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The Power to Detain: Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11

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The Power To Detain: Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11

Oona Hathaway, Samuel Adelsberg, Spencer Amdur, Philip Levitz, Freya Pitts & Sirine Shebaya†

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I. INTRODUCTION

U.S. counterterrorism operations today are being carried out on an unprecedented scale. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, a key element of these counterterrorism operations has been the detention of suspected terrorists. As of mid-2012, the United States held 168 terrorism suspects at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and roughly three thousand in Afghanistan. Even after transferring most of the Afghan detainees to Afghan control in September 2012, the United States arranged to “maintain control over dozens of foreign detainees in Afghanistan for the indefinite future.” The docket of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit continues to be filled with cases filed by detainees challenging detentions that, in some cases, are entering a second decade. Meanwhile, Congress and the President have repeatedly sparred over detention-related issues, including the scope of military commissions set up to try law-of-war detainees, the transfer of detainees held abroad to prisons within the United States, the propriety of prosecuting terrorism suspects in U.S. federal courts, and the unlimited detention of terrorism suspects without trial. Yet the sources of the U.S. government’s authority to detain suspected terrorists, and the limitations on that authority, remain ill-defined.

This Article aims to fill this gap by clarifying the reach and limits of existing sources of U.S. government authority to detain suspected terrorists in


the ongoing conflict with al-Qaeda and associated forces. While prior scholarship has examined pieces of the detention picture,\(^6\) this Article seeks to offer a more comprehensive view—examining both statutory and constitutional authority for law-of-war detention, and comparing it to detention and prosecution of terrorism suspects under domestic criminal law. In the process, the Article shows that law-of-war detention has weaknesses not often recognized by those who champion its use for terrorism suspects. In many cases, criminal law detention and prosecution of terrorism suspects is not only more consistent with U.S. legal principles and commitments, but is also likely to be more effective in battling terrorism.

Our inquiry begins with the key statutory authority for counterterrorism detention: the Authorization for Use of Military Force of 2001 (2001 AUMF). The 2001 AUMF authorizes the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.\(^7\) Although detention power is not specifically mentioned in the 2001 AUMF, courts have repeatedly held that the statute authorizes the detention of members of al-Qaeda and associated forces for the duration of hostilities as a fundamental incident of waging war. Outside of these parameters, however, the scope of detention authority under the 2001 AUMF has been less clear.\(^8\)

The National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 (2012 NDAA)\(^9\) codifies the expansive interpretation of detention authority under the 2001 AUMF advanced by the Obama Administration since 2009.\(^10\) It provides that, pursuant

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\(^8\) See cases cited infra Subsection II.A.1.

\(^9\) 2012 NDAA, supra note 5. The included terrorism detention provisions were among the most controversial aspects of the defense budget discussion. The 2013 NDAA was signed into law shortly before this Article went to press. Despite calls to restrict the President's authority to detain terrorism suspects during the debate over the new Authorization Act, the version that was signed into law left the President's detention authority effectively intact. 2013 NDAA, supra note 5.

\(^10\) The government has maintained that authority under the 2001 AUMF extends to "associated forces," as well as those directly involved in planning, authorizing, committing, or aiding the attacks. Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantánamo Bay at 2, In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 624 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009) (Nos. 05-0763, 05-1646, 05-2378) [hereinafter Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority].
to the 2001 AUMF, the President has authority to detain "covered persons," including those who "planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored those responsible for those attacks" and those who were "a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners."11 Although the 2012 NDAA explicitly disclaims any intention either to limit or to expand the scope of the 2001 AUMF,12 it reaches beyond the text of the original authorization to provide legislative support for law-of-war detention of members of associated forces that, although not directly involved in the September 11 attacks, may pose threats to the United States currently or in the future. By affirming an expansive reading of detention authority under the 2001 AUMF, and by providing for temporary military custody of certain specified terrorism suspects,13 the 2012 NDAA significantly expands the possible scope of law-of-war detention.14

This Article first examines the reach and limits of existing statutory and constitutional authority for the detention of terrorism suspects. Part II begins by discussing the scope of the government's detention authority under the 2001 AUMF. It then explores the extent and limitations of alternative sources of law-of-war detention authority—that is, sources of authority to detain in the course of military operations.15 It examines not only the power to detain terrorism suspects granted to the President in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (2002 AUMF)16 and the Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA),17 but also the President's independent power to detain under Article II of the Constitution. It concludes that, while each of these legal authorities offers limited additional detention authority, none of them offers a basis for authority that could be used to justify any

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11. 2012 NDAA, supra note 5, § 1021(b). For further discussion of "associated forces," see infra Subsection II.A.1.c.
12. 2012 NDAA, supra note 5, § 1021(d) ("Nothing in this section is intended to limit or expand the authority of the President or the scope of the Authorization for Use of Military Force."). In his signing statement, President Obama also asserted that Section 1021 "breaks no new ground and is unnecessary." Press Release, The White House Office of Press Secretary, Statement by the President on H.R. 1540 (Dec. 30, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/31/statement-president -hr-1540.
13. 2012 NDAA, supra note 5, § 1022 (requiring military custody "pending disposition under the law of war" for a person who is "captured in the course of hostilities" authorized by the 2001 AUMF, who is "a member of, or part of, al-Qaeda or an associated force that acts in coordination with or pursuant to the direction of al-Qaeda," and who has "participated in the course of planning or carrying out an attack or attempted attack against the United States or its coalition partners").
15. This Article uses "law-of-war detention" interchangeably with "military detention."
significant number of terrorism detentions not already authorized under the 2001 AUMF.

Part III examines the affirmative limitations on law-of-war detention imposed by international law. Under *jus ad bellum*, the use of military force, including detention, is only authorized where the host state has consented to, the Security Council has authorized, or self-defense has necessitated the use of military force. Under *jus in bello*, privileged combatants may be held only until the end of hostilities. Unprivileged enemy combatants may be tried for crimes committed in the course of their belligerency and detained punitively past the end of hostilities. But if they are not charged with a crime or tried, they also must be released at the end of hostilities. Finally, international human rights law imposes additional limitations on the use of law-of-war detention authority. The United States has ratified a series of human rights treaties that create obligations that bear on the legality of initial and continued detention.

Part IV discusses criminal detention as a frequently preferable alternative to law-of-war detention in the terrorism context. The 2012 NDAA demonstrates strong congressional support for the use of law-of-war detention for terrorism suspects. This Article challenges this policy trend and highlights criminal detention as a worthy alternative. Part IV shows that while law-of-war detention is appropriate in some contexts, it has many drawbacks, including lack of certainty about conviction and sentence duration, heightened risk of error, poor incentives for cooperation by defendants and allies, and inflexibility. By contrast, the use of criminal detention and prosecution has a number of advantages that produce greater predictability, legitimacy, and flexibility. Even so, the government has consistently pointed to certain situations in which it believes detention and prosecution within the criminal justice system to be impossible. In these cases, alternative authority to detain may exist under the authorities described in Part II.

Part V concludes that, where criminal antiterrorism statutes provide authority to prosecute and detain, this authority should be treated as the first resort—including in situations that have previously relied on military commissions and law-of-war detention. There are challenges inherent in the increased use of the criminal system in the terrorism context, but these challenges can be overcome in most cases. Indeed, some of the challenges posed by criminal law can be seen as advantages of criminal prosecution and detention as opposed to law-of-war detention. Thus, in most cases, suspected terrorists can—and should—be charged and prosecuted within the federal criminal justice system.

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18. For example, the government opined on the question of detention authority after acquittal in a brief in the trial by military commission of Abd Al Rahim Hussayn Muhammed Al Nashiri. Gov't Response to Defense Motion for Appropriate Relief To Determine if the Trial of This Case Is One from Which the Defendant May Be Meaningfully Acquitted, United States v. Al Nashiri (Oct. 27, 2011), at 6, available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Govt-Response-to-Al-Nashiri-Motion.pdf ("Should the accused be acquitted following a trial by military commission, the government could, as a legal matter, continue to detain the accused during hostilities pursuant to the AUMF if it establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused was part of or substantially supported al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces.").
II. LAW-OF-WAR DETENTION AUTHORITY AND LIMITATIONS

Under U.S. law, the President must trace his authority to detain individuals in the context of military operations to one of two sources of legal authority: either a specific statute granting him that authority or his independent constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States. Both sources of authority are, however, narrowly circumscribed, while international law—including the law of armed conflict and human rights law—provides independent restrictions on the scope and nature of military detention authority.

The President's statutory authority to detain individuals in the course of military operations is provided in three separate statutes. First, the 2001 AUMF provides congressionally authorized detention authority in the context of hostilities that have a nexus to the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Second, the 2002 AUMF provides detention authority in the context of the conflict in Iraq. Third, the MCA provides independent statutory authority to detain those whom it grants jurisdiction to prosecute. All of these sources of authority, however, have well-defined limits that constrain the President's authority to detain those whom he suspects of engaging in terrorist activities.

The President also possesses independent constitutional authority to detain individuals in the course of military operations. This authority derives from the President's power as Commander-in-Chief and his responsibility to protect the nation in times of emergency. This authority is also highly constrained. There is consensus that the President has independent Article II authority to conduct defensive military operations in very limited settings. When he acts on his own constitutional authority, however, any use of force must be closely tied to and justified by permitted limited purposes. Therefore, once again, the detention authority of the President is limited.

This Part considers each source of authority for law-of-war detention of terrorism suspects. Prior scholarship has examined these sources of authority individually, but so far none has addressed them as a whole. Here, we offer a comprehensive overview of the President's current law-of-war detention authority. Examining all of the statutory and constitutional sources of detention authority together makes clear that the detention power is far from unlimited. Indeed, even the most significant grant of authority—that found in the 2001 AUMF—is carefully circumscribed. Understanding the true reach of and limits to the power to detain is an essential first step toward deciding the best course forward for addressing the threat of terrorism.

A. Statutory Authority

1. The 2001 AUMF

A week after terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon killed nearly three thousand people, Congress passed the 2001 AUMF, authorizing the President to respond to the attacks. The statute authorized the President:

[T]o use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.

Although the statute does not explicitly refer to detention, all three branches of government have since affirmed that the statute authorizes detention. In *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that the statute incorporated detention authority for the duration of the war against al-Qaeda, because the “capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by 'universal agreement and practice,' are 'important incident[s] of war.'” The plurality arrived at its conclusion that detention authority was inherent in the statutory authorization to use military force by examining international law, including the customary concept of belligerent rights. Belligerent rights grant sovereigns affirmative capabilities in wartime, including capture, detention, and the seizure of neutral ships. The plurality thus used longstanding international legal principles to give content to non-specific statutory language by inferring an authority generally associated with hostilities. Under international law,
detention authority is predicated on the importance of preventing a combatant’s return to the battlefield. In light of this longstanding principle, a plurality of the Court concluded that the authority to detain until the end of hostilities was “an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the President to use.”

The Supreme Court’s holding affirmed the consistent legal position of the U.S. government—one that has held across administrations. In 2009, for example, the Obama Administration filed a memorandum with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit discussing its authority to detain those held at the U.S. military base in Guantánamo Bay. It argued that it possessed detention authority by virtue of the 2001 AUMF. In 2012, Congress endorsed this understanding of the authority granted in the 2001 AUMF for the purposes of detention. In a section of 2012 NDAA entitled “Affirmation of Authority of the Armed Forces of the United States to Detain Covered Persons Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force,” Congress stated that “the authority of the President to use all necessary and appropriate force pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force . . . includes the authority for the Armed Forces of the United States to detain covered persons.”

It is well established that the 2001 AUMF authorizes detention, but the scope of that authority is much less clear. In this section, we therefore examine the specific scope of detention authority under the 2001 AUMF. The power to detain under the AUMF rests on several factors in the statute. First, detention authority under the language of the 2001 AUMF requires a sufficient link between a targeted nation, organization, or person and the September 11 attacks. Second, the geographic scope of the AUMF is not expressly restricted; the AUMF apparently authorizes the use of force wherever those sufficiently linked to the September 11 attacks may be found. Finally, the statutory authority to hold a detainee under the 2001 AUMF may derive either from the individual’s own role in planning, authorizing, committing, or aiding the September 11 attacks, or from his or her association with an organization that performed such a role.

a. September 11 Nexus Requirement

The central textual restriction on the scope of detention authority under the 2001 AUMF is the September 11 nexus requirement. Under the terms of the statute, the President is authorized to use military force “against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or

29. *Hamdi*, 542 U.S. at 518 (plurality opinion).
30. Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority, *supra* note 10, at 1 (“The detention authority conferred by the AUMF is necessarily informed by principles of the laws of war.” (citing *Hamdi*, 542 U.S. at 521 (plurality opinion))).
31. 2012 NDAA, *supra* note 5, § 1021(a) (“Congress affirms that the authority of the President to use all necessary and appropriate force pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40) includes the authority for the Armed Forces of the United States to detain covered persons (as defined in subsection (b)) pending disposition under the law of war.”). Interestingly—and importantly—the language in this section of the statute is limited to detention and does not extend to targeting.
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States.”32 Given that the September 11 attacks occurred over a decade ago, the need to establish a link to those attacks arguably provides some substantive limits on an otherwise broad grant of military authority.33 This is especially true in the context of counterterrorism efforts involving groups with potentially fluid organizational structures and membership. The statute does grant the President authority to determine which nations, organizations, or persons satisfy the criteria.34 Nonetheless, this does not give the President authority to interpret the scope of the statute to reach individuals or groups outside the scope of the authority granted.

The nexus with September 11 is necessary to the President’s authority to act under the statute. A holding by a district court interpreting the statute to require a nexus either with the September 11 attacks or with a terrorist threat was subsequently overturned, although on other grounds.35 Moreover, an earlier version of the authorization, proposed by the White House, that granted broad authority “to deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States,”36 was dismissed as an “overreach.”37 It would be perverse, therefore, to read the narrower language adopted by Congress to encompass the broader authority that it specifically declined to enact. The statutory detention authority under the 2001 AUMF thus reaches only so far as a sufficient link can be established between the September 11 attacks and the organization or individual concerned.

The counterterrorism provisions of the 2012 NDAA provide additional congressional guidance about the meaning of the nexus requirement. The text of the Act asserts that it neither limits nor expands the scope of the 2001 AUMF.38 Yet it serves to codify the Administration’s expansive interpretation of the federal government’s detention authority under the statute. Since 2009, the Administration has argued that it possesses authority to detain “persons

32. 2001 AUMF, supra note 7, § 2(a).


34. 2001 AUMF, supra note 7, § 2(a).

35. In Khalid v. Bush, the D.C. District Court concluded that Congress “in effect, gave the President the power to capture and detain those who the military determined were either responsible for the September 11th attacks or posed a threat of future terrorist attacks.” 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 319 (D.D.C. 2005) (emphasis added), decision vacated sub nom. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), order vacated, 511 U.S. 1160 (2007). According to the statute, the 2001 AUMF was created “in order to prevent any future acts of terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.” 2001 AUMF, supra note 7, § 2(a).


37. Id. at 74.

38. 2012 NDAA, supra note 5, § 1021(d).
who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaeda forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces."  

According to this reading, a person may be detained if he has at some time in the past supported Taliban or al-Qaeda forces or associated forces that are currently engaged in hostilities against the United States. The 2012 NDAA adopts nearly identical language. It describes two classes of "covered persons." The first, "[a] person who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2011, or harbored those responsible for those attacks," echoes the language in the 2001 AUMF requiring a nexus with the September 11 attacks. The second, "[a] person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces," affirms the Administration's litigation position nearly verbatim—for detention purposes—and thus substantially weakens the September 11 nexus requirement for the purposes of detention.

b. Geographic Reach

The 2001 AUMF does not include any explicit geographical restriction. The lack of such restrictive language in the statute, coupled with language in the preamble invoking the rights of the United States "to self-defense and to protect United States citizens both at home and abroad," implies that the AUMF authorizes the use of force—as a matter of domestic law—wherever those sufficiently linked to the September 11 attacks may be found. The Fourth Circuit accepted this geographically open reading of the 2001 AUMF in Padilla v. Hanft. The court rejected the argument that the 2001 AUMF did not authorize detention of a terrorist suspect seized on American soil, noting that the language in Hamdi articulating the authority to detain as a fundamental incident of war makes no distinction between the lawfulness of capturing and detaining a terrorist suspect abroad as opposed to in the United States.

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40. 2012 NDAA, supra note 5, § 1021(b).  
41. Id.  
42. Id.  
43. For a discussion of associated forces, see infra Subsection II.A.1.c. Note again that the relevant provision for the 2012 NDAA does not apply to targeting. The nexus requirement would appear to remain intact, therefore, for targeting purposes. 2012 NDAA, supra note 5, § 1021 (entitled "Affirmation of Authority of the Armed Forces of the United States to Detain Covered Persons Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force" (emphasis added)).  
44. This is in contrast with, for example, the subsequent 2002 AUMF, supra note 16, which specifically limits authority to operations in Iraq.  
45. 2001 AUMF, supra note 7, pmbl.  
States. The Padilla court reasoned that if detention authority is predicated on the necessity of preventing a combatant from returning to the battlefield, then the location of capture should not be determinative. The District Court for the District of South Carolina reached the same conclusion in a separate case, reasoning that, because the 2001 AUMF was enacted in direct response to the September 11 attacks, Congress must have intended its scope to reach alien al-Qaeda operatives who had already entered the country and were plotting terrorist attacks. The District Court for the District of Columbia similarly concluded that “the AUMF does not place geographic parameters on the President’s authority to wage this war against terrorists,” explaining that any interpretation that limited search, capture, and detention to the battlefields of Afghanistan would contradict Congress’s clear intention to the contrary and unduly hinder the President’s ability to protect the country from future terrorist acts and to gather vital intelligence.

Although the locus of capture does not place an absolute geographic limitation on the authority to detain under the 2001 AUMF, geography still may be relevant to the scope of the statutory authorization. Specifically, geography may be a significant indicator of both whether a given organization falls within the substantive scope of the 2001 AUMF and whether a specific individual has sufficient ties to a relevant organization to be subject to detention authority.

International law also places affirmative limits on the geographic scope of the President’s lawful detention authority. Even if the 2001 AUMF grants authority as a matter of U.S. domestic law to engage in military action—including detention of combatants—that authority is subject to independent international legal limits. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter states that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Moreover, state sovereignty places limits on the authority of the United States to engage in acts short of armed attack—including seizing and detaining individuals—on the territory of another country.

47. Id. at 393-94.
48. Id. at 391.
49. Id. at 393-94.
52. Chesney, supra note 51, at 847 (raising the question of whether a provision of support criterion for membership in a designated organization, if legitimate, must be limited to persons captured or acting in certain geographic locations, or to certain types of support, or to support rendered with certain specific mental states).
exceptions are where the governing state authority has granted its consent,55 the Security Council has authorized action,56 or unilateral state action is justified as a matter of self-defense.57

c. Included Organizations and Associated Forces

The authority to hold a detainee under the 2001 AUMF may derive either from the individual’s own role in planning, authorizing, committing, or aiding the September 11 attacks, or from his or her association with an organization that performed such a role.58 The question of which organizations trigger 2001 AUMF detention authority for their members has been a matter of controversy, but the U.S. government and some academics have suggested that cobelligerency theory can provide some guidance.59 Some support for this approach is now found in the 2012 NDAA, which includes in its definition of “covered persons,”

a person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any such person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces.60

The language of the 2001 AUMF explicitly refers to organizations that the President determines directly “planned, authorized, committed, or aided” the September 11 attacks “or harbored such organizations,” thereby clearly encompassing members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban.61 However, it is the government’s position, now endorsed by Congress, that the statute also provides for detention authority for “persons who were part of... associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.”62 The D.C. District Court has also agreed that the “President also has the authority to detain persons who were part of Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its

57. Id. art. 51.
58. Id.
59. E.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 20, at 2112; Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority, supra note 10, at 7.
60. 2012 NDAA, supra note 9, § 1021(b).
61. 2001 AUMF, supra note 7; Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority, supra note 10, at 6 (“[I]t is enough that an individual was part of al-Qa’ida or Taliban forces, the principal organizations that fall within the AUMF’s authorization of force.”).
62. Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority, supra note 10, at 2; see also Anam v. Obama, 653 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[P]ersons who were part of... associated forces that are engaged in hostilities... ”); Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 70 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Because the AUMF permits the President ‘to use all necessary and appropriate force’ against ‘organizations’ involved in the September 11 attacks, it naturally follows that force is also authorized against the members of [associated] organizations.”).
The extension of authority to "associated forces" includes several ambiguities. As noted earlier, covered persons under the 2012 NDAA include "[a] person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities." The change in tense raises questions as to whether members of groups created after September 11, 2001, are included in the detention authorization. If they are, then the Act would provide for a significant expansion of detention authority beyond that authorized in the 2001 AUMF—an expansion that the act itself denies.

In Hamlily v. Obama, a case that continues to spark debate, the D.C. District Court interpreted the term "associated forces" to mean "co-belligerents" as that term is understood under the law of war. The concept of co-belligerency remains "undertheorized," but captures the notion of actively waging war in concert with another belligerent. The Hamlily court used the concept of neutrality to inform its analysis of co-belligerency, although the concepts are legally distinct. Under the Hamlily analysis, a group "attains co-belligerent status by violating the law of neutrality—i.e., the duty of non-participation and impartiality." Violations of neutrality include recruiting agents, conveying weapons, or facilitating communications for a belligerent party. The Court did not make clear what level of neutrality violation it required for a group to be considered a co-belligerent. However, it did clarify

63. Anam, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 64. The opinion goes on to note that "this precise framework has been adopted by multiple Merits Judges, and is not inconsistent with Judge Walton’s opinion in Gherebi v. Obama, as applied." Id. (internal citation omitted).

64. 2012 NDAA, supra note 9, § 1021(b) (emphasis added).

65. Id. § 1021(d) ("Nothing in this section is intended to limit or expand the authority of the President or the scope of the Authorization for Use of Military Force.").

66. Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 70, 74. The regularly cited example of the United States' past practice in targeting co-belligerents against whom it did not originally declare war is Vichy France. Having declared war against Germany, Italy, Japan, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania, the United States targeted French forces in North Africa after the Vichy government formed an alliance with Germany and fought against the United States.


68. Id. at 87 ("[W]hen neutral states take actions that are seen as . . . violating neutrality . . . [s]uch violations do not necessarily bring neutrality to an end . . . or necessitate that the violator has become the ‘enemy’ of either belligerent.").

69. Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 75. Note that the traditional notion of co-belligerency is not automatically implicated by individual violations of neutrality. As a leading treatise on the international law of the nineteenth century—when neutrality and co-belligerency law were developed—explains, "[m]ere violation of neutrality must not be confused with the ending of neutrality. . . . [T]he condition of neutrality continues to exist between a neutral and a belligerent in spite of a violation of neutrality." 2 L. Oppenheim, International Law § 358 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952). In fact, "[t]he law of neutrality itself did not traditionally articulate when a state or individual gave up its neutral status and became a belligerent." Ingber, supra note 67, at 88.


71. Neutrality is at least ended by "acts of force performed for the purpose of attacking a belligerent. They are acts of war, and they create a condition of war between such neutral and the belligerent concerned." Oppenheim, supra note 69, § 320. Others have argued that "[a] state that significantly and systematically violates its neutral duties—through participation in the conflict or flagrant violations of impartiality—may be treated as a co-belligerent." Tess Bridgeman, Note, The Law
that associated forces “do not include terrorist organizations who merely share
an abstract philosophy or even a common purpose with al Qaeda—there must
be an actual association in the current conflict with al Qaeda or the Talibann.” To qualify as a co-belligerent, the group must be a “fully fledged belligerent
fighting in association with one or more belligerent powers.”

The application of traditional law-of-war principles such as co-belligerency and neutrality to the evaluation of the 2001 AUMF’s scope is
generally regarded as consistent with the Administration’s general position that “[p]rinciples derived from law-of-war rules governing international armed
conflicts... must inform the interpretation of the detention authority,” and
with its more specific position that “the United States has authority to detain
individuals who, in analogous circumstances in a traditional armed conflict
between the armed forces of opposing governments, would be detainable under
principles of co-belligerency.” However, certain aspects of neutrality law—
for instance, requirements relating to states’ use of their territory—do not
translate perfectly into the context of the United States’ conflict with
decentralized terrorist groups. Several scholars have, indeed, been highly
critical of applying the theory of co-belligerency from international law to
interpret statutory authority. Although the 2012 NDAA codifies the
Administration’s inclusion of associated forces within the scope of detention
authority under the 2001 AUMF, the imperfect application of neutrality law to
non-state actors may present difficulties with the use of traditional concepts of
co-belligerency and neutrality to identify the specific organizations that fall
within the reach of this authority.

d. Level of Individual Affiliation

Closely linked to the identification of organizations falling within the
scope of the 2001 AUMF is the identification of individuals sufficiently
affiliated with such organizations to be subject to detention under the statute.
The government’s position, endorsed by Congress in the 2012 NDAA, is that
the United States may lawfully detain persons who were either “part of” or

of Neutrality and the Conflict with Al Qaeda, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1186, 1200 (2010). In addition, “[p]rior
U.S. practice is consistent with the conclusion that a country becomes a co-belligerent when it permits
U.S. armed forces to use its territory for purposes of conducting military operations.” Memorandum
from the Office of Legal Counsel, “Protected Person” Status in Occupied Iraq Under the Fourth Geneva
73. Id. at 75 (quoting Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 20, at 2112).
74. Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority, supra note 10, at 1. The
Administration applies this framework to detention power, arguing that “[t]he president also has the
authority under the AUMF to detain in this armed conflict those persons whose relationship to al-Qaida
or the Talibann would, in appropriately analogous circumstances in a traditional international armed
conflict, render them detainable.” Id.
75. Id. at 7.
76. See, e.g., Ingber, supra note 67. Indeed, there are reasons to question whether neutrality
law and co-belligerency theory have any applicability to transnational non-international armed conflict
in a post-U.N. Charter era. Neutrality theory, after all, was developed in and is premised upon a world in
which war is a legitimate means of resolving disputes between states. See Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J.
"substantially supported" al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces, but there is some ambiguity regarding which specific activities constitute sufficient evidence of membership or support. As a threshold matter, the Supreme Court determined that detention authority under the 2001 AUMF extended to U.S. citizens. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the plurality found that a citizen, no less than an alien, could be engaged in armed conflict against the United States, and therefore could be held as an enemy combatant. The definition of individual membership is not explicitly addressed in the 2001 AUMF, and evaluating membership is complicated by the informal and sometimes unstable organizational structures of the groups involved. The individuals most clearly within the scope of detention authority are those who personally take a direct role in combat against U.S. forces as part of a qualifying organization, such as al-Qaeda or the Taliban. The D.C. District Court has also upheld the President's authority to detain an individual who directly functions or participates within the military command structure of a designated organization, even without evidence of his or her direct participation in combat.

Although direct participation in combat is sufficient to establish authority to detain under U.S. law, several courts have held that it is not necessary. Substantial gray area exists between an individual who operates within al-Qaeda's and the Taliban's formal military command structures and a "freelancer" who is arguably beyond the scope of the authorization. The

77. Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority, supra note 10, at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 2012 NDAA, supra note 9, § 1021(b).
79. See Chesney, supra note 51, at 794 (contrasting the concept of membership in targeted organizations with the clearer concept of membership in structured armed forces, where identification is facilitated both by uniforms and the likelihood that a captured member will admit his status in order to obtain the benefit of POW status).
80. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (indicating that detention authority extends at least to persons bearing arms as part of a Taliban military unit in Afghanistan).
81. Al Odah v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2009) (identifying the "key inquiry" as "whether the individual functions or participates within or under the command structure of the organization" (quoting Hamiily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (2009))). It is notable that this holding appears to be in direct tension with the International Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC) interpretative guidance on direct participation in hostilities under international humanitarian law (IHL). See Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Law, 90 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 991, 1108 (2008) ("Individuals who continuously accompany or support an organized armed group, but whose function does not involve direct participation in hostilities, are not members of that group within the meaning of IHL. Instead, they remain civilians assuming support functions . . .").
82. See, e.g., Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating that operating within al-Qaeda's formal command structure is sufficient but not necessary to show that the individual is part of the organization); Kandari v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 2d 11, 22 (D.D.C. 2010) ("[P]roof that an individual actually fought for or on behalf of al Qaeda or the Taliban, while sufficient, is also not required to demonstrate that an individual is 'part of' such enemy forces.").
83. See Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 752 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that "the purely independent conduct of a freelancer is not enough" to establish that an individual is "part of" al-Qaida and therefore subject to detention under the AUMF (quoting Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725)); see also Chesney, supra note 51, at 828 (arguing that the D.C. Circuit cases since Boumediene indicate a "strong consensus that membership counts as a sufficient condition for detention, but reveal considerable disagreement as to both the actual meaning of membership and whether support independent of membership can serve as an alternative sufficient condition").
evaluation of membership is made on a case-by-case basis through judicial assessment of the “totality of the circumstances.” The government has endorsed this case-by-case approach to evaluating individual membership for the purposes of detention.

Significant factors examined by courts evaluating whether an individual’s connection to a designated organization constitutes membership include attendance at military training facilities associated with targeted groups, overnight use of affiliated guesthouses, “self-identification with an organization through verbal or written statements, participation in a group’s hierarchy or command structure” (both military and non-military), and participation in an organization’s activities (both military and non-military). Although courts look to these common indicators, they diverge with respect to which factor or constellation of factors constitutes adequate proof of membership.

The related question of whether the government may detain an individual on the basis of his or her support of a designated enemy organization—even when the individual is not a member of the organization—has been a source of controversy. The Administration has consistently asserted the authority to detain individuals on the grounds of “substantial” support, and at least one court has agreed with this position. However, other court decisions and

85. Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority, supra note 10, at 7 (“In each case, given the nature of the irregular forces, and the practice of their participants or members to try to conceal their affiliations, judgments about the detainability of a particular individual will necessarily turn on the totality of the circumstances.”).
87. See Chesney, supra note 51, at 866 (summarizing the findings of various courts reaching the scope of detention authority with regard to the relevance of past conduct, associational status, citizenship, location of capture, and future dangerousness, among other factors). Compare Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 69 (D.D.C. 2009) (implying that membership in the military chain of command of a covered organization is a necessary condition), with al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8, 16-17 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (implying that membership is a sufficient condition and may be proven by training camp attendance).
88. Chesney, supra note 51, at 828.
89. The Bush Administration defined enemy combatants as individuals who were “part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces,” including “any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy forces.” Mortlock, supra note 6, at 386. The Obama Administration has confined its articulation of the scope of its detention authority to those who provided “substantial” support. Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority, supra note 10, at 7 (“Under a functional analysis, individuals who provide substantial support to al-Qa’ida forces in other parts of the world may properly be deemed part of al-Qa’ida itself.”). The government’s memorandum recognized uncertainty regarding the degree of support that would justify detention. Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority, supra note 10, at 2 (“[T]he particular facts and circumstances justifying detention will vary from case to case. . . . [T]he contours of the ‘substantial support’ and ‘associated forces’ bases of detention will need to be further developed in their application to concrete facts in individual cases.”).
90. Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 4 (finding that the 2001 AUMF authorizes the President to detain both persons who are part of enemy organizations and those who provide substantial support to such organizations); see also Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872-73 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding, in dicta, that the defendant could be detained, not only as a member of a belligerent force allied with the Taliban, but also for providing support to the group).
commentary have taken the position that statutory authority to detain individuals who are “part of” an organization involved in the September 11 terrorist attacks does not extend to individuals who simply supported enemy forces, even if such support is “substantial” or “direct.” Congress has now provided its answer to this question. The 2012 NDAA extends detention authority to persons who were either “part of or substantially supported” covered organizations, including those who have “directly supported [hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners] in aid of such enemy forces.”

This language extends beyond individuals who substantially supported al-Qaeda and the Taliban to include those who have supported unspecified associated forces. Although courts have disagreed on the substantive requirements to meet membership or support criteria under the 2001 AUMF, they agree that the government bears the evidentiary burden of proving sufficient affiliation with an organization or affiliated group, and that a “preponderance of the evidence” standard is appropriate. Hearsay evidence has been treated as admissible for the purposes of determining detainability. The Hamdi plurality, for instance, found that “the exigencies of the circumstances may demand” the tailoring of enemy-combatant proceedings, aside from the core elements, “to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict,” and specifically stated that hearsay may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence. When addressing hearsay statements, judges

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91. Al Odah v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that, while evidence of support may be probative of whether an individual is part of an enemy organization, it does not by itself provide grounds for detention); Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69, 70, 76 (rejecting both the concepts of “substantial support” and “directly supporting[ing] hostilities” as an independent basis for detention, but allowing that “the concept may play a role under the functional test used to determine who is a ‘part of a covered organization.’”); see also Mortlock, supra note 6, at 386 (presenting a “membership model” for determining which individuals are “part of” an organization within the scope of the AUMF).

92. 2012 NDAA, supra note 5, § 1021(b).

93. Compare Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (accepting the provision of the Administration’s formulation of its detention powers which included those providing “substantial support” to enemy organizations), with Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (rejecting “substantial support” as an independent basis for detention).

94. In Al-Bihani, in an opinion since called into some doubt, Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J., Ginsburg, Henderson, Rogers, Tatel, Garland & Griffith, JJ., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc), the D.C. Circuit panel upheld this approach as constitutional. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 878. The court analogized to the “burden-shifting” scheme approved in Hamdi, “in which the government need only present ‘credible evidence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria’ before ‘the onus could shift to the petitioner to rebut that evidence with more persuasive evidence that he falls outside the criteria,’” reasoning that that description “mirrors a preponderance standard.” Id. (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533-34 (2004) (plurality opinion)). Although the court accepted a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard as constitutional, it emphasized that its “opinion does not endeavor to identify what standard would represent the minimum required by the Constitution,” opening up the possibility that a lower standard of proof might suffice. Id. In Hamdi, Justice O’Connor also suggested that it may be appropriate to adopt a presumption in favor of the government’s evidence, “so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534 (plurality opinion); see also Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (relying on Al-Bihani to hold that the district court did not err in holding the government to a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard). See generally WITTES ET AL., supra note 6.

95. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-34 (plurality opinion).
generally require corroboration, although courts have diverged as to the strength of the corroboration required. There is disagreement between judges regarding further evidentiary issues, including whether the government is entitled to presumptions in favor of accuracy or authenticity of evidence, the use of evidence allegedly resulting from coercion or torture, and the appropriateness of the government’s use of a “mosaic theory” of evidence.

This Subsection has described the scope of the 2001 AUMF and the controversy surrounding it. It has also discussed the 2012 NDAA, which effectively codifies the Administration’s interpretation of detention authority under the statute. In the context of U.S. counterterrorism efforts spread broadly across the globe more than a decade after September 11, however, alternative sources of detention authority that might supplement the 2001 AUMF should still be explored. The next two Subsections consider two additional sources of statutory authority: the 2002 AUMF and the MCA.

2. The 2002 AUMF

Much of the policy debate regarding detention has surrounded the forty-five square miles of Guantánamo Bay and the roughly eight hundred detainees that have at one point been housed there. Relatively little attention has been paid to the nearly one hundred thousand individuals the United States has detained in Iraq during the war that began in 2002. This Subsection provides an overview of the domestic legal authority under which these individuals were detained.

The detentions in Iraq were justified as a matter of domestic law under the legal authority granted in a joint resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq, the 2002 AUMF. The resolution authorized the President to use the armed forces “as he determines to be necessary and appropriate” in order to “(1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq.” The 2002 AUMF does not explicitly mention any authority to detain individuals, but the language it shares with the 2001 AUMF suggests that detention authority is “necessary and appropriate” to

96. WITTES ET AL., supra note 6, at 52-89.
98. See, e.g., Caroline Alexander, Last U.S.-Run Prison Handed over to Iraqis Ahead of Withdrawal, WASH. POST, July 15, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/15/AR2010071502545.html (stating that about 100,000 detainees have been held at Camp Cropper alone).
99. The military intervention and detentions were justified under international law by a series of United Nations mandates and, when the final mandate expired, under the bilateral agreements between the United States and the Iraqi governments. See Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq and the Crisis of Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447, 463-76 (2011) (describing the U.N. mandates and the bilateral agreements that superseded them).
100. 2002 AUMF, supra note 16, § 3.
carrying out authorized military force. Unlike the 2001 AUMF, however, it is geographically limited, applying only to the "threat posed by Iraq" and Security Council Resolutions "regarding Iraq."

The continuing validity of the 2002 AUMF as a source of detention authority is a subcomponent of a larger question: does the 2002 AUMF still provide legitimacy for any U.S. military operations in Iraq? The purpose-oriented clauses of the resolution suggest that the document should cease to be a source of legal authority once these conditions have been met. The extent to which the first condition, defending the United States "against the continuing threat posed by Iraq," is satisfied turns on the nature of the threat contemplated by Congress. Some have argued that this threat should be limited to the existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), while others have articulated a broader construction of this threat to encompass the post-invasion insurgency. The second prong of the 2002 AUMF is less controversial, as the final U.N. Security Council Resolution expired at the end of 2009. The Bush Administration justified a continuing U.S. presence in Iraq based on a combination of bilateral agreements with the Iraqi government, the 2001 AUMF, the 2002 AUMF, and congressional support in the form of appropriations. With the exception of the 2002 AUMF, all of these justifications provided questionable domestic authority to continue active military operations in Iraq after the fall of the Hussein government—and, by extension, detention—without renewed congressional authorization.

101. One possible explanation for the lack of explicit language referencing detention authority is that "detention operations did not figure prominently in pre-invasion planning because the assumptions driving that planning did not include a sustained U.S. ground presence, let alone an extended occupation and counterinsurgency campaign." Robert M. Chesney, Iraq and the Military Detention Debate: Firsthand Perspectives from the Other War, 2003-2010, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 549, 563 (2011).


103. See Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 99, at 469.

104. Id. at 471-72 (citing Declaration and Principles: Future U.S. Commitments to Iraq: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Middle E. and S. Asia and the Subcomm. on Int'l Orgs., Human Rights, and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 6 (2008) (written response of David M. Satterfield, Senior Adviser, Coordinator for Iraq, U.S. Dep't of State, to Rep. Gary L. Ackerman, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Middle E. and S. Asia)). Ambassador Satterfield cited three separate legal rationales for the continuation of the Iraq war without additional congressional authorization: (1) The 2002 AUMF, (2) the 2001 AUMF, and (3) the fact that "Congress has repeatedly provided funding for the Iraq war, both in regular appropriations cycles and in supplemental appropriations." Id.

105. While proponents of strong presidential power argue that appropriations suffice to demonstrate congressional authorization, they seem to be outside the constitutional consensus. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167 (1996). The Supreme Court has held that appropriations bills can only substitute for enactments in very limited circumstances. The Court acknowledged that appropriations are "'Acts of Congress,'" but explained that they "have the limited and specific purpose of providing funds for authorized programs." Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978); see also Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 99, at 472.
The issue of detention authority in Iraq has become largely moot as the U.S. military has transferred nearly all detention responsibilities to its Iraqi counterparts. In fact, the vast majority of individuals formerly detained by the United States in Iraq have either been released or prosecuted within the Iraqi judicial system, with the exception of “about 200 dangerous, yet difficult to charge, individuals.”\(^\text{106}\) Under one of the bilateral agreements governing the ongoing relationship between the United States and Iraq, U.S. forces only have limited powers to detain pursuant to “an Iraqi decision issued in accordance with Iraqi law,” and “persons must be handed over to competent Iraqi authorities within 24 hours from the time of their detention or arrest.”\(^\text{107}\) While the agreement provides limited detention authority within Iraq, it does not purport to grant domestic legal authority for these detentions.

3. **Pendent Authority To Detain Under the MCA**

While the 2002 AUMF covers only detainees linked to U.S. participation in the conflict in Iraq, some have suggested that the MCA, the statute that governs the process for trying and punishing unprivileged combatants, may provide detention authority of a broader scope.\(^\text{108}\) The MCA does provide some additional detention authority, but that additional authority is limited to those individuals actually prosecuted under the statute.

Responding to the Supreme Court’s holding in *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*,\(^\text{109}\) Congress passed the MCA to establish a jurisdictional and procedural foundation for the use of military commissions. The statute authorizes military commissions to try any “alien unprivileged enemy belligerent,” which includes any individual, other than a privileged belligerent, who (a) has engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; (b) has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; or (c) was a part of al-Qaeda at the time of the alleged offense.\(^\text{110}\) Military commissions are granted jurisdiction to try listed offenses (such as murder, attacking civilians, and taking hostages), as well as aiding the enemy, spying, and violations of war, whether the offense is committed before,

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108. Similar to the 2009 MCA, *supra* note 17, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005), arguably could be read as a (post-hoc) legislative ratification of the executive’s policy of detention up to that point. However, the Detainee Treatment Act contains no authorization for detention in itself, and neither the Obama Administration nor any of the habeas rulings in post-September 11 terrorism cases have relied upon the DTA for advancing detention authority arguments.
110. 10 U.S.C. § 948a(7) (2006). Privileged belligerents are those “belonging to one of the eight categories enumerated in Article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.” *Id.* § 948a(6).
on, or after September 11, 2001. The MCA states, moreover, that military commissions may proceed against aliens who are members of groups covered by the 2001 AUMF as well as those who are not members but nonetheless provide support to such groups. Importantly, the MCA is silent on the issue of detention authority, and the legislative history explicitly notes that the statute was not intended to define the scope of the President’s authority to detain.

The D.C. Circuit panel’s opinion in Al-Bihani v. Obama, which was cast into doubt in subsequent proceedings, suggested that the scope of the MCA includes detention authority. Speaking for the panel, Judge Janice Rogers Brown concluded that anyone subject to a military commission under the MCA is a fortiori subject to indefinite detention without trial as well. According to the panel’s logic, anyone who has “purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners” could be detained. The opinion applied a lower bar for indefinite detention than under the 2001 AUMF by allowing the government to detain under the MCA those who provide independent support to an AUMF-covered organization, even without proof of membership in that organization, and even if there is no intention to prosecute under the MCA. By doing so, Al-Bihani suggested a substantial expansion of detention authority.

The Al-Bihani panel erred in deriving expansive stand-alone detention authority from the MCA’s purely jurisdictional and procedural provisions. It is uncontroversial that individuals subject to trial by a military commission will also be detained—at least for the period of the trial. But the Al-Bihani panel opinion suggests that the authority to prosecute always and necessarily implies the authority to detain—and that this authority to detain can be unhinged

111. 10 U.S.C. § 948d; see also 10 U.S.C. §§ 904, 950t, 906.


113. See S. Rep. No. 111-288, at 862-63 (2009) (Conf. Rep.) [hereinafter Conference Report] (noting that the MCA’s definition of “unprivileged enemy belligerents” is included only for the purpose of establishing persons subject to trial by military commission in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 948c, and is not intended to address the scope of the authority of the United States to detain individuals in accordance with the laws of war or for any other purpose).

114. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J., Ginsburg, Henderson, Rogers, Tatel, Garland & Griffith, J.J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“We decline to en banc this case to determine the role of international law-of-war principles in interpreting the AUMF because, as the various opinions issued in the case indicate, the panel’s discussion of that question is not necessary to the disposition of the merits.”).


116. Id. (citing § 948a(1)(A)(i)).

117. WITTES ET AL., supra note 6, at 29.

118. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872 (“The provisions of the 2006 and 2009 MCAs are illuminating in this case because the government’s detention authority logically covers a category of persons no narrower than is covered by its military commission authority. Detention authority in fact sweeps wider...”).

119. This first step of the argument is itself incorrect. The government has the authority to prosecute a criminal law violation but does not possess the authority to detain in cases where the available penalties for the criminal law violation do not include detention. For example, certain non-federal statutes criminalize activities such as jaywalking, speeding, or wildlife violations as misdemeanors and limit the punishment to a fine. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1701 (indicating that Class A and Class B traffic offenses have a maximum penalty of $100). On a federal level, certain
from the authority to prosecute, thereby allowing the government to detain individuals without any intention of prosecuting them. Under this formulation, Congress's vesting of prosecutorial authority was enough to supply the President with stand-alone detention authority. Yet this expansive reading of the MCA is not only inconsistent with specific statutory language to the contrary—in which Congress expressly stated that it did not intend to address the scope of authority to detain—it is also inconsistent with basic principles of detention authority pursuant to prosecution authority. To detain someone suspected of murder, for example, the government must intend to prosecute that person for murder. Similarly, in order to detain an individual pursuant to the MCA, the government must intend to prosecute that individual under the MCA.

While the MCA may provide detention authority for some individuals who are not covered by the 2001 AUMF—for example, because they are not members or supporters of al-Qaeda or the Taliban—the government must not only intend to prosecute, but it must charge and prosecute within a reasonable timeframe. Article 14(3)(c) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) requires that trials take place “without undue delay.” The Human Rights Committee has noted that this applies “not only to the time by which a trial should commence, but also the time by which it should end and statutes establish maximum fines for certain acts and exclude the power to detain. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006) (“If the persons, corporation, or association owning or controlling any railroad or other bridge shall, after receiving notice [that their railroad or bridge is obstructing navigation waters], as hereinbefore required, from the Secretary of Transportation and within the time prescribed by him willfully fail or refuse to remove the same or to comply with the lawful order of the Secretary of the Army in the premises, such persons, corporation, or association shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $5,000 . . .”). Other statutes criminalize activity perpetrated by corporations but do not allow for detention authority. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.51(b) (“If a corporation or association is adjudged guilty of an offense that provides a penalty including imprisonment, or that provides no specific penalty, a court may sentence the corporation or association to pay a fine in an amount fixed by the court, not to exceed: (1) $20,000 if the offense is a felony of any category; (2) $10,000 if the offense is a Class A or Class B misdemeanor; (3) $2,000 if the offense is a Class C misdemeanor; or (4) $500,000 if, as a result of an offense classified as a felony or Class A misdemeanor, an individual suffers serious bodily injury or death.”). Although all of those statutes suggest that detention authority does not automatically flow from prosecutorial authority, the nature of the underlying crimes in these provisions, such as crossing a street when the traffic light is green, obviously differs significantly from the nature of the crimes outlined in the MCA. The point here is simply that those examples illustrate that the power to prosecute for a violation of criminal law does not always entail a power to detain.

120. See Conference Report, supra note 113.

121. Many of the current detainees at Guantánamo Bay would likely not be subject to prosecution under the MCA because they have not committed any crimes. See, e.g., Editorial, Obama and Guantánamo, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123258578172604569.html (“[M]any of the Guantanamo prisoners haven’t committed crimes per se but are dedicated American enemies and too dangerous to let go. Other cases involve evidence that is insufficient for trial but still sufficient to determine that release is an unacceptable security risk.”).


judgment be rendered; all stages must take place "without undue delay.""

Lengthy pre-trial detention constitutes a violation of 14(3)(c) and, although the Committee has not specified a particular timeframe, it has found delays of twenty-two months, two years, and twenty-nine months to violate the right to trial without undue delay. When read in light of this fundamental guarantee, the MCA does not provide the authority to detain individuals indefinitely under the pretext of intent to prosecute, but only where they are prosecuted "without undue delay."

Jurisdiction under the MCA is also disputed for certain subject matters. For example, the D.C. Circuit recently held that the crime of providing material support for terrorism falls outside the scope of the Military Commissions Act and therefore is not subject to prosecution before the military commissions. If the decision stands, it will significantly undermine the capacity of prosecutors to charge detainees before the Military Commissions. Moreover, human rights organizations have generally been critical of the MCA on due process and independence grounds, and the Committee has expressed concern about the trial of civilians by military courts and has indicated that such trials "should be very exceptional and take place under conditions which genuinely afford the full guarantees stipulated in article 14.""

In sum, while the MCA may provide detention authority for prosecutions of some persons who do not fall under the 2001 AUMF—where such persons


126. See id. ¶ 7.2.


129. See Hamdan v. United States, No. 11-1257, slip op. at 5-6 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 16, 2012); see also Brief for National Institute of Military Justice, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, United States v. Al-Bahlul, No. 11-1324 (2009), 2012 WL 2458066 (arguing that material support does not constitute a violation of the law of nations and is therefore outside the subject-matter jurisdiction of the military commissions); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Laws of War as a Constitutional Limit on Military Jurisdiction, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 295 (2010).


131. General Comment 13, supra note 124, art. 14, ¶ 10 ("The Committee notes the existence, in many countries, of military or special courts which try civilians. This could present serious problems as far as the equitable, impartial and independent administration of justice is concerned. Quite often the reason for the establishment of such courts is to enable exceptional procedures to be applied which do not comply with normal standards of justice. While the Covenant does not prohibit such categories of courts, nevertheless the conditions which it lays down clearly indicate that the trying of civilians by such courts should be very exceptional and take place under conditions which genuinely afford the full guarantees stipulated in article 14.").
are to be imminently prosecuted under that statute for violations of the law of
nations—the nature and extent of that authority remains controversial.

This Section has argued that the three existing sources of statutory
authority for detention provide highly circumscribed authority to detain persons
suspected of engaging in terrorist activities. The next Section turns to a
separate—and, as we shall argue, even more restricted—source of presidential
authority to detain: the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief under the U.S.
Constitution.

B. Constitutional Authority: The President’s Article II Power To
Detain

After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration argued that it
had expansive detention authority under Article II of the Constitution because
detention of the enemy is among the core functions of the President as
Commander-in-Chief. This position was widely criticized, and the Obama
Administration has refrained from making similar arguments. Instead, it has
relied on the 2001 AUMF to justify military detention of individuals
apprehended in the course of counterterrorism operations. Courts have
declined to reach the issue of whether the President has independent Article II
detention authority in the global fight against terrorism and have generally
analyzed the scope of that detention authority under the 2001 AUMF. This
Section addresses two questions: (1) does the President have independent
Article II authority to detain; and (2) if yes, what is the scope of that authority?
To the extent that detention authority is incident to the authority to engage in
military operations, the President may have independent detention authority,
but only in the very limited settings where he has independent military
authority.

1. Source of Article II Detention Authority

The President’s law-of-war detention authority is ancillary to the
President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief to conduct military operations. It
follows that the scope of the President’s independent Article II detention
authority cannot exceed the scope of his power to engage in military
operations.
The President’s detention authority during armed conflict is grounded in the President’s powers as Commander-in-Chief. The plurality opinion in *Hamdi* stated that “[t]he capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by ‘universal agreement and practice,’ are ‘important incident[s] of war’” and that “detention . . . is a fundamental incident of waging war.” As a result, the plurality concluded that the 2001 AUMF’s authorization for the use of “necessary and appropriate force” unmistakably includes the authority to detain.

This reasoning was echoed in subsequent cases. In a brief to the Fourth Circuit, the government had also argued that “the President’s core functions as Commander-in-Chief in wartime [include] detention,” and Justice Thomas treated detention authority as part of the President’s war powers in his dissent in *Hamdi*. While there is disagreement about the scope of the President’s Article II detention authority, there is nonetheless broad consensus that the authority arises from the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers. Hence, the scope of the President’s authority to engage in law-of-war detention in the absence of statutory authorization is limited to the scope of his independent authority to use military force.

The Court’s reasoning in *Hamdi* and elsewhere suggests two further restrictions on the President’s Article II detention authority. First, the detention must be a fundamental or necessary incident to the specific type of military operation under consideration. This follows directly from the reasoning in *Hamdi* and subsequent cases—that detention is included in “necessary and appropriate force” because it is a fundamental incident of the use of such force. In order for ancillary detention authority to exist, therefore, it must be a fundamental incident to the specific type of military operation the President has

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138. 542 U.S. at 518 (citing *Quirin*, 317 U.S. at 28, 30).


140. *Id.*


144. It bears mentioning in this context that, in the wake of September 11, the Department of Justice proposed a bill that would have authorized “indefinite preventive detention, without charge, of aliens suspected of some connection to terrorist activities or groups,” and Congress pointedly rejected those provisions. Brief for the Constitution Project as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 9-16, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011) (No. 10-98) (citing Dep’t of Justice Antiterrorism Bill 2d Draft, § 202 (Sept. 19, 2001)), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/al-Kidd_jan31_2011.pdf; *Homeland Defense: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 107 Cong. 18 (2001) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). The proposal (and rejection) of this bill indicates that neither the executive nor Congress viewed the President as having independent Article II authority to indefinitely detain persons with ties to terrorism within the United States and outside the circumscribed context of an authorized war or military operation.

145. *See Johnson v. Eisentrager*, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); *Ex parte Quirin*, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); *In re Territo*, 156 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1946).
independent authority to engage in. Second, the capture and detention must have as its object the disabling of enemy combatants and the prevention of their return to the battlefield. *Hamdi*, *Eisenhower*, and similar cases make clear that the key purpose of detention in the course of war is to disable the enemy. That is, wartime detention has a defensive purpose. Thus, to determine whether detention authority exists, the key question is whether the military operation is of such a nature that detention could serve the disabling defensive function envisioned in these cases.

Where the President has independent Article II authority to engage in military operations and where these two additional conditions are met, limited independent Article II detention authority likely also exists.

2. **Scope of Article II Detention Authority**

Given the dependence of executive detention authority on the scope of the President’s Article II authority as Commander-in-Chief, the more expansive a view one takes of the President’s independent military powers, the more expansive the detention authority that follows. Broadly speaking, there are three views about the President’s substantive powers under Article II and their implications for the scope of detention authority.

At one extreme is the view that the “Constitution vests the President with exclusive authority to act as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s sole organ in foreign affairs.” In this view, the different powers allocated by the

146. *See Hamdi*, 542 U.S. at 519 (“Because detention to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of ‘necessary and appropriate force,’ Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow circumstances considered here.”); *Eisenhower*, 339 U.S. at 772-73 (“The alien enemy is bound by an allegiance which commits him to lose no opportunity to forward the cause of our enemy; hence the United States, assuming him to be faithful to his allegiance, regards him as part of the enemy resources. It therefore takes measures to disable him from the commission of hostile acts imputed as his intention because they are a duty to his sovereign.”); *Territorial Law*, 156 F.2d at 145 (“The object of capture is to prevent the captured individual from serving the enemy.”).

147. Two cautionary notes should be made. First, *Hamdi*, *Quirin*, and *Eisenhower* were all decided in the setting of a *statutorily authorized* war or military operation; thus, the arguments presented here are arguments by analogy only. Based on the reasoning these courts use in referencing or discussing detention authority, some more general conclusions may be drawn, but they are not by any means obvious or settled law. Moreover, the analysis presented here brackets questions about the authorized duration of detention and instead focuses solely on the initial authority to seize or capture in the course of military operations. Additional restrictions that limit the President’s detention authority include all applicable law-of-war limitations, such as the well-settled rule that privileged combatants must be released at the end of hostilities and unprivileged combatants must be tried and convicted or released at the end of hostilities. However, in a setting where there is no anticipated end to the hostilities in sight and where detention for the duration of hostilities begins to approach indefinite detention, this traditional approach “may unravel” and different or additional limitations and procedural protections may apply. *Hamdi*, 542 U.S. at 521. For a more detailed discussion of the problem of duration, see infra Section III.B.

148. This summary follows the basic framework laid out in Barron & Lederman, supra note 20.

Constitution among the branches are "separate and distinct powers," meaning that there is no overlap in the substance of these powers and "Congress may not make rules and regulations that burden the President's ability to act as commander in chief."\textsuperscript{150} In John Yoo's words, "[t]he power of the President is at its zenith under the Constitution when the President is directing military operations of the armed forces, because the power of Commander-in-Chief is assigned solely to the President."\textsuperscript{151} As Justice Thomas stated in his dissenting opinion in \textit{Hamdi}, authority over matters relating to national security, including detention, is vested exclusively in the President "principally because the structural advantages of a unitary Executive are essential in these domains."\textsuperscript{152} He concludes that "the President has \textit{constitutional} authority to protect the national security and . . . this authority carries with it broad discretion"\textsuperscript{153} and a "need to be free from interference."\textsuperscript{154} This approach would give the President very expansive military authority, including detention authority, and would regard this authority as unencumbered by congressional limitations.

At the other end of the spectrum is the view that the Commander-in-Chief Clause confers no substantive powers, and that this designation is a purely hierarchical one.\textsuperscript{155} On this view, the President lacks independent detention authority under Article II, and his authority to detain is entirely statutory. This interpretation finds some support in the historical use of the term "commander in chief"\textsuperscript{156} but, as David Barron and Martin Lederman note, ultimately cannot be reconciled with "a long line of Supreme Court precedent recognizing a range of distinct substantive powers that the Commander-in-Chief may exercise in the absence of legislative authorization."\textsuperscript{157}

The intermediate view, grounded in Justice Jackson's concurrence in \textit{Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer},\textsuperscript{158} holds that the President's Commander-in-Chief power is a component of a shared war power. On this view, presidential authority does not preclude regulation by Congress. Instead, "[t]he Constitution . . . means for the President and Congress each to wield aspects of the war power, which means that the powers should be understood in a way that accommodates the exercise of each and recognizes that they overlap and interrelate."\textsuperscript{159} This approach yields a more flexible model that sees some

\begin{itemize}
\item 151. Yoo, OLC Memo, supra note 149.
\item 152. \textit{Hamdi}, 542 U.S. at 580 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
\item 153. \textit{Id.} at 581.
\item 154. \textit{Id.} at 582.
\item 156. Wuerth, \textit{supra} note 155, at 67, 83.
\item 158. 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.").
\item 159. Kinkopf, \textit{supra} note 150, at 1170.
\end{itemize}
of the President's powers as "core" powers that are "preclusive" of congressional regulation and others as more "peripheral" and therefore "non-preclusive" of such regulation.\textsuperscript{160} This model envisions a distribution of power where the President's actions can be circumscribed by Congress even where he acts in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief.\textsuperscript{161} Thus, even though the President's detention authority is part of his authority as Commander-in-Chief, it does not exist independently of Congress's concurrent power to declare war\textsuperscript{162} and to regulate aspects of the conduct of war.\textsuperscript{163} Numerous cases support this view, holding that the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief may be limited by Congress,\textsuperscript{164} and that the War Powers Resolution places additional constraints on the President's exercise of his Commander-in-Chief authority:

The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.\textsuperscript{165}

While there are different views about how far the War Powers Resolution limits the President's powers in practice\textsuperscript{166} and about how to sort preclusive

\begin{footnotes}
\item[160] See generally Barron & Lederman, supra note 20, at 726-29.
\item[161] See generally Wuerth, supra note 155, at 91-95 (discussing marque and reprisal authority and other relevant powers vested in Congress and their implications for the scope of the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief).
\item[162] U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; see Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1144 (D.D.C. 1990) ("To the extent that this unambiguous direction requires construction or explanation, it is provided by the framers' comments that they felt it to be unwise to entrust the momentous power to involve the nation in a war to the President alone; Jefferson explained that he desired 'an effectual check to the Dog of war'; James Wilson similarly expressed the expectation that this system would guard against hostilities being initiated by a single man. Even Abraham Lincoln, while a Congressman, said more than half a century later that 'no one man should hold the power of bringing' war upon us.").
\item[163] For the view that the war powers are overlapping shared powers, see Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1971) ([T]he war power of the country is an amalgam of powers, some distinct and others less sharply limned. In certain respects, the executive and the Congress may act independently. The Congress may without executive cooperation declare war, thus triggering treaty obligations and domestic emergency powers. The executive may without Congressional participation repel attack, perhaps catapulting the country into a major conflict. But beyond these independent powers, each of which has its own rationale, the Constitutional scheme envisages the joint participation of the Congress and the executive in determining the scale and duration of hostilities.").
\item[164] See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804) (standing for the proposition that Congress may prescribe statutory limitations on the President's executive authority as Commander-in-Chief); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1 (1801) (deciding a question of executive authority to capture neutral vessel by analyzing statutory not inherent authority); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 45 (1800) (Paterson, J.) ("As far as Congress tolerated and authorized the war on our part, so far may we proceed in hostile operations."); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 662 (1952) (Clark, J., concurring) ("Where Congress has laid down specific procedures to deal with the type of crisis confronting the President, he must follow those procedures in meeting the crisis; but . . . in the absence of such action by Congress, the President's independent power to act depends upon the gravity of the situation confronting the nation." (emphasis added)).
\item[166] It is unclear how far the War Powers Resolution extends in limiting the President's authority, since courts have tended either to find the question of whether the executive's actions were authorized by statute non-justiciable for reasons of standing or ripeness or under the political question doctrine, or to find that the President had statutory authorization because Congress approved financing
\end{footnotes}
core powers from non-preclusive shared powers, there does appear to be a broad consensus that the President has independent Article II authority to conduct defensive military operations in very circumscribed settings—paradigmatically, where he acts to repel an attack on the United States, to defend U.S. citizens abroad, and to defend U.S. embassies, consulates, and of the war effort or because it retrospectively ratified the war effort. However, the mere practice of deciding by looking to statutory authorization (even where a finding that there was one seems strained) reinforces the view that Congress may limit the President’s exercise of his Commander-in-Chief powers if it so chooses. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2003); Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Mass. v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971); Rappenecker v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 1024 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).

See generally Barron & Lederman, supra note 20, at 753-61 (discussing possible distinctions to define the scope of the President’s preclusive Commander-in-Chief powers but finding none satisfactory).

Presidents have also asserted the authority to engage unilaterally in humanitarian intervention without congressional authorization where the operations are of limited “nature, scope, and duration” and where the President determines it is in the national interest to do so. E.g. Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 6-9 (2011); see also Authority To Use U.S. Military Forces in Somalia, 16 Op. O.L.C. 6, 11 (1992) (“Nor is the president’s power strictly limited to the protection of American citizens in Somalia. Past military interventions that extended to the protection of foreign nationals provide precedent for action to protect endangered Somalians and other non-United States citizens.”). To the extent such authority exists, the President may also have ancillary detention authority in the context of resulting hostilities.

See Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 893 n.1 (1970); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 668 (“If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority. And whether the hostile party be a foreign invader, or States organized in rebellion, it is none the less a war, although the declaration of it be "unilateral."’’); Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d at 26, 31-32 (1971); see also El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that courts cannot question the President’s determination that the plant’s destruction was a necessary and appropriate response to the imminent threat of terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities). Scholars also have widely accepted the President’s power to repel an attack on the United States. See Michael J. Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy 84 (1990); see, e.g., Elia V. Pirozzi, The War Power and a Career-Minded Congress: Making the Case for Legislative Reform, Congressional Term Limits, and Renewed Respect for the Intent of the Framers, 27 SW. U. L. Rev. 185, 194-98 (1997).

This was recognized as early as 1860 in Durand v. Hollins, which reasoned that U.S. citizens abroad are entitled to protection, and that threats of violence against U.S. citizens abroad cannot be anticipated and frequently require prompt action. 8 F. Cas. 111, 112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860). Consequently, the court concluded that the duty to protect the lives and property of citizens abroad must rest with the President. Id. Numerous presidents have since invoked this authority, for example during the Iran hostage crisis, see Presidential Powers Relating to the Situation in Iran, 4A Op. O.L.C. 115, 127 (1979), in order to send troops to Somalia, see Auth. to Use Military Forces in Somalia, 16 Op. O.L.C. 6, 8 (1992) (“The President’s role under our Constitution as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive vests him with the constitutional authority to order United States troops abroad to further national interests such as protecting the lives of Americans overseas. Accordingly, where, as here, United States government personnel and private citizens are participating in a lawful relief effort in a foreign nation, we conclude that the president may commit United States troops to protect those involved in the relief effort.”); see also Pirozzi, supra note 169, at 200-202 (stating that the President has the authority to initiate military actions to protect U.S. citizens abroad), and, perhaps less persuasively, in assessing the legality of deploying troops in Haiti, see Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. 173, 176 n.3 (1994); Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Haiti (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2004/legalityofdeployment.pdf. Given the purpose of this authority, however, it is very limited in nature. See Glennon, supra note 169, at 86 (“[T]he president does have the power to use the armed forces, in the face of congressional silence, in emergency situations involving the imminent threat of grievous harm to American citizens and nationals.”). Moreover, at least one scholar suggests that the use of force for this purpose must be proportional; that this authority is
military bases abroad. However, "when the President acts on his own constitutional authority, the force employed must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances initially permitting the use of force." Any detention authority the President may have under his defensive war powers is similarly limited.

In sum, detention authority under Article II derives from the President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief. Its scope can be no greater than the scope of the President’s independent war powers. Independent Article II detention authority therefore exists only in those rare situations in which the President has unilateral authority to initiate and conduct military operations.

* * *

As U.S. counterterrorism operations become less directly tied to the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the 2001 AUMF is becoming more tenuous as a central source of detention authority for the U.S. government. The 2002 AUMF only provides limited detention authority within Iraq—authority that is also drawing to a close with the conclusion of U.S. military combat in that country. Detention authority under the MCA is limited to alien enemy combatants prosecuted for law-of-war violations in military commissions under the MCA. Finally, the President’s independent constitutional detention authority exists only in very limited circumstances, because Article II detention authority rests on the President’s independent authority to use military force.

limited to situations where diplomatic remedies have been exhausted; and that it does not exist in situations where “people . . . voluntarily enter ultrahazardous areas” and therefore have “no reasonable expectation of rescue by the United States armed forces.”

171. See GLENNON, supra note 169, at 87. While there do not appear to have been any legal analyses specifically of the President's detention authority when acting to defend U.S. embassies or consulates abroad, such authority would similarly exist as ancillary to military engagement authority, and would similarly be limited by its relatedness to the type of operation required to defend U.S. positions abroad. Notably, courts have not been inclined to review the President’s determination that a particular action was necessary for the defense of U.S. personnel and facilities abroad. See El-Shifa Pharm. Ind. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1362-65 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that courts cannot question the President’s determination that the plant’s destruction was a necessary and appropriate response to the imminent threat of terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities). When the President undertakes actions solely to defend holdings abroad, it is likely that these operations would be very limited in scope and duration. As a result, it is highly unlikely that detention authority exists in these contexts, except for the very limited purpose of disabling combatants and preventing them from returning to the battlefield while the military operation is ongoing.


173. See, e.g., Admiral Jonathan Greenhert, Sea Change: The Navy Pivots to Asia, FOREIGN POLICY (Nov. 14, 2012) (“Our nation’s security priorities, and our military, are in transition. In the Middle East, we ended the war in Iraq and are reducing ground troops in Afghanistan with the shift of security responsibilities to Kabul.”); John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. and Counterterrorism, Remarks at Harvard Law School: Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011) (“Simply put, [newly proposed detention legislation] is not an approach we should pursue. Not when we have al-Qa’ida on the ropes. Our counterterrorism professionals—regardless of the administration in power—need the flexibility to make well-informed decisions about where to prosecute terrorist suspects.” (emphasis added)); Oona A. Hathaway & Bruce Ackerman, The World After Bin Laden, WASH. POST, May 3, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/topic-a-the-world-after-bin-laden/2011/05/02/AFF7ujhF_story.html.
As we shall see in the following Part, these are not the only limits on the government’s law-of-war detention authority. International law—both the law of armed conflict and human rights law—provides an independent set of limitations on the government’s authority to detain suspected terrorists.

III. INTERNATIONAL LAW LIMITATIONS ON LAW-OF-WAR DETENTION

International law places limits on detention authority. These limits are incorporated into domestic law in several ways. First, they may be incorporated into the affirmative statutory authority that Congress grants the President. The government has explicitly acknowledged, for example, that the statutory grant of detention authority in the 2001 AUMF is interpreted in light of international law. In a brief before the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the United States explained that “[p]rinciples derived from law-of-war rules governing international armed conflicts . . . must inform the interpretation of the detention authority.”

This position is consistent with the *Hamdi* plurality’s use of international law to interpret congressional grants of war-making authority as well as with longstanding historical practice. Indeed, the Supreme Court has frequently used international law as an interpretive tool for construing statutes to avoid conflict with “the law of nations” where possible.

Second, many treaty provisions have been directly implemented into domestic law by Congress. Although international agreements now face a
presumption of non-self-execution, a number of federal statutes explicitly enforce both human rights and humanitarian law treaties. For instance, the War Crimes Act of 1996 implements parts of the Geneva Conventions and Hague Convention IV, and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 implements the Convention Against Torture. These and similar statutes provide an additional constraint on detention authority. Absent a clear statement to the contrary, subsequent legislation, such as the 2001 AUMF or 2012 NDAA, cannot be understood to abrogate these prior statutes.

Even where international law requirements are not incorporated into domestic law, they still impose obligations as a matter of international law. Transgressing these norms would put the United States in violation of its international commitments, could alienate allies in the global fight against terrorism, make it more difficult to encourage others’ compliance with international law, and make the United States a less credible partner for future agreements.

For present purposes, it is enough to say that the international law of war—along with human rights law—constrains detention authority as a matter of international law, and often also as a matter of domestic law. Law-of-war limitations on detention derive from jus ad bellum restrictions on initial capture and jus in bello due process and humane treatment requirements. Human rights law also provides both independent and overlapping limits on law-of-war detention authority. This Part considers each of these bodies of law in turn.

A. Jus ad Bellum

Jus ad bellum principles governing the commencement of hostilities place limits on U.S. law-of-war detention authority regardless of whether the source of the authority is statutory or constitutional. In many cases, including the 2001 AUMF, the 2002 AUMF, the 2012 NDAA, and Article II, detention authority is a necessary incident of a grant of authority to use military force. Hence the

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180. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974) ("In the absence of some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable... The intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest." (quoting United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939)); The Vera Cruz, 10 App. Cas. 59, 68 (1884) ("[W]here there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any evidence of a particular intention to do so.").
181. For a discussion of the sanctions that states face when they violate international law, see Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252 (2011).
182. This term is used to apply to jus ad bellum and jus in bello collectively.
183. For a discussion of the international law regarding indefinite detention, see Jenks & Jensen, supra note 6, at 43.
same ad bellum principles governing the lawfulness of strikes or military operations govern the lawfulness of detention in those same operations.

In brief, *jus ad bellum* provides that the use of military force, including detention, is only authorized where the host state has consented to, the Security Council has authorized, or self-defense has necessitated the use of such military force.\(^{184}\) Although some scholars have dismissed the relevance of *jus ad bellum* to detention of suspected terrorists,\(^{185}\) the language of the 2001 AUMF explicitly references fundamental ad bellum concepts. It asserts the "right[] to self-defense," and, in light of the September 11, 2001 "acts of treacherous violence," characterizes the hostilities it authorizes as "necessary and appropriate," closely echoing the ad bellum notions of necessity and proportionality.\(^{186}\) These references appear to signal Congress’s intention to abide by the basic tenets of *jus ad bellum*, as codified in the U.N. Charter and interpreted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).\(^{187}\) It would be peculiar for Congress to explicitly situate its statute within these norms if it intended to authorize their violation.\(^{188}\) While some scholars note that "for purposes of the U.S. legal system, Congress has the authority to override international law,"\(^{189}\) the language of the 2001 AUMF seems to signal the opposite intention. As already noted, the Administration has expressly taken this same view in its litigation documents. Similar reasoning applies to the 2002 AUMF\(^ {190}\) and to the MCA.\(^ {191}\)

Ad bellum compliance may therefore be understood to be incorporated into the detention authority granted by Congress to the President. This raises a series of questions about the scope of the statutory authority. For example, relying on ad bellum self-defense for domestic authorization means that the authorization must be limited to actions permitted under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. That in turn raises questions about how to assess imminence with respect to terrorist groups. Moreover, it would subject the "authority to detain persons . . . engaged in hostilities against . . . coalition partners"\(^ {192}\) to the procedural requirements for collective self-defense, which the ICJ has construed to include declaration, U.N. reporting, and a formal request for

\(^{184}\) See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; *id.* art. 43 para. 1; *id.* art. 48 para. 1; *id.* art. 49; *id.* art. 51.

\(^{185}\) Bradley & Goldsmith, *supra* note 20, at 2089-90.

\(^{186}\) 2001 AUMF, *supra* note 7, § 2(a).


\(^{188}\) Furthermore, the *Charming Betsy* canon, discussed *supra* note 176, dictates that statutes be interpreted to comply with international law absent explicit indications to the contrary.

\(^{189}\) Bradley & Goldsmith, *supra* note 20, at 2089 n.180.

\(^{190}\) For example, the 2002 AUMF uses the same "necessary and appropriate" language used in the 2001 AUMF. 2002 AUMF, *supra* note 16, pmbl. In addition, the scope of detention authority under the 2002 AUMF is geographically limited to Iraq and temporally limited to the duration of hostilities in Iraq and/or the temporal scope of the 2002 AUMF. See *Military Commissions Act of 2009*, Pub. L. No. 111-184, 123 Stat. 2190.

\(^{191}\) For example, the MCA of 2009 uses terms that clearly reference the laws of war, such as privileged and unprivileged enemy belligerents.

\(^{192}\) *Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority*, *supra* note 10, at 2.
aid. These limitations should be carefully considered in determining whom the President has the authority to detain, whether by statute or under Article II authority.

Jus ad bellum also places independent limitations on U.S. government actions as a matter of international law. The President may be authorized as a matter of domestic law to detain certain individuals, but if that detention violates ad bellum principles it is prohibited as a matter of international law. Where that international law has—like the U.N. Charter—been ratified by the United States, it is incorporated into U.S. law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.194

B. Jus in Bello

Jus in bello norms also place limits on U.S. detention authority during armed conflict. Law-of-war jus in bello norms embodied in treaties and customary international law place limits on the President’s detention authority, unless Congress specifically overrides them. Even then they continue to apply as a matter of international law, even though they cannot be enforced in U.S. courts.

The conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces is a non-international armed conflict, governed primarily by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Common Article 3, which the Supreme Court found binding and enforceable in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,195 provides the minimum applicable level of protection under international humanitarian law, requiring that detainees be “treated humanely.” In addition to Common Article 3, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) regards the provisions of Article 75 of Additional Protocol I196 (Article 75) as customary international law and therefore applicable in non-international armed conflict.197 The Obama Administration has taken the position that it intends to treat Article 75 as legally binding in international armed conflicts, but has made no public statements regarding the applicability of Article 75 in non-international armed conflicts such as the conflict with al-Qaeda.198

194. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Nonetheless, the Administration has indicated that its practices are consistent with Article 75.\footnote{199}{Id.}

Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions uncontroversially applies to non-international armed conflicts and provides protection for persons “taking no active part in hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause.”\footnote{200}{Third Geneva Convention, supra note 28, art. 3.} It provides, in particular, that such persons should be treated humanely and without discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, birth, wealth or any other similar criteria.\footnote{201}{Id.} It prohibits “violence to life and person” including torture and “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.” It also provides that sentences may not be passed without judgment “by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”\footnote{202}{Id.}

Article 75 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions elaborates on these requirements, stating that any persons “who are in the power of a Party to the conflict and who do not benefit from more favorable treatment under the Conventions or under this Protocol shall be treated humanely in all circumstances” and “without any adverse distinction based upon race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria.”\footnote{203}{Article 75, supra note 196.} Article 75 further elaborates on the Common Article 3 prohibition on violence to life and person, by specifying that “[v]iolence to the life, health, or physical or mental well-being of persons” is prohibited, including torture, humiliating or degrading treatment, or the threat of such violence or treatment.\footnote{204}{Id.} In addition, Article 75 provides that detainees must be informed of the reasons for their detention and must be released as soon as the circumstances justifying their detention cease to exist.\footnote{205}{Id.} Article 75 also provides for stringent due process protections, including trial by a regularly constituted court, provision of information about the specifics of the charge and the means to defend against it, and the presumption of innocence.\footnote{206}{Id.; see Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INT’L. REV. RED CROSS 858 (2005); Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 299-384 (2006) (discussing fundamental guarantees), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/pcustom.htm.}

The duration of detention has been a particularly contentious issue in the current conflict. The end of hostilities normally marks a bright line between lawful and unlawful law-of-war detention. In conventional armed conflict, privileged combatants may be held only until the end of hostilities and
unprivileged enemy combatants may be tried for crimes committed in the course of their belligerency.\textsuperscript{207} If convicted of a crime, unprivileged enemy combatants may be detained punitively past the end of hostilities, but, if they are not charged with a crime or tried, they also must be released at the end of hostilities.\textsuperscript{208} In the current conflict, the difficulty arises of determining what would mark the end of hostilities.

The \textit{Hamdi} plurality opinion acknowledged this possibility. It concluded that under "longstanding law-of-war principles," detention of "individuals legitimately determined to be Taliban combatants" is authorized for the duration of the conflict.\textsuperscript{209} It explained that it understood Congress's grant of authority to the President to use "'necessary and appropriate force' to include the authority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict."\textsuperscript{210} As long as active combat operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan were ongoing, that authority remained active. Yet it warned that this understanding "may unravel."\textsuperscript{211}

The question is whether that time of unraveling has arrived. After all, the conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and unspecified "associated forces" appears likely to continue indefinitely. If persons who are "part of" or substantially support any of these groups may be detained for the duration not simply of the active combat operations in Afghanistan, but for the duration of U.S. counterterrorism operations, then they may be detained indefinitely.\textsuperscript{212} One D.C. District Court opinion proposed resolving this problem by individualizing the concept of "hostilities." The Court concluded that because there is a required nexus between detention and the government's purpose to prevent future terrorism, when an individual defendant no longer constitutes a threat to the United States, the government is no longer authorized to detain him pursuant to the 2001 AUMF.\textsuperscript{213} However, other courts have declined to adopt this approach.\textsuperscript{214} Further, given the difficulty of establishing that an individual detainee no longer poses a threat to the United States or its allies, this solution may be difficult to apply on a broad scale to resolve the
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problem of indefinite detention. Another option is to define “hostilities” based on status of conflict between the United States and the particular armed group of which the individual was a part or substantially supported at the time he was detained. Hence, if the Afghan Taliban was no longer involved in armed conflict with the United States, then members of that group who have not been convicted of crimes would be released from detention. Thus far none of these potential solutions has gained consensus support, leaving the issue of indefinite detention deeply contested.

C. Human Rights Law

Human rights law provides additional limits on the government’s detention authority. The United States has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), all of which have provisions that are relevant to government detention. Of particular relevance are the ICCPR prohibitions on arbitrary deprivation of life and liberty; the CERD prohibition on discrimination on the basis of race or national or ethnic origin; the ICCPR prohibition on discrimination of any kind, including on the basis of religion; the ICCPR requirement that detainees be able to challenge the lawfulness of their detention in a court of law and be released if such detention is found to be unlawful; the CAT and ICCPR prohibitions on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment; and the due process guarantees of the ICCPR. These and other human rights limitations bear on the legality of initial and continued detention.

There remains significant disagreement about the extraterritorial reach of human rights law and its applicability to situations of armed conflict. International and foreign courts have increasingly held that human rights

215. ICCPR, supra note 122, art. 6.
216. Id. art. 9.
218. ICCPR, supra note 122, art. 2.
219. Id. art. 9.
220. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment arts. 2, 4, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (1984); ICCPR, supra note 122, arts. 7, 10.
221. ICCPR, supra note 122, art. 14.
obligations exist wherever a state exercises effective control. Moreover, both the U.N. Human Rights Committee and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have taken the position that human rights law and the law of war are complementary because they share the same underlying purpose of protecting human life and dignity.

In the context of detention, there are few conflicts between international humanitarian law and human rights law. The clearest area in which the two bodies of law diverge, however, is duration of the detention: human rights law permits detention only until a timely trial and then only for the duration of a lawful sentence. International humanitarian law, by contrast, contemplates detention for the duration of the conflict. For the most part, though, the norms provided in each context reinforce and confirm the norms provided in the other. Human rights law provides that persons deprived of their liberty must be treated humanely and with respect for their dignity in all circumstances, and the Human Rights Committee considers this a non-derogable norm. Common Article 3 and Article 75 also require humane treatment and respect in all circumstances and prohibit treatment that is humiliating or degrading. Both bodies of law require that persons not be detained arbitrarily or without cause or beyond the point where a reason justifying detention ceases to exist; both provide due process protections and a right to a fair trial; and both place stringent limitations on the conditions of detention. Hence human rights law provides limitations on government behavior in the detention context that largely, though not entirely, overlap with and reinforce those provided by the laws of war.

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223. See Sarah Cleveland, *Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad*, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 225, 229 (2010); Hathaway et al., *IHL and HRL*, supra note 222, at 11. It is important to note here, however, that the United States government has not yet expressed support for an effective-control standard, making it an outlier among peer governments and international tribunals. See, e.g., Oona Hathaway et al., *Human Rights Abroad: When Do Human Rights Treaty Obligations Apply Extraterritorially?*, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 389 (2011) [hereinafter Hathaway et al., *Human Rights Abroad*].


The statutory and constitutional sources of authority for law-of-war detention are limited in scope and may contract further with growing distance from September 11, 2001. At the same time, international law places independent limits on detention authority during armed conflict. There is as yet no settled law regarding the duration of the detention of individuals captured and detained under the 2001 AUMF, but it is well settled in international humanitarian law that detainees who cannot or will not be prosecuted must be released when the circumstances justifying their detention cease to exist, or upon the cessation of hostilities. International humanitarian law also provides clear guidance with respect to the due process protections detainees are owed and the conditions in which they may be held. Moreover, human rights law also applies and provides additional guidance. Thus, there are important limits on the government’s detention authority, even where there is clear statutory or constitutional authority to detain under domestic law.

As our military prepares to exit Afghanistan, justifying counterterrorism detention primarily through the lens of war is less tenable. As Parts II and III have demonstrated, statutory authority for detention under the 2001 AUMF, 2002 AUMF, and MCA, and the President’s independent constitutional authority under Article II, are narrowly circumscribed and subject to significant limitations. It is time, then, for a new approach to counterterrorism detention—one that places criminal law detention at the center of counterterrorism efforts. Part IV explains why criminal detention provides a legitimate and effective source of authority that could—and should—be much more widely used as an alternative to law-of-war detention of suspected terrorists.

IV. DETENTION OF TERRORISM SUSPECTS UNDER CRIMINAL LAW

The United States is still actively engaged in hostilities with global terrorist organizations, but there are indications that “we’re within reach of strategically defeating al-Qaeda.”227 This development, combined with the growing distance from the national trauma of September 11, has reinvigorated the debate surrounding the detention and prosecution of suspected terrorists both outside of and within the United States. Even though Congress has recently expanded military detention and prosecution,228 prosecution in federal court offers several key advantages over law-of-war detention, including predictability, legitimacy, greater cooperation by defendants and international partners, and flexibility.229 These advantages have led a diverse set of actors—from current Department of Defense and counterterrorism officials,230 to

229. For an in-depth analysis of these advantages from a former Department of Justice National Security Division lawyer, see David S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 1, 50-70 (2011).
former Bush Administration officials,\textsuperscript{231} to the Washington Post editorial board\textsuperscript{232}—to support the prosecution and detention of individuals through the federal courts, despite Congress's recently expressed preference for law-of-war detention.

In some cases, prosecution in federal court is the only available option for prosecuting an accused terrorist. Federal antiterrorism statutes are extensive and provide statutory authority to prosecute individuals who are part of or supporting terrorist groups without direct ties to forces associated with al-Qaeda or the Taliban (and therefore outside the scope of the 2001 AUMF or the NDAA),\textsuperscript{233} and independently operating terrorists who are inspired by, but are not part of or associated with, al-Qaeda or the Taliban.\textsuperscript{234} These statutes also reach persons or citizens who, because they are apprehended in the United States, cannot be tried under the MCA. The following sections discuss the contours and limitations of such criminal prosecution and detention in the terrorism context.

Even where detention under the law of war is available, the criminal justice system offers some key advantages for the detention and prosecution of suspected terrorists. We thus aim here to offer a correction to the recent trend toward favoring law-of-war detention over criminal prosecution and detention. In the vast majority of cases, criminal prosecution and detention is the most effective and legitimate way to address the terrorist threat.

We begin this Part by discussing the specific advantages of criminal prosecution and detention, including predictability, legitimacy, and strategic

\begin{quote}
("As a former prosecutor, I know firsthand the strength, security and effectiveness of our federal court system . . . . Given the reforms since 9/11, the federal court system is even more effective. And, as a result of lengthy and mandatory minimum prison sentences authorized by Congress and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, those convicted of terrorism-related offenses often face decades, if not life, in prison.").

\textsuperscript{231.} See, e.g., Jim Comey & Jack Goldsmith, Holder's Decision on Mohammed Trial Defended, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/19/AR2009111903470.html ("By contrast [to military commissions], there is no question about the legitimacy of U.S. federal courts to incapacitate terrorists. Many of Holder's critics appear to have forgotten that the Bush administration used civilian courts to put away dozens of terrorists, including 'shoe bomber' Richard Reid; al-Qaeda agent Jose Padilla; 'American Taliban' John Walker Lindh; the Lackawanna Six; and Zacarias Moussaoui, who was prosecuted for the same conspiracy for which Mohammed is likely to be charged. Many of these terrorists are locked in a supermax prison in Colorado, never to be seen again.").

\textsuperscript{232.} Editorial, Justice for the 'Underwear Bomber,' WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/justice-for-the-underwear-bomber/2011/10/12/glQAO6dUl_story.html ("Federal courts have long been a tried and true venue in which to prosecute accused terrorists. . . . The courts' rules are clear, procedures are fair and their legitimacy is unparalleled. . . . Efforts to strip the executive branch of this powerful tool or to force all terrorism suspects to be held in military custody are . . . myopic . . . .")

\textsuperscript{233.} See, e.g., Hamilley v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75, n.17 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that under the AUMF, the government cannot detain individuals associated with "terrorist organizations who merely share an abstract philosophy or even a common purpose with al-Qaeda—there must be an actual association in the current conflict with al-Qaeda or the Taliban").

\textsuperscript{234.} See, e.g., Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("[I]t is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of criteria for determining whether an individual is 'part of' al Qaeda. . . . [b]ut the purely independent conduct of a freelancer is not enough."). As discussed below, this advantage has become much more pronounced in the wake of the D.C. Circuit's 2012 decision that material support for terrorism may not be tried in the Military Commissions. See infra Subsection IV.D.1.
\end{quote}
advantages. Next, we respond to critics of criminal prosecution and detention, considering the three chief concerns that have been raised regarding criminal prosecution of terrorism suspects in federal court. Finally, we conclude by acknowledging the limits of criminal prosecution and detention in the terrorism context.

A. The Advantages of Criminal Prosecution and Detention

The least contested bases for detention authority in any context are post-conviction criminal detention and pre-verdict detention for those who pose a risk of flight. It is often assumed that such criminal detention is ill-suited to terrorists. However, with very little fanfare, federal district court dockets have been flush with terrorism cases over the past decade. Strikingly, efforts to measure the conviction rate in these cases place it between 86 and 91 percent. Far from being ineffective, then, trying suspected terrorists in criminal courts is remarkably effective. It also offers the advantages of predictability, legitimacy, and strategic benefits in the fight against terrorism.

1. Predictability

Post-conviction detention of terrorists after prosecution in federal court provides predictability that is currently absent in the military commission system. Federal district courts have years of experience trying complex cases and convicting dangerous criminals, including international terrorists, and the rules are well established and understood. The current military commission system, on the other hand, is a comparatively untested adjudicatory regime.

As already noted, conviction rates in terrorism trials have been close to ninety percent since 2001, and those rates have remained steady in the face of large increases in the number of prosecutions. The military commissions, by contrast, have—as of this writing—convicted seven people since 2001, five of whom pled guilty. Charges have been dropped against several defendants,


236. See Kris, supra note 229, at 50 (“This invites, if it does not guarantee, challenges to virtually every aspect of the commission proceedings—the legality of the system, the jurisdiction of the court, the lawfulness of certain offenses, the rules on the use of evidence derived from coerced statements, discovery obligations, and the nature of protective orders (among others).”).


and other defendants have been charged but not tried.239 The commission procedures have been challenged at every stage, and it is unclear what final form they will ultimately take. Even their substantive jurisdiction remains unsettled. In October 2012, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit overturned Salim Hamdan’s military commission conviction for providing material support to terrorism.240 The Court held that the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which made material support for terrorism a war crime that could be prosecuted in the commissions, was not retroactively applicable to Hamdan’s conduct prior to enactment of the statute.241 Moreover, the Court explained that material support for terrorism was not a recognized war crime under international law.242 As a result, his conviction for material support for terrorism in the commission could not stand.243 It is uncertain how this will affect other trials of detainees, but this decision clearly illustrates the unsettled nature of the commissions.244

2. Legitimacy

Federal courts are also generally considered more legitimate than military commissions. The stringent procedural protections reduce the risk of error and generate trust and legitimacy.245 The federal courts, for example, provide more robust hearsay protections than the commissions.246 In addition, jurors are

241. Id. at 27-28.
242. Id. at 24.
243. Id. at 27-28.
244. Interestingly, the commissions have, as of this writing, not meted out lengthy prison sentences for terrorism suspects. For example, David Hicks was sentenced to nine months in prison. Michael Melia, Australian Gitmo Detainee Gets 9 Months, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2007, http://www .washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/31/AR2007033100279.html. Salim Hamdan was sentenced to 66 months but given credit for 61 months of time served, and made to sign a “pledge not to commit violent acts.” Yemen Releases Former Bin Laden Driver from Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/12/world/middleeast/12yemen.html; see also Kris, supra note 229, at 53 n.147. By contrast, those found guilty of criminal behavior in federal terrorism trials have been sentenced for significantly longer periods of time. See Kris, supra note 229, at 62. To be sure, it is difficult to estimate the counterfactual results were the defendants in each case to have been tried in the other forum. But thus far the commissions have tended to result in shorter sentences. See Kris, supra note 229, at 64 (“Sentencing in the commissions is much harder to predict at this stage.”). In addition, the Department of Justice was reoriented with respect to counterterrorism prosecution in 2006 with the creation of the National Security Division, which interfaces with the intelligence community while coordinating appeals and providing resources to trial prosecutors. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 506, 120 Stat. 192 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 50 U.S.C (2006)); Kris, supra note 229, at 8. This reorganization aims to increase coordination and experience with terrorism cases and the evidentiary issues they entail.
245. For a summary of the differences between federal criminal procedure and military commission procedure, see JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40932, COMPARISON OF RIGHTS IN MILITARY COMMISSION TRIALS AND TRIALS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL COURT (2009).
246. In reformed military commissions, a party may offer a hearsay statement as long as (1) the evidence is reliable, probative, and lawfully obtained; (2) direct testimony from the witness is not available as a practical matter, considering the totality of the circumstances; and (3) the interests of justice will best be served by admissibility of the statement. Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(3)(D) (2006).
ordinary citizens, not U.S. military personnel. Indeed, some of the weakest procedural protections in the military commission system have been successfully challenged as unconstitutional. 247 Congress and the Executive have responded to these legal challenges—and to criticism of the commissions from around the globe—by significantly strengthening the commissions’ procedural protections. Yet the remaining gaps—along with what many regard as a tainted history—continue to raise doubts about the fairness and legitimacy of the commissions. The current commissions, moreover, have been active for only a short period—too brief a period for doubts to be confirmed or put to rest. 248 Federal criminal procedure, on the other hand, is well-established and widely regarded as legitimate.

Legitimacy of the trial process is important not only to the individuals charged but also to the fight against terrorism. As several successful habeas corpus petitions have demonstrated, insufficient procedural protections create a real danger of erroneous imprisonment for extended periods. 249 Such errors can generate resentment and distrust of the United States that undermine the effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts. Indeed, evidence suggests that populations are more likely to cooperate in policing when they believe they have been treated fairly. 250 The understanding that a more legitimate detention regime will be a more effective one is reflected in recent statements from the Department of Defense and the White House. 251

3. Strategic Advantages

There is clear evidence that other countries recognize and respond to the difference in legitimacy between civilian and military courts and that they are, indeed, more willing to cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism efforts when terrorism suspects are tried in the criminal justice system. Increased international cooperation is therefore another advantage of criminal prosecution.

Many key U.S. allies have been unwilling to cooperate in cases involving law-of-war detention or prosecution but have cooperated in criminal


248. Kris, supra note 229, at 50 ("[T]he current commissions are essentially a new creation, and they do not have the body of established procedures and years of precedent and experience to guide the parties and the judges.").


251. Brennan, supra note 173 (discussing "the perceived legitimacy—and therefore the effectiveness" of Guantánamo policy); Johnson, supra note 230 (arguing against detention policies that "make military detention more controversial, not less").
prosecutions. In fact, many U.S. extradition treaties, including those with allies such as India and Germany, forbid extradition when the defendant will not be tried in a criminal court.  

This issue has played out in practice several times. An al-Shabaab operative was extradited from the Netherlands only after assurances from the United States that he would be prosecuted in criminal court. Two similar cases arose in 2007. In perhaps the most striking example, five terrorism suspects—including Abu Hamza al-Masri, who is accused of providing material support to al-Qaeda by trying to set up a training camp in Oregon and of organizing support for the Taliban in Afghanistan—were extradited to the United States by the United Kingdom in October 2012. The extradition was made on the express condition that they would be tried in federal criminal courts rather than in the military commissions.  

And, indeed, both the European Court of Human Rights and the British courts allowed the extradition to proceed after assessing the protections offered by the U.S. federal criminal justice system and finding they fully met all relevant standards. An insistence on using military commissions may thus hinder extradition and other kinds of international prosecutorial cooperation, such as the sharing of testimony and evidence.

Finally, the criminal justice system is simply a more agile and versatile prosecution forum. Federal jurisdiction offers an extensive variety of antiterrorism statutes that can be marshaled to prosecute terrorist activity committed outside the United States, and subsequently to detain those who are convicted. This greater variety of offenses—military commissions can only


254. Kris, supra note 229, at 68 n.190.


256. Id. (“Under the terms of British and European court rulings authorizing the extradition, the men must be tried in U.S. civilian courts and federal prosecutors cannot seek the death penalty.”).


258. Federal prosecutors have relied upon numerous substantive statutes to bring terrorism-related suits for acts committed abroad including: 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006) (providing material support to terrorists); 18 U.S.C. § 956 (2006) (conspiring to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure persons or damage property in a foreign country); and 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (2006) (acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries). In cases in which authorities seek extraterritorial jurisdiction, they must first establish that Congress intended for the statute at issue to be applied outside U.S. territory, either on the basis of explicit authorization or based on “the nature of the law itself.” Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 121, 167 (2007); see also Brian L. Porto, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 1 A.L.R. FED. 2d 415 (2005). In order to fulfill the requirements of international law, the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction must also be consistent with one or more of
punish an increasingly narrow set of traditional offenses against the laws of war—offers prosecutors important flexibility. For instance, it might be very difficult to prove al-Qaeda membership in an MCA prosecution or a law-of-war habeas proceeding; but if the defendant has received training at a terrorist camp or participated in a specific terrorist act, federal prosecutors may convict under various statutes tailored to more specific criminal behavior. In addition, military commissions can no longer hear prosecutions for material support committed before 2006. Due in part to the established track record of the federal courts, the federal criminal justice system also allows for more flexible interactions between prosecutors and defendants. Proffer and plea agreements are powerful incentives for defendants to cooperate, and often lead to valuable intelligence-gathering, producing more intelligence over the course of prosecution.

B. Answering Critics of Criminal Law Detention and Prosecution

Those opposed to widespread prosecution and detention of suspected terrorists under criminal law point to certain constraints on the criminal justice system, in particular: (1) lack of preventive detention tools, (2) limitations, and (3) evidentiary concerns. This section addresses those limitations and argues that, while some pose genuine obstacles to widespread criminal prosecution and detention of terrorism suspects, none is insurmountable in the appropriate cases. Rather, the federal criminal system is well equipped to confront the complex array of issues that prosecution and detention of terrorism suspects present.

1. Preventive Detention Concerns and Solutions

The prohibition on detention without charge is fundamental to the American criminal justice system. This prohibition places limits on the criminal justice system’s ability to incapacitate terrorists and poses a particular dilemma in cases where individuals the government believes to be truly dangerous

five essential principles of international law: (1) the subjective or objective territorial principle; (2) the nationality principle; (3) the protective principle; (4) the passive personality principle; and (5) the universality principle. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 402, 404 (1987). This international law requirement is often satisfied in the terrorism context either by the protective principle (jurisdiction based on national security concerns) or by the passive personality principle (jurisdiction based on the victim being American). A further due process limitation on the extraterritorial reach of criminal statutes is that some nexus must exist between the defendants and the United States, so that the application of the statute abroad “would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.” United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1990). Where a suspect poses a threat to the United States, including U.S. citizens or missions abroad, this nexus requirement would clearly be satisfied.

259. See supra Subsections II.A.3, IV.D.1.


cannot be prosecuted—often because the evidence against them is inadmissible in court. While indefinite preventive detention is, and should be, outside of the government’s set of counterrorism tools in the criminal justice system, there are tools available for legally detaining individuals suspected of terrorism offenses.263 Those tools include material support prosecution, prosecution for non-terrorism crimes, and administrative detention. We discuss each briefly in turn.

a. Material Support Prosecution

Targeted prosecution under material support laws may in some cases provide a useful supplement to direct prosecution of terrorist activities. Where an individual has not yet engaged in an act of terrorism but has participated in preparation or other support for an act of terrorism, the individual may be detained and prosecuted under material support laws.265 These laws do not require prosecutors to prove that the individual has directly engaged in an act of terrorism. They therefore can be used, and have been used, to prosecute and detain those suspected of planning or contributing to terrorist acts.266 Material support prosecutions have been brought, for example, “against individuals who enrolled in terrorist training camps, who acted as messengers for terrorist leaders, who intended to act as doctors to terrorist groups, or who raised money to support terrorist organizations.” While excessive use of material support prosecution against individuals who do not have direct ties to terrorist organizations is both controversial and problematic, carefully targeted material support prosecution can be a useful prosecutorial tool.

263. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (“[T]he Government’s regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty interest. For example, in times of war or insurrection, when society’s interest is at its peak, the Government may detain individuals whom the Government believes to be dangerous. Even outside the exigencies of war, we have found that sufficiently compelling governmental interests can justify detention of dangerous persons.” (citations omitted)). In Salerno, the Supreme Court held that authorization of pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act constituted permissible regulation that did not violate substantive due process. Id. at 747-48. In reaching its decision, the Court noted the “legitimate and compelling” government interest at issue, as well as “Congress’ careful delineation of the circumstances under which detention will be permitted” and the “extensive” procedural safeguards incorporated in the Act. Id. at 749-52.

264. Prosecutors often charge individuals with inchoate crimes in these situations (e.g., attempt and conspiracy), but there are certain situations where prosecutors possess insufficient evidence to sustain an indictment or conviction on these grounds. See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 28 (2005) (“The sleeper scenario, however, often will not be amenable to [the strategy of charging individuals with inchoate crimes]; the essence of the sleeper dilemma is that the suspect cannot be linked to plans to commit a particular harmful act.”).

265. Strategic use of the material support statute to incapacitate individuals supporting terrorist activities should be distinguished from overbroad use of the material support statute to prosecute individuals or organizations providing humanitarian aid through designated organizations.

b. Non-Terrorism Crimes

Another criminal law detention tool is the use of non-terrorism statutes to incapacitate terrorism suspects. In a method broadly applied in other areas of the law, prosecutors can arrest the suspect on an alternative, readily provable charge that does not, on its face, require any allegation that the defendant is linked to terrorism. This “preventive charging” also allows law enforcement to arrest suspects at an early stage without risking disclosure of sensitive information. Statutes that have been invoked for this purpose include those criminalizing identity theft, wire fraud, and making misrepresentations to federal investigators. For example, the 9/11 Commission noted in its report that as many as fifteen of the nineteen September 11 hijackers were vulnerable to criminal charges based on their fraudulent travel documents.

Many of these alternative charges carry high maximum sentences—thirty years for bank fraud, twenty-five for passport fraud, and fifteen for identity theft. Cumulatively, these alternative charges can be made either in addition to or instead of charges of terrorist acts. They present a viable alternative for incapacitating terrorism suspects who cannot be prosecuted directly for terrorism. In practice, this approach has worked. Conspiracy charges led to four life imprisonments and one thirty-three-year sentence in the 2007 Fort Dix plot. Perjury, obstruction, and false statement charges added up to a ten-year sentence in United States v. Sabri Benkahla. While some non-terrorism prosecutions result in shorter sentences, the alternative—long-term military detention without trial—faces all the problems outlined above.

267. This strategy is sometimes referred to as the “Al Capone approach,” named for the famous mobster who was prosecuted on tax evasion charges, than on the more obvious racketeering crimes associated with him. Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 584 (2005); see Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92 GEO. L.J. 1135, 1135 (2004).

268. See Chesney, supra note 264, at 30-34.

269. In fact, the Department of Justice has an explicit strategy of employing alternative statutes for terrorism suspects:

[T]he Department’s counterterrorism efforts have broadened since September 11 to include pursuit of offenses terrorists often commit, such as identity theft and immigration violations. These statutes include 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (fraudulently obtaining travel documents), 18 U.S.C. § 1425 (immigration violations), and 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (making misrepresentations to federal investigators). Prosecution of terrorism-related targets on these types of charges is often an effective method—and sometimes the only available method—of deterring and disrupting potential terrorist planning and support activities without compromising national security information.


272. Id. § 1546 (statutory minimum of twenty-five years in prison applies when done in furtherance of an act of international terrorism).

273. Id. § 1028(b)(1).


275. 530 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008).

276. Consider that many defendants who could only be prosecuted for non-terrorism crimes in civilian court could probably not be prosecuted for terrorism crimes in a military commission either. The
c. Administrative Detention

The diverse statutes and regimes authorizing detention for individuals not convicted of a crime include detention for aliens, sex offenders, the mentally ill, alcoholics, those with communicable diseases, those awaiting trial, material witnesses, and others. These detentions are generally time-limited and, in some cases, raise serious due process concerns. They have limited applicability to suspected terrorists, but in certain dire circumstances may be a relevant tool. For instance, aliens suspected of terrorism within the United States may in some cases be legally detained for an immigration violation. Like material support and non-terrorism crime prosecutions, administrative detention can fill some of the gaps in the criminal system. Yet like those prosecutions, administrative detention must also be carefully targeted.

2. Miranda Concerns and Solutions

A second criticism that is often raised in discussions of criminal law detention for suspected terrorists is the feasibility of providing Miranda warnings prior to arrest. This criticism of the criminal law model has particular resonance if the suspected terrorist is captured abroad. Critics also claim that applying Miranda warnings can be an obstacle to gathering intelligence.

In practice, providing Miranda warnings has yet to be a real impediment to intelligence collection in the terrorism context. John Brennan recently confronted and unequivocally rejected these concerns:

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277. For a detailed analysis of the different preventive detention regimes, see David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 700 (2009), which notes the existing statutory authorities for preventive detention, including pretrial detention and immigration detention. See also Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in American Theory and Practice, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 85 (2011) (analyzing the pervasive use of non-criminal preventive detention in different areas).


280. See Press Release, Chairman Lamar Smith, HR Comm. on the Judiciary, Bill Requires Consultation Before Giving Terrorists Miranda Rights (Mar. 17, 2011), http://judiciary.house.gov/news/03172011MirandaRights.html ("The President’s policy of treating terrorists like common criminals has failed. Giving terrorists the same rights as American citizens ignores the seriousness of the threat from al Qaeda and other foreign terrorist groups. These are acts of war, not isolated incidents of crime. Foreign terrorists should be treated like enemy combatants and interrogated by intelligence experts to obtain crucial information about future attacks. Anything less risks the safety and security of the American people.").
Claims that *Miranda* warnings undermine intelligence collection ignore decades of experience to the contrary. Yes, some terrorism suspects have refused to provide information in the criminal justice system, but so have many individuals held in military custody, from Afghanistan to Guantánamo, where *Miranda* warnings were not given. What is undeniable is that many individuals in the criminal justice system have provided a great deal of information and intelligence—even after being given their Miranda warnings. The real danger is failing to give a *Miranda* warning in those circumstances where it's appropriate, which could well determine whether a terrorist is convicted and spends the rest of his life behind bars, or is set free.  

In fact, it is unclear whether the reading of *Miranda* rights has any meaningful effect on the gathering of intelligence or the prosecution of terrorists. According to one study, approximately eighty three percent of suspects who were advised of their *Miranda* rights waived those rights. This empirical finding supports the conclusion reached by FBI Director Robert Mueller in October 2010: “I do believe that if you look at the number of recent cases we’ve had, Miranda has not stood in the way of getting extensive intelligence.”

Beyond the dubious operational value of withholding notice of *Miranda* rights, the extent to which these warnings in the terrorism context must mirror those issued in the criminal context remains unsettled. The Supreme Court has recognized public safety exceptions to *Miranda* rights and lower courts have applied this exception within the terrorism context. Statements elicited by foreign law enforcement officials are generally admissible in U.S. courts, regardless of whether a *Miranda* warning was given, as long as the statements were voluntarily made. However, in *United States v. Bin Laden*, Judge Sand

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281. Brennan, supra note 173.
285. United States v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 111, 121-22 (2d Cir. 2000) (invoking *Quarles* to permit the government to introduce inculminating statements made prior to the administration of *Miranda* warnings in a case involving an impending terrorist attack on the New York City subway system); see also ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 235, at 10 (“As an initial matter, few individuals have been placed on trial following a battlefield capture; the vast majority of confessions in terrorism cases have resulted from traditional interrogation by law enforcement officers rather than soldiers . . . . [W]e believe in a battlefield situation, the courts would likely find that *Miranda* does not apply.”); Kris, supra note 229, at 77 (“Where the exigency in question is the danger of bombs on commercial aircraft or other coordinated mass-casualty attacks—as opposed to a loose gun in a supermarket—the public-safety exception should permit broader questioning, as necessary, to protect against the threat.”). The courts will address this issue in the course of the trial of Ahmed Warsame, the Somali terror suspect held for two months aboard a Navy ship before being Mirandized and indicted in the Southern District of New York. Ken Dilanian, *Somali Terror Suspect Secretly Held on Navy Ship for Two Months*, L.A. TIMES, July 5, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/05/nation/la-naw-somali-detainee-20110706.
286. See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 145-46 (2d Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338, 373-74 (E.D. Va. 2005) (holding that inculpatory statements made by an American citizen to Saudi Arabian officials without *Miranda* warnings were admissible because they were not the product of a “joint venture” relationship between U.S. and Saudi officials, nor were they produced by means that shocked the judicial conscience).
of the Southern District of New York held that *Miranda* does generally apply when U.S. law enforcement questions a detainee outside the United States.\(^2^8^7\)

This does not mean that the government cannot detain and interrogate an individual held abroad; it simply means that law enforcement must read the detainee his *Miranda* rights in order to use any of his statements in a criminal court.\(^2^8^8\) For the foregoing reasons, providing notice of *Miranda* rights is not likely to be a substantial hindrance in the detention and prosecution of suspected terrorists.

3. **Evidentiary Concerns and Solutions**

Opponents of federal criminal law prosecution and detention of suspected terrorists often point to two evidentiary concerns: (1) the inability to utilize sensitive national security information for fear of exposure, and (2) adherence to the Federal Rules of Evidence, which makes it impossible for the government to present probative evidence in terrorism cases.\(^2^8^9\) Once again, these challenges can be met within the criminal justice system.

  a. **Release of Sensitive National Security Information**

Critics of terrorism prosecution in criminal court worry that exposure of probative evidence in a trial will imperil ongoing investigations or sources. However, the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) offers a decisive answer to this concern. It allows sensitive national security information to be used in a federal criminal trial without being publicly released.\(^2^9^0\) Under CIPA's detailed procedural framework, classified evidence need not be disclosed to the defense during discovery unless the court finds, based on an in camera review, that it is relevant under traditional evidentiary standards, and even relevant evidence may be withheld through a non-disclosure order (for which the government may face some sanctions). All of the relevant proceedings are conducted without the defendant present and in secure facilities.


\(^{290}\) 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2006); see also ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 235, at 85 ("Thus, while CIPA has provided a flexible, practical mechanism for problems posed by classified evidence, Congress did not intend the statute to ossify the courts' ability to deal with these issues. Rather, Congress' express intent in enacting CIPA was that federal district judges, and thus the criminal justice system, 'must be relied on to fashion creative and fair solutions to these problems,' i.e., the problems raised by the use of classified information in trials." (quoting United States v. Rosen, 2007 WL 3243919, at *7 (E.D. Va. Nov. 1, 2007))).
to ensure maximum protection for classified information. Moreover, classified evidence that is released may use substitutions to minimize security risks. 291

CIPA has been used in many terrorism cases where the government seeks to rely on evidence that is probative of the defendant’s guilt but that implicates sensitive national security interests. In particular, it has been used to protect information concerning intelligence sources, means of intelligence gathering, and even the state of our intelligence on other subjects or intelligence priorities. 292 CIPA allows defendants the opportunity to examine the government’s classified evidence where a judge deems it necessary. 293 A report by former federal prosecutors who surveyed CIPA invocations in criminal court concluded that “courts have proved, again and again, that they are up to the task of balancing the defendant’s right to a fair trial, the government’s desire to offer relevant evidence, and the imperative of protecting national security.” 294

While CIPA has become a fixture in criminal law terrorism prosecutions, courts have also had to balance security concerns and due process in assessing the government’s duty to disclose “evidence favorable to an accused” under the Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. Maryland. 295 This has been particularly challenging when some of the government’s evidence is confidential or when the government’s “witnesses are either being detained by the government or are involved in ongoing counterterrorism efforts.” 296 The Court in United States v. Moussaoui dealt with precisely these challenges as defense counsel sought Brady material in the form of access to certain detained al-Qaeda figures. 297 The Fourth Circuit rejected the lower court’s proposed solution—a closed video deposition of the witnesses—arguing that while Moussaoui was entitled to the witnesses’ exculpatory information, summaries of interviews or

291 For a more in-depth discussion of CIPA procedures, see LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PROCEDURES ACT (CIPA): AN OVERVIEW (1989); and Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 235, at 82-91.

292 See, e.g., Aref v. United States, 452 F.3d 202, 204 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing trial court’s issuance of a protective order in criminal terrorism trial pursuant to CIPA).


294 ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 235, at 8; see also ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., THE INDEFINITE DETENTION OF “ENEMY COMBATANTS”: BALANCING DUE PROCESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 143 (2004) (There is “no indication that [CIPA], reasonably interpreted by federal judges, is inadequate to the task of protecting national security interests while affording defendants a fair trial.”). But see Afsheen John Radsan, Remodeling the Classified Information Protection Act, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 441-42 (2010) (“[Zabel and Benjamin’s] study examined only minor cases of material support to terrorism. The Bush administration, in part to avoid problems under CIPA, turned away from the federal courts and dealt with high-level cases through alternative means. Second, in a significant error, the two authors failed to interview intelligence officers to learn the true costs of public trials to sources and methods. Accordingly, their study does not address what is necessary to surmount the obstacles that compelled the Bush administration to move away from civilian courts after 9/11. For the two former prosecutors, CIPA is a wand to wave at all problems of mixing classified information with public trials.”).

295 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In Giglio v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the government’s Brady obligation extends to evidence that may be used to impeach government witnesses. See 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (“When the ‘reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, non-disclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within [the Brady doctrine].” (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959))).

296 ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 235, at 93.

297 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004).
interrogations of these witnesses would satisfy the government's *Brady* obligation. While this was not squarely a CIPA issue, the court used the CIPA balancing scheme to craft a suitable alternative to the depositions. The government was required to produce summaries that were as unedited and true to the original statements of the witnesses as possible without compromising national security. Summary evidence would be a sufficient substitution for deposition testimony so long as "the compiling of substitutions [is] an interactive process among the parties and the district court" and the substitutions are crafted so that they "use the exact language... to the greatest extent possible."

The compromises reached under both CIPA and *Brady* to protect classified information are made significantly more challenging where a defendant chooses to proceed pro se. In *Faretta v. California*, the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to self-representation in criminal cases. However, in a subsequent case, *McKaskle v. Wiggins*, the Court acknowledged that this right is not absolute. The *McKaskle* Court held that court appointment of standby counsel, who can assist the defendant with courtroom procedures and mechanics, is fully consistent with a defendant's right to self-representation. During terrorism related trials, just as in international criminal trials, standby counsel can play a crucial role in acting as a buffer between the government and the defendant to protect information that the court agrees must remain confidential. This issue arose in *United States v. Moussaoui* when the defendant sought to represent himself pro se. The lower court allowed Moussaoui to represent himself with standby counsel in order to, among other things, review classified national security documents. When Moussaoui challenged his exclusion from reviewing the classified information, the court ruled that "Moussaoui's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights are adequately protected by standby counsel's review of the classified discovery and their participation in any proceedings held pursuant to [CIPA]... even though the defendant will be excluded from these

298. *Id.* at 456-57.
299. *Id.* at 471.
300. *Id.* at 480.
301. *Id.*
302. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
304. There have also been a number of pro se litigants in international prosecutions. In these cases, some judges have attempted to accommodate the scope of the right to self-representation while others have disallowed defendants from proceeding pro se when doing so would not serve the interests of justice. In a number of cases, judges have allowed litigants to proceed pro se, but have required standby counsel to assist the defendant. See GIDEON BOAS, THE MILOSEVIC TRIAL: LESSONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 205-17 (2007).
305. 465 U.S. at 183. ("Faretta" rights are also not infringed when standby counsel assists the pro se defendant in overcoming routine procedural or evidentiary obstacles to the completion of some specific task... Nor are they infringed when counsel merely helps to ensure the defendant's compliance with basic rules of courtroom protocol and procedure.); see also ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 235, at 89 ("[W]e anticipate that courts would recognize that a criminal defendant cannot plausibly claim an entitlement to see classified information by the simple expedient of firing his lawyer and that, in this area, standby counsel can be relied upon to protect the defendant's interests.").
The use of standby counsel for CIPA purposes demonstrates judicial ingenuity and flexibility in balancing security and due process concerns. While the pro se scenario certainly poses a challenge to prosecuting these cases in federal court, the Moussaoui case makes clear that this challenge is not insurmountable.

b. Admissibility of Evidence

The second evidentiary concern raised in opposition to criminal prosecution and detention of suspected terrorists is that the Federal Rules of Evidence make it difficult or impossible for the government to present probative evidence in terrorism cases. This concern can be further broken down into three separate issues: (1) authentication requirements; (2) testimony from witnesses around the world, including some who may be active in the military; and (3) the hearsay rule.

Regarding the first concern, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide a relatively low burden for proving the authenticity of evidence, requiring only that "sufficient proof has been introduced so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or identification." The admission of evidence is a decision of the trial judge and judges in the past have exercised this discretion flexibly in international terrorism cases. In practice, the authentication rules have not appeared to impose a significant barrier to the prosecution of terrorism cases.

The second concern involves the unavailability of witnesses, particularly for the trial of individuals seized abroad. According to federal prosecutors who have surveyed past terrorism prosecutions, "alleged problems with unavailable witnesses are not supported based on our review of the cases that have been brought." Moreover, courts have been flexible in this regard—allowing depositions and other forms of testimony in the terrorism context, despite Confrontation Clause concerns raised by some parties.

307. For further discussion on balancing the defendant’s right to self-representation with safeguarding the government’s interest in protecting confidential information, see Joshua L. Dratel, Ethical Issues in Defending A Terrorism Case: How Secrecy and Security Impair the Defense of a Terrorism Case, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 81, 100 (2004).
308. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 235, at 107. For an in-depth discussion of how these issues are confronted in the terrorism criminal law trials, see id. at 107-10.
309. United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1289, 1303 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting 5 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE ¶ 901(a), at 901-17 (1990)).
310. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (admissibility of evidence is a decision for the court).
311. See, e.g., United States v. al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139, 162 (2d Cir. 2008) (describing how the prosecution relied on a "Mujahidin Form" to demonstrate the defendant’s predisposition to support terrorist activities and to rebut the impression created by the defense that there were no documents or other evidence establishing al-Moayad’s involvement in supporting terrorism early on in the alleged conspiracy).
312. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 235, at 107.
313. Id. at 108.
Finally, there has been opposition to federal criminal trials due to the inflexibility of hearsay rules. This may be a more serious impediment in some cases, but it generally is not insuperable. Hearsay rules are necessary to protect the right of defendants to receive a fair trial. Federal evidence rules contain numerous exceptions that provide judges with the necessary flexibility to admit out-of-court statements in criminal cases as appropriate. Moreover, in the past, courts have shown flexibility regarding hearsay rules in the terrorism context. These cases demonstrate that courts are able, when necessary, to take national security concerns into account in making hearsay determinations.

In sum, none of the common objections to criminal prosecution and detention of suspected terrorists presents an insuperable barrier. There are more preventive detention options through the criminal justice system than many realize, and Miranda and evidentiary-based concerns about use of the criminal system in terrorism cases have been overstated. Although it may not be possible to apply criminal jurisdiction to detain suspected terrorists in every case, the criminal system remains an underappreciated alternative to law-of-war detention.

V. CONCLUSION

As the United States enters the second decade following the attacks of September 11, 2001, it is time to re-examine the legal basis for ongoing counterterrorism efforts. The Obama Administration has eschewed references to the “war on terror” trumpeted by its predecessor—and rightly so. The number of al-Qaeda members active in Afghanistan, where the September 11 attacks were planned and orchestrated, now number in the hundreds at most. At the same time, threatening terrorist groups across a broad geographic

objection, to allow depositions of Canadian witnesses who were outside the court’s subpoena power and who were unable or unwilling to testify at trial in the United States).

315. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801, 804(b)(3).

316. See, e.g., United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 112 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding the trial court’s admission into evidence of materials seized from defendant that considered “the desirability of attacking enemies of Islam” and “how to produce and use explosives”); United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338, 373 (E.D. Va. 2005) (concluding that inculpatory statements made to Saudi Arabian interrogators while defendant was detained were voluntary and admissible); see also ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 235, at 107 ("[Hearsay] issues have traditionally been addressed in a common-sense manner, and our research indicates that to date they have not presented a significant obstacle to the government's terrorism prosecutions.").

317. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 235, at 10 ("The Federal Rules of Evidence... generally provide a common-sense, flexible framework to guide the decision whether evidence is admissible in court. We are not aware of any terrorism case in which an important piece of evidence has been excluded on authentication or other grounds.").


scope—some loosely affiliated with al-Qaeda and some not—have proliferated. The U.S. Department of State currently lists fifty-one separate foreign terrorist organizations.\footnote{Bureau of Counterterrorism, \textit{Foreign Terrorist Organizations}, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Sept. 28, 2012), \url{http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm}.}

In this context, treating counterterrorism efforts—and justifying counterterrorism detention—primarily through the lens of war is no longer practical or effective. Nor does existing law provide sufficient legal authority for detaining a wide range of terrorist suspects under the law of war. As this Article has shown, statutory authority for detention under the 2001 AUMF, 2002 AUMF, and MCA, and the President’s independent constitutional authority under Article II, are narrowly circumscribed and subject to significant limitations.

It is time, then, for a new approach to counterterrorism detention—one that recognizes the advantages that the criminal law system offers not simply for defendants but for counterterrorism efforts as well. Already the criminal justice system has proven to be highly effective at detaining and prosecuting terrorists, and it has provided a level of predictability, legitimacy, and flexibility that is missing in prosecution and detention practice carried out within the frame of war. The well-established procedural protections within the criminal justice system promise to reduce the risk of error and thus ensure that the results are regarded as more legitimate than those in the military commission process. A fairer and more flexible detention regime will make a more effective contribution to counterterrorism operations.

There will likely remain some cases in which law-of-war detention is the best available alternative for detaining terrorism suspects. Yet instead of treating law-of-war detention as the centerpiece of the United States’ counterterrorism detention program, the government should treat criminal law detention as its first resort, and should consider law-of-war detention only for those cases in which the detention is unambiguously authorized under both domestic law and international law, and the detainee poses a continuing, substantial threat.

Moving toward a regime of detaining and prosecuting terrorism suspects primarily through the criminal law would reveal terrorists for what they really are—criminals guilty of violating the law rather than soldiers in a war. It would also allow the United States to live up to the “better angels of our nature” by providing even those we suspect of plotting against us the full benefit of the principled commitments that make the United States different from those who have attacked it. That may, in the end, prove to be the most important weapon of all.