Document Type
Article
Abstract
In recent years, the Chinese public, when facing disputes with government officials, hav preferred a non-legal means of resolution, the Xinfang system, over litigation. Some scholars explain this by claiming that administrative litigation is less effective than Xinfang petitioning. Others argue that the Chinese have historically eschewed litigation and continue to do so habitually. This paper proposes a new explanation: Chinese have traditionally litigated administrative disputes, but only when legal procedure is not too adversarial and allows for the possibility of reconciliation through court-directed settlement. Since this possibility does not formally exist in modern Chinese administrative litigation, people tend to avoid it.
Date of Authorship for this Version
August 2008
Recommended Citation
Zhang, Taisu, "The Xinfang Phenomenon: Why the Chinese Prefer Administrative Petitioning over Litigation" (2008). Student Scholarship Papers. Paper 68.
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/68
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