<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?>
<rss version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Student Scholarship Papers</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2013 Yale Law School All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers</link>
<description>Recent documents in Student Scholarship Papers</description>
<language>en-us</language>
<lastBuildDate>Sat, 16 Feb 2013 07:02:07 PST</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>3600</ttl>








<item>
<title>A Private Ordering Solution to Blockholder Disclosure</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/127</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/127</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 10 Jan 2013 09:42:01 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>The recent debate over reforming the Securities Exchange Act section 13(d) ten-day filing window demonstrates the importance of balancing the costs and benefits of delayed blockholder disclosure in both consequentialist and deontological terms.  While hedge fund activism may create shareholder value, short-termism is a very real problem for firms today.  Rather than a rigid mandatory rule, the duration of the blockholder disclosure window should be set through a shareholder amendment to the corporate bylaws that empowers shareholders to set an optimal maximum length for each firm.  To internalize the economic and moral costs to society of permitting trading on asymmetric information, the SEC should impose a filing fee on blockholders utilizing the delayed disclosure window and use the proceeds to compensate investors who sold shares while a blockholder engaged in a stealth accumulation.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Joshua Mitts</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>THE DEBTOR’S DILEMMA: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ASSET RETENTION IN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/126</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/126</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 01 Aug 2012 07:53:08 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p><em>Since 2005, the Bankruptcy Code has limited Chapter 7 debtors to two asset retention options, reaffirmation and redemption. This Note explores the impact of the modified asset retention options both on the incentives of debtors and creditors during bankruptcy proceedings and on the deals they reach in practice.</em></p>
<p><strong><em> </em></strong></p>
<p><em>While the 2005 revisions succeeded in eliminating an irksome circuit split, this Note illustrates the way in which they fostered deeper problems with asset retention. It argues that allowing ride-through – the option laid to rest in 2005 – would better achieve the bankruptcy goals of protecting debtors and creditors while promoting doctrinal uniformity.</em></p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Amber J. Moren</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>Revitalizing the “liberty of the ancients” through citizen participation in the legislative process</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/125</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/125</guid>
<pubDate>Sat, 28 Apr 2012 07:27:54 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>In a 1819 lecture Benjamin Constant distinguished between two kinds of liberty: the “liberty of the moderns” and the “liberty of the ancients.” He identified the former with individual autonomy, while the latter consisted in “exercising collectively, but directly, several parts of the complete sovereignty.” Constant pointed out the inadequacy of the “liberty of the ancients” due to the danger of individuals being fully subjected to the unbridled collective authority; however, modern safeguards of individual autonomy aspire to keep in check potential excesses of collective power. The additional challenge with which we are faced today is that, in focusing on the “liberty of the moderns,” we not lose sight of the “liberty of the ancients” in the sense of “active and constant participation in collective power.”</p>
<p>This essay departs from a case of the South African Constitutional Court, <em>Doctors for Life International v. the Speaker of the National Assembly & Others</em>, regarding citizen participation in the legislative process. The piece establishes a scheme of four generations of participation rights and situates <em>Doctors for Life</em> in this context as a fourth-generation right. It reads the case as an invitation to reconsider the content of the “liberty of the ancients” by recognizing the importance and limitations of an enforceable regime of citizen participation in the legislative process. In that respect, the essay addresses both the novelty of the case but also tries to connect it with more traditional ideas, showing how it might revitalize the “liberty of the ancients.”</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Athanasios E. Psygkas</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>THE CASE OF THE ZIA: LOOKING BEYOND TRADEMARK LAW TO PROTECT SACRED SYMBOLS</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/124</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/124</guid>
<pubDate>Sat, 24 Mar 2012 07:10:14 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This Article tells the story of a tribe’s fight, over the past two decades, to reclaim its sacred symbol. Members of the Zia tribe, a Native American group located near Albuquerque, New Mexico, have been using their sacred sun symbol in religious ceremonies since 1200 C.E. Today, the symbol appears on the New Mexico state flag, letterhead, and license plate, and on numerous commercial products, including motorcycles and portable toilets. The tribe claims that the state appropriated the symbol without permission in 1925, and that the continued use of the symbol by various parties dilutes its sacred meaning and disparages the Zia people. This Article considers the harms the tribe faces when outsiders appropriate its symbol and the possible solutions within current trademark law. Ultimately, this Article illustrates that, for the Zia, non-legal measures have been more effective than legal ones. The case of the Zia thus suggests that indigenous groups should look beyond trademark law in the fight to protect their sacred symbols.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Stephanie B. Turner</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>A Modern Fiduciary Theory of the Necessary &amp; Proper Clause</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/123</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/123</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 15 Mar 2012 07:35:09 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This Article offers a new originalist account of the Necessary and Proper Clause, with important implications for the Supreme Court’s pending decision on the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate.  In <em>United States v. Comstock</em>, the Supreme Court recently offered a substantial rethinking of the Necessary and Proper Clause, for perhaps the first time since <em>McCulloch v. Maryland</em>.  Underlying the Court’s <em>Comstock</em> decision are two puzzles.  First, there is a puzzle on the surface of the opinion as to how to apply Justice Breyer’s novel five “considerations” in future cases, which this Article demonstrates has already left lower courts deeply confused, notably in the cases on the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act.  Second, <em>Comstock</em> brings back to the surface a deeper puzzle that has sat dormant in Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence from the beginning: the puzzle of what it really means for congressional legislation to be rationally related to an enumerated constitutional end.</p>
<p>This Article seeks to solve both puzzles together by proposing a modern fiduciary theory of the Necessary and Proper Clause that provides meaning to Breyer’s considerations and clarifies the nature of a rational relation between legislated means and enumerated ends.  After canvassing the range of possible readings of <em>Comstock </em>and its means-end fit test, the Article draws on newly uncovered history of the fiduciary and agency law roots of the Necessary and Proper Clause to argue that the means-end test that is the best reading of <em>Comstock</em> would ask whether Congress, in legislating, is acting as a proper fiduciary of the people of the United States, within the context of its enumerated powers.  Using the Affordable Care Act as a case study, the Article demonstrates that the modern fiduciary theory brings to bear a new and valuable toolset in interpreting the Act, and ultimately makes clear that the Necessary and Proper Clause should not pose a challenge to the law’s constitutionality.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Philip J. Levitz</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>Governing the Post-Socialist Transitional Commons: A Case from Rural China</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/122</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/122</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 04 Mar 2012 11:02:38 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>When the collective declines, who manages the collective-owned land? When the socialist state fails, who possesses the state-owned river? This paper concerns the governance of land and natural resources that are still owned by collectives or the state in rural China. No effective community governance has evolved in rural China to fill the authority vacuum left by the People’s Commune system. As a result, such land and natural resources became real commons. I use the term “transitional commons” to indicate both the crucial influence of transitional political legal environment in their emergence and evolution and the transitional character inherent in their nature. Transitional commons are often in crisis: The tragedy of the commons occurs when the cost of exclusive use is too high. When the benefit of exclusive use exceeds the cost, contesting property claims arise over the common resources. I argue for an integrated approach to govern the transitional commons  from the ground. Successful management of the transitional commons requires more than choosing the right property institution. A capable state and a well-functioning community are necessary to make the property institution, whichever it is, work. Rule of law is necessary to define the basic structure of a society and to guarantee the normal operation of the community self-governance. Self-governance can increase social capital for the local community to develop local consensus on property arrangements.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Shitong Qiao</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>Rebuilding Justice: A Review of the Collapse of American Criminal Justice, by William J. Stuntz</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/121</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/121</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 04 Mar 2012 10:52:28 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>America’s criminal justice system has led to extremely high incarceration rates and high crime rates in many poor and working-class neighborhoods.  William Stuntz’s final book, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice suggests ways to improve America’s system of criminal justice.  My review compares Stuntz’s view of American criminal justice with the views of empirical social scientists Mark Kleiman and David Kennedy, whose work is used around the country in successful social experiments to reduce crime.  Stuntz believed that changes in law and society have delegated too much power to prosecutors and not enough to judges, juries, and average citizens, and reforms in America’s criminal justice system need to focus on rebuilding the rule of law and local democracy.  In contrast, Kennedy and Kleiman believe that criminal justice reforms should focus on increasing the swiftness and certainty of punishment.  Kennedy’s and Kleiman’s ideas have been used to  combat gang violence, clean up open-air drug sales, and increase the effectiveness of probation for drug-using probationers.  Overall, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice is a well-written and insightful important book, but a comparison with the empirical work of Kennedy and Kleiman strongly suggests that some of Stuntz’s recommendations to improve American criminal justice are impractical or unwise, and that reforms in policing and probation are likely to be more successful than Stuntz’s proposed changes to criminal law and procedure.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Albert Monroe</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>Wasting the Planet: What a Storied Doctrine of Property Brings to Bear on Environmental Law and Climate Change</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/119</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/119</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 04 Mar 2012 10:44:02 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>To many, sustainability is nothing more than another legally ineffectual buzz word manufactured by the modern environmental movement.  However, such a narrow view of the concept ignores a tremendous amount of historical precedent and jurisprudence underlying it.  Specifically, the doctrine of waste in Anglo-American property law has long been a vehicle for those with an interest in the future to restrict resource-depleting activities in the present, rendering it the manifestation of sustainability as a concrete legal obligation.  It is through this doctrine, then, that the rich concept of sustainability as it applies to climate change policymaking can be best understood.  The early history and development of the doctrine of waste in England and the United States, as well as the philosophical discourse surrounding equitable obligations to future generations, help to provide much-needed non-partisan legal and moral grounding for environmental policymaking.</p>
<p>Specifically, the traditional American and English iterations of the waste doctrine provide a natural and tested tool for fashioning sustainability rules on a local scale. The age-old question of what precisely must be left to remaindermen is directly analogous to the modern questions concerning sustainable development and depletion of non-renewable resources.  For this reason, the tests and rules applied in the courts of the early United States and England have a particularly useful and novel application to the modern policy discussion.  Yet, an even deeper level of analytical significance exists because the choice between the extreme American and English versions of the waste doctrine maps onto the debate between the concepts of weak and strong sustainability. Through examination of the early cases and resultant rules in these two common law jurisdictions, this work provides a policy analysis tool and a recommended general course of action for environmental policymakers.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Anthony L.I. Moffa</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>An Alternative to Death-Qualification: The Nonunanimous Penalty Jury</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/118</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/118</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 04 Mar 2012 10:17:17 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Eliminating jurors for cause based on their opinions concerning the death-penalty (“death-qualification”) is a widespread practice that has been upheld by multiple Supreme Court cases, but which has been widely criticized for resulting in juries that studies have shown to be more conviction-prone, and biased toward the prosecution, in addition to being unrepresentative of the community at large. This Note offers a possible solution to the problems caused by death-qualification at both the guilt and penalty phases, unlike those proposed thus far: specifically, the elimination of death-qualification altogether, coupled with the relaxation of the unanimity requirement at the penalty phase.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Jane Tucker</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>Refugees</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/115</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/115</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 16 Feb 2012 11:07:15 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This definition is meant to intervene in the globalized conversation on the nature of the nation state. Whether in political theory, the social sciences, or law, this conversation has already internalized processes which, during the 20th century, have turned the Earth into one political unit.1 Numerous commentators have repeatedly declared the death of the nation state. This political formation, a relatively new one, the advent of which can be traced to the 19th century, has ostensibly been replaced by global mechanisms of governance and force. Whether characterized by global financial or labor markets, intergovernmental organizations such as the EU, or activities of NGOs, such mechanisms fundamentally transform basic political categories such as citizenship.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Itamar Mann</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>The Dual Foundation of Universal Jurisdiction: Towards a Jurisprudence for the ‘Court of Critique’</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/114</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/114</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 16 Feb 2012 11:03:01 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This article revisits the case of <em>The State of Israel v Adolph Eichmann </em>and calls for renewed attention to the analysis of universal jurisdiction in this early example of it. Precisely because the Israeli court’s notion of universal jurisdiction is foreign to contemporary readers, it provides fresh guidance on a doctrine that has recently gained enormous importance in global politics. The <em>Eichmann </em>Opinion suggests a two-tiered test: among the cases satisfying the traditional conditions for universal jurisdiction, only those cases in which there is a political interest in pressing charges should be selected. As a world court with universal jurisdiction has not been established, universal jurisdiction remains grounded both in a universal vision of humanity and in the violence wielded by particular institutions.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Itamar Mann</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>The Necessity Procedure: Laws of Torture in Israel and Beyond, 1987 - 2009</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/113</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/113</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 16 Feb 2012 10:53:57 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This article traces the history of the regulation of torture in Israel, and shows how it foreshadowed the legal understanding of torture in the United States in the wake of “The War on Terror.” Part I of the article demonstrates how the celebrated Israeli Supreme Court decision in Public Committee v. Israel, traditionally understood as a bold prohibition of torture, should instead be seen as institutionalizing and managing torture.</p>
<p>Since Public Committee, the Israeli executive and the judiciary worked hand in glove to protect this regime, which we label necessity management. Part II of the article revisits the Landau Commission, convened to investigate torture in the Israeli security services, which ultimately legitimated physical interrogation techniques. We argue that the roots of necessity management, which developed after Public Committee, are already spelled out in the Landau Commission report. These rules emerge from the needs of preserving an undemocratic regime of military occupation. Public Committee, in which the Israeli Supreme Court seemingly struck down the Landau Commission’s conclusions, actually cleared the way for implementing these conclusions behind a veil of prosecutorial discretion. Part III articulates some of the theoretical assumptions underlying the regime of necessity management. We argue that this regime, which originated in the undemocratic political context of occupation, foreshadowed protections for torturers under the Bush and the Obama administrations.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Itamar Mann et al.</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>An &quot;Outside Limit&quot; for Refund Suits: The Case Against the Tax Exception to the Six-Year Bar on Claims Against the Government</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/111</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/111</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 13 Mar 2011 08:42:47 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Longstanding judicial precedent and the official position of the I.R.S. agree that federal tax refund suits are limited only by the Internal Revenue Code’s two-year statute of limitations, which is triggered only when the I.R.S. mails the claimant a notice of disallowance. 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(1). This article contends that tax refund litigation is <em>also</em> governed by the six-year limitation on “[e]very civil action commenced against the United States,” which is triggered upon the accrual of a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).</p>
<p>The prevailing view that the general statute of limitations does not apply to tax refund litigation is based on <em>Detroit Trust Co. v. United States</em>, 131 Ct. Cl. 223 (1955). Under <em>Detroit Trust</em>, a taxpayer may indefinitely sit on her right to sue the Government unless the I.R.S. issues a formal disallowance that triggers § 6532(a)(1). The contrary view advanced here, that the six-year bar imposes an “outside limit” on the tax-specific statute of limitations, was recently stated in dicta by a unanimous Supreme Court in <em>United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co.</em>, 553 U.S. 1 (2008). The persuasiveness of <em>Detroit Trust </em>was further eroded when a district court held that the case was “wrongly decided” and dismissed as untimely a refund suit filed more than six years after the claim accrued, even though the I.R.S. had never disallowed the underlying claim. <em>Wagenet v. United States</em>, No. 08-00142 AG (ANx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115547 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 14, 2009).</p>
<p>Applying the six-year bar as a backstop to tax refund suits would enforce its plain meaning, would accord with multiple canons of statutory construction, would promote timely resolution of tax refund claims, and would bring tax refund litigation into line with the rest of federal claims jurisprudence, thereby eliminating one manifestation of the tax exceptionalism that the Supreme Court recently criticized in <em>Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States</em>, No. 09-837, slip op. at 9 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2011).</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Adam Gustafson</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>From Kyoto to Quito: Reassessing oil moratorium as an effective climate change policy from a property-based approach</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/110</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/110</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 02 Mar 2011 11:39:02 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Leaving oil reserves unexploited has been recently put forward as an innovative climate change policy. President Rafael Correa has announced Ecuador’s decision not to exploit one of its largest oil fields located in the Amazon in exchange for economic compensation from the international community for at least half of the revenue that would have otherwise come from extracting the oil (namely, $3.6 billion). This proposal has been praised for establishing the foundations of the “new economics of planet Earth” and for having the potential to become “a new paradigm for global conservation programs”. This paper criticizes the Yasuni-ITT Initiative by stressing that a property-based approach would have reduced the likelihood that a post-Correa government would decide to disregard the oil moratorium in the future. Instead, I propose three alternatives to Correa’s model, namely selling the oil reserves; paying for the ecosystem services; and establishing a conse  rvation easement over the national park. I conclude that the last option is the most effective option.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Patrick Wieland</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>Property Rights in Land, Agricultural Capitalism, and the Relative Decline of Pre-Industrial China</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/109</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/109</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 27 Feb 2011 08:25:35 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Scholars have long debated how legal institutions influenced the economic development of societies and civilizations.  This Article sheds new light on this debate by reexamining, from a legal perspective, a crucial segment of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century economic divergence between England and China: By 1700, English agriculture had become predominantly capitalist, reliant on “managerial” farms worked chiefly by hired labor.  On the other hand, Chinese agriculture counterproductively remained household-based throughout the Qing and Republican eras.</p>
<p>The explanation for this key agricultural divergence, which created multiple advantages for English proto-industry, lies in differences between Chinese and English property rights regimes, but in an area largely overlooked by previous scholarship.  Contrary to common assumptions, Qing and Republican laws and customs did recognize private property and, moreover, allowed reasonably free alienation of it.  Significant inefficiencies existed, however, in the specific mechanisms of land transaction: The great majority of Chinese land transactions were “conditional sales” that, under most local customs, guaranteed the “seller” an interminable right of redemption at zero interest.  In comparison, early modern English laws and customs prohibited the redemption of “conditional” conveyances—mainly mortgages—beyond a short time frame.  Consequently, Chinese farmers found it very difficult to securely acquire land, whereas English farmers found it reasonably easy.  Over the long run, this impeded the spread of capitalist agriculture in China, but promoted it in England.</p>
<p>Differences between Chinese and English norms of property transaction were, therefore, important to Qing and Republican China’s relative economic decline.  By locating the causes of key global economic trends in customary property rights, the Article also has ramifications for influential theories of social norm formation and law and development.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Taisu Zhang</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>Apartheid, Profits, and Corporate Social Responsibility: A Case Study of Multinational Corporations in Saudi Arabia</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/107</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/107</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 21 Jan 2011 10:46:32 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This paper looks at the real motivations behind the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) regime through the prism of American corporate activities in Saudi Arabia. The author finds that several companies generally hailed as leading the way in corporate social responsibility, such as Starbucks, McDonalds and the Hilton Corporation, are in effect perpetuating shocking abuses of human rights—specifically women’s rights—for the sake of maximizing profits. Such behavior suggests that, for many companies, the CSR regime is not motivated by a wider normative shift towards more socially responsible behavior, as many authors have suggested, but rather is simply a tool to maximize a corporation’s monetary value by appealing to niche markets. The author suggests that to end this troubling dynamic, the political and judicial branches of government should learn from the harsh lessons gained during the South African Apartheid and step forward to prohibit domestic companies from engaging in gross patterns of gender discrimination abroad.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Nicolo Nourafchan</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>Standing in Barack Obama&apos;s Shoes:  Evaluating the President&apos;s Jurisprudence of Empathy in Light of James Wilson&apos;s Jurisprudence of “Common Sense”</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/106</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/106</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 17 Aug 2010 07:59:26 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This article explains what President Barack Obama meant when he called empathy   an “essential ingredient” in judicial decision making and, thus, the outstanding quality he would look for in his Supreme Court nominees.  It also provides a comparative study between Obama’s jurisprudence of empathy and Justice James Wilson’s jurisprudence of common sense in order to illustrate the dangers of deciding difficult Supreme Court cases with recourse to unconventional, extra-legal tools.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>John Rollert</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>Adverse Reactions: Structure, Philosophy, and Outcomes of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/105</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/105</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 06 Jul 2010 10:10:28 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>On March 24th, 2010, President Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, declaring “everybody should have some basic security when it comes to their health care.” This Note provides legal scholarship’s first comprehensive examination of this complex legislation. Second, it reframes the bill by proposing that its miscellaneous-seeming provisions are designed to protect a single, central provision: the ban on health discrimination. Finally, it argues that underlying economic forces will likely cause PPACA to do more harm than good. While health reform may ultimately prove successful, America has good reason to be concerned.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Michael A. Lee Jr</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>The ‘Specificity’ of Cultural Products versus the ‘Generality’ of Trade Obligations</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/104</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/104</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 29 Apr 2010 11:11:53 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>The duality of cultural products presents themselves both as commercial objects and assets which convey values and identity. The WTO regime currently does not legalize ‘cultural exception’ while the adoption of UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity adds more discord on the interface between the ‘specificity’ of cultural products and the ‘generality’ of trade obligations. Against this backdrop, the recently decided WTO case of China--Publications and Audiovisual Products provides an opportune chance to pinpoint the treatment of cultural products in the WTO framework. Based on the DSB reports, this comment centers its analysis on four key issues, including invoking the UNESCO Convention as cultural defense, applying ‘public morals exception’ to cultural products, the distinction and overlap between cultural goods and services, and how much culture can count for in determining the ‘likeness’ between imported and domestic cultural products, etc.. The comment ends with concluding remarks on the case decisions, lessons China may have learned, and the necessity of reconciliation between free trade and cultural diversity in the context of economic globalization.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Jingxia Shi</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>Do the Fifth and Sixth Amendments Prohibit the Designation of U.S. Persons Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act?</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/103</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/103</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 11 Apr 2010 10:26:52 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) empowers the executive branch to designate organizations and individuals “Specially Designated Global Terrorists.” Though IEEPA designation is used against both domestic and foreign entities, its consequences are most severe within the United States.  The designee’s assets are frozen and transacting with the designee becomes a federal felony. For an American organization, IEEPA designation is a death sentence.  For an Amercan individual, it amounts to house arrest. This Article analyzes IEEPA using the Mendoza-Martinez test and concludes that IEEPA designation of U.S. persons violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by imposing punishment without providing the required procedural protections. This Article offers a new framework for evaluating preventive counterterrorism policies and provides clarity to a notoriously unclear area of our constitutional law—the jurisprudence of the civil/criminal divide.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Eric Sandberg-Zakian</author>


</item>





</channel>
</rss>
