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Who's the Boss?: Armentero, Padilla, and the Proper Respondent in Federal Habeas Corpus Law

Brian O'Donoghue†

Armentero v. INS, 340 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2003).

Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003).

In addition to its novel Constitutional issues, Padilla v. Rumsfeld raises profound procedural questions that will have implications for all federal habeas corpus law. The case’s central procedural dilemma—the question of who is the proper respondent to a federal habeas petition—has been largely ignored by the Supreme Court since the early 1970s and has stimulated a growing divergence among the federal circuits. The Second Circuit’s Padilla decision, should it stand unquestioned, would further divide the circuits. The Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla could become one of the leading cases in habeas law, in large part because of its response to procedural questions. This note argues that the Supreme Court should affirm the more expansive views of the proper respondent adopted by the Second Circuit. As a matter of equity, habeas petitioners such as Padilla should be allowed to name a variety of respondents, and thereby have access to more than one forum for their hearing.

On June 9, 2002, by order of the President, Jose Padilla, a United States citizen, was designated an “enemy combatant” and detained without charges in a South Carolina military brig. Padilla filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Southern District of New York, naming Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as the respondent. The success of a habeas petition can depend on the court in which it is filed, and the Padilla case exemplifies the pivotal importance of the selected habeas corpus respondent. The choice of whom to file suit against is critical because a federal court can only hear habeas petitions if it exercises personal jurisdiction over the respondent. Before Padilla, courts held, in most cases, that the appropriate respondent was the immediate

†Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2004. The author would like to thank Ruby Afram for her patience and tireless efforts in editing this note; Stephen Vladeck for sharing his encyclopedic knowledge of Padilla and the habeas process; and Jeff Goldman for his encouragement and wisdom. Title apologies to Tony Danza and Judith Light’s popular 1980s television show.

1. 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004).

2. The last time the Supreme Court significantly considered federal habeas questions on the matter of proper respondent was in Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341 (1972).

3. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 700.

custodian of the petitioner and that habeas petitions could only be filed in courts with personal jurisdiction over the respondent.\(^5\)

Padilla sought to break with this tradition and to be heard in the Southern District of New York, where he believed he had a good chance of success at trial and on appeal to the Second Circuit.\(^6\) For the district court to have personal jurisdiction over the parties, Padilla had to name Secretary Rumsfeld, or another responsible party with activity in New York City, as the respondent.\(^7\) The government, in opposition, cited precedent for habeas petitions in arguing that Padilla was constrained by statute to name the warden of the South Carolina brig as respondent. Both sides knew that if Padilla had to file for relief in the District of South Carolina, he would be less likely to receive relief at trial and would face the far more conservative Fourth Circuit on appeal.\(^8\)

Most federal prisoners filing habeas claims can choose between two respondents: their immediate custodian or the United States government. Classically, 28 U.S.C. § 2243 and its predecessors required federal prisoners to name their “custodian” as respondent to a habeas petition.\(^9\) The courts universally read “custodian” to mean the warden of the federal prison in which the petitioner was incarcerated.\(^10\) Consequently, most federal detainees could only file habeas petitions in the U.S. district courts for the districts in which they were detained—often small, rural districts, overburdened with habeas petitions, slow in processing claims, and perhaps calloused to petitioners’ pleas.\(^11\) To remedy the administrative imbalance and to add fairness to the habeas process, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which allows federal convicts filing for habeas relief to name the United States as respondent and to collaterally attack their sentence in the U.S. district court that tried and sentenced them.\(^12\)

Persons detained by the federal government without trial, like Jose Padilla, lack the statutory habeas options afforded to most federal prisoners; because

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5. See infra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
7. The Second Circuit could not establish personal jurisdiction for the warden of the South Carolina brig, but easily established jurisdiction over Secretary Rumsfeld. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 708-10.
8. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 110, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (No. 03-2235(L)); see also Laura Sullivan, 4th Circuit’s Reputation is Polite, Conservative Bush Administration Steers Sensitive Cases to Friendly Panel of Judges, BALT. SUN, Nov. 18, 2003, at 1A.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2000). Section § 2241 broadly empowers courts to grant habeas relief, and § 2243 defines the proper respondent as the “custodian.”
10. See, e.g., Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 122 (2d Cir. 1998).
11. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
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they have not been convicted of a crime, non-convict federal detainees cannot invoke the § 2255 option. This group includes, in addition to “enemy combatants” like Padilla, aliens facing deportation, inmates in mental health facilities, and members of the military, who are commonly detained in federal facilities without trial.\(^{13}\) Non-convict prisoners, constrained by § 2243, have been forced to name their wardens or commanding officers as respondents to habeas petitions, often in inconvenient courts. Despite this longstanding rule, the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit allowed Padilla to name the Secretary as respondent, heard Padilla’s petition in the forum of his choice, and awarded the requested relief. The case is now pending review in the Supreme Court.\(^{14}\)

The court’s decision was one in a line of several recent cases to have examined the habeas difficulties faced by federal prisoners detained without trial. Most of the courts of appeal that have considered the issue have endorsed the traditional “formal approach” to interpreting § 2243.\(^{15}\) The formal approach, best seen in *Vasquez v. Reno*\(^{16}\) allows only the immediate custodian of the petitioner to serve as respondent. Other courts have created a new “convenience approach” to extend the flexibility of § 2255 to prisoners not covered by that statute’s language. The leading case for this approach is *Armentero v. INS*,\(^{17}\) which held that, in the interest of equity, the head of a federal agency may serve as the appropriate respondent for an immigration habeas petition. The *Padilla* court—in authorizing the petitioner to name Secretary Rumsfeld as a respondent—created an entirely new line of jurisprudence. The *Padilla* approach determines whether or not a respondent is appropriate based on his personal involvement in the petitioner’s case. The following examination of recent cases reveals that it was stunning departure from established precedent for the Second Circuit to allow Padilla to name Secretary Rumsfeld as a respondent.

I. THE FORMAL APPROACH

The First Circuit’s holding in *Vasquez v. Reno* typifies the formal approach to habeas petitions.\(^{18}\) The formal approach relies on the language of § 2243,
which states that a writ of habeas corpus “shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained” and able to “produce at hearing the body of the person detained.” In a case involving an alien facing deportation, the Vasquez court concluded that only the petitioner’s warden exercised “day-to-day control” over the petitioner and could “produce the body” before the court. Three other circuits have also adopted the formal approach to defining the proper habeas respondent.

The Vasquez court specifically found that the Attorney General was not an appropriate respondent to the habeas petition. The First Circuit found no ambiguity in the statutory language directing habeas petitions “to the person having custody of the person detained” and requiring the respondent “to produce at hearing the body of the person detained.” “The immediate custodian rule effectuates section 2243’s plain meaning,” the First Circuit found, “and gives a natural, commonsense construction to the statute.” The court went on to find that there exists “no principled distinction” between federal prisoners in correctional facilities and immigration detainees except for the different procedural habeas remedies afforded to the two groups. The court insisted that if Congress had intended to give immigration detainees the options of other federal prisoners, it would have passed new legislation, as it did with § 2255.

The First Circuit pointed out that, as a practical matter, the formal approach is simple to administer. The Vasquez court feared that if a broader definition of the term “custodian” were adopted by courts, the adjudication of habeas claims would become significantly more difficult and would allow petitioners to engage in forum shopping. The court conceded that venue considerations would eliminate many district courts from having jurisdiction over habeas petitions, but suggested that petitioners could still force significant delays by forcing courts to engage in “fact-intensive” analyses of venue and forum non

20. See al-Marri v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-3674 (7th Cir. Mar. 8, 2004); Yi v. Maugans, 24 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314 (6th Cir. 2003) (adopting a slightly modified formal approach where an Immigration and Naturalization Service District Director was viewed as the “immediate custodian,” instead of the warden of a local jail); Robledo-Gonzales, 342 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2003).
21. Vasquez, 233 F.3d at 691.
22. Id. at 690 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2243).
23. Id. at 693.
24. The Vasquez court wrote:
If Congress apprehends that an overcrowding of the dockets of certain district courts threatens to interfere with the rights of habeas prisoners, it has demonstrated an ability to rectify that condition through legislation. In our view, proceeding in this measured fashion is far superior to attempting to resolve the problem of habeas overload ... by rewriting, judicially, the time honored definition of “custodian.”
Id. at 694 (footnote omitted).
conveniens issues. According to Vasquez, if any rule other than the formal approach were applied, federal habeas practice would become significantly more complex.

The formal approach does recognize certain extraordinary circumstances in which someone other than the immediate custodian can be named as the respondent to a habeas petition. In modern habeas practice, those courts that adhere to the formal approach allow an exception to the rule when the Constitutional right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus would effectively be denied. Such a situation arises when a petitioner would not have a “realistic” opportunity for judicial review of his habeas petition. Except in those limited circumstances, courts applying the formal approach have been decidedly inflexible.

II. THE CONVENIENCE APPROACH

In 2003, a number of courts suggested an alternate interpretation of the word “custodian” in § 2243. This approach uses a variety of factors to determine the appropriate respondent in a particular case. The convenience approach recognizes that, in some cases, a higher federal official may be the petitioner’s “custodian,” and thus an appropriate respondent for habeas petitions. The Ninth Circuit first presented the convenience approach in Armentero v. INS. In Armentero, Judge Berzon, for a unanimous panel, concluded that “the most appropriate respondent” to immigration habeas petitions is the head of the federal agency responsible for detaining the alien. Armentero conflicts directly with the conclusions of the First, Third, and Seventh Circuits. Unlike Vasquez, Armentero distinguishes sharply between

25. Id.
26. Roman, 340 F.3d at 325. Only two classes of cases have adopted the formal approach but authorized an exception. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 705 n.10; see also al-Marri v. Bush, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1005 (2003). First, in Demjanjuk v. Meese, 784 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the D.C. Circuit concluded that the Attorney General is the appropriate respondent to a habeas claim brought by a petitioner held in an undisclosed location. Second, courts have authorized departure from the formal approach when a habeas petitioner’s custodian is located outside the territorial limits of any district court. Samirah v. O’Connell, 335 F.3d 545 (2003).
27. 340 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2003).
28. As of the publication of this Case Note, no other circuits had adopted the convenience approach in immigration cases, but several district courts had. See e.g., Jama v. Ashcroft, No. 01-1172, 2003 WL 22427839 (D. Minn. Oct. 24, 2003). Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998), a predecessor to Padilla in the Second Circuit, indicated that the Attorney General may be an appropriate respondent for some immigration habeas petitions for “convenience” reasons but did not rule on the matter. Id. at 122.

One novel argument which combines both the formal and convenience approaches appears in Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314 (6th Cir. 2003). There the court held that only the immediate custodian of a federal detainee is the proper respondent for a habeas petition. In so doing, the court held that the only proper respondent in normal habeas cases was the INS district director for the district where the petitioner is detained. This respondent was appropriate based on considerations similar to those found in Armentero. However, the court did not extend this rationale to the Attorney General in ordinary cases. Roman did recognize that the Attorney General may be the proper respondent to immigration habeas petitions in those situations where the constant transfer of detainees from district to district would result
non-convict detainees and other federal prisoners. "Unlike the First and Third Circuits," Judge Berzon wrote, "we see significant differences between the situation of federal criminal prisoners and that of immigration detainees."29 In rejecting the immediate custodian rule, the Armentero court read the custodian requirement of § 2243 as a flexible concept, which permitted the naming of respondents who were not immediate custodians if "practicality, efficiency, and the interests of justice so demand."30

The Ninth Circuit justified such flexibility for habeas petitions challenging immigration-related detentions on practical and policy grounds. The court based the distinction between federal prisoners and immigration detainees partly on the fact that federal prisoners are often held in federal institutions, whereas immigration detainees are often held in state and local facilities. The court held that it was "not logical" for courts to treat state and local wardens under contract with the federal government as custodians because they lack power to release federal detainees without authorization from a federal official.31 Furthermore, because immigration detainees are constantly moved from location to location, the Ninth Circuit believed it would be harder to identify a consistent custodian to act as the appropriate respondent, and the constant change of the appropriate respondent/custodian would hamper expeditious resolution of habeas claims.32 The court also held that the location of detention institutions in rural, isolated locations would hinder effective representation.33 Finally, the court found that its ruling was appropriate for administrative reasons. The majority of immigration detainees were held at an Oakdale, Louisiana facility; as a result, the Western District of Louisiana was flooded with detainee habeas petitions. Allowing the Attorney General to be the respondent to habeas petitions would spread the burden among many federal districts.34

III. THE PADILLA APPROACH

The Padilla decision stands in stark contrast to both the formal and convenience approaches. Padilla creates a new approach to habeas law that hinges on the relationship of the respondent to the petitioner. In Padilla, the government argued that while the case presented many novel facts and legal questions, the procedural footing of the case was standard fare. The court,

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in a denial of the Constitutional right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, the Roman court applied the immediate custodian rule, but considered some immigration cases to be exceptions.

29. 340 F.3d at 1070.
30. Id. at 1068.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1069.
33. Id.
34. Subject to venue considerations. Id. at 1069-1070.
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however, recognized Padilla’s situation as uniquely different from the standard habeas petition. In the standard habeas case, the warden, by default, becomes the appropriate respondent since she alone has the continuing ability to release the petitioner. Here, however, a number of parties exercised direct responsibility for Padilla’s detainment, making the case an unusual one. After examining Supreme Court precedent on the issue, the court concluded that a “broad concept” of custodian should be applied in cases where the respondent, acting through agents, was responsible for the detention. Under this interpretation of the term “custodian,” the analysis turned on whether or not Secretary Rumsfeld had “direct responsibility” for Padilla’s detention. Because of the Secretary’s involvement and control in the apprehension and detention of Padilla, the Second Circuit found that “the extraordinary and pervasive role that [Secretary Rumsfeld] played in [this] matter [ ] is virtually unique” and that the Secretary was consequently the proper respondent. Thus, the *Padilla* court created an entirely new approach: determining whether or not a respondent was appropriate based on her level of involvement in the detention.

Even though it was designed for the equities of a single case and is limited to those cases involving petitioners designated as enemy combatants and others with “congruent” circumstances, the *Padilla* decision is a powerful challenge to the formal approach. The court applied a rationale for its holding that has nothing to do with Padilla’s status as an enemy combatant and was not limited to the facts of that case. Instead, the court determined that Secretary Rumsfeld was the proper respondent because he was personally involved in Padilla’s detention. This approach is applicable to any habeas petition regardless of the distinctiveness of the circumstances. Further, the *Padilla* approach implies an

35. *Padilla*, 352 F.3d at 705.
36. *Id.* at 706. The decision relies on a variety of Supreme Court precedents, *id.* at 705-06, including *Ex Parte Endo*, 323 U.S. 283, 305 (1944), in which the Court concluded that “national-level officials who have power to produce[,] the petitioner even though they were not the immediate custodians” could be proper respondents. The decision also cited *Strait v. Laird*, 406 U.S. 341 (1972), which held that despite intervening levels of military personnel that dealt directly with petitioner, an out-of-state commander had responsibility to decide whether to release petitioner and therefore was the proper respondent. While *Vasquez* and *Armentero* also cite to these cases, those courts did not find their precedent conclusive. *Vasquez*, 340 F.3d at 695; *Armentero*, 340 F.3d at 1068.
37. *Padilla*, 352 F.3d at 706.
38. *Id.* at 707 (quoting Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 126 (2d Cir. 1998)) (alteration in original).
39. *Id.* The Second Circuit may have created this new approach because of its desire to retain jurisdiction over Padilla’s case. During oral argument, Judge Pooler, one of the *Padilla* authors, revealed her hesitation to defer the matter to the Fourth Circuit. When Government counsel commented that “the Fourth Circuit has demonstrated its ability to deal with these matters,” Judge Pooler thanked counsel for his “chauvinistic comparison among circuits.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, *Padilla v. Rumsfeld*, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (No. 03-2235(L)). Later, Judge Pooler commented that the government “desperately” wanted to be in front of the Fourth Circuit instead of her court. *Id.* at 110.
40. *Padilla*, 352 F.3d at 708.
even greater rejection of the formal approach than that implied by *Armentero*. The analysis used in *Armentero* applied solely to immigration petitions, and the convenience approach depends on the peculiar nature of immigration detention. Padilla, who was held consistently in one federal installation, could allege few of the concerns that legitimated *Armentero*’s flexibility. While *Armentero* seems to limit the convenience approach to cases in which the formal approach is unlikely to produce a just result, the *Padilla* approach lacks similar restraint. *Padilla* calls for a consistent flexibility regardless of the suitability of the formal approach to a petitioner’s situation.

IV. COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The *Padilla* decision represents a considerable challenge to the formal approach typified in *Vasquez*. Where *Armentero* only serves to expand the body of exceptions to the formal approach, *Padilla* eviscerates the formal approach altogether. In *al-Marri v. Rumsfeld*, the Seventh Circuit highlights how contrary the *Padilla* holding is to established precedent. While reaffirming the formal approach, the *al-Marri* decision criticizes the *Padilla* holding because it “is not the view long maintained by the federal judiciary, and [did not] unearth any clues suggesting that the historical understanding and practice are wrong.” As a result, *al-Marri* refers to the *Padilla* approach as a “non sequitur.” The Seventh Circuit’s decision is meant as a full-on assault on the *Padilla* approach.

The choice of which approach courts should apply has high stakes for the repeat players in habeas petitions. The formal approach favors the government: by choosing where to keep detainees, the government can determine where petitioners are able to file habeas petitions. The *Armentero* approach only allows an exception to this rule in limited circumstances depending on efficiency and fairness concerns. The *Padilla* approach allows for a variety of possible respondents, and therefore fora, as long as the respondents are actively involved in the detention of the petitioner.

If the *Padilla* court’s reading of § 2243 is correct, nothing but the Second Circuit’s bashfulness prevents the *Padilla* approach from being used in other non-convict habeas cases. The *Padilla* approach reasonably extends to all federal detainees, since this rationale can be applied in any habeas proceeding.

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41. Interestingly, in footnote 13, the *Padilla* decision mistakenly cites *Armentero* as finding a similarly “broad interpretation” of the term custodian based on precedent. *Id.* at 706 n.13 (citing *Armentero*, 340 F. 3d at 1070). In fact, *Armentero* did consider the same precedent as *Padilla*, but found that the case law did not “state[] a clear path toward identifying the respondent or respondents in an immigration detainee’s habeas petition.” *Armentero*, 340 F.3d at 1068.

42. No. 03-3674, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 4445 (7th Cir. Mar. 8, 2004).

43. *Id.* at *11.

44. *Id.* at *13.

45. It remains to be seen what minimum level of involvement is necessary to qualify.
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under § 2243. As discussed above, the approach applied in Padilla is not limited solely to the unique facts presented. Any court may consider whether or not a high-level government official was involved in the detention of a petitioner. If she was, then the approach applied in Padilla holds the official to be a proper respondent. Because of its expansive scope, the Padilla approach envelops the convenience approach by creating more potential respondents in all cases.

The Padilla approach, however, runs directly contrary to an established jurisprudence embodied in the formal approach. Both the Padilla and convenience approaches require a starkly different reading of § 2243 than that which the courts have long employed. The government asserts that these departures from precedence favor the petitioner by allowing forum shopping. This is a hollow contention. While it is true that both the Armentero and Padilla approaches increase the number of fora available to petitioners, traditional consideration of venue would limit the number of available fora. The factors to be considered in determining venue in habeas proceedings include: (1) where the material events took place, (2) where evidence is likely to be found, and (3) the convenience of the forum for both parties. Applying these factors in habeas cases favors neither the government nor the petitioner, but the facts of the litigation.

Each of the non-formal approaches considers different factors in determining the appropriate respondent, and thus forum. The Armentero decision is less offensive to proponents of the formal approach. The “convenience” approach is only applicable to those cases where, in common practice, the only way to effectuate a fair habeas hearing is by naming someone other than the immediate custodian a respondent. Venue considerations also severely limit the fora available in these cases. Yet this approach does move away from a strict application of the formal rule, even if only in limited circumstances.

Padilla, however, completely undermines the formal approach. It allows any person involved in the detention of the petitioner to be a possible respondent. As with Armentero, this approach, when combined with venue considerations, does not create a large number of possible fora. Presumably, in

46. Henderson, 157 F.3d at 127. See also al-Marri, at *9 (“Within the last few months... two courts of appeals have departed from this approach and held that, by naming a cabinet officer as a respondent, a prisoner may litigate in any of the 94 districts.”).

47. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 493-94 (1973). When the respondent is a federal official, venue is controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (2000) (“A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States... acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority... may... be brought in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred... or (3) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.”).

48. In Padilla, the Southern District of New York presented a proper venue given that it is where Padilla resides and his counsel is located. See also al-Marri v. Bush, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1008 (2003).
most cases, the Padilla approach would only allow for a petitioner to file a claim in the jurisdiction in which she is held and the one in which most of the investigation against her exists. In essence, the Padilla approach would give non-convicted federal detainees options similar to those that most federal prisoners already have under § 2255.

The Padilla approach represents a reasonable interpretation of § 2243 that should not be discounted because of its novelty.\(^4\) Armentero also stands outside the traditional jurisprudence, but rests on another logical interpretation of the statute.\(^5\) Vasquez relies on an antiquated reading of the term custodian and assumes that a federal warden can exercise powers unavailable to high level officers of the executive branch. Such a conclusion is incorrect. Since the adoption of § 2255, despite the naming of the “United States” and not the immediate custodian as respondent, the government has been able to produce prisoners before the court when required.\(^5\) Padilla and Armentero make formidable statutory arguments in favor of a broad interpretation of the term custodian in § 2243 based on Supreme Court precedent that suggests significant judicial authority to define the habeas respondent broadly, if called for by the circumstances of the case.\(^5\) Section 2243 never makes explicit that the respondent must be the immediate custodian. Instead, the statute refers to the respondent as “the person having custody of the person detained.”\(^5\) The use of the term “the” to modify the word person does not necessarily indicate a statutory requirement that the respondent be a single, specific person. For that matter, it does not even require that the respondent be a person at all. It could be argued that the word “person” refers to any entity with custody of the prisoner, not an individual.\(^5\) Courts are well within their powers to interpret this ambiguous statutory language to include a variety of respondents and not the lone immediate custodian.

\(^4\) At least one other circuit has adopted the Padilla approach. In United States v. Moussaoui, 2004 WL 868261, *7 (4th Cir. April 22, 2004), in an opinion written by Chief Judge Wilkins, the Fourth Circuit held that where “witnesses [were] in military custody,” Secretary Rumsfeld could be the proper respondent. In the Moussaoui case, the Government argued that the witnesses were “of vital import to the war effort and to national security.” Under such circumstances, the court held that it was “reasonable to believe that Secretary Rumsfeld [was] closely involved in their detention,” and thus a proper respondent. Id.

\(^5\) Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit al-Marri decision does not question Armentero’s interpretation of § 2243, even while criticizing the flexibility of Padilla.

\(^{13}\) Femstenfeld-Torres, supra note 13, at 462.

\(^{52}\) Padilla, 352 F. 3d at 705-707. Among other arguments, the Padilla decision notes: ‘The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected.’ Moreover, the courts ‘have consistently rejected interpretations of the habeas corpus statute that would suffocate the writ in stifling formalisms or hobble its effectiveness with the manacles of arcane and scholastic procedural requirements.’ Id. at 705 (citations omitted).


\(^{54}\) Femstenfeld-Torres, supra note 13, at 464.
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Fairness and efficiency require this broad interpretation of the statutory language. The *Padilla* approach allows for a more equitable habeas process. Venue considerations and the facts of the litigation, and not the whim of the government, should determine the appropriate venue for a petition. Anything less impinges on the constitutional right to habeas relief.\(^{55}\) It is counter-intuitive to suggest that convicted prisoners should be given greater protection under § 2255 than possibly innocent federal detainees are afforded under § 2243. The formal approach imposes significant, uneven administrative burdens on certain federal courts, slowing the habeas process for detainees and creating a burden not faced by convicted prisoners. The equitable concerns raised are compelling and have clearly propelled various courts to respond. If the Supreme Court does not use the *Padilla* case to update the law of the habeas respondent, Congress should respond by promulgating a looser construction of the term custodian, or by extending the flexibility of § 2255 to petitions of federal detainees not yet convicted of a crime.\(^{56}\)

*Padilla* highlights the split between circuits that strictly define the habeas respondent and circuits with more flexible approaches. If the law remains in its current state, a petition that would be dismissed on procedural grounds in some federal courts will earn a hearing on the merits in others. The interpretational questions raised by the circuit split and fundamental fairness both call for the same resolution: allowing federal detainees to name the United States, or an equivalent actor, as habeas respondent.

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56. Admittedly, such an amendment would create a greater number of available fora than § 2255 since there is no analog for § 2255's allowance for filing in the "sentencing" court. See Fernsteld-Torres, *supra* note 13, at 471.