Hyper-Presidentialism: Separation of Powers without Checks and Balances in Argentina and the Philippines (with Diane A. Desierto and Natalia Volosin), 29 Berkeley Journal of International Law 246 (2011)
Politicians have an incentive to enhance their power by creating institutions that give them greater freedom to act and by undermining institutions designed to check their influence. Presidents are particularly likely to test the limits of their power. Legislators must compromise in order to pass statutes.I Judges are aware that the executive or the legislature may refuse to comply with their rulings. An independently elected President, in contrast, can sometimes act without seeking legislative approval or provoking judicial constraints. Although Presidents are generally subject to impeachment, this is almost always an extraordinary remedy invoked only in response to a crisis.
Date of Authorship for this Version
Rose-Ackerman, Susan, "Hyper-Presidentialism: Separation of Powers without Checks and Balances in Argentina and the Philippines" (2011). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 4155.