Judicial Regulation of Court Procedure, 2 Minnesota Law Review 81 (1918)
Anciently, regulations of pleading and practice were principally of judicial origin. Some were the result of judicial decisions in individual cases; others were court rules formally declared; some few were enactments of parliament, the latter of which were attempts to mitigate some of the most technical of the asperities of common law pleading. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the rules of common law procedure had become so rigid and formal that some relief, other than from the courts themselves was imperative. In England it took the form of the civil procedure act of 1833, which provided for the formulating of rules by the common law judges for the simplification of pleading and practice. The Hilary Rules of 1834 were accordingly promulgated. In this country various statutory modifications of the ancient rules were enacted. The early experiences of England under the Hilary Rules and the experience generally with patchwork procedural reform led to the adoption of the Field Code in New York in 1848. Whereas the English act of 1833, while commanding simplification, left with the judiciary the methods of accomplishing it, the New York experiment effectuated a practically complete transfer of procedural regulation from the courts to the legislature. The Field Code has been widely copied and is the basis of most of the systems of procedure in our country today.
Date of Authorship for this Version
Morgan, Edward M., "Judicial Regulation of Court Procedure" (1918). Faculty Scholarship Series. 4022.