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The Great Nuclear Debate*

Eugene V. Rostow†

The last few months have witnessed a healthy increase in public concern about the state of our security in general and about nuclear arms and nuclear arms control agreements in particular. Since I have tried for years to stir up popular interest in these matters, I can only cheer. We cannot hope to restore a strong, confident, bipartisan foreign policy—and surely that is a national objective of primordial importance—until there has been a thorough, civil, and disciplined debate about what our foreign policy is for—what it is supposed to accomplish, and by what means. Such a debate should produce a new state of public opinion, the only legitimate source of policy in a democracy.

Before I comment on some of the issues which are attracting so much attention on the arms control front these days, let me recall a few fundamental propositions by way of framework.

The first principle of President Reagan’s approach to arms control and disarmament has been to insist that arms control be viewed as an integral part of our foreign and defense policy as a whole.¹ Arms control is not a magical activity, which can produce peace by incantation, without pain, and without tears. The other day one of my children sent me a cartoon of the 1930s by the famous British cartoonist David Low. The cartoon makes President Reagan’s point perfectly. Low never drew a figure for “Disarmament” without a twin figure labelled “Collective Security.” Unless collective security is fully and visibly restored, we in ACDA are going to wear out the seats of a good many pairs of pants during the next couple of years. Arms control negotiations can be a useful element in a strategy for achieving peace. But they are not a substitute for such a strategy, nor, equally, are they a substitute for programs designed to restore the military balance with the Soviet Union.

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¹ President Reagan in his first press conference put the Soviet Union on notice that arms control agreements would not be negotiated in a vacuum. Rather, one had to consider “all the other things that are going on.” Press Conference, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1981, at A10, col. 1.
Second, we must guard against the illusion that negotiating with the Soviet Union about arms control is in itself “a restraining influence” on Soviet behavior. This view is wishful thinking and nothing more. We negotiated about arms control with the Soviet Union throughout the 1970s. It was a disastrous period in the history of the Cold War, not only in South East Asia, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Africa, but in the development and deployment of many new and improved Soviet weapons systems. Of course the United States is in favor of negotiating with the Soviet Union about arms control and every other aspect of foreign policy. Indeed, we are doing so now in Geneva about intermediate range nuclear weapons. But we must not confuse hope with reality. And we must not fall into the treaty trap: negotiating with the Soviet Union is not like playing croquet.

Third, I might stress once more that nuclear arms do not exist in a vacuum. The secret is out of the laboratory, and there is no way to put it back. Mankind has eaten the apple and must live with the consequences. Any industrialized country can make nuclear weapons. The West must therefore retain the weapon if only to prevent its possible use by others. Moreover, there is a close and fundamental connection between the nuclear weapon and the use of conventional forces, as the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated twenty years ago.2

We must design both our military and diplomatic policies, and our arms control policies, on the basis of these inescapable facts. There is no way to build an impermeable wall between the use of nuclear and conventional weapons. Just as small nuclear wars may become big ones, so small or large conventional wars could escalate to the nuclear level if nuclear powers are involved. We cannot be sure that we can keep the demon in its cage forever. In order to prevent the horror of nuclear war, therefore, we and our allies, and other nations devoted to peace, must take responsibility for the agreed rules of world public order against all forms of aggression, conventional and nuclear. The ef-


Any member of the Soviet government seriously concerned with the Soviet strategic capability against the United States, and informed of the facts, had to be frightened by the end of 1961. . . . [T]he United States was not on the short side of the missile gap; rather, United States strategic superiority was considerable.

Id. Without confidence in our strategic capability, President Kennedy would have been more reluctant to employ the conventional capabilities of the United States toward the successful result obtained in 1962. He might well have been tempted by the Soviet suggestion that the U.S. remove its missiles from Turkey as a direct quid pro quo for the destruction of Soviet missiles in Cuba. This type of nuclear blackmail is precisely the danger accepted by any state willing to accept strategic inferiority.
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...effectiveness of these rules has declined since the American withdrawal from Vietnam. Until their influence is restored, there is little chance for achieving meaningful arms control. And the United States must be prepared to deter the possibility of political coercion based on the threat to use nuclear weapons.

In my judgment, this is by far the greatest of the nuclear dangers we face—not nuclear war but nuclear blackmail. The President of the United States must never be put in a position where he would have to choose between abandoning a vital American interest and launching nuclear war. That is the essence of the policy of deterrence which has worked successfully since 1945. It must continue to be the goal of our security and our arms control policies.

The fourth preliminary point I might evoke is a simple one: the ground swell of concern about the nuclear problem throughout the Western world is not a mysterious phenomenon, a plague visited on us from the heavens, or a hobgoblin created by Soviet propaganda. It has a perfectly natural cause.

The Soviet Union has pulled out all the stops of a great propaganda campaign to persuade us that the cause of our anxiety is a nuclear arms race. This clearly is not the case. Wars are not caused by arms races or the activities of "merchants of death." They are caused by predation, fear, or the faith of zealots and crusaders. In any event, there has been no nuclear arms race. For ten years or more the Soviet military establishment has increased at the rate of some 4 percent a year in real terms—8 percent a year in the nuclear area.3 During the same period, the armed forces of the West remained stable or fell behind. Now the West is trying to modernize its forces after the long pause of the 1970s, and to close certain critical gaps which have developed. But the Western effort to restore the military balance with the Soviet Union is not the cause of the current concern about war throughout the West. It is a symptom of that concern and a response to it. The West is not seeking nuclear superiority in any sense of the term. The United States is trying only to reestablish its second strike capacity so that we and our allies can deter Soviet aggression and nuclear blackmail against the United States, its allies, and their supreme interests.

The cause of the recent increase in anxiety about war throughout the

3. NATO and the Warsaw Pact—Force Comparisons 65 (NATO 1982). The Soviet Union spends roughly 12 to 14% of its GNP on its military. NATO, as a group, spends roughly 5%. Id. Overall, the Soviet military budget exceeds that of the United States by some 50 percent, the cost of their strategic nuclear programs has, for some years, been triple ours.” Nitze, A Strategy for the 1980's, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 91 (1980).
West is the Soviet program of expansion, based on a formidable and continuing military buildup, and a willingness to use aggressive war as an instrument of national policy. There is no way in which Soviet behavior can be explained as defensive or reconciled with the rules of world public order. The process of Soviet expansion no longer concerns remote coaling stations. It affects areas of great and immediate strategic importance like the Middle East, the Caribbean, and the approaches to Europe and Japan. The Soviet Union’s use of aggression as a tool of policy has weakened the taboos against the use of force and encouraged other nations to follow its example, as we see today in the South Atlantic and elsewhere. As a result, the state system has been slipping towards anarchy.

Naturally, the Soviet drive for hegemony and its consequences have touched sensitive nerves throughout the West. And our people—and people throughout the world—are responding. A Senator told me the other day that what his constituents are saying on these matters is something altogether familiar to a politician, and of the utmost importance: “Do something.” Our people are not committed to any particular solution, he said: a freeze at current levels, a no-first-use pledge, or any other formula, and they certainly do not support either unilateral disarmament or unilateral nuclear disarmament. But they emphatically want their government to do whatever is prudent and reasonable to protect the interests of the nation and to prevent war. As usual, the people are absolutely right.

Actually, public opinion and national policy have moved a long way from the post-Vietnam panic and paralysis of the mid-1970s. We are already more than halfway back to “Collective Security.” I don’t mean to suggest that the post-Vietnam retreat to isolationism is over. One could hardly say that so soon after the publication of the article in Foreign Affairs advocating a no-first-use-policy by Robert McNamara, Gerard Smith, McGeorge Bundy, and George Kennan and other manifestations of the isolationist spirit.\(^4\) But the post-Vietnam foreign policy debate in the United States is now in its second stage. The four years of debate which culminated in the election of President Reagan and his first two years in office have accomplished a good deal. Americans now recognize the imperial character of Soviet foreign policy and the magnitude of the military buildup on which it is based. They understand that Soviet expansion has proceeded too far—that it has be-

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come a threat to the balance of world power and the system of public order which necessarily depends upon it. And they have concluded that the United States made a mistake during the 1970s in allowing the Soviet Union to catch up to the United States in military power, and then forge ahead.

There is a solid American consensus in favor of restoring the conventional and nuclear military balance so that we and our allies can protect our interests in peace, by the methods of alliance diplomacy backed by adequate deterrent force.

Today, we are facing the next set of security problems, those which require us to define those interests in detail, and to develop a strategy for safeguarding them. What is the role of nuclear weapons in our arsenal and in the Soviet arsenal? What is the relation between nuclear and conventional weapons? What are our objectives in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, and what are the objectives of the Soviet Union?

On these questions, consensus does not yet exist. It is the great task of the political process during the next few years to attain it.

The answers President Reagan and his administration have given to these questions are firmly rooted in the history of our experience since 1945. The President has made it clear that we will not retreat to Fortress America, but will defend out alliances and our interests throughout the world. Secretary of State Haig has said that we can no longer tolerate a "double standard" with regard to Soviet aggression.5 Both we and the Soviet Union must obey the same rules with regard to the international use of force—the rules to which we both agreed when we signed the United Nations Charter. This is the only acceptable meaning for that elusive word, "detente." And we are approaching the task of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union for the first time on the basis of the realistic view that we and the Soviet Union have different doctrines about the role of nuclear weapons, and therefore different conceptions of arms control.6

For us, nuclear weapons exist to deter the use of nuclear weapons and other forms of aggression against our supreme interests as a nation. Our weapons are exclusively defensive in character, and the mission of

6. Pipes, Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War, COMMENTARY, July, 1977, at 21. "There is something innately destabilizing in the very fact that we consider nuclear war unfeasible and suicidal for both, and our chief adversary views it as feasible and winnable for himself." Id. at 34.
our nuclear arsenal is to deter aggression by presenting a visible and credible capacity to retaliate as the conclusive deterrent.

It is now clear that the Soviet Union has an entirely different military doctrine. For the Soviet military, the nuclear weapon is the ultimate sanction behind a program of endless expansion conducted by the aggressive use of conventional forces, subversion, and terrorism. The Soviet nuclear weapon is deployed to deter our deterrent by threatening to overwhelm it, and thus make Soviet aggression possible. Some 75 percent or 80 percent of the Soviet nuclear force consists of ICBMs—swift, accurate, and extremely destructive first-strike weapons which could destroy missiles deployed in hardened silos.7 No defenses yet qualify their power to destroy and no American weapon compares in destructive power to the heavy Soviet missiles. The large Soviet ballistic missiles are weapons of intimidation and they exist already in such numbers, and with such capabilities as to cast doubt on the ability of United States forces to survive and retaliate—that is to say, they cast doubt on our nuclear guaranties.8

The Soviet lead in ground-based intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles is the most serious foreign policy problem we face.9 This advantage gives the Soviet Union the potential to improve its military and political position through a first strike against our ICBM force, our submarines in port, and our bombers on the ground. The menace of nuclear imbalance in that sense is being translated into political currents of great power, as we have seen during the last few years. The deployment of vast numbers of warheads on Soviet intermediate-range SS-20s and on ICBMs is designed to make our flesh crawl, and to induce acute political anxiety in Europe and elsewhere at a time when the American intercontinental nuclear guaranty is being questioned.

The combination of these pressures is a recipe for nuclear coercion. Henry Kissinger deepened Western anxiety about the nuclear imbalance a few years ago with his celebrated comment that great powers did

7. See Force Comparisons, supra note 3, at 41.
8. Id. at 43. With over 4800 warheads deployed on SS-18s and -19s alone, the Soviet Union has enough accurate, large, modern warheads to target each U.S. ICBM silo with two warheads and still maintain a large strategic reserve. Id.
9. See id. at 45. The Soviet lead in INF is particularly pronounced. Despite a pledge to halt construction of SS-20 sites, the Soviet Union has continued its massive build-up of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. The Soviets now have over 1200 ballistic missile warheads on SS-4s, -5s, and, of course, the modern, accurate, and mobile SS-20 (accounting for more than 900 of the warheads). Id. By comparison, NATO deploys 108 Pershing IA and 36 Lance missiles, neither of which is in the same class with the SS-20 in terms of range or accuracy.
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not commit suicide on behalf of their allies. But political anxieties about the nuclear umbrella would have existed even if Dr. Kissinger had not spoken. They are what Chancellor Schmidt has called “subliminal” emanations of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. They are there.

The pressures of Soviet nuclear mobilization have other effects. There has been a conspicuous increase in the number of Americans who are seriously advocating an American return to neutrality and isolation, as if that approach to foreign policy were an available option for the United States. Such American voices have their inevitable echo in Europe, Japan, and other parts of the world dependent upon American protection: the chorus advocating American isolation and accommodation to Soviet power is answered abroad by advocates of neutrality on the one hand, and of nuclear armament on the other.

In the light of these considerations, President Reagan decided to make the removal of the destabilizing Soviet advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles the first goal of our arms control effort, and the first aspect of the problem for us to take up with the Soviet Union. We were slightly ahead of the Soviet Union in the number of warheads on deployed ICBMs in 1972. In 1982, the Soviets have a lead in this crucial area of approximately three to one. It follows that they have the capacity to destroy our ICBMs and other nuclear forces with a fraction of their forces, holding the rest in an ominous reserve which could paralyze our remaining strategic forces. Until this Soviet bulge in nuclear power is eliminated, either by arms control or by American modernization efforts—until, that is, a presumptive Soviet first strike ceases to be plausible, and the Soviet strategic arsenal is confined to the role of deterrence—it will not be possible to restore political stability.

The New York Times put the issue well in an editorial entitled How Much is Enough? The task of arms control diplomacy, the Times said, is to allow the United States to maintain deterrence, “which has kept the industrial world at peace for the longest stretch in history” and “to


12. Land-based ballistic missiles combine rapid flight time, high yields, and great accuracy with a high degree of vulnerability. This combination makes them uniquely destabilizing weapons. For that reason, the U.S. has chosen to concentrate upon them in its arms control proposals.

13. Although the Soviet Union had already roughly a 50% advantage in the number of land-based ballistic missiles in 1972 (U.S. 1054 to U.S.S.R. 1530), The Military Balance, Int’l Inst. Strategic Stud. 67 (1973), acquisition of the MIRV technology at the beginning of the 70’s gave the U.S. a slight advantage in total deliverable ICBM warheads. The Soviet Union, however, quickly followed with MIRV capability and now it outstrips the U.S. in ICBM warhead levels.
forbid the weapons which defy deterrence. . . That done, the arms race can subside. Unless it is done, there will never be enough.  

This view of the matter is the basis for our approach both to the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks now going on in Geneva and the START talks the President proposed at Eureka College on May 9. In these talks, we shall sharply distinguish purely retaliatory weapons from those which have first strike potentialities. What we are seeking in these talks, which are closely related in subject matter, is to achieve stability at equal and much lower levels of force—a posture on each side which would permit us to deter both nuclear war and other forms of aggression against our supreme interests. Such a policy would deny the Soviet Union the capacity for nuclear blackmail based on superiority in ground-based intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

In the INF talks, as you know, we have proposed that all the Soviet SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles be dismantled. In exchange, we would not deploy our 572 Pershing II and ground-based cruise missiles in Europe, pursuant to the NATO decision of 1979.

The Soviet Union has bitterly attacked our INF proposal as unfair, on the ground that it would require the Soviets to make a larger reduction than we would be called upon to make. This is hardly the case, since the sacrifice of future weapons is not really different from dismantling existing arsenals. But even if it were true, it would be irrelevant. Arms control negotiations are not bargains among peasants haggling over the price of potatoes at a country fair. The Soviet Union and the United States, the two leading nuclear powers, are trustees for humanity, and should do whatever is necessary to help lift the cloud of war from the horizon of the future. I am glad to note that six months after President Reagan's speech of November 18 on intermediate-range missiles, European and American opinion, and opinion throughout the Western world, solidly supports the principle of our INF proposals as

16. The "zero option" was first proposed by President Reagan on Nov. 18, 1981 in a speech to the National Press Club, and is reported at N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1981, at 17, col. 1.
17. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1981, at 1, col. 5; id., Nov. 20, 1981, at 9, col. 1. On Dec. 1, 1981, the Politburo denounced the "zero option" as an attempt to obtain "the Soviet Union's unilateral disarmament." Id., Dec. 1, 1981, at 7, col. 1. Earlier, the U.S.S.R. had denounced the INF proposal as "a propaganda ploy designed to stalemate the Geneva talks and to present the American course of escalating the arms race and insuring military superiority as a 'peace initiative' . . . ." Id., Nov. 19, 1981, at 1, col. 5.
altogether fair and equitable. After all, no state has a right we must acknowledge to build a military force which could be used only for purposes of aggression.

The President's proposals for the START negotiations are equally sound and equitable. They propose equal ceilings at much lower levels of force—ceilings that would strengthen deterrence and promote stability by significantly reducing the Soviet lead in ICBMs. Coupled with the dismantling of the Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles, such a result would enable us to maintain an overall level of strategic nuclear capability sufficient to deter conflict, safeguard our national security, and meet our commitments to allies and friends.

To achieve this goal, the President announced a practical, phased approach to the negotiation, like the procedure being used in the INF talks. It is based on the principle that the two arsenals should be equal both in the number of weapons and in their destructive capacity. "The focus of our efforts," the President said, "will be to reduce significantly the most destabilizing systems—ballistic missiles—the number of warheads they carry and their overall destructive potential." While no aspect of the problem is excluded from consideration, the United States proposes that the first phase of the negotiation should reduce ballistic missile warheads to equal levels at least one-third below current numbers. Furthermore, to enhance stability, we will propose that no more than half these warheads be deployed on land-based missiles. This provision alone should achieve substantial reductions in missile throw weight. Our proposal calls for these warhead reductions, as well as significant reductions in the number of deployed missiles, to be achieved as quickly as possible.

In a second phase, closely linked to the first, we will seek equal ceilings on other elements of US and Soviet strategic forces, including equal limits on ballistic missile throw weight at less than current US levels.

In both phases of the START talks, we shall insist on verification measures capable of assuring compliance. In the case of provisions that cannot be monitored effectively by national technical means of verification, we will propose cooperative measures, data exchanges, and collateral constraints that can provide the necessary confidence in compliance. The Soviet Union has already told us—and Mr. Brezhnev has

18. The NATO nations have strongly endorsed the U.S. negotiating position at the INF talks, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1981, at 1, col. 4, and at START, id., May 18, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
said publicly—that it will accept reasonable verification procedures of this kind to supplement national technical means of verification.

The Soviet Union has attacked our START proposals as unfair, on the ground that they call for unequal reductions—indeed, that they call for “unilateral Soviet disarmament.” It is hardly obvious why this is the case. Each side now has approximately 7500 ballistic missile warheads. Under the American proposal each side would have to reduce to no more than 5000, of which no more than 2500 could be on ICBMs. True, the Soviet Union would have to dismantle more ICBM warheads than we would in order to comply with the ICBM sublimit, while we might have to dismantle more submarine-based missiles. But that is the point. There is nothing inequitable about an equal ceiling which strengthens deterrent stability.

The significance of this approach as a step towards stabilizing the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union highlights the shortcomings of the familiar popular outcry that there is nuclear “over-kill,” that is, that there are enough weapons on each side to destroy the world many times over. Many use this assertion to support the claim that no more nuclear weapons are required and that a freeze at current levels could do us no harm. It may be that a rose is a rose is a rose, although as a gardener I have never believed that Gertrude Stein’s famous sentence made sense. But all nuclear weapons are not equal. Some are more accurate and destructive than others, and some must cope with defenses. Until we make the Soviet first-strike scenario inconceivable, our nuclear guaranty to our allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East will remain in some doubt. A state of doubt on this crucial point increases the risk to our security.

These aspects of the nuclear problem expose the fallacies of the argument recently put forward in favor of accepting the Soviet Union’s frequent proposal for a pledge that we not use nuclear weapons first even if Soviet tanks were rolling across the German plains toward the English Channel. The American pledge to use nuclear weapons if necessary to defend our allies against Soviet aggression has been the basis for the recovery and cultural renaissance of Western Europe, Japan,

20. Tass Indicates Moscow View of Warhead Cuts Is Negative, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1982, at 4, col. 3; id., May 19, 1982, at 1, col. 6 (Brezhnev declares START proposals as “absolutely onesided”).

21. Bundy et al., supra note 4. The authors of the recent “no-first-use” article appear to recommend that NATO accept defeat rather than resort to the defensive use of nuclear weapons. “It seems much better that even the most responsible choice of even the most limited nuclear actions to prevent even the most imminent conventional disaster should be left out of authorized policy.” Id. at 762.
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and many other parts of the world since 1945. For thirty-five years, it has been the counterweight to Soviet superiority in manpower, tanks, and other conventional arms. In Ambassador Nitze's words, it would be tempting fate "to remove the essential prop of nuclear deterrence before rectifying the conditions that led to its fashioning in the first place." Such a step would deprive NATO of all credibility. And it would give a new and terrifying impetus to the process of nuclear weapons proliferation. For countries threatened with destruction, doubt about the American nuclear guaranty is an invitation to take the nuclear option. To propose in effect the abrogation of NATO and the other security treaties on which our safety as a nation depends cannot be a serious or credible policy. It would inevitably result in a retreat to the isolationism of the nineteenth century.

It is difficult to follow the argument for a no-first-use pledge made in the Foreign Affairs article.\textsuperscript{22} The authors concede that we would have no way of being confident that the Soviet Union would in fact fight only with conventional weapons. After all, Soviet doctrine and Soviet equipment are based on the full integration of nuclear and chemical weapons into the battlefield tactics of the Soviet armed forces.\textsuperscript{23} And Soviet tactical doctrine relies on pre-emption, not passive defense.\textsuperscript{24} Of course, proponents of the no-first-use principle tell us, we should have to be ready to reply in kind if the Soviet Union should use nuclear weapons first. But if we have to be prepared to use nuclear weapons after all, what has been gained by the no-first-use pledge they advocate, except to make nuclear war more likely?

But our security treaties with Europe, Japan, and other key countries

\textsuperscript{22} Note that four prominent German writers, representing diverse parties and backgrounds, unequivocally rejected the proposal of Bundy et al., in the issue of Foreign Affairs following the "no-first-use" article. \textit{Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace: A German Response}, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 1157 (1982). They found the implications of a no-first-use pledge "profoundly disturbing," arguing that it would "destroy the confidence of Europeans and especially Germans in the European-American Alliance as a community of risk, and would endanger the strategic unity of the Alliance and the security of Western Europe." \textit{Id.} at 1161-62. The authors also focus on the role that nuclear weapons played in preserving the peace in Europe for the last 37 years—"[t]he primary function of nuclear weapons is deterrence in order to prevent aggression and blackmail." \textit{Id.} at 1159.

\textsuperscript{23} The Soviet chemical warfare capabilities are disturbing. "[I]t is clear that chemical and bacteriological warfare agents are important components of the Soviet military arsenal, to be used whenever and wherever that use is deemed advantageous." Douglass, \textit{Chemical Weapons: An Imbalance of Terror}, 10 STRATEGIC REV. 46 (1982). Indeed, available evidence indicates that the Soviet Union and its allies are currently using chemical and biological weapons in Afghanistan and Kampuchea. \textit{Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan}, DEPT. OF ST. SPECIAL REPORT NO. 98, MAR. 22, 1982.

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{See} Pipes, \textit{supra} note 6, at 31 ("The costliest lesson which the Soviet military learned in World War II was the importance of surprise. . . . Given the rapidity of modern warfare . . . not to be surprised by the enemy means, in effect, to inflict surprise on him.").
are not gestures of sentiment or philanthropy, to be abandoned if the going gets rough. They represent bedrock security interests of the United States. One has only to consider where we would be if we accepted the no-first-use argument and abandoned Europe to its fate. For more than twenty years, Soviet military and political strategy has been based on the concept that the nation which controls the Eurasian land mass controls the world. If the Soviet Union could gain control of Western Europe, the Soviet leaders believe, it would automatically control the Middle East and Africa as well. Japan, China, and many other countries would draw the necessary conclusions, and accommodate to the power of the Soviets. The United States would be left isolated and impotent.

Proposals for a nuclear freeze at current levels would be almost as devastating in their effect as the thesis of Mr. McNamara and his friends. By halting our current modernization efforts, such a freeze would leave our nuclear guaranty in doubt, and therefore reduce our capacity to protect Europe, Japan, and other supreme national interests. It would remove any incentive the Soviets might have to accept the substantial reductions we are seeking both in START and INF. And it would constitute, in effect, a unilateral American renunciation of the joint NATO decision of 1979 to modernize Western intermediate-range forces. It would therefore adversely affect allied confidence in our leadership and steadfastness.

Some students of the security problem are urging President Reagan to ask the Senate to consent to the ratification of SALT II, preferably with four or five amendments, before we proceed with START. Advocates of this position point out that both the Soviet Union and the United States are respecting the limits on deployed launchers provided for in that Treaty. They ask why we shouldn’t ratify the Treaty and get on with its successor.

It is quite true that both nations are, in general, observing the limits on deployment provided for in SALT II. It is a normal diplomatic procedure not to rock the boat unduly during negotiations; for the moment, the SALT II limits are in the interests of both nations.

But the formal ratification of SALT II would be an altogether different matter.

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In the first place, if we should ratify SALT II, amended or un-amended, the SALT Treaty would inevitably constitute the starting point and base line for the START negotiations. That fact would almost surely force us to use the wrong unit of account in negotiating a new agreement. The Interim Agreement of SALT I and SALT II are based on deployed launchers as the unit of account. It is now obvious that deployed launchers are an inadequate way to measure and compare the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons. President Reagan has decided to base the START treaty directly on the number of missile warheads and their destructive potential. That is the only sensible way to compare the military and political significance of ballistic missiles. To ratify SALT II now would simply perpetuate what turned out to be a costly error.

One of the worst consequences of that error is that neither the Interim Agreement nor SALT II succeeded in preventing the emergence of Soviet superiority in ground-based ballistic missiles which threaten the survivability of our ICBMs. To prevent and now to eliminate that Soviet advantage has always been a major United States interest and objective in nuclear arms limitation agreements. The ratification of SALT II would codify and confirm both the present high ceilings and the Soviet position of superiority in this area.

As Senator Jackson said in recent testimony, it would be "a profound mistake" to legitimize the nuclear status quo. Such a step would lock the United States into a position of strategic inferiority, and make it impossible for us to escape. It would therefore make it nearly impossible for the United States to solve its most urgent security problem: to end the growing doubts about the American nuclear guaranty for Europe, Japan, and other vital American interests. As a result, ratifying SALT II would eliminate any possible motive the Soviet Union might have to agree to reductions.26

There is another pitfall in the SALT II ratification proposal. The Soviet Union could also propose amendments, and we could spend the next few years renegotiating SALT II rather than attempting to persuade the Soviet Union to accept a treaty which would help to stabilize the political and military relationship between the two countries.

These reasons alone are sufficient justification for refusing to ratify SALT II. There are many lesser reasons for reaching the same conclu-

26. See Nitze, supra note 3 ("The prospect of the Soviet Union agreeing to... a treaty in a form which would meet our needs and those of the West, is... low unless we have earlier demonstrated that we are prepared and able to handle our strategic security without a SALT treaty.").
sion—the failure to include the Backfire bomber, for example; to eliminate the Soviet heavy missiles; or to prevent the encryption of telemetry.

In the end, however, those who advocate ratifying SALT II now are motivated by altogether different reasons, which have nothing to do with the actual provisions of the Treaty. Some believe that the overall political and military situation of the United States is hopeless, and that we should make a nuclear arms agreement with the Soviet Union as an act of submission, on the best terms we can get. There is no need for me to characterize this pernicious outlook. Others subscribe to the view that even a bad agreement with the Soviet Union somehow contributes to peace and reduces the risk of war. The bitter history of the 1970s should teach us that there is no substance in this view. If the Soviet Union should ever conclude, however, that this opinion dominates American policy, whether out of mistaken conviction or for reasons of electoral politics, the prospects for negotiation would be dim indeed. Those who favor a few quick cosmetic amendments for SALT II and calling the result START I are not advancing the interests of the nation.

President Reagan is eager to reach a sound agreement with the Soviet Union—an agreement which contributes to our security and furthers the cause of peace. But he will never approve a poor agreement for the sake of having an agreement.

There has been much talk in the press and in Congress about the “acceptability” or “negotiability” of the principles and guidelines President Reagan had proposed. Predicting Soviet behavior is not easy and I am not a card-carrying Sovietologist. I admire people who tell us with assurance exactly what the Soviet Union will and will not do. On this arcane subject, I think it is safe, however, to risk a simple observation.

The Soviet Union did not achieve its advantage in ground-launched ballistic missiles in a fit of absence of mind. It spent years of effort and billions of dollars in doing so. And it will give this advantage up only when it is convinced that the alternatives are worse. That is why we say that arms control agreements can only be understood and negotiated in the context of our foreign and defense policy as a whole. The President’s speech at Eureka College offered the Soviet Union a far-reaching and permanent program of cooperation. It also announced our unshakable determination to defend our interests, and to insist on the fundamental principle, *pacta sunt servanda*, treaties must be kept, as the bedrock on which peaceful international society is built. Without
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the effective implementation of this policy, the essence of our national interest, we may make agreements, but there will be no peace. As Secretary Haig commented in a recent speech, it must be understood that arms control agreements are of no use if they make the world safe for conventional aggression.27

The menace of the nuclear weapon is so great that it should lead the nations at long last to realize that there is no rational alternative to peace. Sound, equitable, and verifiable nuclear arms agreements could reduce the risk of war. In themselves they cannot guarantee peace, or even the absence of nuclear war. But arms control agreements should be viewed as stepping-stones to a much greater goal—peace itself. When the Soviet Union proposes that we sign a no-first-use pledge, the proper answer for the United States is that both nations, and all other nations, should rededicate themselves fundamentally to policies of full and reciprocal respect for the rules of the United Nations Charter against all forms of aggression, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. In the nuclear world, no lesser goal can suffice. Peace really has become indivisible.

The United States and its allies and other nations which accept the principles of peace have more than enough power and potential power to achieve this goal, if they muster up the will to do so. It is time for the Soviet Union to realize that its policies of expansion have passed their peak, and produced not bread but a stone. There are many objective reasons why the Soviet Union should want a period of stability in its relations with the West—its troubles in Poland and Eastern Europe; the state of its economy; and many social problems which have become manifest in recent years. Above all, the Soviet Union, like every other country, should understand the truth behind Khruschev’s famous comment, “The nuclear weapon threatens Socialist and Capitalist states alike.”

Many are offering quick fixes and miraculous cures for the ills which afflict mankind. And others have lost their nerve, and are looking for escape hatches. The medicine men and the escapists should be recognized for what they are. There are no quick fixes, or escape hatches either.

But the American people and their leaders are not going to lose their nerve or bend their knees. The threat we face can be countered by the methods of steady diplomacy backed by adequate deterrent force.

President Reagan has made it clear many times that the tragic lesson of the Thirties is burned into his mind and into his memory. The statesmen of that time failed to prevent the Second World War because they refused to accept the super-obvious facts. In the setting of nuclear weapons, it is imperative that the statesmen of the West succeed this time not only in preventing war but in establishing peace.