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# Mass Imprisonment, Crime Rates, and the Drug War: A Penological and Humanitarian Disgrace

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ARTICLE: Mass Imprisonment, Crime Rates, and the Drug War: A Penological and Humanitarian Disgrace

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#### LEXISNEXIS SUMMARY:

... For if those we have locked up have no more than an average propensity within their demographic groups to commit crimes, imprisoning more than two million Americans should have sharply reduced crime rates and the numbers of new prisoners. ... Although the number of users of illicit drugs has been on the decline for about three decades, arrests for drug offenses have never been higher. ... The criminogenics of drug prohibition: indirect effects on mass imprisonment The fact that drug crimes account for one-third of our prison population is only part of the story, for, like alcohol prohibition, drug prohibition is criminogenic in myriad ways. ... Some police even engage in drug dealing themselves, stealing drugs from drug dealers and redistributing them. ... Prohibition was repealed for the same reasons drug prohibition has failed, including but not limited to crime, corruption, disrespect for law, death and disease from defective or poisoned products, and waste of taxpayer money. ... Among other benefits of decriminalizing marijuana would be the strengthening of official admonitions against and prohibitions of the recreational use of more harmful drugs such as heroin, cocaine and methamphetamine.

#### TEXT:

[\*17]

The explosion in our prison population began in 1973, the same year President Nixon declared war on drugs. During the preceding forty years, the prison population was stable at around 200,000. n1 Since 1970, however, the number of people in U.S. prisons and jails has increased 800 percent n2 and our rate of imprisonment, the percentage of the population in prison or jail, is up more than 500 percent. n3 The United States not only has the largest number of people in prison, n4 nearly one fourth of the world's total prison population, n5 it has the highest rate of imprisonment in the world. n6 There is much speculation about the causes of this mass imprisonment mania, n7 but the mechanisms

by which mass imprisonment was accomplished are clear. We have continued to arrest people at about the same rate since 1973, n8 but since then we have sentenced those we convict to prison, for much longer terms, with fewer opportunities for parole or [\*18] early release than in previous years. n9 When we do release someone on parole, we revoke parole and return the parolee to prison more often than we formerly did. n10 That explains how we increased our prison population eightfold; why we did it is less obvious.

Television coverage of violent crimes has greatly increased and has been accompanied by a false perception in the public that crime rates are relentlessly ascending. n11 Responding to that phenomenon and the ubiquity of television, politicians have discovered that their rants about rising crime and their passage of new anti-crime legislation, however redundant that legislation may be, translates into popularity among the polity. n12

Sparked by the media-generated fear of crime, Americans have undergone a paradigm shift in humane values. From the inception of the penitentiary in the 19th century through the 1960s, imprisonment was justified by its promise of reforming prisoners so that they could return to society as productive, law-abiding citizens. n13 Criminal behavior was commonly thought to be causally related to biographical, environmental factors rather than to inherent wickedness. It was also widely believed and more widely hoped that the prison environment could override or reduce the prisoner's criminal proclivities. Theories of human nature changed during this period, along with theories about how deviant propensities could be modified, but the idea of imprisonment as an instrument of rehabilitation persisted. n14

In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals declared that prisons, reformatories and jails had [\*19] produced a "shocking record of failure." n15 The Commission opined that these institutions may have created more crime than they prevented. But rather than producing alternatives to incarceration, such questioning of the correctional capabilities of the modern prison was soon followed by a "profound counterrevolution" in which "the intellectual cornerstone of corrections policy for nearly a century- rehabilitation-was publicly and politically discredited." n16 Driven "by political steam and fueled by media-induced fears of crime," n17 imprisonment "soon came to be thought of as its own reward, serving only the goal of inflicting pain." n18

The rehabilitative ideal has been overwhelmed by the notion that criminals are fundamentally evil and irredeemable. James Q. Wilson reflected the public mood when he undertook to remind liberals that "wicked people exist. Nothing avails except to set them apart from innocent people." n19 The prevalent contemporary perspective is that only the criminal is responsible for his behavior and "deserves" whatever punishment society chooses to inflict. It is that perspective that accounts for our pinnacle position in the world of imprisonment. It also explains why our "correctional institutions" are actually administered as "toxic waste management facilities." n20

America could not have achieved the distinction of being the world's foremost jailer without a steady stream of new subjects. For if those we have locked up have no more than an average propensity within their demographic groups to commit crimes, imprisoning more than two million Americans should have sharply reduced crime rates and the numbers of new prisoners. It has not. Overall crime rates are about the same as they were in 1973. n21

[\*20]

Moreover, apart from the fact that 1 percent of our adult population, and a much larger percentage of our most demographically crime-prone men, n22 are incarcerated, a myriad of other forces, circumstances and technological developments over the past thirty-five years should have sharply reduced our crime rates.

Among the changes that should have greatly reduced crime is the aging of the population. Crime rates peak in the late teen years. n23 Between 1980 and 2007, however, the proportion of the population between the ages of 15 and 19

decreased almost 24 percent. n24 After the teenage peak, the older we get, the less crime we commit. The median age in 1970 was 28.1 years. n25 It was 32.8 in 1990 n26 and 36.2 in 2005. n27 Thus, the median age during the relevant period increased about 30 percent.

We have also invested far more of our resources in police. From 1972 to 2009, the U. S. population increased by about 45 percent. n28 Yet we [\*21] employ almost two and a half times as many police as we did in 1972. n29 We also spend about \$ 100 billion annually on police functions n30 compared to less than \$ 7 billion in 1972. n31

Technological and training advances greatly facilitate both prevention and detection of crime. Police have learned better how to prevent crime by community policing and community educational programs. n32 The government and other organizations underwrite studies to determine where pockets of crime exist and who is likely to perpetrate particular types of crime. n33 Their findings are available to the police in their computers. n34 Sex offenders, probationers, parolees and defendants released on bail are under supervision and can be subjected to electronic monitoring. Police cruisers are equipped with computers that can run a license number or seek other information about a suspect or a crime scene almost instantaneously. n35 Police cars also contain video cameras that can record much crime as it is being perpetrated. n36 Also ubiquitous are surveillance cameras installed in shopping centers, stores, schools, residences and, [\*22] increasingly, in public places. n37 Millions of cell phones allow crime witnesses to call the police immediately and even to photograph crimes as they are being perpetrated or as the criminals seek to escape. n38 Private parties and businesses have also spent enormous sums on alarm and other security systems and private police. n39 The ability of a criminal to successfully commit thefts, robberies, burglaries or other predatory crimes is substantially diminished by numerous technological advances and vast private investment in self-protection measures.

Despite these powerful developments, however, crime rates, although fluctuating, have remained relatively stable over the thirty-five year period of the prison boom. n40 The most likely explanation, ironically, is the "War on Drugs."

## I. The seeds of drug prohibition were planted in 1914, but war was not declared until 1973

Recreational use of some drugs has been illegal in the United States since 1914, when the Harrison Act proscribed some nonmedical uses of cocaine and heroin. Rather than being a prohibition of the use or distribution of these drugs, the Act was "merely a law for the orderly marketing of opium, morphine, heroin, and other drugs." n41 Alcohol was considered a far greater problem, but as momentum built for prohibiting alcohol, the animosity spilled over to other drugs. The Supreme Court virtually created cocaine and heroin prohibition in a 1919 decision n42 shortly before the Volstead Act, instituting alcohol prohibition, was enacted in 1920. During the 13 years of Prohibition, crime and corruption increased enormously. According to James Ostrowski, "The murder rate [\*23] rose with the start of Prohibition, remained high during Prohibition, then declined for eleven consecutive years when Prohibition ended. The rate of assaults with a firearm rose with Prohibition and declined for ten consecutive years after Prohibition." n43 As Prohibition wore on, prison terms increased in length and penalties increased. Law enforcement budgets more than doubled. n44 When Prohibition ended, the black marketers that had formed to distribute alcohol transferred their talents to other vices, such as gambling, prostitution and illegal drugs. n45 This transformation was facilitated in 1937 when marijuana was added to the prohibited list as a result of a fraudulent campaign highlighted by the movie, "Reefer Madness." n46 Enforcement of drug prohibition, however, was sporadic and relatively benign prior to 1973, when President Richard Nixon declared an "all-out global war on the drug menace." n47 Since then, the federal drug enforcement budget has grown by about 3300 per cent. n48 Federal, state and local governments spend around \$40 billion per year to enforce drug prohibition. n49 Drug arrests have increased 380 percent since 1973. n50

## II. The drug war's direct contributions to mass imprisonment

The three types of crime that account for most prison admissions are [\*24] violent crime, property crime and drug crime. Of the three, drug crimes account for the most admissions. n51 Although the number of users of illicit drugs has been on the decline for about three decades, n52 arrests for drug offenses have never been higher. n53 Drug offenders in prisons and jails have increased 1100 percent since 1980. n54 Nearly half a million persons are in jail or prison for drug offenses, compared to 41,000 in 1980. n55 The percentage of State prisoners doing time for drug offenses has gone up from 6 percent in 1980 to 20 percent in 2003. n56 The percentage of federal prisoners who are incarcerated for drug offenses has increased during the same period from 25 percent to 55 percent. n57

#### III. The criminogenics of drug prohibition: indirect effects on mass imprisonment

The fact that drug crimes account for one-third of our prison population is only part of the story, for, like alcohol prohibition, drug prohibition is criminogenic in myriad ways. Here are four.

#### A. Motivations to Steal and Rob

A premise behind the drug war is that if we ratchet up the cost of using illicit drugs, we will reduce demand for the drugs. The more distributors that we send to jail or prison, and the longer we keep them there, the greater the cost of the drugs. As a result, there will be fewer consumers of the drugs and those who do use the drugs will use less of them. n58 There is a germ of truth in that premise since the demand for even the most popular addictive drugs is not wholly inelastic. The demand for tobacco is curbed somewhat by high prices. n59 The demand for alcohol during Prohibition [\*25] was apparently reduced by about 30 percent. n60 But users who are addicted to a particular drug, such as heroin, do not easily give up the habit or transfer it to other, cheaper drugs. Instead, as the costs of heroin usage increase, many users augment their incomes to make the drug more affordable. The more drugs cost, the more predatory crime is committed by users to cover those costs. n61 In a survey of persons in prison for robbery or burglary, one out of three said they committed their crimes in order to buy drugs. n62 The amount of property crimes generated by drug addictions is staggering. A study of 573 heroin users in Miami found that they admitted to committing nearly 215,000 offenses during the previous year. Included were 25,000 shopliftings, 45,000 thefts and frauds, 600 robberies and assaults, and 6,700 burglaries. n63 Another group of 356 heroin users admitted committing nearly 120,000 crimes (an average of 332 per person) during a single year. n64 Cocaine addictions are even more expensive than heroin, since some cocaine users spend thousands per week on the drug. In a survey of 500 callers to a cocaine hotline, the average caller reported spending \$ 637 per week on the drug and 45 percent reported that they had stolen to buy cocaine. n65 In a nationwide sample of 1,725 adolescents, less than 2 percent of the sample admitted using cocaine or heroin but also admitted to 40-60 percent of the serious crimes committed by the entire sample. n66 Drug prohibitionists often attribute such crimes to "drug use," n67 but drug use alone, without prohibition, produces very little crime apart from the drug use itself. Although few, if any, drugs are as addictive as [\*26] tobacco, crimes are seldom committed to buy cigarettes. When cigarettes are in short supply, however, addicts will rob and steal for a smoke. n68

# B. Systemic Violence

The distribution and consumption of illegal, contraband drugs is a black market activity, wholly illegal. n69 The legal system cannot be relied upon to enforce agreements, to determine the validity of claims, to allocate territories, to protect trade names or even to protect property. The system is maintained and disputes are settled by force or threat of force. The result is the commission of many murders. In some cities, the majority of murders are attributed to hostilities between drug dealers. n70 During the height of the crack epidemic, between 5,000 and 10,000 murders per year were attributed to the illegal drug business. n71 Far more people are killed by the prohibition of drugs than by the drugs themselves. n72

The contribution of drug prohibition to violence is dramatically demonstrated by the ongoing wars between Mexican drug cartels and between the cartels and the Mexican Government. Authorities estimate that these turf wars have resulted in 10,000 murders in the past two years. n73 There is even a concern about the possible "collapse" of the Mexican government which has deployed 40,000 soldiers and federal police in an unsuccessful effort to quell the violence. n74 The violence has spread across the border into Texas, Arizona, Alabama and even to Canada. n75 Murders and kidnapping occur there as well, since many associates of the drug [\*27] cartels live in the U.S. and Canada. The Mexican drug business and its tentacles has made Phoenix the kidnapping capital of the United States. n76 The drug cartels, it is reported, make up to \$ 25 billion a year, most of it from selling drugs to U. S. consumers. n77 As long as that market exists, so will the violence. n78

#### C. Corruption of the Criminal Justice System

During Prohibition, many, perhaps even most, law enforcement officers were bribed to allow the production, distribution and sale of alcohol. n79 There is no reason to suspect that the level of police corruption today remotely resembles that which existed during Prohibition. Still, the corruption associated with drug prohibition is seriously criminogenic. Some police in virtually every major city are on the payrolls of drug merchants, tipping off drug dealers about raids or searches and about "snitches." Some police even engage in drug dealing themselves, stealing drugs from drug dealers and redistributing them. In the late 1980s, dozens of police officers in Miami were charged with crimes ranging from murder to robbery and extortion in connection with drug investigations. n80 In 1989, eighteen Los Angeles County deputy sheriffs were found guilty of systematically stealing cash seized in drug raids. n81 Nearly half of the federal narcotics agents in New York City in the 1970s were convicted or discharged for corruption and the Knapp Commission found that corruption was even worse in the New York City Police Department. n82 Two decades later, the City's Mollen Commission made similar findings. n83

It goes on and on. A federal investigation of New York City police in 2004 bagged a dozen police who were stealing drugs and money from drug [\*28] dealers. n84 New Haven police were recently convicted of a series of crimes, including stealing money and drugs, bribery and planting fake evidence in drug cases. n85 Three Boston police were recently convicted of major drug offenses. One of them extorted money on behalf of Columbian drug dealers while in uniform. n86 Others agreed to protect shipments of cocaine coming into the city. n87

Even lawyers and judges are not immune to the lure of drug cash. An Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of New York was convicted of stealing drugs and money from government supplies. n88 Federal Judge Robert F. Collins was convicted of bribery in a drug case and Judge Walter Nixon was convicted of perjury in an investigation of a drug case. n89 Corruption demoralizes all police and spreads like cancer into all phases of law enforcement.

#### D. Diversion of Law Enforcement Efforts

Despite massive increases in police resources, personnel and law enforcement intelligence and technology, the effectiveness of the police in solving predatory crimes and arresting their perpetrators is at or near an all-time low. The reason is drug prohibition.

In many cities, half or more of the arrests are for drug offenses or drug- related crimes. n90 Nationwide, there are more arrests for drug crimes than for any other offense category. n91 Police are encouraged to focus their law enforcement efforts on drugs because they can obtain forfeitures of drug [\*29] money, cars, boats, houses and other property used by the drug dealers. If they don't steal this property, as corrupt police do, honest police will at least

indirectly benefit from the forfeitures, since some of the forfeited property, if not all of it, can remain with the department. n92 Thus, for both corrupt and honest police, there is a built-in bias in favor of investigating and prosecuting drug crime versus predatory crime. Moreover, given the diminution of the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the courts since the declaration of the drug war, n93 it is much easier to make a drug arrest than one for theft, burglary or other crimes that require a modicum of investigative effort. The police can simply drive into an open air drug market, stop whoever is there and search them, a technique that commonly produces a drug arrest. Also, when police arrest people for a motor vehicle infraction, they can often search their persons or their cars and find drugs, converting a motor vehicle stop into a drug arrest. n94 In part because of the enforcement lure and ease of drug arrests, in 2007 only 44.5 percent of violent crimes reported to the police and only 18.6 percent of thefts and 12.4 percent of burglaries were cleared. n95 These clearance rates are far lower than they were before the drug war was declared. In 1958, 93.5 percent of homicides were cleared. n96 In 1961, the figure was 93.1 percent. n97 By 1974, the homicide clearance rate was down to 80 percent. n98 By 2007, the homicide clearance rate had dropped to 61.2 percent. n99 The [\*30] overall clearance rate for all violent offenses was 79 percent in 1958, n100 compared to 44.5 percent in 2007. n101 The clearance rate for property crimes was 24 percent in 1958 n102 compared to 16.5 percent in 2007. n103 A thief, robber, rapist or murderer who avoids the drug business stands a much better chance of avoiding detection and conviction than he would were the police not so distracted by drug crime. n104

If a person arrested for a drug crime also happens to be a violent drug dealer or a drug user who steals and robs to support his addiction, a drug arrest that ends in a conviction and sentence could have a preventive impact on predatory crime as well as drug crime. There is, however, no reason to believe that this is a common collateral benefit of a drug arrest. Nearly half of all drug arrests are for marijuana offenses. n105 There is little evidence that marijuana users or even most marijuana distributors (as opposed to large scale growers or smugglers) are violent or thieves. Marijuana is less often involved in addiction than cocaine, heroin or methamphetamine and it is much less costly than the other drugs. Few consumers need to rob or steal in order to afford marijuana. Moreover, only about 6 percent of marijuana arrests result in a felony conviction. n106 As noted, some cocaine and heroin addicts steal to afford their addictions. However, arrests for cocaine and heroin comprise less than 30 percent of drug arrests n107 and less than 4 percent of all arrests. n108 And while many predatory criminals use drugs, there is no evidence that the typical user of hard drugs also commits predatory crimes. Contrary to common [\*31] assumptions, the typical user of cocaine or heroin is not an addict n109 and is apparently employed in a legitimate occupation. n110 It is also doubtful that most persons arrested for heroin or cocaine offenses are actually convicted and sentenced as felons. n111 Thus, while drug arrests can prevent some predatory crime, the collateral benefit is much attenuated. The typical drug arrest has virtually no preventive impact on predatory crime. Were it not for drug arrests, much of the time and effort spent investigating, arresting, processing and prosecuting drug arrestees would be spent productively on predatory crime.

Repeal of drug prohibition, or even repealing the prohibition of marijuana, might be the law enforcement equivalent of adding a few hundred thousand police to the rolls-at no cost.

#### IV. What can be done?

The case for replacing drug prohibition with regulation is strong. n112 The U.S. would have difficulty extricating itself from the world-wide mess it has created with drug prohibition, since it has persistently and powerfully insisted that the rest of the world support its prohibitionist policies. For this reason, as well as the fact that drugs are a convenient lightning rod for a variety of societal fears, frustrations and prejudices, n113 hardly anyone regards the substitution of a regulatory regime as likely. Still, one should not bet too heavily against fundamental change in this arena. Throughout the 1920s, Billy Sunday preached that repealing Prohibition was no more likely than "repealing the Thirteenth Amendment and restoring slavery." n114 Three years before Prohibition was ended by Constitutional amendment, [\*32] Senator Morris Sheppard of Texas asserted that "[t]here is as much chance of repealing the

Eighteenth Amendment as there is for a hummingbird to fly to the planet Mars with the Washington Monument tied to its tail." n115 Prohibition was repealed for the same reasons drug prohibition has failed, including but not limited to crime, corruption, disrespect for law, death and disease from defective or poisoned products, and waste of taxpayer money. n116

Even though repeal of drug prohibition is unlikely in the near term, the prospect of de-escalating the drug war is far from hopeless. Glimmers of rationality occasionally appear. Australia, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, and Belgium have decriminalized marijuana use in the past decade, joining the Netherlands that did so in the 1970s. n117 Portugal decriminalized all drugs in 2001 and drug use has not increased there since then. A recent study asserts that Portugal's decriminalization has been "a resounding success." n118 Massachusetts recently joined Alaska and Maine in decriminalizing possession of small quantities of marijuana and other states are considering doing so. n119 Fourteen states have legalized (as far as State laws can do so) n120 medical marijuana and the Obama administration has announced that it will not bring federal prosecutions against distributors of marijuana for medical purposes. n121 This policy should also result in a more tolerant law enforcement attitude toward recreational use of marijuana, since the distinction between medical use and recreational use will be often be unclear and, in any event, the medical use of marijuana will demonstrably undermine false assumptions about the deleterious [\*33] psychological and physiological effects of the drug. While not entirely harmless, marijuana is easily the least dangerous recreational drug in common use. n122 It has never produced a documented case of marijuana rage or "reefer madness." Nor has anyone ever died from a marijuana overdose.

The case for legalizing or at least tolerating recreational use of marijuana by adults is overwhelming, and, for the first time in decades, prominent politicians are willing to encourage debate on the subject. n123 Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger recently urged a study of the matter, saying "[I]t's time for a debate." n124 Representative Barney Frank wants to legalize marijuana to "make room" in prison for some "in the financial world" by "getting the people who smoke marijuana out." n125 Among other benefits of decriminalizing marijuana would be the strengthening of official admonitions against and prohibitions of the recreational use of more harmful drugs such as heroin, cocaine and methamphetamine. Official lumping of marijuana with these drugs in messages to potential users and in criminal penalties discredits the prohibitionist enterprise. It is analogous to a "war" against "incest and public nudity." Although related in a very broad sense to sex, those two offenses are simply incomparable. Marijuana, like heroin, cocaine and methamphetamine, is a psychotropic drug, but its dangers and effects are strikingly different from those other drugs, as are the dangers and effects of other drugs like caffeine, alcohol, and tobacco. Legalizing marijuana would also remove a substantial drain on law enforcement resources, greatly improving effectiveness in policing and preventing predatory crimes. We would be a much safer nation were we to pursue this course.

Apart from scaling back the intensity of the war against marijuana, [\*34] there is evidence that some politicians are beginning to consider reducing sentence severity and mandatory minima, especially in drug cases. n126

What a rational approach to crime reduction or a rediscovery of humane values toward prisoners could not accomplish, a shortage of money might. Several states the budgets of which are undergoing drastic reductions are deciding that they cannot afford to continue the imprisonment mania and are releasing inmates early, adopting more sentencing alternatives to incarceration and generally reversing the trend that has been in place since 1973. n127

Since we now have a President who has admitted having used illegal drugs, n128 and who doubtless has observed drug use by others, we may hope to receive some leadership from him in reducing the baseless fears associated with drug use and the tendency of politicians and others to demonize users as well as distributors. When and if that happens, we can hope to reconsider a range of sentences and attitudes toward sentencing that are not animated merely by a desire to reduce the monetary costs of incarceration.

One of the most bizarre and inexcusable results of the militaristic approach to drug problems is imprisoning drug users while denying them treatment for drug dependency, meaningful work and educational opportunities. Study after study has shown that drug treatment works and that it is far more cost-effective in reducing drug consumption than law enforcement. n129 Studies have also shown that more than half of persons admitted to State prisons have used psychotropic drugs (in addition to alcohol and tobacco) during the 30 days prior to their incarceration. n130 Many of them are addicted to drugs and resourcefully continue to use drugs in prison. n131 Yet only 14 percent of those who were drug-dependent [\*35] or drug abusers prior to entering prison ever received any drug treatment in prison. n132 This was down from 36.5 percent in 1991. n133 Even more appalling, two-thirds of prisoners are functionally illiterate n134 yet only about 10 percent of prisoners are enrolled in full-time training or education programs. n135 More than 700,000 of these prisoners, many after ten or twenty years locked away from society, will be released this year. n136 Discharging inmates in such huge numbers who are wholly unprepared for lawful participation in society is a cruel injustice to those inmates and, for all of us, a construct for calamity n137

#### **Legal Topics:**

For related research and practice materials, see the following legal topics:

Criminal Law & ProcedureCriminal OffensesIntoxicating LiquorsDistribution & SalePenaltiesCriminal Law & ProcedurePostconviction ProceedingsImprisonmentCriminal Law & ProcedurePostconviction ProceedingsParole

#### **FOOTNOTES:**

n1 See Craig Haney, Reforming Punishment 63 fig 3.2 (2006).

n2 James Austin, et al., JFA Institute, Unlocking America: Why and How to Reduce America's Prison Population 1 (2007), available at http://www.jfa-associates.com/publications/srs/UnlockingAmerica/pdf.

n3 The U.S imprisonment rate per 100,000 of population in 1970 was 95.1. U.S. Dep't of Commerce., Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 1974, at 164 tbl.281 (1974), available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1974-03.pdf. The rate in 2006 was 501. Sourcebook of Crim. Just. Stat. Online, tbl.6.29.2006 (2006), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t6292006.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).

n4 Austin, supra note 2, at 3.

n5 Glenn Loury, A Nation of Jailers, Cato Unbound, March 11, 2009, available at http://www.cato-unbound.org/2009/03/11/glenn-loury/a-nation-of-jailers/. The U.S. has about 5 % of the world's population. Id.

n6 Austin, supra note 2, at 3.

n7 See John F. Pfaff, The Empirics of Prison Growth: A Critical Review and Path Forward, 98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology L. Rev. 547 (2008); Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the Mass Imprisonment Problem, 40 Ariz. St. L.J. 47 (2008); Yair Listokin, Does More Crime Mean More Prisoners? An

Instrumental Variables Approach, 46 J.L. & Econ. 181 (2003).

n8 U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the U.S., at 152 tbl.254 (1974), available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1974-03.pdf; U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 2006, Law Enforcement, courts, and Prisons 204 tbl.313 (2006), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/ statab/2006/law enforcement courts prisons/law.pdf.

n9 Austin, supra note 2, at 3-4. Between 1980 and 1990, incarceration rates for federal offenders increased tenfold. Peter Reuter, Hawks Ascendant: The Punitive Trend of American Drug Policy, 121 Daedalus 15, 25 (1992). Between 1990 and 1997, prison admissions increased by only 17 % while the prison population increased by 60 %. Paula M. Ditton & Doris J. Wilson, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, Truth in Sentencing in State Prisons 4 (1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf.

n10 About two-thirds of prison admissions today are the result of revocation of probation or parole. Austin, supra note 2, at 1. In 1971, only about 15 percent of the admissions were revocations. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, supra note 3, at 164 tbl.282, available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1974- 03.pdf. In 1977, only 788 inmates who had been released on parole were returned to prison in California. In 1999, that number had grown to 90,000. Fox Butterfield, Often, Parole Is One Stop On the Way Back to Prison, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 2000, at A1.

n11 Austin, supra note 2, at 6.

n12 See Sara Sun Beale, The News Media's Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 397, 397-398 (2006).

n13 See James Reed, Prisons: History, in 3 Ency. Crime & Just. 1197, 1201 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).

n14 See generally Haney, supra note 1, at 27-49.

n15 Nat'l Advisory Comm'n on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Task Force Report on Corr. 597 (1973).

n16 Haney, supra, note 1, at 59.

n17 Craig Haney and Philip Zimbardo, The Past and Future of U.S. Prison Policy: Twenty Five Years After the Stanford Prison Experiment, 7 Am. Psychologist 709, 712 (1998).

n18 Haney, supra note 1, at 59. See also Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History 305-308 (1993).

n19 James Q. Wilson, Thinking About Crime 209 (1975).

n20 Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear 142-143 (2007).

- n21 There is a sense in which "crime rates" have inevitably increased since the propensity of legislatures to criminalize behavior, some of it trivial, has continued uninterruptedly these past several decades. See William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 505-569 (2001); Steven Duke, Clinton and Crime, 10 Yale J. Reg. 575, 576-577 (1993); Alex Kozinski and Misha Tseytlin, You're (Probably) A Federal Criminal, in In the Name of Justice 43, 43 (Timothy Lynch ed.) (2009). When I and most others refer to crime rates, however, we are usually referring to predatory crime, i.e., serious violent and property crimes that have identifiable victims. It is these crimes that are collected and tabulated by the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports and the National Crime Victimization Survey. See generally Shannan M. Catalano, The Measurement of Crime: Victim Reporting and Police Recording 2 (2006). Because the results of the Uniform Crime Reports (based upon data collected by local police) and the Victimization Survey (surveys of victims, whether or not they have reported crimes to the police) vary considerably, there is some disagreement about crime trends, especially in the early 1990s. See id. at 2. The FBI Crime Reports show violent crime peaking in 1991 and now down about 39 percent from that peak; property crime peaking in 1989 and now down about 36 percent from there. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 2008 Crime in the United States tbl.1, available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/data/table 01.html. The Victimization Survey shows a moderate increase in the early 1990s and a sharp decrease in violent crimes from there. Both surveys show slightly lower crime rates at present than in 1973. See Austin, supra note 2, at 5 fig. 2.
- n22 The percentage of the prison population that is female has doubled from 4 percent in 1973 to almost 8 percent in 2008. For 1973 data, see U.S. Dep't of Commerce, supra note 3, at 166 no.285; for June 30, 2008 data, see U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureauof Justice, Bureauof Justice, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm#findings (last visited Nov. 16, 2009). This increase in the imprisonment of women is "largely due to their low-level involvement in drug-related activity and the deeply punitive sentencing policies aimed at drugs." Austin, supra note 2, at 1.
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- n27 U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Estimates of the Population by Sex 2000 to 2005, at tbl.1, available at http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/NC-EST2005/NC-EST2005-01.xls.
- n28 U.S. Census Bureau, Population estimates Program, Historical Population Estimates, available at http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/popclockest.txt. The population was about 212,000,000 in 1973; it

is about 307.9 million today. See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. POPClock Projection http://www.census.gov/population/www/popclockus.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).

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n30 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics: Direct expenditures by criminal function, 1982-2006, available at http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/glance/tables/exptyptab.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).

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n34 See Barry Wise, Catching Crooks with Computers, Am. City & County, May 1, 1995, at 54, a v a i l a b l e a t http://americancityandcounty.com/mag/government catching crooks computers/; Samuel Nunn, Police Information Technology: Assessing the effects of Computerization on Urban Police Functionsm, 61 Pub. Inf. Rev. 221 (2001): Mac Margolis, Mapping Crime: Police Around the World Are Using Technology to Anticipate Where the Bad Guys Will Strike Next, Newsweek, Apr. 24, 2006, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/47131.

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n100 Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra note 88, at 77 tbl.13.

n101 Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra note 87, at tbl.25.

n102 Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra note 88, at 77 tbl.13.

n103 Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra note 87, at tbl.25. It should be noted that reporting practices have changed over time as have the propensities of victims to report crimes to the police. These comparisons, therefore, must be regarded as merely suggestive of temporal differences in police effectiveness in solving

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