“Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions” (with Ronald Gilson) 21 J. Law Econ. & Org. 330 (2005)
The standard contract that governs friendly mergers contains material adverse change (MAC) and material adverse effect (MAE) clauses; these clauses permit a buyer to costlessly cancel the deal if such a change or effect occurs. In recent years, the application of the traditional standard-like MAC and MAE term has been restricted by a detailed set of exceptions that curtails the buyer’s ability to exit. The term today engenders substantial litigation and occupies center stage in the negotiation of merger agreements. This article asks what functions the MAC and MAE term serve, what function the exceptions serve, and why the exceptions have arisen only recently. It answers that the terms encourages the target to make otherwise noncontractable synergy investments that would reduce the likelihood of low value realizations, because the term permits the buyer to exit in the event the proposed corporate combination comes to have a low value. The exceptions to the MAC and MAE term impose exogenous risk on the buyer; the parties cannot affect this risk and the buyer is a relatively superior risk bearer. The exceptions have arisen recently because the changing nature of modern deals makes the materialization of exogenous risk a more serious danger than it had been. The modern MAC and MAE terms thus respond to the threat of moral hazard by both parties in the sometimes lengthy interim between executing a merger agreement and closing it. The article empirically examines actual merger contracts and reports results that are consistent with the analysis.
Date of Authorship for this Version
Schwartz, Alan and Gilson, Ronald, "Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions" (2005). Faculty Scholarship Series. 305.