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Promoting Democracy: A Panel Discussion

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PROMOTING DEMOCRACY
A PANEL DISCUSSION

EDITOR'S NOTE:

One of the events of the June 19, 1987 conference "Towards a More Democratic World" was a panel discussion that explored future trends toward democracy. The moderator was Stephen Carter, and the panel featured Charles Fairbanks, Joshua Muravchik, Simon Serfaty, and Christopher Hitchens.

The panel operated under the premise that it was November 1988. A new president of the United States had been elected but had not yet taken office. The panel was part of a transition team appointed to assess the foreign policy achievements of prior administrations, and to explore policy goals for the forthcoming administration.

Carter: The main question before the transition team is the issue of the promotion of democracy abroad. We must explore whether it is both possible and a good idea generally for the United States to promote democracy. We will investigate these questions by looking at a series of issues, some of them abstract, some of them more concrete, in particular areas of the world.

Mr. Fairbanks, the first issue before this transition team is the way in which the United States should be acting to promote democracy in Africa, if indeed it should, and if it is possible to do so. There are two particular facets of Africa. One is the Republic of South Africa; the other is the nation of Angola.

The Republic of South Africa has been the seat of enormous unrest for several decades, but increasingly in the last decade an unrest that is now taking the form of a demand for full political participation by the black majority. In Angola, there is a group of rebels fighting against the central government, the rebels of UNITA, who have some degree of support by the United States government. The question in each instance is what the policy of an administration that supports democracy should be, and what you would consider a democratic result in those two countries.

Fairbanks: There is no area where I think the requirements of hard foreign policy diverge more from those of democracy than in South Africa. A kind of realpolitik policy would simply express that

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we are against South Africa as was done during the Carter Administration. We do, however, have some obligation to try to prod the government of South Africa to move away from apartheid.

Carter: That is what we are prodding them away from; are we prodding them towards something?

Fairbanks: Toward democracy, which is not the only alternative.

Carter: How are you defining democracy at this point?

Fairbanks: A system in which every South African has a right to vote and to change the government of South Africa. That system, we have to recognize, would be very difficult to implement at this point, and would involve us in a situation in which we would inevitably be blamed for the necessarily partial success.

Carter: And in Angola?

Fairbanks: In Angola there are two forces contending, neither of which are currently democratic. I suspect that the side of UNITA has more potential for democracy because it is less structured, less committed to a certain avenue of thinking in the future.

Carter: Less structured in the sense that Jonas Savimbi is frequently criticized as an opportunist who will take whatever ideology happens to carry the guns.

Fairbanks: At this point Savimbi is much less committed to a particular ideology, but he is partially committed, whether out of opportunism or something else, to Western ideology with a democratic flavoring.

Carter: So should the new administration give military aid to UNITA?

Fairbanks: I do not see why not. They are against our enemies and they are also marginally more attractive as a political alternative.

Carter: Mr. Serfaty, any objection to military aid to UNITA?

Serfaty: Not really. In both cases the fundamental question is what kind of influence can the United States exert upon the government in place to bring about changes that are compatible with both our values and our interests. Related to that is the question how can that influence be exerted in such a way as to preserve those interests.

Carter: Do you agree with Mr. Fairbanks about the end we should be pursuing in South Africa, a situation in which everyone has a vote?

Serfaty: Absolutely yes, as a matter of conviction. One person, one vote.

Carter: But our influence is limited there.

Serfaty: Our influence is enormously limited there.

Carter: What steps are we to take?

Serfaty: We must develop a framework for the government in Pretoria that would enable some coordinated action with the European allies and others that would progressively bring about the changes we seek. Paramount would be the forthcoming
elections in 1989, although whether those elections will be held as scheduled remains to be seen.

In the case of Angola, on the other hand, it seems that the influence to promote change in that country is much more significant than it is in South Africa. Direct military assistance to Savimbi might set in motion changes that would be compatible to both American interests and values.

Carter: Mr. Muravchik, should majority rule in South Africa be a goal of American foreign policy?

Muravchik: No doubt.

Carter: What steps should we take to pursue them?

Muravchik: We need direct South African developments that offer a hopeful alternative, a way out of the bind that South Africa is in.

Carter: What is the nature of the bind? Some would simply state that the nature of the bind is the South African government's oppression of the black majority.

Muravchik: That is a big part of it. The other part of what makes it a bind is that there is no certainty that what comes next will be democratic, humane, or an improvement over the current situation because it could be horrible in a different way. The challenge is to try to get from the current intolerable situation into something better.

Carter: You raise an interesting question because a number of members of the outgoing United States Administration have made the point that in assessing the human rights record, or the potential for democracy of a nation, it is also important to assess the human rights record, or the potential for democracy, of the opposition. The question that is raised directly by your remarks about South Africa is this one: where does the burden lie? Is it by no means certain that what would replace the government of the Republic of South Africa would be a system that would be better? If the answer to that question is uncertain, should we stick with what is there or try a change?

Muravchik: That is the essential and difficult challenge that faces United States policy. The answer is that we cannot address policy in terms of a single blind choice between supporting the status quo or seeking to topple it without any thought to what will come next. The essence of policy is to try to encourage developments in currents of change that will lead to the kind of outcome that will be compatible with our interests, but even more importantly, that will offer a hopeful and humane future for the people of South Africa. One of the things that we ought to be looking upon with close interest is what was called the Natal Indaba, an effort in one of the provinces of South Africa to negotiate a new basis of rule based on universal suffrage and majority rule, with various kinds of human rights guarantees
built into the political system. The Natal Indaba might possibly be a model or a stepping stone for the country of South Africa as a whole.

Carter: Mr. Hitchens, should we encourage the government of the Republic of South Africa to negotiate with the African National Congress?

Hitchens: We should recognize the African National Congress for what it is, the preferred party, and not just the party of the black minorities. Apartheid is not just a system of white racism, but a system of playing upon tribal differences among Africans, between Yhosa, Zulu, and Madabele. The only organization that has support from all black groups in South Africa is the African National Congress. The only organization that also commands the support among the Indian and mixed-race communities is the ANC. The only group with substantial white support is the ANC.

Carter: When you assert that the ANC has support among these groups, are you suggesting that a majority of these groups subscribe to the principles of the ANC?

Hitchens: At a minimum, if Nelson Mandela was to be released from his twenty-five years of illegal imprisonment and was able to run in an election he would become the leader of South Africa. That should be recognized now, and the ANC should be offered diplomatic and military support in the meantime.

Carter: The United States should offer military support to the ANC as a means of promoting democracy in South Africa?

Hitchens: Yes.

Carter: Do you see the ANC as primarily for some democratic change?

Hitchens: Yes.

Carter: Of course, the South African government does not see it that way.

Hitchens: The government of South Africa cannot view the ANC as primarily for some democratic change because it does not believe in democracy. The South African government has a racial theory originated from a Nazi theory, and is led by the only force in the world still in power that regrets officially the defeat of the Third Reich as a result of the Second World War. It should also be noted that Angola and South Africa would not be neighboring countries, as you described them, if it were not for the illegal occupation by South Africa of the country of Namibia, currently called Southwest Africa. The United States is already committed to the independence of Namibia. Namibia has been on the international agenda ever since the League of Nations. International law to which the United States subscribes demands Namibia’s independence, but this independence that the United States votes on every year at the
United Nations has been allowed to be trumped by the stupid sectarian policy of support for Jonas Savimbi's racist and tribalist movement in Angola.

Carter: Mr. Hitchens, there are thirty or forty thousand Cuban troops in Angola. Also, the current policy of the United States is not unqualified support for the independence of Namibia, but rather support for a solution that would involve simultaneously South African withdrawal from Namibia and Cuban withdrawal from Angola.

Hitchens: I wish it were simultaneous. It is not, because it is made as a precondition. It is a canard. As we know from Mr. Kissinger's memoirs and from the memoirs of the people responsible for the policy at the time, South Africa was encouraged to invade Angola long before the Cubans arrived. South Africans still have a sense of grievance that they were not given sufficient backing. They met stiffer resistance than they had expected. COMIN, the Commitment to the Independence of Namibia, goes back to the League of Nations. It is an inherited mandate from before the Second World War. That commitment should not be overwritten by a Regeanite adventurous policy with Savimbi.

Carter: When you say that we should support independence for Namibia, do you have in mind some version of democratic rule there?

Hitchens: The strictly analogous party to the ANC is the South West Africa Peoples Organization, SWAPO, which is the only nontribal political party and movement in the territory, and the only one that commands enlightened white support, and is recognized by the Organization of African Unity.

Carter: You see both SWAPO in Namibia and the ANC in South Africa as organizations that are committed to democracy in some sense.

Hitchens: Yes.

Carter: Mr. Murvachik, do you agree with that?

Murvchik: No. With regard to the African National Congress, we have a very profound reason for concern because its leadership is very heavily dominated by the South African Communist Party. There are disputes about exactly what proportion of the members of the Executive of the African National Congress are members of the South African Communist party. Also, membership in the South African Communist Party is not always a public act. Thus, there is reason for some uncertainty, but the uncertainty falls within a range in which the differences, for example, whether forty percent or sixty percent of the Executive of the ANC are members of the South African Communist Party, do not matter much. There is a very very
Carter: Suppose for the sake of argument that the ANC were to purge from its membership and leadership not only all members of the South African Communist Party, but substantial members of people who lean to the left generally. Suppose in that circumstance the ANC was rejected in its request for negotiations with the South African government. Suppose further that the ANC were then to come to the new United States administration and say, "In pursuit of democracy, we want to undertake an arms struggle. Please give us military aid." What would you recommend?

Muravchik: That is fairly hypothetical, but I certainly might well recommend that the United States give the reconstituted ANC military aid. There are generally two lines of argument that have been advanced by both critics of the ANC and by the South African government. One line of argument states that the ANC uses violent measures. That is a line of argument critical of the ANC that I do not share because the ANC is denied any substantial nonviolent means of participating in politics. Thus, the fact that under those circumstances people take recourse to violence does not in and of itself predispose me against them. What I am deeply concerned about it the very heavy communist involvement in the ANC because of what that foretells for the future of any society that is ruled by communists.

Certainly, something that ought to be very actively in the minds of this hypothetical new administration that we are setting up is whether it is possible to divide the ANC. A purge as neat as you postulated is not likely because it is difficult to split a communist from a noncommunist. I would not go as far as you did in your hypothetical purge in casting out other leftists. That is not really the issue. The issue is whether a Leninist one-party state with all its brutalities is going to be imposed in South Africa.

Carter: Mr. Fairbanks, when would it be appropriate in the cause of modern democracy for the United States to support armed resistance in South Africa?

Fairbanks: There is no chance that the United States would ever give open military aid to the ANC because there is a strange combination in the foreign policy of the United States and the western European liberal democracies, a combination of energetic high principles on the one hand, with an unwillingness to act vigorously and certainly to act violently on the other hand.
Carter: You are not suggesting that the United States never gives military aid to anyone in the world who is going to use it violently, are you?

Fairbanks: No, but the United States has never given support to a leftist resistance movement, except for the small amount that it is involved in Cambodia for very complicated alliance reasons and for reasons based on composition of Cambodian resistance.

Carter: Of course, this transition team can write on a fresh slate. We can urge the President to alter that policy. We can state that the mere fact that a movement is of the left does not mean that it ought to be denied.

Fairbanks: In government I have argued precisely for that kind of policy supporting movements of the left in certain other cases. Any consideration of the idealistic aspect of American foreign policy has to realize the limits of the amount of idealism we have in us to drive this policy. If we could really support the ANC by supporting ANC people favorable to us, while ruining the people unfavorable to us as the Soviet Union does in places like Central America, the horn of Africa, and with SWAPO in the ANC, then I would be attracted to such a policy. I believe, however, that there is no chance of such a policy, and so that we can discuss in a realistic way what an administration ought to do, I think we ought to face the unlikelihood of United States support for the ANC.

Carter: Granted its unlikelihood, Mr. Serfaty, are there circumstances in which we should support armed resistance in the Republic of South Africa?

Serfaty: At this point, and looking to the foreseeable future, I cannot conceive of any. I do not believe that foreign policy is about good conscience. Nor is foreign policy without the contemplation of various fantasies pertaining to the ultimate fulfillment of objectives that we all share. To meet with Mr. Mandela and to seek and pressure the government of Pretoria for Mandela’s release should by all means be a foreign policy of the United States in November 1988. We should certainly speak to the leaders of the ANC, something that has been done before. To seek military support from the United States Congress as a first priority of an administration besieged with a wide range of problems, however, is not a means to search for the satisfaction of one’s good conscience.

Carter: We are positing military support for the ANC not so much as a top priority but as an ultimate possibility.

Mr. Hitchens, ought the United States be promoting democracy in Angola, and democracy of what version?

Hitchens: The United States has made it very difficult to market any ideology in Angola by being the patron of the preceding
Portuguese colonialism that the MPLA, the current ruling party in Angola, overthrew. The United States was the armorer and the patron of the Solazar Catano dictatorship. Nobody in Angola is particularly interested in what the United States proposes. Angola wishes now to be left alone by the United States and its friends like South Africa.

Do I think the United States has the right to advise, instruct, or otherwise mold the Angolans? No, I do not. If in the name of democracy the United States decided to do something, it has picked the wrong horse in Jonas Savimbi, who broadcasts with South African support on his radio station against the presence of white people in the imperial leadership which is of mixed race and contains many people of Portuguese descent. This black-power tribal racist with white tribal racist money and arms broadcasts in that fashion. Actually, now you can all be proud to know that Savimbi broadcasts with your money and in your name.

Carter: Ought the United States ultimately be indifferent to the form of government in Angola?

Hitchens: It is often said that business only does business with business. Everyone knows the great irony of Gulf Oil in Angola. Gulf Oil considers the Angolan government a great government to do business with and no threat to American interests. Indeed, the Angolan government uses poor and underfed people of its own who have suffered from decades of war in that country, puts them in uniforms, and pays for them to guard Gulf Oil installations, all thanks to the Reagan Doctrine.

Carter: Yes, but should the United States be indifferent to the form of government in Angola?

Hitchens: I think the United States has every right to be indifferent to the form of government in Angola. The United States has every right to be extremely modest about giving advice to the Angolans. A good dose of indifference is what is required.

Carter: Is that because of the uniqueness of the long-term American relationship with Angola? One could make the same argument about South Africa.

Hitchens: Shall I? Allow me to give you an analogy by which I do not mean to sound frivolous. Suppose that it was felt that the present situation of communal warfare in India required international help to bring it under control and containment. That day may actually come, or indeed in Sri Lanka. The United Nations might be asked whose troops it would send. It would not send British troops to conflict in India. It would not send British troops to conflict in Ceylon either. There would be other countries that the British would have to say no to,
because of modesty, because of decency, and because of a realization that they are not wanted there.

Carter: Then the reason that the United States ought to be indifferent about the form of government in Angola, or at least ought to be very modest about what it sits upon, has to do with the history of the United States' relationship with Angola. You would not make the same argument for every country in the world, simply for countries where the United States has a particular kind of history.

Hitchens: Indeed yes. Obviously history will not be the strong point of this transition team as we have already found, and it is a weak point in the formulation of American foreign policy.

Carter: Your statement leads us rather logically back across the ocean to Nicaragua where you would make the same point that because of the history of the relationship between the United States and the Somoza regime the United States should be indifferent to the form of government in Nicaragua.

Hitchens: The United States has no right to determine the government in Nicaragua.

Carter: Are you yourself indifferent to the form of government in Nicaragua?

Hitchens: By no means. There is no reason for the generous American public to feel morally neutral about the fate of political democracy, individual liberty, or self-determination in Nicaragua. There is, however, no right inherent in the United States Constitution or in American politics to reshape by force the government in Nicaragua.

Carter: Do not think so much about matters of right because as the international lawyers in the room can tell you right is not a very important issue in international law. Think instead about the matter of "should," whether it is morally desireable for the United States, without regard to right, to try to prod or pressure the government of Nicaragua into a shape that is like that of some other policies that are called democratic.

Hitchens: Democracy should not need to be imposed. There is a necessary contradiction there.

Carter: Of course, it was imposed in Japan.

Hitchens: Japan had to be defeated in order for democracy to be empowered. Democracy was not imposed upon Japan; democracy was permitted. Perhaps a better word might be enabled. Since it is not the objective of the United States to have democracy in Nicaragua, however, I feel that my answers are becoming ethereal.

Carter: Is your argument that the outgoing administration is not interested in promoting democracy in Nicaragua?

Hitchens: Yes.
Carter: Should the incoming administration be interested in promoting democracy in Nicaragua? Is it a good idea?

Hitchens: The incoming administration would have a lot to do in closing down the attempts to reimpose the Somoza dictatorship on Nicaragua, and would have a great deal to do in clearing up the imminent menace to American democracy that is posed by the forces put in play by that attempt.

Carter: Mr. Fairbanks, should the United States be in the business of promoting democracy in Nicaragua and does it have a right to be?

Fairbanks: I do not see why not. I am struck by the great number of contradictions in the argument of Mr. Hitchens, that on the one hand we ought to intervene militarily to completely reorder the domestic structure of South Africa, while on the other hand, we have no right, or, as he strangely puts it, we have every right to be indifferent in Angola or Nicaragua.

Carter: Do you deny his history of continuing American complicity in the survival of the Somoza regime?

Fairbanks: That regime was not entirely the responsibility of the United States. Any regime is partly the responsibility of the people of that country. The Nazi regime, for example, was to a great degree the responsibility of the German people.

Carter: You would not argue that the United States is much loved in Nicaragua, would you?

Fairbanks: By some people it is.

Carter: By large groups of people?

Fairbanks: I think so.

Carter: By a majority of people?

Fairbanks: Three years ago I met a labor leader in Nicaragua who was a former baggage handler for Pan Am in Managua. This man attended a gathering where there were present various wealthy ranchers. Looking at these wealthy ranchers that were a part of the anticommunist side in Nicaragua he said to me, “I used to hate these people, but that was before I met the Sandinistas.” That is the effect of a very powerful political regime with a utopian agenda. It very much reorders the way people view history, as well as the way people feel about politics in a country, and that has happened in Nicaragua.

Carter: You accept some, but not all, of Mr. Hitchens’ history, but you disagree with his conclusion. You think we do have a right to be concerned. Does that right include military support for those who say they want to change the government in Nicaragua?

Fairbanks: I would say so, although we have a need to be cautious.

Carter: Who in Nicaragua ought to receive political support?

Fairbanks: If you look over the internal resistance that still exists in
Managua, there is no question of Nicaragua’s general interest in having a more humane system than that to which the Sandinistas aim. There is a very specific political agenda which the Sandinistas have that is communism, and we must be quite unblinking about that.

Carter: What is the political agenda of those that you would arm militarily?

Fairbanks: It is rather diffuse because there are many different people, different economic, ethnic, racial, class, and religious interests. All of those motives are going to play on people, and I think it is likely to drive them in the direction of democracy, but not all of them and not necessarily. The very diversity of what I would call “our side” in Nicaragua gives them a greater chance of democracy than that of people who have a very clear agenda that is clearly undemocratic.

Carter: Mr. Serfaty, what should we look for in deciding whether to extend or continue military aid to those trying to overthrow the government in Nicaragua?

Serfaty: We must first understand the nature of the problem, the nature of the policy, and the nature of the capabilities that are going to be used in order to fulfill that policy. The fact that governments do not conform to our principles and values in and of itself does not justify United States intervention, direct or indirect. What is at issue therefore is whether the actions which this government takes are incompatible with American interests at a given time. It follows from this, that the Reagan Doctrine is not about democracy, but is about the preservation of American interests in various parts of the world to roll back Soviet or Soviet-sponsored positions.

It follows that assuming President Reagan and the administration are correct in their assessments, the question is can he and the administration mobilize sufficient resources, capabilities, and domestic support to fulfill those objectives? What would concern me, therefore, is whether we can bridge that gap between announced objectives and available capabilities. The question is not whether the values of a given government fit ours, because the values of the Contras probably do not fit our own values either. It is a matter of interests.

Carter: Has the United States an interest in seeing a different policy or different government in Managua?

Serfaty: To the extent that there is an attempt on the part of the government in Managua to subvert neighboring states, yes. To the extent that there is an attempt to expand the ideological influence of that government, yes. To the extent that there is Cuban or Soviet influence within that state, yes. These are the
questions that ought to be raised, not the structures of the government from within.

Carter: When you say to the extent that these things are true, is it your belief from your experience that these things are true more probably than not?

Serfaty: They are probably more true than not. To the extent that they are true, then a sixteen million dollar humanitarian aid program is not going to suffice, a one hundred million dollar aid program is not going to suffice, and to the extent that a policy cannot fulfill its objectives because of insufficient capabilities, then I would rather change the policy than face the inability to fulfill my goals.

Carter: Mr. Muravchik, on the issue of Nicaragua, ought the United States have a policy of trying through military means to influence the policies of the government in Managua toward what the United States would consider democracy?

Muravchik: Yes.

Carter: What policies should the United States be encouraging internally to Nicaragua that would be a movement toward democracy?

Muravchik: The only conceivable movement toward democracy in Nicaragua can come through the overthrow of the Sandinista dictatorship because it is a communist party that has been determined since the moment it was founded more than a quarter century ago to impose a Soviet-style communist dictatorship on Nicaragua. The only avenue to democracy in Nicaragua is through the overthrow of the existing government. Communist governments do not transmogrify into democracies. That is a feature of all communist governments, with the sole exception of Grenada, which received a great deal of assistance.

Carter: The Reagan Doctrine describes two policies of the outgoing administration. One of the policies, the one that probably gets more play and is more controversial in some sense, states that the United States is going to support indigenous insurgencies at the fringes of what is seen as an overextended Soviet empire. The Soviets cannot hold these places, whose governments cannot hold fast against indigenous revolt if the revolt is properly armed and supported. That is the theory. Places where this policy is put into effect include Nicaragua, Afghanistan, to some extent Angola, and of course, Cambodia.

Mr. Serfaty, do you believe that the Reagan Doctrine has not been properly thought out?

Serfaty: Yes. Each president has had a doctrine that he could legitimately give his name to since President Truman, and none of those doctrines truly did what they purported to do. The
Reagan Doctrine is not about democracy. The Reagan Doctrine is about the Soviet Union. The Reagan Doctrine identified four parts of the world where it might be possible to increase the Soviet difficulties in managing an order that was compatible with their preferences. The hope of the Reagan Doctrine was to be able to somehow link the worsening of a setting from a Soviet perspective to other ongoing negotiations in order to provide some new advantages, as well as justifications, for United States involvement.

Carter: Mr. Serfaty, your view of the Reagan Doctrine is that it is not really about ideology but about superpower conflict that would be ongoing no matter what the form of government in the Soviet Union.

Serfaty: Yes. For example, the United States maintains relationships with communist governments and has done so for quite a while. In 1948-49, we considered the possibility of bringing in Yugoslavia to NATO. To the best of my knowledge, Yugoslavia had a form of government that was not quite compatible with our values. The United States is currently engaging in a number of negotiations with many communist governments.

Carter: The Reagan Doctrine, as described by its adherents and supporters rests in part on two notions. One is that it is a historical accident that one of the superpowers happens to be communist and one happens to be a democracy. It is an important historical accident in the sense that now is a time in human history when there is a superpower that is a democracy. If the Reagan Doctrine holds that the accident is that a superpower is a democracy, then there would appear the possibility of evolution toward democracy in the world, but not in the primarily communist world.

Muravchik: That is exactly right, but it has to be taken farther. That is why I disagree quite sharply with the counterposition that Mr. Serfaty drew between democracy on the one side and American interest on the other. What you call the historical accident, if fully examined, is that what emerged from World War II was a world with an unusual configuration of power. The world was dominated by two superpowers, each of which was the only conceivable rival for the other in a sense of pure power, and neither of which could effectively be challenged by any other power on earth except the other superpower. These two dominating powers were exemplars of two contrary visions of the future of man, the democratic vision and the communist vision.

Carter: Can you tell us what you think the democratic and communist visions of the future of man have been?
Muravchik: Both democracy and communism are universal ideologies. The Declaration of Independence states that all men are created equal, a right endowed by their creator. Therefore, a certain form of government is naturally right, that is, the democratic form, in which no man is governed except by government that in some sense exists by his consent. On the other side, the communist world, built around the Leninist interpretation of Marx’s message, believes that man has a single appointed destiny which it is the duty and the right of the communist parties of various countries to fulfill for mankind. The result of these two distinct versions is that the international situation of our time is a struggle of a dual nature, and the two parts of it cannot be separated. It is a struggle between two power blocs, two entities: the Soviet Union with its ICBMs and tanks, and the United States with its ICBMs and tanks. The struggle, however, is also between two visions or two ideologies, the communist and the democratic. These two elements of a struggle are inextricably intertwined with one another, and cannot be separated. That is why I disagree so strongly with Mr. Serfaty, because although it is possible in analysis to talk about the interest of democracy in the world, or American interest, as a general rule of thumb, the interest of democracy and American interests are intertwined. One can find situations which are exceptions to this proposition, but it is generally the case that where the cause of democracy is advanced in the world, the cause of American interests is automatically benefitted.

Carter: Then in your opinion, when the United States supports what is referred to as a traditional autocratic form of government there is an advancement of the cause of democracy?

Muravchik: As a general rule, when we are talking about American power viz à viz Soviet power, yes. It is also a general rule that where American power has been free to do its will, it has had a tendency to encourage the development of democracy in the world. Most clearly this can be seen in Europe. At the conclusion of the last war, Europe was decimated physically, politically, and sociologically. Europe was presided over by two victors. Almost wherever the American armies went there now flourish free people who govern themselves in democratic regimes. Wherever the Soviet army went, there now flourishes, if one can use that term, the dark night of totalitarianism.

Carter: Mr. Hitchens, when American interests viz à viz Soviet interests are advanced, is democracy almost invariably advanced in the world?

Hitchens: I do not think you can make a theorem or an axiom as Mr. Muravchik has just attempted and failed to do. You can say
that it is possible and that there are such coincidences. There are also some glaring exceptions that we have already discussed, South Africa for example. It was for instance, the United States who overthrew the democratic government in Greece in 1967, which was also in western Europe.

Carter: When you say the United States overthrew the government of Greece, what exactly do you mean?

Hitchens: I mean the United States sponsored a military coup in Athens, and created a military dictatorship on the Greeks which led to no end of bother and unpleasantness. There is no axiom or theorem that would for a moment justify Mr. Muravchik's extraordinary confidence in the Reagan Doctrine. However, no democrat or socialist can regret any check given to Soviet power or expansion of Stalinism either where it lives or where it seems to expand. That is a quite separate question. I sometimes wish the two things were better meshed than they are.

Carter: The Reagan Doctrine does rest in part on the supposition that what are referred to as the traditional autocracies, governments which are, in large measure, nonideological but are based on the personal power of a small group of individuals, are much better candidates for evolution toward democracy than totalitarian states, ones that see themselves as reshaping all aspects of the laws of individuals.

Hitchens: I would accept that.

Carter: If that is the case, then I suppose in order to refute the claim that democracy is always furthered when American interests are advanced, you would have to find American support for totalitarian states in the world. Do you believe that such support exists?

Hitchens: Yes. South Africa is a totalitarian state in the strict definition of the term. That is, the private life of the citizen is determined by the state on the basis of color, with even matters such as sexual relations mandated by law, and the citizen, in large measure, is the property of the state. I think that is what a totalitarian state is. South Africa passes the test with flying colors. If most black South Africans moved to Cuba, they would think they had died and gone to heaven. Cuba is not, for example, a totalitarian state in that way. Cuba belongs to no totalitarian camp. Why is it then, given the extreme susceptibility to change of authoritarian regimes, the kind which the United States sponsors, that it does not try and play on these susceptibilities? Why, for example, are the South Koreans allowed to get away with authoritarianism, when by the analysis of the Reagan Doctrine, they are just the kind of country that can be pushed.
Carter: You do not believe that the plane that took Marcos and Duvalier away is getting ready to go to Seoul in the next two years and to Chile?

Hitchens: The credit for the removal of Marcos and Duvalier goes to the people of the Philippines and of Haiti who had to wage, at great cost to themselves and, in large measure, unnecessarily tremendous, struggles for liberty. I was very lucky in having a classics teacher, who explained to me that if you read Julius Caesar's *De Bella Gallica*, you will see in his account of his campaigns in Gaul that he had to keep on winning victories to make up for all of the self-inflicted defeats. The fact is, the Marcos regime, as we now know particularly from Raymond Bonner's book, was allowed and encouraged by the Nixon-Kissinger Administration to proclaim martial law at the first sign of an insurgency.

Carter: Mr. Fairbanks, does the Reagan Doctrine and the Reagan Administration deserve credit, or perhaps blame for the fall of Marcos and the fall of Duvalier, or are those critics right who are certain that the Reagan Doctrine is primarily about containing the Soviet Union and not really about democracy at all?

Fairbanks: The Reagan Doctrine deserves some credit and some blame. The American pattern which predates the Reagan Administration tends to view everything complacently where a dictatorship is involved, and somewhat more easily if it is a totalitarian dictatorship. The tendency is, as with the Shah of Iran, Somoza, Marcos, and Duvalier, not to look too carefully. That is what as a nation we tend to do. The United States tends not to scrutinize what is going on in those countries very much until trouble starts such as rioting, and then we panic. The Reagan Administration does not deserve a great deal of credit for what it did before it became aware of political instability. It deserves a lot of credit for what it did after political instability became apparent because it truly did urge and facilitate the exit of Marcos and even more of Duvalier.

Carter: One of the aspects of the application of the Reagan Doctrine in those cases that has been criticized has taken place in the case of pro-Soviet communist states, exempting China and Yugoslavia. In the case of pro-Soviet states, the Administration's position in the past has been to finance insurgency. In the case of pro-Western traditional autocracies, those that are supposed to evolve more easily toward democracy, the position has been to proceed upon an instability that is virtually irresistible. Is that a fair description of what is happening?

Fairbanks: Not quite. In cases like Haiti or the Philippines, it was not
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clear that the trouble was irreversible. The United States did begin to distance itself rapidly from those rulers fairly early on. That is a great problem, but if one thinks it is a problem, unfortunately one is led into greater involvement to the question of the domestic policy of other states, both intellectual and diplomatic. That is the thing that the United States feels uneasy about.

Carter: The Reagan Administration has placed primary emphasis on the political freedoms that are involved in representative government, such as the political freedoms involving elections, a willingness of a serving government to leave in an orderly fashion, a free press, a plurality of political parties, and other things that are similar to what we think of in Western style pluralist democracy as perhaps the highest aspect of human rights. The Carter Administration, at least in its rhetoric, placed a very heavy weight on another notion of democracy, so-called economic and social rights: the rights of people to have enough to eat, a job, the rights to unionize, and certain other rights of that sort, that in the United States some think of as aspects of democracy and some think of as aspects of the economic system. Which of these do you consider more important when considering what is happening in another country? Which of these matters more, gentlemen?

Fairbanks: The political system is the fundamental basis for human rights behavior across a wide spectrum. If we look at all the categories of human rights, the countries that are democracies have a generally good situation, and the countries that are not democracies usually have a bad situation whether communist or noncommunist. The contrary notion of economic and social rights came in as part of the loss of self-confidence of Western democracy, and was used by dictators to justify the violation of other human rights. Indira Gandhi, for example, had a program of compulsory sterilization of the poor. She stated that India had to have a compulsory sterilization program for the human right of the nation, the right to develop, the right to progress. That is a simple expression of the notion of economic and social rights.

Muravchik: The essential point we can see from experience is that those countries in the world that have predicated themselves on the respect for human political rights are countries that have prospered. Countries that have pronounced economic rights as something higher have, by and large, not only violated civil and political rights, but have brought economic misery to their people. The simple fact is that the assurance of political rights makes possible the fulfillment of these other rights because groups of people can organize into political parties, such as
labor unions and peasant movements, and fight for their economic and social well-being if they have political rights. On the other hand, not only is the proclamation of economic rights usually and historically a dodge for governments that want to violate civil and political rights, but generally speaking, many of the specific violations of civil rights are announced by the governments in the name of fulfilling some economic or social rights.

Hitchens: Countries cannot for long have human rights without economic rights. They can very easily have neither, which is a common experience, and there can be countries, for example, that have literacy programs but who dare not give people they have taught to read any books or newspapers. That is quite common, also. Economic and human rights are so intimately connected that any other comment would be false antithesis. In the present calculus, Nicaragua will end up without either human or economic rights if the current American policy towards that country continues. There were only two democrats even claimed in the anti-Sandinista front sponsored by the CIA and the Reagan Administration, Eden Pastora and Arturo Cruz. They attempted to kill Eden Pastora, and they have betrayed Arturo Cruz by their clinging to, in the name of representative democracy, the very people, who under Somoza, the discredited remnant of his regime that they are, starved and bled the people of Nicaragua as well as denying political liberty. The outcome of this policy will be defeat for both interpretations of human dignity to the extent that they can be separated for consideration.

Serfaty: Whether or not human rights are catered to in a given country clearly depends on the sources and the structures of the government in place. Additionally, it should be questioned whether United States interests are always advanced when democracy is advanced. Lastly, if we knew when, in a movement for change toward democracy, whether a country has become irresistible, foreign policy would be easy business. Foreign policy is the installment and the management of the inevitable, and the inevitable always clashes. Thus, the problem is one of timing.