pregnancy, West again describes the injury in terms of interference with the ability to act

on the basis of a freely willed moral commitment, in the Kantian, deontic, and duty-bound spirit of ethical liberalism. This specific conjunction of the moral act with the free act—and the identification of that conjunction with a definition of individualism—is precisely what an unwanted pregnancy threatens.\textsuperscript{106}

Thus, in her effort to provide a truer description of women's harms than can be achieved by analogizing them to men's harms, West finds herself forced to describe these harms in terms of their impact on the liberal individual, at best a gender-neutral ideal and, by most accounts, culturally male. The task of telling women's true stories is more complicated than West is willing to admit.

2. Raging Italics

The resistance offered by language—particularly legal language—to the task of telling women's stories is evident in various other aspects of West's style. The most obvious sign of West's frustration with the inflexibility of language may be her excessive use of italics for emphasis. Choosing a page more or less at random, one finds West writing:

Indeed, "justice," as it is generally understood, and "care," as it is widely practiced, are each necessary conditions of the other. The pursuit of justice, when successful, must also be caring, and the activity of caring, when successful, must be mindful of the demands of justice. Put negatively, the zealous pursuit of justice, if neglectful of the ethic of care, will fail not just as a matter of overall virtue, but more specifically, it will fail as a matter of justice.\textsuperscript{107}

One cannot read West's work without imagining her shaking the reader by the shoulders in her effort to communicate passion she cannot make her words express. West is aware of the difficulties encountered by feminists attempting to write feminist legal scholarship and has written perceptively about them in

\textsuperscript{105.} \textit{Id.} at 104 (emphasis in original).
\textsuperscript{106.} \textit{Id.} at 106 (footnote omitted).
\textsuperscript{107.} \textit{Id.} at 24.
her 1989 essay *Love, Rage, and Legal Theory*.108 There she argued, “that feminist legal scholarship distinctively shows that we have unwittingly internalized as well as quite consciously rebelled against, the dominant legal culture's condemnation of the emotional root of our work.” She urged:

[W]e should trust our rage a little more, and our internalized repression of that rage a whole lot less. We should refuse to honor mainstream demands of objectivity and detachment that disable us from feminist methods of narrative expression that we know have worked for women in the past, and that we know to have worked in large part because they move us to an enraged response to our injuries instead of a belittling self-contempt.109

West has not, however, found herself able to take her own advice. Only in her italics does West reveal the rage she says lies behind her work. Despite the evident fact that much of the impetus for West’s work in feminism derives from her own personal experience of consciousness raising,110 West seldom writes in a narrative style at all and reserves the first person singular “I” for observations about the text (“I will argue” or “I will try to show”) and the occasional “I think” or “I believe.”

3. Pronoun Trouble

West ordinarily writes in the third person, describing the objective and intellectual world from a vantage point somewhere outside it. The state of the world or the ideas of others can be summed up in a sentence or two and pronounced right or wrong, true or false, healthy or harmful. For example, “[t]his inattentiveness to silence is not only a massive injustice, but it also distorts understanding”;111 “it is simply not true—it is emphatically not true—... that oppressive ‘power’ in any of its manifestations is the necessary consequence of inequality and hierarchy.”112

When she is not using the third person, West most often writes in the first person plural. Her use of this voice is seldom the editorial “we”113 but tends to be an ambiguous and, sometimes, coercive “we.” Sometimes, “we” seems to refer to West and the rest of the omnipotent legal subjects presumed to be reading her work: “How might we develop a moral sensibility with which to criticize law that is itself independent of the influence of law?”114 “We must

109. *Id.*, at 109.
110. See, e.g., West, supra note 4, at 217-32; West, supra note 2, at 284-86.
111. West, supra note 2, at 272.
112. *Id.*, at 277.
113. But see, e.g., West, supra note 2, at 59 ("We can see the tension between the relational constraint and the economic constraint ... ").
114. West, supra note 4, at 6.
change the fact that, from a mainstream point of view, arguments for feminist legal reform efforts are (or appear to be) invariably irrational. However, omniscient and omnipotent legal subjects ordinarily efface themselves entirely from their texts, leaving the impression that truth itself is speaking. West's "we" may indicate some anxiety about whether, as a woman writing feminism, she really counts as a legal subject.

Sometimes we cannot tell who West means by "we." For example, West writes:

>[I]f it is true, as relational feminists claim, that the act of caring for others to whom we are connected in some way is central to our moral lives, then our capacity for care should be at the center of our understanding of our public and legal, as well as private and personal, virtues, and specifically that it should be central to the meaning of legal justice.\(^\text{117}\)

To be consistent with West's view of the differences between men and women, the "we" in the second line of the quotation above should mean "we women." However, "we women" are not in a position to make "our understanding" of virtue "central to the meaning of legal justice"—"we" would have to include the omnipotent legal subject (or at least some men) to have a prayer of achieving that miracle.

Most often, West's "we" plainly means "we who agree with West." "We" are required by this pronoun to share with West a variety of opinions, beliefs, and experiences that might otherwise appear eccentric or unique to West, if only because they are so rarely acknowledged in law. Because the language West must use is unable to do justice to her arguments, it is perhaps understandable that she falls back on a vaguely coercive "we" to treat her points as established. Thus, "we" feel rage at a television commercial; \(^\text{118}\) "we need to resist the false comparison between legal and patriarchal power"; \(^\text{119}\) "what would best serve us is a balance between objective and subjective conceptions of harm."\(^\text{120}\)

In *Love, Rage and Legal Theory*, West considered her own unwillingness, as well as that of other feminist legal scholars, to write first-person accounts of her own experiences.\(^\text{121}\) She commented on the regularity with which such accounts, when they appeared at all, were confined to prefatory material, brackets, or footnotes.\(^\text{122}\) That article, however, was written in the same voice

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115. West, *supra* note 24, at 68.
116. For a description of the classic legal subject, see Schlag, *supra* note 30, at 1634.
118. See id. at 17.
119. Id. at 263.
120. Id. at 177 (emphasis omitted).
121. See West, *supra* note 108.
122. See id. at 107-08.
as *Caring for Justice*, alternating between the omniscient third person ("While love informs a feminist sense of morality, and hence of ideal conceptions of law, rage informs the feminist sense of justice.")¹²³ and the inescapable first-person plural ("We are enraged, and we are moved to act, by our identification with the gendered injuries that distinctively destroy women's selfhood and security.").¹²⁴ Thus, even when confessing her own weakness or anxiety, West writes from a position of epistemological or numerical strength inconsistent with the importance she assigns to first-person accounts.

The closest West comes to engaging in first-person autobiography is in chapter four, Women’s Hedonic Lives, of *Narrative, Authority, and Law*,¹²⁵ where she tells stories of the lives of individual women including, West tells the reader, her own.¹²⁶ To tell these stories, West quotes extensively from other women’s first-person accounts of abuse and exploitation.¹²⁷ Where such accounts are not employed, however, West does not supply her own story. Instead, she weaves dizzily in and out of the first, second, and third person:

> The battered woman is a giving self for another within an abusive marriage, to precisely the extent to which it is too frightening and dangerous to even contemplate being for oneself... The other must live, and that is why you are. If you are going to be at all, you are going to be for him.”¹²⁸

And:

> One way (there are others) that a young girl can respond to the "rising panic" she feels on a date is by defining herself as giving. A straightforward, sensible, protective reaction to someone who is indifferent to your subjectivity, and at the same time must have you as an object, is to hide your subjective self and objectify and then give

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¹²³. *Id.* at 102.
¹²⁴. *Id.*
¹²⁵. See *West*, supra note 4, at 179-249.
¹²⁶. See *id.* at 196.
¹²⁷. See, e.g., *West*, supra note 4, at 196-200, where West conveys the experience of domestic abuse through extensive quotation from *Del Martin, Battered Wives* (1976); *Erin Pizzey, Scream Quietly or the Neighbors Will Hear* (1977); and *Women Against Violence Against Women* (Dusty Rhodes & Sandra McNeill eds., 1985).
¹²⁸. *West*, supra note 4, at 197-98.
your sexual self for his pleasure and your safety.\textsuperscript{129}

And:

[Street hassling] feels frightening and infantilizing. It always made me feel—still makes me feel—like a helpless and guilty child. . . . One way that (some) women and girls respond to the jolt of fear, the rising panic, that street hassling engenders is by defining themselves as “giving”; by hiding, suppressing, their subjective selves and then giving away for visual consumption their sexual appearance. . . . This quasi-consensual bargain feels horrible. Your body, objectified and separated from your subjective being, becomes dead weight.\textsuperscript{130}

Even when she promises to tell her own story, West encounters great difficulty in actually telling it as her own story.

Ironically, it appears to be other women’s first-person narratives that have convinced West that she shares essential qualities and experiences with women in general. In one of the few explicitly personal accounts in her work West reports the shock of recognizing her own fears and hopes in the work of Carol Gilligan, and her own victimization and injury in the work of Andrea Dworkin.\textsuperscript{131} Her inability to provide similarly personal accounts of her own experience, despite the importance she attaches to such accounts, prevents West’s readers from feeling that same shock. The reader is not moved by general statements about how women, or “we” think and feel, no matter how eloquent or italicized.

\textit{C. Purity of Essence}

As Saussure demonstrated, language is a system of differences without positive terms in which no signifier is essentially meaningful. Determining the significance of any signifier or signified is a process of differentiating it from all other elements in the system and excluding all other possible meanings. Derrida’s work demonstrates the profound philosophical implications of this fact, implications that pose both a serious problem and a splendid opportunity for West’s work on justice. To the extent that West is committed to spelling out a true description of women’s essential qualities, the fact that these qualities, like the concept “woman,” are defined through a process of linguistic exclusion rather than one of natural discovery places practical, logical, and political obstacles in her path. On the other hand, because even the most univocally patriarchal language can only appear to be so through the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[129] Id. at 201.
\item[130] Id. at 206-07.
\item[131] See West, supra note 24, at 55-56.
\end{footnotes}
repression of competing meanings, these silenced significances both shape oppressive language and remain ready to return to disrupt the authorized meaning at any time.

1. Speech and Writing

American practitioners of deconstruction often overemphasize Derrida's complex analyses of the possibility of language and meaning and the relationship of speech and writing at the expense of Derrida's more general philosophical and political interests. However, Derrida's deconstruction of the distinction between speech and writing, and of the priority given the former over the latter by Saussure,132 has particular relevance to West's work. The difficulties into which Saussure was led by his effort to preserve the integrity of speech resemble those that plague West's struggle to preserve an essential male/female difference.

According to Derrida, Saussure intended to found linguistics as a science by identifying as its object a phenomenologically limited unit of study: the spoken word. Defining his new science, Saussure stated: "The linguistic object is not defined by the combination of the written word and the spoken word: the spoken form alone constitutes the object."133 Saussure considered the spoken word, which he called the sign, to be a natural unity of the sound-image, or signifier, and the concept, or signified. Language is thus a system of spoken words or signs; writing is a separate and second system of graphic signs which "exists for the sole purpose of representing the first."134 Thus, while the spoken word is the sign of a thought, the written word is merely the sign of that sign.

Derrida demonstrates that Saussure's distinction of speech from writing, and his exclusion of the latter from consideration as the object of the science of linguistics that he intended to found, led Saussure into contradictions within the terms of his own thought. For example, Saussure showed that the relationship between any signifier and its signified is arbitrary, that is, instituted rather than natural. "To say therefore that there is a natural subordination of writing to speech—that writing is a secondary representation of a primary unity of sound and meaning—whilst propounding at the same time that all signs are arbitrary is contradictory."135

Saussure also understood that language is made up not of positive terms but of a system of differences among terms. This insight, too, contradicts the constituting premise of Saussure's science, for it indicates that the sign or spoken word could not be a phenomenologically limited unit of study, but instead is a secondary effect of the entire system of differences, with no

132. See DERRIDA, supra note 73.
133. Id. at 31 (quoting SAUSSURE, supra note 62, at 23-24).
134. Id. at 30 (quoting SAUSSURE, supra note 62, at 23) (emphasis Derrida's).
135. BEARDSWORTH, supra note 25, at 11.
greater claim to natural existence or integrity than the written word. Saussure knew that signification was a product of difference and, indeed, defined the concept of language by differentiating it from writing, but then purported to find language/speech as a natural object present in the world—that is, with an inherent meaning not constituted by difference. The illusion of natural unity of the linguistic object was thus violently created by expelling difference into its opposite, writing.

Having made the decision to define language as a coherent concept by excluding writing from the field of study, Saussure then expelled into the disfavored category those qualities he did not want complicating language as an object of scientific study: Writing is exterior, artificial, and representational; language/speech is internal, real, and present. Derrida demonstrated that the qualities banished from speech/language into writing in the interest of science were precisely those that made not only language but also science possible. Writing “is not only an auxiliary means in the service of science . . . but first, as Husserl in particular pointed out in The Origin of Geometry, the condition of the possibility of ideal objects and therefore of scientific objectivity.”

Saussure implicitly acknowledged the violence and instability of the exclusion of writing from language in the odd hostility he displayed toward the continuing influence of writing on language. Saussure complained: “Some Parisians already pronounce the t in sept femmes ‘seven women’. . . Such phonic deformations belong to language but do not stem from its natural functioning. They are due to an external influence. Linguistics should put them into a special compartment for observation: they are teratological cases.”

Derrida comments:

Where is the evil? one will perhaps ask. . . Why wish to punish writing for a monstrous crime, to the point of wanting to reserve for it, even within scientific treatments, a “special compartment” that holds it at a distance? For it is indeed within a sort of intralinguistic leper colony that Saussure wants to contain and concentrate the problem of deformations through writing.

Derrida attributes the violence of Saussure’s reaction to the violence of the distinction organizing linguistics and the instability of the resulting concepts. “It seems then as if Saussure wishes at the same time to demonstrate the corruption of speech by writing, to denounce the harm that the latter does to

136. See DERRIDA, supra note 73, at 30-35.
137. Id. at 27.
138. Id. at 42 (quoting SAUSSURE, supra note 62, at 31-32) (emphasis Derrida’s).
139. Id. at 41-42.
the former, and to underline the inalterable and natural independence of language." Linguistics resembles metaphysics generally in the way it constitutes opposing concepts—here, language/speech and writing—"expelling into one term of the opposition the very possibility of the condition of such oppositions." As Richard Beardsworth explains, Derrida is interested in writing because:

Writing offers privileged access to the reinscription of the empirico-transcendental difference since the sign is the determining instance of this opposition for metaphysics. The very possibility of the sign is predicated on an opposition between that which is conveyed (the signified, the logos, the non-worldly) and the conveyor (the signifier, the worldly).

Derrida’s deconstruction of Saussure’s science of linguistics is a deconstruction of metaphysics and Western thought as well. The structure thus illuminated has implications far beyond the question of language and writing.

2. Men and Women

For example, a similar structure can be observed in the constitution of the opposition human/male and female. The category male is constituted through the creation of the category female, to which is assigned the trait of "difference" that made possible the distinction between the two categories and, therefore, the existence of the category human (male). The male (or, simply, "man") can then be taken as the proper object of the human sciences and conclusions derived from that science applied to humans generally, any lack of fit between the results of such research and female humans being regarded as accidental. The vehemence with which the purity of the category male has historically been protected by the dominant discourse at least equals Saussure’s protection of his concept of language from contamination by writing.

West, in her effort to focus feminist inquiry on a naturally-occurring
category “woman,” is engaged in a conceptual project analogous to Saussure’s and encounters similar difficulties. West’s feminist essentialism is paradoxical in several respects: As noted above, West emphasizes the importance of individual women and their stories, but her semi-coercive writing implies that having had her own consciousness raised has given West access to the interiority of all women qua women. West tries to justify her essentialism in *Caring for Justice* and elsewhere in her work but never succeeds in doing so adequately. In a defense against anticipated objections in the introduction to *Caring for Justice*, for example, West confuses sameness with difference. West refers to the work of Carol Gilligan for the proposition that women are different from men, then challenges “those who assert the ‘no difference’ hypothesis”¹⁴⁵ to assume the burden of proof. The critical problem with West’s essentialism, however, is that it posits sameness among women, not that it argues for difference between women and men. By highlighting gender as the difference that matters, West renders differences among women (as well as among men) invisible or, at best, secondary.¹⁴⁶

Moreover, West makes the highly problematic assumption that the category “woman” subordinated by patriarchy is co-extensive with a category “woman” existing in nature and forming a part of individuals’ identities apart from their experience of sexism, just as she assumes that the notion of “race” defining racism is also a natural category independent of individuals’ experience of racism:

The complexity of the intersection of race and sex, raises, in my view, the most challenging set of problems facing feminism, and for this reason: it is surely true that race and racism pose nearly intractable problems of social justice . . . . It is also true, as scores of black feminists have now shown, that black women are injured and subordinated in this culture in ways that simply are not shared by white women or black men.¹⁴⁷

When West answers this objection to the sameness imposed by her essentialism, she simply denies that it is a problem:

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¹⁴⁵. *WEST, supra* note 2, at 18.

¹⁴⁶. For one very problematic example of West’s essentialism undermining her arguments, see *WEST, supra* note 108, at 103-04, where West asserts:

Underlying this disjunction between the feelings that motivate feminist and mainstream legal scholarship is an even more fundamental cleavage between the existential situation—the position in the world—of the feminist legal scholar and the masculine legal scholar. It is the lived reality of physical, emotional and psychic *intersubjectivity* with others which underlies the two emotions—love and rage—that motivate the feminist sense of morality and justice respectively and hence of feminist legal theory.

*Id.* In this passage, West assumes, among many other things, that women, and only women, experience lives of *intersubjectivity* and, therefore, love and rage, and that only injustice against members of one’s gender (and not, for example, ethnic group or even species) can provoke the rage West associates with the feminist sense of justice.

The problem...is racism, and specifically white racism, not essentialism. ... None of the many difficulties inherent in the monumental task of addressing the multiple and intersectional nature of the subordination of black women suggest the anti-essentialist conclusion or premise which these difficulties often invoke. It doesn’t follow from the complexity, multiplicity, or intersectionality of many women’s subordination that any one of the intersecting axes on which men or women might be subordinated doesn’t exist.\textsuperscript{148}

As a category of nature, however, race certainly does not exist; to the extent that it has any physical basis at all, race is a socially constructed set of meanings imposed on any of a number of superficial physical traits with no scientific significance or integrity. Like the problems of sexism, the problems of racism exist and must be addressed independent of whether the members of each subordinated group share some essential traits.

West’s descriptions of the differences between men and women are riddled with contradictions. Women, for example, “are actually or potentially materially connected to other human life. Men aren’t.”\textsuperscript{149} West does not contend, however, that women are connected only to each other. Men (or, at least, males) are often the people to whom women are materially connected, whether pre-natally, while nursing, or during intercourse. To say, then, that women are connected to other life while men are not is to assign to one side of a conceptual opposition a quality necessarily shared by both concepts.

Similarly, West finds women to be dependent while men are autonomous. Men, however, are certainly dependent when they are children (children, oddly, are never quite separated out as a category).\textsuperscript{150} West clearly recognizes the degree to which women provide needed care for men throughout their lives and can point to only incidental examples of women’s natural dependence (for instance, women need protection while they are actually giving birth). As West remarks in another context, a day spent watching people will drive the point home: Men surround themselves with women to care for them—secretaries, cooks, waitresses, maids, baby-sitters, and, of course, girlfriends and wives. Women do not, or, when they do, they surround themselves with other women. Women are most often found taking care not only of themselves but also of others dependent on them.

West also displays an odd vehemence, strikingly similar to Saussure’s, when her project of investigating women’s true nature is threatened. For

\textsuperscript{148} Id. at 15.

\textsuperscript{149} West, supra note 24, at 14; see also id. at 21 ("[W]omen are ultimately more ‘connected’—psychically, emotionally, and morally—to other human beings because women, as children were raised by women and women raise children because women, uniquely, are physically and materially ‘connected’ to those human beings when the human beings are fetuses and then infants.").

\textsuperscript{150} Indeed, West’s failure to place children on one side or the other of the male/female divide is quite interesting, given the great weight she gives both to women’s true nature and to the importance of children.
claiming that gender roles bear a contingent or socially constructed connection
to sex, postmodern theorists are condemned to join the creationists in their
"anti-Darwinian, anti-naturalist and anti-scientific" world view. The
postmodern "dismantling of the connections between sex and gender," like
the "destruction of meaning and language," is decried as "at bottom
inhuman."

West's effort to study the true nature of women may be even more
contradictory than Saussure's project because the concept "woman" has long
consisted in that which was excluded from the concept "man." "Woman" in
the dominant discourse is not a coherent concept at all; instead, it is a tangle of
elements excluded from the concept "man" so that man could appear coherent,
ideal and whole—difference, gender, passion, nature, weakness, dependence.
Not only the concepts "man" and "woman," but also the language in which
West must work to study them are marked by thousands of years of repression
of whatever was assigned to woman.

Drucilla Cornell has pointed out that West's understanding of men and
women as naturally different seems to rule out the possibility of ending the
oppression of women by men:

The fundamental theoretical problem with the American feminist
version of object relations theory, including as it is implicit in West, is
that it collapses psychic structure into social relations. . . . Because
West accepts the story of masculine separation from the mother as the
foundation for male identity, she cannot provide an explanation of why
men could get beyond this identity. Moreover, there would be no
reason they would want to.

West's recognition that essential differences between men and women make
an end to patriarchal violence unlikely may be what drives West to posit an
equally untenable distinction between patriarchal and legal power:

151. WEST, supra note 2, at 16.
152. Id. at 16-17.
153. Id. at 17.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION, supra note 31, at 52. The object relations theory referred
to by Cornell is that of Nancy Chodorow, see id. at 50-51, on whose work West relies heavily. See, e.g.,
WEST, supra note 2, at 129-30, 284. West acknowledges that finding a biological basis for male violence
might be seen to make enforcement of laws against that violence more necessary, see id. at 13, but she does
not explain how persons motivated to enforce those laws would come to have the power to do so.
For it is distinctively because of this central difference between law and patriarchy that law becomes a tool with which patriarchal power can be resisted. Put another way, it is because of the difference between legal and patriarchal power that law, with all its positivity—its socially constructed rights and its ideological, imaginative, and institutional inventions—is a potent weapon against the destructivity and negativity of patriarchy.157

Like Saussure's distinction between speech and writing, West distinguishes legal and patriarchal power, not as theoretical constructs (that is, she offers no definition of either, and does not pretend to be positing them as tools of analysis), but as real weapons capable of being used against each other in the world. To maintain this distinction, she must reject Michel Foucault's work on the productive aspects of power. She plainly finds Foucault's description of power disturbing (enough to italicize it in its entirety):

*We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it "excludes," it "represses," it "censors," it "abstracts," it "masks," it "conceals." In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production.*158

West asks:

Is Foucault's suggestion, though—that we should quit talking about power in negative terms—something feminist legal scholars should heed? Is its underlying assumption—that modern power is creative and productive rather than negative and censorial—as true of modern patriarchal power as it seems to be of legal power?"159

The answer, according to West, is no—the law and the patriarchy must be seen as exercising distinct and opposed types of power. Legal power is

157. WEST, supra note 2, at 263 (footnote omitted).
158. Id., at 260 (quoting MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 194 (A. Sheridan trans., 1979) (1975)) (emphasis West's).
159. Id. at 260-61. Ironically, while West concedes that Foucault's insights on the productive nature of power are important to an understanding of the legal power of the state, contesting only their applicability to the private exercise of patriarchal power, many others have criticized Foucault for concentrating on private exercises of power to the exclusion of the legal power of the state. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 91, at 16-20 (noting that "Foucault's method keeps us from seeing, or recognizing, what we might want to do with the state"); HUNT & WICKHAM, supra note 86, at 17-20 (commenting that Foucault's focus on the interaction of "micro-powers" impedes the development of a political strategy for dealing with sites of concentrated power such as the state); Lucie E. White, Seeking "... The Faces of Otherness ...": A Response to Professors Sarat, Felszter, and Cahn, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1499, 1505 (1992) (warning that we cannot get "stuck" in Foucault's theory of power because of its weakness in explaining the role of institutional power and its role in perpetuating domination).
"constructive, positive, creative, and inventive," while patriarchal power is characterized by its "destructive, negating, censorial violence." West's refusal to consider the positive effects of patriarchal power is puzzling in light of the importance of these effects in her own work. Examples of patriarchal power's constructions abound in West's writing. The "giving self," for example, movingly described by West in chapter four of *Narrative, Authority, and Law*, who "consents to transactions, changes, or situations in the world so as to . . . maximize the pleasure and satiate the desires of others" in response to "a fully justified fear of acquisitive and violent male sexuality" is a product of patriarchal power's positive effects. Indeed, the world described by West in which domestic violence, despite its prevalence, remains invisible, in which "[w]ay too many people, including the women who sustain them, think that a slap on the face is normal, ordinary, unexceptional, or deserved," is a positive effect of patriarchal power.

West's belief in the continuing invisibility of patriarchal violence, despite the pervasive reality of "[t]he danger, the violence, and the fear with which women live," is also symptomatic of contradictions in her essentialist theory. West argues that this violence is not a part of men's world, externally or internally. . . . [W]omen's definitional fear is not a part of their external world: the danger and the threat that causes it are largely, to them, invisible. Left and liberal men do not see women shake with fear. They do not see . . . women sexually harassed at work. They do not see women battered in the home. They do not see women being raped, by strangers, dates, or husbands. They do not see women violated, abused, and afraid. . . . It is not surprising that the claim that women's lives are ruled by fear is heard by these men as wildly implausible. They see no evidence in their own lives to support it.

Of course, it cannot be that violence against women is in fact invisible to men because men are the perpetrators of the violence. Nor is there any basis

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160. West, supra note 2, at 263.
161. Id.
162. See West, supra note 4, at 179-249.
163. Id. at 192.
164. See West, supra note 4, at 193.
165. West, supra note 2, at 208-09.
166. West, supra note 4, at 193.
167. Id. at 194. West also seems to assume that the fear and violence are visible to all women. However, although most women may fear violence against themselves at various times, women appear to be just as likely as men to doubt a story of "date rape," see, e.g., Katie Roiphe, *The Morning After: Sex, Fear, and Feminism on Campus* (1993) (questioning the phenomenon of date rape), or to dismiss as a shrew the wife who provokes her husband to hit her. See, e.g., Andrea Dworkin, *Living in Terror: Pain: Being a Battered Wife*, in *Violence Against Women: The Bloody Footprints* 237-39 (Pauline B. Bart & Eileen Geil Moran eds., 1993) (documenting the lack of support a battered woman can expect from friends, family, and neighbors—male and female alike).
for supposing that men can be divided into violent men on the one hand and "left and liberal men" on the other. The logic of West's essentialism, however, drives her to posit these unsupported divisions.

IV. DECONSTRUCTION FOR FUN AND PROFIT: DERRIDA IN THE U.S.

A. Turning Back Flips

West's essentialism, by elevating the female over the male in importance while leaving gender categories basically undisturbed, bears a striking resemblance to the operation of deconstruction as (mis)understood by many of its American practitioners. J.M. Balkin, for example, presents deconstruction as a method of analyzing texts that can be used to critique legal doctrine, to reveal disguised ideological premises, and to provide fresh interpretations of legal texts. Balkin considers deconstruction to be a technique, a tool for locating and inverting hierarchical conceptual oppositions—what Balkin calls "nested oppositions"—structuring a given text or argument.

Although Balkin himself seems to enjoy deconstructing things, his account of deconstruction never makes clear what other advantage this new tool might have over traditional legal argument. The value of deconstructive reversal of conceptual hierarchies, for example, is simply that it enables us to see our legal doctrines from a new point of view:

168. Id. at 193.

169. See Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 29, at 746 ("[M]y goal in this Article is to offer ways of bringing the concerns and methods of deconstructionists to the study of legal issues."). But see Jacques Derrida, Biodegradables: Seven Diary Fragments, 15 CRITICAL INQUIRY 812, 827 (Peggy Kamuf trans., 1989). ("I have explained a hundred times why deconstruction was not essentially a 'method . . . ."). Balkin acknowledges that Derrida and others refuse to call deconstruction a method of analysis. See Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, supra note 29, at 1131. The problem of how to refer to deconstruction is endemic among those who wish to write carefully about it. See, e.g., BEARDSWORTH, supra note 25, at 4-6 (discussing why he has chosen to refer to deconstruction as a "method"); GASCHÉ, supra note 25, at 121-24 (reviewing the philosophical origins of deconstruction and of methods in general to open a chapter entitled Deconstructive Methodology); Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 29, at 746 & n.9.

BEARDSWORTH explains:

Derrida is careful to avoid this term [method] because it carries connotations of a procedural form of judgment. A thinker with a method has already decided how to proceed, is unable to give him or herself up to the matter of thought in hand, is a functionary of the criteria which structure his or her conceptual gestures. For Derrida . . . this is irresponsibility itself.

BEARDSWORTH, supra note 25, at 4. Implicit in the Derridean unwillingness to refer to deconstruction as a method, therefore, is a concern to avoid the sort of normative pre-judgment Balkin advocates as "transcendental deconstruction" or "rational deconstruction."

170. See Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 29, at 744; see also Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, supra note 29, at 1138 ("[D]econstructive argument is a species of rhetoric, which can be used for different purposes depending upon the moral and political commitments of the deconstructor.").

171. See Balkin, Nested Oppositions, supra note 29, at 1671 ("Properly understood and properly used, deconstruction offers theorists a set of techniques and arguments involving the concepts of similarity and difference."); see also id. at 1674, 1705. But see Derrida, supra note 69, at 827 ("I have explained a hundred times why deconstruction was not essentially a 'technique'").

172. See Balkin, Nested Oppositions, supra note 29.

173. See Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 29, at 746 ("Described in its simplest form, the deconstructionist project involves the identification of hierarchical oppositions, followed by a temporary reversal of the hierarchy.").
The deconstruction of legal concepts, or of the social vision that informs them, is not nihilistic. Deconstruction is not a call for us to forget about moral certainty, but to remember aspects of human life that were pushed into the background by the necessities of the dominant legal conception we call into question. . . . By recalling the elements of human life relegated to the margin in a given social theory, deconstructive readings challenge us to remake the dominant conceptions of our society.174

This is more or less unobjectionable, but why go to the trouble of deconstructing a text to reach conclusions so easily demonstrated through more traditional methods—particularly when the mere hint that an argument is intended to be deconstructive is enough to insure that many readers will discount it no matter how brilliant the wordplay.175 Indeed, Balkin’s account of deconstruction often renders it indistinguishable from standard legal reasoning and leads one to wonder how anyone could possibly object to it.176 In Nested Oppositions, for example, Balkin states that, “to deconstruct a conceptual opposition is to . . . observe simultaneously the similarity and difference, the dependence and differentiation, involved in a relation between concepts. Deconstructive argument is simply the means by which this reinterpretation is achieved.”177

According to Balkin, the tool of deconstruction can cut both ways:

Although one can use deconstructive arguments to further what Derrida believes is just, one can also deconstruct in a different way to reach conclusions he would probably find very unjust. . . . [D]econstructive argument is a species of rhetoric, which can be used for different purposes depending upon the moral and political

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176. For example, Balkin’s “deconstruction” of the opinions of Justices Scalia and Brennan in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), plays upon the etymological relationship between “tradition” and “betrayal” to reach the unremarkable conclusion that each Justice betrays some traditional value to serve another. See, e.g., Balkin, Politics, supra note 29, at 1613-25.

177. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, supra note 29, at 1676. Lest anyone think deconstruction might be something new, Balkin at one point offers David Hume’s 1739 criticism of Descartes as an example of deconstructive argument. See Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 29, at 753 n.27 (quoting DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 6 (L. Selby-Bigge 2d ed. 1888)).
commitments of the deconstructor.\textsuperscript{178}

Balkin thus understands deconstruction to serve bigotry as well as tolerance,\textsuperscript{179} oppression as well as freedom.\textsuperscript{180}

Deconstruction, therefore, does not alleviate the need for the existence of a set of political commitments that preexist the deconstructive act. These commitments may change as one deconstructs, and the deconstructor may change with them—but they must already be present for the deconstruction even to get off the ground. Thus, deconstruction turns out to be instrumental, rather than a source of ethical or political value.\textsuperscript{181}

From a feminist point of view, however, new tools, no matter how handy and sharp, are no better than old ones; the problem with existing law is not its lack of effective tools but its failure to use the tools available to benefit women. Balkin’s account of deconstruction presents it as a rigorously neutral instrument, as easily used against the oppressed as for them and therefore likely to do more harm to women than good.

Derrida has specifically rejected the mechanical, reverse-the-hierarchy form of deconstruction advocated by Balkin:

Deconstruction cannot limit itself or proceed immediately to a neutralization: it must, by means of a double gesture, a double science, a double writing, practice an overturning of the classical opposition and a general displacement of the system. It is only on this condition that deconstruction will provide itself the means with which to intervene in the field of oppositions that it criticizes, which is also a field of non-discursive forces.\textsuperscript{182}

Derrida warns that a deconstruction satisfied with simply reversing hierarchical oppositions is irresponsible:

To remain content with reversal is of course to operate within the immanence of the system to be destroyed. But to sit back . . . and take an attitude of neutralizing indifference with respect to the classical oppositions would be to give free rein to the existing forces that effectively and historically dominate the field. It would be, for not

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{178} Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, supra note 29, at 1137-38.  
\textsuperscript{179} See id. at 1145. But see Derrida, supra note 69, at 827 (objecting to the statement that deconstruction can be used equally well for fascist or liberal purposes).  
\textsuperscript{180} See Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 29, at 786 & n.114.  
\textsuperscript{181} Balkin, Politics, supra note 29, at 1628.  
\textsuperscript{182} Jacques Derrida, Signature Event Context, in MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 307, 329 (Alan Bass trans., 1982); see also Derrida, supra note 77, at 21.}
having seized the means to intervene, to confirm the established equilibrium.\textsuperscript{183}

As described above, conceptual oppositions are instituted through the banishment of certain shared qualities into the disfavored concept. In the second, generally omitted, phase of deconstruction, as described by Rodolphe Gasché, these qualities are recalled from exile:

[The hitherto repressed traits of concepts, or traits held in reserve, are restored to their generality, to their power of generalization, and to their generative force. With this liberation of the traits held in reserve by the concepts within philosophy, new “concepts” erupt into the territory of philosophy. These concepts refer to something that could never be comprehended, that could never have been an “object” within the discourse of philosophy.\textsuperscript{184}]

Gasché, following Derrida, calls these new concepts “infrastructures”.\textsuperscript{185}

Whereas the first gesture [of deconstruction] plays entirely within the closure of metaphysics, the second attempts a breakthrough toward a certain outside of philosophy. . . . Compared to the conceptual hierarchies, reversed or not, the infrastructures produced during the second phase of deconstruction are unheard-of concepts within the limits of philosophy.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{183} Jacques Derrida, Dissemination 6 (Barbara Johnson trans., 1981); see also Gasché, supra note 25, at 163-76:

The phase of reversal of the hierarchy of predicates or concepts is only the first step; the second step consists of what is called a reinscription, displacement, or reconstruction. This second phase is necessary because the first operates solely within the conceptuality of the system to be deconstructed. Without such a second movement, the reversal would be “nothing more than a clamorous declaration of the antithesis.”

Id. at 171-72 (quoting Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles 95 (B. Harlow trans., 1979)); see also Nealon, supra note 20, at 22-49 (examining the general failure of American deconstruction to proceed beyond an initial reversal of oppositions).

\textsuperscript{184} Gasché, supra note 25, at 172.

\textsuperscript{185} Id.

\textsuperscript{186} Id. at 173. Balkin sometimes describes his version of deconstruction as proceeding in two steps, but they are very different from the double gesture called for by Derrida. In Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, Balkin advocates a practice of “rational deconstruction” followed by “rational reconstruction.” Balkin, Understanding, supra note 29, at 124. Neither step resembles the openness and responsibility required by Derridean deconstruction:

In order to tell what is anomalous and what is central to our story, we need the tools of rational deconstruction. Through rational deconstruction we decide that two parts of the existing corpus cannot live together in a coherent scheme of principles and policies and that we must choose between them. Rational reconstruction thus makes use of rational deconstruction not only in determining which consistent sets of principles and policies could serve as a rational reconstruction, but also in deciding which parts of the legal corpus must be explained by the rational reconstruction and which parts can be jettisoned as mistaken.

Id. at 127.
It is in this second, neglected gesture that deconstruction's potential for feminism can be seen. Even the most militant feminists do not seriously believe that patriarchy can or should be replaced with an equally oppressive matriarchy, so a simplistic focus on reversing hierarchies presents itself as a game women have no time to play. But a mode of thought that seeks to break the bonds of our either/or thinking, releasing repressed and constrained content to flow where it will, may offer more potential.

Balkin's failure to follow through on his "deconstructions" accounts for his belief that deconstruction is a neutral tool that can cut both ways. For example, Balkin remarks that, although "deconstruction calls into question the boundaries of subjects of justice, it does not follow that the only way to question these boundaries is to advocate their expansion." However, the only other possible configuration of this field that Balkin allows is the contraction of the same boundaries:

[T]heir instability might be evidence that they are about to implode, rather than expand. Furthermore, even if there must be an expansion, one can expand the boundary in two opposite directions—by expanding the scope of what is assigned to the "human," who is a subject of justice, or by expanding the scope of what is assigned to the "nonhuman," which is not a proper subject of justice. In this way, the instability of these boundaries might well be used, as it has in the past, to show that blacks, or Asians, or women are not fully human beings, or that the distinction between women and animals, for example, is so unstable that it cannot fully be maintained.

Balkin continues:

Indeed, one can understand the history of bigotry as the continuous deconstruction of an imagined unity of humankind. . . . The egalitarian claims to rediscovery the true similarity of the subjects of justice by reclaiming those who were wrongly grouped with nonsubjects; the bigot claims to rediscover the true similarity of nonsubjects of justice by rejecting those who were wrongly grouped with the subjects of justice. Both deconstruct boundaries and categories, and the act of deconstruction does not decide between them.

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187. See, e.g., WEST, supra note 2, at 262-63 (dismissing deconstruction as a "hip philosophical . . . excuse for men to blind themselves to the violence of patriarchy. . . . Why talk about something as banal as violence" she imagines them saying, "when there are so many 'social constructs' to deconstruct?") But see Young, supra note 174, at 306-07 (critiquing the interpretive practice of inverting the valuation of hierarchically opposed terms without questioning the oppositions themselves).
188. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, supra note 29, at 1145.
189. Id.
190. Id.
Thus, although Balkin refers to deconstruction and questioning of boundaries and categories, his "deconstruction" questions neither. Instead, he implicitly restricts the universe of possible outcomes to the expansion or implosion of existing boundaries or categories, leaving no room for rethinking the question of whether there can be any boundary between the categories human and non-human, or for the still more radical rethinking of the concepts of boundary and category. Not only does he fail to move on to the second gesture of deconstruction—displacement of the system of conceptual oppositions—but he also totalizes the field of what can be thought to exclude the possible restructuring of the system. West, too, limits the potential reach of her thought by working within traditional gender oppositions.

A. The Sound of Silence

To return once more to Derrida's work on language and meaning, one of the reasons no text can have a single, unitary meaning is that signification is a process of exclusion, and every signifier and every concept bears the traces of all the others from which it must be differentiated to have any meaning at all. Determining the meaning of an utterance means excluding a host of other possible meanings. A text, therefore, is structured by the meanings excluded to make it intelligible. Just as the qualities banished from the favored member of a hierarchical opposition keep returning to contaminate and disrupt the hierarchy, the excluded, or more accurately, repressed meanings can never be eliminated from the text completely and are always capable of returning to unsettle the coherence of the authorized meaning—no voice is ever truly silenced.

Thus, when West observes that the law provides no account of women's lives, joys, or suffering, her statement is not entirely accurate; the lives, joys, and sufferings of women (and workers and servants and slaves) have made the law possible, and the text of the law bears the traces of all it has repressed to make its univocal, authorized meaning appear. Among the ghosts, palimpsest images and traces hidden by the surface of the law are those of women.

Deconstruction seeks out the meanings excluded to make authorized meanings possible. As such, it opens possibilities for transformation of existing structures of meaning, freeing texts to mean more than one might have thought. For feminists, therefore, deconstruction offers the exciting possibility of liberating from old legal texts the suppressed, silenced meanings that had to be excluded (but could not be eliminated) to enable these texts to appear to speak with a unitary patriarchal voice. In addition, feminist lawyers

191. See West, supra note 2, at 97-138 (attempting to provide the description of women's harms missing from the law); West, supra note 4, at 179-89 (calling for descriptions of women's hedonic lives because they are unknown to the law).
seeking to create or to give effect to new liberties are often thwarted by the
effect of centuries of patriarchal precedent. Deconstructing those old texts can
not only identify sources of this intransigence but also reveal the women, there
from the beginning but silenced in favor of tradition, and enable them to
demand to know why they should not be heard.

Although, as explained at length above, J.M. Balkin’s descriptions of
deconstruction obscure its potential for turning precedent inside-out to liberate
the persons on whose backs the law was written, his work actually includes an
excellent example of such an emancipatory deconstruction. In his article The
Footnote, Balkin traces the themes of exclusion and inclusion, purity and
contamination, inside and outside, and footnote and text through a reading of
Carolene Products and its famous footnote four.192 By approaching the text of
Carolene Products open to whatever meaning it might hold out to him, aware
that what has been excluded and marginalized in favor of the authorized
meaning can still speak, Balkin presents richer insights into the origin and
tensions of judicial review than could possibly be attained through traditional
legal argument. In commenting on his deconstruction of the case, Balkin notes
that themes of inclusion and exclusion are characteristic not only of
Carolene Products but of writing and of law as a form of writing. Both involve
the formation of concepts—the creation of meaning—through a process of
inclusion and exclusion of alternate meanings.193 Yet, “the marginalization
and exclusion necessary for intellectual conception is never complete. Traces
of banished and deemphasized alternatives lurk within the dominant
conception, supporting it and at the same time calling its dominance into
question.”194 Considering the question of why figurative and literary features
of a legal text should play any role in the discussion of the law, Balkin returns
to the same theme:

Yet the more we profess our lack of interest in the metaphorical,
figurative, and syntactic features of the text, (as yet another form of
impurity to be excluded from legal analysis) the more assuredly they
return to trouble the logic of the opinion. Once again, our ability to
exclude and marginalize these elements is never complete; our attempt
at purifying legal discourse of its literary aspects (leaving only reliable
logic and fact) is always impure.195

192. See Balkin, Footnote, supra note 29, at 284-85; see also United States v. Carolene Products, 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (explaining that the Court, in according deferential scrutiny to state legislation
prohibiting the introduction of filled milk, has no need to consider whether statutes restricting the political
processes or directed at “discrete and insular minorities” might receive stricter scrutiny).
193. See Balkin, Footnote, supra note 29, at 304; cf. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95
Yale L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986) (describing any legal decision as simultaneously jurisgenerative, as one party’s
view is made part of the law, and jurispathic, as another party’s view is written out of the law).
194. Balkin, Footnote, supra note 29, at 304.
195. Id. at 313.
Defending his use of the literary aspects of *Carolene Products* in his analysis, Balkin first states that making use of the "economy" or "lucky condensation of features" in the text "must be understood as a shortcut to understanding the structures and tensions of logic in modern constitutional jurisprudence." At the same time, however, there is another reason to attend to the surface features of the text:

Disregarding the contingent or surface features of legal language features is symptomatic of the very issue of marginalization, exclusion, and false preservation of purity that we have noted before. We believe that we preserve the real, pure meaning of the text we call *Carolene Products* by excluding superficial, contingent features of the text. We believe that we thus purify it, claiming that the same ideas could have been stated another way, unlike a poem, which resists paraphrase. Yet in so doing, we deliberately place blinders on the ways in which textuality (metaphor, expression, and so forth) affect our ways of thinking about legal problems.

Balkin concludes:

The opinion, which concerns the need for economic regulation, itself demonstrates the unregulatability of the economy of a text. For what is orthodox legal analysis but an attempt to regulate this economy—to delimit a certain set of features about a text that are appropriate for the reader to consider?

Deconstruction, by seeking out the meanings repressed by authorized readings, is a way of giving voice to the silenced who make the law possible. As all feminists know, the voices that are silenced so that legal texts may speak with authority are not chosen at random; a method of analysis centered on the marginalized will find itself attending to women and workers and servants and slaves. Thus, West's objection that postmodernism fails to concern itself with "archaeologies of the voices patriarchy has silenced" may be a just criticism of some offshoots of deconstruction in America but overlooks one of the truly exciting aspects of Derridean deconstruction for women, its dedication to—indeed, obsession with—the voices and meanings trivialized, marginalized, and discounted by dominant discourse.

196. Id. at 314.
197. Id. at 315.
198. Id. at 319-20.
199. West, supra note 2, at 265.
A. Justice and Care

In *Caring for Justice*, Robin West issues a compelling call for the law to recognize, protect, and incorporate moral values associated with nurturant caring. She argues that:

\[\text{If it is true, as relational feminists claim, that the act of caring for others to whom we are connected in some way is central to our moral lives, then our capacity for care should be at the center of our understanding of our public and legal, as well as private and personal, virtues, and specifically that it should be central to the meaning of legal justice.}\]

Historically, according to West, “our capacity to care has not been regarded as necessary to our capacity to do justice,” leading to deformation of both public and private values: “Our justice is not just when it is not caring, and care is not caring when it is not just.”

Similarly, in *Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority,"* his first explicit discussion of justice, Derrida examined the relationship between law (droit) and justice. What Derrida means by “law” (droit), “the generality of a rule, a norm or a universal imperative,” is what West and others concerned with the care/justice dichotomy mean by “justice.” What Derrida means by “justice,” on the other hand, resembles what West calls “care” or “caring justice” in that it focuses on particularity. As Derrida remarks, “justice always addresses itself to singularity, to the singularity of the other.”

West’s concern in *Caring for Justice* is to integrate into the judicial role an
obligation to particularize the litigants before the court when applying general rules of law:

The judge has a special obligation to the very particular litigants before her, as the parent has a special obligation to her children. He or she must listen to the injured patient, the ruined farmer, or the despondent mother to understand the particularizing details of their predicament, not simply universalize each case, each injury, and each contract so as to fit it within a more general rule.207

Derrida, too, asks:

How are we to reconcile the act of justice that must always concern singularity, individuals, irreplaceable groups and lives, the other or myself as other, in a unique situation, with rule, norm, value or the imperative of justice which necessarily have a general form, even if this generality prescribes a singular application in each case?208

West identifies the judge’s act of applying a general rule to particular facts as a moment of ethical responsibility. She argues, for example, that in deciding whether to force a surrogate mother to relinquish to the would-be adoptive parents the child she has borne, a judge must not avoid the difficult decision by treating the case as just another contract action. Instead, the judge is required “to attend, empathically, to the wrenching pain of litigants before her who unquestionably have diametrically conflicting needs.”209

To refuse to do this work, and to instead reach the Draconian conclusion that the birth mother must be forced to give up the baby because of the apparent similarity between the plight of such a person and any commercial contractor who discovers that the cost of performance is higher than initially presupposed, is a failure of a relational ethic of care: it is a refusal to grant the uniqueness of this litigant, and the moral duty of relational recognition she imposes upon this court and this judge.210

West also disputes, on ethical grounds, the view of normative economists on how particular cases should be decided:

Economists urge courts to think not of the plight of particular litigants
before them but of the incentives for (or against) prudent market behavior that will result from particular decisions, and to treat those incentives as dispositive. . . . But . . . there is a difference between “doing” justice and “doing” sound economic social policy.  

Again, Derrida would agree:

Every time . . . that we placidly apply a good rule to a particular case, to a correctly subsumed example, according to a determinant judgment, we can be sure that law (droit) may find itself accounted for, but certainly not justice. Law (droit) is not justice. Law is the element of calculation, and it is just that there be law, but justice is incalculable.

The moment at which justice must be done, for Derrida, “is always full of anxiety, but who pretends to be just by economizing on anxiety?”

Derrida compares his concept of justice to that of Emmanuel Levinas, for whom justice is “the relation to others,” in which “the extent of the right of the other” is “a practically infinite right.” For Levinas, “equity is not equality, calculated proportion, equitable distribution or distributive justice but rather absolute dissymmetry.” Derrida’s justice, therefore, is a “responsibility without limits.” It is an infinite “idea of justice,” infinite because it is irreducible, irreducible because owed to the other, owed to the other, before any contract, because it has come, the other’s coming as the singularity that is always other. This “idea of justice” seems to me to be irreducible in its affirmative character, in its demand of gift without exchange, without circulation, without recognition or gratitude, without economic circularity, without calculation and without rules, without reason and without rationality.

Distinguishing law from justice, Derrida explains:

[L]aw (droit) is essentially deconstructible, whether because it is

\[\text{supra note 9, at 947.}\]
\[\text{supra note 9, at 955.}\]
\[\text{at 959 (quoting EMMANUEL LEVINAS, TOTALITY AND INFINITY: AN ESSAY ON EXTERIORITY 89 (Alphonso Lingis trans., 1969) (1961)); see also DERRIDA, supra note 203, at 17 ("Levinas says somewhere that the definition of justice—which is very minimal but which I love, which I think is really rigorous—is that justice is the relation to the other.").}\]
\[\text{supra note 9, at 959 (quoting EMMANUEL LEVINAS, DU SACRE AU SAINT, CINQ NOUVELLES LECTURES TALMUDIQUES 17-18 (1977)).}\]
\[\text{at 959.}\]
\[\text{at 953.}\]
\[\text{at 965.}\]
founded, constructed on interpretable and transformable textual strata (and that is the history of law (droit), its possible and necessary transformation, sometimes its amelioration), or because its ultimate foundation is by definition unfounded. . . . Justice in itself, if such a thing exists, outside or beyond law, is not deconstructible. No more than deconstruction itself, if such a thing exists. Deconstruction is justice.219

Like justice, Derrida argues, deconstruction corresponds to a "sense of a responsibility without limits, and so necessarily incalculable, before memory."220 This is a difficult and, as Derrida admits, dangerous221 idea of justice but one rich with possibilities for a progressive transformation of law.

Neither Derrida nor West explains how legal justice is to be reconciled with care. West presents the task as a matter of finding the right proportion—for each decision there is an appropriate blend of justice and care that will result in caring justice. West gives a number of examples of arguments and decisions that fail to seek that balance. For example, John Rawls' conception of justice as that to which each member of society would freely consent, "so long as we further define ‘each member’ as a disembodied, rational, contracting agent ready to give rational consent where it best serves his or her self-interest, but in ignorance of . . . what those interests might be,"222 fails "to take seriously the nature of our nurturant practices, and hence fail[s] to take seriously the particularistic values those practices reflect."223 However, acceptance of the "cultural defense" in a criminal case "to excuse or mitigate the punishment of a criminal defendant who has committed a homicide, at least in part because he was raised in a culture of permissive misogynist violence"224 improperly elevates nurturant care for the litigant over consistency and justice to the victim.225 West presents these examples as self-evidently unjust and/or uncaring. She does not explain how one is to know when the balance between justice and care has been properly struck, but neither does she indicate that a proper balance cannot be found.

Derrida offers no solution to the problem of reconciling "justice (infinite, incalculable, rebellious to rule and foreign to symmetry, heterogeneous and heterotropic) and the exercise of justice as law or right, legitimacy or legality, stabilizable and statutory, calculable, a system of regulated and coded

219. Id. at 943-45.
220. Id. at 953.
221. See id. at 971 ("Left to itself, the incalculable and giving (donatrice) idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation.").
222. WEST, supra note 2, at 63 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12, 15, 72 (1971)).
223. Id. at 64.
224. Id. at 78.
225. See id.
prescriptions.\textsuperscript{226} Instead, he demonstrates that the problem is structurally impossible to solve:

Everything would still be simple if this distinction between justice and droit were a true distinction, an opposition whose functioning was logically regulated and permitted mastery. But it turns out that droit claims to exercise itself in the name of justice and that justice is requires to establish itself in the name of a law that must be "enforced."\textsuperscript{227}

But if law takes the form of a rule of universal applicability, it cannot be just to apply it mechanically to the particular case:

We would not say of a being without freedom, or at least of one without freedom in a given act, that its decision is just or unjust. But this freedom or this decision of the just, if it is one, must follow a law or a prescription, a rule. . . . But if the act simply consists of applying a rule, of enacting a program or effecting a calculation, we might say that it is legal, that it conforms to law, . . . but we would be wrong to say that the decision was just. . .

. . . In short, for a decision to be just and responsible, it must in its proper moment if there is one, be both regulated and without regulation: it must conserve the law and also destroy it or suspend it enough to have to reinvent it in each case, rejusitify it, at least reinvent it in the reaffirmation and the new and free confirmation of its principle. Each case is other, each decision is different and requires an absolutely unique interpretation, which no existing, coded rule can or ought to guarantee absolutely.\textsuperscript{228}

For Derrida, then, justice is an aporia.\textsuperscript{229} "An aporia is a non-road. From this point of view, justice would be the experience that we are not able to experience."\textsuperscript{230} But, "there is no justice without this experience, however, impossible it may be, of aporia. Justice is an experience of the impossible."\textsuperscript{231}

It would seem that the promising confluence of Derrida's thinking with West's has here gone horribly wrong—far from assisting in West's project of providing a theoretical basis on which justice could be constructed, Derrida

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{226} Derrida, \textit{supra} note 9, at 959.
\item \textsuperscript{227} \textit{Id}. at 959-61.
\item \textsuperscript{228} \textit{Id}. at 961.
\item \textsuperscript{229} For an extended discussion of the philosophical history of the term "aporia" and of Derrida's use of this term, see BEARDSWORTH, \textit{supra} note 25, at 31-34.
\item \textsuperscript{230} Derrida, \textit{supra} note 9, at 947.
\item \textsuperscript{231} \textit{Id}.
\end{itemize}
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Caring for Deconstruction

seems to have "deconstructed" justice of any kind out of the question. The difficulties identified by Derrida's work, however, are shared equally by West's. Once again, the work of J.M. Balkin is useful in highlighting these problems.

B. Reading with Care

In his article Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, Balkin examines the relationship of deconstruction and justice. Although he considers Derrida's meditations on this relationship in Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority," Balkin begins his examination by rejecting the idea, put forward by Derrida in that article, that his work has been about justice all along.232 Balkin remarks that "it takes quite a stretch to see [the works Derrida lists] as directly addressing the question of justice."233 Instead, Balkin turns to Derrida's two essays on Paul de Man's wartime writing. Derrida was among the first to write extensively about articles written by the late Paul de Man for a collaborationist newspaper during the Nazi occupation of Belgium in 1940 through 1942. De Man's wartime journalism was unknown or unrecalled outside Belgium until it was rediscovered in the late 1980s by a graduate student studying de Man. The first of Derrida's two works on this topic, Like the Sound of the Sea Deep within a Shell: Paul de Man's War,234 is an extended and sometimes anguished reading of the pieces in question; the second, Biodegradables: Seven Diary Fragments,235 responds to six other articles, five of which generally condemn de Man, Derrida, and deconstruction as more or less equally complicit in the horrors of the Nazi regime.236

Balkin states that the "major concerns" of Derrida's two articles on de Man's wartime writing are "how one should judge de Man, deconstruction, and Derrida himself."237 In the first of these articles, however, Derrida specifically disclaimed any intention of judging Paul de Man:

232. See id. at 929 (listing a number of Derrida's prior works as particularly concerned with ethics and politics).
233. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, supra note 29, at 1134. In a footnote to this proposition, Balkin writes, "See, for example, JACQUES DERRIDA, GLAS (1974), whose subject matter has never precisely been determined." Glas is a difficult work, setting forth parallel readings of the work of G.W.F. Hegel and Jean Genet. Despite its difficulty, however, a number of thinkers working at the intersection of philosophy and justice have found Glas to be important to their work. See, e.g., BEARDSWORTH, supra note 25, at xv, 46-97 (relying on a reading of Glas to situate Derrida's thinking with respect to Kant and Hegel); CORNELL, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 31, at 62-90 (basing a rich discussion of deconstruction, ethics and the figure of woman, in part, on Glas); CRITCHLEY, supra note 203, at 1-50 (finding Glas to be both a "tour de force of Hegel scholarship" and a helpful commentary on Genet's work).
235. Derrida, supra note 69.
236. As Balkin notes, "Many silly and intemperate accusations were leveled on all sides of this dispute." Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, supra note 29, at 1135.
237. Id.
Through the indelible wound, one must still analyze and seek to understand. . . . In analyzing, judging, evaluating this or that discourse, this or that effect of these old fragments, I refused to extend these gestures to a general judgment, with no possibility of appeal, of Paul de Man, of the totality of what he was, thought, wrote, taught, and so forth.\textsuperscript{238}

The latter of the two articles is among Derrida’s most polemical writings. Nevertheless, its main message, repeated over and over, is not that de Man’s critics have made the wrong judgments, but that they have not read either the writings in question or Derrida’s reading of them:

I am not going to request that people reread what I wrote or, one more time, that they reread de Man. . . . What is more, I never said that \textit{it was necessary at all costs to read} de Man or anybody else, but, and this is quite a different thing, that \textit{if} at least one claims to speak about all this, it is a good idea to read, even better to reread, preferably everything one can.\textsuperscript{239}

It is somewhat irresponsible of Balkin to turn to Derrida’s works on de Man for an illustration of Derrida’s thinking on justice. Derrida’s investigations of Western thought invariably take the form of careful readings of works by thinkers who have played important roles in shaping that thought and, to a great extent, his writings derive their weight from the weight of the works being read. The pieces on de Man, therefore, are not well chosen to display the depth of Derrida’s thought; the first is a painful reaction to de Man’s unfortunate exercise in collaborationist journalism, while the second responds to a series of diatribes of no lasting value (hence the title of Derrida’s response, a reference to the sort of paper on which Derrida hopes these works are written).

Nevertheless, the articles on de Man do indeed concern justice and injustice in precisely the sense that emerges from \textit{Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”} and all of Derrida’s work. The injustice of which Derrida complains in the de Man articles is the failure to read and judge with care—the irresponsible rush to judge the meaning of de Man’s texts and of his life without respecting the singularity of these events and the multiple interpretations to which they are susceptible and without acknowledging the violent and necessarily provisional nature of any decision one must finally make. Derrida writes:

\begin{quote}
Can one speak of responsibility or assume a responsibility without
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{238} Derrida, \textit{supra} note 234, at 631.
\textsuperscript{239} Derrida, \textit{supra} note 69, at 838.
difficulty and without anguish? I don’t believe so. To speak of it
calmly and as if there were some obvious, commonsense facts
available on this subject, as if one knew what were and ought to be the
“ethical categories,” is irresponsibility itself—moral, political,
philosophical, intellectual irresponsibility in general.240

Derrida’s concern here is not with de Man’s responsibility but with his
own and that of those who wish to judge de Man. Balkin, however, reads
Derrida as arguing that “de Man is not responsible for all of the many evils of
Nazism or for the Holocaust.”241 To show that Derrida does not really think
that justice demands infinite responsibility, Balkin quotes Derrida:

Five of the six ‘responses’ that I reread last night are written, as one
used to say, with a pen dipped in venom. Less against the de Man of
1940-42, perhaps, than against me (I . . . who have nothing whatever to
do with everything that happened; I who, at the time, was rather on the
side of the victims . . .). Less against me, in truth, than against
‘Deconstruction’ (which at the time was at year minus twenty-five of
its calendar!).242

Balkin infers from these remarks that:

Derrida cannot mean by “a responsibility without limits” a limitless
responsibility. Otherwise, he, de Man, and indeed all of us are
responsible without limits for the Holocaust and many other horrible
crimes, both past and present. But this would not be just: The demand
of justice is often the demand that we are not responsible, even though
we have been unjustly accused.243

Balkin confuses responsibility with blame. Levinas and Derrida are not
concerned with blame, with assigning responsibility to the other. Neither de
Man nor Derrida nor Balkin is to blame for the Holocaust. Justice, however,
according to Levinas and Derrida, makes it my responsibility to ask whether I
could be more attentive to the singularity of others, and whether by acceding

240. Id. at 846. In this reply to six responses to his earlier article, after asking over and over how his
critics could have failed to read the earlier piece to which they were responding, Derrida provides a Table of
Concor(redun)dances listing the pages in the earlier article on which he had already said what his critics
accused him of failing to say, and a Table of Concordances listing the pages on which he had already
responded to the arguments his critics were now making.


242. Derrida, supra note 69, at 820, quoted in part in Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, supra
note 29, at 1151. Derrida, whose mother was Jewish, was ten years old in 1940. In 1942, he was expelled
from his school in Algeria when it was determined that the school had too many Jewish students. See
GEORGE BENNINGTON & JACQUES DERRIDA, JACQUES DERRIDA 325-26 (Geoffrey Bennington trans., 1993)

to general rules or propositions about Jews or Germans—or women—I might be helping to make a world in which the Holocaust is possible. If I were sitting in judgment on Derrida, justice would require me to read his work with at least the care Derrida devoted to de Man’s articles in *Like the Sound of the Sea Deep within a Shell: Paul de Man’s War* and, when I could hesitate to judge no longer, to take responsibility for my necessarily violent, incomplete, and unjust judgment.\(^{244}\)

For Balkin, however, the imposition of responsibility on others appears to be what justice is about. He argues:

We do not necessarily increase justice by increasing responsibility. Suppose a plaintiff is injured in a traffic accident. The plaintiff picks a name at random from the phone directory and sues this person as a defendant. We do not necessarily increase justice by holding this person liable for the accident. Justice is increased by eliminating her responsibility.\(^{245}\)

Despite Derrida’s repeated statements that justice is incalculable, Balkin contends:

The demand for an increase of justice is not necessarily the demand for increased responsibility. It is rather the demand for an *appropriate apportionment* or responsibility. That is what “just” means—neither too much nor too little, but just the right amount of responsibility for each person. . . . If the deconstructive argument is to make sense, it must assume that one’s responsibility goes as far as it should, but no further, whether or not this can be known for certain.\(^{246}\)

Balkin’s version of justice, reminiscent of Goldilocks and the Three Bears,\(^ {247}\) is alien to deconstruction. Judging, for Levinas and Derrida (and, sometimes, for West) is a matter of ethics.\(^ {248}\) Ethics is my responsibility, my asymmetrical relationship to the other; it is not dependent on the other’s reciprocation. As Simon Critchley explains, for Levinas, “[e]thics is not a spectator sport; rather, it is my experience of a claim or demand that I both cannot fully meet and cannot avoid. . . . I cannot even demand that the other

\(^{244}\) See Derrida, *supra* note 9, at 969.

\(^{245}\) Balkin, *Transcendental Deconstruction*, *supra* note 29, at 1149.

\(^{246}\) Id. at 1150.

\(^{247}\) Or, perhaps, Aristotelian. See *ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, BOOK V*.

\(^{248}\) Simon Critchley points out that Derrida’s adoption of Levinas’ definition of justice is somewhat problematic in this respect. Derrida cites in the context of law and judging a definition of ethical justice that Levinas offered in the context of my face-to-face relationship to the other. However, in a later work, Levinas distinguished justice from this ethical relation, and argued that the question of justice only arises when a third party comes on the scene, presenting me with competing ethical claims. See *SIMON CRITCHLEY, ETHICS—POLITICS—SUBJECTIVITY: ESSAYS ON DERRIDA, LEVINAS AND CONTEMPORARY FRENCH THOUGHT* 99-199 (1999).
respond responsibly to my response, 'that is his affair' . . ."249

C. The Importance of Being Doubtful

The judge who wishes to do justice in Derrida’s world must have a high tolerance for doubt.250 Doubt is inherent in Derrida’s view of the meaning—doubt can never be eliminated because the relationship between singularity and universality, between the event and the rule, is aporetic, not simply uncertain. No amount of reading will fully exhaust all the possible meanings of a text; some must always be excluded to render the text intelligible, and the decision which meanings to exclude—when to stop reading—is always a violent one. Richard Beardsworth explains:

[N]o law can be general enough not to be violent, not to engender exceptions or instances of counter-violence which, as the precipitate of the disjuncture between the universal law and its particular application or reality, are appropriately thought of as “singular.” The undecidable relation between the general and the singular translates in other terms the iterability of law.251

The impossibility of a decision without violence, and therefore of a just decision, does not excuse the judge from deciding:

[J]ustice, however, unpresentable it may be, doesn’t wait. It is that which must not wait. To be direct, simple and brief, let us say this: a just decision is always required immediately, “right away.” It cannot furnish itself with infinite information and the unlimited knowledge of conditions, rules or hypothetical imperatives that could justify it. And even if it did have all that at its disposal, even if it did give itself the time, all the time and all the necessary facts about the matter, the moment of decision, as such, always remains a finite moment of urgency and precipitation, since it must not be the consequence or the effect of this theoretical or historical knowledge, of this reflection or this deliberation, since it always marks the interruption of the juridico- or ethico- or politico-cognitive deliberation that precedes it, that must precede it. The instant of decision is a madness, says Kierkegaard.252

A decision, however,

249. Id. at 66 (quoting EMMANUEL LEVINAS, ETHIQUE ET INFINI 92 (1982)).
250. On the need for a greater tolerance for doubt in law, see Katherine C. Sheehan, Toward a Jurisprudence of Doubt, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 201 (1997).
251. BEARDSWORTH, supra note 25, at 25.
252. Derrida, supra note 9, at 967.
that didn't go through the ordeal of the undecidable would not be a free decision, it would only be the programmable application or unfolding of a calculable process. It might be legal; it would not be just. But in the moment of suspense of the undecidable, it is not just either, for only a decision is just.\footnote{253}

The point is not, therefore, to avoid decisions. Rather, as Beardsworth explains:

\begin{quote}
[T]here are different kinds of decisions—those that recognize their legislative and executive force and those which hide it under some claim to naturality \textit{qua} “theory” or “objective science.” The point is thus secondly that the acknowledgment of the prescriptive force of one’s statements may make one more ready to transform the field that is posited by the nature of one’s decisions . . . . This is the argument of a “lesser violence” in a general economy of violence.\footnote{254}
\end{quote}

Thus, not only is doubt inherent in the application of the general law to particular events, but a judgment that fails to recognize this doubt, that instead purports to reach justice by way of calculation, cannot be just.

Balkin’s treatment of \textit{Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”} avoids all mention of aporia or doubt, smoothly concealing these fissures beneath a totalized surface. Balkin concedes that in his effort to “adapt deconstruction to the critical study of law” he has transformed deconstruction: \footnote{255}

\begin{quote}
Certain features of Derrida’s texts, for example, must be emphasized and others de-emphasized and regarded as mistaken. Only in this way can deconstructive argument be made a useful tool of critical analysis. Only in this way can it escape the many criticisms of nihilism that have been leveled at it.\footnote{256}
\end{quote}

Balkin describes his project of identifying features of Derrida’s texts to be “regarded as mistaken” as “hermeneutic charity,” a term he borrows from Hans-Georg Gadamer.\footnote{257} Throughout \textit{Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice}, Balkin tries “to make sense of Derrida’s arguments about law and justice and read them charitably to avoid confusing and self-contradictory interpretations.”\footnote{258} In connection with his discussion of
Derrida's statement that justice demands that we speak in the language of the other, Balkin explains:

We can restate the difficulty by relating it to a similar problem in understanding the views of another. This is the problem of hermeneutic charity. When we try to understand what another person means, we usually do so by trying to envision how what they are saying makes sense. As Hans-Georg Gadamer has argued, we must make an "anticipation of completion" that what another is saying is coherent and has a claim to truth. A stance of openness and interpretive charity is actually essential to the process of understanding. If we do not take this stance, we cannot be sure that our discovery of incoherence or falsity in another's position is due to a defect in their argument or our inability to understand it fully.  

It should be evident that a method of interpretation capable of accepting only those meanings fitting neatly into existing understanding is inherently conservative and hostile to radical reconceptualization. Indeed, Balkin's requirement that Derrida be read to "make sense," to avoid contradiction and incoherence, prevents Balkin from understanding Derrida to be saying anything new or different from what Balkin already knows. Elsewhere, Balkin says this quite plainly:

It is important to try to understand and respect people who are different from us. To understand and respect their difference, however, we must first understand their similarity to us. We must try to see how their concerns and values are really similar to our concerns and our values, and thus, how the situation they find themselves in and their reactions to that situation make sense.

Thus, when Derrida says that deconstruction is "'[t]he sense of a responsibility without limits,'" one that is "'necessarily excessive, incalculable, before memory,'" Balkin charitably concludes that "Derrida cannot mean by 'a responsibility without limits' a limitless responsibility," because "'[i]f deconstructive argument is to make sense, it must assume that

260. Id. at 1161.
261. Id. at 1149 (quoting Derrida, supra note 9, at 953).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1151.
one's responsibility goes as far as it should, but no further... When Derrida says, "Deconstruction is justice," Balkin charitably rejects Derrida's "mystical equation," finding no "convincing argument" for it, and undertakes instead to "make sense of deconstruction's proper relationship to justice, and, in the process, to offer a more charitable interpretation of Derrida's rather obscure discussion." Balkin concludes this particular exercise by announcing that "it is simply not true, as Derrida asserts, that Deconstruction is justice."

Derrida's work questions the possibility and limits of philosophical thought.

The philosophical meaning of such an intellectual enterprise is certainly not easy to grasp. Its difficulty stems not simply from philosophy's notorious transgression of commonplace representation, but from an attempt, made in full respect of all the classical requirements of philosophical argumentation and development, to question the laws of possibility of that transgression itself, without, however, aiming to do away with it.

To subject such an attempt to a facile requirement that it "make sense" is to prevent it from happening at all.

Balkin's employment of "hermeneutic charity" to "make sense" of Derrida is what Derrida would call a totalizing or totalitarian gesture. In connection with Derrida's assertion in Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority" that deconstruction opposes totalitarianism, Balkin asks: "What is a 'totalitarian' logic of discourse or a 'totalitarian' gesture in discourse?" For an answer he looks to Derrida's response to de Man's critics:

purification, purge, totalization, reappropriation, homogenization, rapid objectification, good conscience, stereotyping and nonreading, immediate politicization or depoliticization (the two always go together), immediate historicization or dehistoricization (it is always the same thing), immediate ideologizing moralization (immorality itself) of all the texts and all the problems, expedited trial, condemnations, or acquittals, summary executions or sublimations. This is what must be deconstructed.
Balkin comments, "[t]he totalitarian gesture, then, is oversimplification and inattention to complexity and context,"\textsuperscript{273} a statement that is itself an oversimplification of magnificent proportions. The totalitarian gesture against which Derrida warns is the unacknowledged—and therefore irresponsible—imposition of limits on the possible meanings of a text (or a life)—precisely what Balkin calls charity.

VI. CONCLUSION

Judgment, the application of law to decide a singular case, must also be the imposition of limits on the possible meanings of a text or a life. Robin West has argued that "adjudication is not interpretation,"\textsuperscript{274} and that such a view of law both overlooks the imperative, violence-based aspects of judgment and, by restricting the possible "meanings" of law to those already embedded in its traditional text, provides no basis for radical critique or change.\textsuperscript{275} West’s point is a powerful one, but West herself underestimates both the imperative aspects of interpretation—the degree to which "the" meaning of a text is the product of a violent decision—and the transformative possibilities remaining in the text in the form of that which has been repressed. Law, the common law in particular, does not proceed by way of yes/no, thumbs up/thumbs down determinations, which might extinguish the voices of the vanquished for good; rather, it consists in volumes and volumes of text, determined to explain itself, to present each exercise of power as meaningful, to account to the losers for their losses. Traditionally, however, it does so by presenting its decisions as inevitable, required by the neutral application of universally valid principles to correctly categorized facts, leaving no ends loose or obligations unmet.

West’s justice of care recognizes that universal principles may be unjust in the individual case and calls upon the judge to take responsibility for particularizing each dispute, empathizing with each litigant.\textsuperscript{276} West does not, however, acknowledge the degree to which such an assumption of empathy must itself be an act of violence. Clearly basing her model of the caring judge on the caring mother, West envisions a wiser, more powerful, hierarchically superior judge able to understand the needs of each litigant and to meet these needs so far as it is in the law’s power to do so. But to understand fully any other’s position is to appropriate that other’s position as one’s own, as West does when she posits an essence of woman qua woman, and to deny that other his or her singularity, to decree that certain differences don’t count. And to place the law in the hands of a subject who believes she can read the heart of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{273} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{274} WEST, supra note 4, at 89-176.
\item \textsuperscript{275} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{276} See WEST, supra note 2, at 89.
\end{itemize}
the other is to entrust the law to a legal subject who cannot be trusted. West’s caring justice may be possible, but it is not just.

Derrida’s asymmetrical relationship between judge and litigant is structured differently. First, Derrida’s judge is not superior to the litigant. The judge is under an obligation to the litigant that can never be met, to do justice to the litigant in all his or her singularity. Derrida’s judge can never be just because any application of the general law violently denies the litigant’s singularity. The judge’s ability to do justice, then, is not dependent on the judge’s superior wisdom or compassion because no amount of wisdom will enable the judge to cross the aporia between the universal and the singular. However, the severity of the judge’s failure to be just depends on the judge’s humility, on her willingness to place herself in a position inferior to the litigant, to open herself and the law to welcome the unknown.

Second, because Derrida’s judge must always acknowledge that justice has been left undone, and must always repress in any decision traces and meanings capable of returning to subvert that decision in the future, the present decision is always founded on the promise of a justice to come. This justice to come or promise of democracy is not understood as an event expected to occur in a future version of the present and merely to be awaited now, but as a sort of messianism, an obligation to do now what is required to welcome the promise of the future. In his recent work on these topics, Derrida has explored the relationship between justice or ethics—the infinite responsibility to the other—and politics, the need to make decisions in the here and now. This work points in a number of new and fruitful directions and may reward careful reading, not only by Robin West and feminists hoping to introduce caring into judgment, but by anyone thinking about the possibility of justice for the marginalized and silenced.

278. See, e.g., Derrida, supra note 9, at 969-71.