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Fred Rodell
Yale Law School

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GOODBYE TO LAW REVIEWS—REVISITED

Fred Rodell*

Twenty-five years ago Professor Rodell, as part of a series of articles on the value of law reviews appearing in the first issue of Volume 23 of the Review, wrote his “last law review article.” To celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of that “last” article, which did, incidentally acquire a certain amount of fame, or possibly notoriety, the editors asked Professor Rodell to give an account of his present-day impressions of law reviews. Offered here is his original article, together with his recent “supplement,” not only as a humorous change of pace from the usual law review make-up, but also for the poignant remarks they contain on law review make-up and style, legal writing, and scholarship in general.

GOODBYE TO LAW REVIEWS

IT is doubtless of no concern to anyone that this is probably my last law review article. As a matter of fact, this makes one more article than I had originally planned to write. It was something in the nature of a New Year’s resolution. Yet the request to do a piece about law reviews seemed a golden opportunity to make my future absence from the “Leading Articles, Authors” lists a bit more pointed than would the business of merely sitting in a corner, sucking my thumb, and muttering Boo. Keeping well in line with two traditions—a course which lawyers will readily understand—I decided to break the resolution and not wait for opportunity’s second knock. This, then, is by way of explaining why I do not care to contribute further to the qualitatively moribund while quantitatively mushroom-like literature of the law.

There are two things wrong with almost all legal writing. One is its style. The other is its content. That, I think, about covers the ground. And though it is in the law reviews that the most highly regarded legal literature—and I by no means except those fancy rationalizations of legal action called judicial opinions—is regularly embalmed, it is

* Professor of Law, Yale University. B.A., 1926, Haverford College; LL.B., 1931, M.A., 1939, Yale University.
in the law reviews that a pennyworth of content is most frequently concealed beneath a pound of so-called style. The average law review writer is peculiarly able to say nothing with an air of great importance. When I used to read law reviews, I used constantly to be reminded of an elephant trying to swat a fly.

Now the antediluvian or mock-heroic style in which most law review material is written has, as I am well aware, been panned before. That panning has had no effect, just as this panning will have no effect. Remember that it is by request that I am bleating my private bleat about legal literature.

To go into the question of style then, it seems to be a cardinal principle of law review writing and editing that nothing may be said forcefully and nothing may be said amusingly. This, I take it, is in the interest of something called dignity. It does not matter that most people—and even lawyers come into this category—read either to be convinced or to be entertained. It does not matter that even in the comparatively rare instances when people read to be informed, they like a dash of pepper or a dash of salt along with their information. They won't get any seasoning if the law reviews can help it. The law reviews would rather be dignified and ignored.

Suppose a law review writer wants to criticize a court decision. Does he say "Justice Fussbudget, in a long-winded and vacuous opinion, managed to twist his logic and mangle his history so as to reach a result which is not only reactionary but ridiculous"? He may think exactly that but he does not say it. He does not even say, "It was a thoroughly stupid decision." What he says is, "It would seem that a contrary conclusion might perhaps have been better justified." "It would seem—," the matriarch of mollycoddle phrases, still revered by the law reviews in the dull name of dignity.

One of the style quirks that inevitably detracts from the forcefulness and clarity of law review writing is the taboo on pronouns of the first person. An "I" or a "me" is regarded as a rather shocking form of disrobing in print. To avoid nudity, the back-handed passive is almost obligatory:—"It is suggested—," "It is proposed—," "It would seem—." Whether the writers really suppose that such constructions clothe them in anonymity so that people can not guess who is suggesting and who is proposing, I do not know. I do know that such forms frequently lead to the kind of sentence that looks as though it had been translated from the German by someone with a rather meager knowledge of English.
Long sentences, awkward constructions, and fuzzy-wuzzy words that seem to apologize for daring to venture an opinion are part of the price the law reviews pay for their precious dignity. And circumlocution does not make for strong writing. I grant that a rapier in capable hands can be just as effective as a bludgeon. But the average law review writer, scorning the common bludgeon and reaching into his style for a rapier, finds himself trying to wield a barn door.

Moreover, the explosive touch of humor is considered just as bad taste as the hard sock of condemnation. I know no field of learning so vulnerable to burlesque, satire, or occasional pokes in the ribs as the bombastic pomposity of legal dialectic. Perhaps that is the very reason why there are no jesters or gag men in legal literature and why law review editors knit their brows overtime to purge their publications of every crack that might produce a real laugh. The law is a fat man walking down the street in a high hat. And far be it from the law reviews to be any party to the chucking of a snowball or the judicious placing of a banana-peel.

Occasionally, very occasionally, a bit of heavy humor does get into print. But it must be the sort of humor that tends to produce, at best, a cracked smile rather than a guffaw. And most law review writers, trying to produce a cracked smile, come out with one of those pedantic wheezes that get an uncomfortably forced response when professors use them in a classroom. The best way to get a laugh out of a law review is to take a couple of drinks and then read an article, any article, aloud. That can be really funny.

Then there is this business of footnotes, the flaunted Phi Beta Kappa keys of legal writing, and the pet peeve of everyone who has ever read a law review piece for any other reason than that he was too lazy to look up his own cases. So far as I can make out, there are two distinct types of footnote. There is the explanatory or if-you-didn’t-understand-what-I-said-in-the-text-this-may-help-you type. And there is the probative or if-you’re-from-Missouri-just-take-a-look-at-all-this type.

The explanatory footnote is an excuse to let the law review writer be obscure and befuddled in the body of his article and then say the same thing at the bottom of the page the way he should have said it in the first place. But talking around the bush is not an easy habit to get rid of and so occasionally a reader has to use reverse English and hop back to the text to try to find out what the footnote means. It is true, however, that a wee bit more of informality is permitted in small type.
Thus “It is suggested” in the body of an article might carry an explanatory footnote to the effect that “This is the author’s own suggestion.”

It is the probative footnote that is so often made up of nothing but a long list of names of cases that the writer has had some stooge look up and throw together for him. These huge chunks of small type, so welcome to the student who turns the page and finds only two or three lines of text above them, are what make a legal article very, very learned. They also show the suspicious twist of the legal mind. The idea seems to be that a man can not be trusted to make a straight statement unless he takes his readers by the paw and leads them to chapter and verse. Every legal writer is presumed to be a liar until he proves himself otherwise with a flock of footnotes.

In any case, the footnote foible breeds nothing but sloppy thinking, clumsy writing, and bad eyes. Any article that has to be explained or proved by being cluttered up with little numbers until it looks like the Acrosses and Downs of a cross-word puzzle has no business being written. And if a writer does not really need footnotes and tacks them on just because they look pretty or because it is the thing to do, then he ought to be tried for wilful murder of his readers’ (all three of them) eyesight and patience.

Exceptions to the traditions of dumpy dignity and fake learnedness in law review writing are as rare as they are beautiful. Once in a while a Thomas Reed Powell gets away with an imaginary judicial opinion that gives a real twist to the lion’s tail. Once in a while a Thurman Arnold forgets his footnotes as though to say that if people do not believe or understand him that is their worry and not his. But even such mild breaches of etiquette as these are tolerated gingerly and seldom, and are likely to be looked at a little askance by the writers’ more pious brethren.

In the main, the strait-jacket of law review style has killed what might have been a lively literature. It has maimed even those few pieces of legal writing that actually have something to say. I am the last one to suppose that a piece about the law could be made to read like a juicy sex novel or a detective story, but I cannot see why it has to resemble a cross between a nineteenth century sermon and a treatise on higher mathematics. A man who writes a law review article should be able to attract for it a slightly larger audience than a few of his colleagues who skim through it out of courtesy and a few of his students who sweat through it because he has assigned it.

Of course, the conventional cellophane in which most legal writing
is wrapped is not entirely unconnected with the product itself. I am fully aware that content helps to determine style. I am also aware that one of the best ways to palm off inferior goods is to wrap them up in a respectable-looking package. And though law reviews and law writers deserve a round of ripe tomatoes for their devotion to what they solemnly suppose is the best legal style, it is the stuff concealed beneath that style, the content of legal writing, that makes the literature of the law a dud and a disgrace.

Harold Laski is fond of saying that in every revolution the lawyers are liquidated first. That may sound as if I had jumped the track but it seems to me to be terribly relevant. The reason the lawyers lead the line to the guillotine or the firing squad is that, while law is supposed to be a device to serve society, a civilized way of helping the wheels go round without too much friction, it is pretty hard to find a group less concerned with serving society and more concerned with serving themselves than the lawyers. The reason all this is relevant is that if any among the lawyers might reasonably be expected to carry a torch or shoot a flashlight in the right direction, it is the lawyers who write about the law.

I confess that "serving society" is a slightly mealy phrase with a Sunday school smack to it. There are doubtless better and longer ways of expressing the same idea but it should still convey some vague notion of what I mean. I mean that law, as an institution or a science or a high-class mumbo-jumbo, has a job to do in the world. And that job is neither the writing of successful briefs for successful clients nor the wide-eyed leafing over and sorting out of what appellate court judges put into print when, for all sorts of reasons, some obvious and some hidden in the underbrush, they affirm or reverse lower court decisions.

Yet it would be hard to guess, from most of the stuff that is published in the law reviews, that law and the lawyers had any other job on their hands than the slinging together of neat (but certainly not gaudy) legalistic arguments and the building up, rebuilding, and sporadic knocking down of pretty houses of theory foundationed in sand and false assumptions. It would be hard to guess from the mass of articles dedicated to such worthy inquiries as "The Rule Against Perpetuities in Saskatchewan," "Some New Uses of the Trust Device to Avoid Taxation," or "An Answer to a Reply to a Comment on a Criticism of the Restatement of the Law of Conflicts of Laws."

Law review writers seem to rank among our most adept navel-gazers. When they are not busy adding to and patching up their lists of cases
and their farflung lines of logic, so that some smart practicing lawyer can come along and grab the cases and the logic without so much as a by-your-leave, they are sure to be found squabbling earnestly among themselves over the meaning or content of some obscure principle that nine judges out of ten would not even recognize if it hopped up and slugged them in the face.

This centripetal absorption in the home-made mysteries and sleight-of-hand of the law would be a perfectly harmless occupation if it did not consume so much time and energy that might better be spent otherwise. And if it did not, incidentally, consume so much space in the law libraries. It seems never to have occurred to most of the studious gents who diddle around in the law reviews with the intricacies of contributory negligence, consideration, or covenants running with the land that nether life nor law can be confined within the forty-four corners of some cosy concept. It seems never to have occurred to them that they might be diddling while Rome burned.

I do not wish to labor the point but perhaps it had best be stated once in dead earnest. With law as the only alternative to force as a means of solving the myriad problems of the world, it seems to me that the articulate among the clan of lawyers might, in their writings, be more pointedly aware of those problems, might recognize that the use of law to help toward their solution is the only excuse for the law's existence, instead of blithely continuing to make mountain after mountain out of tiresome, technical molehills.

In what I have said about the stuffy style and fluffy filling of law review articles, I have not been referring exclusively to those elegant effusions in the front of the book known as "leading articles." The shorter fillers called "notes," "comments," "recent cases," and similar apologetic terms come in for the same kicks in the pants as they pass in review. Usually written by students—and then rewritten by the editors—their subjects are likely to be just as superficial and their style even more assiduously stilted. I see no difference except that the top dogs among the law review authors, in return for seeing their stuff spread out in slightly larger type, are forced to confess authorship in public, whereas the small fry are spared the embarrassment of signing their names.

If any section gets a partial reprieve from all this slapping around it is the book review section. When it comes to the book reviews, company manners are not so strictly enforced and it is occasionally possible to talk out loud or crack a joke. As a result, the book reviews are stuck away in the back like country cousins and anyone who wants
to take off his shoes and feel at home in a law review will do well to come in by way of the kitchen.

All of this raises another question about which I am curious. I wonder why all the law reviews, so far as lay-out and general geography are concerned, are as like as a row of stiffs in a morgue. Why do they all start out with a fanfare of three or four leading articles and then dribble back diminuendo through variations on the same sort of theme until they reach the book reviews at the end?

The answer, I suspect although I have no means of proving it, is that they have all been sucked into a polite little game of follow-the-leader with the Harvard Law Review setting the pace. That might also account for the universally dignified tone of law review writing. I have nothing in particular against the Harvard Law Review and I have nothing against the New York Times either, but it seems to me that if all the newspapers in the country had stepped all over themselves in an effort to imitate the stately mien of the Times, the daily press might well be as badly in need of a hypodermic as are the law reviews. Even at the cost of breeding a Hearst in their midst, the law reviews could stand a few special features, a few fighting editorials, a cartoon or two, and maybe even a Walter Winchell.

When it comes right down to laying the cards on the table, it is not surprising that the law reviews are as bad as they are. The leading articles, and the book reviews too, are for the most part written by professors and would-be professors of law whose chief interest is in getting something published so they can wave it in the faces of their deans when they ask for a raise, because the accepted way of getting ahead in law teaching is to break constantly into print in a dignified way. The students who write for the law reviews are egged on by the comforting thought that they will be pretty sure to get jobs when they graduate in return for their slavery, and the super-students who do the editorial or dirty work are egged on even harder by the knowledge that they will get even better jobs.

Moreover, the only consumers of law reviews outside the academic circle are the law offices, which never actually read them but stick them away on a shelf for future reference. The law offices consider the law reviews much as a plumber might consider a piece of lead pipe. They are not very worried about the literary or social service possibilities of the law, but they are tickled pink to have somebody else look up cases and think up new arguments for them to use in their business, because it means that they are getting something for practically nothing.
Thus everybody connected with the law review has some sort of bread to butter, in a nice way of course, and all of them—professors, students, and practicing lawyers—are quite content to go on buttering their own and each other's bread. It is a pretty little family picture and anyone who comes along with the wild idea that the folks might step outside for a spell and take a breath of fresh air is likely to have his head bitten off. It is much too warm and comfortable and safe indoors.

And so I suspect that the law reviews will keep right on turning out stuff that is not fit to read, on subjects that are not worth the bother of writing about them. Yet I like to hope that I am wrong.

Maybe one of these days the law reviews, or some of them, will have the nerve to shoot for higher stakes. Maybe they will get tired of pitching pennies, and of doting themselves up in tailcoats to do it so that they feel a sense of importance and pride as they toss copper after copper against the same old wall. Maybe they will come to realize that the English language is most useful when it is used normally and naturally, and that the law is nothing more than a means to a social end and should never, for all the law schools and law firms in the world, be treated as an end in itself. In short, maybe one of these days the law reviews will catch on. Meanwhile I say they're spinach....

—Revisited

Hang on to your top-hats, boys; here we go again. Not that there is anything new or nastier to say about those citadels of pseudo-scholarship, those squanderers of numberless square miles of timberland (for paper is made from wood, remember?), the law reviews. A quarter century has wrought no revolution among the professional purveyors of pretentious poppycock, even while hot war and cold war and split atoms and space shots have rocked the earth. No, the law review literati have stayed self-locked in their libraries, as though the latter were fallout shelters—which indeed they may some day prove to be since their shelves are so loaded with legalistic lead. And though an occasional article may hint at the horrid prospect of having to restate the Restatement of the Law of Property to encompass incorporeal hereditaments on the moon or on Mars, by and large the law reviews have let the rest of the larger world go by.

To get personal for a moment—since I have been so often uncharitably chided on this special score—I grant I have not quite kept my rash resolution of 25 years back. Perhaps half a dozen times since then, or roughly once every four or five years, my name has appeared (or so...
I assume, since I would wince to see it there and hence never look) in
the “Leading Articles, Authors” lists. But by way of confession and
avoidance, let me plead, or possibly whimper, that (1) most of those
promise-breaking pieces were small anniversary or memorial tributes to
friends, some living, some newly dead; (2) one piece, believe it or not,
was reprinted—yes, with my permission—in a law review from the general
magazine for which I wrote it, which may set some sort of record and
at least renders me blameless, almost; (3) another was reprinted in a
general magazine from the law review for which I wrote it, which may
also set a record and at least tells a bit about how it was written; (4)
only one article had footnotes, of which the first one read: “All foot-
notes accompanying this article were appended by the editor.” Am I
maybe forgiven? Yet here, as I said, we go again—and without apology.
Like the criminal returning to the scene of his crime, I simply could
not say No to the Virginia Law Review which so long has held a soft
spot in my law-review-hardened heart.

Last time, I blasted the law reviews with a shotgun type of attack.
I carped at their contents; I sneered at their style; I lampooned their
ludicrous merry-go-round on which everyone gets a brass-ring—fat
jobs for editors, promotions for professors, free dirty-work done for lazy
law firms—while the merry-go-round never gets anywhere, never moves
except in the same old circle to the same old tinkle-tinkle-tinkle tune.
No shotgun attack this time. (As a metaphor-mixer from way back,
I remind you that the merry-go-round is handy by the shooting gallery;
stay with me.) Discarding the old-time fowling piece with which I
unsportingly scattered shot at those sitting ducks, the law reviews, when
I was young and gay, I now take up my trusty rifle and draw a bead,
I hope, on the heart of what is wrongest with them and wrongest as well
with all the other explicit manifestations (wow!) of so-called scholar-
ship in academic America today. I mean, of course, the language in
which they are written. I mean the nonsensical, noxious notion that
a piece of work is more scholarly if polysyllabically enunciated than
if put in short words. I mean the utilization of “utilization”—ugh—
instead of the plain and simple use of “use.”

Granted, it calls for a spot of word-eating on my part—though short
ones are not too hard to swallow—when I now put the finger on style,
not substance, as the greater evil. Hark while I chew:—Without a style
that conceals all content and mangles all meaning, or lack of same,
beneath impressive-sounding but unintelligible gibberish, most of the
junk that reaches print in the law reviews and such scholarly journals
could never get itself published anywhere—not even there. If scholars
had to write simply, they would simply have to make sense—or else be
laughed right back to their library mole-holes. Yet the awful fact
is—according to the latest Rodell Random-Sample Poll—that 90 per
cent of American scholars and at least 99.44 per cent of American legal
scholars not only do not know how to write simply; they do not know
how to write. Thus I doubt that there are so many as a dozen professors
of law in this whole country who could write an article about law,
much less about anything else, and sell it, substantially as written, to a
magazine of general circulation. If perchance there are, these phenomena
must be independently wealthy or perhaps be married to wealthy wives.
Else why—once they have won their full professorships, at any rate—
do they keep submitting that turgid, legaleseooky garbage to law re-
views—for free?

Oh, I can hear the answer echo from the halls of academe:—A
scholar cares naught about money (hah!) or “financial remuneration,”
as academe would put it. A scholar cares naught about winning a wide
plebeian public for what he has to say, since to do so he must demean
his work to the indecorous status of journalism. A scholar cares only
for the good esteem of his fellows in scholarship, however few; amen.
Well, no Anglophile I, but the British know better and are several
light years ahead of us so far as sense-making scholarship is concerned.
No Oxford or Cambridge don is damned for writing a popular piece in
his field and eminent eggheads are encouraged to use the King’s
English (or is it now the Queen’s?) for the edification of such as shop-
keepers, barmaids and clarks. Who ever heard of a Huxley, an Orwell,
a Maitland or a Trevelyan being frowned on by the big-think fraternity
as “just a journalist” for writing so any bloke could understand? Yet a
U.S. law professor I know was passed over, like a left-handed third
baseman, ten times in a row, while those ultimate academic accolades,
charmingly called “chairs,” were awarded his junior colleagues—and
this because he did his writing primarily for such infra dig. sheets as
the New York Times Magazine, the Saturday Review, and the Atlantic.
Ah, scholarship. Ah, American scholarship. Ah, American legal
scholarship.

Which brings me back to the law reviews, from which I have not
strayed far. The reasons why law review writing style is unfit for the
consumption of cultured men, and sounds like a 33 r.p.m. disk played at
78 to the uncultured, are linked in a chain of causal calamity. Link
No. 1, which might be the subject of a book called “Johnny Can’t
Write,” is the fact that three-fourths or more of the bright boys who beat their way into law school, cannot, even after four years of college, construct a decent English sentence, much less an entire paragraph that holds together. Link No. 2 is the fact that these bright boys are barraged, from their first lecture and assignment, by the verbal horrors of legal language—so that even the few who could write when they came soon succumb. Link No. 3 is the fact that the very bright boys, who make the law review, are forced by faculty precept and precedent to follow the lead of their masters—and mark-dispensers—in massacring the Anglo-Saxon tongue. Link No. 4 is the fact that the brightest boys, when they in turn become teachers, are still browbeaten by their seniors—now promoters or non-promoters—into writing the same old round-the-bush rubbish for law reviews. By the time they become full professors themselves—and this is Link No. 5—they have been so brainwashed, indoctrinated, that they cannot, if ever they once could, phrase a paper, an article, a book, or a lecture in clean and simple words; but these are what law students read and hear; the chain is closed. There is, however, a sixth link, attached to all of the other five, like a Chinese puzzle. Link No. 6 is the literal fear with which the law-school elite regard a student or fellow-teacher who resists the rodomontade of legalisms and insists on simple writing and simple speech. For the notion that the complexities of conceptualization that compose the law could ever be made comprehensible—so the guy in the street could get them—is too terrible, too treasonable, to contemplate. He who tries such stuff is suspect; surely he can be no scholar. Ah, scholarship.

Let me wind it up with a personal note, though not this time on my law review lapses; and how can you stop me? Not so long ago, I published a book; I had spent better than twenty years collecting the stuff for it casually, a couple of years getting it all in order, and one tough year writing it. Though it dealt with law, there were none of those phony excrescences called footnotes, and I slaved like a slave (like what else do you slave?) to keep it clean of longiloquent legal language. Indeed, I daresay I could have written it in half the time had I used the pompous patois of the profession—but this book was meant for anybody to read. Along came a typical law professor to review it in a typical law review; what he said was complimentary; but the professor clearly felt guilty about praising a book like this. For he added, as though looking over his shoulder, in a sentence I shall forever treasure: “It is to be regretted that the author did not write his work with footnotes and that his style is not in keeping with the depth of
study he must have had to pursue to acquire the information necessary to write this book.” Well, fellows, there it is in a nice, neat nutshell. All I can add is:—Ah, scholarship; ah, nuts.