Bad Girls of Art and Law: Abjection, Power, and Sexuality Exceptionalism in (Kara Walker’s) Art and (Janet Halley’s) Law

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ABSTRACT: This Article draws some connections between legal theorist Janet Halley and contemporary artist Kara Walker. It compares their recent oeuvre to show how both reject understandings of the interplay of sex, power, and subordination proffered by conventional “justice projects”—specifically civil rights’ and feminism’s articulations of bodily violence and violation as key modes of racial and gender injury and subordination. Neither of these two is the first to dispute such accounts; what distinguishes them is that both attempt to ground their indictments in the notion of abjection, or the liberatory potential of suffering, degradation, and shame, particularly in sexual contexts. This Article disputes abjection as a conceptual grounding for Walker and Halley’s political and theoretical indictments. Abjection is classically associated with Julia Kristeva’s work in psychoanalysis, but gained political traction in queer theorist Leo Bersani’s call for a subversive sex-based queer identity. I contend that Halley’s theoretical invocation of Bersani’s abjection is misplaced, and that Walker’s aesthetic claims fall victim to similar misreadings. In fact, the theoretical innovations of both versions of abjection lie in their engagements with power and identity; Bersani’s notion of subversive abjection in particular is embedded in the very sorts of justice projects,

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identitarian claims, regulatory discourses, and material economies of bodies and power that Walker and Halley disavow. While their aesthetic and academic invocations of abjection are fascinating and provocative, the Article concludes that neither Kristeva's psychoanalytic turn nor Bersani's political one endorses Halley and Walker's embrace of dematerialized economies of bodies and disavowals of anti-subordination projects. It argues that Halley in particular has fallen prey to what I characterize as sexuality exceptionalism, a deeply essentialist, almost Freudian notion of sex as sacred, repressed, distinct from other bodily pleasures, and exempt from regulation. Furthermore, reading Walker and Halley in tandem poses some interesting questions for Halley about both the conceptual and regulatory limits of her claims. The Article concludes that Walker and Halley have joined the anti-identitarian zeitgeist in a peculiar way: rooting their projects in abjection, while fascinating, even more deeply embeds them in what they are trying to escape, investigations of material economies of injury, identity, and power.

INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................. 3
PART I.  BAD GIRLS OF ART & LAW .................................................................................... 7
  A. Kara Walker's Art........................................................................................................... 7
  B. Janet Halley's Law ...................................................................................................... 16
  C. Common Commitment/Common Critique, or Genealogies
     Against Justice .............................................................................................................. 25
PART II.  GENEALOGIES OF ABJECTION ..................................................................... 34
  A. Abjection: Classic & Subversive .................................................................................. 34
  B. Abjection, Materiality, and Power ............................................................................... 38
PART III.  SEXUALITY EXCEPTIONALISM ..................................................................... 43
CONCLUSION: SILHOUETTES OF POWER .................................................................... 54
INTRODUCTION

In 1997 African American artist Kara Walker won a MacArthur "genius" award. This highly public recognition poured gasoline on the slow burn already in progress among members of the senior black art establishment. Walker’s métier revives the old silhouette form: she creates life-sized racial caricatures engaged in every sexual taboo in the book—sodomy, bestiality, pedophilia, and scatological sex committed amidst piles of excrement. One aspect of her work that has been particularly explosive is that it pokes fun at that greatest of American taboos, interracial sex. She parodies fears that have achieved the status of myth in both white and black communities, and she does so using as her setting that greatest of American interracial sex factories, the antebellum plantation. Walker’s response to the conflagration? More irreverence and proclamations that injury has become part of black identity: “All black people . . . want to be slaves just a little bit.”

Meanwhile, legal scholar Janet Halley was igniting her own firestorm among feminists. Arguing that feminism’s first principle of sex equality might be in tension with projects and methodologies centered on sexual liberation, Halley invited progressive thinkers to “Take a Break from Feminism.” In a series of articles and talks that culminated in a book, she argued that sexual acts feminists indict as abuse might be applauded as liberatory according to other political scripts. Targeting feminist totems erected at the intersection of sex and violence, Halley argued that feminist “wins” may entail substantial losses according to “queer” goals and that the losses may outweigh the gains. Given her pedigree as an anti-subordination theorist, Halley’s indictment stunned many legal feminists, and her refusal to reconcile infuriated some.

Beyond involving bad girls in art and law, what do these two controversies have in common? At first glance, not much. The first dispute involves the racial politics of censoring high-brow art. (This is not Dogs Playing Poker.) The second involves a pretty rarefied academic debate about a supposed fissure between feminism and queer theory, two theoretical schools most think to be in “collusion,” when “most” think of them at all. Despite these apparent differences, this Article seeks to make some connections between the Halley and Walker disputes. It shows that both Walker and Halley reject understandings of the interplay of sex, power, and subordination proffered by conventional “justice projects”—specifically civil rights’ and feminism’s articulations of bodily violence and violation as key modes of racial and gender injury and subordination. Central to both of these justice projects is a relentless

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analysis of material economies and how they accumulate and allocate racial and gendered power over bodies. Certainly Walker and Halley are not the first to dispute such accounts of injury and identity; yet what distinguishes them is that both attempt to ground their theoretical and aesthetic indictments in the notion of abjection, or the liberatory potential of suffering, degradation, and shame, particularly in sexual contexts. Both seek in abjection an alternative conception of bodies and power, one not rooted in civil rights’ and feminism’s first principles of equality, anti-subordination, and what Halley calls “minoritizing” impulses. Through abjection, each offers an alternative account of how bodies and power configure human subjectivity, in which consent does not play the usual starring role it does in liberal accounts, including many feminist ones. If consent is the liberal’s key to sexual pleasure (including, crucially, in domination), then by subverting it, Halley and Walker throw our entire sexual system up for grabs. For Walker and Halley, the attraction, indeed, the “sexiness,” of abjection lies precisely in its \textit{dematerialization} of bodies and power. Both invoke abjection to theorize and imagine the manipulation of orifices outside of social relations of power or contexts in which bodies are actually found. In their renderings, abjection is sexy precisely because of its apparent disavowal of justice projects and their accompanying materialist, identitarian, and regulatory discourses.

This Article disputes abjection as a conceptual grounding for Walker’s and Halley’s political and theoretical indictments. Abjection is classically associated with Julia Kristeva’s work in psychoanalysis, but gained political traction in queer theorist Leo Bersani’s call for a subversive sex-based queer identity. I contend that Halley’s theoretical invocation of Bersani’s abjection is misplaced, and that Walker’s aesthetic claims fall victim to similar misreadings. In fact, the Article argues that the theoretical innovations of both versions of abjection lie in their engagements \textit{with} power and identity, their interplay with loss, longing, and belonging in Kristeva’s classic iteration and with injury, rebellion, and politics in Bersani’s subversive one. In particular, Bersani’s notion of subversive abjection is hopelessly embedded in the very sorts of justice projects, identitarian claims, regulatory discourses, and material economies of bodies and power that Walker and Halley disavow. And, as I will


\begin{quote}
If intra-gay identity wars can be roughly described as a tension between universalizing and minoritizing and between realist and nominalist understandings, so can disagreements about the ontology of racial differences. Minoritizing understandings emerge in ethnic solidarity, politics-of-recognition multiculturalist, and nationalistic discourses of race; and universalizing understandings emerge in integrationist, hybridizing, mestiza, and strong-social-constructivist models.
\end{quote}

show, feminism's regulatory discourse of consent looms large in Bersani's call for a sex-based queer identity. While their aesthetic and academic invocations of abjection are fascinating and provocative, the Article concludes that neither Kristeva's psychoanalytic turn nor Bersani's political one endorses Halley and Walker's embrace of dematerialized economies of bodies and disavowals of anti-subordination projects.

Halley in particular has fallen prey to what might be thought of as a sort of sexuality exceptionalism, a deeply essentialist, almost Freudian, notion of sex as sacred, repressed, distinct from other bodily pleasures, and, because she views it as in need of liberation, exempt from regulation and distributive justice inquiries. (This is all the more odd given Halley's queer commitments, including her professed skepticism about the power feminists attribute to sex.) In this rendering, sex floats free of material, background conditions, influences, or effects. In addition, reading Walker and Halley together poses some tough questions for Halley. Walker's commitments are aesthetic; Halley, on the other hand, seems to be making regulatory claims about how law should govern. If Walker's representations of the racial power of abjection resonate with so many, what does this mean for the scope of Halley's claims? Are her arguments to take a break from justice projects limited to feminism only, or must we liberate shameful desire wherever we find it, including making room for the sorts of racial desires for humiliation and degradation we find in Walker's art? The Article concludes that Walker and Halley have joined the anti-identitarian zeitgeist in a peculiar way: rooting their disavowal projects in abjection, while fascinating, embeds them even more deeply in what they are trying to escape: investigations of material economies of injury, identity, and power. And, importantly for Halley, it may undermine her professed goal of liberating shameful sex, instead leaving her susceptible to what I will characterize as sexuality exceptionalism.

The Article makes its argument in three steps. First, Part I explores Walker's installations and Halley's writings to show how each rejects conventional justice projects' investigations of material economies of bodies, injury, and power (especially sexual power) and accompanying discourses of regulation and anti-subordination. Instead, both claim an alternative genealogy of bodies and power rooted in the liberatory potential of abjection. Next, Part II argues that their mutual embrace of abjection, while intriguing and provocative, in the end fails to offer theoretical and political support for their claims. Walker and Halley both reject justice projects that seek to counter subordination and injury through egalitarian, regulated social relations, including sexual ones. Yet, the Article argues that the theoretical innovations of both Kristeva's classic abjection and Bersani's subversive abjection lie in their analyses of power, including identitarian and materialist considerations very much akin to those Walker and Halley are trying to escape. In particular, consent and anti-
subordination lie at the heart of Is the Rectum a Grave?, Bersani's germinal abjection text on which Halley heavily relies. In fact, I argue that without these conventional justice totems, abjection, to borrow an au courant phrase, loses its (subversive) expressive dimensions. Part III turns its attention to some meaningful differences between Walker's and Halley's projects, distinguishing Walker's aesthetic claims of boredom and racial economies of sexualized abjection from Halley's regulatory claims. This Part focuses more on Halley's project, partly because this is a legal article, but also because it is from her regulatory claims that I derive some limits to her logic. This Part argues that Halley's plea for a queer approach to sex may be in tension with what I characterize as her sexuality exceptionalism, a rather essentialist view of sex as somehow sacred and, unlike other bodily pleasures, beyond rational or distributive inquiry or regulation. In her appeals to the left, Halley exceptionalizes sex, exempting it from the distributive inquiries to which liberals/leftists subject other bodily pleasures (food comes to mind). This Part also uses Walker's scenarios of racial abjection to pose some questions about the scope of Halley's skepticism about justice projects. Finally, the Article concludes by giving some attention to the parts of Halley's and Walker's representations that seem to agitate their audiences most—their efforts to dematerialize bodies while locating them within economies characterized by the brutality of their power and injury: slave plantations and modern-day rape camps. This Article argues that attention to the interplay of sex and power in material economies, or sex as a matter of distributive justice, is necessary to discern the meaning, and hence the politics and subversive potential, of sexual acts.

Mine is not the first critique to be made of either Walker or Halley.4 Other critiques, many personal and some ad hominem, have been made of both,
especially of Walker. What distinguishes this Article, however, is its emphasis on their mutual impulse to root their claims about bodies and power in the notion of abjection and its conclusion that such a conceptual grounding may lead to precisely what they seek to disavow: sexuality exceptionalism.

PART I. BAD GIRLS OF ART & LAW

A. Kara Walker's Art

As noted, a 1997 MacArthur Fellowship put into high gear the controversy over a newcomer to the art world, Kara Walker. The relatively young Walker revitalized a largely archaic art form, the silhouette. Popular as both inexpensive portraiture and parlor craft in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, silhouettes are cut-outs from solid pieces of paper that highlight the subject’s profile features. The form dictated the limitations of the genre: “[s]ilhouettes require that all the information be contained on the edges of the figures,” and hence “[t]he original forms were limited to static profiles often drawn from the subject’s shadows cast onto a surface.” Representing neoclassical revival as well as the new “science” of physiognomy, silhouettes

1635-36 (2004) [hereinafter Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence] (“Advancing their like-straight arguments and drawing attention to heterosexuality’s glories, lesbian and gay rights advocates completely avoid[ ] any serious and engaged analysis with the existing problems of sexual abuse, whether cross-sex or same-sex . . . .”); see also Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1365 (2005) (arguing that “extension of marriage rights to lesbians and gay men also raises the possibility that it has effectively enlarged the sex-relational terrain on which male sexual privilege . . . is free to roam”).

5. See infra notes 30, 42, 104 and accompanying text. A PBS-sponsored website asked viewers to vote on whether it is morally acceptable to publicly display Kara Walker’s art and the films of Nazi propagandist Leni Riefenstahl. A higher percentage of viewers voted to display Riefenstahl’s work than Walker’s. Mark Reinhardt, The Art of Racial Profiling, in KARA WALKER: NARRATIVES OF A NEGRESS 108, 120 (Ian Berry et al. eds., 2003).

6. Opponents sought to have her MacArthur fellowship revoked and had some success in deterring museums from showing her work. For instance, Walker’s piece, A Means to an End: A Shadow Drama in Five Acts was pulled by the Detroit Institute of the Arts in July 1999. GWENDOLYN DUBOIS SHAW, SEEING THE UNSPEAKABLE: THE ART OF KARA WALKER 103-05 (2004). For discussion of the controversy, including the letter-writing campaign to have Walker’s MacArthur award revoked, see, for example, Robert S. Chang & Adrienne D. Davis, The Adventure(s) of Blackness in Western Culture: An Epistolary Exchange on Old and New Identity Wars, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1189, 1202 nn.43-44, 1203 n.45 (2006).

7. Walker was twenty-eight when she won the MacArthur grant. See Riché Richardson, Kara Walker’s Old South and New Terrors, 25 J. CONTEMP. AFR. ART 48, 50 (2009). Ten years later, at thirty-eight, Time Magazine named her one of the one hundred most influential people in the world. Id. She also works in other genres, including gouaches, printed texts, and, most recently, animated puppet shows crafted from silhouette figures.


9. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 211.
were both backward- and forward-looking. Most depicted their subjects delicately and favorably.

Walker deployed the genre to substantially different effects. Her silhouettes feature multiple life-sized cut-outs made from black paper arranged on blank white canvases or walls. Unlike classic silhouettes, which following conventional portrait form appear posed, Walker’s updates capture interactive bodies in motion, caught unaware, more akin to a contemporary action photograph. Her installations wrap around museum or gallery walls like a mural, with cavorting figures frozen in independent panels, linked by a common theme but apparently unaware of each other. Several art critics have described the black-on-white friezes as having the appearance of “shadow dramas.” Her stock characters—the slave master and mistress, the pickaninny, the old slave, the Confederate soldier, and what Walker alternately calls “the Negress” and the “nigger wench”—invoke antebellum Southern slavery. Lest the context be unclear, the pieces have titles like The End of Uncle Tom and the Grand Allegorical Tableau of Eva in Heaven and Gone: An Historical Romance of a Civil War as It Occurred Between the Dusky Thighs of One Young Negress and Her Heart. But this ain’t Tara. Or Roots.

Walker’s installations appear deceptively simple. The only geographic references to slavery are backdrops of moss-dripping trees and clouded moons, sometimes with idyllic plantation buildings in the far distance. Against these

12. Several critics have noted that her installations have the appearance of cycloramas. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 2, at 215. As Walker herself put it:

Well, from the moment that I got started on these things I imagined that someday they would be put together in a kind of cyclorama. I mean, just like the Cyclorama in Atlanta that goes around in an endless cycle of history locked up in a room, I thought that it would be possible to arrange the silhouettes in such a way that they would make a kind of history painting encompassing the whole room.

13. See, e.g., SHAW, supra note 6, at 39-43 (discussing various referents for Walker’s shadow dramas, including Jungian psychoanalytic theory and the gothic). Indeed, Walker entitled one of her installations A Means to an End: A Shadow Drama in Five Acts. Shaw refers to Walker’s installations as “pageants.” Id. at 6.
14. The End of Uncle Tom and the Grand Allegorical Tableau of Eva in Heaven (1995), reprinted in PICTURES FROM ANOTHER TIME, supra note 8, at 54-55; Gone: An Historical Romance of Civil War as It Occurred Between the Dusky Thighs of a Young Negress and Her Heart (1994), reprinted in PICTURES FROM ANOTHER TIME, supra note 8, at 50-51. Between 1994 and 2002 Walker did over twenty silhouette wall installations. For a biography of Walker, see SHAW, supra note 6, at 12-18. For a descriptive bibliography of her work, see KARA WALKER: MY COMPLEMENT, MY ENEMY, MY OPPRESSOR, MY LOVE 384-406 (Philippe Vergne ed., 2007) [hereinafter MY COMPLEMENT]. See also PICTURES FROM ANOTHER TIME, supra note 8, at 97-100 (selected list of Walker’s exhibitions, projects, and publishing). While most known for her larger installations, Walker also does variations that feature smaller silhouettes, single subjects, or different colors and backgrounds. She also works outside of the silhouette form altogether. My Complement offers the most comprehensive selection of her work.
odes to nineteenth-century sentimentality unfolds Walker’s “racially coded mayhem.” Her figures, posed in discrete encounters, are a postmodern pastiche of canonical texts and popular myths of slavery. In *The End of Uncle Tom and the Grand Allegorical Tableau of Eva in Heaven*, a trio of young black women enthusiastically suckle each other while a (black) infant futilely grabs for a breast; to the right, Stowe’s heroine, little Eva, wields an axe against an innocent black toddler while behind her a younger black girl holds a spike at a threateningly sodomizing angle. In a 1997 installation, a banjo-playing black man with a pair of scissors in his back spurs blood from his mouth while a little black girl approaches from behind: will she wind the scissors like a key to bring him back to life or will she drive them further into his back?

And sometimes you get the feeling Walker took one psychoanalysis course too many. Her “plantations” are an homage to Freud 101. Swords and sabers appear to have minds of their own, seeking sexual orifices at every turn, as do carrots, bugles, legs, and even a cloud. Excrement pervades the images: everywhere children and adults carelessly trail feces. And something is always, always going on beneath those darned hoop skirts. Second pairs of (masculine) legs are visible as women perform sentimental poses of courtship toward their apparent suitors. (Such a second pair appears ready to interrupt Walker’s interpretation of Eliza’s infamous run across the frozen Ohio River while the pieces of ice over which she skips now turn out to be the near-submerged head of a black man.) Finally, that swan that raped Leda is everywhere, performing in-your-face miscegenation, buried up to its substantial white neck in black females’ various orifices.

Much noted is how viewers are incorporated into Walker’s installations; less so is how Walker plays with the processes of artistic production. She strategically recuperates the material production process of the silhouette in which the image is cut from a traced projection of the subject. Walker arranges her installations such that viewers find their own shadows projected onto the walls and interspersed among her figures and scenes. Thus Walker’s viewers find themselves projected into her art, not in the typical semiotic way, but as visible participants, collapsing conventional boundaries between art and audience.

Even most of her critics seem to concede Walker’s formal skills as an artist. Art scholar Michael Harris compliments her draftsmanship as

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15. SHAW, supra note 6, at 18.
“disarmingly subtle.” He continues: “The fact that Walker has depicted racialized figures in convincing postures attests to her drawing skills.” And yet, this is where Walker’s troubles start. Walker’s challenge is to convey racial differentiation and interaction in what is in essence an evacuated form, one that takes its meaning solely through its edges and boundaries. (Indeed, race is frequently represented through reduced means and often blacks are read as only silhouettes, i.e., without regard to content or interiority.) As Annette Dixon puts it:

[Her] work engages the question of how one represents race through reduced means. It is through outline and shape, and the intervals between the shapes, that information is conveyed. With all figures shown on black paper, the identity of a figure as black or white can be shown only through racially coded profiles. Walker creates racial meaning through exaggerated racial features: the profiles sport thick lips and noses, kinky hair, often rendered in spikes or “pickaninny” pigtails, big buttocks. Not only their features but their movements are coarse, with legs and buttocks jutting out at odd angles and mouths hanging open. In contrast, figures coded as “white” are typically shown in more refined and delicate postures. These are not only silhouettes, but caricatures. And intriguingly, “[d]espite all the riotous miscegenation occurring in the work, the complication of mulatto characters seems to elude this format; recognizable contours require physiognomic distinctions that are not as clear as when we are talking about one of Archibald Motley, Jr.’s octoroons.”

Rather, in Walker’s work, race appears as an essence and a binary.

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19. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 211; see also SHAW, supra note 6, at 18 (“In their deceptive simplicity, silhouettes had established themselves as a way that Walker could signify on the racialized imagery that had been a challenge to her artistic practice since Atlanta.”); Dixon, supra note 8, at 23 (noting Walker’s skills as “an extremely versatile artist”).

20. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 211.


22. The contrast is apparent in a tableau, From the Bowels to the Bosom (1996), featuring elements of several of Walker’s installations. Reprinted in PICTURES FROM ANOTHER TIME, supra note 8, at 52.


24. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 211-12.

25. In Excavated from the Black Heart of a Negrress (2002), Walker inverts race by re-assigning color. In this set of silhouettes “black” characters are now cut from white paper, and vice versa. This is apparent as an inversion only because, crucially, the now “white” characters have the phenotype and coarser movements that Walker (and viewers) assign to blacks. Reprinted in MY COMPLEMENT, supra note 14, at 332-37.
Not surprisingly, Walker’s irreverent representations of bodies and power have triggered a contentious debate.\(^{26}\) For a substantial number of viewers, her work is reminiscent of minstrelsy rather than the racial redemption that many seek in black art (e.g., “Black is Beautiful,” the Black Arts Movement, and Négritude).\(^{27}\) Of course, one can read her work as a postmodern riff on the silhouette’s obsession with physiognomy and its connections to racism. Several art critics (including African American ones) have done so.\(^{28}\) But others simply don’t see those politics, contending to the contrary that any subversive elements are outweighed by the offensiveness. Walker’s opponents argue that black art has conventionally emphasized black humanity for a reason, and it was not simply because black people’s feelings were hurt. They point out that the stereotypical images Walker rehabilitates and recycles were linked to structural violence, repression, and racial supremacy. A supporter, Michael Harris, fears that Walker has locked herself into the racial discourse she is attempting to subvert. By identifying with slavery, she seems to trivialize it, and this has alienated her from preceding generations who have profound memories of racial violence and oppression and therefore a deep empathy for the crushing and violent consequences of slavery.\(^{29}\)

Hence, the campaigns, the censorship, and the outrage.\(^{30}\)

\(^{26}\) A good summary of the debate over Walker and her work can be found in Shaw, supra note 6, at 114-123. See also Harris, supra note 2, at 216-18; Robert F. Reid-Pharr, Black Girl Lost, in PICTURES FROM ANOTHER TIME, supra note 8, at 27.

\(^{27}\) Walker herself characterizes her work in this way. According to Michael Harris, “Walker has described her work as a minstrel show, and, like the original shows, her work is rooted in southern mythologies and unresolved racial conflict.” Harris, supra note 2, at 212. Hence the discomfort of some viewers when Walker describes herself as playing the slave “just a little bit,” apparently one of her favorite phrases.

\(^{28}\) Gwendolyn Shaw is a leader in efforts to rehabilitate and defend Walker’s work. She argues that the discomfort with Walker’s work comes from not knowing how to situate oneself against this “gothic space.” Shaw, supra note 6, at 39. She goes on, “[i]t is much like comparing Alice Randall’s recent satire, The Wind Done Gone, with the book on which it signifies, Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the Wind.” Id.; see also Harris, supra note 2, at 222 (“Much of the criticism of Walker’s art seems linked to its literal translation.”).

\(^{29}\) Harris, supra note 2, at 216.

\(^{30}\) The editor of the International Review of African American Art explains that some feel that artists such as Walker “are making their reputations and large sums of money off of their own people’s suffering, are repeating monotonous themes to exhaustion, and are catering to the most base interests of white curators and collectors.” Juliette Bowles, Extreme Times Call for Extreme Heroes, 14 INT’L REV. AFR.-AM. ART 3, 3 (1997). Michael Harris offers a more measured account:

It is telling that three of the most recent African American artists to experience a meteoric rise in the American art world at early ages are Jean-Michel Basquiat, Michael Ray Charles, and Kara Walker: artists whose work locates them deeply within white racial perceptions of blackness. This does not diminish, and is not a comment on, the quality of their work. However, I do wish to question the response to the work by many whites in an art apparatus that shows little egalitarian sincerity.
And Walker herself has contributed to the interpretation of her work as irreverent. She proclaims her boredom with the conventional civil rights emphasis on black injury and its rectification. Her caricatures of slavery’s violence, racial and sexual degradation are not designed to indict these harms, but rather to express her impatience with them: “So much irritating fucking truth about [blacks] and our reliance on the old master/slave dialectic to define and redefine our selves [sic] and our history. I really started working this way because I was so sick of that dialectic of my colored gal experience.”31 Her installations continually riff on this rejection of injury and its connection to black identity. “All black people . . . want to be slaves just a little bit. It gives people heaping teaspoons of dignity and pride.”32 This disdain for racial dignity claims separates Walker from most other black artists. Perhaps most controversially, she attributes craving injury to being part of black identity: “to be a slave runs along the lines of being a better masochist and knowing how to put up with things.”33

One distinct and particularly explosive aspect of the controversy is the sexual representations of black women, particularly with white men, that pervade Walker’s installations. Her most redundant figure is the “sexually magnetic Negress” and her younger version, the (female) pickaninny, posed in sexually explicit acts.34 Acts designed to shock. Swords and guns, symbols of both Confederate militarism and Southern “chivalry,” embody the white phallus in several installations. In one panel of The Battle of Atlanta: Being the Narrative of a Negress in the Flames of Desire—A Reconstruction, a “negress” fellates a limp soldier’s musket while she appears to vaginally sodomize herself with a second weapon.35 In another, a Confederate soldier holds a young black girl close to his crotch as he marches, appearing to penetrate her, while his lifted foot anally sodomizes a young black boy.36 The girl arches her back and flings her arms back (sexual ecstasy? fright and pain?), while the boy grasps an erect carrot situated at his genitalia. In a third panel, a young white boy, his playfulness represented by his paper sailor’s hat, jabs his toy sword at the

HARRIS, supra note 2, at 197. For thoughtful discussion of efforts to prevent some of Walker’s exhibitions and to revoke her MacArthur grant, see SHAW, supra note 6, at 102-23.


32. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 216. Another critic—a “fan” who interprets Walker’s work through the lens of Freudian uncanny—even “struggled” with whether to include this quotation, in part because it might lead readers to conclude that she is “politically irresponsible.” Reinhardt, supra note 5, at 127.

33. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 216.

34. Dixon, supra note 8, at 13. Even finding language to describe the installations becomes a problem: some critics render “neutral” descriptions while others characterize the women as the objects of sexualized torture and brutal violence. See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.


36. Id. at 56.
spread legs of a lifeless black woman tied by her neck to a tree. He is a bit off balance, and behind him a young white girl appears about to give him the final push toward penetration (and murder?). In An Abbreviated Emancipation, a little black girl fellates what turns out to be her own tail (or is it a whip?). The Means to an End—A Shadow Drama in Five Acts starts with a black woman carrying around a young white boy, suspended by his lips from her breast. The installation ends with a white man wearing Lincoln’s unmistakable stovepipe hat grabbing a lifeless black girl by her neck while his enormous leg moves towards her crotch.

Walker’s defenders argue again from postmodern sensibilities. Walker is playing with the “‘psychosocial Legacy’ of southern racism.” Or, another postmodern trope, self-referentiality and self-reflexivity. In this account, the sexually violated women in her installations are Walker herself projected onto the backdrop of slavery. Those who endorse this reading of her tableaux cast her as re-enacting the trauma of her own early interracial intimacy. In both cases, the installations ought not be read literally, but rather function as critiques of Walker’s own relationship to race and gender.

But to her detractors, these burlesque images of black women and girls are among the most offensive aspects of her work. As numerous black feminists...
have noted, in addition to public discrimination, economic tyranny, political repression, and criminal surveillance, whites established dominance over blacks through what Angela Davis termed sexual terrorism. Slavery, with its culture of rape and forced reproduction of black women, embodied the worst aspects of sex in the service of racial subordination. Walker's installations, with their conflation of sexual erotics with slavery's violence, or, even more provocatively, obliviousness to sexual subordination and abuse, flaunt this brutal and painful history. One commentator captures their impact:

The master may rape his property, but his victim does not hang her head in shame; instead, she looks back over her shoulder to see if her attacker is pleased. In this bizarre and horrific tableau there are no innocent heroines, no loyal retainers, and no one escapes unpunished—not the black paper characters on the white walls, and certainly not the viewer.

Arlene Keizer similarly observed, “When others have visually represented the rape of enslaved women, an attitude of mourning and outrage appropriate to a cultural tragedy has surrounded the image, an attitude in which the woman’s resistance (or unequivocal victimization) is a critical element.” In contrast, “Walker’s work is explicit, playful, grotesque, and deliberately shocking: it is emphatically not the work of mourning.” The fear is that such depictions satisfy “a strong desire for an essentially pornographic depiction of interracialism,” reassuring whites of the innocence of their own sexual past.

Elsewhere I have referred to the reflexive interpretation of white male/black female sexual relations through the historical lens of slavery’s skewed and brutal power relations as the “juridical imperative.” In this master narrative of structural rape and forced reproduction, sexual interactions

Id.; see also Arlene R. Keizer, Gone Astray in the Flesh: Kara Walker, Black Women Writers, and African American Postmemory, 123 PMLA 1649, 1656 (2008) (“More than any other image Walker deploys, [these depictions of sexual violence are] the source of the cultural controversy surrounding her work.”).

43. ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS 24 (1983).

44. SHAW, supra note 6, at 65. According to Arlene Keizer, the enslaved, raped woman is a “conceptual icon” in black studies and black culture. She argues, “Walker has forced it into view,” yet “[i]t is an image that many in the black community fervently wish had never been pictorially represented.” Keizer, supra note 42, at 1656.

45. Id.

46. Id.

47. Reid-Pharr, supra note 26, at 33.

48. Chang & Davis, supra note 6, at 1203 (according to the “juridical account: interracial intimacy between black women and white men has followed, and must always follow, a top-down exercise of power. This power is held by men and wielded against black women who may only futilely resist victimization. The emphasis is on the distribution of power between the dyad.”); id. at 1203-08; Adrienne D. Davis, Slavery and Shadow Families: Re-Thinking Interracial Intimacy Regulation 5-7, 21-29, 63-65 (Aug. 8, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (urging limits of the juridical imperative and arguing instead for attention to background conditions of equality and power that shape the social meaning of sexual relationships and intimacy).
between this dyad can only be subordinating manifestations of slavery’s racial supremacy and political in motivation and effect, that is, designed and executed to oppress. Unlike frequent representations of black male/white female relationships as “a revolutionary act,” “in the context of the black arts and black power movements, no such rebellious cast could be imagined for black women’s relationships with white men.” Instead, these sex acts are interpreted through a deeply gendered and conservative lens, in which black women are the gatekeepers of not only their own chastity and bodies but also of the honor and integrity of black communities. Indeed, following the juridical imperative, slavery’s sexual dynamics subordinated not only black women, but also black men, alienating them from conventional masculinity’s protection of women, thereby demoralizing the entire black community. Interestingly, both Walker’s detractors and her supporters embrace this reading of history: either Walker is condemned for not adhering to it or she is forgiven and understood because she lived it.

It is this view of sex as repressive and subordinating that Walker appears to be opposing in her art. Her silhouettes establish boundaries while simultaneously inviting their transgression and apparently reveling in their violation. (And, as mentioned, the viewer, too, becomes implicated, violating the conventional boundaries between audience and art.) Contrary to the juridical imperative, Walker embraces the pleasure possibilities, the liberatory potential of degrading, subordinating, and unequal sex. In Walker’s

49. Keizer, supra note 42, at 1666. Indeed, Keizer observes, “Many in the black community experience this suggestion as a profound heresy, a breaking of the last taboo.” Id. Hence “[t]he suggestion that such relationships are driven, on the woman’s part, by self-hatred, masochism, and a desire to demean black people as a group hovers just below the surface of many of the critiques leveled at Walker, Jones, and other black women writers investigating this territory.” Id. at 1667; see also Wagner, supra note 11, at 98 (describing unspeakability of such representations for older black artists).

50. Gwendolyn Shaw and, to a lesser extent, Michael Harris and Riché Richardson, try to rehabilitate Walker by reading her art in this way, filling in missing history and theoretical references. Although it is arguably the most pervasively traumatic, guilt-ridden episode in U.S. history, the experience of African slavery in America, this delineation produces an extraordinary space of psychological projection. It is a gothic space, belonging to the dark ages of American history, one that is barbarous, rude, uncouth, unpolished, in bad taste, and completely savage, a space made real on the walls of the gallery, in which the present-day viewer comes in contact with magnetic and disturbing specters from a mythical past engaged in an apocryphal and pornographic, unsentimental master-slave dialectic.

51. Patricia Yaeger combines a juridical reading of slavery’s sexually “traumatic events” and “stolen milk” with an intriguing Freudian interpretation of the silhouettes, comparing Walker’s “riot of lactation” with the role of cross-racial and incestuous suckling in Alice Randall’s parody, The Wind Done Gone, contending that in both, “milk has the power to initiate new genealogies, unexpected forms of rivalry and sisterhood, as well as old forms of capital.” Patricia Yaeger, Circum-Atlantic
portrayals, sex is everything MacKinnon tells us it is, but it’s fun. Or uninteresting.

These are Walker’s fantasy slave plantations, more influenced by Freudian repression and postmodern pastiche and parody than nineteenth-century sentimentality or contemporary Black Pride. (Nat Turner and Gabriel Prosser are conspicuously absent and she delights in a Harriet Tubman who cannot remember which star is the North Star.\(^2\)) They are full of mischief and mayhem, and no one seems particularly angry or upset about, or even really aware of, the rampant debauched violence. Figures always seem to be looking the other way as their orifices are penetrated. If classic silhouettes were a nod to the artistic and scientific conventions of their time, Walker’s reworked versions manifest an unabashed commitment to the irreverence and excess of contemporary and postmodern art.\(^3\) The power of the images, and the controversy over her work, stems from the ambiguity: is Walker reiterating or subverting the myths and stereotypes of slavery?\(^4\) A master (and mistress) of the postmodern, Walker dissembles in her answers. In other words, Kara Walker is a bad girl.

B. Janet Halley’s Law

Janet Halley is a widely and highly regarded gender and sexuality theorist. Her early work in law indicted legal and political institutions for perpetuating

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\(^1\) Superabundance: Milk as World-Making in Alice Randall and Kara Walker, 78 AM. LIT. 769, 784 (2006). Yaeger links “the hyperfolded, tradition-crumpling art of Walker and Randall” to a tradition of subverting racial legacies through subversive nursing and milk drinking within contemporary black fiction, including a plantation mistress’s nursing a black baby in Sherley Anne Williams’s Dessa Rose and Milkman Dead’s pre-adolescent suckling in Toni Morrison’s Song of Solomon. Id.


\(^3\) She violently reworks the silhouette form, contrasting the “ugliness” of slavery and ‘prettiness’ of the silhouette.” Reid-Pharr, supra note 26, at 28. Walker herself has argued that, as a “weaker, more feminine form,” the silhouette may have been available to nineteenth-century black women artists. SHAW, supra note 6, at 20. “I often compare my method of working to that of a well-meaning freed woman in a Northern state who is attempting to delineate the horrors of Southern slavery but with next to no resources, other than some paper and a pen knife and some people she’d like to kill.” Dixon, supra note 8, at 11 (quoting Walker). Interestingly, even though machines allowing precision silhouettes date back to at least the nineteenth century, Walker works freehand in today’s far more technologically sophisticated economy. Thelma Golden/Kara Walker, supra note 52, at 47; see also HARRIS, supra note 2, at 215 (discussing Walker’s work in context of postmodemism and hip-hop culture).

\(^4\) For instance, Gwendolyn Dubois Shaw notes that The Grand Allegorical Tableau “evoked for me the restaging of an apocryphal episode from . . . Uncle Tom’s Cabin. But I also saw piles of excrement, children being sexually assaulted, and babies being murdered, elements that didn’t fit in with my memory of the book.” SHAW, supra note 6, at 4.
heterosexism and repressing same-sex and gender rebellion.\textsuperscript{55} While not explicitly feminist in method or claims, Halley's work was largely applauded by leading legal feminists and she was seen as a fellow traveler. Then the troubles began. In a series of essays, talks, and a book, Halley began to argue that we should "Take a Break from Feminism."\textsuperscript{56} The "we" here was progressive types, those whose first principles typically include equality, anti-subordination, and liberation broadly conceived, but not won by sending in the troops and bombs. In other words, the usual suspects among the liberal left in law.

Halley's argument proceeds in three steps. As an initial matter, she offers what she describes as a "minimalist definition" of feminism.\textsuperscript{57} While acknowledging variance and diversity, she defines all feminisms as sharing certain common features.\textsuperscript{58} First, feminism draws a distinction between M and F. "Different feminisms do this differently: some see men and women, some see male and female, some see masculine and feminine."\textsuperscript{59} Next, as a descriptive matter, feminism posits the subordination of F to M, or, as Halley succinctly puts it, feminism sees M > F. Then, as a normative matter, feminism always carries a brief for F.\textsuperscript{60} Defending this minimalist definition, Halley


\textbf{56. The following essays contain overlapping arguments and are listed in the order I believe readers would find most useful in understanding Halley's argument: Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3 (contending that a "queer theory by men" offers an alternative way of thinking about sexuality); Janet Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?, in GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Karen Knop ed., 2004) [hereinafter Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?] (making a "taking a break from feminism" argument in the context of human rights debates); Brenda Cossman et al., Gender, Sexuality, and Power: Is Feminist Theory Enough?, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 601, 601-02, 604-17, 635-37 (2003) (exchange between Halley, Brenda Cossman, Dan Danielsen, and Tracy Higgins over the merits of "taking a break from feminism") [hereinafter Is Feminist Theory Enough?]; see also Karen Engle et al., Roundtable Discussion: Subversive Legal Moments?, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 197 (2003) (roundtable discussion between Halley and Nathaniel Berman, Adrienne Davis, Karen Engle, Elizabeth Schneider, and Vicki Schultz) [hereinafter Subversive Legal Moments?]. Seeds of the argument can also be found in Halley's Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 4 [hereinafter Halley, Sexuality Harassment] and Halley's introduction with Wendy Brown in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) [hereinafter Brown & Halley, Introduction]. Halley's book Split Decisions captures some of the arguments made in these essays, but not all, so I cite directly to her essays to maintain the nuance and subtlety of her critiques. I include citations to the book where its arguments are distinct.

\textbf{57. Halley, in Is Feminist Theory Enough?, supra note 56, at 604; Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 8; Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?, supra note 56, at 61.}

\textbf{58. "I think these attributes are noticeable in virtually every form of feminism in the United States today . . . ." Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 8. Elsewhere she says "there are many many features of contemporary and historically important feminism that are optional, however much they appear to their proponents as indispensable." Halley, in Is Feminist Theory Enough?, supra note 56, at 604; Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?, supra note 56, at 61.}


\textbf{60. Id. at 604. In her last essay, Halley concedes that feminism might turn on a distinction between M and F and carry a brief for F without insisting on F's subordination to M. But, Halley continues: "I think if you push hard enough, almost any currently available feminist text will eventually manifest its commitment to M > F." Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 8 n.3.}
explains that it "maximizes the range of projects that can be described as feminist, and makes it harder to Take a Break from them."61

Halley’s next step argues for a divergence between feminism’s goals and those of queer theory. Within the minimalist architecture she identifies two “phyla,” one committed to theorizing F’s subordination through sexuality and the other focused on care work.62 Of concern to Halley is the former.63 In its activist mode, feminism targeted sexual violence, sexual harassment, sex between unequals (Halley’s examples are “boss/secretary, teacher/student”), and pornography “as leverage points for the de-subordination of women.”64 She fears that, in the process, these “feminist justice projects” succumbed to

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61. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 7. In the earlier essays, Take a Break from Feminism?, Is Feminist Theory Enough?, and particularly, Subversive Legal Moments?, she is pretty vehement about the universal indictment of feminism:

My point today has been that, in those practices, feminism has argued itself into the idea that all left anti-subordination justice projects must be feminist—and if they are not, feminists have been morally bad. My countermove is to suggest that, in this practice that is feminism, we were more willing to let some projects go and to let some things not be feminist.

Halley, in Subversive Legal Moments?, supra note 56, at 241. In the last essay, Queer Theory by Men, it appears her real targets are dominance and cultural feminism:

Our very desire and our very modes of knowledge are inhabited throughout by the epistemology of this power structure. Men emerge as objective knowers, and women as known objects; and this turns us all on and is our basic grammar of action: man fucks woman, subject verb object. Feminism is a project in quest for women’s point of view, which, because it is already constituted as its subordination, is not only a profoundly deferred but also a deeply problematic starting place.

Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 10; see also Romero, supra note 4, at 233 (“Halley’s real problem is with two strands of “sexual-subordination” feminism, not feminism in toto . . . . Halley detests the anti-sex culture connected to [MacKinnon] and the moralism that pervades [West].”) (footnotes omitted). Yet all of the pieces proclaim equally her commitment to the “minimalist definition” of feminism. The Split Decisions monograph incorporates an analysis of more kinds of feminisms, but still adheres to the “minimalist” definition. See, e.g., HALLEY, supra note 4, at 4-5, 8, 17-20, 149, 189, 249, 287, 290, 309-10. The book also introduces another set of feminist minima, the Injury Triad, a “triad of descriptive stakes: women are injured, they do not cause any social harm, and men, who injure women, are immune from harm—female injury + female innocence + male immunity.” Id. at 320; cf. West, supra note 4, at 38, 44 (urging that Halley erases rape’s injury, absolves perpetrators of responsibility, and denies a role for state or social intervention, which she terms the “legitimation triad”).

62. See, e.g., Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 8-9; see also Adrienne D. Davis & Joan C. Williams, Foreword—Symposium: Gender, Work & Family Project Inaugural Feminist Legal Theory Lecture, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 3 (2000) (“Yet, even as the sex/violence strand has become a mainstay of contemporary feminist legal theory, another core piece of anti-sexist analysis has been left under-attended. It is the conflict that people experience as they negotiate between their work lives and their family lives, especially once complicated by parental status.”).


64. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 13; see also Halley, in Is Feminist Theory Enough?, supra note 56, at 608; Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?, supra note 56, at 65.
governance goals, developing frightening alliances with the state to police and discipline undesirable sex.65 Halley also fears what she/Ian (Halley's *Queer Theory by Men* is authored by "Ian Halley") calls governance feminism's "convergentism,"66 or its desire to integrate and assimilate everything "good" into itself,67 leaving it mesmerized by its own "moral perfectionism" and unable to hear criticism.68 Feminism's unapologetic recruitment of state power, convergentist impulses, and will to power, to run things, are in need of "a theory and practice of its own role in governance, of itself as a responsible wielder of power."69

Understood as a theory of sexuality, one that embodies a "simultaneous turn to the state and against sex," governance feminism threatens to thwart other left/liberal sexuality projects.70 Of primary concern to Halley are queer projects committed to affirming sex without a first principle of equality or anti-subordination. Halley's version of queer theory rejects governance feminism's adherence to certainty, identity, and subordination as guiding principles.71 Queer theory's vision of "sexuality [as] dark, unknown to us, riven by paradox and reversal" contradicts governance feminism's commitment to knowing and pursuing women's sexual welfare.72 In fact, Halley argues that feminism's rigorous mapping of sexual injury may actually be injuring its "client base,"

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65. Halley, in *Is Feminist Theory Enough?*, supra note 56, at 608. Halley develops this skepticism of the left's alliance with the state in her introduction with Wendy Brown in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 56. See also Halley, *Sexuality Harassment*, supra note 56. In a fascinating close reading of Catharine MacKinnon's work, she/Ian identifies the emergence of governance impulses as a key distinguishing feature between MacKinnon's earliest work and her classic book, *Feminism Unmodified*. "Early MacKinnon" embraced "a critique of the state and of the law . . . . The state could not be used against something so constitutive of it as male power; and female subjectivity, which was a constitutive element of male power, provided no way out of the dilemma." Halley, *Queer Theory by Men*, supra note 3, at 11. But by the time *Feminism Unmodified* was published in the mid-1980s, MacKinnon "claimed to know many, many things." *Id.* at 11. The state had a discernible role to play, and that was in protecting women from sexual violence, pornography, and sexual harassment through imposing legal sanctions and conferring rights. *Id.* Halley urges that "feminists who want to resist the influence of the Late MacKinnon should consider whether their own reasons for resistance appear as MacKinnon's own position" in the early work. *Id.* at 10.


68. Halley, *Take a Break From Feminism?*, supra note 56, at 66. Halley also refers to this as "big tent" feminism. Halley, in *Subversive Legal Moments?*, supra note 56, at 225. She rejects efforts by self-described feminists to incorporate her criticisms or defend feminism as "recuperative" and part and parcel of governance through convergence. Halley, in *Is Feminist Theory Enough?*, supra note 56, at 606. Dan Danielsen also offers a brief but insightful comparison of this aspect of Halley's work with a disparate tendency in Brenda Cosman's. Danielsen, in *Is Feminist Theory Enough?*, supra note 56, at 629 (contrasting "containment" versus "big tent" feminisms).

69. Halley, in *Is Feminist Theory Enough?*, supra note 56, at 608; see also *Subversive Legal Moments?*, supra note 56, at 231-33, 236-40 (extensively discussing governance feminism and its willingness to induce "sex panics" to achieve its regulatory aims).


71. Halley's queer theory borrows from Judith Butler, Michel Foucault, Friedrich Nietzsche, and postmodernist thought more generally.

causing victims of sexism to suffer. Halley’s queer theory is also rigorously anti-identitarian, rejecting the distinction between M and F, thus forfeiting women as a client base. Finally, it breaks with the “equality-is-freedom” impulses of conventional anti-subordination and civil rights movements. In its place, it permits, even celebrates, the eroticization of domination and its liberatory potential. A consequence, indeed a goal, of governance feminism is to repress through legal sanctions and moral indictments “unequal” sex in the name of its client base, women. Hence, Halley fears that queer theory’s interests in [affirming] the “intersections of the erotic with power and pain might just not always line up under the minimal terms required by feminism today . . . .”

Halley’s final step is to urge that left/liberal/progressives Take a Break from Feminism. Instead of urging a reconciliation of feminism with queer theory, she argues the conceptual benefits of divergence. “The argument is not that the convergence of feminism with queer theory is impossible or undesirable; it is merely that divergence is both possible and possibly highly valuable.”

73. Id. at 12. Describing a woman who sued her husband for intentional infliction of emotional distress, claiming he coerced her into sadomasochism, Halley contends that, while the woman viewed herself as a victim, she was able to use the law, influenced by feminist theory, to exercise control over her husband’s sexual preferences. Noting that the court agreed with the wife, Halley argues: “feminism might be responsible not only for her power, but also for the terrible suffering that grounds it.” Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?, supra note 56, at 75 (emphasis omitted); see also Janet Halley, The Politics of Injury: A Review of Robin West’s Caring for Justice, 1 UNBOUND 65, 83 (2005) (hereinafter Halley, The Politics of Injury) (“While feminism is committed to affirming and identifying itself with female injury, it may thereby, unintentionally, intensify it.”); cf West, supra note 4, at 18 (“The sense of injury, in other words, may well have been brought on, albeit indirectly, by texts, feminist and otherwise. It does not follow that the injury itself had its genesis in the Word. The sense of one’s entitlement to equal regard, by which one’s suffering might be regarded as injurious, avoidable, deterrollable, and compensable, though, might well have.”).

74. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 38.

75. [A]s long as men and women do find intense pleasure inside the eroticization of domination; as long as pleasure sometimes takes the form of pain, and pain of pleasure; as long as desire can extend its reach to shame; as long as gender as power-over is subject to complex psychic reversals; as long as the resulting highly volatile system is understood to provide the raw material both for domination and for “resistance, compromise, and opportunism”; as long as these conclusions about our life in sexuality hold, it could never be “just the truth” that the scenario we are construing was only pleasure/resistance and not something bad as well, or only something bad and not pleasure/resistance as well.

Id. at 37-38.

76. Id. at 49. Acknowledging variations of queer discourse, she seeks a queer theory purged of identitarianism and feminist convergence: in other words, a purely Foucauldian dedication to “bodies and pleasures.” Id. at 20 (citing Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, in AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS/CULTURAL ACTIVISM 197 (Douglas Crimp ed., 1988)).

77. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 9-10. “My overall goal in this discussion is to make a case for the proposition that divergence in left thinking about sexuality and power can get us some conceptual gains that seem unavailable from convergence.” Id. at 9. In fact, as noted above, the convergentist impulse is one key feature of governance feminism. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
standard queer critiques of feminism that do not urge a full-on "break." Taking a Break from Feminism appears to have two components. As a descriptive matter, it rejects feminism’s monopoly as a theory of sexuality. Halley observes: "[Gayle] Rubin’s hypothesis that a left sex radical could have an analysis or a political moment that engages the politics of erotic life without being feminist has come to have a significant descriptive validity, at least for now." Such a Break leaves room for hypotheses "that sexuality can be understood without reference to M and F; and . . . that power can be understood without >." The normative component is that there are benefits of suspending feminism’s monopoly. Halley compiles an exhaustive list of "costs" that governance feminism imposes. Of primary concern are its ruthless efforts to end the sexual subordination of its client base, women, at the expense of other social interests, including queer goals. In sum, "we don’t always need feminism in order to have meaningful left projects about sexuality."

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78. See, e.g., FEMINISM MEETS QUEER THEORY (Elizabeth Weed & Naomi Schor eds., 1997) (compilation of essays addressing "the odd sort of feminism queer theory presents [feminism] with," which is "a strange feminism, stripped of its contentious elements, its internal contradictions, its multiplicity.” Id. at vii, ix.); Cheshire Calhoun, Separating Lesbian Theory from Feminist Theory, 104 ETHICS 558 (1994); Elisa Glick, Sex Positive: Feminism, Queer Theory, and the Politics of Transgression, 64 FEMINIST REV. 19 (discussing how the sexual politics of the 1980s and 1990s permitted a theoretical alliance between feminism and queer theory on sex positivity); see also infra notes 92, 205 and accompanying text (discussing rejection of women queer theorists).

79. Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?, supra note 56, at 58. Halley quotes Rubin: "Feminism is the theory of gender oppression. To automatically assume that this makes it the theory of sexual oppression is to fail to distinguish between gender, on the one hand, and erotic desire, on the other.” Id. at 57 (quoting Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267, 307 (Carol S. Vance ed., 1984)).

80. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 47. Her monograph, Split Decisions, is more ambivalent about whether queer theory generated by men can offer the refuge from governance and equality-seeking Halley envisions. Halley herself notes the tension within the book:

I’m not promoting Queer Theory as The Answer, or as The Replacement of Feminism, or as a Normative Ideal. It has been a brave Break Taker, and it has carried the ball further down certain fields. But it has its own limits . . . . Other people might idealize queer theory—for instance, the Janet Halley who started this book did—but I simply no longer think it’s a good idea to collapse your theory with your utopia.

HALLEY, supra note 4, at 309. On the very next page she reiterates, “My idea that Queer Theory by Men would give me a clean break from feminism was promptly defected by the very texts I selected to study.” Id. at 310.


82. Halley is adamant that she is endorsing neither anti-feminism nor post-feminism, which she characterizes (and implicitly rejects) as neconservative. “To say that this is an anti- or post-feminist question is to presuppose that ‘we’ are ‘women’—a claim that would be untrue in a very trivial sense if ‘we’ are ‘gay men and lesbians,’ or ‘black feminist women and progressive black men,’ or ‘the working class.’ To insist that Taking a Break from Feminism is anti- or post-feminist is to presuppose that feminism will always be the origin and destiny of left politics on sexuality. But that’s exactly what Taking a Break from Feminism is challenging.” Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?, supra note 56, at 59-60 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted); see also Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 14 (“Taking a Break from Feminism is anti- or post-feminist only if feminism requires convergentism on all matters relating to sexuality; that is, if M/F, M>F, and carrying a brief for F must be the ultimate ground of all work in this wide and politically, historically, and intellectually riven domain.”).

83. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 9.
The Taking a Break from Feminism (TBF) essays comprise only one strand of Janet Halley’s substantial and complex oeuvre. Some of her germinial articles also grappled with tensions between queer commitments and feminism, but in those papers she distinguished among different forms of feminism, those she found compatible with sexuality justice projects (e.g., socialist feminism and sex-positive feminism) and those, e.g., “sexual subordination” feminism, that she did not. Her characterization in Sexuality Harassment is emblematic:

Indeed, feminist queer thinking might even say that we insult women by attributing to them such milquetoast psyches that they must be assumed incapable of fomenting powerful phantasmatic cathexes on abjection. And so we have queer and feminist queer projects of asking whether, when a woman claims that a male coworker or supervisor or teacher injures her by desiring her sexually, we should believe her, or think her claim of injury is reasonable.

But the feminism she endorsed in Sexuality Harassment drops mysteriously out of the TBF essays. In fact, what distinguishes the essays is that each attributes the “minimalist definition” to feminism, which she argues characterizes all feminisms. In marked distinction from the earlier work, the TBF project rejects all feminisms as intrinsically incompatible with sexual liberty goals, now denominated as “queer.” To be fair, she does not uniformly limit her critique to calls for sex equality: at some points she rejects all “minoritizing” civil rights projects. Yet it is feminism that is consistently and squarely in her

84. Halley, Sexuality Harassment, supra note 56, at 194-97; see also Halley, supra note 4, at 41.
85. Halley, Sexuality Harassment, supra note 56, at 81. For instance, she says, “I argue that it is time for a return to a socialist feminist understanding of this piece of left legalism. This is in part because socialist feminism provides the more germane insights into working women’s lives.” Id. Similarly, in a contemporaneous essay, a review of Robin West’s book, Caring for Justice, Halley does not make a case for the TBF project, but instead urges feminism to “understand women’s version of what Leo Bersani, writing on behalf of gay men, has called ‘gay male love of the cock.’” Halley, The Politics of Injury, supra note 73, at 70 (emphasis in the original) (footnote omitted). In this essay, she expresses her concern not as a contradiction between feminism and queer theory, but rather as an intellectual failing of feminism, insightfully arguing that “a feature that I regard as widely characteristic of feminist legal theory today and highly puzzling if not downright inexplicable: a pervasive lack of interest in women’s erotic yearning for men and a foreclosure of theoretic space for an affirmation of men’s erotic yearning for them.” Id. She continues: “Inside feminism I’ve found affirmations of female femininity, female masculinity, and male femininity—but no affirmations of male masculinity.” Id.; see also Jane M. Gaines, Sexual Semiosis, 11 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 55, 57 (2004) (noting that feminism has generated theories of pleasure but not of excitement).
86. Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 56, at 101 (emphasis in original). Similarly, she says, “I argue that it is time for a return to a socialist feminist understanding of this piece of left legalism. This is in part because socialist feminism provides the more germane insights into women’s working lives.” Id. at 81.
87. This architecture is maintained in her monograph. See supra note 61.
88. See, e.g., Halley, The Politics of Injury, supra note 73, at 65 (characterizing Robin West’s recent book on cultural feminism as exemplary of “other left-multicultural identity-political subordination-theory (LMIPST) projects” that share a vision of identity politics as harm); see also Halley, “Like Race” Arguments, supra note 3, at 65 (on minoritizing identity projects).
crosshairs. “Is there . . . something about the social world, something about justice, something about left ambitions, that need not be referred to by feminism?” And, it is only feminism that she calls for a break from, not “justice” more broadly.

In her quest for an alternative vision of sexuality and power, in one important essay Halley appeared to be rejecting not only feminism, but also the germinal queer texts by female scholars such as Eve Sedgwick, Judith Butler, and Gayle Rubin. Instead, she endorsed a particular brand of queer theory, that “authored by men.” (In fact, this essay is authored by “Ian” Halley.) It is here that Halley finds the relationship between sex and power she seeks. In contrast with feminism’s suspicions of “unequal sex,” its insistence on such sex as a core aspect of the subordination of its client base, women, and its commitment to punish and regulate deviations, Halley finds in male-authored queer theory the liberatory possibility of sexual shame and suffering:

In this queer mode, it is the confrontation of the self with its embodiment, with its will to power over and its utter lack of control over that object, the body; its pleasurable and frightening ability to wield itself as embodied to control the world, and the utter, persistent fragility and reversibility of that project (the world against the body, against the self) that is erotic; both assertion and dissolution are compellingly familiar, mutually contingent, and constantly yielding to one another in the body’s very capacity for experience of itself as human; gender is secondary, derivative, and (however highly useful as a vocabulary) definitive of exactly nothing in the tremulous project of the self. Indeed, if the implicit masochism of the orgasmic aim involves a will to be shattered, disoriented, erased, then gender would be one of the things that one lost track of.

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89. Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?, supra note 56, at 59.
90. Contrast Halley’s book with Left Legalism/Left Critique, in which Halley and Wendy Brown compile essays “attempting to reinvigorate and revalue the tradition of critique as vital to what the intellectual left has to offer” with Halley’s call to “take a break from feminism.” Brown & Halley, Introduction, supra note 56, at 4.
91. See, e.g., Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990); Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (1990); Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in Pleasure and Danger, supra note 79, at 267. Further examples of women scholars whose work in postmodernist and critical theory is often used by early queer scholars include: Teresa de Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema (1984); Diana Fuss, Identification Papers: Readings on Psychoanalysis, Sexuality, and Culture (1995); Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman (Gillian C. Gill trans., 1985); Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (Leon Roudiez trans., 1982); Monique Wittig, Les Guerilleres (David Le Vay trans., 2007). Halley’s monograph, Split Decisions, incorporates an extensive analysis of some of these thinkers, but in a context in which Halley is already backing away from queer theory as a theoretical and political refuge from feminism’s governance and equality-seeking. Halley, supra note 4, at 114-18, 133-50.
92. See Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 14-38.
93. Id. at 26.
Significantly, because her embrace of sexual shame is rooted in the release that comes from relinquishing power, *Queer Theory by Men* locates the shame in a masculine surrender of sexual dominance, an embrace of abjection which lesbians, implicitly, do not enjoy. In so doing, Halley appears to reject lesbianism as failing to embody the satisfaction and fulfillment in surrendering sexual power. "Queer theory by men," on the other hand, embraces the humiliation and degradation that feminism condemns as subordinating injury.

Halley’s critics have been only slightly less forgiving than Walker’s. Mary Anne Franks’s sharp review concludes, “[W]hat Halley seems to be after is not mere reinstatement of patriarchy, but patriarchy with a smile—with a stamp of (erotic) approval from women” and characterizes Halley’s approach to feminism as “paranoid-critical.” A review in *Feminist Legal Studies* found *Split Decisions* to be a “famously reductive” “taunt” and noted: “It is worth pausing for a moment to consider why a scholar of Halley’s sophistication would do something as crass as reduce a long and vibrant tradition of intellectual and political resistance [feminism] to a slick mathematical formula.” A different review charged that Halley “revels in the bombastic” and has created “caricatures” while failing to proffer “sophisticated and nuanced feminist theorizing.” Both Robin West’s and Robyn Wiegman’s reviews similarly look askance at Halley’s politics. Moreover, informally, at feminist conferences and gatherings, one hears murmurings: “I just don’t get it”; “What is she doing?”; “I thought she was a feminist.” The jury is in and,

95. In her monograph, *Split Decisions*, Halley engages many more texts, including some authored by those who identify as lesbian. See, e.g., HALLEY, supra note 4, at 132-50, 230-37, 246-60 (discussing Eve Sedgwick and Judith Butler). The monograph is also more skeptical of the promise of queer theory by men.
96. Franks, supra note 4, at 259, 262 ("Halley frequently characterizes feminism as paranoid; ironically, Halley’s reading of the power of feminism could itself be described as paranoid."). Franks’s scrupulous reading of *Split Decisions* focuses on and deconstructs the binary she finds Halley erects between "undifferentiated, decontextualized, and dehistoricized bodily pleasures" and "the allegedly pleasure-killing, paranoid, and moralizing power of feminism." Id. at 257. At the end of her review, Franks concludes, “Halley’s theory does not just ask us to take a break from feminism; it asks us to take a break from critical thinking and to embrace a theory that immunizes us from any scrutiny of pleasure.” Id. at 267. But, basing her disagreement in a focus on the material, Franks disagrees: “While it is certainly Halley’s prerogative to find value in patriarchal norms, there is something intellectually dishonest about the implication that her position is somehow less moralizing, less paranoid, or less powerful than this Thing Called Feminism.” Id. at 261; see also Lisa Jervis, *The Feminist Minima*, 24 WOMEN’S REV. BOOKS 6 (2007) (book review) (also criticizing Halley for failing to take account of material conditions of power).
98. Mary Hawkesworth, *Book Review*, 5 PERSP. ON POL. 609, 609, 610 (2007) (“Halley’s virulent condemnation appears to depend upon a hypothetical feminism judged in the context of a counterfactual Supreme Court case on the basis of facts not in evidence, a troubling mode of theorizing, to say the least.”); see also Jervis, supra note 96, at 6 (“Her take is at once too bloodless to inspire much defensive anger and too obscure to sway the general public.”).
99. See West, supra note 4, at 14-16; Wiegman, supra note 94, at 96.
like Walker's ejection from the black art establishment, Halley is out of feminism's vast big tent. She is an official bad girl of law.

C. Common Commitment/Common Critique, or Genealogies Against Justice

One might object to Walker's installations and Halley's invitation to Take a Break from Feminism on any number of grounds. Criticisms might start with an effort to deny or explain away the disputes, as some art critics try to do with Walker. Next, one might dismiss as undescriptive their characterizations of the "justice projects" they reject. Walker caricatures the civil rights movement and, although in at least one essay Halley limits her concerns to dominance and cultural feminism, her indictment of feminism is relentlessly broad-ranging while her essays embrace only a stunningly narrow slice of queer theory. Finally, one could castigate them, Walker in particular, for fueling the fire. (Walker's response to the fury and storm against her? An installation featuring a little black girl fellating the penis of a lynched black

100. Annette Dixon argues that Walker's interest "is neither the history of American race relations nor the physical and psychological damage that has been visited upon (Black) American people, but instead the very discursive and aesthetic field that would allow the confusions surrounding her work to become so prominent." Dixon, supra note 8, at 28; see also supra notes 41-42, 51 and accompanying text (critics arguing Walker does conform to juridal notions of race and sex). Insert sex for race and women for black people and this statement is probably equally descriptive of Halley's work.

101. In contrast to the cottage industry dedicated to Walker's work, while there has been much grumbling, published critiques of Halley's argument are only now coming. (This appears to stem in some part from Halley's own reluctance to publish her work until she had fully thought it through.) In her exchange with Halley, Brenda Cossman defends the analytic purchase of gender, contending that feminism can shed light on dynamics and disputes. Mapping different forms of feminism, she offers alternative readings of Halley's key case. Cossman, in Is Feminist Theory Enough?, supra note 56, at 619-23; id. at 623 ("Together, sex radical, redistributive, and queer theory feminist readings would dispute and disrupt the dominant feminist reading of Twyman. But, each of these readings retains a focus on gender as an axis of power, as 'a primary way of signifyng relationships of power'.") In addition, Robyn Wiegman's response to Ian Halley questions Queer Theory by Men's taxonomies of both feminism and queer theory, concluding that it confuses the inherent governance of legal feminism with "feminism in its traversal of either public political culture or the academy." Wiegman, supra note 94, at 105.

102. Halley defines dominance feminism as "domination of women through power" and cultural feminism as unjust male derogation of women's traits or points of view or values or experiences through male-ascendant normative value judgments. Their solutions are to attack male power versus transvaluing values and restorative projects. In sum,

MacKinnon would like to get men by the balls because she does not believe their minds and hearts can follow; whereas cultural feminism has detailed plans for their hearts and minds. Cultural feminism is a fighting faith seeking the moral conversion of a little less than half the human race.

Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 12; see also Halley, in Is Feminist Theory Enough?, supra note 56, at 605 ("Countering MacKinnon's alliance with some cultural feminists to regulate heterosexual eroticism on the assumption that it is a key element in women's subordination and is always . . . bad for women, there have been powerful sex liberationist, sex radical, and more recently 'sex positive' feminisms that understand sexuality to be a domain of 'pleasure and danger' to which women need untrammelled access."). For discussion of Halley's narrow vision of queer theory, see infra notes 202-207 and accompanying text.
In a less inflammatory way, Halley also has expressed skepticism about feminist and other civil rights "justice projects" and rejected feminist overtures to return to the fold. Both have been dismissed as merely generating and reveling in psychosocial dramas lacking in significant theoretical or aesthetic content or import. Others have tried to ascertain Halley and Walker's psychological motivations for disavowal, putting them on the couch, as it were. Yet, here I want to focus on a different aspect of Walker's and Halley's common commitment and common critique—their mutual indictment of conventional justice projects and the grounding of these indictments in alternative genealogies of sex and power rooted in their embrace of abjection.

In classic civil rights and feminist conceptions, bodies, power, and subordination run through a defined circuit. Certain bodily relations manifest or reinforce group-based power imbalances and should be condemned as subordinating. Both projects view sexual relations as particularly vulnerable. Indeed, structural subordination, whether racial or sexual, erupts most violently and visibly through bodies, leaving its imprints on broken carcasses—whipped, battered, lynched, or raped. These racially and sexually injured bodies manifest the machinations of material political economies that accumulate and allocate power among groups, and much of the historic mission of civil rights and feminism has been to investigate, document, and combat these effects. Both justice projects advocate egalitarian and regulated social relations, especially in sex, as crucial to countering group subordination.

In particular, consent and equality loom large in conventional justice projects' sexual critiques. Both the juridical imperative and dominance feminism, which Halley terms sexual subordination feminism, theorize sex as a core source of identity injury. Men maintain power over women and, less
between the sexes is organized so that men may dominate and women must submit and this relation is sexual—in fact, is sex.”) (footnote omitted); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989) (contrasting feminism’s account of male power through sex with Marxism’s account of class power through labor); see also Davis & Williams, supra note 62, at 2-3 (explaining that feminists such as MacKinnon “have shown how the eroticization of dominance systematically empowers men, while subordinating women and endangering their lives and bodily integrity”).

107. Notably, both Angela Davis and Andrea Dworkin have used sexual terrorism to characterize sexual relations. Compare Angela Davis, Reflections on the Black Woman’s Role in the Community of Slaves, 13 MASS. REV. 81, 96 (1972) (“In confronting the black woman as adversary in a sexual contest, the master would be subjecting her to the most elemental form of terrorism distinctively suited for the female: rape. Given the already terroristic texture of plantation life, it would be as potential victim of rape that the slave woman would be most unguarded.”), with Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: The New Terrorism, 8 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 217 (1978-79) (“Pornography is the propaganda of sexual terrorism . . . . Female rebellion against male sexual despotism, female rebellion against male sexual authority, is now a reality throughout this country. The men, meeting rebellion with an escalation of terror, hang pictures of maimed female bodies in every public place.”).

108. Some feminists allocate the duty to the object of desire to express or withhold consent; others endorse a regime in which the desiring party actively solicits consent. See, e.g., MAKING SENSE OF SEXUAL CONSENT (Mark Cowling & Paul Reynolds eds., 2004) (contemplating sexual consent outside the scope of both radical feminist rejections of consent as inextricably embedded in male domination and liberal defaults to individual agency as measure); Alan Soble, Antioch’s “Sexual Offense Policy”: A Philosophical Exploration, 28 J. SOC. PHIL. 22 (1997).


110. On the legibility of black suffering and its connection to “sentimental citizenship,” see generally REBECCA WANZO, THE SUFFERING WILL NOT BE TELEvised: AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN AND SENTIMENTAL POLITICAL STORYTELLING (2009). I purposely use Douglass and Du Bois as examples of men who connected racial equality to black women’s sexual injury. See, e.g., W.E.B. DU BOIS, The Damnation of Women, in W.E.B. DU BOIS: A READER 299, 304-05 (David Levering Lewis ed., 1995) (“I shall forgive the white South much in its final judgment day . . . . But one thing I shall never forgive, neither in this world nor the world to come: its wanton and continued and persistent insulting of the black womanhood which it sought and seeks to prostitute to its lust . . . . To no modern race does its women mean so much as to the Negro nor come so near to the fulfillment of its meaning. As one of our women writes: ‘Only the black woman can say ‘when and where I enter, in the quiet, undisputed dignity of my womanhood, without violence and without suing or special patronage, then and there the whole Negro race enters with me.’”). Douglass’s abolitionist newspaper, The North Star, carried this slogan on
white men. Less obviously, but no less centrally, consent is seen as intrinsically linked to equality for civil rights as well as feminism.

This relentless focus on the material economies of bodies and power is part of what sends Halley and Walker screaming for the hills. Both reject justice projects’ minoritizing impulses and emphasis on power and subordination, and both seem to want to subvert the accompanying regulatory discourses of consent and egalitarianism.

As summarized above, Halley indicts feminism for its first principles of equality and anti-subordination as measures of women’s welfare. Discussing Twymen v. Twymen, Halley hypothesizes that “power relationships between husband and wife are myriad, indeterminate, and not readily captured by dominance/subordination models.”111 In fact, she argues that feminism’s discourse of sex and power might actually be contributing to sexual injury. She also takes it to task for its “governance,” i.e., its regulatory impulses that cause it to systematically recruit state power to discipline and punish inequitable and subordinating sex.112

Even more provocatively than Halley, Walker proclaims herself bored by conventional civil rights justice and dignity projects, in her case as an aesthetic mission. Already resented for success without “paying dues,”113 Walker disassociates herself from the racial establishment, which she derides as “the niggerati.”114 She expresses vast impatience with and derision for the civil rights generation and its cultural and historical icons. Poking fun at fire hose brutality, she indicts her brother for “seem[ing] to me to be a person who has been bracing himself for the fall, for the fire hoses, for the riot, for some kind of upsurge that’s racially motivated, then being in a situation where it never

its front page: “Right Is of No Sex—Truth Is of No Color—God Is the Father of Us All, and We Are All Brethren.” Douglass attended the 1848 Seneca Falls Convention to support women’s rights. In 1888, just before his death, he told the International Conference of Women that one of his proudest moments was his support for women’s rights forty years earlier. For a discussion of Douglass’s paper and both men’s views on gender equality, see Beverly Guy-Sheftall, 11 Black Women in United States History: Daughters of Sorrow (Darlene Clark Hine ed., 1990).

111. Halley, in Is Feminist Theory Enough?, supra note 56, at 615; see also Halley, supra note 4, at 346 ("If a social subordination exists and an antisubordination discourse—while also pursuing its antisubordination goals—ratifies it, fixes it, creates the discursive capacity for its experiential uptake by the subordinated, all the while hanging a bull’s-eye on it, then where does one intervene to attack it?").

112. See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.

113. “She has won major awards, the fervent support of many collectors and galleries, the adoration of curators . . . and the appreciation of art historians. She also has inspired the unprecedented disdain of artists like Betye Saar and Howardina Pindell and many others within African American cultural circles.” Harris, supra note 2, at 210. While this may sound like sour grapes, older black artists were subjected to structural racism and exclusion in the mainstream art world. In contrast, four years after her MacArthur award, Walker was selected to represent the United States at the 2002 Bienal de São Paulo and then the 2007 Venice Biennale. Kara Walker, Columbia Univ. Sch. of the Arts, http://arts.columbia.edu/visual-arts/kara-walker.

114. A Conversation Between Darius James and Kara Walker, supra note 31, at 1 ("Harvard and Henry Louis Gates, Jr. also put on a kind of niggerati circus in 1998 that I failed to attend—probably to my detriment, but I hate being lion fodder.").
arrived: bracing himself for the fall but landing on a pillow.”115 She concludes, “That’s for me the middle class black experience.”116 But according to Walker, her brother is not alone: “Everyone wants to play the nigger now. There is more power in the role of the underdog, pop culture tells us.”117 Particularly in her crosshairs is older black Americans’ insistence on dignity and humanity in the face of racial humiliation and shame. Of hearing older black people singing Lift Every Voice and Sing, James Weldon Johnson’s ode to black faith in and hope for equality and liberty, Walker says, “To hear a song of such social and moral uplift dragged, kicking and screaming, by the well-meaning tone-deaf . . . seemed a cruel yet apt metaphor for African America as the 20th century prepares to retire.”118 Paralleling Halley’s argument on the feminist production of sexual injury, Walker concludes that civil rights discourse has made injury the sine qua non of racial identity. “I think really the whole problem with racism and its continuing legacy in this country is that we simply love it. Who would we be without it and without the ‘struggle’?”119

In the end, Walker and Halley share a disinterest in, even an indictment of, the justice claims and critiques—anti-subordination, minoritized identity, egalitarian regulation—conventionally articulated by civil rights and feminism. Both disclaim the structural analyses that ground feminist and civil rights critiques of social and sexual power. And frankly, both appear bored by the investigations into material economies of injury and violation that have long been standard among the liberal/left. Instead, power dissipates in Halley’s law and Walker’s art as it is reworked into the personal, the individual’s ecstasy, without attention to its accumulation in society or collectively in groups.

“Inside” indictments of justice projects are certainly not new. Some blacks have long distanced themselves from civil rights initiatives, and women castigating feminism has a long pedigree.120 Some contemporary blacks call for

115. Bowles, supra note 30, at 8.
116. Id.
117. Walker elaborates, “History is carried like a pathology, a cyclical melodrama immersed in artifice and unable to function without it. The historical romance creates a will for abusive submission, exacerbated by contemporary ideologies that revere victimhood.” Shaw, supra note 6, at 118.
118. Bowles, supra note 30, at 8.
119. Reid-Pharr, supra note 26, at 33 (emphasis in original); Kara Walker, Kara Walker interviewed by Liz Armstrong, in No PLACE (LIKE HOME) (Richard Flood ed., 1997); see also James Hannaham, Pea, Ball, Bounce: Interview with Kara Walker, 28 Interview 119 (1998) (“It seems like I had to actually reinvent or make up my own racist situations so I would know how to deal with them as black people in the past did. In order to have a real connection with my history I had to be somebody’s slave. But I was in control. That was the difference.”).
120. For discussions of alternative black political traditions, see, for example, Christopher Alan Bracey, Saviors or Sellouts: The Promise and Peril of Black Conservatism from Booker T. Washington to Condeleeza Rice (2008); Michael L. Ondaatje, Black Conservative Intellectuals in Modern America (2010); Dean E. Robinson, Black Nationalism in American Politics and Thought (2001); Adjoa A. Ajetoro & Adrienne D. Davis, Historic and Modern Social Movements for Reparations: The National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America (N’COBRA) and Its Antecedents, 16 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 687 (2010). For discussions of women’s opposition to feminism, see, for example, Donald T. Critchlow, Phyllis Schlafly and
color-blindness in lieu of racial consciousness and many women affirm conventional gender roles. What is different, and hence interesting, about Walker’s and Halley’s aesthetic and political claims is that they do not line up with these arguably “conservative” critiques of justice projects either. Far from embracing a color-blind aesthetic, Walker’s art gains its aesthetic traction from racial depictions and caricatures, and Halley is hardly interested in the family values/missionary sex endorsed by most anti-feminists.

Rather, what distinguishes their indictments is that both attempt to ground their rejection of conventional justice projects in an alternative conception of bodies and power, one not rooted in civil rights’ and feminism’s first principles of sexual injury and subordination, equality, and regulation. And both turn to the concept of abjection—the liberatory potential of suffering and degradation—to do so.

As noted, Halley finds in “Queer Theory by Men” the celebration, the eroticization, of dominance. Rejecting feminism’s regulatory discourses of consent and egalitarianism, Halley finds in male-authored queer theory the liberatory and redemptive possibility of loss of self, of absence of control. “Shame is deeply embroidered into this image of erotic life.”121 Sex holds the possibility, through suffering, degradation, and humiliation, of challenging the primacy of identity and the grip of dimorphic gender. She embraces Bersani’s willingness to affirm sexuality as carrying an appetite for deep threats to integrated selfhood, its willingness to lose touch of propositional ethical logic to do so, its plunge into a profoundly irresolvable problematic of desire, and its fragmentation not only of the self but of the gendered self . . . . 122

Locating pleasure in abjection rejects mutuality and reciprocity as sexual goals, instead seeking the shattering, the explosion, indeed, the annihilation of self. Through shamed desire and shamed pleasure, “suffering can be what people seek.”123


121. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 36.
122. Id. at 25.
123. Halley, in Is Feminist Theory Enough?, supra note 56, at 617. Halley elaborates elsewhere:

[A]s long as men and women do find intense pleasure inside the eroticization of domination; as long as pleasure sometimes takes the form of pain, and pain of pleasure; as long as desire can extend its reach to shame; as long as gender as power-over is subject to complex psychic reversals; as long as the resulting highly volatile system is understood to provide the raw material both for domination and for “resistance, compromise, and opportunism”; as long as these conclusions about our life in sexuality hold, it could never be “just ‘the truth’” that the scenario we are construing was only pleasure/resistance and not something bad as well, or only something bad and not pleasure/resistance as well.
Several commentators, as well as the artist herself, have commented on the role of the abject in Walker’s art. Most notably, art scholars Michael Corris and Robert Hobbs applaud her use of abjection to rethink social stereotypes: “The body is opened to the social order, a more permeable world that experiences flows from the inside as well as from the outside.”124 If silhouettes are “rendered intelligible by their margins,” then Walker makes excellent use of this medium to foreground the abject, focusing attention on acts of penetrating orifices traditionally defined as sexually taboo (fellatio, sodomy, bestiality, pedophilia).125 This is classic abjection, the blurring of social boundaries by blurring bodily ones. Most controversially, Walker herself claims abjection in explaining her art, as “lur[ing] viewers into something ‘totally demeaning and possibly very beautiful.’”126 Elsewhere, describing her own reaction to racist images she says, “Those postcard coon images aren’t ugly because they’re ugly, they’re hateful because they’re cute, loveable, desirable.”127 As caricatures, her renderings of slavery’s violence, racial and sexual degradation, and general debauchery induce in viewers an impulse to giggle at this national trauma. Caricatures are cartoons; as simple characterizations, they are often designed to induce laughter. But there is something about how viewers find their own cartoonish fantasies literally projected onto the walls to cavort among Walker’s silhouettes that many find disturbing. And, like Halley, Walker embraces sexual shame and the seductiveness of degradation. She explains, “My work is intended to function like Harlequin romance novels which veil themselves in history and encourage women to participate in stories that are not in their best interests.”128 Indeed, Walker celebrates her own shamed desire through adolescent relations with white boys who sought to, in her words, exploit her: “‘I guess that’s when I decided to offer up my side-long glances: to be a slave just a little bit.’”129 In abjection’s embrace of shame and degradation, Walker appears to seek the converse of the dignity that the civil rights generation sought and that she derides.

Walker’s invocation of blacks “wanting to be slaves a little bit” is different when she invokes it for herself versus when she indicts other blacks for the
same thing. When she recounts her adolescent relationships with white boys, self-described as exploitative, her explanation of “wanting to be a slave a little bit” is quite Halley-like in its embrace of shame and humiliation as possibly erotic. On the other hand, when she characterizes other blacks as wanting to be slaves “just a little bit,” followed by the indictment, “It gives people heaping teaspoons of dignity and pride,” she seems to be making a different Halley move—accusing them of what Wendy Brown would call wounded attachments, their identity as a minority group lying in their perpetual reenactment of injury.\textsuperscript{130} Readers of these interviews with Walker might be so shocked by her inflammatory invocations of desires to be mastered that they might miss these two very different rhetorical moves and how each resonates with Halley in a different way.\textsuperscript{131}

Finally, central to their mutual embrace of abjection is Walker’s and Halley’s creation of alter egos who revel in suffering and degradation. As mentioned earlier, Halley’s important essay, \textit{Queer Theory by Men}, is authored by one “Ian Halley.”\textsuperscript{132} Through Ian, Halley rejects the identitarian injuries and commitments she argues feminism projects onto her body, read as female and lesbian. Instead, Ian represents a politics not “for women” but “for gay men.”\textsuperscript{133} As Ian, Halley further focuses on Bersani’s “affirmation of a shamed desire and a shamed pleasure because they are a desire and a pleasure: it’s as if he had said ‘we desire it, and love it when we get it, so it’s good.’”\textsuperscript{134} Similarly, Walker’s much-noted blurring of her art and her person has been a key point of contestation with her critics.\textsuperscript{135} Her ubiquitous “Negress Wench”

\begin{footnotesize}
130. WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 53 (1995) (exploring “the ways in which certain troubling aspects of the specific genealogy of politicized identity are carried in its political demands, ways in which certain emancipatory aims of politicized identity are subverted not only by the constraints of the political discourses in which its operations transpire but by its own wounded attachments.”).

131. I thank Mary Anne Case for pointing this out to me.


133. \textit{Id.} at 18. Wiegman’s essay notes that Halley participates in the “traffic in gay men,” a term which denotes the proliferation by lesbian thinkers, activists, and culture makers of a grammar of sex drawn from, often in overt debt to, gay male sexual styles and their idealization. Wiegman, \textit{supra} note 94, at 93. Ranjana Khanna asks,

If Janet Halley owns the words of Ian Halley, what is suggested about the constitution of the self, responsibility, and agency designated in the signature and in the name of the copyright holder? . . . Janet seems particularly keen to maintain ownership of Ian, and in some ways continues to insist her presence even though she presents herself as absent.

If Janet Halley owns the words of Ian Halley, what is suggested about the constitution of the self, responsibility, and agency designated in the signature and in the name of the copyright holder? . . . Janet seems particularly keen to maintain ownership of Ian, and in some ways continues to insist her presence even though she presents herself as absent.

Khanna, \textit{supra} note 104, at 70. Indeed, there is an arguable tension as to whether Halley is anti-identitarian or pro-ambiguity, i.e., sometimes she appears confidently pro-male, as in her endorsement of Duncan Kennedy’s taking account of heterosexual male interests and the residuum of risk to men. At these times she seems more interested in keeping M/F but flipping F > M, which seems decidedly identitarian. For a discussion of Kennedy and how he figures into Halley’s work, see \textit{infra} note 152.


135. According to one critic, Walker “has made a bargain with the viewer to implicate herself in the imagery.” HARRIS, \textit{supra} note 2, at 212. Cf. Keizer, \textit{supra} note 42, at 1670 (“Walker uses her personae to make a wide range of often contradictory statements.”).
\end{footnotesize}
is not only a stock character in her tableaux but also an alternative creative persona.136 (Interestingly, black men do not figure as significantly in Walker’s sexualized representations. The notable exceptions are images of black men’s decapitated heads, including a rather blunt analogy between anthropomorphism and race-mixing that features white swans with ill-fitting black men’s heads.)137 Self-consciously periodizing herself as part of a post-civil rights generation, she rejects the juridical imperative’s interpretation of her experience. Disputing critics’ interpretations of her early interracial sexual experiences as “abuse,” Walker proclaims her own embrace of what has been conventionally interpreted as sexual degradation and violation in the service of racial supremacy. (Recall her explanation of those experiences: “I guess that’s when I decided to offer up my side-long glances: to be a slave just a little bit.”138) Like Halley, Walker rejects the regulatory discourses of consent and egalitarianism erected to protect her from racial and sexual danger. Hence, through the “Negress Wench” and “Ian,” choosing as their registers another black woman and a gay man, Walker and Halley have inserted themselves as objects of the discourse, featured players in shadow dramas of their own.139

136. Two installations are attributed to nineteenth-century “Missus K.E.B. Walker, Colored,” which is a literary reference to an autobiography form favored by nineteenth-century blacks. See Presenting Negro Scenes Drawn Upon My Passage Through the South and Reconfigured for the Benefit of Enlightened Audiences Wherever Such May Be Found, By Myself, Missus K.E.B. Walker, Colored (1997), reprinted in PICTURES FROM ANOTHER TIME, supra note 8, at 36. A subsequent installation is even more self-referential: No Mere Words Can Adequately Reflect the Remorse This Negress Feels at Having Been Cast into Such a Lowly State by Her Former Masters and So It Is with a Humble Heart that She Brings About Their Physical Ruin and Earthly Demise (1999), reprinted in id. at 68. Other attributions include the “Emancipated Negress”; “An African Anonymous Adventuress” from Endless Conundrum; the “Black Heart of a Negress” from Excavated; and “Dusky Thighs of One Young Negress” from Gone. My Complement, supra note 14, at 384-89 (exhibition list). Furthermore, in an interview, Walker describes her efforts to “set up a narrative of herself.” Walker, supra note 119, at 104. More recently, Walker distanced herself from this persona:

There were a couple of long-winded titles for different works and shows where the word “negress” was prominent—partially as a device and partially as a way of distancing myself from myself, or liberating myself from myself, or something. . . . I have rather stopped doing that now. It got a little tired after a while.


137. This is featured in at least two installations, The Emancipation Approximation (1999-2000), reprinted in PICTURES FROM ANOTHER TIME, supra note 8, at 82-83; and No Mere Words Can Adequately Reflect the Remorse This Negress Feels at Having Been Cast into Such a Lowly State by Her Former Masters and So It Is with a Humble Heart that She Brings About Their Physical Ruin and Earthly Demise, supra note 136.

138. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.

139. The devices through which Walker and Halley transform their persona, time and sex, are themselves telling of their projects. Walker, a black woman, essentially re-periodizes herself, while Halley’s alter ego, a gay man, plays with both gender and sexuality. As I describe infra note 187, this is emblematic of the different idealized forms in which the two work, Walker’s nostalgia and Halley’s utopianism. I thank Mary Anne Case for suggesting this to me.
In the end, abjection functions for both Halley and Walker as a crucial alternative to civil rights’ and feminism’s structural and material analyses of power and injury. Halley explicitly grounds her academic critique of feminism’s governance in abjection; Walker’s invocations are more complex, but she is no less committed to deploying abjection to aesthetically disrupt civil rights discourse. For both, abjection, as a genealogy of sex and power, emphasizes the liberatory value of degrading bodily violation rather than its indictment as a source of inequality and subordination. Instead of equality and conventional justice, abjection permits, and even endorses, humiliation and shame as constitutive of human subjectivity.

PART II. GENEALOGIES OF ABJECTION

Halley and Walker are correct in that abjection is very much about power. But can it stand for dematerialization and disavowal? I am skeptical. This Part proffers a brief genealogy of abjection—from Julia Kristeva’s classic account to Leo Bersani’s more narrow one. It then considers whether either account offers the conceptual grounding Halley and Walker might seek for their disavowal projects.

A. Abjection: Classic & Subversive

Abjection is classically associated with French theorist Julia Kristeva. Challenging the primacy of desire in psychoanalytic thought, Kristeva identifies the foundational role of exclusion and limits in shaping human subjectivity and the social order. Abjection is fundamentally concerned with “inside/outside boundar[ies],” banishments, and limits. It links the integrity of the individual—his guarding of his own margins—to the integrity of the social order. To belong, one must exclude. Following anthropologist Mary Douglas’s work on pollution, Kristeva argues that filth is never a quality itself,
but relates to a boundary and "the object jettisoned out of the boundary, its other side, a margin." Kristeva's interest is in the border that establishes the limit between the clean and proper and the filthy and banished. She argues it is the fascination with the border itself, with the margin, that constitutes the abject. By respecting this limit defining inside and outside, belonging and exclusion, the subject emerges from chaos, yet suffers in doing so.

In configuring what is interior to limits as belonging, one discovers the loss of what has been jettisoned and excluded, the subject's "inaugural loss that laid the foundations of its own being" and inclusion in the social order. This loss is experienced as a void, a missing piece that the subject seeks and yet must disclaim. It draws the limit, and yet immediately regrets it. The abject then, is not the excluded, despised thing, but rather is the subject's own loss, "silhouetted as non-being," as a gulf, an abyss, threatening and yet beckoning. Hence, "from its place of banishment, the abject does not cease challenging its master." Rather, "the abject simultaneously beseeches and pulverizes the subject." Abjection wavers between the loss of meaning in "absolute degradation" and the unbearable ecstasy in this suffering. The greatest threat posed by the banished is its ongoing power to fascinate, even as it repulses and disgusts. In the end, the "intimate side of abjection" is suffering and horror its public feature.

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143. KRISTEVA, supra note 91, at 69. She continues, "[t]he potency of pollution is therefore not an inherent one; it is proportional to the potency of the prohibition that founds it." Id. Motivated by culturally specific impulses, societies identify sources of pollution and threatening objects and establish their limits, their boundaries against these threatening others.

144. Abjection functions by constituting a deject, which constantly questions not its being but its place, situating itself by asking "Where Am I" as opposed to "Who Am I?" Id. at 5.

145. Id. at 5.

146. Id. at 67. Kristeva expresses this simultaneous agony and ecstasy of differentiation through exclusion as crests, heights of harmony, and crescendos.

147. Id. at 2.

148. Id. at 5.

149. Id. at 18.

150. Id. at 140. Towards the end of the book she refers to abjection as "the power of fascination exerted upon us, openly or secretly, by that field of horror." Id. at 208.

151. The question of subjectivity and belonging or "exile" pervades other aspects of Kristeva's work on psychoanalysis. Like Powers of Horror, Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia and especially Strangers to Ourselves investigate the subject's formation through the linguistic, the maternal, and the anthropological. JULIA KRISTEVA, BLACK SUN: DEPRESSION AND MELANCHOLIA 11 (Leon S. Roudiez trans., Columbia University Press 1989) (1987) ("For my identification with the loved-hated other, through incorporation-introjection-projection, leads me to imbed in myself its sublime component, which becomes my necessary, tyrannical judge, as well as its subject component, which demeans me and of which I desire to rid myself."); JULIA KRISTEVA, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES 1 (Leon S. Roudiez trans., Columbia University Press 1991) ("Strangely, the foreigner lives within us: he is the hidden face of our identity, the space that wrecks our abode, the time in which understanding and affinity founder. By recognizing him within ourselves, we are spared detesting him in himself. A symptom that precisely turns 'we' into a problem, perhaps makes it impossible, The foreigner comes in when the consciousness of my difference arises, and he disappears when we all acknowledge ourselves as foreigners, unnamable to bonds and communities."). (Although I doubt that Kristeva's interlocution of the meaning and "absorption" of otherness and how we define ourselves, collectively and individually, is
In 1987, Leo Bersani’s germinal queer text, *Is the Rectum a Grave?*, deployed abjection to a different use. If Kristeva’s classic psychoanalytic conception concerned itself with the linguistic, the maternal, and the anthropological aspects of abjection, Bersani’s interests were in its political and subversive potential. Outraged by the “homophobic rage unleashed by the AIDS crisis,” Bersani located both the threat and the subversive potential of homosexuality in the “hygienics of social power” invoked by gay men’s association with anal penetration.

With the politics of gay identity (indeed with “gay” as an identity) in crisis, Bersani’s essay sought sexual liberation in the gay male sex act itself. In his assessment, neither of the mainstream gay political modes, minoritizing analogies to other subordinated groups nor appeals to liberal impulses and original loss of the mother and maternal language:

> Living with the other, with the foreigner, confronts us with the possibility or not of being an other. It is not simply—humanistically—a matter of our being able to accept the other, but of being in his place, and this means to imagine and make oneself other for oneself.

*Id.* at 13. And, for the foreigner himself:

> The foreigner . . . does not give the same weight to ‘origins’ as common sense does. He has fled from that origin—family, blood, soil—and, even though it keeps pestering, enriching, hindering, exciting him, or giving him pain, and often all of it at once, the foreigner is its courageous and melancholy betrayer. His origin certainly haunts him, for better and for worse, but it is indeed elsewhere that he has set his hopes, that his struggles take place, that his life holds together today.

*Id.* at 29.

152. Bersani, *supra* note 76. Bersani’s later work, *Hamos*, reiterates and refines this notion of a gay male identity rooted in “love of the cock.” LEO BERSANI, *HOMOS* 103 (1995) (arguing against “desexualizing discourses” of gay identity); cf. Leo Bersani, *Sociality & Sexuality, 26* CRITICAL INQUIRY 641, 648 (2000) (“To neglect self-defeat in sexual relations leads to that pastoralizing of sexuality that I have frequently criticized; but to privilege self-defeat in the relational field is to reduce that entire field to libidinal relationality.”). Some associate Bersani’s later writings with the trend toward “queer negativity” or “the antisocial thesis” also articulated by Lee Edelman, Tim Dean, and Judith Halberstam. See, e.g., TIM DEAN, *UNLIMITED INTIMACY: REFLECTIONS ON THE SUBCULTURE OF BAREBACKING* (2009); LEE EDELMAN, *NO FUTURE: QUEER THEORY AND THE DEATH DRIVE* (2004); Judith Halberstam, *The Anti-Social Turn in Queer Studies*, 5 GRADUATE J. SOC. SCI. 140 (2008). As Benjy Kahan notes, this view refuses dreams of the future grounded in redemptive narratives of the past, in which past histories of suffering, stigma, and violence are either overcome or memorialized (as Kahan succinctly puts it, “we will never go back” or “we will never forget.”). Comment by Benjy Kahan to Adrienne Davis at Colloquium, *supra* note 1; see, e.g., HEATHER LOVE, *FEELING BACKWARD: LOSS AND THE POLITICS OF QUEER HISTORY* 5 (2007) (calling it the “backward turn” in queer studies). Although Bersani’s discursive trajectory is complex, I focus on the germinal work, *Is the Rectum a Grave?* because Halley locates her embrace of queer theory by men in this single essay by Bersani and an additional one by “straight” scholar Duncan Kennedy. See *supra* note 133. DUNCAN KENNEDY, *Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing, and the Eroticization of Domiance, in SEXY DRESSING ETC.* (1993).

values—the "Whitmanesque" bathhouse for instance—grappled with anal eroticism. Hence they failed to meet homophobia head on. More intriguingly, though, Bersani indicts putatively "queer" political projects for also turning away from sex and the body. He re-centers the gay male sex act to counter a tendency toward "the redemptive reinvention" of sex he argues is more rooted in analyses of power than of sex and anal eroticism. For instance, Bersani fears that Foucault's emphasis on bodies and pleasures shares with radical feminism's indictment of heterosexual intercourse a "[frequently] hidden agreement about sexuality as being . . . less disturbing, less socially abrasive, less violent, more respectful of 'personhood' than it has been in a male-dominated, phallocentric culture." In contrast, Bersani wants to defend, indeed to preserve, the "anticommunal, antiegalitarian, antinurturing, antiloving" aspects of the sex act. Bersani then locates not just social subordination, but political possibility in the "seductive and intolerable image of a grown man, legs high in the air, unable to refuse the suicidal ecstasy of being a woman." Bersani then asks the crucial question: What is the political possibility in suicidal ecstasy? Herein lies the essay's status as a germinal text on abjection.

Bersani uses abjection to counter "pastoralizing" political impulses. He finds in the "exploded limits" and "ecstatic suffering" of the sexual the ability to achieve a "more radical disintegration and humiliation of the self." While there is the "temptation to deny the . . . strong appeal of powerlessness, of the loss of control," Bersani urges that "[h]uman bodies are constructed in such a way that it is, or at least has been, almost impossible not to associate mastery

154. Bersani, supra note 76, at 205-07.
155. Id. at 215. Bersani rejects gay-macho, gay-femme, and lesbian-butch style as subversion by parody and by "honor" because of latent hostility. He contends these stylistic aesthetics "deny what I take to be wholly nonsubversive intentions by conflating them with problematically subversive effects." Id. at 207.
156. Bersani, supra note 76, at 215 (Foucault and others "argue[] for a radically revised imagination of the body's capacity for pleasure"). For Foucault, this flows from his turning away from sex itself, "from the acts in which [the body] engages, from the pain it inflicts and begs for—and directs our attention to the romances of memory and the idealization of the presexual, the courting imagination." Id. at 219-20. For MacKinnon and Dworkin, Bersani shows that their indictment of sex had the "effect of publicizing, of lucidly laying out for us" abject sex. Id. at 215. He also refers to Gayle Rubin, (the old) Pat Califia, Jeffrey Weeks, and Simon Watney. Id. Bersani elaborates this incipient critique of how Foucault "de-gays" gay identity in Homos and Sociality and Sexuality. BERSONI, supra note 152, at 81-82 ("What strikes me as most interesting about this argument is a connection that Foucault appears to deny in the Salmagundi interview when he says that it is not sex acts themselves that are most troubling to nongays, but the gay lifestyle, those 'as yet unforeseen kinds of relationships.'"); id. at 77-112; Bersani, supra note 152, at 641-42 (using Foucault's contention that society's discomfort with homosexuality is not due to the sex act to interrogate psychoanalytic and philosophical conceptions of the self, sexuality, and relationality).
158. Id. at 212.
159. Id. at 215, 217.
160. Id. at 217.
Bersani’s abjection is all about transgressed boundaries, plunging beyond “a certain threshold of endurance” and the body’s capacity for pleasure when its margin is violated, abolished. It is precisely in the self-shattering and self-annihilating aspects of sex that he finds the potential for liberation. “Queer” sex should embrace the shame in abdicating power, not run from it in pastoralizing redemptive moves. For Bersani, if the source of our exclusion is supposed to subordinate us, we can instead embrace it as a politics of identity.

Clearly then, Bersani’s abjection builds on and yet departs from Kristeva’s classic conception. Again, in Kristeva’s psychoanalytic model, it is the fascination with, the attraction to, the separation and suffering from that which has been expelled, and hence lost, that constitutes the abject. Kristeva appears most interested in abjection in its noun and verb forms: the abject and to abject (or ab-ject). In other words, in abjection as longing and loss for what has been excluded and expelled. In contrast, Bersani’s interest is in the political possibility of abjection as a state of being, or non-being, as it were. His emphasis is on the capacity of shameful suffering to shatter the subject, fracture the self. His abjection re-centers the expelled body and its subversive potential in sexual politics. For Kristeva, the abjector suffers from its own longing for what has been lost. For Bersani, the abjected object embraces his own filthy expulsion, thereby subverting his exclusion into a politics of belonging and identity. Both Bersani and Kristeva find in abjection an account of human subjectivity, an alternative to dominant liberal conceptions of the coherent, desiring subject.

As the next Part will argue, Kristeva’s classic iteration of abjection and Bersani’s subversive one (in particular I think) pose some fascinating questions about the limits of sex and shame as normative conceptions of bodies and power in Walker’s and Halley’s work.

B. Abjection, Materiality, and Power

The heart of Julia Kristeva’s project is to illuminate the simultaneous articulation and violation of boundaries. Walker’s silhouettes conform to this conception of abjection almost exactly. The bounded edges of her silhouettes seem to delineate hard and fast boundaries, yet they continually invite their own penetration and violation. In addition, they distract from the other boundary violation, that between the viewer and the tableau, thereby blurring...
established delineations between art and audience. And, as art historian Michael Murphy noted, this secondary violation may in fact be contingent on the viewer’s focus on the “edginess” of the cutouts and the “outrageousness” of the topic. In fact, the viewer loses her own innocence as she finds herself inserted into Walker’s tableaux. Abjection read in its classic form as expulsion, longing, and loss is highly descriptive of Walker’s work. What Walker provocatively represents is racial loss and longing, of both blacks and whites. Both yearn for less complicated sexual pasts and race relations, fetishes of an innocent white sexual past and the juridical imperative respectively, long since expelled and surrendered to updated racial histories. In Walker, racial innocence, of both blacks and whites, is that which is expelled and yet mourned precisely because of its expulsion. Sexual loss is the price of racial belonging.

Halley appears less interested in classic abjection than in Bersani’s subversive iteration. As Part I explains, she grounds her break from feminism and queer embrace of abjection in Bersani’s Is the Rectum a Grave? And, although Walker’s commitments are less explicit, she, like Halley, appears most interested in abjection’s disruptive possibilities, its capacity to subvert and generate aesthetic, and hence political, discursive ruptures. In Halley’s Taking a Break from Feminism and Walker’s installations and accompanying interviews we find a common commitment to the liberatory possibilities of “shamed desire,” “shamed pleasure,” and the seductiveness of degradation. Both endorse the “anticommunal, antiegalitarian, antinurturing, antiloving” aspects of human and sexual relations, disavowing justice projects and their accompanying discourses of minoritized identity, anti-subordination, and regulation.

Paradoxically, though, it is in Bersani’s subversive abjection that we find the limits of Walker’s and Halley’s desires and claims for sex and shame as normative. This is particularly acute for Halley, who explicitly grounds her embrace of abjection in “queer theory by men,” with Bersani as her avatar. Specifically, she misses three analytic moves I take to be central to subversive abjection. While they pose challenges for both projects, in the end, I think, they prove more fatal for Halley, given her specific embrace of a politics of abjection as articulated in Bersani’s “queer theory by men.”

The first point of divergence is in Halley’s and Walker’s disavowal of justice projects’ focus on anti-subordination and explorations of material economies of power and injury. Recall, both dematerialize sex, with slavery’s labor and production relations absent from the moonlight and magnolia representations in Walker’s silhouettes and Halley’s essays rendered as seemingly self-consciously and purposely abstract. Bersani’s subversive abjection manifests a serious attention to the economic and material structures

164. Comment by Michael Murphy to Adrienne Davis at Colloquium, supra note 1.
165. Bersani, supra note 76, at 215.
in which sexual acts occur and from which they take their meaning. As noted, *Is the Rectum a Grave?* is rooted in the mid-1980s AIDS crisis and “how a public health crisis [became] treated like an unprecedented sexual threat.” Bersani makes broad-ranging links between health care policies, media representations, mortality statistics that value bodies in different ways, and labor policies that subsidize some forms of care-giving and not others. In opposition to Walker’s and Halley’s dematerialized bodies, Bersani’s essay is utterly grounded in the background distribution of power and resources between groups and how these materially affect real bodies.

Also of interest to Bersani are geographic manifestations of sexuality and its regulation, most notably bathhouses and their practices, hierarchies, and ideologies. There is a vast theoretical literature on how spatial configurations influence human relations and possibility. Most obviously, overtly “gay” relationships became possible with the rise of hotels and other spaces that permitted rebellious sex. Again, Bersani would be among the first to call attention to how these background conditions influence abjection’s political possibility. Subversive abjection requires certain pre-conditions, and this in turn requires attention to the material conditions of any given political economy.

Second, Bersani’s is explicitly an identity claim. As noted, he seeks to reconceive a gay male identity and politics in contradistinction to Foucault, Weeks, and Watney’s pastoralizing and redemptive articulations. (He also gives mild attention to how gays are excluded from mainstream institutions.) Granted, his is not an effort to ground identity in injury, as Walker and Halley

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166. *Id.* at 198.


169. See, e.g., George Chauncey, *Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Makings of the Gay Male World 1890-1940*, at 162 (1994) (“A male couple sharing a room, or a respectable-looking male hotel guest taking another man to his room for a few hours, aroused less suspicion on the part of desk clerks . . . . A few hotels, such as the St. George in Brooklyn, developed a reputation for their willingness to accommodate gay men on a short- or long-term basis, but gay men could use a larger number of them surreptitiously.”).

170. In a classic indictment of the media’s role in producing heterosexual hysteria and anxiety as a response to AIDS, Bersani noted: “Thus the family identity produced on American television is much more likely to include your dog than your homosexual brother or sister.” Bersani, *supra* note 76, at 203.
accuse feminist and civil rights folks of doing. But their characterization is
certainly subject to dispute. Others, myself included, would argue that justice
projects get painted with too broad a brush (or, in Walker’s case, cut too
coarsely). For instance, political projects such as Bersani’s focused on positive
rights and access to resources to combat the lethal reach of AIDS. Other
projects similarly sound in the register of distributive justice. Contemporary
examples of identity politics not rooted in injury might include demands for
language accommodation or disability rights. Hence, the search for minoritized
identity rooted in injury is only one among many strains of such politics,
several of which share common cause with Bersani’s own efforts to theorize a
common, cohesive identity and its politics.\textsuperscript{171} In short, Bersani’s is explicitly a
justice claim, an anti-subordination and identity manifesto grounded in
resistance to economies of death in the gay male health crisis.

Finally, it is worth giving some attention to the role of consent in
subversive abjection. Consent, while a finely guarded liberal principle, has
reached its greatest heights in feminist theory. This is one of the regulatory
forces that Halley wants us to Take a Break from and that Walker rather
brutally parodies in her installations. (Consent appears irrelevant in Walker’s
slavery tableaux, perhaps because of its associations with regulatory projects
she disdains.) Yet, the subversive potential, indeed, the very logic of, Bersani’s
abjection lies in the consent of the penetrated. Both the threat and the political
possibility of abjection lie in the “widespread confusion in heterosexual and
homosexual men between fantasies of anal and vaginal sex.”\textsuperscript{172} Bersani argues
heterosexual intercourse provides the social map for sex and power, in which
women are passive receptacles and men are active conquerors. Even when on
top, \textit{“To be penetrated is to abdicate power.”}\textsuperscript{173} Importantly, in such a
construction, “gay” takes its social meaning not from its same-sex character but
from its association with passivity and the female role, from the willingness to
become penetrated and despised.\textsuperscript{174} Yet, neither the vagina nor its imagined
anal analog is conceived as powerless, vulnerable, and inviolable. Rather, both
are imagined as the antithesis of the penis, imminently able to perform,
insatiable, and hence promiscuous, if not properly tamed and regulated.\textsuperscript{175} For
Bersani, the crucial analogy is to prostitutes, who “publicize (indeed, sell) the

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\item[171.] Ranjana Khanna emphasizes that Bersani does not fall prey to the “wounded attachments”
\item[172.] Bersani, \textit{supra} note 76, at 211.
\item[173.] \textit{Id.} at 212; see also Khanna, \textit{supra} note 104, at 73 (noting that “Bersani insists on the value of
the subordinate position”) (footnote omitted).
\item[174.] Certainly Bersani was not the first or only one to note this. \textit{See, e.g.}, Roger N. Lancaster,
(describing male sexualities through the prism of machismo and active/passive sexual roles).
\item[175.] Both engender suspicion and hostility as the antithesis of the penis, requiring no stimulation to
perform and with unending stamina. “Tragically, AIDS . . . has reinforced the heterosexual association
of anal sex with a self-annihilation originally and primarily identified with the fantasmatic mystery of an
insatiable, unstoppable female sexuality.” Bersani, \textit{supra} note 76, at 222.
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inherent aptitude of women for uninterrupted sex.”  

(Thus the critical border between “wife” and “prostitute,” apparently invented and then violently guarded in so many societies.) If marriage represents the satiated vagina, the controlled and domesticated woman, then, like prostitutes, gay men are untamed by marriage, unregulated by monogamy, and, governed by their insatiability, will murder us all.  

“[P]romiscuity in this fantasy, far from merely increasing the risk of infection, is the sign of infection. Women and gay men spread their legs with an unquenchable appetite for destruction.”  

The political possibility lies in the active abdication, the purposeful relinquishment, of control over the margin, the limit, the boundary and border. It comes from the way that gay men voluntarily take on the role of women, not the ways that any man can be forced to assume this role through sexual violence.  

In the voluntary inequality lies the threat, and, crucial to Bersani’s argument, the subversive potential as well.  

Of course, one could make the case for the possibility of sexual pleasure in non-consensual acts. Similarly, one could argue the imminent rape-ability of both gay men and straight women. But that is not where Bersani locates his political potential. Rather, it is in the body’s seeking its own annihilation, its own debasement. (Recall Bersani’s muse is the prostitute, not the rape victim). His emphasis on sex as self-abolition, self-debasement, self-annihilation assumes the solicitation, the invitation, in other words, the consent to, the “ecstatic suffering.”  

The meaning of anal eroticism here comes in relinquishing control over this margin, this precious limit, that has taken on so much social meaning. Countering “redemptive projects” requires embracing the liberatory potential in voluntary inequality. 

176. Id. at 211.  

177. “[T]he similarities between representations of female prostitutes and male homosexuals should help us to specify the exact form of sexual behavior being targeted, in representations of AIDS, as the criminal, fatal, and irresistibly repeated act.” Id. For eclectic discussions of women as sexual agents, see generally PLEASURE AND DANGER, supra note 79; Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2001); Susan Ekberg Stiritz, Cultural Cliteracy: Exposing the Contexts of Women’s Not Coming, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 243 (2008).  

178. Bersani, supra note 76, at 211 (footnote omitted).  

179. Marc Spindelman makes related points about consent in the gay community. “If gay men like Lawrence and Garner, and perhaps lesbian women as well, are not persons who might be violated through same-sex sex, what does it mean for them to say ‘yes’ to sex when they do?” Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence, supra note 4, at 661.  

180. Ranjana Khanna proposes melancholia in lieu of disavowal. “Halley, following Bersani, sees a politics derived from the dissolution of the self as something peculiar to homosexuality rather than to melancholia more generally.” Khanna, supra note 104, at 74, 83 (footnote omitted).  

181. Bersani, supra note 76, at 218.  

182. In some ways Kristeva’s articulation of abjection captures Walker’s and Halley’s interest in the jouissance of straying onto forbidden ground. Classic abjection articulates the compulsion and fascination with what has been left behind—the sense of belonging and community that can come through discarding. Hence there is a way in which classic abjection is about belonging and subjectivity, if not justice and identity.
In sum, Bersani’s subversive abjection is a justice project accompanied by a discourse of minoritized identity, anti-subordination, and attention to material economies of power. Without question, equality and identity lie at the heart of his subversive notion of abjection. Perhaps Halley is rendering Bersani as a silhouette. (Indeed, perhaps the persona of Ian is a silhouette?) While both Walker and Halley invoke a political possibility in abjection as an alternative mode of conceiving bodies and power, neither appears interested in these aspects of subversive abjection. (In fact, Halley rejects this as the part of Bersani that capitulates to feminism’s governance.183) Rectifying queer injury is at the heart of Bersani’s project. Without it, Bersani’s abjection loses its meaning and power as a queer text. Or, put another way, without consent, abjection may lose its subversive expressive dimensions. One might argue (persuasively) that Halley just got her texts wrong. That she really intended to invoke Kristevan classic abjection, the yearning for that which is lost and expelled. But she is very explicit in her claims about Bersani. And she explicitly calls for the liberatory potential in shame and degradation over equality, anti-subordination, and dignity as an alternative first principle. Hence, Halley’s call for sexual abjection finds some limits precisely in the queer theory she turns to. In the end, abjection seems more helpful as psychoanalysis than as politics.

The next Part suggests some limits to Halley’s project specific to law, feminism, and regulatory projects. At some moments, it uses Walker to do so.

PART III. SEXUALITY EXCEPTIONALISM

Thus far this Article has emphasized convergences between Halley and Walker’s projects. Now I’d like to consider some meaningful differences. Walker’s aesthetic vision disdains and disclaims the juridical imperative, the solely subordinating vision of sex and race, seeking to enable and urge a different vision of bodies and power. Her textual claims, primarily in interviews, go even further, disclaiming what Halley would call “minoritized identity” based on injury.184 In both media, Walker’s arguments are primarily ones about human subjectivity, particularly its racialized and sexualized dimensions (recall her desire to encourage women to participate in stories that

183. She makes a similar charge against Duncan Kennedy’s Sexy Dressing. Both this and Bersani are examples of what Halley calls “queer theory by men.” Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 15, 18 (discussing Bersani’s “unusually strongminded embrace of abjection” and how his interests are those of gay men, not women); see also id. at 29 (discussing how Kennedy’s work is not feminist and is in fact taken only from his perspective as a white middle class male by “affirm[ing] that men (even those who don’t abuse women) eroticize women’s subordination, suspect[ing] that women do too, and acknowledging multiple male interests in the underenforcement of rules against men’s sexual abuse of women”); Khanna, supra note 104, at 72-73, 77-78 (offering an alternative description of Bersani’s and Kennedy’s relationships to feminism).

184. See supra note 3.
are “not in their best interests.”) However, whatever her impatience with civil rights fetishism, Walker stops short of calling for its end, for a return to pre-civil rights racial relations, or for “Taking a Break from Civil Rights.” Indeed, her claims do not appear to be regulatory ones. Rather, she seems most interested in exploring the spaces opened up by civil rights and its transformation of race, of changing racial subjectivity in the shadow of these new spaces. Considering the limits of Walker’s claims is useful in deriving the scope of Halley’s and their import for law and legal theory.

In contrast to Walker, Halley’s embrace of abjection seeks to clear not only conceptual but regulatory space. Halley states: “I hope to show that left/liberal/progressives can Take a Break from Feminism in their theorizing, their alliance formation, and their activism from time to time, and that the results can be (not that they must be—only that they can be) good, not only for projects that fall outside the domain of feminism, but for feminism, too.” But what, exactly, is the nature of Halley’s regulatory claims? How does abjection go from an account of human exclusion and belonging (Kristeva) and a basis for an identitarian politics (Bersani) to the engine for dismantling a regulatory regime? In other words, what is the connection between Halley’s embrace of abjection and her break from feminist-inflected sexual regulation?

What is both seductive and frustrating about the TBF project is it is so very difficult to pin Halley down on the nature and scope of her normative claims or regulatory vision. There is a contemporaneous and slightly later set of essays on “Governance Feminism” at work in the international context, but I do not take these to be part of the TBF project, nor do they appear in the Split Decisions monograph. (I exclude them from consideration here as part of my interlocution with TBF because they give a quite different account of both “Governance Feminism” and feminism itself, and they do not iterate feminism

185. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
187. Robin West characterizes them as “dystopian imaginings.” West, supra note 4, at 44. Elsewhere West says, “Readers of Halley’s work do not often encounter straightforward, empirical claims about the amount, types, or intensities of sexual harms in the world. Rather, what one more often sees in Halley’s writings is a hermeneutic of interpretation, not an empirical claim, regarding sexual harms.” id. at 30-31. Mary Anne Case made the opposite observation, contrasting Walker’s nostalgia with Halley’s utopianism. Telephone Conversation with Mary Anne Case, Arnold I. Shure Professor of Law, Univ. of Chicago Law Sch. (Aug. 2010). If Walker looks firmly backwards to question our aesthetic and political present, Halley looks resolutely forward, to a future compelling in its contours, but that remains empty of substantive content.
as in tension with other projects of sexual liberation. Instead, in much of the formal TBF essays Halley’s disavowal remains abstract. It is clear she has a beef with feminism’s governance, i.e., its vision and its alliance with the state on matters ranging from sexual harassment to rape, but, apart from tantalizing statements like, “why don’t we consider rape as a long slow punch in the face,” it is difficult to know what is in her crosshairs. Halley argues that feminism has been guilty of both identitarian and governance harms, i.e., that its construal of sex and power has actually been productive of injury, inducing women to embrace a victimized identity, and the regulatory salve itself has been too concentrated, foreclosing other sexual goals. Let’s concede for the moment the identitarian fear about women’s internalization of injured identity. In other words, for the moment, let’s assume that Halley is correct, that feminism’s verb form injunction to “survive” and its noun-form lauding of “survivors” has exacerbated rather than ameliorated the psychic injuries of rape. Now let’s explore her second argument, that feminist-initiated reforms of

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189. But here, again, we find the ambiguity: an interlocution of “governance feminists” versus feminism per se. The Governance Feminism, or what she dubs, G Feminism, essays criticize the collaboration of a newly emergent feminism with nationalism (“In nationalist normativity, only sheer domination—only the designation ‘rape’—makes women’s sex with a wartime enemy tolerable”) and its alliance with what Martha McCluskey has termed the incarceral state to pursue a criminal mode of abolition and prohibition of rape in wartime. Martha McCluskey, Comment at Symposium on Injury and Distribution: An Inquiry into the State of Our Art on Sex, Sexuality, Gender and the Family, Harvard Law School (Nov. 20-22, 2003).

These essays define “governance feminism” differently than do the TBF essays. They do not adhere to the “minimalist” definition of feminism that characterizes all of the TBF pieces. Instead, these essays differentiate feminisms with distinctly different investments, distinguishing “structural,” “individualist,” and “radical” versions of feminism and inquiring which “strands” of feminism “docked” more successfully in Governance Feminism’s alliance with state power. In addition, in these essays Governance Feminism itself appears more as a political and tactical mode of interaction and engagement, a management style, and/or an Eriksonian life cycle for feminism. It is “a new feminist organizational style that has evolved over the course of the 1990s” characterized by its “multiplicity, mobility, fragmentation, a regulatory or bureaucratic legal style, as well as ready facility with non-state and para-state institutional forms (NGO’s, law school clinics, ad hoc expert groups doing letter writing campaigns)” and its “institutionalization” of feminist achievements. As a life cycle, Halley perceptively notes that it is “feminism grown up, professionalized, and adept at wielding power” and a “newly mature engagement with power.” Again, crucial to the Governance Feminism project is that it encompasses different kinds of feminism. Finally, none of the Governance Feminism essays call for a “break” from feminism, or even hint at it. Indeed, instead of calling for a break, her essay on rape in war and sex trafficking with Thomas, Shamir, and Kotsiwaran identifies an “exciting new research paradigm for feminists and nonfeminists alike.” In sum, these projects seem to enjoin feminists to realize and come to terms with its accumulated hard-won power, to envision ourselves as rulers. Halley, Rape at Rome, supra note 188, at 2, 3, 18, 39; Halley, Rape in Berlin, supra note 188, at 106; Halley et al., supra note 188, at 336, 340, 341 (emphasis added).

190. Within the TBF project, her most substantive critique is interpreting a domestic violence/marital rape case as a sex panic. Each of the TBF essays includes almost identical analysis of Twyman v. Twyman. Janet Halley, Taking a Break to Decide (II), in HALLEY, supra note 4, at 348-63; Halley, In Is Feminist Theory Enough?, supra note 56, at 611-17; Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 3, at 39-48; Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?, supra note 56, at 68-78. The Split Decisions book also includes an analysis of a Supreme Court decision on same-sex sexual harassment, updated from a pre-TBF article. HALLEY, supra note 4, at 290-303 (revising discussion of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), from Halley’s Sexuality Harassment essay, supra note 56, at 189-93); see also Halley, in Subversive Legal Moments?, supra note 56 (raising concerns about sex panics in roundtable discussion of other germinal sex equality cases).
sexual assault governance have themselves imposed substantial costs, shutting
down other sexual goals that value liberatory versus reciprocal and egalitarian
sex.

What follows is my effort to take seriously Halley’s call for a break from
feminism, but to do so within her own logic, that is, a logic that seeks to
distance itself from minoritized identity projects and their equality and anti-
subordination principles to embrace abjection as an alternative liberatory
politics of the left.

First, sex seems to occupy a curiously abstract, yet deeply essentialist line
in Halley’s accounting, one surprisingly Freudian in fact. Sex appears sacred,
essential to the self, irrational perhaps, and hence exempt from regulation,
perhaps even unregulatable. This syncs well with biological notions of sex as a
“natural drive,” one that is pre-social and universal. (Evidence here includes the
fact that babies masturbate and get erections.) It is a Freudian monolith, an
oddly pre-Foucauldian rendering of sex as “repressed” and in need of
“liberation.” (Indeed if, following Foucault’s mandate, we cannot meaningfully
distinguish between repression and production of sex, it is unclear how a queer-
based “regulation,” or “non-regulation,” would liberate it.) Absent is a sense of
the multiple uses and appearances of sex, not only as conventional “pleasure”
or “intimacy,” but as work in labor markets; an object of both production and
consumption in media of all sorts (pornography, advertising, entertainment); a
technique of population management and discipline (à la Agambens and Foucault);
a strategy of political discipline and destruction; an intensely regulated resource in processes of personal and social reproduction; a contested
scarce resource for some populations (i.e., the disabled); or as a metric for
distributing resources.191 In all of these, sex is deeply material, intensely
economic, linked to populations and their access to distributive justice and
cultivation of capabilities.

It is odd, then, to argue that if there are markets for sex, they could not be
regulated as other labor or consumption is, because of sex’s essential, Freudian
meaning. Or that populations struggling to contain AIDS and other health
threats cannot properly include sexuality as an object of public health
innovation. Or that scrutiny of the techniques of the camp or the prison (or the
plantation for that matter) would exclude and exempt sex.192 Positing sex as

191. An essay on international governance feminism that Halley co-authored with Prabha
Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir, and Chantal Thomas gives explicit attention to distributive concerns.
However, the essay attributes sections to the authors separately, and the other authors focus more on the
distributive contexts and consequences, Halley more on indicting governance feminism. Halley et al.,
supra note 188, at 337 (“We take it as a given, for a distributively focused legal analysis, that punishing
conduct as crime does not ‘stop’ or ‘end’ it, as governance feminists . . . sometimes seem to imagine.”)
(emphasis added).

192. See, e.g., GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (1998)
(contending that modern sovereign power operates via biopolitics, or managing the very fact of life and
death, as manifest in the camp); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
more connected with the self than other acts or endeavors—labor, reproduction, production, consumption—and making this the basis of its exemption from regulation and from governance, seems such a curious call for Halley to embrace. (Much as it would be odd to contend that the excesses of OSHA or labor unions mean we should Take a Break from Labor Regulation.) All law is a governance project. I fear that for all of its bona fides TBF falls prey to a view of sex as exceptional, that is, distinctive (and distinguished) from other market and political relations, beyond rational analysis, and exempt from meaningful regulation. We might call this excepting and exempting “sexuality exceptionalism.”

A second way of thinking about these anti-governance claims is through the lens of costs, not of regulating sex, but of sex itself. As my former colleague Richard Myers put it, consensual and non-consensual sex used to impose similar, or at least comparable, “costs.” These included unwanted pregnancy, unknown paternity, and, of course, disease. Yet the increasing availability and acceptability of birth control, abortion, and condoms, all public health techniques, plus DNA testing for paternity, have significantly altered the equation. One result of this “technology innovation” was to lower significantly the consequential costs of consensual sex, particularly with regard to disease and pregnancy, thereby creating a significant disparity between the costs of consensual and nonconsensual sex. In the face of this striking disparity, and the lowered costs of consensual sex, Halley’s call to end, or break from, the feminist-inflected consent principle of sexual governance is curious. The technological “cost reduction,” a key component of “liberating” sex, alongside the reduction in its moral costs authored by feminist, queer, and other sex-positive movements, relies on both a certain rationality about sex, that is, its articulation as a technique of abating human misery and enhancing human capability, not merely as a source of pleasure or technique of morality, and its contextualization within political economies (or what I have elsewhere called sexual political economies). In this sense, abating nonconsensual sex and

(Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (arguing that the prison and its perpetual surveillance is the archetype of modern sovereign power).

193. Adam Romero concurs that “Halley should leave the take-a-break-from-feminism rhetoric behind.” Romero, supra note 4, at 229.

194. Conversation with Richard Myers (Fall 2007).

195. Adrienne Davis, Don’t Let Nobody Bother Yo’ Principle: The Sexual Economy of American Slavery, in SISTER CIRCLE: BLACK WOMEN AND WORK 103, 120 (Sharon Harley & the Black Women and Work Collective eds., 2002) (“[E]nslaved black women shared the world of productive labor with white men, black men, and white women but also inhabited a separate world of compelled sexual and reproductive labor. By understanding American slavery as a sexual economy in which black women’s reproduction and sexuality were appropriated for any number of white economic and political interests, we can see more clearly how slavery was a deeply gendered and sexualized institution in which there was a constant interplay between black sexuality and white economic profits. Such an understanding collapses the distinctions we draw between sex and work, families and markets, also showing how this distinction was itself largely under male control.”); Adrienne D. Davis, Slavery and the Roots of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 4, at 460-61 (“Designating
sexual violence is a technique of distributive justice, not meaningfully different from abatement of famine, illiteracy, poverty, disease, and unwanted pregnancy. (This is quickly illustrated by the fact that both rape and consensual but unsafe sex have been key contributors to the AIDS crisis in underdeveloped countries. Consider the intensely controversial “Real Men Don’t Tolerate Rape” campaign in South Africa as part of the anti-AIDS campaign which emerged alongside the more conventional approach to push condoms with consensual sex.\textsuperscript{196}) I fear that to ignore the shift to consent and the accompanying liberation of sex invites a return to a regime in which higher cost sex is viewed and treated the same as lower cost sex, that is, beyond the reach of capabilities enhancement and shielded by shame from scrutiny. With this disparity precarious, and the costs of consensual sex again on the rise, it is an odd time to urge the end of governance of sex, or to govern it solely towards its liberatory and shameful potential.

Relatedly, calls to view rape as “like any other bodily assault” (i.e., the long punch in the face), like the implication that people might revel in its liberatory possibilities, ironically exceptionalize it. They seem to suggest that law enforcement could not subject sexual violence to the same forensic scrutiny they apply to homicide, home invasion, arson, or securities fraud. In fact, discerning what motivates, and hence deters, perpetrators requires some focus on their crime and its motivations. Calls to wrap rape into non-sexual assault will definitionally miss why rapists rape, which is almost certainly different than why burglars burgle, serial killers kill, and arsonists burn. In \textit{Split Decisions}, Halley asks whether feminism’s emphasis on sexual violence has recruited women to suffer: “What if the politics of injury and of traumatized sensibility that have almost completely occupied the space cleared by MacKinnon’s politics of domination and subordination are helping to authorize and enable women as sufferers?”\textsuperscript{197} These critiques focus on the victim, or, if I may, the object of sexual assault. Yet criminal law typically focuses its regulatory energy on perpetrators. (In fact, as Robin West notes, there is a curious lack of perpetrators in the TBF project.\textsuperscript{198}) To re-focus attention on the victims and why they suffer is, again, an exceptionalizing move. Similarly, contending that sexual components of crimes are unworthy of their own forensics is to exceptionalize those acts from all others.

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\textsuperscript{196} See, e.g., Corrina Schuler, \textit{A Voice Against Rape Rattles South Africa}, \textsc{Christian Sci. Monitor}, Oct. 13, 1999, at 1 (describing how South Africa’s advertising regulator pulled controversial “real men don’t rape” commercials off the air).

\textsuperscript{197} \textit{Halley}, supra note 4, at 345.

\textsuperscript{198} West, supra note 4, at 34-35, 41.
Third, Halley’s argument de-materializes power in an intriguing and perhaps unanticipated way. She appears to suggest that law sacrifices too much when it takes account of institutional or cultural power disparities in crafting sexual regulatory regimes. For instance, she questions the sexual governance of status-based power differentials, such as teacher/student, boss/underling, guard/prisoner. The left’s relationship with power is obviously complex. Yet, I think it is safe to say that a focus on power and its distributitional effects are two key tenets of the left. In fact, a sustained, some would say unrelenting, analysis of power is much of what distinguishes “left” from “liberal” approaches to law and policy. After all, what is the difference between police brutality and a bar fight? Certainly, the unrelenting analysis of power is a core tenet of the critical legal studies movement that has so influenced both me and Halley: “[E]very time you bring a case and win a right, that right is integrated within an ideological framework that has as its ultimate aim the maintenance of collective passivity. That doesn’t mean you don’t bring the case—it means you keep your eye on power and not on rights.” Hence it is hard not to contrast Halley’s call to break with these critiques of power against Bersani’s material focus on the distributive effects of power in 1980s San Francisco and its bodies withering of AIDS. For Bersani, this generated a hatred, a rage, and a call to action. But in the TBF project, the material and distributitional context of bodies disappears. Bodies are notable for their capacity for liberatory pleasure, but not much beyond that. In disdaining feminism’s engagement with power, either Halley is rejecting this key tenet of the legal left, or she is arguing that power is somehow exempt from scrutiny when bound up with sex, or (again) sexuality exceptionalism.

Fourth, given Halley’s professed alignments with queer approaches, the TBF project is curiously identitarian. In *Sexuality Harassment* and *Split Decisions*, she contrasts “gay” with “queer” conceptions of sexuality. Halley characterizes gay theory as endorsing stable, dichotomous identities, including heterosexual/homosexual, and lesbian women/gay men as “very different.” She contends that queer theory, on the other hand, regards the very idea of gender and other stable identities with “some skepticism even resentment,” thereby presumptively rejecting differences between het/homo, as well as lesbians and gay men, and instead encouraging contingent and alternate sexual identities along dimensions other than the sex of the object of desire. Yet

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201. Mary Anne Franks also takes Halley to task for failing to live up to a truly “left” spirit of interrogation and engagement. Franks, supra note 4, at 257-59, 263 (noting Halley’s project is “meant to be a leftist one” and charging her with “depoliticized” and “decontextualized” analysis and claims).
204. HALLEY, supra note 4, at 113.
recall that in her own early foray into TBF, Halley’s embrace of abjection is rooted in queer theory only by men. In that crucial, provocative essay, authored by Ian, Halley identified her politics as aligned with “Queer Theory by Men,” appearing thereby to want no truck with the work of Eve Sedgwick, Judith Butler, Gayle Rubin, and other leading queer theorists who are not biologically male. 205 (Indeed, I suspect Kristeva comes closer to Halley’s rejection of the coherent sexual subject than does Bersani.) Robyn Wiegman is concerned, in fact, that Halley participates in the “traffic in gay men.” 206 In her essay, styled as a letter to Ian Halley, she asks Janet/Ian:

[Why does the queer sexual imaginary that you seek seem to require for its startling, sexy, divergentist appeal a model and mode of sexual, social, and psychic definition based on identifications with gay men? Is it because the figure of the lesbian is now so overwhelmed by her proximity to feminism, where she has trafficked in a kind of self-production that many have come to disavow, that only her absence can open the project to sexual and theoretical imagination and a transformed future? 207]

The effect is to privilege the very identitarianism and dimorphic gender Halley seeks to disavow through queer theory while evacuating lesbian sexuality, theory, and politics from her version of “queer.” Hence parts of the TBF project manifest an odd adherence to the very idea of the stable gender dimorphism Halley wants to escape. Crucially, this gender identitarian distinction is not one that is drawn within queer theory. (This is also reminiscent of Walker, whose silhouettes and tableaux I noted take on their racial meaning precisely by relying on and executing the same racial stereotypes she resists.) Hence, there is an odd quality to Halley’s simultaneous disavowal and yet intermittent reification of dimorphic gender identification.

205. Adam Romero’s review of Split Decisions offers a helpful consideration of Butler’s resistance to disaggregating feminist and queer theories. Romero, supra note 4, at 255-56. As noted above, the Split Decisions monograph does complicate this early, identitarian stance. See supra note 95.

206. See supra note 133; see also Khanna, supra note 104, at 71 (discussing what was lost or gained in Halley’s “substitution of Janet for Ian, and the constitution of the self sometimes proposed in the proffering of a signature”).

Queer Theory by Men tries to have its cake and eat it too by on the one hand offering a compelling commitment to the most profound and to my mind productive anti-identitarian impulses of queer theory, while enacting, on the other hand, its rebellion against feminism in a performative grammar of identitarian attachment to the belligerent bodies (yes, I’ll say it) of variously embodied men.

Wiegman, supra note 94, at 95.

207. Id. at 110. In her “letter” to Ian Halley, Wiegman asks, “How anti-identitarian are you, finally, if your retreat from governance feminism is nominated Queer Theory By Men?” and “Can a pro-sex, shame affirmative, self-shattering, and anti-domestic sexual imaginary be pursued if lesbians remain in the room?” Id. at 96, 105.
Finally, I’d like to consider Halley’s work in light of Walker’s to identify a latent tension in the TBF essays. Walker’s tableaux demonstrate that racial degradation and subordination can be sources of intense bodily pleasure, including sexual pleasure. (Indeed, Walker’s work is characterized by its foregrounding of the sexually and racially abject body.) In more recent installations about lynching, she depicts the sexual pleasures of racial degradation and violence, echoing what several cultural critics have articulated in scholarly form.\(^{208}\) Where Walker departs from these scholarly critiques and joins with Halley is in her far more provocative claim, that racial humiliation and degradation could also serve as a source of sexual pleasure for blacks, the abjected bodies, as well. Hence Walker’s art seizes upon this discomforting element of our national history—the racial erotics of lynching—and pushes it even farther, arguably into Halley’s terrain.

Walker’s aesthetic projections raise some questions for the TBF project. Halley contends that feminism’s regulatory impulses are at odds with queer theory’s interests in sexual possibility, including the liberatory possibility of non-reciprocal, shameful, and degrading sex. But Walker’s silhouettes illustrate that the body’s capacity for pleasures derived from shame, humiliation, and degradation is expansive.\(^{209}\) Sixty years ago, Frantz Fanon identified the psychoanalytic roots of racial pleasures, neatly deconstructing the purported dichotomy between sex as “natural” and race as “constructed.”\(^{210}\) Following Fanon, Walker’s aesthetic projections radically expand Halley’s sexual claims into the racial arena. Halley has distanced herself from the conventional justice critiques of oppression and injury. With no anti-subordination principle in

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\(^{209}\) Of course, we could pose the same question of other justice projects as well. Most obviously, if homophobia is a source of bodily pleasure, as it surely is, should it, too, be condoned? I think here of Ted Haggard, Senator Larry Craig, and Congressman Mark Foley as only the most recent exemplars of public homophobes and anti-gay activists who engaged in closeted same-sex practices. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick terms this desire-triggered homophobia homosexual panic. Sedgwick, *supra* note 91, at 182-212; see, e.g., Andrew Chung, *The Elephant in the Room*, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 2, 2007, at 1D; Timothy Patrick McCarthy, *Homes, Hypocrites, Haters*, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 9, 2007, at H-1.

\(^{210}\) Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (Charles Lam Markmann trans., 1967) (1952). More recently, David Eng also uses psychoanalytic theory to show that “sexuality is not natural—that it is resolutely cultural and constructed.” David L. Eng, *Racial Castration: Managing Masculinity in Asian America* 14 (2001); see also Anthony P. Farley, *Black Body as Fetish Object*, 76 Or. L. Rev. 457, 474 (1997) (discussing Fanon’s view that the “colorline . . . , like sexuality, gives one’s body a thematic structure”); Wagner, *supra* note 11, at 98-99 (discussing Fanon in context of Walker’s work). To take a very small example of racial pleasures and hierarchies, recessive genes such as light skin and blue eyes are treasured in many cultures.
place, Walker's identification of the racial and other erotics of subordination put the question squarely to her: what is the scope of her desired break from justice projects? And what, exactly, is her relationship to pleasure?

There is an ambivalence in the essays as to the scope of Halley's proposed "Break"—is it a Break from all justice projects or merely from feminism? At some points Halley proclaims that the Break is limited to, as the project and book title suggest, feminism. For instance, while Halley prefers power feminism over cultural feminism, which she finds "repellent," she believes "that it might sometimes be good to Take a Break from both forms of feminism." At others, she joins forces with political theorist Wendy Brown to query, in effect, since when did the left get in bed with the state? Is Halley calling for relinquishing the state's regulatory role any time pleasure is possible? Or, are the claims limited to gender justice projects? If the former, broader version of the claim, TBF seems to be calling for a consistent privileging of the possibility of pleasure in abjection and subordination over equality and justice. Which then raises the next question—what is it that makes her project "left"? Why is it not merely part of the vast anti-identitarian and anti-equality zeitgeist that characterizes "right" (and many liberal) projects today? If TBF is limited to the latter, more literal interpretation—as a break solely from feminism—why? Without a guiding principle, some mechanism distinguishing between the liberatory value in bodily pleasures deriving from

211. HALLEY, supra note 4, at 41.
212. See also Halley, The Politics of Injury, supra note 73, at 65 (characterizing feminism as part of larger LMIPST projects, i.e., "left-multicultural identity-political subordination-theory ... projects" that include "some critical race theory, gay identity politics, disability rights projects, indigenous-nationalist projects and human rights projects").
213. This is a core theme of Mary Anne Franks's review of Split Decisions:

A politically viable theory must be critical and contextual; Halley's desire-as-theory is neither. This is clearest in the way that Halley approaches "pleasure," and consequently, in the way that she approaches "harm." To put it bluntly, Halley seems to think that a lack of pleasure, or the loss of an opportunity for pleasure, is, in itself, a harm. This is hedonics indeed; Halley does not concern herself with evaluating pleasures but rather implies that the very fact that someone could take pleasure in something makes that possibility inherently valuable. Simply put: Halley immunizes pleasure from critique.

Franks, supra note 4, at 263.

214. Although I noted that I was not going to consider the Governance Feminism essays, I'll cheat a little here. In her critique of the ICTY norms criminalizing rape in war, Halley characterizes the decisions of women to engage in sex with enemy combatants as choice, solace, pragmatism, desire, etc. Halley, Rape in Berlin, supra note 188. There is nothing "wrong" with her critique, but to me it resonates so much more with liberalism's emphasis on choice and agency than with a left engagement with the background contexts of distribution and power that shape "choice." Of course, Marx put this much better than I: "The slave is the property of a particular master; the worker must indeed sell himself to capital, but not to a particular capitalist, and so within certain limitations he may choose to sell himself to whomever he wishes; and he may also change his master." KARL MARX, 1 CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY app. at 1032 (Ben Fowkes trans., Penguin Classics 1990) (1867); see also Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943) (discussing how background political and economic context shape both life options and bargaining power, undermining conventional doctrines such as duress).
conventionally sexual acts versus other sexual and bodily pleasures, Halley’s entire project is susceptible to a sort of gender essentialism, or a claim that sex is more “special” than (or prior to?) other bodily functions and pleasures. In short, if we are to disavow some regulatory regimes but not others, embrace some bodily pleasures but not others, what is the guiding principle? Can we articulate it, without devolving into sexuality exceptionalism?

Which leads me to be curious about the implications of Halley’s injunctions for the queer theoretical project itself. Some interesting recent work in queer theory directs its attention to questions of how race and other categories inflect the distribution of power and the meaning of acts in queer life. I think here of critiques ranging from the racialization of sex and power vis-à-vis dinge queens and rice queens, to the fascinating recent studies of how black punks and their white daddies negotiated the strictures of racism and homophobia in the Jim Crow South, to the need for a compelling analysis of Tyrone Garner that defies both the “gay” glorification of the Lawrence v. Texas facts as “the gay Loving” and the condemnation of them, as the black police officer did, as “unspeakable.”215 (You may recall that it was Garner’s white “boyfriend” who instigated the Lawrence litigation when he turned Garner in, describing him as “a nigger with a gun” to compel police to rush to find Garner in bed with Lawrence.216 This flies in the face of the gay Loving analogy.) In Halley’s iteration, how far does a queer theoretic anti-identitarianism go? Can identitarian-based critiques be sustained as queer in Halley’s rigorously anti-identitarian political mode? Does her critique render black queer analysis oxymoronic?

In sum, in Halley’s TBF, rather than being historical, contingent, and varying, sex appears natural, essential, and fundamentally more “special” than (prior to?) other bodily functions and pleasures. It is isolated from real

215. DAVID L. ENG, THE FEELING OF KINSHIP: QUEER LIBERALISM AND THE RACIALIZATION OF INTIMACY 35-37, 40-42 (2010) (citing Dale Carpenter, The Unknown Past of Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1464 (2004)). David Eng and I both resist romanticized readings of Garner’s interracial relationship. I have contended that, contra liberal interpretations of interraciarity as a “bellwether” of racial affection and equality, such relationships can often reinforce and intensify structural subordination and power imbalances. I call this the injuries of intimacy. Garner’s racialization by an angry white boyfriend, who also sought the assistance of the incarceral state to punish his straying partner, is emblematic of this. Davis, supra note 48, at 67; see also BLACK QUEER STUDIES: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY (E. Patrick Johnson & Mae G. Henderson eds., 2005) (collection of germinal black queer texts); ENG, RACIAL CASTRATION, supra note 210, at 1 (using psychoanalytic theory to consider interplay of racial and sexual formations); RODERICK A. FERGUSON, ABDERRATIONS IN BLACK: TOWARD A QUEER OF COLOR CRITIQUE, at ix (2003) (telling “a story of canonical sociology’s regulation of people like the transgendered man, the sissy, and the bulldagger as part of its general regulation of African American culture.”); DWIGHT A. McBRIDE, WHY I HATE ABERCROMBIE AND FITCH: ESSAYS ON RACE AND SEXUALITY (2005) (using queer insights to transform terrain of African American studies as a field); Jennifer Devere Brody & Dwight A. McBride, Introduction, 23 CALLALOO 286, 287 (2000) (introducing collection of essays challenging “[the] heterosexist impulse in black studies and connect[ing] it to the reigning politics of black authenticity”).

216. Cf. Carpenter, supra note 215 (giving different accounts of Lawrence and Garner’s arrest to show actual facts and motivations remain unclear).
economies of distribution, populations, labor, and public health. Unlike other labor forms, it cannot be regulated. Unlike other social relations, it is amaterial, isolated from power and its distributive effects. Unlike other bodily forms and practices, i.e., race or religion, it is embraced as natural and crucial to the self, thus appearing as ahistorical, pre-social, and beyond the scope of innovation, technology, and regulatory inquiry. And finally, her embrace of its “liberation” is deeply identitarian, rooted in the sex practiced “by gay men” and the queer theory generated “by gay men,” embracing dimorphic gender as stable and meaningful. It is exempt from regulation because of its “primality” and its repression (and its need for liberation). Sex exceptionalism isolates sex from other social relations, networks of exchange and power, and distributive justice inquiries. This seems to be the opposite of what Halley desires for sex in our world.217

I fear that Halley’s TBF has placed sex beyond the distributive justice and capabilities projects that I know Halley cares deeply about. My closing question then is: can sex be part of the same distributive inquiry that we make with respect to other central capabilities, i.e., literacy, food, health care, shelter—and yet also be recognized for its distinctive traits? And I do mean distinctive, not exceptional, in the sense that we recognize the differing characteristics of all capabilities. When sex is in play, can we be attentive to the distributive consequences of power? In sum, can we move from this exceptional view to an understanding of sex occurring within political economies, or, what I’ve characterized elsewhere as sexual political economies?218

CONCLUSION: SILHOUETTES OF POWER

This Article has used the disparate aesthetic and scholarly projects of Janet Halley and Kara Walker to make some observations about the latest wave of anti-identitarianism among the left. If the current anti-identitarian zeitgeist is about distancing bodies from the material effects history is supposed to inflict on them, Walker and Halley have joined it in a powerful way. While among the more interesting provocateurs, they are hardly alone in their claims. Other now-standard moves against justice projects attempt to marginalize the injury, play

217. I should note that Halley is not alone in sexuality exceptionalism. In a narrower context, labor advocate Vicki Schultz too tries to find a way to exempt sexuality from regulation in the workforce. See generally Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003) (contending that sexual harassment law wrongly suppresses sex and intimacy in the workplace); see also Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1689 (1998) (arguing that sexual harassment law should focus on women’s consignment to lesser, gendered work roles, not “sexuality as such”); cf. Romero, supra note 4, at 242 (“Vicki Schultz’s recent work on employment discrimination in the form of hostile environment sex harassment illustrates that Halley’s critical stance, and the critique of feminist projects she seeks, can be achieved without taking a break from feminism.”).

218. See supra note 195.
the blame game, or pit some injuries against others. In contrast, Walker and Halley root their disputes with conventional civil rights and feminist justice projects in their embrace of abjection.

As I hope this Article has made clear, there is merit to their projects. Both seek to shed light on economies of injury and the current flaccidity of identity politics. Both challenge us to re-conceive power’s nuance and the body’s capacities. They force us to grapple with the liberatory possibilities of shame and the fragmented self, versus the dignity-seeking at the heart of most justice projects. Yet, this Article has also tried to suggest some limits to their provocation, and for Halley in particular, her normative and regulatory claims.

Abjection as they articulate it celebrates shame and degradation over justice projects’ first principles of equality, anti-subordination, and dignity. If justice projects are skeptical of power for its proclivities to violence and group subordination, Walker and Halley applaud power as liberatory, particularly in sexual contexts. Yet, despite their embrace of these alternative conceptions of bodies, both oddly dematerialize sex and power. Slavery’s labor and production relations are absent from the moonlight and magnolia representations in Walker’s silhouettes, and Halley’s essays about feminist regulation and governance rarely discuss “real cases” or the background conditions of the rape camps. In both, the abject is dematerialized into a liberation that is deeply personal and not at all political.

This Article performed a brief genealogy of abjection to raise some questions about Walker’s and Halley’s claims. It contended that while their aesthetic and intellectual invocations of abjection are fascinating, neither Kristeva’s psychoanalytic turn nor Bersani’s political one endorses Halley and Walker’s embrace of dematerialized economies of bodies and disavowals of anti-subordination projects. In particular, Bersani’s notion of abjection, which has achieved canonical status in sexuality studies, is an identity and justice project, one that rests on material investigations of injury and background regimes.

In addition, for legal scholars in particular, this Article has sought to show how, even as we try to escape the perils of identitarianism, we may find ourselves in a trap of exceptionalism. Halley is correct that feminism needs to account for its own power. All law is governance and feminist law is no different, despite its impulses to moralize. Yet Halley goes from a provocative and rip-roaring critique of feminism to a claim about sexuality of her own—that it is sacred, repressed, and in need of liberation from feminist regulation and governance. It appears outside of the regulation we apply to markets, beyond the efforts to help vulnerable populations, almost Freudian in its simultaneous irrationality and necessity for the constitution of the self. And, while Halley’s commitments are clearly to the anti-identitarian project, she
herself falls prey to a deeply essentialist identitarianism as she parses and prefers a queer theory made "by men."

In the end, I am calling for a new justice project. My hope is to avoid both moralizing sex as an identitarian force, which Halley contends feminism does, and exceptionalizing it, as I contend Halley does. Must we except sex from rigorous attention to distributive economies of justice? I hope not. Instead, those committed to proliferating sexual capabilities should give close attention to the material and distributive contexts and backgrounds of sex, or sexual distributive justice.