Abstract
This paper presents original primary research on mortgage lending in New Haven, Connecticut in the early nineteenth century. It observes a shift in the market at 1837: lending institutions abruptly began to make significant volumes of mortgage loans to non-elite individuals with less wealth and social standing. Before 1837, these institutions primarily made loans to the city’s social and economic elite. The paper uses this shift as a case study in local financial development, placing particular emphasis on the role of local political institutions in facilitating economic growth.
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Introduction

Financial institutions promote economic development. Empirical economic research has established that the presence of financial intermediaries leads to wealth creation.\(^1\) While theorists have long disputed whether financial institutions are a cause or effect of economic growth,\(^2\) the balance of the argument has tipped in favor of those recognizing a causal role for banks and other financial intermediaries.\(^3\) The last few centuries have borne out the wisdom of Alexander Hamilton: “[m]ost commercial nations have found it necessary to institute banks; and they have proved to be the happiest engines that ever were invented for advancing trade.”\(^4\)

Where these happy engines come from is much more of a mystery. A lively scholarly debate continues over which factors contribute, or are essential, to the creation of sound financial institutions.\(^5\) This debate is not merely academic: much of humanity lives without financial institutions or substantial economic development. If the current debate produces coherent


\(^3\) Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 688 (1997) (reviewing the literature and concluding that “[a] growing body of work would push even most skeptics toward the belief that the development of financial markets and institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the growth process”)


\(^5\) See, e.g., Sambit Bhattacharyya, Political Origins of Financial Structure, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 979 (2013) (“In spite of growing policy interest on the role of financial structure in promoting development, very little is known about how different financial structures emerge and evolve.”).
accounts of how and why financial institutions form, these insights could inform legal and policy choices in the many jurisdictions seeking to promote economic development.\textsuperscript{6}

This paper seeks to make a narrow contribution to this broad debate. It examines the development of institutional mortgage lending in New Haven, Connecticut in the early nineteenth century. It focuses on this period and this market because, around 1837, new lending institutions appeared in New Haven and began to make a significant volume of mortgage loans to middle-class New Haven citizens.\textsuperscript{7} Prior to 1837, the city’s lending institutions primarily made mortgage loans to an elite segment of the city’s population. The speed of this shift, as well as New Haven’s documentation of mortgage lending in its Land Records office, make the city an attractive case study. Moreover, land and improvements to land constituted a huge portion of the nation’s wealth in this early period.\textsuperscript{8} Accordingly, mortgage lending was an important part of the financial system. The importance of accessible mortgage markets continues to the present-day. Modern development theorists have hailed the economic and social virtues of empowering holders of real assets to borrow against them.\textsuperscript{9}

In focusing on the development of a more broadly accessibly mortgage market in antebellum New Haven, this paper addresses two particular conversations within the wider debate over the origins of financial institutions. First, the economic and financial development of

\textsuperscript{6} See Stephen Haber et al., Political Institutions and Financial Development, in \textit{Political Institutions and Financial Development 2} (Stephen Haber et al. eds., 2008) (offering different policy prescriptions based on whether the legal-origins or political-institutions view of financial institution development prevails).

\textsuperscript{7} See infra Figure 1.


the United States in the early nineteenth century has served as an important case study for how
and why financial institutions emerge.\textsuperscript{10} The country’s enviably rapid expansion during this
period is surely the primary reason for this sustained historical attention. But the early nineteenth
century United States is also attractive because it was so diverse. Different regions walked
different paths to economic development but shared some initial conditions, allowing scholars to
compare the effects of regional policy choices while controlling for other factors like cultural and
legal heritage.\textsuperscript{11} This paper makes a modest contribution to the literature on New England’s
development.\textsuperscript{12} In particular, it offers New Haven’s mortgage experience after 1837 as an
exception to the pattern of “insider lending” which prevailed throughout New England at the
time.\textsuperscript{13} It also adds some nuance to the division of the early United States into separate regions.
In New Haven’s case, the American West and national fiscal policy choices had important,
possibly transformative, consequences—even in a very local market for mortgage loans.

The second conversation this paper addresses concerns the role of legal and political
institutions in the development of financial institutions. In the wider debate over the drivers of
financial development, commentators have found it useful to delineate between theories that
emphasize the legal origins of financial institutions and those that cast financial development as

\textsuperscript{10} See, e.g., HOWARD BODENHORN, STATE BANKING IN EARLY AMERICA: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY (2003);
RICHARD SYLLA, THE AMERICAN CAPITALIST MARKET, 1846-1914: A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC POLICY ON
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1975); John Joseph Wallis, Answering Mary Shirley’s Question, or: What Can the
World Bank Learn from American History?, in POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 92
(Stephen Haber et al. eds., 2008); John Joseph Wallis et al., The Interaction of Taxation and Regulation in
Nineteenth-Century U.S. Banking, in THE REGULATED ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL
ECONOMY 121 (Claudia Goldin & Gary D. Libecap eds., 1994).

\textsuperscript{11} See, e.g., HOWARD BODENHORN, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA: FINANCIAL MARKETS AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF NATION BUILDING (2000); Hugh T. Rockoff, Varieties of Banking and

\textsuperscript{12} See BODENHORN, supra note 10, at ch. 4; NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, INSIDER LENDING: BANKS, PERSONAL
CONNECTIONS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDUSTRIAL NEW ENGLAND (1994); PETER J. COLEMAN, THE

\textsuperscript{13} See LAMOREAUX, supra note 12. But see Ta-Chen Wang, Banks, Credit Markets, and Early American
Development: A Case Study of Entry and Competition, 68 J. ECON. HIST. 438 (2008) (observing some decrease in
insider lending in Plymouth County, Massachusetts in the late 1830s and early 1840s).
the result of politics and political institutions.14 While this paper considers possible legal origins for the 1837 shift, it ultimately sides with the political-institutions camp. In particular, it offers an account of how the Town Deposit Fund, a local body created by the direct political participation of New Haven’s citizens, may have contributed to the shift in the city’s mortgage market. Many political-institution accounts focus on the incentives and actions of governments at a higher level, considering, for instance, the incentives of state governments to regulate financial institutions.15 Hopefully, this study can add greater depth to the political-institutions perspective by providing a local example of political institutions shaping financial development. Given that New England, in particular, had a large number of small banks during the early nineteenth century,16 a more local perspective could be useful.

Part I of this paper introduces the capital hierarchy model, a framework describing different sources of debt and equity capital in growing economies. It also presents two datasets documenting mortgage lending in New Haven between 1800 and 1844 and discusses the entry of new institutional lenders into the market around 1837. The remaining Parts of the paper explore this change and its context more fully. Part II examines mortgage lending in New Haven before 1837. It considers where institutional mortgage lenders in New Haven before 1837 should be categorized in the capital hierarchy model, describing how banks primarily conducted “insider lending” though pre-existing social networks. Part II concludes by discussing mortgage lending

15 See, e.g., Bhattacharyya, supra note 5; Stephen Haber, Political Institutions and Financial Development: Evidence from the Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Mexico and the United States, in POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 10 (Haber et al eds., 2008); Richard Sylla, The Political Economy of Early U.S. Financial Development, in POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 60 (Haber et al. eds., 2008).
by the State of Connecticut before 1837. Part III looks at mortgage lending during and after 1837. It first examines loans made by New Haven itself in 1837. Next, it discusses the rise of the New Haven Savings Bank in the late 1830s and early 1840s. Throughout, it documents key differences between the insider mortgages made before 1837 and the later mortgages made by the Town and the Savings Bank. Ultimately, Part III casts these post-1837 loans as occupying a higher wrung on the capital hierarchy, indicating a progression in New Haven’s financial development. Part IV proposes some theories for what caused this progression, introducing economic, legal, and sociopolitical accounts. In particular, Part IV argues that political participation by a broad range of New Haven residents in the creation of the Town Deposit Fund may have spurred more widespread mortgage lending by later private banking institutions.

I. Capital Hierarchies and Mortgage Lending in Antebellum New Haven

This Part introduces two foundations for this paper—one theoretical, the other empirical. Section A looks to economics and economic history for a theoretical understanding of the stages of financial development. These literatures propose a hierarchy of capital sources that can be used to describe changes in New Haven’s early nineteenth century mortgage market. Sections B and C present the empirical foundation of this paper: two datasets constructed from primary research in the New Haven Land Records. The first, less detailed dataset, given in Section B, examines New Haven’s total mortgage market at several points in the early nineteenth century. The second, more detailed dataset, given in Section C, documents institutional mortgage lending in the city between 1800 and 1840. Both datasets confirm that New Haven’s mortgage market change significantly in the late 1830s, as institutional lenders began to lend in substantial volumes for the first time.

A. A Hierarchy of Capital Sources
Economists have developed a taxonomy of private sources of capital for firms,\textsuperscript{17} which economic historians have subsequently relied upon to assess the financial development of economies across time.\textsuperscript{18} The following chart lists this “hierarchy of sources of capital”:\textsuperscript{19}

Table 1:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
Type & Debt Capital & Equity Capital \\
\hline
Internal Sources & Loans from owners & Retained earnings \\
Informal External Sources & Loans from family and friends; trade credit, brokers & Investments by informed participants \\
Financial Intermediaries & Lending by financial institutions (banks) & Some joint-stock companies \\
Public Markets & Bond issues & Stock issues \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

The different sources of capital in the first column can be used as “an index of financial sophistication,” with each subsequent row allowing for more complex financial arrangements and more modern economic growth.\textsuperscript{20} The progression between “Row 2” and “Row 3,” where debt capital begins to flow from financial intermediaries instead of families and friends, is of particular interest in the present case. One of the key differences between these rows concerns how parties gather and use information. In the case of external sources of capital, Row 2, lenders obtain information about borrowers primarily through pre-existing social arrangements, including kinship structures. But once an economy transitions to Row 3, Peter Temin explains that

\[ \text{[t]he presence of a financial intermediary, which we can call a bank for its simplest manifestation, solves a lot of the information problems present in the} \]

\textsuperscript{18} See, e.g., Peter Temin, \textit{Financial Intermediation in the Early Roman Empire}, 64 J. Econ. Hist. 705 (2004).
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Id.} at 708-709. Table 1 is taken directly from Temin’s \textit{Financial Intermediation in the Early Roman Empire}.
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Id.} at 708, 712-13.
conditions of [informal external sources]. The bank solves the problem of finding borrowers and lenders because they each know to go to the bank to place their excess purchasing power or to borrow. . . . The bank has the responsibility for evaluating potential borrowers, and banks typically develop expertise or staffs to make these kinds of decisions. 21

The remainder of this paper uses Temin’s capital hierarchy as a conceptual framework for understanding the changes that took place in New Haven’s mortgage market in the late 1830s. In particular, it asks when and why “Row 3” lending—capital allocation through expertise—appeared in New Haven. To answer these questions, it first maps the dominant sources of capital in New Haven’s mortgage market to accurately place mortgage lending within the capital hierarchy. The following Section presents the results of this investigation.

**B. Institutional versus Non-Institutional Lending in New Haven’s Mortgage Market**

To categorize New Haven’s mortgage market within Temin’s capital hierarchy, I constructed two datasets using the archives of the New Haven Land Records. Before introducing these datasets, some background on land records and mortgage law in early nineteenth century Connecticut may be useful. At the time, mortgages consisted of a promissory note or other instrument pledging repayment of a debt and an associated deed transferring ownership in real property to a mortgagee. As legal documents transferring title, these mortgage deeds were recorded in local land records. Most of them took the form of warranty deeds and, in New Haven at least, were recorded on standard warranty deed forms or using standard warranty deed language—the same forms and language used for warranty deeds transferring title upon sale. However, unlike warranty deeds transferring title upon sale, mortgage deeds contained (always handwritten) voiding provisions invalidating the deed if the associated promissory note was timely repaid. The language of these voiding provisions suggests that mortgage deeds transferred

21 Id. at 711.
title from mortgagors to mortgagees outright, with satisfactory repayment of a debt reversing the
transfer. But, in legal terms, this was not the case. At the time, Connecticut courts subscribed to a
lien theory of mortgages, meaning that mortgagees held only a security interest in a mortgaged
property. Title remained in the mortgagor until a mortgagee obtained a foreclosure decree from
a local Superior Court. Even the foreclosure decree did not transfer title to the mortgagee. It
merely began a redemption period during which a mortgagor could make good on her debt and
retain title to her land. Redemption periods varied depending on the foreclosure decree, but they
appear to have lasted six months to a year. Only once this redemption period expired did a
mortgage deed effectively transfer title from a borrower to a lender.

In New Haven, all recorded deeds are held in archives attached to the Town Clerk’s
office. Assembling the mortgage deeds for a given period allows for reconstruction of the size
and details of the city’s mortgage market at a certain time. The first dataset I constructed focuses
on New Haven’s total mortgage market in the 1830s and 1840s. In particular, to determine where
on the capital hierarchy antebellum New Haven’s mortgage market should be categorized, I
reviewed every mortgage deed recorded in the archives for three six-month periods—the first six
months of 1830, 1835, and 1844. The time periods were chosen partly to confirm that changes
took place in the mortgage market around 1837. The six-month periods in 1830 and 1835

22 See Cooper v. Davis, 15 Conn. 556, 561 (1843) (“The mortgagee has merely a lien upon the property for the
security of the debt.”)
23 See Basset v. Mason, 18 Conn. 131 (1846).
24 See, e.g., Atwood v. Vincent, 17 Conn. 575, 578 (1846) (citing a February 1842 foreclosure decree “limiting the
time of redemption . . . to the first Monday of September 1842”); Cooper v. Davis, 15 Conn. 556, 557 (1843) (citing
a January 1842 decree of foreclosure limiting the time of redemption to the first Monday of July 1842); Avery v.
Kellogg, 11 Conn. 562, 563 (1836) (citing a March 1833 decree of foreclosure limiting the time of redemption to the
first Monday of January 1834).
25 Connecticut mortgage law operated under a “strict foreclosure” regime, where land was transferred to the
mortgagee even if its value exceeded the original debt. See Bassett v. Mason, 18 Conn. 131, 132 (1846). For more
background on redemption periods and strict foreclosure proceedings, see generally GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A.
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 112-116 (7th ed. 2006).
establish a baseline for what the market looked like before 1837. The 1844 period was chosen to be representative of the city’s mortgage market post-1837. By the mid-1840s, the nation was emerging from the economic depression that began with the Panic of 1837. Accordingly, by 1844, any structural changes to the mortgage market that occurred in the late 1830s should no longer be obscured by poor macroeconomic circumstances. To construct the dataset, I located the volumes in the archives that contain deeds for the relevant periods, noted whether each deed was a mortgage deed, and, if so, recorded whether the lender was a Row 3 financial intermediary or a Row 2 private individual (or groups of private individuals) and the amount of the mortgage. This process involved reviewing 2,172 individual deeds recorded in the Land Records.26 Table 2 summarizes the dataset:

26 Note that the dataset may nonetheless not include 100% of the mortgages for these periods. Deeds are organized into roughly three categories in the Land Records archives: warranty deeds printed on forms containing some basic warranty deed language, quitclaim deeds printed on forms containing some basic quitclaim deed language, and bespoke “manuscript” deeds that contained no printed form language. All of the deeds contain some individualized handwritten material. For instance, as previously mentioned, mortgage deeds were generally recorded on warranty deed forms with handwritten voiding provisions. But the manuscript deeds are entirely handwritten. They often continue for many pages and are generally used for explaining more exotic real estate transfers. For instance, many probate transfers are recorded in manuscript form. Most of the volumes in the Land Records archives contain warranty deeds or quitclaim deeds (or some combination of both). I reviewed all of the relevant warranty and quitclaim deed volumes for the first six months of 1830, 1835, and 1840. However, I did not review the manuscript volumes for these periods. Doing so would have required deciphering many hundreds of pages of handwritten early nineteenth century script. Accordingly, the dataset may underestimate the total number of mortgages originated during this period. This underestimation should be minimal. One estimate of its magnitude comes from the database introduced in Section C, which contains detailed information on the hundreds of institutional mortgages originated from 1800 and 1844. Of the 174 mortgages originated by the New Haven Savings Bank during the period, only 6, or 3.4%, were recorded in manuscript volumes. (Mortgage deeds in manuscript volumes originated by specific mortgagees can be located easily using the archives’ indexes.) Consistent with the unusual nature of many of the manuscript deeds, it appears, then, that mortgages were only rarely recorded in the manuscript volumes. Based on the proportion of New Haven Savings Bank mortgages appearing in manuscript form, it is probably safe to say that the dataset underlying Table 2 underestimates the total number of mortgages in New Haven by around 5%.
Table 2: Total Mortgage Lending in New Haven

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mortgages Originated by &quot;Row 2&quot; Individual Lenders</th>
<th>First Six Months of 1830</th>
<th>First Six Months of 1835</th>
<th>First Six Months of 1844</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>$70,402</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>$141,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>$800</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Mortgages</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>$71,202</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 displays several important trends in New Haven’s mortgage market. First, it confirms that the early nineteenth century was a period of dynamic growth. The town’s mortgage market grew by roughly two and a half times between 1830 and 1844, in terms of both the number of loans and the total amount lent. Second, the market share of institutional lenders abruptly increased in the late 1830s, from virtually 0% in 1830 and 1835 to 26% of the total amount loaned in 1844. In addition, although the number of mortgages made by non-institutional lenders increased by 27% between 1835 and 1844, the total dollar amount loaned by them barely changed, increasing only 3%. This pattern suggests that a structural shift took place in the New Haven mortgage market in the late 1830s: as the total amount of capital disbursed by Row 2 mortgage lenders hit a ceiling, financial intermediaries and other Row 3 lenders appeared and began to provide another source of capital to borrowers. Moreover, although not shown in Table 1, the average size of a non-institutional mortgage in the first six months of 1844 was $835, whereas the average institutional mortgage was $1,426.27 The relative sizes of institutional and non-institutional mortgages further support the view that New Haven’s mortgage market progressed up the capital hierarchy in the late 1830s. Because they could assemble larger

27 See Database of Total Mortgages (on file with author).
amounts of capital and pool risks, banks and other financial intermediaries may have been better equipped to make larger loans than private individuals. Overall, Table 1 and the data behind it indicate that the changes in New Haven’s mortgage market between 1835 and 1844 were different from the changes between 1830 and 1835. The changes between 1830 and 1835 were changes of degree: mortgage activity, although consistent in character, became more frequent. But the changes between 1835 and 1844 included a shift in sources of capital and the type of lending, as delineated in Temin’s capital hierarchy.

This is not to say that financial intermediaries categorically replaced individual mortgage lenders after the late 1830s. By 1844, institutional lenders only constituted about a quarter of the mortgage market—although it is possible that this proportion increased as the New Haven Savings Bank and similar institutions grew. Regardless of the exact market shares of institutional and non-institutional lenders during the rest of the nineteenth century, informal external sources of capital, mainly private individuals, continued to play a significant role in New Haven’s mortgage market into the early twentieth century. Moreover, from a theoretical perspective, financial development does not require Row 3 financial intermediaries to drive informal Row 2 lenders from the market. No economy progresses through the capital hierarchy in lockstep, leaving behind old sources of capital and definitively switching to new ones. Instead, different sources of capital coexist: even in highly advanced economies, there are roles for less sophisticated sources of capital. However, although informal external sources did continue to exist and, for a time, dominate New Haven’s mortgage market, the increased participation of

financial intermediaries after 1837 was a permanent shift, with ostensibly profound economic consequences over a long period of time. For example, the New Haven Savings Bank, founded in 1838 and responsible for the bulk of the institutional lending in the 1840s, remained active until 2004, when it underwent a successful merger with two other regional banks.30

The remainder of this paper sets aside the question of the relative magnitude of institutional versus non-institutional lending in New Haven. Instead, it focuses on why, when, and how the shift towards institutional lending occurred. It focuses on the shift itself, instead of documenting the extent of its ramifications, because a turn to Row 3 lending in a developing economy is an important but by no means inevitable step. Indeed, the social, legal, and economic forces responsible for such shifts are poorly understood. With this in mind, the following Section introduces the second dataset drawn from the Land Records. It presents the story of institutional lending in New Haven in much greater detail.

C. Institutional Lending in New Haven: 1800 - 1844

The dataset introduced in Section B does not provide much clarity on when exactly the shift in New Haven’s mortgage market occurred and what entities were responsible for it. To examine these issues more closely, I constructed a second dataset of the three hundred and fifty-five mortgages in New Haven originated by a state-chartered bank or the state or local government between 1800 and 1844. I began the dataset at 1800 and ended it at 1844 for several reasons. First, although the overall ratio between institutional and non-institutional lending given in Table 1 for 1830 and 1835 are broadly representative of the period, the almost complete lack of institutional lending in 1830 and the total lack of it in 1835 are slightly anomalous. Financial

intermediaries did make some loans before the late 1830s. To understand institutional lending before 1837 and to see if institutional lending had ever been prevalent in New Haven in the early nineteenth century before 1837, I examined the earliest decades of the century as well. I continued the dataset through 1844 because, as mentioned above, by the mid-1840s the nation’s economy was emerging from the economic depression of the late 1830s. Although it may have been useful to continue the dataset further into the 1840s, the New Haven Savings Bank was making so many mortgages by 1845 that assembling data on later years became arduous. A less rigorous review of deeds through the end of the 1840s confirmed that the trends shown in the dataset continued throughout the decade. To construct the dataset, I used the archives’ indexes, which list the locations of deeds by grantor and grantee. For each mortgage originated by one of the seven state-chartered banks and two government entities active as mortgagees before 1844, I recorded the date of the mortgage, its amount, its term (if given), all mortgagors, and all mortgagees.\footnote{I also coded the property description given in the mortgage based on whether it used an address, physical landmarks, neighbors’ holdings, or other more technical methods to describe the mortgaged property. Ultimately, I did not use this data in this paper, although most mortgages during the period described the property at issue with reference to streets and neighbor’s landholdings.} Figures 1 and 2 present the results of this primary research, in terms of volume of mortgages originated by institutions and total amount lent:
Fig. 1: Volume of Institutional Mortgages Per Year

Fig. 2: Dollar Amount of Institutional Mortgages Per Year
These graphs tell the story of Table 2 in greater detail: in the late 1830s and early 1840s, institutional lenders began to make more mortgages and lend out more money overall. But the shift was not as abrupt as Table 2 might make it seem. Institutional lenders were active, although erratically and at relatively low levels, before 1837. Moreover, the increase in institutional lending was not monotonic. After a flurry of loans in 1837, institutional lending fell back, although never to its pre-1837 levels, before picking up steam again in the early 1840s. Further analysis reveals that the 1837 peak was driven by a different lender than the bank driving the rise of institutional lending in the early 1840s. Figures 3 and 4 show institutional lending from 1800 and 1844 broken by mortgagee. The first major institutional player in the New Haven mortgage market was actually the town government:

32 A third aspect of this same shift, which is harder to see in Figures 1 and 2, is that the average size of mortgages also decreased after 1837 because the volume of mortgages rose more rapidly than the total amounts loaned out. The social significance of this shift is discussed in greater detail infra at Section III.B.
Fig. 3: Volume of Institutional Mortgages in New Haven, By Mortgagee

- New Haven Savings Bank
- Other Private Banks
- State of Connecticut
- Town of New Haven
Fig. 4: Amount of Institutional Mortgages in New Haven, By Mortgagee

Dollar Value of Mortgages

Year

1805 1810 1815 1820 1825 1830 1835 1840

New Haven Savings Bank  Other Private Banks  State of Connecticut  Town of New Haven
While the lending data presented in Figures 1-4 confirm that the city’s mortgage market underwent a shift from Row 2 to Row 3 of the capital hierarchy in the late 1830s, they raise several important questions. First, given that banks did make mortgage loans earlier in the nineteenth century, can the shift at 1837 be cast as a discrete step up the capital hierarchy? Second, given that two of the most active institutions in New Haven’s mortgage market were public entities, how did governmental activities shape the city’s financial development? Finally, why did the change happen when it did? Parts II, III, and IV address these questions.

II. **Mortgage Lending in New Haven Before 1837**

This Part examines institutional mortgage lending in New Haven before 1837. Section A discusses bank lending activity and considers where pre-1837 bank lending should be categorized within the capital hierarchy. In particular, it asks whether bank lending before 1837 fits with the “insider lending” model of New England banking in the nineteenth century. Section B focuses on mortgage lending by the State of Connecticut before 1837. Although Temin’s hierarchy of capital only considers private sources of capital, Section B attempts to characterize the State’s lending as Row 2 or Row 3 based on how it located borrowers. Overall, both bank lenders and the State before 1837 are more appropriately categorized as Row 2 lenders because they relied on pre-existing social networks to allocate capital.

A. **Bank Lending Before 1837**

One difficulty with casting the shift in 1837 as a progression from Row 2 informal external lending to Row 3 financial intermediary lending is that financial intermediaries were active in the New Haven mortgage market prior to 1837. Early institutional lending complicates the claim that the increased participation by institutional lenders in the late 1830s should be seen as a straightforward step up the capital hierarchy. In particular, it suggests that the shift in 1837 was
more of an acceleration of existing Row 3 activity instead of a discrete transition from Row 2 to Row 3.

However, categorizing early bank mortgages in New Haven as Row 3 activity would be an oversimplification, one that points out imprecisions in the traditional capital hierarchy model. The capital hierarchy model delineates different sources of capital on the theory that each source will pool and lend capital in different ways. For instance, as explained above, how lenders acquire and use information about borrowers is a key distinction between Row 2 and Row 3 activities.\textsuperscript{33} The model, as stated by Temin and in Table 1, assumes that financial intermediaries in Row 3 will gather and use information in different ways than private individuals acting as informal external sources of capital in Row 2. But this assumption can break down if financial intermediaries behave in the same way as informal, individual lenders. When banks rely on the same pre-existing social and kinship networks to pool capital and make loans, their loans are more appropriately categorized under Row 2.

In early nineteenth century New England, the prevailing pattern was, in fact, for banks to operate within pre-existing social and kinship networks instead of serving as genuine financial intermediaries that solved information problems using Row 3 methods.\textsuperscript{34} Naomi Lamoreaux has dubbed this phenomenon “insider lending” and has documented its dominance throughout New England in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{35} New England banks were often controlled by socioeconomically privileged families which would use the corporate form to accumulate capital and then direct funds to their own economic projects, making themselves the primary borrowers

\textsuperscript{33} See note 21 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{34} See Bodenhorn, supra note 10, at 91 (“Records from the period show that many, if not most, banks loaned predominantly to insiders.”); Lamoreaux, supra note 12; Temin, supra note 18 at 711.
of their banks’ money. Lamoreaux argues that these insider banks were nonetheless “engines of economic development”\(^{36}\) for the region and thrived in part because they used social and kinship networks to gather information on borrowers and to disseminate information to investors:

[I]t is important to realize that loans to outsiders might [have led] to heavy losses, because it was difficult during this period to obtain accurate information about the creditworthiness of strangers. Indeed, given the generally poor quality of information, the monitoring of insiders by insiders may actually have been less risky than extending credit to outsiders.

. . .

[Insider lending also gave investors important information about the contents of banks’ portfolios, thus solving [a] problem of asymmetric information . . . . Purchasers of bank stock knew that they were investing in the diversified enterprises of the particular group that controlled the bank, not in some anonymously diversified portfolio.\(^{37}\)

Within this system, the crucial source of information for borrowers and investors was not the institutional status and expertise of the financial intermediary, as the capital hierarchy model imagines in Row 3 lending activities. Instead, the pre-existing social network behind the bank provided the relevant information, as with informal external sources of capital in Row 2. This is not just a fine theoretical distinction: modern economic arrangements require financial systems with the expertise to efficiently evaluate and conduct business with strangers.\(^{38}\) If financial intermediaries are simply proxies for pre-existing social networks, they will be unable to sustain modern economic growth.

So what of New Haven’s banks before 1837? Were they insider lenders, more appropriately placed at Row 2 of the capital hierarchy instead of Row 3? Despite Lamoreaux’s extensive research on insider lending, Connecticut banks do not make an appearance in her work.

\(^{36}\) Lamoreaux, supra note 12, ch. 3.
\(^{37}\) Id. at 79.
Bodenhorn mentions some New Haven banks but also does not focus on Connecticut.\(^{39}\)

Examining New Haven’s early nineteenth century mortgage market, then, allows for a chance to test the prevailing account of New England’s early banking system. The following Subsections consider the banks that made mortgage loans in the city prior to 1837.\(^{40}\) The overwhelming majority of these loans, about 87\%, came from the New Haven Bank, and its origins and practices receive the most scrutiny. But other bank mortgagees are also discussed in Subsection I.B.2. Overall, New Haven’s pre-1837 bank mortgage market fits with the insider lending account of New England banking during this era: mortgage loans were made by institutions controlled by the city’s socioeconomic and business elite and for members of this same group.

1. **The New Haven Bank**

   The New Haven Bank, New Haven’s oldest bank and the twelfth oldest bank in the United States,\(^{41}\) was born at the home of Thomas Atwater, a scion of one of New Haven’s most historically prominent families.\(^{42}\) New Haven residents gathered at a meeting there on February 16\(^{th}\), 1792, to draft a petition to the Connecticut General Assembly to charter a bank in New Haven.\(^{43}\) The petition was approved later that year.\(^{44}\)

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\(^{39}\) Bodenhorn, supra note 10, at 72, 86.

\(^{40}\) The city’s ill-fated first mutual savings bank, the Savings Bank of New Haven, made two mortgage loans during this period. Because of the later success of the New Haven Savings Bank, the city’s second mutual savings bank, these two mortgages and the short and unhappy life of the Savings Bank of New Haven are discussed in Section III.B instead of here.

\(^{41}\) Sylla, supra note 15, at 78 tbl.3.2.


\(^{43}\) Id. At the time, the legislature had to pass a specific act to create a banking corporation. In practice, however, this was not much of a barrier. New England had a de facto “free banking” system by the early nineteenth century—meaning that state legislatures generally granted charters to just about anyone who petitioned for one. See Wallis, Answering Mary Shirley’s Question, supra note 10, at 111.

\(^{44}\) See Hasse, supra note 42, at 6.
The New Haven Bank accumulated capital through sale of stock, which its Act of Incorporation set at two hundred dollars per share.\textsuperscript{45} The Act of Incorporation also established that the Bank would be led by a nine-person Board of Directors, voted into office by its shareholders.\textsuperscript{46} The Bank’s Directors not only controlled the Bank but also likely served as major sources of capital for it. Its Boards during the early nineteenth century were made up of the city’s social and business leaders: the annual results of its internal elections read like a who’s who list of New Haven’s patrician elite.\textsuperscript{47} Moreover, despite a provision in its Act of Incorporation requiring that “[n]ot more than three fourths of the directors in office, shall be eligible as directors the next succeeding year,”\textsuperscript{48} the Board’s membership was quite stable across the early nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{49} Many of the Bank’s Directors shared the same last name.\textsuperscript{50}

It is unsurprising that the oldest bank in New Haven would be helmed by the city’s elite—the composition of its borrowers is the real test of insider lending.\textsuperscript{51} Outright kinship bonds appear to have existed between the Bank’s Directors and its mortgagees in 28\% of its mortgage loans before 1837.\textsuperscript{52} While this is on the low end of Lamoreaux’s examples, it still represents a significant portion of the Bank’s mortgage portfolio.\textsuperscript{53} Other details suggest that,


\textsuperscript{46} Id. at 69-70. Each Director had to be a shareholder of the Bank as well.

\textsuperscript{47} See Record Books of the New Haven Bank (on file at the New Haven Museum).

\textsuperscript{48} SWIFT, supra note 45 at 70.

\textsuperscript{49} Record Books, supra note 47. Caleb Brintwall, for instance, left the Board in 1838, only to return in 1840.

\textsuperscript{50} Id. For instance, Stephen Huggins was a Director in 1822; Henry Huggins was a Director in 1836.

\textsuperscript{51} While the Bank conducted substantial non-mortgage activities, the present analysis is confined to its mortgage lending.

\textsuperscript{52} I calculated this number by comparing the last names of pre-1837 mortgagees with the last names of Directors for this period. 11 out of the Bank’s 39 mortgages between 1800 and 1837 went to individuals who shared a surname with a past or future Director. This estimate may be conservative because loans to businesses were coded as non-kinship loans, although kinship ties may have existed between business leaders or firms may have had interlocking Boards.

\textsuperscript{53} While Lamoreaux reports examples in this neighborhood, she also finds instances of extremely high rates of insider lending. See LAMOREAUX, supra note 10, at 15-17, 16 n.13. However, in some of the highest cases she
even when Directors were not related by blood to the Bank’s mortgagees, its borrowers were
drawn from a wealthy, sophisticated segment of New Haven society. First, the loans were
relatively large, averaging $2,358 dollars, a large sum of money at the time.54 Because borrowers
had to put up sufficient real estate to secure these large loans, most likely only members with
considerable wealth and social status received them. Few residents of New Haven had “new
brick dwelling houses” like the ones mortgaged by Ira Atwater and Addin Lewis in 1826 and
1827.55 Second, the terms and structure of many of the loans were sophisticated, in that they
varied loan-to-loan and could grow quite complex. For instance, the Bank made a bundle of
loans worth $3,400 to Russell Hotchkiss and Walter Buddington in 1817, but secured them with
a single piece of real estate.56 In addition, in contrast to many post-1837 institutional mortgages,
the terms of the Bank’s mortgages were not standardized, suggesting that they resulted from
specific negotiations between the Bank and savvy customers.57 In 1821, for example, the New

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found, banks were controlled by specific families. For instance, up to 84% of one Rhode Island’s banks loans were
to “three interrelated families that controlled the bank.” Id. at 16. The New Haven Bank does not seem to be so
firmly under the control of a single kinship group.

54 Database of Institutional Mortgages 1800-1844 (on file with author).
55 Mortgage Deed at Vol. 74, p. 444 (Aug 28, 1827); Mortgage Deed at Vol. 74, p. 268 (Sept. 14, 1826); Mortgage
Deed at Vol. 74, p. 276 (Oct. 4, 1826).
56 Mortgage Deed at Vol. 66, p. 91 of Land Records (Sept. 30, 1817).
57 By current standards, most of the mortgages in New Haven in the early nineteenth century were very short-term,
many coming due in a matter of months. This is consistent with American antebellum banking more broadly. See
BODENHORN, supra note 10, at 55 tbl. 3.1. However, renewals appear to have been common practice during this
period as well, although there was substantially more regional variation in this respect. Id. at 56. Renewal rates in
New Haven are unclear as few of the promissory notes associated with the mortgage deeds survive. However, a
promissory note issued by the New Haven Savings Bank in 1843 that includes the actual repayment schedule of the
loan suggests that banks were comfortable with renewals and that the short terms of some loans were not as harsh as
they appeared: the borrower of the surviving note did not begin to make principal payments until 1851, despite the
note being “payable on demand, for value received.” See Promissory Note between New Haven Savings Bank and
unknown individual, October 6th, 1843, New Haven Historical Society, Manuscript File # 76, Box 4, Folder A.
Moreover, analysis of releases for some of the mortgages in this paper’s database suggest that many loans were not
repaid on time or were renewed. This analysis is inconclusive, however, because the Land Records do not contain an
associated release for every mortgage deed. It should also be noted that interest rates were largely set by usury laws
during this period. The mortgage deeds do not contain interest rates for their associated loans, but, most likely, all of
the loans were close to the legal limit of 6%. For an extended discussion of the effects of usury laws and interest
rates in antebellum capital markets, including New England, see BODENHORN, supra note 11, ch. 4.
Haven Bank made four mortgages, none of which became payable on the same schedule.\textsuperscript{58} Finally, several of the Bank’s loans were used to finance manufacturing activities, such as two mortgage loans totaling $7,000 to the New Haven Fontine Company in 1827 and 1828.\textsuperscript{59} Manufacturing was not yet well-established in New Haven at the time and, while there were certainly failed manufacturing ventures, participation in early industry as an entrepreneur suggested above-average financial resources and social capital. In sum, then, the mortgage activities of the New Haven Bank and, by extension, most of the mortgage lending made in the town prior to 1837 were not accessible to individuals outside of the city’s socioeconomic elite. Although only 28\% of the mortgage loans were prototypical examples of insider lending—loans where some kinship relationship existed between the borrower and the bank Board—other attributes of the loans place them within insider networks.

2. Other Bank Lenders

Few banks besides the New Haven Bank were active in the mortgage market before 1837. However, loans made by these other banks appear to be even more embedded in pre-existing social and economic arrangements. The only years with significant mortgage lending activity by other banks were 1812 and 1829.\textsuperscript{60} In 1812, the Bank of Bridgeport made a $15,000 loan to Elisha Atwater, Ward Atwater, and Henry Daggett: the purpose of this loan is unclear, but its size and the involvement of the Bank of Bridgeport were anomalous.\textsuperscript{61} The Atwaters and Daggetts were socially prominent families within the New Haven community, and both were

\textsuperscript{58} See Mortgage Deed at Vol. 69, p. 116 of Land Records (Feb. 21, 1821); Mortgage Deed at Vol. 70, p. 218 of Land Records (Dec. 11, 1821); Mortgage Deed at Vol. 70, p. 317 of Land Records (Dec. 11, 1821); Mortgage Deed at Vol. 70, p. 322 of Land Records (Dec. 27, 1821).
\textsuperscript{59} Mortgage Deed at Vol. 75, p. 103 of Land Records (Nov. 23, 1827); Mortgage Deed at Vol. 75, p. 171 of Land Records (July 18, 1828).
\textsuperscript{60} See Figure 4 \textit{supra}. Again, the two much smaller mortgages made by the Savings Banks of New Haven are not discussed here but are considered \textit{infra} at Section II.A.
\textsuperscript{61} Mortgage Deed at Vol. 60, p. 485 of the Land Records (Dec. 8, 1812).
represented on the Board of the New Haven Bank.\(^6^2\) In 1829, the Mechanics Bank of New Haven, which had been chartered in 1824 to finance the Farmington Canal, technically made a $26,328 mortgage loan to the Farmington Canal Company.\(^6^3\) The Company mortgaged basically the entire canal and threw in a wharf for good measure.\(^6^4\) The Mechanics Bank would eventually place $200,000 of its roughly $500,000 capital stock in ownership of the Farmington Canal Company; after the Canal failed, the bank had to write down this investment, a huge loss.\(^6^5\) Because of the Bank’s significant ownership interest in the Canal, the Canal’s fraught history, and the significant assets transferred in the 1829 mortgage deed, it is not clear exactly how to interpret the canal mortgage—it was likely part of a larger, complex financing arrangement between the Mechanics Bank and the Farmington Canal Company. Regardless of the details of any such arrangement, it seems safe to cast the loans made by the Mechanics Bank and the Bank of Bridgeport as complicated, commercial mortgages that came out of pre-existing social and economic relationships.

Overall, this Section’s examination of mortgage lending by banks in New Haven before 1837 affirms the characterization of the later shift in the market as a step up the capital hierarchy, with the important caveat that banks can exist but nonetheless operate more like friends and family of borrowers than as impersonal financial intermediaries relying on expertise to interact with unknown economic actors. New Haven’s banks before 1837 were profoundly patrician and more representative of Row 2 of the capital hierarchy than Row 3. However, to fully judge the shift as a step up the hierarchy, it is necessary to establish that the loans after 1837 were not of the same patrician character. Part III undertakes this analysis. Before moving on to this question,

\(^{6^2}\) See Record Books supra note 47.
\(^{6^3}\) HASSE, supra note 42 at 21; Mortgage Deed at Vol. 77, p. 437 of the Land Records (Aug. 13, 1829).
\(^{6^4}\) Id.
\(^{6^5}\) HASSE, supra note 42 at 22-23.
however, an important and largely unexplored historical wrinkle in New Haven’s financial development must be addressed: Section B considers the role of the State of Connecticut as an important mortgage lender in New Haven before 1837

B. State Lending Before 1837

The most significant difficulty with applying the capital hierarchy framework to the development of New Haven’s early nineteenth century mortgage market is that a substantial volume of loans in the city were made by economic actors that do not appear in the hierarchy—state and local governments. In particular, before 1837, the State of Connecticut was the largest and most frequent mortgagee in the city after the New Haven Bank.66 Its method for pooling and disseminating capital, however, was starkly different from the other sources of capital given in Table 1. Although Sirri and Tufano briefly discuss economic pooling by governments, they do so primarily in the context of socialist and centrally planned economies,67 and Temin does not include pools of capital assembled by governments in the hierarchy of capital.68 However, it appears that government capital played a significant role in New Haven’s economic and financial development. Accordingly, this Section considers how the State pooled the capital used in its pre-1837 loans and how it solved information problems in choosing borrowers.

The classic method by which governments pool capital is taxation. However, taxation is fundamentally redistributive: it uses the coercive power of the state to reallocate wealth within society. This was not the State of Connecticut’s project in making mortgage loans in the early nineteenth century. Even if the political will had existed for such an arrangement, there was not a

66 See supra Figures 3, 4. Database, supra note 54. The Town of New Haven also technically made five loans during this period, but their average size was barely $100, and they are not discussed here.
67 See Sirri & Tufano, supra note 17 at 99.
68 Temin, supra note 18, at 705.
great deal of wealth to reallocate so early on in the state’s development. Instead, the State’s mortgage lending activities were one way it injected into Connecticut’s economy a large pool of capital it had assembled outside of it—not through taxation, but conquest. Explaining the State’s capital pooling methods requires a digression through deep American history and, briefly, back to the Old World.

In Connecticut’s original 1662 charter, King Charles II granted the colony

all that Part of Our Dominions in New-England in America, . . . on the South by the Sea; and in Longitude as the Line of the Massachusetts-Colony, running from East to West, That is to say, From the said Narraganset-Bay on the East, to the South Sea on the West Part . . .

The “South Sea” referred to the Pacific Ocean, although, even from a European’s perspective, Charles could only grant the land up to the Mississippi River. Thus, the earliest version of Connecticut stretched westward in a long strip through present-day New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Over time Connecticut’s claims to these lands conflicted with those of New Yorkers and “Pennamites,” residents of present-day Pennsylvania. At various points, disputes over the lands boiled over into armed conflict, although the “battles” of the Pennamite-Yankee War were far from spectacular. In 1782, a Court of Commissioners appointed by the Continental Congress sided with the Pennamites, awarding the Wyoming River Valley to Pennsylvania. Apparently in recompense, when Connecticut ceded its other western claims to

69 Charter of Connecticut (1662), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ct03.asp.  
the Continental government in 1785, it was allowed to keep 3.3 million acres of its originally chartered territory, the so-called “Connecticut Western Reserve.”\(^72\)

In 1795, the State sold the Connecticut Western Reserve for $1.2 million, a huge pool of capital at the time, to a group of speculators operating as the Connecticut Land Company.\(^73\)

However, at the time of sale, neither the State, the federal government, nor any settler held clear title to the Reserve. Native Americans remained in possession of most of the lands into the early nineteenth century. The Supreme Court would not definitively settle the issue of Native title to Western lands until its 1823 *Johnson v. M’Intosh* decision, which danced around the reality of European armed conquest before finally stating that “the exclusive right of extinguishing the title which occupancy gave to [Native Americans] . . . [has] been maintained and established as far west as the river Mississippi, by the sword.”\(^74\)

The Connecticut Land Company began to survey and divide the Western Reserve into townships in 1796, claiming that it paid the Native Americans for their land as it did so—apparently giving them less than the $1.2 million it had already paid Connecticut.\(^75\)

Native title may not have been legally extinguished until the Treaty of Fort Industry in 1805, which was the result of armed conflict.\(^76\)

From one perspective, then, Connecticut got the money for its nineteenth century mortgages in New Haven through theft, in that it sold someone else’s land and then allowed the buyers to violently drive the original owners from the premises.

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\(^{74}\) Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).

\(^{75}\) See Shephard, *supra* note 73, at 74.

However the (il)legal details of Connecticut’s land sale are described, the State appears to have made prudent decisions with the proceeds. It created the Connecticut School Fund, which made loans and investments, including mortgages in cities like New Haven. By statute, “the nett amount of interest received yearly on said fund, [was] to be distributed, for the benefit of the public or common schools.” The School Fund is significant not only because it was an unusual mechanism of public finance but also because of the State’s active participation in the capital markets. Essentially, to fund one of North America’s earliest public school systems, the State of Connecticut functioned as a relatively large bank. The Fund’s existence also underscores one of the most important facts of early American history: the States, although largely industrially undeveloped by the end of the seventeenth century, were nonetheless wealthy in one crucial respect—land.

In practice, the School Fund operated as one of the nation’s earliest administrative agencies. It was headed by a Commissioner, who took the oath prescribed in the State Constitution for executive officers and was among the State’s highest paid salaried officials.

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77 See Harriet Taylor Upton & Harry Gardner Cutler, History of the Western Reserve (1910).
78 See Swift, supra note 45 at Title 84, Chapter II, An Act relating to the School-Fund. Although the schools statute also provided for a general tax as a source of school financing, it stated that “whenever, in any year, the amount of interest arising from the school-fund, and to be divided to the school societies, shall exceed sixty-two thousand dollars, the amount of such excess shall, for said year, so far diminish the sum hereby appropriated, from the avails of the state tax.” Id. at Ch. I. Thus, the Fund was legally the primary source of funding for Connecticut’s first public schools. The size of the School Fund’s returns for this period are unclear, so the Fund’s interest may never have decreased the tax. However, it would have taken only slightly more than a five percent return on the Fund’s initial $1.2 million dollars to clear sixty-two thousand dollars in interest. Accordingly, the Fund may have been the primary source for school funding in practice as well as in theory.
79 Unlike other banks of the period, however, the School Fund did not issue currency. Connecticut’s Upper House voted down a proposal to charter a true Bank of the State of Connecticut in 1806. See Hasse supra note 42 at 9-10.
80 See William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth Century America (1996). Novak has claimed that the “first real administrative agencies in the United States” were state and local boards of health founded in Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. While the School Fund Commissioner could not promulgate regulations to the extent of these boards, the other administrative attributes of the office suggest it may also be a contender for this distinction.
81 See Swift, supra note 45 at Title 84, Chapter II, An Act relating to the School-Fund; See Swift, supra note 45 at Title 83, An Act for regulating Salaries and Fees. The Commissioner was paid $1,000 a year from the Fund. It
The Commissioner apparently had real discretion, and neither the General Assembly nor the governor seem to have given specific guidance on which loans and investments were to be made.82 The Commissioner was constrained by a web of bureaucratic requirements, including registration of all the Fund’s investments and regular reporting to the state treasurer and comptroller.83 He was also authorized to hire a subordinate.84 The administrative attributes of the School Fund suggest that it could have operated as a Row 3 financial intermediary, building out a lending portfolio through expertise and institutional competence.

Before 1837, however, this was not the case: the School Fund’s borrowers were of the same profile as the New Haven Bank’s. The available evidence for the School Fund’s mortgagors is not as conclusive as the New Haven Bank’s, but, along each of the aspects discussed in the context of the Bank’s lending, except one, the State’s borrowers appear just as patrician. While calculating a rate of kinship relationships between individual borrowers and the State of Connecticut would be incoherent, many of the State’s pre-1837 borrowers are identifiably elite. Among others, they included Seth Staples, a founder of Yale Law School; James Hillhouse, a United States Senator; and James Brewster, a leading business magnate.85 In addition, the average size of the Fund’s pre-1837 mortgages was $2,355 (compared to $2,358 for the New Haven Bank’s), suggesting that borrowers had considerable wealth. While the record does not provide clear visibility on the purpose of these loans, several of them appear to have been related to business activities. For instance, John Calhoun mortgaged his factory lands in

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82 See SWIFT, supra note 45 at Title 84, Chapter II, An Act relating to the School-Fund.
83 Id.
84 Id.
The only dimension along which the Fund’s pre-1837 mortgages do not align with the Bank’s is the variety and sophistication of their terms. The Fund’s mortgages were standardized; all of them contained essentially identical voiding clauses. These voiding clauses provided that interest would be paid annually on September 2nd and that every mortgage became payable on the September 2nd after it was made. These standardized components coincide with the reporting requirements of the Fund’s Commissioner under state statute: the Commissioner was required to deposit duplicate copies of accounting materials for the Fund in a vault in Hartford on September 2nd every year. The bureaucratic origins of the loans, then, appear to have affected their terms. In addition, all of the voiding clauses set out “penal sums” for which the borrower would be liable if his loan was not satisfactorily repaid. These penal sums were generally twice the principal of the mortgage. There is little evidence that these harsh terms were enforced to their legal extent. One likely explanation for their inclusion is that the State, or more accurately the Fund’s Commissioner, wanted to secure the maximum possible legal protections when loaning out public money. Given their origins, the standardized terms of the Fund’s mortgages are not inconsistent with the patrician borrower profile established by the loans’ other attributes. Overall, then, the School Fund appears to have located borrowers using the same pre-existing social and economic networks as the New Haven Bank. Despite being a public institution, the Fund loaned to the socioeconomic elite.

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86 Mortgage Deed at Vol. 85, p. 145 of Land Records (May 30, 1834). It is not clear if this John Calhoun was related to (or even, in fact, was) John C. Calhoun, the Vice President and United States Senator. A graduate of Yale College, John C. Calhoun had many connections to New Haven, so this is a reasonable possibility.
87 The Fund’s mortgages were, accordingly, short-term. See supra note 57 for an explanation of the short terms of antebellum loans.
88 See SWIFT, supra note 45 at Title 84, Chapter II, An Act relating to the School-Fund.
89 See, e.g., Mortgage Deed at Vol. 89, p. 54 of Land Records (Nov. 25, 1835).
90 See supra note 57.
In sum, this Part concludes that New Haven’s mortgage market before 1837 was characterized by large, often sophisticated loans to New Haven citizens with significant wealth and social status. To the extent that the lenders can be categorized within the capital hierarchy, they operated on Row 2, relying on insider networks to locate and evaluate borrowers. Even when the relevant capital pool cannot be placed inside the traditional capital hierarchy because the State assembled it, the funds flowed along the same channels. The next Part asks if this patrician mortgage market lasted and finds that it did not: bank mortgages soon became accessible to a wide range of non-elite New Haven residents.

III. Mortgage Lending in New Haven During and After 1837

This Part examines the New Haven mortgage market after 1837. It finds a profoundly different landscape from the pre-1837 market considered in Part I. In particular, after 1837, the most active bank, the New Haven Savings Bank, made loans to a broad population of residents and does not appear to have relied on pre-existing networks of wealth and social status to allocate its capital. However, the New Haven Savings Bank was not the first institution to lend outside of New Haven’s elite. In 1837, the year before the Savings Bank was chartered, the Town Deposit Fund, a local, public institution, made a significant volume of loans to a wide range of people. Section A documents the Town’s lending activities and the mortgage market in 1837. Section B focuses on the New Haven Savings Bank and how it continued the 1837 shift into the 1840s and beyond. Based on the greater accessibility of the market and the interactions of later institutions with borrowers, the shift at 1837 can be characterized as a progression up the capital hierarchy from Row 2 to Row 3 and thus an important step in New Haven’s financial development.
A. Mortgage Lending in New Haven in 1837: The Town Deposit Fund

1837 was a big year in the New Haven mortgage market. Private banks made $37,100 in mortgage loans. These loans were typical of pre-1837 private bank mortgages: there were only six of them, and their average size was $6,183. However, in the same year, another institution made five times as many loans as any private lender had previously made in a single year. This lender was not a bank, but the Town of New Haven itself. Because the Town abruptly made such a large volume of loans, this Section considers its funding sources and lending activities in detail.

Like the State of Connecticut, the Town of New Haven cannot be located on the traditional capital hierarchy because it is a public institution. Also like the State, the Town did not use taxation to accumulate its capital but instead acquired a windfall through the sale of Western lands. However, the Town’s windfall, and the seizure of Native American lands that lay behind it, was filtered through several more layers of politics and history than the State’s. After the Eastern states ceded their Western holdings to the federal government, it began a long process of selling them to settlers and speculators. By 1836, the government had accumulated a substantial surplus through these sales. The question of what to do with the surplus generated significant political controversy, until Congress decided to divide it up and distribute it to the states.

In an early commitment to state-local federalism, Connecticut continued to divide and distribute the surplus funds downwards—into the hands of Connecticut towns. In 1836, it passed a statute creating “Town Deposit Funds” in each Connecticut town that wished to receive part of

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91 See Figures 3 and 4 supra.
93 See id. at ch. 3; An Act to regulate the deposits of the public money, 5 Stat. 52 (1836). The statute required that the money eventually be paid back.
the surplus.\footnote{SWIFT, \textit{supra} note 45, An Act Relating to Moneys Received from the Government of the United States, Connecticut Statutes, Title XXXVI, Chapter II, § 7. Connecticut also required that the funds eventually be paid back and attached various conditions to their disbursal.} These Funds were to make loans and investments, and the profits they earned were to go, in part, towards funding local school systems.\footnote{Id. § 17. In an abundance of caution, § 18 of the Act authorizes the town’s to use any portion greater than half for schools.} Essentially, when faced with another windfall from the sale of western lands, Connecticut created a set of miniature School Funds, each in its own municipality. Like the School Fund, the Town Deposit Funds were examples of active participation by early American government in the capital markets. This time, however, all levels of government, including federal and local, were involved: almost a century before the formation of Fannie Mae, the federal government’s money was already shaping the mortgage market in New Haven.\footnote{See Steagall National Housing Act of 1938, 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (1938).}

The statute creating the Town Deposit Funds also required towns to establish small administrative agencies to manage them: “[a]n agent or agents, appointed by each town at an annual town meeting, or at a special town meeting warned for that purpose, shall from time to time be the manager or managers of the fund belonging to their respective towns, and shall at their discretion make loans therefrom.”\footnote{Id. § 13.} In practice, then, the State actually devolved the surplus funds two levels down, skipping over mayors and existing local government structures to give authority over the money directly to townspeople in public meetings. While the Town Deposit Funds did not have the bureaucratic heft of the Connecticut School Fund, they did have two hallmarks of modern administrative agencies: discretion authorized by statute and additional legitimacy arising from direct public input.
New Haven’s Town Deposit Fund began making mortgages early in 1837. Its loans, however, did not look like the pre-1837 bank or State mortgages. First, there were a lot of them: thirty-five in 1837 alone, almost as many as the New Haven Bank had made between 1800 and 1837 in total. Second, they were small, averaging $814 (compared to $2,358 for the New Haven Bank and $2,355 for the State of Connecticut before 1837). None of the Town’s mortgages exceeded $1,000. Third, they were standardized, in part because the statute creating the Town Deposit Funds regulated the mortgages they could make. Every Town mortgage contained an essentially identical voiding clause, making the loan payable on the upcoming September 28th and requiring annual interest payments on September 28th, days before the October 1st date required by statute. However, the Town does not appear to have taken full advantage of these terms. I located release documents for nineteen of the Town mortgages; the average period between issuance of the loan and recorded release of obligations was seventy-nine months. Finally, and most importantly, many of the borrowers from the Town Deposit Fund were identifiably not patrician. Determining the social status of the mortgagors is difficult, but New Haven began publishing a city-wide Directory in 1840. Many of the Town’s initial thirty-five borrowers are listed there, although not all. Appendix A provides the Directory information for

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99 SWIFT, supra note 45, An Act Relating to Moneys Received from the Government of the United States, Connecticut Statutes, Title XXXVI, Chapter II, § 13. The statute also required that each loan be secured by real estate worth twice the value of the loan.
100 See Database, supra note 54. See generally supra note 57 (providing background on terms and renewal rates in antebellum lending markets). To locate the release documents, I searched later archive indexes for deeds listing the Town of New Haven as grantor and, by comparing names of grantees, amounts of mortgages, or dates, was able to match release documents (usually quitclaim deeds) to original mortgages. These data suggest that the Town did not always enforce the legal terms of its mortgages to the fullest extent and, indeed, was quite lenient with renewals and repayments schedules. However, this conclusion is tentative. It is possible that quitclaim deeds for some of the mortgages were recorded much later than when an associated loan was repaid: mortgagors may have needed to demonstrate clear title for a later sale and requested that the bank record release documentation. This would explain why release documents were recorded for only some mortgages. Promissory notes would provide better evidence of repayment practices. However, very few promissory notes from the period survive.
101 See CITY DIRECTORY OF NEW HAVEN (1840) (available at the New Haven Museum).
each borrower in full. The list includes several joiners (carpenters), a blacksmith, a shoemaker, and other middle-class occupations. The list is not universally middle-class: a few manufacturers, a state senator, and a sheriff appear. But the leading social and business lights of New Haven are not present. The Town’s loans went to a more diverse crowd with less wealth and lower social standing.

It is not clear why the Town Deposit loans went to this group of people. Several different economic explanations are possible. First, because the private banks were also active in 1837, there may not have been patrician demand for loans from the Fund. However, the first private bank mortgage that year was not made until April 22, 1837, by which point the Town had already made twenty mortgages. Second, 1837 was a tough year economically: the Panic of 1837 began in the spring and plunged the nation into a severe depression. The Town Deposit Fund may have been providing some financial relief to New Haven townspeople. Buried within this second economic explanation, though, is a political one: the idea that the Fund would help out average townspeople implies that they had some way to translate their economic hardships into action by the Fund. The statute that created the Fund supplied such a mechanism: the people of New Haven controlled the Fund through an agent they appointed at a town meeting. Regardless of the wider economic circumstances, then, the best account of why the Fund began lending to ordinary folks may be simply that state law put them in charge of the money.

In any case, the mortgage lending activities of the Town Deposit Fund did not last long. After 1837, the Town made only seven more mortgages, although they were typical of the 1837 loans in their size, terms, and the identities of the borrowers. The withdrawal of the Town from

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102 Mortgage Deed at Vol. 92, p. 495 of Land Records (April 11, 1837).
the market is not mysterious: the surplus funds were limited and, under the Connecticut and federal statutes, eventually had to be repaid. However, although the particular lending activities of the Town did not continue, the practice of making small, standardized loans to a socioeconomically diverse range of residents in New Haven did. A private bank founded in 1838 would carry these practices forward, into the 1840s and beyond. The following Section examines the rise of this institution, the New Haven Savings Bank, in detail.

B. Mortgage Lending After 1837: The Rise of the New Haven Savings Bank

Institutional mortgage lending after 1837 is primarily a story of the New Haven Savings Bank. In every year after it was founded in 1838, until at least 1845, it made a greater number of mortgage loans and lent more in total than all other private banks in New Haven combined. Indeed, the other banks largely abandoned the mortgage market after 1837, making only five more loans through the end of 1844. In that time, the New Haven Savings Bank made one hundred and sixty-nine mortgages, rapidly establishing itself as a force in the New Haven mortgage market. This Section explores the origins and practices of the New Haven Savings Bank and concludes that it was the city’s first genuine Row 3 financial intermediary, one that primarily relied on expertise and institutional competence instead of pre-existing social and economic networks to pool and allocate capital.

Unlike most other private institutional mortgage lenders in New Haven, the New Haven Savings Bank was a mutual savings bank rather than a full-service bank. In practice, this boils down to two key differences. First, the New Haven Savings Bank did not issue currency like other banks of the period. A national currency would not emerge until the 1860s, and a key
function of banks in the early nineteenth century was to provide paper money. The fact that there were no New Haven Savings Bank banknotes in circulation does not have many consequences for its participation in the mortgage market. The second and more important difference is that the New Haven Savings Bank pooled capital through deposits instead of primarily sales of bank stock. This meant that it pooled capital from a much broader and socioeconomically diverse set of private wealth holders than other banks. Recall that, under its Act of Incorporation, a share of New Haven Bank stock cost $200, more than many of the individual mortgages issued by the New Haven Savings Bank. In contrast, the New Haven Savings Bank took any deposit of one dollar or greater. Indeed, the Savings Bank’s cheerful yellow passbooks from the period, where account holders recorded deposits and dividend payments, were explicitly targeted at upwardly mobile depositors who had dreams of acquiring wealth but were not there yet. Adorned with a large image of a beehive, a symbol of industry, the passbooks contained a Remarks section explaining that

[t]he New Haven Savings Bank has been established for the purpose of affording a secure investment for persons who have not the facilities of safely putting their income otherwise to use. . . . By the habit of saving in small matters, riches are frequently acquired. . . . Many instances are known of persons beginning the world without anything, who have become rich by their own industry and frugality.

. . .

The Savings Bank will be particularly useful to . . . persons who come in possession of money received by way of wages, gifts, or gratuities . . . .

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104 See An Act to provide a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and to provide for the circulation and redemption thereof, 12 U.S.C. § 38 (1864).
106 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
107 New Haven Savings Bank Passbook, on file at New Haven Historical Society, Manuscript File #76, Box 1, Folder K (Insider Cover included in Appendix B).
108 Id.
Materials like the Savings Bank’s passbooks are quintessential attributes of Row 3 financial intermediaries. The Savings Bank did not accumulate capital through existing social and kinship networks, bundling together the wealth of high-status individuals who already knew each other. Instead, the Savings Bank targeted essentially anonymous people and convinced them to part with their money by advertising its institutional competence and expertise. These Row 3 strategies appear to have been effective. Founded in May 1838, the Bank had collected $6,559.11 in deposits by October 1838.\footnote{Id.; See Letter from William Hooker to Henry Kilbourn, Oct. 9, 1836, on file at the New Haven Historical Society, Manuscript File # 76, Box 1, Folder K.} By 1840, less than two years into its existence, the Savings Bank had 600 depositors in a town of around 14,000 people.\footnote{See HASSE, supra note 42, at 30.}

It would be tempting to settle on the deposit structure of the Savings Bank as the reason it made loans to a more socioeconomically diverse set of borrowers. From this perspective, the whole shift in New Haven’s mortgage market could be reduced to an innovation in capital pooling that subsequently opened the institutional lending market to a new class of mortgagors. However, there is a glaring counterexample to this theory. The New Haven Savings Bank was not actually the first primarily deposit-taking, mutual savings bank in New Haven: the earlier and confusingly similarly named Savings Bank of New Haven (SBNH) was chartered in 1820. The SBNH pooled capital and functioned more or less identically to the later New Haven Savings Bank—all the way down to the colorful passbooks, although the SBNH’s were pink and had a reassuring quote from Benjamin Franklin on their cover instead of a beehive.\footnote{Compare Passbook, supra note 107 with Savings Bank of New Haven, Passbook No. 240, belonging to Sally Gillet, Inside Front Cover, New Haven Museum, Manuscript File #76 Box 1, Folder L. The front cover of an SBNH passbook is included at Appendix B.} The SBNH was also successful at attracting depositors. Hasse quotes from the minutes of the SBNH’s first annual meeting that “255 persons in 10 months have made 401 deposits in the amount of $23,
By the mid-1820s, the SBNH had over one thousand depositors. Although it accumulated capital from a socially diverse range of individuals in New Haven, the SBNH did not lend to a wide range of them. Indeed, it made only two mortgages during its existence. Most of the SBNH’s capital went into the Eagle Bank, New Haven’s second bank, founded in 1811. The Eagle Bank appears to have been fully of the patrician mold of the New Haven Bank, although much less successful. It failed in 1825, “giving New Haven its first real financial panic” and dragging the SBNH down with it. The SBNH managed to pay back its depositors, with modest interest, by 1832, but it also officially shut its doors in 1825. The unhappy details of New Haven’s first bank crisis are largely beside the point here. The lesson of the SBNH is that accumulating deposits from a wide range of individuals did not imply that a bank would lend to them or that it would be beyond the control of the financial elite.

The later New Haven Savings Bank was no exception to this latter point. Although it accepted deposits from a socioeconomically diverse set of people, it remained firmly under the

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112 Hasse, supra note 42, at 17 (quoting minutes of SBNH meeting).
113 Savings Bank of New Haven, Passbook No. 1010, New Haven Museum, Manuscript File #76, Box 1, Folder L.
114 See Mortgage Deed at Vol. 76, p. 136 of Land Records (Jan. 29, 1828); Mortgage Deed at Vol. 78, p. 229 of Land Records (Nov. 16, 1830).
115 See Hasse, supra note 42, at 10, 16-17. The two institutions shared Presidents. For more background, see generally the facts of Savings Bank of New Haven v. Davis, 8 Conn. 191 (Conn. 1830); Homer v. Savings Bank of New Haven, 7 Conn. 478 (Conn. 1829); Savings Bank of New Haven v. Bates, 8 Conn. 505 (Conn. 1831); and Catlin v. Savings Bank of New Haven, 7 Conn. 487 (Conn. 1829). All of these cases concerned the affairs of the Eagle Bank, but the NHSB was the captioned party in them.
116 Its President was elected Mayor in 1822, in the middle of an era where patrician professionals controlled the office. See Robert Dahl, Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City tbl.2.1 (1961). In addition, an accounting of the Eagle Bank’s holdings on its demise shows that it operated as a typical bank during the period. See Report of Investigators of Eagle Bank (Oct. 25, 1825) (on file at the New Haven Museum, Manuscript File #76, Box 1, Folder C).
117 See Hasse, supra note 42, at 13, 17.
118 Id. Hasse reports that depositors received $1.11 for every dollar deposited by the end of 1832. My own calculations based on the passbooks on file at the New Haven museum put the number closer to $1.20.
control of New Haven’s elite. As of 1840, it had a President, 4 Vice Presidents, and 9 trustees. Of these 14 men, half either served on the Board of the New Haven Bank or shared a last name with someone who did. Of the remaining 7, 4 had borrowed money from the New Haven Bank at some point before 1837, including James Brewster, one of New Haven’s earliest industrial magnates. The final 3 included Ralph Ingersoll, a United States Congressman, and Roger Sherman, an apparently direct descendant of the more famous Roger Sherman, a Founding Father and New Haven’s first mayor. The only Trustee that did not have easily identifiable patrician bona fides is Henry White. But given his compatriots among the Savings Bank’s management, it is doubtful he was a “person who [began] the world without anything.” In addition, the New Haven Savings Bank was housed for many years “in a room in the rear of the New Haven Bank building,” which, in 1839 at least, it was allowed to use rent-free. For a time, the Board of the Savings Bank conducted meetings in the New Haven Bank’s boardroom. Although its capital may have come from outside elite circles, the New Haven Savings Bank was still managed by the city’s patrician leaders.

But the New Haven Savings Bank did differ from its predecessors in the volume and socioeconomic composition of its borrowers. Unlike earlier private banks in New Haven and even the SBNH, the New Haven Savings Bank lent to a broad population of residents. Moreover, its lending practices indicate that it relied on expertise and institutional competence to locate and evaluate borrowers, operating as a genuine Row 3 financial intermediary. First, the sheer volume of mortgages originated by the Savings Bank would have strained reliance on pre-existing social and economic networks in New Haven. In 1844 alone, the Savings Bank made sixty mortgages,
an order of magnitude more than any other private bank in a single year. The upward trend in the volume of the Bank’s mortgages appears to have continued and accelerated in later years. In 1847, a few years outside the window of this’s paper’s datasets, the Land Records began to accept printed form pages specifically for mortgages originated by the Savings Bank, ostensibly because their volume was so large.124 Second, in keeping with developments like printed forms and unlike other bank lenders, the Savings Bank’s mortgages were standardized, including essentially identical voiding clauses setting semiannual interest payments and making mortgages “payable on demand for value received.”125 Unlike the Town and the State, the Savings Bank was not constrained by statutory demands in standardizing the terms of its loans. Accordingly, the consistency of the voiding clause language across a large volume of mortgages suggests that the Bank sold a standardized product, perhaps familiar to its customers over time, and did not engage in extensive bargaining with sophisticated mortgagees. Third, the Savings Bank’s mortgages were small, $1,100 on average—less than half the size of those made by earlier banks.

124 See Volume 124 in the Land Records; see, e.g., Mortgage Deed at Vol. 124, p. 1 of Land Records (Oct. 15, 1847) (included in Appendix B). These printed forms were used at least until 1891. See Marshall, supra note 28, at Appendix A.
125 See, e.g., Mortgage Deed at Vol. 105, p. 69 of Land Records (Oct. 4, 1841). Some of the Bank’s early loans in 1838 deviated from this language, and there are exceptions in the record even in later years. For the most part, though, the language of the Savings Bank’s mortgage deeds remained constant. The payability-on-demand term is puzzling. Taken at face value, it would give the Savings Bank the power to demand repayment of a loan at any time. Even given the short-term nature of many of the loans from this period, such a provision would be extreme. See supra note 57. In practice, it appears that loans were paid back over a period of years. Using the archives’ indexes, I searched for deeds where the Bank was listed as a grantee. I located thirty-one release documents, generally quitclaim deeds, recorded before 1844 explicitly releasing mortgagors from obligations to the Bank and renouncing Bank claims to mortgaged land. As with the release documents for the Town mortgages, I matched these releases with earlier Bank mortgages using the name of the grantee, the date of the original mortgage (if given in the release), or the volume and page number of the original mortgage (in some cases this was included in the release document). The average length of time between the initial mortgage deed and the associated release was 26 months, implying that, in many cases, the Bank did not demand repayment of loans as early as it might have. However, release documents may not be valid indications of when loans were repaid. See supra note 100 for a fuller discussion of these issues. It is also possible that the language “payable on demand for value received” incorporated more lenient repayment terms contained in the promissory note associated with each mortgage. However, a surviving promissory note from this period contains no such extra terms and instead repeats the same provision: “On demand, for value received, I promise to pay the New Haven Savings Bank, at the office of said Bank, in the city of New Haven, the sum of Two Thousand Dollars, with the interest payable semiannually.” Promissory Note, supra note 57 (noting, on the reverse side, that principal repayments did not begin for eight years). The legal and economic significance of the payability-on-demand terms is discussed in greater depth infra at Section IV.B.
The smaller size of the mortgages suggest that they were made to less wealthy borrowers, who were less likely to be plugged in to patrician social networks. Finally, many of the Savings Bank’s borrowers were identifiably not members of New Haven’s elite, based on their occupations as given in the annual city directories. Because so many mortgagors are unlisted in the directories, they do not provide a complete picture of the socioeconomic composition of the Savings Bank’s borrowers. However, they do confirm that the borrowers included joiners, painters, grocers, an African American laborer and various other middle-class folks.126 There were upper class, professional borrowers as well: a physician, whom the directories also identify as an “instructor in elocution,” and a lawyer.127 By the early 1840s, however, the Savings Bank was making more loans every year to carpenters and blacksmiths than the New Haven Bank made in a single year to anyone.

The composition of the Bank’s borrowers, the details of its mortgages, and the way it presented itself through materials like its passbooks all show that the Savings Bank operated as genuine Row 3 financial intermediary. Unlike the earlier banks that accumulated capital and made loans primarily within elite social networks, the Savings Bank had the expertise and institutional capabilities to reach beyond existing social structures, attract capital from strangers, and allocate capital to strangers. Moreover, operating in this way was profitable for the Savings Bank: it grew in size, was still a force in New Haven’s mortgage market in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,128 and remained in business into the early 2000s before undergoing

126 See Directory, supra note 101.  
127 Id.  
a successful merger.\textsuperscript{129} Its transition into Row 3 of the capital hierarchy was a permanent change in the city’s financial development.

This Part has examined the 1837 shift in New Haven’s mortgage market. During and after 1837, mortgages from institutions became broadly accessible to residents of the city who were not among its elite. A relatively small number were able to acquire mortgages from the Town Deposit Fund in 1837 and, soon thereafter, a greater number took out mortgages from the New Haven Savings Bank. While the Town Deposit Fund was a public institution and accordingly cannot be categorized within the traditional capital hierarchy, it at least operated like a Row 3 institution in that it relied on its institutional capabilities to find borrowers instead of pre-existing social networks. The New Haven Savings Bank was the city’s first true Row 3 financial intermediary: pooling as well as disseminating capital outside of pre-existing social structures. However, this discussion of the change in the city’s mortgage market has not addressed a central question—and a particularly salient one if any modern lessons are to be drawn from New Haven’s nineteenth century experience: why did this change occur? Why did the city climb the capital hierarchy in 1837? The next and final Part proposes some answers to this question.

**IV. Why Did the Shift in New Haven’s Mortgage Market Occur?**

This Part considers why New Haven’s mortgage market progressed up the capital hierarchy when it did. Understanding what drove the changes in the market could provide valuable insights into how to promote financial development and economic growth in settings besides early nineteenth century New Haven. The following Sections consider, in turn,

\textsuperscript{129} See MERGER DECISIONS, supra note 30.
economic, legal, and sociopolitical accounts of why the change happened when it did. All of the theories discussed in this Part may have some truth to them: history rarely proceeds along unicausal lines.

A. Economic Theories

1. Macroeconomic Theories

Macroeconomic conditions may have played a role in the shift in the New Haven mortgage market. The early nineteenth century was a period of amazing growth. Between 1800 and 1850, the city’s population more than tripled, and the number of buildings quadrupled. One account of the shift in the city’s mortgage market might be that it was primarily product of this economic growth. However, this is too thin an account to fully explain the change. First, New Haven’s economic development during this period unfolded over decades, but the shift in the mortgage market happened abruptly. Moreover, the particular moment when the change began was an exception to the long-term pattern of growth: the Panic of 1837 was among the most severe in American history and began a recession lasting through the mid-1840s. Bank failures and loan losses were widespread. More locally, the New Haven Bank, along with a consortium of New York City banks, suspended specie payments for a year in 1837-1838. The late 1830s and early 1840s would be a counterintuitive time for macroeconomic conditions to spur financial development. A second problem with a purely macroeconomic account of the shift is that empirical research suggests that the causal process generally runs the other way, with

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130 See NEW HAVEN CITY REPORTS 91 (1860-1861) (available at the New Haven Museum).
131 See Rousseau, supra note 103.
132 Id.
133 Id.; see Record Book, supra note 47. Banknotes at the time were backed by “specie,” usually commodities like gold or silver, which holders could demand from any bank honoring the notes.
financial development supporting economic growth. The city’s growth, particularly after 1837, was more likely a consequence of its progress up the capital hierarchy instead of a cause. Moreover, economic research has documented situations where significantly higher levels of economic development and complexity than those present in 1830s New Haven nonetheless did not lead to a shift from Row 2 to Row 3. In sum, then, while the general trend of economic expansion in the nineteenth century may have contributed to the city’s financial development, it does not sufficiently explain the discrete shift in the market.

2. Microeconomic Theories

A microeconomic perspective on the shift may do a better job of explaining it. Drawing on the theories of Ronald Coase in the *Nature of the Firm*, one might expect Row 3 lenders to appear and make smaller, broader mortgage loans when the costs of a firm doing so are less than the costs of Row 2 individuals and firms making the same loans. Genuine Row 3 financial intermediaries may be able to take advantage of lower marginal costs in pooling capital, locating and evaluating mortgagees, and spreading risk. Thus, a microeconomic account would argue that the New Haven Savings Bank appeared when it did because, with its passbooks and form mortgages, it was able to lower the transaction costs of making mortgages in New Haven, capture some of this cost reduction, and thereby sustain itself as an institution. This would also explain why the Bank was successful over a long period of time, even when Row 2 capital sources were still available.

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134 See supra note 1.
The microeconomic explanation is parsimonious and coherent, but, with respect to the timing of the Bank’s appearance, it leaves something to be desired. For this simple version of the theory to explain the sudden rise of Row 3 lending after 1837, the relative costs of individual and institutional lending must have changed abruptly. This defect is particularly striking because there were other active financial institutions in existence before 1837 that could have operated as genuine Row 3 intermediaries. New firms must pay up-front costs to form and become active in a market. But existing firms may have already recouped these expenditures and accordingly will have even lower transaction costs than new firms. Thus, if lower costs for lending by firms fully explained the appearance of Row 3 lending, then the New Haven Bank or some other existing, profit-maximizing firm would have shifted into broader mortgage lending practices over time. This is not a fatal flaw of the microeconomic account, but it does lead to a corollary question: what changed in 1837 that sufficiently shifted the economic calculations for institutional lending to justify the formation of a new firm and a novel project of small bank loans to a diverse group of borrowers?

B. Legal Changes

Legal developments can bring about changed economic circumstances. They are particularly important to consider in the development context because they point to discrete reforms jurisdictions might make to promote development. This Section considers two types of legal developments that could have changed the economic calculations behind Row 3 lending in New Haven in the 1830s. However, legal changes do not seem to be the source of the changed circumstances driving the rise of Row 3 lending. In particular, there do not seem to be relevant, specific changes that occurred before the shift.
First, changes in incorporation laws could have lowered the costs associated with forming a genuine Row 3 intermediary. This would place New Haven in line with New York State and its turn to free banking laws in 1838, which reduced the legal barriers to entering New York’s banking market. However, Connecticut did not embrace free banking. Indeed, in 1838, it added to the statute setting out the procedural steps necessary to petition the General Assembly for a bank charter. Moreover, although Connecticut had these process requirements on its books, it and the rest of New England had established a de facto free banking system early in the 1810s and 1820s, essentially granting bank charters to all petitioners who followed the statutory procedures. There simply were not any developments in incorporation laws that would have changed the entry costs for a new Row 3 financial intermediary in the late 1830s.

Second, it is possible that changes in contract or real property law precipitated the shift in the mortgage market. In particular, the standardized terms of the New Haven Savings Bank’s mortgages may have included some drafting innovation or term previously disallowed by law that substantially lowered its costs. The most likely such term would the provision making its loans “payable on demand.” Particularly given Connecticut’s usury laws, which capped interest rates at 6 percent, it may have been valuable to make loans immediately payable on demand. However, there do not seem to have been observable, relevant changes in property or contract law during this period. Mortgages with “payable on demand” provisions were made between private individuals and recognized by courts many years before 1837. Connecticut’s mortgage

137 See BODENHORN, supra note 10, at ch. 8.
139 See BODENHORN, supra note 10, at 78; Wallis, Answering Mary Shirley’s Question, supra note 10, at 111 (“[New England states] had established de facto free entry in banking in the 1810s and 1820s.”).
140 See BODENHORN, supra note 11, at 147 tbl.4.5.
141 See, e.g., Wheaton v. Wheaton, 9 Conn. 96 (Conn. 1831).
case law at the time seemed primarily concerned with notice-giving requirements and not with adjustments that have might accommodated new institutional lenders.\textsuperscript{142}

Moreover, the available evidence suggests that the “payable on demand” provisions of the Savings Bank’s mortgages were not consistently enforced. It is difficult to draw firm conclusions on this point because the Land Records contain release documents for only a portion of the Bank’s mortgage deeds.\textsuperscript{143} However, thirty-one deeds explicitly releasing mortgagors from obligations to the Bank and renouncing Bank claims to mortgaged land were recorded before 1844.\textsuperscript{144} The length of time between an initial mortgage deed and a release varied considerably but averaged twenty-six months.\textsuperscript{145} Thus, for at least a non-trivial portion of its mortgages, the Bank appears to have allowed its mortgagors some flexibility in the practical terms of their loans.\textsuperscript{146} This is not to say that the Bank never foreclosed on its mortgagors.\textsuperscript{147} However, when it did foreclose, it had to follow the same foreclosure procedures as any other lender: a deed of sale recorded in 1841 relates how the Bank sought a foreclosure decree for the land in question and waited for the duration of a redemption period before taking title.\textsuperscript{148} Overall, then, the legal details and context of the Bank’s operations offer little explanation for why it appeared when it did. Explanatory shifts in corporation, contracting, or real property law are not apparent.

\section{C. The Town and the Bank: A Sociopolitical Story}

\textsuperscript{142} For a sample of representative mortgages cases from this period, see Hubbard v. Savage, 8 Conn. 215 (Conn. 1830); Stoughton v. Pasco and Pasco, 5 Conn. 442 (Conn. 1825); Sanford v. Wheeler, 13 Conn. 165 (Conn. 1839).
\textsuperscript{143} See supra notes 100 and 125. Note that release documents may not be a good indication of repayment periods.
\textsuperscript{144} See supra note 125.
\textsuperscript{145} Id.
\textsuperscript{146} But see supra note 100 (explaining why deeds releasing mortgagor from obligations may have been recorded later than repayment of associated loans).
\textsuperscript{147} See, e.g., Deed of Sale at Vol. 104, p. 178 (describing how the bank foreclosed on the property at issue).
\textsuperscript{148} Id. (“[S]aid land and buildings hereby conveyed are the same premises which were mortgaged to the said New Haven Savings Bank . . . by deed dated July 15th 1839 and on which said New Haven Savings Bank attained a decree of foreclosure from the Superior Court for the County of New Haven at its terms for January 1841 . . . and the time limited by said Court for the redemption of said premises by all said parties has expired.”).
Although legal changes do not appear to have caused the shift in the market, there was one statutory development that had a direct effect on institutional lending in New Haven: the creation of the Town Deposit Fund. The proximity of the activities of the New Haven Town Deposit Fund to the rise of the New Haven Savings Bank suggests a final theory for the shift in the mortgage market. This theory takes the microeconomic account of the formation of Row 3 financial intermediaries as given and accepts that the Savings Bank formed and was successful because it had lower marginal costs of pooling capital, locating and evaluating mortgagees, and spreading risk. But, before 1837, the relative efficiency of a Row 3 institution like the Savings Bank might not have been known to the banks operating in the city. Although smaller mortgages to non-elite individuals during this period were profitable—as demonstrated by the existence of mortgages between individuals and the later success of the New Haven Savings Bank—patrician banks may not have made such mortgages because they gathered information primarily through closed, elite networks that had no way of assembling this knowledge. Without any institution compiling the knowledge of profitability in a single place, it must have been dispersed across a volume of individual-to-individual loans throughout the city, many of them between individuals with whom the patrician banks probably did not communicate. The very tools used by the Row 2 banks to efficiently evaluate borrowers—pre-existing social status and wealth—made them institutionally blind to downmarket opportunities.

The reason the market shifted in 1837, then, may be because the Town solved this information problem by demonstrating the demand for and viability of Row 3 lending. The Connecticut statute disbursing the federal surplus called for town meetings to appoint a manager for each Town Deposit Fund. The manager’s appointment and his work were subject to the deliberative will of the community. It is possible, then, that the Town overcame the information
barrier in the market simply by asking townspeople what they wanted to use the influx of capital for and then following their instructions. By creating a political forum where economic actors who were not plugged into pre-existing elite social networks could publicly present and assemble privately held knowledge, the Town performed an information-aggregating service with economically significant results. In addition to the social barriers the Town overcame, it may also have performed a service in purely economic terms. The evidence of the profitability of downmarket loans may have existed in the New Haven Land Records for some time in the form of mortgage deeds between private individuals. But, in an anti-Hayekian moment, the information may have been too atomized to be useful until the Town made it legible through a public forum and subsequent public action.149

This theory has several flaws. The first of which is a lack of direct evidence shedding light on the town meetings creating the Deposit Fund or on the Fund’s activities in selecting borrowers. The New Haven Clerk’s office contains extensive handwritten notes from several of New Haven’s municipal government bodies at the time, including the City’s Board of Alderman and Court of Common Council. However, the archives of the Town’s governing body, the Board of Selectmen, are missing volumes covering several early decades of the nineteenth century.150 In particular, no record of the Town’s political decisionmaking in 1837 appears to exist. While this absence of evidence is not a direct counterargument to the sociopolitical account of the 1837 shift, it does point out how much weight such a theory places on the simple proximity of the Town Deposit Fund to the formation of the New Haven Savings Bank. Without direct evidence

150 Records exist for meetings of the Board of Selectmen from 1771 to 1819 and again from 1863 onwards. It is an unfortunate coincidence for this paper that the Town Deposit Fund was administered during a period for which the minutes of the meetings of the Board of Selectmen are unavailable.
that townspeople had real input into the creation and activities of the Town Deposit Fund, the link between the Fund and the wider changes in the market must remain speculative.

A related and more substantive criticism of the sociopolitical account would push back on the idea that demand for downmarket mortgages was so atomized that private lenders could not put the information to use on their own, without the intervention of a government-backed Town Deposit Fund. Individual lenders were ostensibly earning above-market returns on their mortgages to individual borrowers. What if they came together to create an institutional lender to capture more of these profits? While this critique makes sense in terms of the theoretical incentives of the relevant economic actors, it suffers from a few defects. First, like a pure microeconomic theory explaining the New Haven Savings Bank as a more efficient mortgage lender, a story of spontaneous organization by individual lenders in New Haven begs the question of why the Bank appeared when it did. Individual mortgage lenders had been profitably making mortgage loans in New Haven for many years before the late 1830s—what would move them to act on their knowledge and form a bank in the teeth of a bitter depression? Second, the counterexample of existing private lenders coming together to create an institutional lender does not line up with the historical record. The New Haven Savings Bank was founded and operated by members of the patrician elite who were likely socially disconnected from at least a significant portion of the individual borrowers and lenders in the city. The Bank’s formation was not the result of bottom-up economic knowledge and financial incentives guiding the efforts of entrepreneurs. The Bank was created because something caught the attention of the primary holders of social and economic capital in New Haven and convinced them that it was time to deploy their capital downwards. The innovative lending practices of the Town Deposit Fund may
seem far-fetched as a source of inspiration for the likes of James Brewster and Ralph Ingersoll, but, particularly in the absence of alternatives, they are a plausible catalyst.

A final criticism of the sociopolitical account is simply that it is incomplete. The theory cannot stand on its own. The Town may have served as an information gate, providing a public forum for aggregating information and demonstrating its accuracy through profitable loans. But this would have counted for little if the wider economic conditions in New Haven had not been right or if the New Haven Savings Bank had been legally or organizationally incapable of capitalizing on the information. Most importantly, the activities of the Fund alone would probably not have shifted the lending practices of the patrician leaders of the New Haven Savings Bank if they had not been prepared for some change already. The background sociopolitical dynamics in New Haven must have played an important role. In particular, the sociopolitical account rests on the assumption that a town meeting could adequately assemble dispersed community knowledge of downmarket demand and profitability. If patricians had totally dominated the town’s political scene, the relevant information about the lower segment of the mortgage market might not have been heard. However, the assumption that the town’s political institutions allowed middle-class voices to be heard—particularly upwardly mobile middle-class voices asking for mortgages—is not unreasonable. At the time, New Haven was on the cusp of significant social change. Economic and social leadership was slowly shifting from the patrician elite to a new group of more self-made strivers. Robert Dahl identifies the election of P.S. Galpin in 1842 as the moment when political leadership shifted between these two groups.\(^\text{151}\) If the Young Turks of New Haven could capture the mayor’s office in 1842, then they

\(^{151}\) See DAHL, supra note 116, tbl.2.1.
may very well have been able to influence the creation and activities of the Town Deposit Fund five years earlier.

Alongside the wider social changes taking place in the city, the statute creating the Town Deposit Fund also deserves credit for ensuring that citizens outside the patrician elite had some say in how the federal surplus funds were ultimately allocated. Had the statute simply placed the Fund under the control of the New Haven mayor in 1837, H.C. Flagg, a patrician lawyer, the Fund might not have been able to serve the same information-aggregating purpose.\(^{152}\) Accordingly, the statute can be seen as an early and successful example of federalism-all-the-way-down through its empowerment of a local population that had not yet won outright political control of the city.\(^{153}\) From this perspective, the sociopolitical account offers some policy guidance for modern governments seeking to promote financial development. In particular, it suggests that modern governments might embrace robustly decentralized models of economic action to solve information gaps in local markets. It also highlights how unregulated local markets may have particular information problems that require public action. However, the sociopolitical account does not call for sustained or large-scale government intervention in markets. Instead, it recommends government action on a local scale to assemble information that would otherwise be too diffuse or buried in the community to be economically useful. The real lesson of the shift in New Haven’s mortgage market may be the value of small-scale legibility produced by local political structures.\(^{154}\)

\(^{152}\) Id.
\(^{154}\) For an extended discussion of how governments produce legibility (and the negative consequences that can result), see generally James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (1998).
Overall, the sociopolitical account has strengths and weaknesses and is likely only a partial explanation for the changes in the city’s mortgage market. However, one final advantage of the theory is that it may be testable. The statute creating the Town Deposit Fund authorized and financed similar Funds in municipalities across Connecticut. These towns, like New Haven, kept land records. It would be possible to recreate the methodology of this paper in other cities, such as Hartford and Bridgeport. If the federal surplus funds were distributed in similar ways in other municipalities, further research could determine if similar shifts occurred in other local mortgage markets. Moreover, cities in other New England states like Rhode Island and Massachusetts could be included in the sample. Lamoreaux and Bodenhorn have documented extensive similarities between the nineteenth century financial systems of these states. But each state did not spend its share of the federal surplus in the same way. The financial markets of towns with active Deposit Funds could be compared with the outcomes of towns in neighboring states that lacked Deposit Funds. Further research along these lines could provide more compelling evidence that the Town Deposit Fund played a significant role in New Haven’s development and could yield further recommendations for modern policy approaches.

Conclusion

This paper has taken a detailed look at New Haven’s progression up the capital hierarchy. It has no illusions that the experience of a mid-sized Connecticut city in the early nineteenth century will be comprehensively representative of economic development in other times and

155 See BODENHORN, supra note 10 at ch. 4; LAMOREAUX, supra note 12, at ch. 3.
places. However, the city’s mortgage market did undergo a change in the late 1830s that is crucial for complex, sustained economic growth—namely the transition from capital allocation through pre-existing social networks to capital allocation through institutional expertise. This transition was not inevitable, and this paper has proposed several theories for why it happened when it did. In focusing particularly on the activities of the Town Deposit Fund, it has sought to develop a new perspective on how local political institutions can shape economic development. Ultimately, markets are powerful, but fragile, institutions, and historical and sociopolitical approaches can be valuable in understanding how to improve them.
Appendix A: Occupations of the Borrowers from the Town Deposit Fund, 1837

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Grantor</th>
<th>Mortgage Amount</th>
<th>Volume in Land Records</th>
<th>Page in Volume</th>
<th>Occupation as stated in 1840 directory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04/07/1837</td>
<td>John Anderson</td>
<td>$400</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>listed without occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/06/1837</td>
<td>Elihu Atwater</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>Joiner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/17/1837</td>
<td>Stephen Bishop</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>dealer in paints and groceries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/26/1837</td>
<td>Ezekiel Chidsey</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>boot and shoe store</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/26/1837</td>
<td>Beriah Bradley</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>boot and shoe store</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/26/1837</td>
<td>George Bradley</td>
<td>$400</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>blacksmith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/06/1837</td>
<td>Oliver Bryan</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>merchant tailor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/09/1837</td>
<td>Hannah Carr</td>
<td>$850</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>unlisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/05/1837</td>
<td>Charles B. Linus and Abel Chamberlain</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>unlisted; cabinet manufacturer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/22/1837</td>
<td>John Durrie</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>booksellers &amp; publishers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/31/1837</td>
<td>Mary Foster</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>listed without occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/06/1837</td>
<td>Luther Gilbert</td>
<td>$930</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>livery stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/06/1837</td>
<td>Eliazer Gorham</td>
<td>$750</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>boot and shoe store</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/05/1837</td>
<td>Marcus Merriman</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>Senator (State)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/15/1837</td>
<td>Rhodolphus Northrop</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>carver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/06/1837</td>
<td>James Parker; James Parker Jr.</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>livery stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/31/1837</td>
<td>Asahel Pierpont</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>door lock and latch manufacturer (with Hotchkiss)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/14/1837</td>
<td>Samuel Rowland</td>
<td>$750</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>listed without occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/30/1837</td>
<td>Anna Whittlsey</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>unlisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/07/1837</td>
<td>John Mitchell</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>listed without occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/07/1837</td>
<td>John Mitchell</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>listed without occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/09/1837</td>
<td>Washington School District</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>School District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/12/1837</td>
<td>Chauncey Wells</td>
<td>$250</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>joiner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/05/1837</td>
<td>Alexander Stover</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>unlisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/06/1837</td>
<td>Minott Osborn</td>
<td>$750</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>printers and publishers of Columbian Register (with Baldwin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/06/1837</td>
<td>Charles Monson</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>store 2 Elm c York, factory Whitney Avenue c First, h 4 Elm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/05/1837</td>
<td>Joel Hartshon</td>
<td>$400</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>shoe maker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/05/1837</td>
<td>Samuel Bassett</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>unlisted (although S.M. Bassett has a looking glass manufactory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/22/1837</td>
<td>Treat Botsford</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>marble and stone yard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/05/1837</td>
<td>Daniel Brown</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>builder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/20/1837</td>
<td>Judson Curtiss</td>
<td>$750</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>joiner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/07/1837</td>
<td>Anson Colt</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>unlisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/10/1837</td>
<td>Abigail Bishop</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>unlisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/28/1837</td>
<td>Anson Colt</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>unlisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/18/1837</td>
<td>Stephen Cooke</td>
<td>$750</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>unlisted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To all People to whom these Presents shall come:—GREETING.

KNOW YE, THAT I, Alexander O. Coburn, of the City and County of New Haven, and State of Connecticut, for the consideration of One Thousand Dollars, received to the full satisfaction of the New Haven Savings Bank, a Corporation, located, and doing business in the city of New Haven, New Haven County, and State of Connecticut, do give, grant, bargain, sell, and convey unto the said New Haven Savings Bank, their successors, and assigns, a certain piece of land bounded, with all the buildings, houses, situated in said City of New Haven, as follows, viz.: Northeastly on Water Street about Fifty feet, Eastwardly on land of Nathaniel Hill: Southwesterly by the line of W.N. to the boundary belonging to the heirs of William Saffin, and Westwardly subject to a right of way over same foot on the East side of same.

To have and to hold the above granted and bargained premises, with the appurtenances thereof, unto the said New Haven Savings Bank, their successors, and assigns forever, to them and their own proper use and benefit. And also to the said Alexander O. Coburn,

do for my heirs, executors, and administrators, covenant with the said New Haven Savings Bank, their successors, and assigns, that at and until the enrolling of these presents shall be well and truly sealed and executed by them, and in consideration thereof, I, Alexander O. Coburn, do covenant and agree, to and with the said New Haven Savings Bank, their successors, and assigns, and their heirs forever, to warrant and defend the above granted and bargained premises unto the said New Haven Savings Bank, their successors, and assigns, against all claims and demands whatsoever.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 15th day of October, A. D. 1847.

THE CONDITION OF THE ABOVE DEED IS SUCH, that whereas the said Alexander O. Coburn,

has borrowed of the said New Haven Savings Bank, the sum of One Thousand Dollars, and in consideration thereof, has executed and delivered to said Savings Bank, a promissory note, dated October 15th, 1847, as follows:

New Haven, in the County of New Haven, the interest payable semi-annually.

For value received, the sum of One Thousand Dollars to the order of the said Savings Bank, the promissory note shall be used and truly paid, according to its terms and conditions, on or before the date thereof, otherwise the present deed shall be null; but otherwise shall remain in full force and effect.

Signed, sealed, and delivered.

[Signature]

In presence of

[Notary's Signature]

A. O. Coburn, October 15th, 1847.

New Haven County, in the presence of the signers and sealers of the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged the same to be a free act and deed, before me,

[Notary's Signature]

Received for Record and Recorded by

[Recorded by]

An example of a later mortgage deed recorded on a form specially printed for the New Haven Savings Bank.

60
The cover of a passbook for the ill-fated Savings Bank of New Haven.
The inside cover of a passbook for the much more successful New Haven Savings Bank, the city’s first genuine financial intermediary.