What Causes of Action May Be Joined in One Count under the Connecticut Practice Act, 7 Yale Law Journal 245 (1898)
The following memorandum of decision was rendered by Hon • . Samuel 0. Prentice, Judge of the Superior Court, in February, 1898, and is now on file in the office of the Clerk at New Haven. The action which is now pending in that Court is for the loss of goods shipped by the,plaintiff over defendant's railroad. The plaintiff stated in one count that the goods were delivered to the defendant as a common carrier at common law; that at the time of the delivery of the goods certain bills of lading were also delivered to and accepted by the defendant, but that there was no consideration for the bills of lading, that they were unreasonable and unjust in their terms, and that therefore they were not binding contracts, and that the defendant had no right to the limitation of liability expressed therein. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff claimed that, in spite of the bills of lading, the defendant was liable as a common carrier at common law, and alleged the failure of the defendant to carry and deliver the goods. The plaintiff went on to say that if the bills of lading were valid, then the defendant was liable because the goods were lost through its negligence.
Date of Authorship for this Version
Prentice, Samuel O., "What Causes of Action May Be Joined in One Count under the Connecticut Practice Act" (1898). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 3921.