Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 Emory Law Journal 1 (1984)
This article examines and analyzes the Glass-Steagall Act (the Act), which separates commercial banking from investment banking and concludes that the most plausible explanation for the passage of the Act derives from a theory that recognizes the role of special interest groups in influencing legislative outcomes. It follows ineluctably from the application of this theory to the Glass-Steagall Act that judges, when called upon to interpret the Act, will face a virtually insurmountable burden due to the vast dichotomy between the ostensible legislative intent and the actual motivations of Congress.
Date of Authorship for this Version
Macey, Jonathan R., "Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall" (1984). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 1766.