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Charles Horton Cooley

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Similarly the Cox vote did not split on the wet-dry issue. The wets were most highly correlated with the Smith vote, and somewhat less so with the foreign-born, with the Catholics and with the urban. Correlations with the Cox vote were all low except the negative correlation with the foreign-born. The percentage urban was about equally correlated with the foreign-born, with the Catholics, and with the wets. The relationship was very slight between the Cox vote and the Smith vote and urbanism.

**The counties.** The lists below show the counties that were selected for this piece of research. They are classified by states.

**California:** Alameda, Contra Costa, Fresno, Imperial, Kern, Lassen, Los Angeles, Merced, Monterey, Marin, Orange, Riverside, Sacramento, San Diego, San Joaquin, San Mateo, Santa Barbara, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano, Stanislaus, Tehama, Tulare, Ventura.

**Colorado:** Alamosa, Chaffee, Fremont, La Plata, Larimer, Las Animas Logan, Mesa, Pueblo.

**Illinois:** Adams, Christian, Cook, Dupage, Kane, Lake LaSalle Lee, Logan, Macoupin, Madison, Mason, Montgomery, Morgan, Peoria, Perry, Rock Island, Saline, Sangamon, Stephenson, St. Clair, Vermillion, Wabash, Whiteside, Will, Winnebago.

**Massachusetts:** Berkshire, Franklin, Hampden, Hampshire, Middlesex, Norfolk, Plymouth, Worcester, Barnstable, Essex.

**Montana:** Beaverhead, Carbon, Cascade, Custer, Dawson, Hill, Missoula, Deer Lodge, Powell, Silver Bow, Yellowstone.


**Wisconsin:** Ashland, Chippewa, Clark, Columbia, Dane, Dodge, Douglas, Eau Claire, Fon du Lac, Grant, Jefferson, Kenosha, La Crosse, Lincoln, Marathon, Manitowoc, Marinette, Monroe, Milwaukee, Oneida, Outagamie, Price, Racine, Rock, Sauk, Sheboygan, Trempealeau, Waukesha, Winnebago, Wood.

CHARLES HORTON COOLEY

WALTON H. HAMILTON

It was in September 1910 that I first met Charles Horton Cooley. I had come to the University of Michigan to handle sections of Economics One and upon the chance of sometime "making a contribution to knowledge" and picking up a doctor's degree. I was one of a changing group of instructors—graduate students, who were, with an exception or two, the property of Freddy Taylor. The conditions of our servitude, far too unre­munerative to be called wage slavery, were alike exacting and agreeable. Taylor insisted upon our teaching "Freddy's econ­omics," thinking it straight, and getting our students past his dreaded examinations. Our job was to make "marginal utility" in all its ramifications clear to the sopho­mores; whether or not we made it clear to ourselves was quite another matter. And, as for the rest, we might roam the intellec­tual universe, argue to our hearts' content, scribble as we would, and outside of the accepted system "think as we damned pleased."

At the time there was little rig-a­ma­role to graduate instruction. If any grades were given, I never heard of them.
An invitation "to come up" for the doctorate was rare enough; there was much shaking of heads and "the big three," Taylor, Adams, and Cooley, were quite sure of their man before extending it. But it never occurred to any of them that a counting up of courses was very relevant to the issue. One youth never even bothered to matriculate until an impending degree made a visit to the registrar's office "advisable;" and for ought I know others may have neglected the ritual. But there was only a handful of us and the staff was diligent; our elders knew what we were doing and leaving undone, and something at least of what, if anything, was going on inside our heads.

Our programs included a stint of teaching, informal courses, and our self-directed ventures into understanding. We took Taylor's course in "theory" year after year; the mythical credit was to be had for three years running. We elected Henry Carter Adams; that is, if he was there, and if he was giving an advanced course, and if his extra-mural duties permitted him to attend it. In seeking an escape from economics, we overlooked history, since we could get that for ourselves and it wasn't written right anyway, and strayed over into philosophy to "take work to" Wenley and Lloyd. Against sociology we were prejudiced, deeply prejudiced, since there could be nothing to "a branch of knowledge which comprehended the universe." But then Cooley was Cooley, and different, and not a sociologist anyway. So into his seminar we went; in fact we composed it.

How it was later I do not know; in those days it was with groups like ours that Cooley worked. He had few students of his own; if there was a budding sociologist among us I do not recall him. Most of us were, or thought we were, heaven bent for economics. Our majors, if there were such things, were in other fields. Cooley's work was with cubs who had not committed themselves to his trade; it was complementary to the work of Taylor and of Adams. Taylor was the dominant personality; he drilled us in neo-classical economics, taught us the value of discipline, helped us to be critical of our work, and gave us a God-awful fear of publishing half-baked stuff. Adams now and then had a critical suggestion of an inviting lead to offer, but his distinctive service was in keeping us mindful of the world in which we lived. Cooley was tolerant of our doubts about things generally accepted and gave us encouragement in our half-foolish rides into the winds. We had to live at peace with all of them; yet no two thought the same thoughts, approached a problem in the same way, or would have formulated the same social program. Thus favor was not to be had through conformity; it was perhaps their differences, and the remarkable tolerance each of the others, that helped us to be ourselves.

In a division of labor never consciously planned it was Cooley's task to help us towards intellectual freedom. No one was ever more honestly cast for, or ever appeared more innocent in the rôle of corrupter of youth. He was a quiet, shy, unobtrusive person; he was handicapped by an impediment in speech and a partial deafness; in conversation and class-room he was never glib. He had none of the dynamic energy, the flash of colorful speech, the lively quality of hippodrome which marks the superficially good teacher. There was only the intense fire back of his dark eyes to give the show away. He did not attack conventional beliefs, dramatize issues, stage controversies, or attempt to shock the conventionally-minded. He was quietly concerned with that abstract and remote thing "social
theory''; his talk was all about assumptions, points of view, concepts, and ideas, all matters a bit hard to get excited about. He did not proclaim his speculations "important," or even apply them to the questions of the day about which men differed. For the most part it was, "it seems to me," "sometimes I think," and "often I wonder." He never disposed of the issues we brought him; instead he suggested new ways of looking at the problems or else gave us different questions to worry about. His seminar was always his seminar; the discussion went where he would; yet, unless he had a paper to read, he kept control by mere casual suggestions. His "instruction," if such it was, of course never got anywhere; that was the reason it was so insidiously effective. Cooley never told us what to do, or how to do it. Our excursions into learning and unlearning were our own—or at least not his. But whatever we thought or wrote, we thought or wrote differently because of his subtle influence.

It was our luck to chance upon him in the flush of his creative work. Like most of us he had begun academic life as an economist. He had gone the way along which we were blundering; that is one reason he understood our problems, doubts, and confusions so well. If for a time he stuck to his craft, his thoughts were straying elsewhere. The titles of his early studies, Personal Competition and A Theory of Transportation were innocent enough; they could cause no worry to the orthodoxy; yet the first is concerned with an "institution" and the second has a "functional approach." Their completion left him with fresh leads; he became absorbed in the relation of the individual to society, and embarked upon that adventure of mind which resulted in his great trilogy. Human Nature and the Social Order had been published in 1902, and Social Organization followed in 1909. We found him just beginning the studies which in 1918 were to appear as Social Process. He shared with us the progress of his creative labors; from very faint beginnings we watched that work take shape at his hands.

It is not easy to set down what we got from Cooley. If it could be done, it would not be half so important. How much of the freshness that came into our intellectual outlook was his, how much came from reading and conversation and other exposures, I cannot say. We had been taught an economics made up of principles as neatly articulated as the laws of physics; he helped us to see it as a system of thought, rooted in ideas, a product of a particular time and place. In a short paper, written for our seminar, which later we persuaded him to print, he characterized neo-classical doctrine as "an attempt to tell time by the second hand of the watch." He helped us to see the industrial system, not as an automatic self-regulating mechanism, but as a complex of institutions in process of development. He may never have said so; but from him we eventually learned that business, as well as the state, is a scheme of arrangements, and that our choice is not between regulation and letting things alone, but between one scheme of control and another. In some way he forced us to give up our common sense notions, led us away from an atomic individualism, made us see "life as an organic whole," and revealed to us "the individual" and "society" remaking each other in an endless process of change. Underneath it all were a few simple, basic ideas, that made inquiry fruitful whether the study was concerned with the market, marriage, or contract; with freedom, property, or inheritance.

And it was all done so honestly, so quietly, so undisturbingly that we did not
look upon him as the author of our corruption. Once Cooley was asked for an opinion upon one of those trumped-up issues which serve for mighty academic controversy. His reply was, "Do you remember the great quarrel over the method of baptism, sprinkling or immersion?" "Yes." "How was that settled?" A distinct service of his was in making us see that issues may be of the mind and had best be forgotten. A suggestion from him often effected a revolution in the habits of a youngster. A cub once handed to him a dreadfully erudite essay filled with the polysyllabic slang of the academic trade. Cooley pencilled on the back, "This may be self-expression; but it is not communication." The writer, after all these years, is still a sorry scribbler; but a great deal of the very little he has learned about writing is due to that casual remark. An idea would come from the blue; Cooley would jot down a note or two. At his first free moment he would attempt to think the matter through; then he wrote it out and filed it away. Later it appeared, more or less rewritten as a section in a chapter. You will find his books full of such units; quite in accord with his own notion of process, they grew. In the face of such a procedure it was hard for us to keep the faith or to pass on a rigid body of knowledge. We, too, must know the zest of inquiry.

As his manner was quiet, so was his life uneventful. He was born at Ann Arbor in 1864; he died at Ann Arbor in 1929. His father Thomas M. Cooley was a man of action; he edited Blackstone, was a great judge, helped along the development of American law, created the Michigan law school, agitated for railroad reform, filled public offices, and served as first chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The son, Charles Horton, spent his life quietly as a student. He took his undergraduate work at Michigan; he had his graduate training at Michigan; from Michigan he received his doctor's degree. After a short period in government work at Washington, where he learned how valuable statistics are and what they cannot be made to do, he returned to Michigan to teach, to inquire and to think. In spite of repeated calls to go elsewhere he remained at Michigan. His hours of creative work were given to a single university; the years of his life were tolled off one by one in a single town. Yet he was able to free young men from slavery to the little intellectual systems of time and place. His daily orbit lay between Forest Avenue and the Economics Building; yet out of it there came Life and the Student.

This is not the place to tell off Cooley's "Contributions" and to pass them in critical review. It will be agreed that he set for himself a heroic and a worthwhile task. An accepted social theory, the ultimate term of which was the individual, was inadequate to explain contemporary society. Individualism, as philosophy, institution, and reform, was outworn. The complex life of the modern world was not to be crowded into mechanical formulas. Cooley set about elaborating concepts of "the individual" and of "society" adequate alike for a study of social organization and the formulation of a social program. It is idle to attempt to record the measure of his success; that is a thing which no person can tell another; yet each may judge the matter for himself. Let me suggest to anyone who will essay it an engaging venture in appraisal. First, read the parts of John Stuart Mill which are most nearly social theory; second, run through the volumes penned by Thomas Hill Green; third, follow again the thread that runs through Cooley's trilogy; and, finally, turn to left and right,
and dip into Cooley’s contemporaries. Such a procedure will not result in assigning Cooley to his rank among social thinkers; but it will throw into sharp perspective his fresh and penetrating approach. It will surely reveal the debt we owe him for invaluable aids towards understanding of human society.

It is to Cooley’s lasting credit that his own work has already become a bit “old-fashioned.” He could hardly escape the evangelical world in which he was brought up; today many persons are superiorly tolerant of the sweetness and light and betterment to be found in his pages. Today in many a book concerned with particular problems his social philosophy is to be found; there it is more relevantly full of meaning than in his abstract accounts. The same general social theory is being rewritten by men who come at it later, who have the advantages of the borrower, and who give to it an articulate form which a creator is powerless to impart. Some of us, perhaps ourselves a little craftworn, will continue to prefer the original, distinguished or marred by the marks of the tortuous growth of thought. And surely the books will remain as evidences that inquiry may result alike in scholarship and in literature.

A good old English word “radical” has of late been abused and has fallen into very low estate. Its real meaning is “a person who persists in getting to the root of the matter.” Cooley was one of the great intellectual radicals of his generation. As to the quality of his radicalism, the content of his contribution, his precedence or subsequence with ideas and doctrines, we may let academicians dispute. In the decades ahead they are sure to do so, with or without our leave; they have time for such matters. But the Cooley we knew would never bother his head with such questions.

SOME ASPECTS OF MENTAL HYGIENE AND RELIGION

ERNEST R. GROVES

THERE is, and since the days of the Greek thinkers there has been, much speculation regarding the origin and the significance of religion. This is not strange since religion, whether thought of as an individual or social experience, is one of the most impressive of human interests. In importance it rivals the family, the state, and industry, and no discussion of mental hygiene would be complete if man’s religious experiences were ignored. The diversity of these experiences, however, makes treatment difficult. The term religion has to be highly abstract, since it attempts to generalize the greatest differences possible in emotion, thinking, and behavior. The multitude of creeds, the striking peculiarities of beliefs, the various sorts of worship, all having appeal for certain individuals, and the great diversity in moral preaching in the different faiths and churches, reveal the complexity of the experiences that we designate religious. Fortunately,