Few principles are as universally accepted in legal scholarship today, but
based on such scant support, as the fundamental nature and broad scope
of the right to procreate. What is perceived as a vague but nonetheless
justified legal and moral interest to procreate freely without regard to
others is, upon closer examination, based on little more than misconstrued
or inapposite case precedent and blurry statements in non-binding
sources of international law. By relying on this authority, conflating
procreation with conceptually distinguishable behaviors, presuming its
intrinsic value, and ignoring competing rights and duties, lawyers have
largely overlooked procreation and its legal and normative limits.
Interpreting U.S. constitutional and international law sources, and
finally employing Locke's model of natural rights, this Article redefines
the right in law and practice as satiable and narrow, acknowledging the
competing rights and duties that both qualify and justify the right. It
posits that the procreative right, properly stated, includes at least the act
of replacing oneself and at most procreation up to a point that optimizes
the public good.
Dillard, Carter J.
"Rethinking the Procreative Right,"
Yale Human Rights and Development Journal:
1, Article 1.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol10/iss1/1