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CHANGING PRACTICES, CHANGING RULES: JUDICIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL RULEMAKING ON CIVIL JURIES, CIVIL JUSTICE, AND CIVIL JUDGING

Judith Resnik

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I. THE CHANGING CONTOURS OF THE CIVIL LITIGATION SYSTEM

The topic for this symposium\(^1\) is procedural change and the respective roles of Congress and of the judiciary in making the rules that govern civil justice. The immediate focus is the last decade of innovations, from the 1980s when a group sponsored by Senator Joseph Biden published a pamphlet *Justice for All: Reducing Costs and Delay in Civil Litigation*,\(^2\) through the en-

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2. TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS
actment in 1990 of the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA), to its study by RAND over the past few years, to 1997—the year in which Congress considers whether to renew the Civil Justice Reform Act. The central questions are: What is the shape of the litigation system in the United States in the late 1990s? How—if at all—does it look different than it did before Congress enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990?

My response requires an understanding not only of the last decade but also the last half century, the years since 1938 when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective. My purposes are several: to map the respective roles of the federal judiciary and of Congress in governing civil processes; to understand the relationships between national and local rule regimes; to examine the changes over these decades in the practices of judging, and to learn more about the interactions of judges and lawyers during the course of civil litigation. Below I rely on two examples (changes related to the size of the civil jury and those related to the role of the judge during the pretrial process) from which to learn about how practices change, about the relationship between practices and rule regimes (be they local or national), and about the respective roles of the federal judiciary.

AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION (BROOKINGS, 1989).


and Congress in altering both practice and rules.

As the discussion below details, the history of these past decades is one of growing judicial discretion over civil process, of judicial care to guard its own discretionary authority, of ongoing variation between national and local rules and between rules and practice, and of declining discussion by trial judges of their roles as adjudicators. Thus far, the judiciary has generally succeeded in convincing Congress that expansive judicial discretion over civil case processing is appropriate. Despite evident discord between Congress and the federal judiciary about the enactment of the CJRA, the congressionally-enacted CJRA and the judicially-promulgated Federal Rules of Civil Procedure closely resemble each other.

Thus, while a good deal of commentary has located civil justice reform as a contested arena, I disagree about the locus of tension, but not about the fact of conflict. Contemporary battles between the federal courts and Congress are less about civil process and more about the structure and authority of the judiciary itself. Over the past decades, the federal judiciary has shored up its dominion over case processing and its role as case managers and settlers, but neither through doctrine nor through commentary have judges articulated a robust commitment to federal adjudicatory authority nor have they developed a literature or a practice supporting their special license and expansive authority.

II. A First Example: The Size of the Civil Jury

My mandate for this symposium (to write about the role of the federal judiciary vis-a-vis Congress and how and when rules and practices change) was much on my mind when I participated in another conference, held in the winter of 1996 in New York City and co-sponsored by the New York University School of Law and the Federal Judicial Center. Assembled were about 45 federal judges from the Eastern seaboard; the topic was the jury system in the United States. After my segment of the pro-

5. See Improving Jury Selection and Jury Comprehension, A Workshop Co-sponsored by the Federal Judicial Center and the Institute of Judicial Administration of New York University School of Law, Dec. 11-13, 1996 (materials on file with
program was over, I listened as a federal appellate judge, Patrick Higginbotham, gave an impassioned defense of the twelve-person civil jury. Judge Higginbotham, who sits on the Fifth Circuit, had chaired the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules in the mid-1990s during its work that resulted in a proposed amendment (ultimately unsuccessful) of Federal Rule 48 to reinstate the requirement of a twelve-person civil jury.\(^6\)

**A. The Practice of a Six Person Jury, and Subsequently, a Revised Rule**

To understand the exchange in 1996 among federal judges about the size of a civil jury, a bit of background is needed about how the size of the civil jury changed, from twelve to six. Insofar as I am aware, advocacy for a jury smaller than twelve began in the 1950s and became more insistent in the 1960s.\(^7\) Advocates

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6. As amended in 1991, FED. R. CIV. P. 48 currently states that: “The court shall seat a jury of not fewer than six and not more than twelve members . . . .” In 1995, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules had proposed language to state: “The court shall seat a jury of twelve members . . . .” Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, Criminal Procedure and Evidence, 163 F.R.D. 91, 147 (transmitted by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States for Notice and Comment, September 1995) (hereinafter Proposed Rules). According to the memorandum from Judge Higginbotham in support of that change, the Advisory Committee “unanimously recommend[ed] a return to 12-person juries . . . .” Id. at 135. As he explained, the purpose was to ensure that a civil jury would commence “with 12 persons, in the absence of a stipulation by counsel of a lesser number, but could lose down to 6 as excused by the trial judge for illness, etc.” Id. at 136.


The first federal legislation that I have been able to locate that makes possible a smaller than twelve person jury was introduced on Feb. 19, 1953, by Representative Abraham Multer, a Democrat from New York. See H.R. 3308, 83d Cong, Feb. 19, 1953 (to permit that “[i]n each civil action tried by a jury, other than those tried by a jury as a matter of right guaranteed by the seventh amendment of the Constitution, the number of jurors which constitute a jury and the number of jurors who must agree [for a valid verdict] shall be determined by the law of the State in which such civil action is tried”). No hearings appear to have been held nor have I
suggested that shrinking the number of jurors would "relieve congestion," encourage "prompt trials and lower costs," with no effects on outcome. Some of the vocal proponents were federal and state trial judges, who asserted not only their own experiences but also those of state systems that had used smaller juries in certain kinds of cases. A fair inference from the ad-

found commentary on what sparked this proposal.

In 1958, an Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure of the Temporary Commission on the Courts reported to the New York State Governor and Legislature about proposed procedural revisions. Included was a provision that a "party demanding jury trial . . . shall specify in his demand whether he demands trial by a jury composed of six or of twelve persons. Where a party has not specified the number of jurors, he shall be deemed to have demanded a trial by a jury composed of six persons." Thereafter, opposing parties would also have had the option of demanding a jury of twelve. Title 41.4 at 223-224, 1958 Report of the Temporary Commission on the Courts, 13 [N.Y.] Legislative Document (Feb. 15, 1958). According to the Notes, the Municipal Court of New York had that practice and it "worked well." Further, New York courts had had six person juries in New York "justice of the peace" courts since the state's inception in the eighteenth century. Appended was a list of the size of the juries in the then forty-eight states. Id. at 579-97 (reporting that "[m]ost departures from the twelve-man jury practice occur in courts of limited jurisdiction").

In 1972, the New York Legislature changed its statute to provide for a reduction in jurors from twelve to six. See NY CPLR § 4104 (McKinney's, 1996) ("A jury shall be composed of six persons"). That change accorded with recommendations from the Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, arguing that, "by speeding up the selection of juries," trials would also be "speeded up." Governor's Memorandum, N.Y. State Legis. Annual, ch. 185; 1972 Laws of N.Y. at 322.

8. Six-Member Juries, supra note 7, at 136.

9. For example, United States District Court Judge Tamm referred to his experience with the District of Columbia's code of five person juries in condemnation cases and argued that five provided the "perfect balance in affording the litigants all of the benefits of a jury trial, while eliminating unnecessary delay, expense and inefficiency." Tamm, Five-Man Civil Jury supra note 7, at 138.

10. See, e.g., id. at 134-35 (citing a 1956 speech by a California judge that "at least 36 states have constitutional and statutory provisions for juries of less than 12 in one or another of their courts," albeit often in only certain kinds of cases).

For a description of state court experiences, see Hon. Richard H. Phillips, A Jury of Six in All Cases, 30 CONN. B.J. 354 (1955) (discussing lower court use of six person juries in courts other than the superior court); Philip M. Cronin, Six-Member Juries in District Courts, 2 BOSTON B.J., Apr. 1958, at 27 (reporting on the "success" of the 1957 "experiment" of six person juries in Worcester Superior Court). According to Professor Hans Zeisel, while some of the states permitted smaller juries for cases involving small claims, at least Utah permitted eight person juries in noncapital cases in general jurisdiction courts. Hans Zeisel, . . . And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1971) [hereinafter Zeisel, And Then There Were None]. Judge Devitt reported that in addition to Utah, Florida and Virginia also provided for less than twelve person juries in courts of general jurisdiction. See Edward J. Devitt, The Six Man Jury in the Federal Court,
vocacy in favor of making this change is that, although the Federal Rule permitted a jury of less than twelve upon stipulation, such stipulations were rare;\(^1\) in the 1960s, the twelve person civil jury was the norm in federal court.\(^2\) In 1970, the United States Supreme Court decided *Williams v. Florida*,\(^3\) which held that Florida's six person criminal jury was constitutionally permissible. That case was decided on June 22, 1970.\(^4\) At the time, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 48 provided that juries of less than twelve could occur only by party stipulation.\(^5\) Nevertheless, within four months, federal district courts began to change their local rules. By 1972, 54 local district court rules provided for six person juries.\(^6\) During that time, the Judicial

\(^{10}\) See Tamm, *Five-Man Civil Jury*, supra note 7, at 140 (noting that no one had ever so stipulated in his experience as a judge).

\(^{11}\) I have found no direct empirical evidence on the number of jurors who sat, but the arguments for change all seem to be addressed to a uniform tradition of twelve jurors. For example, according to Judge Tamm, at least one state (Connecticut) that provided for the option of six had not then succeeded in installing six person juries except in courts of limited jurisdiction and that, to “change” the number of jurors, a constitutional and legislative mandate was needed. Id. (quoting Phillips, *supra* note 10, at 355-56). See also Gordon Bermant and Rob Coppock, *Outcomes of Six- and Twelve-Member Jury Trials: An Analysis of 128 Civil Cases in the State of Washington*, 48 WASH. L. REV. 593 (1973) (reporting on the “growing” support for a jury smaller than 12). Further, in 1956, when describing smaller juries, Judge Herndon commented that only the “increasing numbers of heretics have had the boldness to argue that the number twelve is not sacred . . . .” (emphasis in the original). Herndon, *Jury Trial*, supra note 7, at 47.

\(^{12}\) 399 U.S. 78, 86-103 (1970) (concluding that a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by a Florida rule permitting a six person jury).

\(^{13}\) Id.

\(^{14}\) As promulgated in the 1930s, Rule 48, entitled “Juries of Less than Twelve—Majority Verdict,” provided that the “parties may stipulate that the jury shall consist of any number less than twelve or that a verdict or a finding of a stated majority of the jurors shall be taken as the verdict or finding of the jury.” RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES 102 (ABA, William W. Dawson, ed., 1938) [hereinafter 1938 Rules].

\(^{15}\) According to Chief Judge Richard Arnold of the Eighth Circuit (who also supported the return in 1995 to a twelve person jury), within the first year after *Williams*, 29 federal district courts had, by local rule, “moved to six person juries.” See Richard S. Arnold, *Trial by Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve in Civil Trials*, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 25 (1993) [hereinafter Arnold, *Jury of Twelve*]. See also Devitt, *supra* note 10, at 277 (“The trend toward six-man juries in civil cases in the Federal Courts is growing rapidly.”). For the details of which districts made the change, see H. Richmond Fisher, *The Seventh Amendment and the
Conference of the United States passed a resolution in favor of a six person civil jury and asked Congress to enact such a rule.\textsuperscript{17}

In 1973, the Supreme Court reviewed one of those local federal district court rules that permitted a six person jury in civil cases.\textsuperscript{18} The Supreme Court (5-4) held that neither the Seventh Amendment, the Rules Enabling Act, nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure required that twelve people sit on a

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Chief Justice Warren Burger's enthusiasm for the smaller jury played a role, but the chronology of changes is somewhat difficult to reconstruct. According to Hans Zeisel, seventeen of these districts changed their rules under the sponsorship of the Chief Justice. See Zeisel, \textit{And Then There Were None}, supra note 10, at 710. In contrast, the Chief Justice points to districts that had changed their rules as support for his position that such alterations were worth further investigation. See Warren E. Burger, \textit{The State of the Federal Judiciary—1971}, 57 A.B.A. J. 855, 858 (1971) (address given July, 1971, and published Sept. 1971). In that address, and despite the existence of Fed. R. Civ. P. 48 that then provided for deviations from twelve only upon party stipulation, the Chief Judge mentioned the state practice of smaller juries, that a "dozen federal districts have followed the examples of some of those states" and reduced the size of civil juries, and that he had "urged the recently appointed Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure to look closely at the experience of courts" using smaller juries. \textit{Id.} Paul Carrington recalls the Chief Justice asked in a (perhaps unpublished) speech why juries should be twelve and that soon thereafter, the local rules began to appear. Telephone Conversation with Paul Carrington of Duke University (Feb. 24, 1997).

Support for smaller juries also came from a study, conducted under the auspices of the Institute for Judicial Administration of NTU, which gathered data by surveying lawyers, judges, and court clerks in New Jersey's state courts. See \textit{Institute for Judicial Administration, A Comparison of Six- and Twelve-Member Civil Juries in New Jersey Superior and County Courts} (1972) (concluding that smaller juries saved money and that differences in outcomes "appear to be due to differences in the types of cases selected by lawyers to be tried to six- and twelve-member juries rather than to differences in the size of the jury").


18. The rule came from the federal district court of Montana. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (citing Local Rule, U.S. District Court, Montana 13(d)(1)).
federal civil jury; thus, the local variation was neither unconstitutional nor unlawful.\textsuperscript{19} Note that, by the time the Supreme Court considered and upheld the federal six person civil jury, more than half the districts had rules providing for six person juries in at least some of their civil cases.\textsuperscript{20}

Despite the federal judiciary's enthusiasm for six person juries, the Judicial Conference met with skepticism when it pressed Congress for legislation to change the size of civil juries.\textsuperscript{21} After a series of unsuccessful efforts to obtain congressio-

\textsuperscript{19} Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 160, 162-163. Justice Brennan wrote for the five person majority; Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Powell, argued in dissent that the local rule was flatly inconsistent with the federal rules. Id. at 165. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented on constitutional grounds as well as on statutory and rule grounds. Id. at 166-88. The decision has been much criticized. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 33, 51 (noting that Geoffrey Hazard had called the decision "monumentally unconvincing" and adding that "[o]ne some, it may not be even that persuasive") [hereinafter, Carrington, The Seventh Amendment].

\textsuperscript{20} As the Court so noted. Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 150 n.1.

\textsuperscript{21} Representative William Lloyd Scott, a Republican member of Congress, introduced H.R. 7800, 92d Cong. (1971), to provide that "[a] petit jury in civil and criminal cases in a district court of the United States shall consist of six jurors" except in capital cases. In 1973, after he had become a Senator, Scott introduced an identical bill in the Senate. See S. 288, 93d Cong. (1973).

In 1972, Emanuel Celler, a Democrat from New York and then Chair of the Judiciary Committee of the House, introduced H.R. 13496, 92d Cong. (1972), to provide for six person juries in civil cases "unless the parties stipulate to a lesser number." In 1973, Peter Rodino, the new chair of the Judiciary Committee and a Democrat from New Jersey introduced H.R. 8285, 93d Cong. (1973), which was identical to the Celler bill of the year before. A companion bill (S. 2057, which slightly varied from the House version) was before the Senate. In 1977, Representative Rodino introduced a bill again, identical in its effort to alter the jury size but also including requirements of unanimity absent stipulations by the parties. See H.R. 7813, 95th Cong. (1977).

Testifying in 1973 on behalf of the legislation were federal judges, including Judge Devitt, Judge Arthur Stanley, Jr. in his capacity as Chair of the Judicial Conference on the Operation of the Jury System, and an official from the Justice Department. See Three Judge Court and Six Person Civil Jury: Hearings on S. 271 and H.R. 8285 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. [hereinafter Hearings on a Six Person Jury].

Judges Devitt and Stanley argued for the reduction in size on the grounds of its utility, economy, and for the statute on the grounds of the need for "uniformity" of practice. Id. at 17, 19, 30, 36. James McCafferty of the Administrative Office provided data on juror utilization and cost savings. Id. at 25-26. The Justice Department argued that the reduction in size would save money, increase speed, and diminish the burden of service on juries. Id. at 92-96. The ABA took no position at that point. Id. at 104 (statement of Edmund D. Campbell).
nal blessings, in 1978 the “Judicial Conference agreed to stop seeking legislation on the subject.” By that time (1978), 85 of

Opponents included the ACLU, the NAACP, and Professor Hans Zeisel. Arguments advanced against the change included that juries would have fewer members of minority communities (id. at 127, Testimony of Charles Morgan for the ACLU; id. at 142, Testimony of Nathaniel Jones for the NAACP; id. at 161, testimony of Hans Zeisel); that jury service is an important part of American life that should be encouraged and widely distributed (id.); that civil juries were vital parts of the justice system (id. at 133-34); and that the claims of size not affecting outcome were erroneous (id. at 157-162).

The question of the size of the civil jury was debated thereafter by the ABA. In 1974, an ABA committee initially recommended "support[ing] the enactment of legislation which would revise the number of jurors in civil trials in federal courts to six persons," but when that proposal encountered opposition, withdrew that recommendation. See Proceedings of the 1974 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates and Report No. 1 of the Special Committee on Coordination of Judicial Improvements, ABA ANN. REP., vol. 99, at 182, 305 (1978).

In 1983, the ABA promulgated its first set of Standards Relating to Juror Use and Management; in that volume, ABA Standard 17(b) stated that civil juries should "consist of no fewer than six and no more than twelve." See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO JUROR USE AND MANAGEMENT, at 150 (1983) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. See also Standard 17(b) at 156 (ABA, 1993).

At the midyear meeting in 1990, the ABA House of Delegates approved by voice vote a resolution from the Section of Tort and Insurance Practice that the ABA supports "legislative efforts to restore the size of a federal civil jury to 12 persons and to enable 10 of the 12 to render a verdict in a civil trial." (resolution on file with author). The ABA House of Delegates endorsed that resolution in 1991. 1993 ABA STANDARDS, supra, at 161.


As among the different proposals, the Conference expressed its preference for one bill (S. 2057) that provided for unanimity absent stipulation and for alterations in peremptory challenges over another bill (H.R. 8285) that did not have those features; the Conference also stated its view that juries should be reduced in size in civil but not in criminal cases. Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, held in Washington, D.C., Sept. 13-14, 1973, at 54-55.
the districts had their own rules permitting fewer than twelve jurors. 23

Not until more than a decade later, however, did the national rule reflect this change. Moving forward to the late 1980s, Professor Paul Carrington (then the Reporter for the Advisory Committee) proposed revisiting Rule 48 initially in the hopes of returning to the twelve person jury. But, upon finding little support in the Advisory Committee for that position, Professor Carrington thought it appropriate to revise the text to reflect the practice of empaneling smaller juries. 24 Thereafter, the Advisory Committee proposed a rule change to authorize judicial selection of a smaller civil jury; the comment explained that the older rule was rendered "obsolete," an inventive euphemism to capture the point that the national rule was disobeyed at the local level. Hence, in 1991, about twenty years after the change in practice, the Supreme Court promulgated an amended Federal Rule 48 to state that a court "shall seat a jury of not fewer than six and not more than twelve." 25 Today, federal civil juries across the United States routinely consist of fewer than twelve persons. 26 I provide an overview of the evolution of this rule


In terms of the size of juries in states, see J. Clark Kelso, Final Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1433, 1490-91 (1996) (describing eight states that have juries of less than twelve in certain kinds of felony cases and, in contrast, "fewer than fifteen" states that have civil juries of twelve "without exception"; also reporting a recommendation to reduce jury size in certain criminal cases in California).

24. Telephone Conversation with Paul Carrington of Duke Law School (Feb. 24, 1997). See also Carrington, The Seventh Amendment, supra note 19, at 52-53 (because the then-text of Rule 48 "is rendered meaningless ... it is now necessary to revise the rule, lest it mislead parties and counsel in light of the reality established by the local rules").


27. Once again, statements in rules and the actual practice diverge. Many local rules speak of six person juries. Yet case law from litigants seeking reversals on the grounds that the wrong number of jurors deliberated demonstrates that, regardless
of mandates of six or twelve, some district judges sent more than six jurors and fewer than twelve to deliberate. For example, the Fifth Circuit concluded in one case that, if a judge "convert[s]" alternate jurors to "regular voting jurors before" discharging the jury to deliberate, the acceptance of a verdict from the larger jury (there, a jury of eight) was not reversible error, absent a party's objections at the time. Rideau v. Parkem Indus. Servs., Inc., 917 F.2d 892, 895 (5th Cir. 1990). The Fourth Circuit developed a rule that no more than six jurors could retire to deliberate (see Kuykendall v. Southern Ry., 652 F.2d 391, 392 (4th Cir. 1981), while the Sixth Circuit concluded that permitting a larger number to deliberate did not constitute reversible error. Hanson v. Parkside Surgery Ctr., 872 F.2d 745 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Hanson v. Arrowsmith, 493 U.S. 944 (1989). See also E.E.O.C. v. Delaware Dept of Health & Social Servs., 865 F.2d 1408, 1420-21 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting that a seven person jury, comprised of six jurors plus one alternate deliberating, was not a "problem" when parties did not object); UNR Industries, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 682 F. Supp. 1434, 1446-47 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (rejecting a challenge to an eight person jury consisting of six jurors and two alternates)).

Such anecdotal evidence can only be supplemented in part. According to John K. Rabiej of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, when the Advisory Committee was considering the proposed change, it sought to obtain comprehensive data but learned that such information could not be collected nationwide from the current data base. Telephone Conversation with John K. Rabiej, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Feb. 17, 1997). Thereafter, David Williams of the Administrative Office did a survey for the Committee; he reviewed monthly juror utilization forms returned periodically from different districts. See Monthly Petit Juror Usage, JS 11, Rev. 10/90 (on file with author). When filled out by the districts, some but not all of these forms distinguish between civil and criminal juries. Some note use of alternatives, but many do not. The form does not request information on the number of jurors sitting at the time of verdict. Within these constraints, Mr. Williams concluded that, in 1994, eight person civil juries were utilized most frequently in the federal courts, followed by seven, twelve, and nine person juries, and relatively infrequently, six person juries. Interview of Alys Brehio with David Williams, Administrative Office of United States Courts (Feb. 26, 1997).

Given the practice of varying numbers of jurors, the Advisory Committee argued that its proposal was less transformative than would be a leap from six to twelve jurors: "[t]hroughout the United States today the district courts are seating 8 and 10 person juries for any other than the most routine civil matters." Proposed Rules, supra note 6, at 136. At the NYU/JFC Jury Conference, supra note 5, many district judges also commented that they rarely used six person juries and that the debate was not fairly cast as six versus twelve but more accurately should be understood as nine versus twelve.

For a local rule detailing a district judge's options on the number of jurors, see the current rule in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Local Civil Rule 48.01 (1997) (providing that civil cases may be submitted to either a jury of six or twelve, "at the discretion of the presiding Judge. However, if the parties agree to waive a six (6) person jury with one or more alternate jurors and proceed to trial with an eight (8) person jury with no alternate jurors, the Court may allow them to do so." Further, if any of the eight leave, the court may take a verdict as long as at least six remain).
From this background, move forward once again to December of 1996, and consider the exchange between Judge Higginbotham and the federal district court judges. With the skill of a well-practiced trial lawyer, Judge Higginbotham made an impassioned plea for the twelve person jury. For him, trial courts were the "heart" of the federal judiciary, and jury trials one of the most important activities of the trial court. He argued that a return to twelve persons helped the quality of deliberations and the consistency of verdicts. He pointed out that a twelve person jury also enhanced the opportunity for a diverse group of citizens to participate in and be educated by the jury—all of which, in his view, improved the fairness and the legitimacy of the jury and outweighed what he considered to be the negligible savings in cost and time achieved by a smaller jury.

But despite my appreciation for the skills of the advocate,
most of his audience of 45 district trial judges were unmoved. Rather, these federal trial judges insisted on how normal a jury of six to nine people was; more were rarely needed. Many trial judges reported positive experiences with smaller juries and believed them to be “economical and expeditious.” Moreover, these district judges bridled at the prospect of a mandatory twelve person jury; they decidedly preferred the flexibility and discretion that inhered in the current rule. Judge Higginbotham did succeed in one respect. In conversation afterwards with a few relatively new trial judges, I learned that, prior to Judge Higginbotham’s speech, they had not realized that they had the discretion to have a jury “as large as twelve;” some reported they might well “try” a jury of twelve.

Thus, within twenty-five years, a rule and practice had changed so completely that a generation of “new” judges assumed it ordinary to have juries of less than twelve and thought it odd for someone to insist that twelve was a number not only to be preferred but to be mandated. The district judges’ views were sufficiently powerful within the Judicial Conference to cause that body to reject a proposal by the Standing Committee on Civil Rules to return to the twelve person jury. The avalanche of protest from federal district judges—a kind of rebellion against their own judicial rulemakers—resulted in the refusal to transmit a proposed rule change.

31. Judge John Keenan, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, was assigned the task of presenting the arguments on behalf of a smaller jury and representing the district judges’ views. NYU/FJC Jury Conference, supra note 5.

32. Rule 48, Prepublication Comments, materials provided to the NYU/FJC Jury Conference, supra note 5, at 21 (on file with author).


35. See Brown, supra note 33, at 12 (describing comments about district court opposition). See also materials provided for the NYU/FJC Jury Conference, supra note 5, at Tab “Jury Size and Unanimity” including excerpt from Report of the Judicial Conference, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Agenda F-16, Rules Sept. 1996 (including prepublication comments on proposed amendments to Rule 48,
**B. Initial Lessons**

The civil jury practices provide a first occasion from which to look at the processes of rule change. Note the trajectory: First, the practice relating to the size of civil juries changed at the local level, initially coming from state court practice and then moving to federal district civil practice. Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court countenanced—indeed, endorsed—both the state and federal practices and found them permissible under federal constitutional and statutory law.\(^{36}\)

Second, local federal rule changes both predated the national rule and were at variance with the governing federal rule.\(^{37}\) Third, the national rule—Rule 48—followed long after the practice and codified what was already deeply in place. National...
rulemaking was not the beginning of change, but the announce­
ment of a change that had already occurred. While at the formal 
level, the change was complete within about twenty years (mea­
sured from the time of introduction in the early 1970s to the 
enactment of the national federal rule in 1991), local practice 
had been revised more rapidly.

Fourth, and related to the roots of the change at the local 
level, the revision had great support from trial judges, who pro­
moted the concept of a smaller jury, persuaded the bar, and then 
implemented the change. For example, when proponent Edward 
Devitt (then Chief Judge of the federal district court in Minneso­
ta) described his local rule on six person juries, he explained 
how the change was negotiated by the bench with the bar. In his 
words, “[i]n the interest of securing the cooperation of the mem­
bers of the Bar in accepting the Rule graciously and assisting in 
making its purposes effective,” the change had initially a limited 
application.\footnote{Devitt, supra note 10, at 274-75 (“the Rule was made applicable only to 
those cases where jurisdiction was also obtainable in the state courts. Hence it was 
limited to Diversity, FELA, and Jones Act cases with the thought that if the Rule 
in its limited form was effective and withstood challenge, if any, it later would be 
extended to federal jurisdiction cases as well”). According to Judge Devitt, the State 
of Minnesota adopted a rule providing for six person juries after Williams v. Florida 
was decided in 1970. See Hearings on a Six Person Jury, supra note 21, at 31; see 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 593.01 (June 8, 1971). The prior rule had defined a jury to be a 
“body of 12 men or women, or both” but was replaced with the definition of a “body 
of six persons.” Historical Note to MINN. STAT. ANN. § 593.01 (1988). In 1988, the 
Minnesota Constitution was amended; it now states that “[t]he legislature may pro­
vide for the number of jurors in a civil action or proceeding, provided that a jury 
have at least six members.” MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4. Thereafter, the Minnesota 
statute was repealed by 1990 MINN. LAWS 1990, ch. 553, § 15 (Rule 48 of the Min­
nesota Rules of Civil Procedure continues to provide that “parties may stipulate that 
the jury shall consist of any number less than twelve . . . .”).}

Fifth, the change enhanced the discretion of trial judges, 
who in this instance took authority away from litigants (or more 
accurately, their lawyers) to decide on the number of jurors.\footnote{We lack definitive empiricism to tell us how that discretion is exercised 
in practice, how many juries of what kinds are populated by what number of jurors, 
both at the time of commencement of a trial and at its completion. See supra note 
27 and accompanying text.} As judges at the 1996 NYU/FJC Jury Conference explained, they 
have varied practices on the number of jurors routinely empan­
eled. Few reported selecting only six, and more said that they
often picked eight or nine jurors. An obvious utility of using more than six is permitting attrition without a mistrial.\textsuperscript{40} Trial judges liked this flexibility and objected strongly to a mandated number of jurors, and, more specifically, twelve. As Professors Stephen Subrin and Stephen Burbank have taught us,\textsuperscript{41} a basic feature of the twentieth century rule reform in the United States has been the growth of judicial discretion; specifically, discretionary practices more commonly associated with equity were imported by the federal rules into law and have become routine across the federal docket. Here we see an example of that increase in judicial discretion.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{40} The system of empaneling alternate jurors on the civil side changed when judges gained the flexibility of determining the number of jurors. In 1989, when proposing to authorize smaller juries, the Advisory Committee proposed the elimination of the practice of empaneling alternative jurors. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 25, at 355-357. At the time, Rule 47 had provided that judges could empanel no more than six additional jurors who would sit and then, prior to deliberations, be excused if not needed. \textit{Id.} The Advisory Committee noted "dissatisfaction" with the "burden . . . on alternates who are required to listen to the evidence but denied the satisfaction of participating in its evaluation." \textit{Id.} at 356. Further, if judges attempted to include the alternates, they risked reversal. Some circuits held that, absent parties' consent on the record, judges who permitted alternate jurors to deliberate commit reversal error. See, e.g., Cabral v. Sullivan, 961 F.2d 998 (1st Cir. 1992) (ordering a new trial when a district judge permitted four alternates to deliberate with six jurors). \textit{See also supra} note 27.

The 1995 proposals to return the jury to the larger size were not accompanied by a return to alternates; rather, proposed Rule 48 provided that the court seat twelve jurors, that all participate "unless excused," that absent party stipulation, verdicts be unanimous, and that no verdict be taken from fewer than six jurors. \textit{Proposed Rules, supra} note 6, at 147. The alternate juror system remains on the criminal side. See \textit{Fed. R. Crim. P.} 24(c). Data remain unavailable nationwide on the number of jurors empaneled as contrasted with those sitting at verdict. Further, to my knowledge, no research has been done on whether the willingness to excuse jurors has been altered since the rule changes. \textit{See supra} note 27 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{42} The rejection of a proposed lawyer voir dire of jurors is consistent with this aspect of the trajectory of judicial control rather than of lawyer/litigant control. See \textit{Proposed Rules, supra} note 26, at 129, 145 (Advisory Committee recommendation that Rule 47, on the selection of jurors, be modified so that, after a judge-conducted voir dire, the "court shall also permit the parties to orally examine the prospective
The sixth point is about the role of Congress, which stayed away from making changes. Presumably, the popular base of juries made it politically unpopular to press for legislation cutting their size. Some members of Congress evidently also thought it unwise. This example of the size of the civil jury provides no evidence of Congress as adventurously championing efforts to alter civil practice in a dramatic fashion. Rather, Congress appears to have been a conservative spectator.

Jurors to supplement the court's examination within reasonable limits of time, manner, and subject matter, as the court determines in its discretion.


Judge Arnold mentioned “congressional misgivings” in discussing the absence of legislation to decrease jury size. Arnold, Jury of Twelve, supra note 16, at 27. Specifically, both Representatives Kastenmeier and Drinan expressed skepticism about the wisdom of the reduction. During the questioning, Representative Kastenmeier asked about opposition to the change stemming from litigants concerned about the “quality of justice,” and about whether a change in the civil jury was a “foot in the door for the reduction in size of criminal juries.” Hearings on a Six Person Jury, supra note 21, at 29, 32. Representative Drinan stated that, given the 5-4 decision in Colgrove, he did not believe that the matter was “settled.” Id. at 30. Furthermore, in his view, federal judges had exceeded their authority by local rulemaking beyond the parameters of Rule 48 and the Rules Enabling Act. Id. at 36. Drinan also raised the possibility of some kind of “compromise” in which certain kinds of cases, such as those involving civil rights, would be exempt from the smaller jury provisions. Id. at 139.

When testifying in opposition to the then-pending legislation, Professor Zeisel called upon the committee to make “the 12-man jury obligatory in Federal courts.” Hearings on a Six Person Jury, supra note 21, at 163. Kastenmeier demurred, explaining that he had not received reports of injustice. In an exchange with Representative Drinan, Professor Zeisel discussed the politics, that in his view, the Colgrove case was one in which the defendant insurance company wanted the larger jury, and that, plaintiffs' lawyers “almost by a political decision” had not complained. Given his view that a smaller jury was a more erratic jury, he thought that plaintiffs' attorneys might well have a preference for it. Id. at 164.

It is not clear whether views of the size of the jury during the 1970s corresponded to one's position in the bar as a “defense” or “plaintiff” attorney. According to the lower court opinion in Colgrove, both plaintiff and defendant protested District
Seventh, the grounds for change were economy and efficiency: speed and ease. More than two decades ago, proponents argued on behalf of a "six man" jury in words familiar today. As Judge Devitt put it, the change would "improve[] efficiency at less cost without sacrifice of legal rights."\(^\text{46}\) Hans Zeisel, a critic, put it more bluntly: that the two arguments in favor of a reduction in size were "save money and . . . save time."\(^\text{47}\)

Eighth, once the change was made, the new approach became hard to revise, even when its underpinnings were questioned from several directions; for many, the change was a "terrible blunder."\(^\text{48}\) One ground for objection to the central premise of the 1970s Supreme Court rulings is familiar. Made then and now is the argument that courts err when they conclude that twelve versus six jurors makes no difference in the outcome; social scientists instruct us that jury size matters.\(^\text{49}\) A second

Judge Battin's decision to empanel a six person jury; the plaintiff filed the mandamus action and was then joined by the defendant. Colgrove v. Battin, 456 F.2d 1379, 1380 (9th Cir. 1972).

\(^{46}\) Devitt, supra note 10, at 273 (speaking at the Eighth Circuit Judicial Conference in June of 1971). See also Tamm, Five-Man Civil Jury, supra note 7, at 141 ("Modern conditions, i.e., ever increasing congestion and delay in the federal courts, mounting costs—monetary and social—of the jury system necessitate its serious reform in the interest of efficiency and economy if the jury system is to survive.").

\(^{47}\) Hearings on a Six Person Jury, supra note 21, at 167. His response was that the "time argument is absolutely wrong and the money argument is quite clear." Id.

\(^{48}\) Conversation with John Frank, Feb. 24, 1997. See generally Arnold, Jury of Twelve, supra note 16, at 32-35. See also the debates within the ABA, supra note 21.

\(^{49}\) Hans Zeisel, supra note 10, at 715-24, was one of the first to attempt to correct the Supreme Court's interpretation of social science data. See also ROBERT J. MACCOUN, GETTING INSIDE THE BLACK BOX: TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF CIVIL JURY BEHAVIOR (ICJ, Dec. 1987); Michael J. Saks, The Smaller the Jury, the Greater the Unpredictability, 79 JUDICATURE 263 (1996).

Professor Shari Diamond of the American Bar Foundation and the University of Illinois pointed out to me that the "frequency and magnitude of differences due to size are likely to be modest—although certainly important." Given the small number of cases that individual judges see tried to verdict, trial judges are unlikely to attribute surprising verdicts to size; "it is only be a systematic study of multiple cases (or a large scale simulation) that we can detect real and important, although not huge effects." Hence, judges may be comfortable accepting "the apparent efficiencies" (ranging from selection time to reduced interruptions due to personal needs of individual jurors) associated with smaller juries and not perceive them "as purchased at the price of less dependable jury verdicts." Letter from Shari Diamond to Judith Resnik (May 15, 1997) (on file with author).
argument is new and it is about the effect of size on the diversity of members within a jury. As Judge Higginbotham and others have explained, between 1970 and 1990, aspirations for participation on the jury changed. Juries shrunk in size as the jury pool was opened by Supreme Court doctrine to include a wider range of individuals and as the Court revised its doctrine on peremptory challenges to ban those based in race and gender. Noting with poignancy this temporal sequence, Judge Higginbotham argued that, given contemporary concerns about inclusivity, whatever the accuracy of the 1970s cost/benefit analysis, it should be recalculated to reflect current views on the importance of diversity on the jury. But these substantive, specific arguments against the six person jury were trumped by two general positions: that trial court discretion was the desirable means to achieve the desired goal of judicial economy.

III. A SECOND ILLUSTRATION: THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT

Turn now from the change in the size of a civil jury, a change that is discrete, specific, and small in terms of the scope of its application compared with that of the CJRA, legisla-


51. See also Proposed Rules, supra note 6.

52. Id. (arguing that a “12 person jury . . . works an exponential increase in its ability to reflect the interests of minorities. . . . Reducing the size from 12 to 6 plainly deals a heavier blow to the representativeness of the civil jury than any bigoted exercise of preemp­tory challenges.”). Albert Alschuler and Andrew Deiss note that, “as the jury's composition became more democratic, its role in American civil life declined.” Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 868 (1994).

53. The change in the number of jurors affects a small fraction of all federal litigation; over the past decades, civil jury trials in the federal courts represent under 10 percent of the annual dispositions. For example, in 1971, when the number of jurors was being reduced in federal courts by local rulemaking, a trial was commenced in 7950 of the civil cases, of which 3,347 were jury trials and 4,603 were non-jury trials; in contrast, the federal courts disposed of 85,638 cases; thus 9.3 percent of the civil caseload reached trial. 1971 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, Table C-4 at 280.

In 1995, a trial was commenced in 7,443 of the civil cases (4,126 of which were jury trials and 3,317 were non-jury trials). The district courts disposed of a
tion that some describe as aimed at "reform" of the entire civil justice process and its rulemaking procedures. 55 Congress has targeted cost and delay as problems to be solved, commissioned local Advisory Groups in each district to develop plans as the means of reform, offered guidance in the form of principles on differential case management, discovery control, and use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), 56 and asked the Institute for Civil Justice (ICJ) of RAND to assess the impact of its efforts. RAND's ICJ considered a series of variables (time to disposition, litigation costs, attorney satisfaction and views of fairness 57) and then measured those variables in twenty federal

total of 229,325 cases; thus 3.2 percent reached trial. See 1995 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, Table C-4 at 162.

Note that the actual number of civil trials over the time period remained fairly stable; given increases in the size of the judiciary, the number of trials per judge went down. Hence, each judge selects fewer juries and the number of such selections per year is small; the economies achieved by having to select fewer jurors at the front end thus become minimal.

A different argument about economies is not the time for selection, but the savings achieved from having fewer jurors with which to deal. While the absolute numbers of trials have remained roughly constant, their length has increased. Data are no longer available that distinguish the length of jury and non-jury trials. Interview with staff at the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (June 11, 1997). In 1971, of 10,093 trials completed, 8,860 (about 88 percent) were three days or under and 160 (under 2 percent) were longer than 10 days. Table C-8, 1971 ANNUAL REPORT at 311. In 1995, of the 10,395 trials commenced, the 7,706 trials (74 percent) were three days or under and 401 (almost 4 percent) were longer than 10 days. 1995 ANNUAL REPORT at Table C-8, 177.

One other comment is appropriate about judicial perceptions of jury selection as a burden. Criminal trials remain, absent party stipulation, trials of twelve in the federal courts. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b). In terms of numbers and percentages, the volume of criminal trials is proportionally higher than civil trials. In 1971, of 44,615 criminal defendants, at least 6,416 (about 14 percent) were tried. 1971 ANNUAL REPORT, Table D-4 at 340. In 1995, of 54,980 criminal defendants, at least 4,765 (about 9 percent) were tried. 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, Table D-4 at 225.


57. See James S. Kakalik, Terence Dunworth, Laural A. Hill, Daniel McCaffrey,
districts by comparing data from cases terminated in 1991 and from cases filed in 1992-93. The researchers concluded that the "CJRA pilot program, as the package was implemented, had little effect" on any of the variables studied. RAND's report tells us that "implementation often fell short;" "in practice, there was much less change in case management after CJRA than one might have expected from reading the plans."
RAND argues that one reason for a lack of change was Congress' top-down effort to impose rules on a group of people—federal judges—who are themselves specially tied to their self-perception as independent actors. 63

I do not disagree with the idea that federal judges are particularly invested in their own independence. I do think, however, that the reports on the CJRA need to be recast and therefore the results reinterpreted. The problem is not with RAND's able and thoughtful work. 64 The problems are with RAND's mandate and its metric; the researchers were charged with looking for the

THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF THE FIVE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 (FJC, Jan. 27, 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter, FJC DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS REPORT]. These districts were designated because of particular judges' interest in and support of ADR, and they were thus "willing participants" in using differential case tracking and ADR. Id. at ii-iii. The FJC's data are based on interviews with court personnel and advisory group members and from questionnaires answered by attorneys and some who conducted the ADR; no litigant surveys were undertaken nor were there independent measures of costs other than attorneys' perceptions of the effects of procedural changes on costs.

This FJC report echoes, in some respects, RAND's findings. One focus was on differential case tracking and management. The FJC reports that management efforts sometimes reduce the time to disposition. FJC DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS REPORT at 7 (reporting that in only one of three case management districts studied did statistics "show a clear lowering of disposition time during the demonstration period"). Further, the cause of such decrease may be attributed to a variety of factors, including the reporting obligations in the CJRA itself. Id. More than half the attorneys surveyed in three districts reported that case management regimes had no effects on costs (id. at 9, Table 3), and about two-thirds reported that they [the attorneys] were "satisfied with the cost of litigation" in their case. Id. at 8. Like RAND, the FJC reports intangible benefits, such as a change in "climate" and like RAND, the FJC report describes attorney appreciation for contact with the bench. Id. at 9-10.

The other focus of FJC's DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS REPORT was on ADR. In one of the districts studied—the Western District of Missouri—attorneys reported that ADR decreased their litigation costs. FJC DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS REPORT at 18. The FJC made estimates of costs savings, but stated that its conclusions could only be tentative pending measurement of actual costs and comparison data. Id. Similarly, many attorneys reported that ADR was the cause of settlement. Id. at 19.

Because some ADR proponents and providers have been distressed with RAND's finding of no direct data to support ADR's utility in saving cost and time (see discussion infra, at notes 185, 199-201 and accompanying text), some of them have invoked the FJC report and stressed its findings. See, e.g., Elizabeth Plapinger, Twi...
effects of the 1990 legislation, and to do so, they understandably relied on assessing the differences in case processing before and after 1990. But the CJRA is not the beginning of a change. Its enactment marks the fact of changes long underway in the civil process. Searching for footprints of those changes in a short time-frame results in conclusions of little implementation or of unsuccessful attempts to bring about procedural change. When the inquiry shifts from an immediate to a somewhat longer time span, however, one finds significant alterations.

A. Rules Codify Practice; Practice Persists
After Rules Change

The CJRA (like the enactment of a national rule in 1991 on the size of civil juries) represents a national codification of practices that have already become embedded in culture and that have garnered substantial (albeit not universal) support from bench and bar. Because the changes predate 1990, it is not surprising to find few effects of a reform of this magnitude in an interval as short as four years.

I am not making the argument that Congress and the judiciary were easy co-venturers in 1990, happily working together to ratify changes already in place. Members of the judiciary objected vehemently to the then-proposed legislation; some commentators argued that the so-called “Biden Bill” infringed on Article III prerogatives of federal judges. But step back from

65. RAND’s EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at 7-8. The methodology involved relying on comparisons between ten pilot and ten comparison districts, and separately analyzing quantitative data from cases terminated in 1991 and those filed in 1992-93 after “the implementation of the pilot program plans.”


the description of the fray and consider the proposals found
within the CJRA; virtually all that is within the CJRA can also
be found in either the national or local federal rules, as they
were amended in the 1980s and again, after the CJRA, in the
1990s. These practices themselves evolved over several decades.

Hence, a first conclusion. National rulemaking—be it pro­
posed by Congress or the federal judiciary—frequently represents
codification of practice and reflection of change rather than the
commencement of newly-minted regimes. The footnote here is
that I am not claiming a meta-rule that insists national
rulemaking can never be the source of innovation. Rather, my
point is to underscore a strong tendency in contemporary
rulemaking to codify practice rather than to invent.

Moreover, I am also not arguing that national codification
represents an underlying unity—a single nation-wide set of
processes in place and then expressed by a national rule. Recall
that RAND found that most judges described little difference in
their practices, before and after the CJRA. (Those who man­
aged continued to do so, and those who did not, did not change.)
Codifying “national practice” thus provides a statement of

Cf. Carrington, Disunionism, supra note 37, at 961-62 (describing judicial objections
that the legislation would undermine their independence); Marcia Coyle, Senate Sets
its Sights on Delays in Civil Trials, NATL. L.J. July 23, 1990, at 5 (describing ABA
and Judicial Conference opposition to the “mandatory nature” of the bill’s proposals).
68. See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, State Rules: Uniformity,
(describing the “cross-pollination between state and federal procedure”) [hereinafter
Subrin, Local Rules]. John Langbein observed that his experience with the Uniform
Law Conference is parallel: Most projects begin with examples from earlier practices,
and the tendency to borrow rather than innovate is endemic in legal systems
throughout the world. Letter from Professor John H. Langbein of Yale Law School to
Judith Resnik (Apr. 11, 1997) (on file with author).
69. See, for example, the 1966 revision of the class action rule, FED. R. CIV. P.
23 and the 1938 rules themselves. See also Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic
Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act 47 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 1997)
(manuscript on file with author) (discussing legislative and judicial lawmaking, its
interaction, and offering categories of statutes as instrumental, expressive, and sym­

60. RAND’s EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at 84-
85.
trends, as described and inscribed by judicial leaders including those supported by institutions like the Federal Judicial Center and the Judicial Conference, but the corollary points are that practice persists after rules change and proponents of change cannot always compel compliance. Below I sketch forty years of work of judges and lawyers that is reflected in the CJRA.

1. The Sources of Judicial Management.—Congress described the CJRA as framed by “principles” whose implementation was at the center of RAND’s inquiry. According to the Act, Congress hoped for use of six techniques: “differential case management;” “early judicial management;” “monitoring and control of complex cases;” “encouragement of cost-effective discovery through voluntary exchanges and cooperative discovery devices;” “good-faith efforts to resolve discovery disputes before filing motions;” and “referral of appropriate cases to alternative dispute resolution programs.”

Those “principles” are not inventions of the 1990 Congress. Each of them can be found in revisions in the 1980s to federal and local rules, and then in subsequent revisions of those rules after 1990. Further, the six principles (fairly reducible to three—judicial management, discovery reform, and promotion of alternative dispute resolution) have their sources in the work of federal judges and of lawyers over the decades from the 1930s through the 1980s.

Where do the ideas of judicial control, alternative processes, burdensome discovery, and reliance on judges to process cases come from? A first source is the structure of the 1938 rules themselves. As is well explained by Professor Stephen Yeazell, the 1938 rules created a pretrial phase of litigation in which judges and lawyers had new opportunities for exchange. That exchange was influenced by what Professor Stephen Subrin has described as the 1938 rules’ adoption of equity’s orientation,

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71. RAND’s EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 3; see also 28 U.S.C. § 473.
licensing discretionary behavior of judges.74

While the 1938 rules both created a space in which manage-
ment could occur and authorized judges to exercise discretion to
do so, the original rules did not articulate a strong vision of
judges as case managers. Rereading the original Rule 16, one
finds a description of the pretrial process both completely dis-
cretionary and focused on the preparation of cases for trial.75
Neither the word “discovery” nor “settlement” are mentioned in
the 1938 version of Rule 16.76 For the origins of today’s judicial
case management with its reorientation of judicial role, one
must go outside the text of then-governing Rule 16, to practices
of judges and lawyers beginning in the 1930s in both state and
federal courts.

74. Subrin, How Equity Conquered, supra note 41.
75. The 1938 text read:
"Rule 16. Pre-Trial Procedure; Formulating Issues.”
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for
the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents
which will avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master for
findings to be used as evidence when the trial is to be by a jury;
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the
conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements
made by the parties as to any of the matters considered, and which limits the
issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of coun-
sel; and such order when entered controls the subsequent course of the action,
unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice. The court in its
discretion may establish by rule a pre-trial calendar on which actions may be
placed for consideration as above provided and may either confine the calendar
to jury actions or to non-jury actions or extend it to all actions.
1938 Rules, supra note 15, at 37-38. See also David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A
76. See infra, note 80 and accompanying text for drafter Charles Clark’s view of
the deliberate exclusion of the discussion of settlement from the 1938 version of
Rule 16.
a. State Practices: The Uses of the "Pre-Trial"

Like the downsizing of the civil jury, the development of federal pre-trial processes has roots in state practices,\(^\text{77}\) admired by the federal rule drafters. The 1938 version of Rule 16 cites state and municipal court use of the "pre-trial,"\(^\text{78}\) and some federal judges drew from that practice when incorporating the pre-trial in their routine soon after the 1938 rules were promulgated.\(^\text{79}\)


New Jersey's use of pretrials was also a point of reference. See, e.g., Remarks of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Introduction to the Problem of the Protracted Case, in Seminar on Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. at 376-77 (discussing need for the pre-trials to be mandatory and to be held in advance of trial). Pre-trials were also used in North Dakota, Tennessee, and Kansas. See Nims, Pre-Trial at 8.

\(^{78}\) The Advisory Committee's notes refer to similar rules in the cities of Boston, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, and New York. 1938 Rules, supra note 15, at 38-39. Reference was also made to the practice in England of "directions" and to the use of pre-trial conferences for "discussion and identification of the actual points in dispute" to facilitate presentations at trial. Id. at 297. In 1936, a Royal Commission had published The Dispatch of Business at Common Law, discussing the pre-trial hearing and its utility; that report is quoted in Pre-Trial Clinic, Demonstrations, a Conference co-sponsored by the Committee for the Improvement of the Administration of Justice of the Judicial Conference of Senior Judges and by the Section of Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association, 4 F.R.D. 35, 80-81 (1944) [hereinafter Judicial Conference/ABA Pre-Trial Clinic].

In the 1990s, the English judiciary is reconsidering its practices; a recent report endorses a form of case management. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES (July, 1996) (also known as "Lord Woolf's Report," after the chair, Lord Harry Woolf, now Master of the Rolls and presiding judge in the Court of Appeal, Civil Division). Description and criticism of that approach can be found in REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (A.A.S. Zuckerman & Ross Cranston eds., 1995) and in Michael Zander, Judicial Case Management in England (distributed to participants in the CJRA Implementation Conference). For discussion of managerial approaches and civil justice reform in Australia, see the Hon. G.L. Davies, Managing the Work of the Courts (paper delivered at the Australian Institute for Judicial Administration Asia-Pacific Courts Conference, Aug. 22-24, 1997) (on file with the author).

\(^{79}\) Following the promulgation of the Federal Rules, Judge George C. Sweeney (of the federal district court in Boston) and Judge Bolitha J. Laws (of the federal district court in the District of Columbia) were the first federal courts to set up a pre-trial calendar and to bring the pre-trial conference to its full use. Report by the Committee on Pre-Trial Procedure to the Judicial Administration Section of the American Bar Association 1 (1952) [hereinafter 1952 ABA Pre-Trial Committee Report].
Of course, when focused on the "practice," a question exists about what that practice was. What happened at a "pre-trial" and how does it comport with what occurs today? Equating the 1939 and the 1997 "pre-trial/pretrial" is unwise; indeed, the word itself has changed, with the hyphen between "pre" and "trial" dropping out. The earlier, hyphenated form reflected a focus on trial preparation and clarification. As one judicial proponent pointed out: "pre-trial, perhaps is a misnomer; it is rather a part of the actual trial." Others spoke of cases having

See also Ross W. Shumaker, An Appraisal of Pre-Trial in Ohio, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 192, 196 (1956) [hereinafter Shumaker, Appraisal] (detailing pre-trial use by a federal district judge as soon as the 1938 rules became effective); Hon. James Alger Fee, Pre-Trial Conferences and Other Procedures Prior to Trial in the Ordinary Civil Action, in Pre-Trial Procedure in Ordinary Civil Actions, in Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 319, 328 (1958) (describing the District of Oregon as using that practice since the inception of the Federal Rules and arguing that it was "the most efficient device as yet discovered for finding out what is the essential controversy in a case before trial"); Herbert W. Clark, What Remedies for Refusal of a Pre-Trial Conference? (mandatory use in the districts of Oregon and Massachusetts). Id. at 334, 335. By 1944, one report states that a majority of federal district courts used pre-trial procedure. Will Shafroth, Pre-Trial Techniques of Federal Judges, 4 F.R.D. 183, 184 (1944).

In terms of numbers of such conferences, in 1948, 3,716 pretrials were reported; by 1951, the number was 8,202. 1952 ABA Pre-Trial Committee Report, supra at 11. These numbers require at a minimum the context of the number of civil cases then pending and those concluded by trial. At the end of 1948, 49,215 civil cases were pending; of the 37,769 cases terminated that year, 11.6 percent were disposed of by trial. See 1948 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 47, 93 (Chart 8). Using the number of cases pending in 1948, we know that, in about 7.6 percent, courts held pre-trials. Turning to 1951, at the end of that year, 55,084 civil cases were pending. Of the 52,119 civil cases terminated, trials were begun in 6962, or a bit more than 13 percent. 1951 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED COURTS 52, 95, 148 (Table C7). Thus, in 1951, courts held pre-trials in about 14.9 percent of the cases.

80. In 1938, the ABA Committee on Pre-Trial Procedure described the pre-trial as a "preview," during which the court should narrow the issues, to shorten and speed the trial hearings, and avoid trial in cases where it is not useful. Report of the Committee on Pre-Trial Procedure, 63 Annual Report of the American Bar Association 534 (1938) [hereinafter 1938 ABA Committee Pre-Trial Committee Report]. Later, one of the original drafters, Charles E. Clark, sought to confine the rule to that use. He argued that Rule 16, "in its inception and in its wording, makes it clear that pre-trial is not intended as a substitute for trial; its whole tenor is that of proper preparation for trial." Hon. Charles E. Clark, To an Understanding Use of Pre-Trial, in Proceedings of the Seminar on Procedures for Effective Judicial Administration, 29 F.R.D. 191, 455 (1961) [hereinafter Understanding Use of Pre-Trial].

81. Judicial Conference/ABA Pre-Trial Clinic, supra note 78, at 56 (Hon. Bolitha J. Laws describing the practice in the District of Columbia).
been “pre-tried,” and some advocated that no case should be permitted to be tried without that step.\(^{82}\) In contrast, today the unhyphenated “pretrial” is a stage unto itself, no longer fixed on trial but rather assumed to be the predicate to a conclusion without trial.

Yet the concept of a pre-trial conference having ends other than the trial itself was not outlandish from Rule 16’s inception. In 1944, the Pre-Trial Committee of the Judicial Conference recommended that “orders with reference to both discovery and summary judgment may be entered at the pre-trial conference in appropriate cases.”\(^{83}\) In the “demonstrations” held during the same year, a mock pre-trial conference resulted in agreement for a plaintiff to submit to a physical examination.\(^{84}\) By 1958, one lawyer argued that Rule 16’s pre-trial conference was a “discovery device itself,” to be used like a subpoena or a request for documents, to gain information and expedite the process.\(^{85}\)

In addition to the use of a pre-trial for discovery, many also saw the pre-trial conference as the occasion for exploration of settlement.\(^{86}\) Again the 1944 demonstrations (held to teach law-

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82. Clark, *Understanding Use of Pre-Trial*, supra note 80, at 341. Charles Clark described the role of the judge at the pre-trial as that of the “primary architect in preparing the case for adjudication” and therefore, that the judge who was to preside at the trial should preside at the pre-trial and the two events should not be temporally far from each other. Charles E. Clark, *Objectives of Pre-Trial Procedure*, 17 Ohio St. L.J. 163, 165 (1956).

83. *Pre-Trial Procedure*, Committee Report, 4 F.R.D. 83, 97 (1944) (appended to *Judicial Conference/ABA Pre-Trial Clinic*, supra note 78. The Pre-Trial Committee’s recommendations included that, absent special circumstances, every civil case “should be pre-tried before it is assigned for trial.” Id. at 98.

84. *Judicial Conference/ABA Pre-Trial Clinic*, supra note 78, at 61.

85. Manley B. Strayer, *Discovery in Pretrial Conference Procedure in Proceedings on the Seminar in Protracted Litigation*, 23 F.R.D. 347, 349 (1958) (describing practice in the District of Oregon, including the practice that pretrials be held “soon after a case is filed,” and stating that parties sometimes attend). See also Kaufman, *Effective Judicial Supervision*, supra note 77, at 214 (“[i]n the ordinary case [the pre-trial conference] is the apex of the discovery process, providing a final opportunity to narrow the issues . . . and, generally streamline the case”); Jayne, 17 Ohio St. L.J., *supra* note 77, at 162 (describing pre-trial in state courts in 1930s as providing a “preview” of each case).

Cf. Rule 11(A) of the Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, 4 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1112, 1115 (1961) (“So far as practicable all discovery should be completed prior to pretrial. Pretrial should not be deemed a substitute for discovery procedures provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).

86. One of the pre-trial's major proponents, Advisory Committee member and
yers and judges about this “most successful of the new procedures” are illustrative. The mock pre-trials included judges who raised the question of settlement. Other proponents relied on state court examples in which pre-trials were scheduled before trial dates were set and settlement was discussed.

Judicial promotion of settlement at pre-trials was a particularly controversial aspect of the procedure. We know this in part from discussion about what place settlement had in pre-trial proceedings. Proponents such as Justice Brennan ap-

Michigan law professor Edson Sunderland, described pre-trial hearings as typically occurring about two weeks before trial, and that sometimes the case was settled, or alternatively, the dispute was reduced in scope. He cited data from Detroit that cases were dropped from the trial list. See also 1938 ABA Pre-Trial Committee Report, supra note 50 at 537-38 (discussing the use of pre-trials to avoid unnecessary trials by facilitating settlements); Hon. Bolitha J. Laws, Pre-Trial Procedure, 1 F.R.D. 397, 401-03 (1940) (speaking at an ABA conference and explaining his settlement efforts, including reassuring counsel that his views should not deter them from seeking their day in court).

87. These are the words of Judge Parker, who chaired the Judicial Conference/ABA Pre-Trial Clinic, supra note 78, at 36.

88. Judicial Conference/ABA Pre-Trial Clinic, supra note 78, at 54 (“The Court: Have you gentlemen considered the possibility of a settlement or adjustment of this matter?”); id. at 69 (“The Court: . . . Gentlemen, is there anything I can do to aid you in the settlement of this case? Have you talked it over?,” followed by a discussion of a demand of $5,000, an offer of $3,000, and a judge asking: “Would you consider giving an additional $1,000?” and, after additional exchanges, the judicial statement: “The trial judge will probably bring up this matter of settlement again before the actual trial starts . . . . [A]s I often have told counsel at pre-trial, I have no desire to bring any pressure on you to settle,” followed by a direction to the clerk to note that “the estimated time of trial is five days, and . . . the prospects of settlement are good.”).

89. See Harry D. Nims, Some By-Products of Pre-Trial, 17 OHIO St. L.J. 185, 187 (1956) (discussing a 1955 report of the New York Temporary Commission on the Courts, describing a settlement rate of 95 percent of the cases in the State Supreme Court and arguing for earlier settlements, before cases were listed for trial; also describing a 1954 Judicial Survey Commission of Massachusetts which urged settlement and that “a vigorous effort” should be made to help pre-trial do its “proper work”) [hereinafter Nims, By-Products of Pre-Trial]. See also 1952 ABA Pre-Trial Committee Report, supra note 79, at 5 (discussing accidents involving the Long Island Railroad, the pre-trial of 200 cases within eleven days, and 92 settlements).

90. But not its exclusive source of controversy. See, e.g., comments of Detroit Judge Moynihan, discussing the early opposition to pre-trial; that he was “threatened with constitutional actions and told [he] had no authority and [he] was invading the rights of lawyers and litigants, and [he] was depriving people of trials by jury, and many other things.” Judicial Conference/ABA Pre-Trial Clinic, supra note 79, at 47.

91. See, e.g., Shumaker, supra note 79, at 205 (quoting a recommendation of the 1944 Pre-Trial Committee of the Judicial Conference that “the committee considers that settlement is a by-product of good pre-trial procedure, rather than a primary
provingly described the link between pretrial conferences and settlement in New Jersey courts and opponents, such as Judge Clark, inveighed against a focus on settlement during pretrials. Some federal judges were plainly enthusiasts of the view that pre-trials, in federal court, like some state courts, was “to enlarge justice by consent and to reduce the need for judgment by command.” Charles Clark, among others, firmly disagreed. Relying on his authority as an original drafter of the Federal Rules, he opined: “It is no mere chance that no provision is made [in Rule 16] for settlement negotiations; those are no part of a proper pre-trial.”

92. Brennan, supra note 77, at 378 (“We have learned that ‘cards face up on the table’ before we go to trial will lead, as we have found in New Jersey definitely that it does, to settlements.”).

93. Shumaker, Appraisal, supra note 79, at 200-01 (quoting Mahoning County, Ohio’s rule, which also provided that in cases not terminated prior to trial, parties could request reassignment to another judge for trial).

94. Clark, Understanding Use of Pre-trial, supra note 80, at 455-56, in Proceedings of the Seminar on Procedures for Effective Judicial Administration, July, 1961 (also invoking New Jersey’s famous chief judge, Arthur Vanderbilt, as not tolerating “maneuvering” as a part of pre-trials and allowing “settlement negotiations only quite apart from the hearing and only at the side bar of the court”). Clark argued that “the function [of the pre-trial] is to see that the parties and the court are fully acquainted with the case, leaving no room for the tactic of surprise attack or defense, and to uncover and record the points of agreement between the parties—all to the end of shortening and simplifying the eventual trial.” Id. at 456. See also Charles E. Clark, Pre-Trial Orders and Pre-Trial as a Part of Trial, in Seminar on Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 319, 506, 509-10 (1958) (describing “pre-trial at its best is just a part of the trial itself” and criticizing the conception of pre-trials as a “failure unless the parties are dragooned into a settlement”). See also Shumaker, Appraisal, supra note 79, at 201, 204 (describing one Ohio County’s rule, different from the others, that “if settlement is to be had there is no reason to have a pre-trial conference. Pre-Trial should not be primarily for settlement,” and describing the use of pre-trial for settlement as the “most controversial” aspect of the practice).
judge who pre-tried a case should try it. Because the judge at the pre-trial was the “primary architect in preparing the case for adjudication,” that judge should preside at a trial, close in time to the pre-trial. But not all courts adopted that view; in several jurisdictions, one judge did the pre-trial and another presided at trial.

To summarize, in the early years under Rule 16, its use and function was debated as state and federal judges argued on behalf of its utility—either as a means of detailing the contours of a trial or as a means of avoiding that trial. Adjudication served as a dominant end-point. But while seen as a principal, if not exclusive, focus of the judicial process, trials were not described as desirable events. Rather, even as fierce a proponent of cabining pre-trial procedures as Charles Clark considered that during pre-trials, as parties made final selections of facts in dispute, they might also learn of the views they shared, and “go the small remaining distance to reach a settlement without the agony of trial.” Further, Clark promoted the concept of the trial judge as skillful at pre-trials, perhaps “more effective... than one who may be able to turn out well-rounded opinions.” “Pre-trial is not a matter for errand boys or clerks. Rather it is the high function on the part of both judge and counsel.”

See also a 1960 local rule from the Eastern District of North Carolina that “the primary objective of pre-trial should be to facilitate trial and a just judgment,” and that “compromise settlement shall be regarded as a by-product of such procedure rather than the end sought,” and another from the Western District of North Carolina, which provided that “any party has the right to decline to discuss settlement and insist on an immediate trial.” Both are quoted in Comment: The Local Rules of Civil Procedure in the Federal District Courts—A Survey, 1966 DUKE L.J. 1011, 1054 (hereinafter Local Rules Survey).

95. Clark, Objectives of Pre-Trial Procedure, supra note 82, at 165.
96. NIMS, PRE-TRIAL, supra note 77, at 20, 29, 31, 38, 54 (describing such practices in New York, Massachusetts, D.C., Delaware, and Texas); see also 1938 ABA Pre-Trial Committee Report, supra note 80, at 538 (emphasizing how freely the parties could feel to discuss their chances for prevailing at trial, since the pretrial judge “will not (ordinarily) be the one who hears the case”).
97. Clark, Objectives of the Pre-Trial Procedure, supra note 82, at 164.
98. Id. at 165.
99. Id. at 166. Clark stated that he hoped the symposium on pre-trial would “promote the conviction that the judge’s finest accomplishment is adjudication on the basis of a case properly developed by astute counsel, with his own pronouncements largely muted, rather than the ex-cathedra pronouncement of the formal opinion.” Id. at 170.
b. Protracted Cases: Calling for Control

For some, it was state court practices in ordinary litigation that anchored their views on the utility of a "pre-trial;" for other judges, it was their experiences with larger, "protracted" cases that committed them to the vision of judge as useful overseer of the pretrial arena. When the problems of "protracted cases" became the focus, aspects of state court pre-trial practice were modified. State courts relied on different judges during the phases of a case, but, as detailed below, promoters of pre-trial in the "big case" argued that a single judge should control such cases from filing to disposition.

In the early 1950s, in the wake of anti-trust litigation that had been filed in several federal districts, the federal judiciary turned its concerns to what were then called "protracted" cases. A first judicial committee, chaired by Judge Barrett Prettyman, produced a report on the problem, and a second committee, chaired by Judge Alfred Murrah, wrote a "Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases" to teach judges to respond to these cases. The response advocated was that

\[\text{the judge assigned should at the earlier moment take actual control of the case and rigorously exercise such control throughout the proceedings in such case.}\]

Specifically, that judge ("iron-hearted" in demeanor) was

\[100. \text{See Committee to Study Procedure in Anti-Trust and other Protracted Cases (also called the "Prettyman Committee," after its chair, the Hon. E. Barrett Prettyman), Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases, 13 F.R.D. 62 (1953) (discussing such cases as posing an "acute major problem in the current administration of justice" and suggesting that trial judges should provide firm oversight in the preparation for trial to avoid undue expense and waste); Hon. Alfred P. Murrah, Background of the Seminar, in Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States Judges 319, 386 (1958) [hereinafter Background of the Seminar] ("[T]he judicial process was literally breaking down under the weight of these cases.").}\]


\[102. \text{23 F.R.D. at 614-15.}\]

\[103. \text{25 F.R.D. at 384 (attributing the phrase to a 1951 speech by Judge Prettyman).}\]
supposed to hold conferences to get "acquainted" with both counsel and the case, define issues beyond what was set forth in the pleadings and authorize discovery only within "the bounds" of the issues so delineated, require counsel to confer prior to bringing discovery disputes to the judge, employ masters to supervise discovery if needed, establish a "tentative timetable" for the phases of the litigation, including scheduling motions and forecasting the time to trial, "promote" stipulations of fact among parties, consider bifurcation of issues for trial, organize and limit the presentation of proof at trial, and control the use of experts on and proof of "complicated scientific, technical and economic facts."

As the details of these directives demonstrate, the activities identified as important in 1953 for the protracted case are in 1997 considered appropriate for the ordinary case. That application was less obvious three decades ago. In many respects, the protracted case was conceptualized as different from the rest of the docket and because of that difference, in need of a distinct kind of process. As the Preface to the *Handbook for Protected Cases* explained:

> Let it be emphasized this is not the ordinary litigation; our subject is rare in number, the truly complicated, a few hundred amid the tens of thousands of cases on federal court calendars. 

Because these cases were "rare," the judge dispatched to control these cases was instructed to act in a special capacity. Unlike ordinary litigation, in which under the master calendar sys-

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105. *Id.* at 385 (IV.A. "The First Pre-Trial Conference: Timing; Order Setting Conference; Scope").
106. *Id.* at 387.
107. *Id.* at 396.
108. *Id.* at 392-93.
109. 25 F.R.D. 395 ("Early designation of an unalterable time for trial has many benefits.").
110. *Id.* at 397.
111. *Id.* at 403.
112. *Id.* at 405-407.
113. *Id.* at 415-431.
115. *Id.* at 383 ("Control of a case during the trial thereof is familiar to all trial judges. But here we speak of control of the case in its procedural aspects prior to trial as well as during the trial itself.").
tem then in use, different judges worked on phases of the same lawsuit. In protracted litigation, a single judge would be assigned "for all purposes" and would need relief from other duties. Hence, procedures crafted for the "big" case might have been understood as appropriately applied only to litigation fitting that criterion.

But early on, some judges insisted on the similarity between the "ordinary" and the "big" case. As one judge explained to his colleagues: "[a]s far as techniques are concerned, you are driving at the same end and obviously enough you go through the same motions." Thus the summary of recommendations from the first Seminar on Protracted Cases proposed: "The techniques suggested herein will likewise save time, lighten calendars and further justice in most cases."  

2. The Means of Change: Local Rulemaking, Judicial Education, and Constituencies for Judge-Lawyer Contact.—I have sketched the sources from which the principles of the 1990s CJRA evolved. A distinct issue is how individual judges' experiences and preferences made their way into widespread use and then into rules and statutes. Three other parts of twentieth


117. See Murrah, Handbook for Protracted Cases, supra note 102, at 373, 377, 384 (recommending that assignment be made "to one judge for all purposes" to enable "his prompt assumption of control" and that "necessary adjustments should be made in the normal case load of the assigned judge.").

118. See, e.g., Judge E. Barrett Prettyman, The Importance of the Problem, in Seminar in Protracted Cases, 21 F.R.D. 395, 405 (1957) (questioning whether the "American judicial system [could] devise procedures for such controversies no matter how big or complicated").

119. Fee, supra note 79, at 381.

120. Id. at 382. The seminar had devoted a day to the use of pre-trial procedure "in the ordinary civil action" at the suggestion of Judge Fee, who had also done such a program for the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference. Murrah, Background of the Seminar, supra note 100, at 319.

century federal procedural history thus become relevant: the
growth of local rules, changes in the size and composition of
both the judicial and legal professions, and the advent of the
federal judiciary as an organized bureaucracy and training cen­
ter for federal judges. This is not the occasion upon which to
provide a full history of any, but a brief foray into all three top­
ics is necessary.

a. Local Rules Communicating Techniques

Local rules provide a vehicle for judicial communication of
changes afoot in operating practices. As is familiar, the 1938
Rules provided that district courts could make additional rules
not inconsistent with the national regime. As many commen­
tators have documented over the decades, local rules have ex­
panded in scope and number. In terms of the national rule of
particular interest here—Rule 16—some of the local rules echoed
a pre-trial of which Charles Clark would have approved. Such
rules either left the matter to the discretion of the district
judge or used the pre-trial to organize the case for trial, in­
cluding provisions for introduction of exhibits and the like.
In contrast, other local rules expanded the domain of the pre­
trial, such as requiring that lawyers meet in advance of the pre­
trial conference to make agreements and write documents detail­
ing their positions, authorizing the discussion of settlement (but

122. FED. R. CIV. P. 83 (1938) ("Each district court by action of a majority of the
judges thereof may from time to time make and amend rules governing its practice
not inconsistent with these rules . . . . In all cases not provided for by rule, the
district courts may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these
rules."). See generally Subrin, Local Rules, supra note 68, at 2011-16 (discussing the
history of local rulemaking and the assumption that some such rulemaking would be
needed under the then nascent federal rules, and the drafting of Rule 83).

123. Id. at 2018-21. Professor Robel notes that the 1988 amendments to the
Rules Enabling Act attempted to address the divergence by requiring notice and
review of local rulemaking. Robel, Local Advisory Groups, supra note 56, at 881
n.12. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 83, as amended in 1995.

124. E.g., Rule 12 of the Rules for the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 1137, 1140 (1960) ("The court
may hold pre-trial conferences in any civil case upon notice to counsel for all par­
ties.").

125. E.g., Rule 11 of the Rules of the United States District Court for the Dis­
not its inclusion in a pre-trial order), and threatening the imposition of sanctions.\textsuperscript{126} That such requirements exceeded the national rules is yet another illustration of disuniformity, discussed earlier in the context of downsizing the civil jury.\textsuperscript{127} Several local rules on case management display a parallel disloyalty to the national regime.

\textit{b. Judges as Teachers and "Proselytizers"}

While local rules provide a medium for individual judges within a district to express their shared commitments,\textsuperscript{128} a critical element in the transformation of the role of the federal judge was communication across the United States judiciary. Others have chronicled the growth of the federal judiciary as a self-conscious bureaucracy;\textsuperscript{129} my focus here is on the federal

\textsuperscript{126} E.g., Calendar Rules of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Rules 13-16, 4 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1157, 1158-63 (1961); for criticism of this packet as beyond the scope of Rule 16 and providing inappropriate penalties for non-compliance, see Clark, \textit{Understanding Use of Pre-Trial}, supra note 80, at 458-60. Judge Clark's comments often linked the expansion of pre-trial beyond what he claimed was intended with his concerns about erosion of general pleadings rules, particularly in large cases. See Charles E. Clark, \textit{Comment on Judge Dawson's Paper on the Place of the Pleadings in a Proper Definition of the Issues in the "Big Case,"} in \textit{Seminar on Protracted Cases}, 23 F.R.D. 319, 435 (1958); see also his opinion for the Second Circuit in \textit{Nagler v. Admiral Corp.}, 248 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir. 1957).

Other examples of local rules expanding the Rule 16 practice include Rule 3 ("Informal Conference—Pre-Trial Statements"); Rule 4 ("Contents and Form of Pre-Trial Statements"); Rule 6 ("Pre-Trial"), of the Rules of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, 6 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1263, 1264-67 (1962); and Rule 7 ("Pre-Trial") of the Rules of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, 5 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1148, 1158-60 (1962). Some local rules expressly authorized discussion of settlement at pre-trial conferences. See, e.g., Rule 15(c) of the Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, 5 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1109, 1113 (1961); Rule 7(L)(4) of the North Carolina Rules, \textit{supra} at 1159.

\textit{See also} Shapiro, \textit{Federal Rule 16}, \textit{supra} note 75, at 1982-83 (discussing the practice of expanding requirements in pre-trial conferences).

\textsuperscript{127} See \textit{supra}, notes 7-27 and accompanying text. See also discussion \textit{infra}, Section III D.

\textsuperscript{128} "Local," "local" rules or standing orders, issued by an individual judge and stating that judge's own rule regime, express that judge's variation from or a refusal to abide by a district's local rules.

The judiciary as a teaching institution, aimed at educating judges about a particular set of attitudes to take toward their work. That interest requires a brief explication of the evolution of the federal judiciary as a self-administering, staffed, data-collecting entity that set about (in connection with other organizations) to train judges and lawyers under the 1938 rule regime.

Through the work of judges, administrative staff, lawyers, and law teachers as they met at judicial conferences, at bar-hosted events, and at law schools, different modes of case processing were described and inscribed. Committees and institutions were created because of the felt need for change and as a means of reiterating particular visions of the shape such change should take. The discussion that follows therefore returns to many of the materials described above to consider the sources of the commentaries and the modes of their dissemination.

A first development of relevance is the formal investiture of a group of judges with administrative responsibility for the federal judiciary, which in turn relates to the growth in the number of federal judges. In 1922, Congress created twenty-five new federal judgeships and an administrative body, the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges. Congress authorized the conference to meet annually; its judges were "to advise as to the needs of his circuit and as to any matters in respect of which the administration of justice in the courts of the United States may be improved." In 1948, a renamed conference, now called the "Judicial Conference of the United States," continued the work of its...
predecessor.\textsuperscript{131}

The work of these judges was enabled by the creation of staff offices to support them. Congress has formed two such entities: the Administrative Office ("AO") of the United States Courts, established in 1939, to "examin[e] the state of the dock­
ets" and "transmit ... statistical data" on the courts,\textsuperscript{132} and the Federal Judicial Center ("FJC"), created in 1967 to "further the development and adoption of improved judicial administration" by undertaking research, staffing judicial committees, and conducting "programs of continuing education and training for personnel of the judicial branch."\textsuperscript{133}

Moving back to the 1940s, the judiciary's Conference chartered committees, including a "Pre-Trial Committee."\textsuperscript{134} In the

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\textsuperscript{132} Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501, \S 304(2), 53 Stat. 1223 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. \S\S 601-12 (1944)).

\textsuperscript{133} Pub. L. No. 90-219, \S 620, 81 Stat. 664 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. \S\S 620-29 (1967)). See also Russell R. Wheeler, Empirical Research and the Politics of Judicial Administration: Creating the Federal Judicial Center, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31 (1988) [hereinafter Wheeler, Empirical Research]. Once again, the creation of both institutions comes after the existence of some of the work that each entity assumed; prior to the creation of the Administrative Office, the Department of Justice had been collecting data on the docket and, as detailed below, prior to the 1968 creation of the FJC, the federal judiciary had begun its educational efforts.

\textsuperscript{134} See Chandler, Major Advances, supra note 130; Judicial Conference/ABA Pre-Trial Clinic, supra note 76; NIMS, Pre-Trial, supra note 77, at 191. The committee was first chaired by Chief Judge John Parker of the Fourth Circuit. The committee issued its report in 1944 and concluded its term. It was reactivated in 1947 and was chaired by Judge Alfred P. Murrah, who would lead the committee and also the Federal Judicial Center.
\end{quote}
1950s, that committee expressed its concern about the lack of implementation of the 1951 *Report on Procedure in Antitrust and Other Protracted Cases*;¹³⁵ the Chief Justice responded in 1956 by appointing federal district judges from each circuit "to study the pre-trial problems peculiar to protracted civil and criminal litigation."¹³⁶ A few years earlier, New York University's Institute for Judicial Administration¹³⁷ had begun a series of seminars for judges; in 1957, the federal judges' committee joined with NYU for the first "Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States Circuit and District Judges," and others followed at law schools around the United States.¹³⁸

Shortly thereafter, in 1960, the Judicial Conference expanded the focus by authorizing seminars for judges and lawyers "for the purpose of exploring the most effective techniques for the utilization of the pretrial and trial procedures contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."¹³⁹ In addition to the

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¹³⁵. Murrah, *Background of the Seminar*, supra note 100, (discussing the committee's work in the 1950s).


¹³⁷. Established in 1952, 21 F.R.D. at 404. Arthur Vanderbilt, former dean of NYU, former President of the American Bar Association, and then Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court, was pivotal in its founding. During the 1930s and 1940s, Vanderbilt worked on the creation of "Minimum Standards for Judicial Administration," and then pressed for law schools to become more involved in judicial reform and for law teachers to be more cognizant of social science data. In its early years, the Institute for Judicial Administration (IJA) served as a clearinghouse on judicial administration and published reports on the organization of courts and caseloads. In 1956, the IJA began an appellate judges seminar, which continues in the 1990s in two sessions, one for new judges and one for judges with more years of service on appellate courts. See FANNIE J. KLEIN, *CHANGING THE SYSTEM: THE TWENTY-FIVE YEAR CRUSADE OF THE INSTITUTE FOR JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION FOR EQUAL JUSTICE IN AMERICAN COURTS, AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE* (1977).


¹³⁹. Resolution of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 29 F.R.D. 192 (1962) (authorizing the Committee on Pretrial Procedure, "in cooperation with the
seminars on "protracted" cases, federal judicial leaders did a series of programs for newly-appointed judges. As Judge Murrah, who served as a Director of the Federal Judicial Center described them, "the seminars and conferences have been by and for judges . . . planned and largely executed by a group of seasoned judges."\footnote{140}

One of the agendas of this educational effort was to teach judges about "effective judicial supervision of litigation 'from cradle to grave,'"\footnote{141} and another was to educate lawyers about new procedures.\footnote{142} The proponents were self-described "proselytizers."\footnote{143} As the New York Times described the effort, "The Federal judicial hierarchy is pushing a campaign to make its trial judges abandon their traditional role as passive umpires between opposing lawyers and to become more masterful in controlling trials."\footnote{144} The emphasis on management in the 1960s reflected a general interest in "systems management," in vogue in business at the time,\footnote{145} and a view of the need for the federal judiciary to modernize.\footnote{146} The agenda was not, howev-
er, simply a question of caseload rationalization but rather one of altering the modes of process, to create "speedier and more effective procedures."\textsuperscript{147}

At many of these "new judges" conferences in the 1960s, discussions of judges as managers and settlers were often accompanied by the comment that the role was controversial. But (at least in the materials I have located thus far), the judicial lecturers at such conferences were not those opposed to such roles for judges. Rather, the proponents mentioned opposition, as they rebutted charges that such a role was inappropriate or unwise.\textsuperscript{148} Over time, the discussion of case management became more assured, with the judge envisioned as appropriately engaged in settlement.\textsuperscript{149} By 1973, some participants described a "trend ... from settlement as part of a pretrial conference (to get the parties talking) to the beginning of a separately identifi-


\textsuperscript{149} See, e.g., Hon. Walter E. Craig \& Dean Gordon A. Christenson, \textit{The Settlement Process, Report of Seminar F in Reports of the Conference for District Judges}, \textit{supra} note 140, at 252, 253-54 (describing discussion of the "richness and variety of judge's skills in the settlement role" and the "creative ingenuity to generate new techniques rapidly" including ex parte meetings with counsel and sealed estimates on recommendations of sums, and noting that the judge was moving from the role in a "traditional pretrial conference" toward a process "of mediation"); see also Will, Merhige, \& Rubin, \textit{supra} note 148, (expressing enthusiasm about the judicial settlement role).}
able process of mediation and conciliation."¹⁵⁰ In other words, what the 1990 CJRA terms "alternative dispute resolution" had begun to emerge.¹⁵¹

By 1968, when Congress created the Federal Judicial Center, judges had been lecturing to and educating each other for several years.¹⁵² Like the transformation of practice into rules, many of the activities of judicial education pre-dated the institution (the FJC) that became their sponsor.¹⁵³ According to the programs from those sessions,¹⁵⁴ as of 1971, new judges were

¹⁵⁰. Murrah, 1973 Foreword, supra note 140.
¹⁵¹. The relationship between alternative dispute resolution and courts changed over the decades. One illustration comes from commentary in 1971, at the District of Columbia Circuit's Judicial Conference, about the need for what the conferees termed "non-judicial means" of dispute resolution. See Excerpts from Proceedings of the Thirty-Second Annual Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 54 F.R.D. 107, 142 (1971) ("Panel and Discussion—Non-Judicial Means of Resolving Legal Disputes"). The term "non-judicial means" enables us to understand that, in the 1970s, arbitration, administrative resolutions, and "alternative grievance" procedures were all understood as activities occurring outside those of the judiciary. Changes in the language of Rule 16 provide similar insight. In the 1983 amendments to the rule, reference is made to "extrajudicial" procedures. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(7) (1983).

By the 1990s, however, the judiciary had reformatted its processes to include ADR. The 1993 amendments to Rule 16 thus speak of "special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute." Today we understand these procedures as "judicial" means of resolving disputes. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(9) (1993). As the 1993 Advisory Note explains, the revision "more accurately" describes the procedures that, aside from "traditional settlement conferences . . . may be helpful in settling litigation." FED. R. CIV. P. 16, advisory committee's note (1993). See generally Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211 (1995), also reprinted by RAND (1995).

¹⁵². See also 1948 Annual Report of the Director of the U.S. Courts, supra note 79, at 51 (discussing "demonstrations of the practice [of pre-trials] in actual cases before meetings of members of the bar and judges," a Judicial Conference Committee attempted to "show how [pre-trial] can be most effectively employed"). In addition to judicial education on the federal side, the states launched parallel efforts, and in 1964, the National College for the State Judiciary was established in Reno, Nevada. See KLEIN, supra note 137, at 40.

¹⁵³. With the establishment of such an organization, the judiciary obtained a means to exercise some control over its own management as well as a vehicle for disseminating norms on judging. See Wheeler, Empirical Research, supra note 133, at 44-51 (arguing that the Judicial Conference lacked effective means to implement its proposals and that the structure of the FJC enabled judges to control research and education more than some legislators desired).

¹⁵⁴. With the help of Rob Jones, librarian Matt Sarago, and staff at the Federal Judicial Center, I have located programs, beginning in 1971 from seminars for newly-appointed United States District Judges. Some of the programs, including those that pre-date the FJC, resulted in publications by West Publishing, in free-standing
instructed about the “concept of judicial responsibility for the disposition of litigation” during an initial orientation session conducted by Judge Murrah; other sessions included “management of civil case flow from filing to trial,” and “the role of the judge in the settlement process.”155 By 1976, Judge Hubert L. Will was instructing that, “most cases . . . are better disposed of, in terms of highest quality of justice, by a negotiated—freely negotiated—settlement, than by the most beautiful trial that you can preside over.”156 By 1990, when the Hon. William Schwarzer assumed the directorship of the FJC, civil management training became a day-long session.157

One other comment on the role of judicial education institutions in promoting case management is in order. These institutions are self-conscious actors, in need of support (including funding) and attentive to risks of alienating their audience or sponsors. As explained by Gordon Bermant and Russell R. Wheeler, the FJC institution sought to develop curricula that avoided “contaminating the stream of adjudication” and was “free from biases and special pleading.”158 A focus on case management and the pre-trial processes appears to meet that need; judicial economy, improved administration, reducing costs, and accelerating dispositions are all topics that appear “merely”

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155. 1971 Program (on file with author).


157. Program for Seminar for Newly Appointed Judges at 2-5 (June 17-22, 1990) (on file with author). Several years earlier, additional special programs were developed devoted to case management. See, e.g., Programs for District Court Case Management Workshop, Atlanta, Georgia (Mar. 21-23, 1983) and periodically thereafter (on file with author).

procedural and offer a superficially safe haven from partisanship.

In addition to activities within institutions of the judiciary, the other organizations of relevance to the promotion and dissemination of pretrial management are the American Bar Association and law schools. The ABA has long been a key participant in the rule regime; the ABA was central to the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act in 1935 that authorized the formulation of a nationwide set of federal rules, and the ABA has also played an important role in popularizing those rules by teaching lawyers and judges about the meaning and use of those rules and in working with judges to popularize them. The ABA's Pre-Trial Committee, formed in the late 1930s, predated the one created by the federal judiciary. The ABA co-sponsored some of the "clinics" and conferences, many of which occurred at law schools, which served both as venues for conferences and as publishers of the results. Another important means of dissemination was the West Publishing Company, which as a "courtesy" to judges, provided free publication of proceedings of many of the conferences.

In sum, as one reads the materials about the promotion of case management, a group of "repeat players" emerge, serving

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159. See Subrin, How Equity Conquered, supra note 41, at 943-61.
160. 1938 Rules, supra note 15, at 299 (excerpts from the proceedings of the Institute on Federal Rules of the American Bar Association, held with cooperation from the School of Law of Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio).
161. That committee, formed in 1937, was chaired by Joseph A. Moynihan and issued an enthusiastic report on the future of pre-trial procedure in 1938. 1938 ABA Pre-Trial Committee Report, supra note 80, at 534-50.
162. See, e.g., Judicial Conference/ABA Pre-Trial Clinic, supra note 78. In 1955, the ABA committee (then chaired by Judge Clarence L. Kincaid) published and distributed A JUDGE'S HANDBOOK OF PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE which included suggestions on the conduct of pre-trial conferences, forms for pre-trial orders, and transcripts of pre-trial conferences. A JUDGE'S HANDBOOK OF PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE, 17 F.R.D. 437 (1955).
163. For example, the symposium in which this essay sits illustrates the shared roles of the ABA and of law schools. Here, the University of Alabama serves as host, co-convener, and publisher of the results.
164. The relationship between West Publishing Company and the federal judiciary has become a source of controversy. See Sharon Schmickle & Tom Hamburger, Who Owns the Law?, MINN. STAR TRIB. Mar. 5, 1995, at 1A (reporting that judges took trips at West's expense). West Publishing has also provided funds for NYU's Institute for Judicial Administration's appellate judges seminars. See KLEIN, supra note 137, at 89.
on ABA committees, federal judicial committees, and lecturing, going to and hosting conferences at which they reiterate their commitments to judicial control over the pretrial phase and to a managerial mode. The judges who were the speakers are the same ones who served as leaders of new judicial institutions such as the FJC and as members of committees of the Judicial Conference and the ABA. In their work, these judges urged their colleagues to change their understandings of the practice of judging. Through these series of “clinics,” “institutes,” meetings, “demonstrations,” seminars and symposia, the messages of a new gospel on judging were reiterated and spread.

The effectiveness of the mixture of local practices, rulemaking, and judicial education is underscored by Benjamin Kaplan, who in one of the early (1961) seminars (on “Procedures for Effective Judicial Administration”) understood the significance of the changes underway. Attending in his capacity as the newly-appointed reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Kaplan summarized the proceedings by noting that:

there is unanimity of feeling that the pretrial conference is a vital and necessary part of the pretrial proceedings in civil causes . . . it is definitely on the move. It is becoming a most important feature of the proceedings prior to trial, and in certain judicial districts it has already established itself as a dominating element in those proceedings. 166

He accurately forecast that some would urge the rulemakers to make the Rule “mandatory in all or most cases . . . [and to] prescribe detail” as well as “sanctions.” 167

c. Management as a Moment of Contact Between Attorneys and Judges

Judicial leaders’ affection for pretrial management is one

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166. Id. at 462.
167. Id. at 463, counseling at least hesitation and invoking the comments of Professor Maurice Rosenberg about misuse of judicial time, of Judge Clark about the use of Rule 16 to reintroduce special pleading rules, and of Judge William Smith about the need for cooperation.
source of the transformation of process; lawyers’ interest in it is another. Several researchers have reported that lawyers “like” pretrial management; my interest is in understanding why.

A 1944 description of pre-trial conferences, offered by the Detroit judge (Joseph A. Moynihan) who also chaired the ABA Committee on Pre-trial, spoke of the informality; at pre-trials, judges and lawyers “talked about the ball game and the weather” while smoking cigarettes and cigars.\textsuperscript{168} In 1950, Harry Nims called pre-trials “simple straightforward discussion between lawyers and the judge.”\textsuperscript{169} In the late 1950s, lawyers at a conference about the pre-trial process argued that an “intangible benefit” of pre-trials was that the practice “opened up a new relationship between the trial lawyer and the trial court.”\textsuperscript{170}

More recent reports and data echo the theme of pre-trial conferences and judicial management as enabling contact between lawyers and judges. In 1980, when reporting data on lawyers’ opinion of civil discovery, Wayne Brazil (then a researcher for the American Bar Foundation and now a magistrate judge) described attorneys’ frustration with judicial inactivity around discovery.\textsuperscript{171} Thereafter, Magistrate Judge Brazil argued for “firm judicial control . . . [over] the pretrial development of big cases.”\textsuperscript{172} In 1983, Brazil surveyed lawyers within his district and learned that ninety percent “prefer[red] a settlement judge who actively offers suggestions and observations [to]

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{168} Judicial Conference/ABA Pre-Trial Clinic, supra note 78, at 48.
\item \textsuperscript{169} NIMS, PRE-TRIAL, supra note 77, at 199.
\item \textsuperscript{170} Roy F. Shields, Advantages to a Trial Lawyer of a Pre-trial Conference, 23 F.R.D. 342, 347 (1958).
\item \textsuperscript{171} Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217, 245-51 [hereinafter Brazil, Views from the Front Lines]. Brazil noted that lawyers cited judges’ negative attitudes, limited resources, and reluctance to impose sanctions as three critical causes of judicial ineffectiveness. Id. at 248. In response to the survey question “Do you feel that you get adequate and efficient help from the courts in resolving discovery disputes and problems,” 69 percent of respondents answered negatively. That figure rose to 93 percent among those he described as big case litigators. Id. at 247.
\item \textsuperscript{172} Wayne D. Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the Pretrial Development of Civil Actions: Model Rules for Case Management and Sanctions, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 873, 890. Brazil describes the increase in support for the proposition that “firm judicial control is an absolutely essential element of any serious effort to improve the efficiency and fairness of the pretrial development of big cases.” Id. at 890.
\end{itemize}
one who simply facilitates communication."173 In short, the claim is that lawyers like judges who manage and who attempt to bring about settlement.174 Those findings are reiterated in the 1996 RAND report on the CJRA, which reported that "a higher degree of case management is associated with higher lawyer satisfaction"175 and in discussions of the report by the Judicial Conference itself.176

Why do lawyers like case management? It is one of the few arenas in which attorneys have an opportunity to meet with judges—an activity enjoyed by some lawyers in and of itself, and surely an activity that is useful for lawyers in their relationship[s] with their clients. In the current litigation regime, in which fewer than four percent of the civil docket conclude by commencement of trials177 and many of the adjudicated mo-

173. Wayne D. Brazil, A Close Look at Three Court-Sponsored ADR Programs: Why They Exist, How They Operate, What They Deliver, and Whether They Threaten Important Values, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 303, 309 (emphasis omitted). These data come from a larger study, involving four districts, in which Brazil found some regional variations, as well as differences between plaintiff and defense lawyers. See WAYNE D. BRAZIL, SETTLING CIVIL SUITS: LITIGATORS’ VIEWS ABOUT APPROPRIATE ROLES AND EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES FOR FEDERAL JUDGES, at 137-43 (1985), and WAYNE D. BRAZIL, EFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO SETTLEMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES, at 435-445 (1988) [hereinafter SETTLING CIVIL SUITS]. For example, lawyers from California (the state in which Brazil presides as a magistrate judge) were more enthusiastic about judicial engagement in settlement conferences than those from Florida. Id. at 436. Plaintiffs’ attorneys distinguished themselves from defense attorneys, particularly on the issue of judicial intervention to preclude a party from accepting a settlement that the judge believed to be insufficient. Id. at 438.


175. RAND’s EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at xxxii, 55. Both RAND and the Judicial Conference also concluded that the CJRA’s creation of local advisory groups has engendered additional contact between judges and attorneys and that such contact is beneficial. See RAND’s IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at xvi, 24, 26. See also Robel, Local Advisory Groups, supra note 56, at 897-99 (discussing tensions when judges did not implement Advisory Group recommendations).

176. See 1997 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE CJRA REPORT, supra note 3, at 30 (discussing the FJC’s report in which many attorneys approved of case management practices as “helpful in moving their cases along”); id. at 19, 21 (discussing the utility of advisory groups as a means of education and contact between bench and bar).

177. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 36 tbl.C-4 (Dec. 31, 1995) (reporting that 3.2 percent of civil cases reached trial). The relationship between judicial settlement efforts and the
tions are determined “on the papers,” lawyers described as “litigators” (to be distinguished from lawyers who are “trial lawyers”) still want to “go to court.” Judicial management provides one route. 178 Further, in a world in which “incivility” is described as a central quality of litigation, lawyers want judges to hear their claims of inappropriate adversarial behavior and hopefully to chill if not sanction those excesses. 179

Lawyers not only want help when dealing with opponents but also want guidance for their own lawyering and assistance in their interactions with clients. Again, according to research by...
Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil, many attorneys want judges to raise the topic of settlement and then to give advice, “to express an opinion, to comment specifically on the strengths or weaknesses of evidence or arguments, or to evaluate a case.” Brazil argues further that the judicial contribution to the merits of settlement discussions stems from judges’ work as judges; “[j]udges . . . are paid to make decisions,” and he proposes, are valued for their “skill in judging.” Thus, judicial case management may assuage attorneys’ own anxieties about how to prepare cases and what advice to provide clients. We also know that attorneys use judges in their dealings with their own clients. Researchers report lawyers frequently invoke (albeit not always accurately) judicial opinions on the value of a case. Attorneys report that judicial views on the reasonableness of a settlement have significant effects on “balking client[s].”

Finally, lawyers use judicial case management as one place in which to advocate to judges. They want to persuade judges of the validity of their positions, and case management is a strategic occasion upon which to advance a client’s cause.

Judges, in turn, like aspects of the pre-trial management process. In contrast to attorneys who may see it as an advocate’s avenue, judges see it as a moment in which lawyers can be constrained. The rule revisions of the 1980s were explicit in their interest in constraining attorneys. As Arthur Miller explained in an FJC publication about the 1983 amendments, a major theme was “somehow to try and engineer improved or increased lawyer responsibility, to moderate lawyer behavior in litigation so that

180. A good deal of literature suggests that proposing the possibility of a settlement is a sign of weakness. See, e.g., BRAZIL, SETTLING CIVIL SUITS, supra note 173, at 45.
182. BRAZIL, SETTLING CIVIL SUITS, supra note 173, at 45.
184. BRAZIL, SETTLING CIVIL SUITS, supra note 173, at 101-02. See also Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 183, at 1462-65 (describing a series of techniques lawyers use to persuade their clients, including attorneys’ knowledge of legal rules and their estimates of what judges will do).
there is less of the aimless, less of the pavlovian, less of the drifting.\textsuperscript{185} Judicial management is the means,\textsuperscript{186} and many judges believe that they are good at it, reaping results both in terms of cheaper process and of quicker dispositions.\textsuperscript{187}

Of course, that attorneys and judges respond positively to access to judges during the pretrial phase is insufficient to validate it as an appropriate process; issues remain about the propriety or fairness of case management as well as its utility. A few commentators have suggested that limitations on the interactions are appropriate; for example, Professor David Shapiro proposed a presumption that, "in the absence of informed consent by the parties, a judge who has become significantly involved in settlement discussions should not ordinarily preside over the adjudication of issues on the merits . . . .\textsuperscript{p188} Empirical reports also inform us of litigant distress at attorney-judge settlement conferences in which the parties are absent.\textsuperscript{189}

Another question is about the efficacy of case management. RAND reports that early "judicial case management" may save time, but only at the price of "significantly increased lawyer work hours."\textsuperscript{190} RAND further concludes that to maximize effi-

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\item \textsuperscript{186} As Professor Miller put it, "what has been done to rule 16 . . . is that it has been transformed. The old rule 16 is gone and what you now have in rule 16 is a blueprint for management." Id. at 20.
\item \textsuperscript{187} Hence, one finds both surprise and hesitancy in embracing RAND's findings. See, e.g., Rex Bossert, Case Management Gets Judicial Nod; RAND ADR Study Fails to Deter Judges, Who Say More Experiment Is Warranted, NAT'L L.J. June 9, 1996, at A11; Darryl Van Duch & Marcia Coyle, Start Over on Case Management Reform?, NAT'L L.J. Feb. 10, 1997, at A6.
\item \textsuperscript{188} Shapiro, Federal Rule 16, supra note 75, at 1996 (arguing against a flat prohibition); see also Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 426-32 (1982) (discussing the risk of premature judgment). The assumption, according to one ABA committee, in state court practice in the 1930s was that the judge who did the pre-trial would not conduct the trial. 1938 ABA Pre-Trial Committee Report, supra note 80, at 538.
\item \textsuperscript{190} RAND's EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at xxiii 55. In her comments at the University of Alabama CJRA Implementation Conference and then at a FJC training seminar for district judges, Professor Lauren Robel sug-
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cacy, management must be coupled with enforcement of deadlines, including shortening discovery periods and insisting on trial dates, which might be understood as proposing less judicial management and more court-based cut-offs. Judges might respond (indeed have, in a fashion, via the Judicial Conference report on the CJRA and RAND's findings that the "close-up view" has use because judges provide needed guidance for inept lawyers, focus for overspending lawyers, and control of misbehaving lawyers.

These points about the fairness and utility of case management are relevant to the ongoing use of managerial processes, and I will return to them below; the point here is to underscore that judicial promotion of pretrial management finds a receptive ear in lawyers, eager to have a chance to "go to court."

3. The Results of Four Decades of Changes.—By individual practices (carried over from state courts and appearing particularly useful in large-scale litigation), through articulation (by local rules, in committee reports, and repeated under the aegis of judicial education), and through support from attorneys (in search of an open court house door), the "pre-trial" moved from a predicate to trial to a stage unto itself, an activity focused on disposition without trial. Some of the terms have changed; we no longer hear about "iron hearted judges" or "protracted cases" but rather about "managerial judges" and "complex cases." Some new terms—such as "differential case management" (DCM or tracking) and "alternative dispute resolution" (ADR)—have been added, but the framework (once detailed for the rare "protracted" case) has become accepted as appropriate in the ordinary case.

gested that judges should think of case management as imposing costs on clients and then determine how much management is appropriate to do.

191. RAND's EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at xxxiii.

192. See 1997 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE CJRA REPORT, supra note 3, at 29-32 (discussing a list of recommendations involving judicial management including setting limits on discovery, the filing of motions, and time limits to trial).

193. Shields, supra note 170, at 347.

194. See supra note 100, and accompanying text.
The second chart provides a snapshot of the distance traveled. I have there marked the late 1950s and early 1960s as a useful stop along the way. One way to appreciate the change in the gestalt is to consider an essay written in 1958 by Professors Benjamin Kaplan and Arthur Mehren of the Harvard Law School, joined by Judge Rudolf Schaefer of the Hamburg Amtsgericht.\textsuperscript{195} They had just returned from a trip to Germany, and they wrote about what they learned for their United States audience, comprised of judges and lawyers.

Basically Kaplan et al. reported on the news from abroad: that is, they described behavior of German judges that looked quite foreign from the perspective of the United States. As they put it, the German judge was

constantely descending to the level of the litigants, as an examiner, patient or hectoring, as counselor and advisor, [and] as insistent promoter of settlements.\textsuperscript{196}

While at the time these foreign judges were just that, “foreign” in their behavior as compared to what was expected of United States judges,\textsuperscript{197} today the words that Kaplan used to


\textsuperscript{196} Kaplan et al., pt. 1, at 1472.

\textsuperscript{197} See Resnik, \textit{Managerial Judges}, supra note 188, at 382-86 (describing expectations in the United States in the 1930s-1960s that judges not engage in settlement promotion); see also Nims, \textit{Some By-Products of Pre-Trial}, supra note 89, at 188 (describing “bitter criticism from lawyers and judges in New York and elsewhere” when in 1949, judges in Brooklyn and New York called conferences specifically “[to] help[] the parties to end” cases without trial, and the then-more recent “spreading”
describe German judges capture the role of the United States managerial judge, who is also an "insistent promoter of settlement." Since the 1960s and 1980s, federal judges have been taught—taught by each other in conferences before the creation of the FJC and then by the FJC as it trains new judges, by local rules and practice, by state court practices, by colleagues, by seminars at law schools, by their own prior experiences as lawyers in the federal courts, and then by a national rule regime—taught by all these sources to exercise their discretion to manage cases, to try to control attorneys, to try to get control over discovery, to urge ADR, to bring up the question of settlement and to function as "settlement judges."

In sum, there has been a change, significant and substantial, in the federal civil docket in terms of the relationship between judges and lawyers, in terms of the daily processes of litigation, in terms of what federal district judges take to be their job, and in terms of the goals of the process. The 1938 Rules provided a vague category called the pre-trial and left it utterly to the discretion of the district judge as to whether it would be filled and if so, how. The 1990s find the mandate that judicial involvement with lawyers begin soon after the filing of lawsuits and continue through conclusion. The change is not, however, a change that occurred between 1990 and 1994 but one that has been underway since the 1950s and which is still in process today.
Thus it is not surprising that RAND found little difference over a four year time span in costs, time to disposition, the views of lawyers and judges,\(^{201}\) in the amount of time "judicial officers" invested per case,\(^{202}\) or in judicial perceptions of their role in managing cases.\(^{203}\) Both the CJRA and recent revisions by the judiciary of Rule 16 are instances in which statutes and rules codify practices rather than invent them. This is not to say that after the codification represented by the CJRA, no change occurred but rather that codification is a marker rather than the point of departure.\(^{204}\) Hence, one would expect, as RAND found, some evidence of new programs or greater use of programs already extant, specifically an increase in the fraction of cases managed.\(^{205}\)

**B. Migratory Procedure: From Case Management to Lawyer Management**

Given this first conclusion (that national rulemaking—be it from Congress or from the federal judiciary—frequently represents codification of practice), a second, related point (again, reflected in RAND's findings) is about the basis for rulemaking.

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201. RAND's EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 22 (suggesting that the finding of little effect from the enactment of the CJRA can be explained by several reasons, including that some districts did not alter their practices after the legislation, that those districts that did make alterations applied those rules to only a small number of cases, that those changes that were more widely implemented had relatively little effect on time, cost, and perceptions of fairness, and that variation among individual judges limited implementation efforts).

202. RAND's EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 24; RAND's EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at 249-50. The study included time spent by magistrate and district judges per case but not special masters, mediators, arbitrators. Id. at 244.

203. RAND's EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 24 (85-92 percent of the judges responded "no difference"); RAND's EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at 84-85. According to the FJC DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 62, at 38, one judge said "[w]e've only renamed what we've been doing." Similarly, in the Northern District of Ohio, advisory group members reported that a differential case management program predated the CJRA. Id. at 87. Not all agreed, however, that the CJRA worked no change; for example, in the Western District of Michigan, the majority of judges reported substantial changes stemming from the CJRA. Id. at 51.

204. See RAND's EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 17.

205. Id. at 10.
Rulemakers write with cases in mind, with paradigms of the problems or events to which rulemaking is addressed.206 Be they judicial or congressional, rulemakers generalize from their experiences. In recent years, those experiences are disproportionately in “big” cases. Below, I detail why and how these cases are so dominant and then some of the consequences when rulemaking, based on the “big” case, migrates and is applied to other kinds of cases. My purposes here are (again) to understand what RAND found about the CJRA and at what else RAND might have looked.

From a host of social science work, we know that small cases are typically resolved without judicial involvement.207 In their daily work, judges see only a fraction of the caseload, those pulled to their attention by means of pre-trial discovery disputes, requests for adjudication such as motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, and trials. (Judges also used to see a disproportionate amount of prisoner litigation, in part because those cases are lawyer-less and hence without gatekeepers or advocates.208) Given a declining rate of trials in civil litigation in federal court,209 discovery and motion practice become important means by which cases come before the judiciary (including both district court and magistrate judges).

While discovery had been a practice celebrated from its inception in the 1930s through the 1960s,210 claims of difficulty

207. David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L. F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer, & Joel B. Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 72, 83-84 (1983) (based on empirical research, the Civil Justice Litigation Project found, “[t]he typical case is procedurally simple and will be settled voluntarily without a verdict or judgment on the merits”).
208. Judges see fewer of these cases because of practices of delegation of them to magistrate judges (see CARROLL SERON, THE ROLE OF MAGISTRATES: NINE CASE STUDIES (1986)) and of federal legislation limiting prisoner access. See the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, § 803 (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies); Prison Litigation Reform Act § 804, amending 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (requiring that prisoners, attempting to file in forma pauperis, pay funds from trust accounts, if any, and precluding filings in excess of three under certain conditions).
209. Yeazell, Misunderstood Consequences, supra note 73, at 633-39 (describing the decline over a fifty year period, from 15.4 percent in 1940 to 4.3 percent in 1990).
210. See, e.g., Maurice Rosenberg, Columbia Project for Effective Justice, Field
with discovery emerged early on in the "big case." More generalized cries of "discovery abuse" come to the fore in the late 1970s, again many of them in reference to the "big case." Basically, data on discovery—then and now—are that the majority of cases do not involve discovery disputes; large-scale litigation does. Similarly, problems associated with large-scale lit-

Survey of Federal Pretrial Discovery, Report to the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure at 3 (Discussion draft, Feb. 1965) (at the request of the Advisory Committee, research on discovery found that "there are not any widespread or profound failings in the present scope or availability of discovery"); Maurice Rosenberg, Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 479, 488 (1968) (describing findings as demonstrating that while discovery works well, it does "not appear to save substantial court time" and should not be understood as an "efficiency-promoting device"). See also the 1951 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE, supra note 78, at 104-05 (discussing which forms of discovery were "popular").

211. See, e.g., Richard W. McLaren, Procedure in Private Antitrust Cases, in Seminar on Protracted Cases, 21 F.R.D. 395, 440, 445-48 (1957) (discovery problems in anti-trust litigation); Hon. John W. Murphy, Summary and Resolution, 21 F.R.D. 395, 519-520 (1957) ("Control of discovery is desirable and may properly be exercised by the judge."). See also Tactical Use and Abuse of Depositions Under the Federal Rules, 59 YALE L.J. 117, 125-26 (1949) (relying on interviews with judges, lawyers, and stenographic reporters and concluding that, while in the "majority of cases" no abuse occurs, those involving "complex litigation" do entail abuse because the "resources of time, money and counsel make it practicable as a litigation tactic").

212. See Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981 BYU L. REV. 579 (describing the criticism and arguing that two premises of the rules, unlimited access and the assumption of judicial involvement as exceptional, should be revised).

213. See PAUL R. CONNOLLY, EDITH A. HOLLEMAN, & MICHAEL J. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 28 (1978) (in 52 percent of the cases studied, no discovery requests existed on file; in those with requests for discovery, the median number of requests was three). More recent data comes from work by the FJC, who at the request of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, sent questionnaires to 2,016 attorneys in 1000 cases and, based on a response rate of 59 percent, reported that 94 percent engaged in what they termed "formal discovery," and that 48 percent reported some discovery problems; FJC DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE SURVEY, supra note 179, at 10-21. See also Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil Discovery (paper prepared through the FJC for the 1997 Advisory Committee meetings) (summarizing the literature on discovery and analyzing its limitations) (on file with author); NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO DCM STUDY, supra note 60, at 21-23 (problems of unduly expensive litigation, including discovery abuse, are likely related with a subset of the docket).

214. See Brazil, Views from the Frontlines, supra note 171, at 222-35 (dividing civil discovery into two "subworlds," one of large cases and the other of small cases); FJC DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE SURVEY, supra note 179, at 2, 19-21 (reporting that attorneys attributed four percent of the total litigation attorney expenses per
igation have become one basis for arguments in favor of alternative dispute resolution.215

It is not only judges who “know” about pre-trial litigation in civil cases by means of the big case; the same is true of the lawyers who serve on the rule and bar committees involved in rulemaking. Lawyers who work on large-scale litigation have the economic wherewithal (and sometimes self-interest) to sustain involvement in the rulemaking process.216 These lawyers and judges have common reference points, share experiences and, over the past decades, share perceptions of the waste and expense of practices that they are in a position to see. In short, the “big case” forms the basis of a good deal of the experiences and understanding of the set of lawyers and judges who make rules about civil litigation.

What do such judges and lawyers “know” when they contemplate large litigation? They know of problems, of the need for judicial control, of attorney misbehavior. Over the years, judges and lawyers generalized that the rules they were developing in what I will call “context A” (such as securities and anti-trust) would benefit “context B” (the general civil docket). Over time, the discretionary approach of the 1938 Rule 16 (in essence, providing that whatever pretrial process occurred was within the unfettered discretion of the district court) was replaced first informally by judges urging their colleagues to shift toward a managerial, discovery-controlling, settlement-oriented regime,217 and then formally by a rule that mandated judicial involvement.218

The concept of judicial control, argued as essential for the

client to “unnecessary discovery expenses” and concluding that the problems with discovery stem not from the forms of discovery but the type of case; that “complex,” “contentious,” “high-stakes,” and “high-volume cases” present problems.


big case and in discovery disputes, was then generalized as useful in ordinary litigation. I detailed earlier what the 1950s *Handbook on Protracted Litigation* included to demonstrate how that which was specially crafted in the 1950s to apply to the unusual lawsuit has become familiar in the 1990s to judges and lawyers as steps to be taken in most cases. Further, while state use of a pre-trial had relied on different judges for that phase than for trial, the *Handbook* argued the need for a single judge to control the case throughout its life, and that has become the current federal practice. Procedures crafted with one kind of case in mind have migrated to almost the whole docket.

What flows from the use of experience with large cases to make rules for most cases? The problem, of course, is that assumptions fairly-based in experiences with one set of cases may not be apt in other kinds of civil litigation. One might make the wrong rules for cases that are not the basis from which the initial rule regime is built and find oneself faced with unexpected and unintended consequences.

The image of transferring rules that are plausible in one set of cases to another set helps explain what RAND found about how management can increase costs. In large-scale litigation, lawyers spend lots of time with and before judges. Judges in turn have focused on reining in those lawyers, already present and consuming court and client resources. What we call "case management" is really an effort to manage lawyers, not cases.

Further support for the translation of "case management" into "lawyer management" comes from the specific decision to leave unregulated a group of cases that RAND called "minimal

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219. See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
220. See 1938 ABA Pre-Trial Committee Report, supra note 80, at 538.
management cases,” described as lawsuits involving prisoners, social security, bankruptcy appeals, foreclosure, forfeiture and penalties, and debt recovery. The absence of judicial management for such sets of cases is not novel with the CJRA; the practice is continuous with that under Rule 16, as revised in 1983. That these cases are not managed underscores that the goal of management is superintendence of attorneys, not cases. If case management were at the central concern, provisions for litigants in need of assistance might be prominent, but the innovations of the last decades have not been to equip these litigants—to use the offices of the court to bring assistance to them—but rather for judges to work on cases in which litigants have lawyers. (Some might respond that many of these “minimal management cases” are not worth judicial assistance because they are either of very little economic value and/or pose few legal questions and should not be before the Article III judiciary at all.)

The exclusion of certain cases from the management regime makes plain the focus on lawyers. Yet experiences with lawyers in big cases do not provide great insight into lawyer behavior in ordinary cases, in which judges and lawyers had not been so entangled. Judicial management is an effort to insist on attorney investment in litigation, and specifically, that attorneys spend time with each other and with judges in the pretrial process. Unlike the large-scale cases, in which lawyers were already front and center, in the middling range of cases, lawyers might not—but for judicial management—undertake certain kinds of activities, such as taking depositions before a discovery cut-off or

222. See RAND’s EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 7 n.3, 11-12 (finding that these cases remain untouched by the management regime of the CJRA).

223. Social security and prisoner litigation are cases offered in the Advisory Notes to the 1983 Rule as examples of ones that might be exempt from the mandatory pretrial process. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) advisory committee’s note (1983). Note that Professor Robel also found that under the exemption category were an array of cases broader than those listed here, and further argued that any such exemptions should not be left to district court discretion but should be uniform nationally. See Lauren K. Robel, Mandatory Disclosure and Local Abrogation: In Search of a Theory for Optional Rules, 14 REV. LITIG. 49, 52-55 (1994).

224. See, e.g., THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 55-60; 48-50 (Apr. 2, 1990) (proposals to move social security cases to an administrative system and to increase dispute resolution mechanisms other than the federal courts for prisoner litigation).
preparing for conferences. When transposed to other cases, judicial management (that potentially economizes in the large-scale context) requires greater investment of lawyer hours. When managing lawyers, judges sit as “super senior partners” attempting to oversee attorneys’ products. What RAND’s work nicely reminds us is that lawyers (at least those paid on an hourly basis) have the ability to pass on the costs of management to their clients. As a result, the very “reforms” advanced on the grounds that they would save money end up costing money.

Hence, the CJRA should serve as a caution against the practice of generic rulemaking based on a narrow band of information and experience. RAND’s report is thus supportive of commentators who call for more and better empiricism to inform the rulemaking process in general. But the empiricism pro-

225. See RAND’s EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 14 (management and discovery cutoffs push lawyers to do work that might not occur without those provisions and thus both increase costs).

226. While management compelled more attorney work (see RAND’s EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at xxiii-xxiv), judges reported to RAND that it did not, however, take them more time. Id. at 84. That finding fits with reports that, before and after the act, judicial time investment remained relatively stable. Id. at 24.

227. See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 188, at 422-23 (managerial judging, if imposed across all kinds of cases, requires attorneys to invest time, including in some cases that would have been disposed of without that work).

228. When RAND’s findings are coupled with the recent experiences of revisions of Rule 11, a possible conclusion is that judges are clumsy actors when asked to oversee attorneys and that the structural position in which judges sit makes it unlikely that they can do much other than give attorneys excuses to “keep the meter running.” The initial expansion of Rule 11 in 1983 was borne of an impulse parallel to that found in the CJRA and in Rule 16: judicial superintendence of attorneys, and specifically, their misbehavior. However laudatory the goal, the means—judges watching over lawyers—proved cumbersome, time consumptive, and imprecise. The task spawned (in the Rule 11 context) “satellite litigation,” and in relatively short order, Rule 11 was revised again in an effort to pull back from what came to be understood as needless and/or ineffective efforts by judges to control attorneys. See the 1993 amendments to Rule 11, FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (amended 1993), 146 F.R.D. 401, 419 (1993); John Frank, Bench-Bar Proposal to Revise Civil Procedure Rule 11, 137 F.R.D. 169 (1991). Note that Congress modified the Rule 11 process in the 1995 securities legislation, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(c) (Supp. 1995), to impose greater oversight of attorneys in that category of cases.

vided there also needs revisiting. If the data were disaggregated by kind of case, would the results be the same? Would cost savings be found in the subset of cases for which these rules were initially designed?

C. The Durability of Discretion

One reading of RAND's report is that, at least in the time frame studied and without disaggregation of the data, judicial discretionary control of the pre-trial docket and the various management techniques do not, in and of themselves, achieve the congressional goals of cost savings. (RAND's recommendation is that, to save money, judges need modify their practices and set discovery and trial deadlines. 230) Further, RAND's evaluation of six alternative dispute programs provides little support for their use as means to reduce time to disposition or costs to litigants. 231 In other words, just like the change from the twelve to the six person jury, the new rule regime is subject to question about at least its claims of economy, if not its wisdom. One might then assume that RAND's findings would lead to some calls for revision of these rules.

Thus far, little evidence of that response exists. The Judicial Conference's formal response, issued in May of 1997 as required by Congress, continues to express commitment to judicial discretionary control; most of its recommendations relate to techniques to control attorney behavior, and few address limitations on judicial behavior. 232 Further, at the Alabama conference for

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230. RAND's Evaluation of Judicial Case Management, supra note 57, at xxxiii. RAND explains, "the combined effects of early management, setting the trial schedule early, and reducing time to discovery cut-off tend to offset their respective effects on lawyer work hours." Id. at 90.

231. RAND's Evaluation of Mediation and ENE, supra note 57, at xxxix-

232. 1997 Judicial Conference CJRA Report, supra note 3, at 2-3, 5-7. In a summary of its recommendations, the Conference included a few mandates, such as consideration of whether FED. R. CIV. P. 16 should be amended to "require a judicial officer to set the date of trial to occur within a certain time." Id. at 3. Otherwise, the Conference called for continued use of case management and a good deal of local decisions, including that "individual districts continue to determine on a local basis whether the nature of their caseload calls for the track model or the judicial discre-
which this essay was written and in other materials, providers of alternative dispute resolution questioned RAND’s data, invoked aspects of the FJC’s Report as supportive of their work, and affirmed the utility of ADR and of case management.\textsuperscript{233}

In that discussion, the rationale for the CJRA shifts; no longer are cost and delay the central justifications but rather the processes themselves are claimed to be useful, offering intrinsic utility because they provide for more dialogue, for better and more just (if not less expensive) decisionmaking.\textsuperscript{234} The argument is that Congress and the federal judiciary properly installed a regime of judicial management of lawyers, and that RAND’s limited congressional charter did not reveal how the additional investment of lawyer time was useful. The argument runs further that, rather than focus on cost and money, RAND should have considered either litigant satisfaction or the better, more generative remedies produced by case management and ADR.

Assessing these claims is difficult. Given the problems RAND encountered in obtaining data from litigants,\textsuperscript{235} we do

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\item \textsuperscript{233} See News Release, CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, ADR Group Cautions Against Developing Policy Based on RAND Institute’s ADR Study (Mar. 14, 1997); Judges, Scholars Oppose Rand Findings, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, May, 1997, at 24.
\item \textsuperscript{234} See, e.g., ADR Group Press Release, supra note 233, at 4 (arguing that well-designed and implemented ADR programs offer “better quality solutions . . . and may increase public confidence and satisfaction with our courts. Mixed cost and delay data should not overshadow these important justice values.”); 1997 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE CJRA REPORT, supra note 3, at 37 (“Despite the failure to find positive cost and delay reducing impacts, the Conference does believe that the positive attributes often associated with ADR (and reflected in the FJC demonstration data and findings), such as increased lawyer and litigant satisfaction, argue for continued experimentation.”). See also Rex Bossert, Case Management Gets Judicial Nod; RAND ADR Study Fails to Deter Judges Who Say More Experiment Is Warranted, NAT’L L.J., June 9, 1997, at A11 (quoting the chair of one Judicial Conference Committee as expressing disappointment that the study did not “affirm our belief that ADR reduces cost and delay”). For responses, see Janet Conley, Is ADR Living Up to Its Promise?, AM. LAWYER (Sept. 24, 1997) (including comments by Dr. Deborah Hensler, director of RAND’s ICJ).
\item \textsuperscript{235} RAND attempted to obtain litigant data, but the response rates were too low for use and much of the satisfaction and perception of fairness data come from lawyers. See RAND’s EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 6 (responses from one eighth of the litigants surveyed); see also RAND’s EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at 117-19 (discussing the difficulties of sampling liti-
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not know whether judicial oversight helped lawyers provide better services to clients or become more responsive or knowledgeable. Because other RAND reports tell us that litigants value process, we might have grounds for celebrating the procedural changes of the last decades if we had information on achievements other than those specified by Congress, which were primarily time to disposition and litigation costs.

The post-RAND rationales for the CJRA demonstrate the ability to shift rationales for procedural innovations. The impulse to remain committed to a rule regime even if it does not appear to have accomplished the purposes for which it was first articulated permits another conclusion about the rules of the last decades—their durability. Further, what appears to be particularly durable is discretion; procedural changes that augment trial court discretion in the service of ease and economy are hard to undo.

Embedded in the pattern of change ongoing from 1938 forward is a deep commitment by the federal judiciary to the discretionary authority of the district court judge over pretrial processes. Here, recall the rebellion of the federal judges against their own rulemakers when faced with a proposed mandate of a twelve person jury. Not only did district judges insist that they knew how to tailor, individually, the number of jurors needed for a particular case, but they clung to that discretion as if it had been part of an "hoary and time honored"
tradition, rather than the newly-minted option (younger than 25 years) that it was.

Recall also how, when earlier drafts of the CJRA included mandatory language, the federal judiciary launched an energetic lobbying effort, resulting in the current, and deliberately "vague" language of the CJRA that vests discretion for CJRA implementation with federal judges. The judiciary was able to persuade Congress of its need for "maximum flexibility on the part of each judge to manage his or her own caseload." Thus, the 1938 Federal Rules' ideological commitment to judicial discretion became codified in the text of the CJRA of 1990.

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241. The task force, assembled by Senator Joseph Biden and meeting at the Brookings Institute, had recommended that "by statute, [Congress should] direct all federal district courts to develop and implement within twelve months a 'Civil Justice Reform Plan'" (JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 12), and that such plan should include "case tracking" (id. at 14), the setting of firm discovery deadlines and trial dates, and deviation permitted only under limited circumstances (id. at 16-21). See also the draft of S. 2027, introduced Jan. 25, 1990, § 471(b), that provided that "[e]ach civil justice expense and delay reduction plan shall include . . . [a] system of differentiated case management . . . ." and other mandates.

242. See, e.g., CJRA Hearings, supra note 66, at 208-09, 218-22 (testimony and statement of Judge Robinson urging Congress to permit additional opportunities for judicial input and hear from Chief Judge Robert Peckham, who chaired a special task force of the Judicial Conference on the then-proposed CJRA; stating that the federal judiciary agreed with the principles of the CJRA but disagreed with the "specific means" of achieving the "common goal" (id. at 220), that the bill's mandates could have negative effects and would be "extraordinarily intrusive into the internal workings of the Judicial Branch" (id. at 221)); see also id. at 320-32 (statement by the Honorable Robert F. Peckham, arguing that the judiciary's changes to Rules 11, 16, and 26 addressed parallel concerns, that the Judicial Conference created a committee on "Court Administration and Management" to respond, that the proposed legislation was spawned without assistance from judges who have attempted to respond but felt pressured, and that a key point of disagreement was the effort "to insist on mandating conformity with procedural principles"; and id. at 360 (statement of the Hon. Diana E. Murphy, then President of the Federal Judges Organization, objecting that the legislation responded as if the civil docket was not affected by other aspects of the district court docket and was ill-advised, especially in its absence of flexibility).

243. This term is the ICJ's. See RAND's EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 30 ("the vague wording of the act itself").

244. Statement of Judge Robinson, CJRA Hearings, supra note 66, at 224. Of course, congressional pressure also resulted in increased judicial attention to these issues, including its drafting of a "14 [p]oint [p]rogram," as was noted by Judge Peckham. Id. at 397.

245. My view is not, however, that all of the ideological commitments within the 1938 rules are still shared. See Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch It Disintegrate, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1155, 1158 (1994) (discussing the "sea
Evidence of the depth of judicial commitment to discretion is illustrated by one of RAND's findings, that in practice, federal judges have generally not used the congressionally-recommended system of what some call "differential case management" and others term "tracking," by which cases are sorted according to specified criteria and given differing pretrial procedures. Instead, RAND found that judges prefer individual "tailoring," a practice consistent with the preference for discretion that drives both the implementation of the CJRA and the language of the act itself. Rather than work together to create uniform pretrial practices that create tracks describing different kinds of process for different kinds of cases, most federal judges continue to prefer what Charles Clark described forty years ago as the "individualization of the case."247

Perhaps Judge Clark's phrase needs to be altered; the commitment is to "individualization" of the judge. I began this essay by describing a conference, held in 1996, at NYU about civil juries. Reports of another conference, held in July of 1938, in Cleveland, illuminate judges' attachment to their own individual authority. In July of 1938, the ABA, working with another law school (Western Reserve) held an "Institute" to discuss the then brand-new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Members of the Civil Rules Committee explained their project to the bar, and Professor Edson Sunderland, a major proponent of Rule 16,248 was charged with leading the discussion. After he explained the rule, the following exchange took place:

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246. RAND's EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 12-13 (very little evidence that judges use differential case management but rather that judges tailor "management to the needs of the case"); RAND's IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 28-32, 45-46, 49. Judicial objections to tracking can be found in CJRA Hearings, supra note 66, at 289 (questions answered by Judge Robinson include the view that to "assign cases mechanically to rigid tracks would have a detrimental effect" on management efforts).

247. Clark, Objectives of Pre-Trial Procedure, supra note 82, at 164.

248. See Edson R. Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure, 36 Mich. L. Rev. 215 (1937) (arguing that civil procedure lacked a means to test pleadings comparable to that of the preliminary hearing on the criminal side, describing the "remarkable effort" in Wayne County courts in having a compulsory informal hearing in which attorneys appeared before judges, with the result that some cases were disposed of and others were tried better).
Mr. Herbert M. Bingham, (Washington, D.C.): As I read Rule 16, it is solely discretionary and the court acts on its own volition. In other words, neither party can file a motion for a pre-trial hearing.

Mr. Sunderland: It is entirely discretionary with each district judge. He can handle it as he sees fit.

Mr. Bingham: As a matter of curiosity, why was it made discretionary?

Mr. Sunderland: Because if the district judges didn't like it, it wouldn't work anyway. (Laughter)

Mr. Bingham: Why could it not have been mandatory?

Mr. Sunderland: There is no use in making it mandatory because nothing will be accomplished without the sympathetic interest of the judge, and you can't force him to be sympathetic. (Laughter).

D. Discretion at the Expense of Uniformity

The observation that trial judges are deeply committed to their own discretion helps to explain the proliferation of local rulemaking, both before and after the CJRA. Uniformity is, inevitably, in tension with the exercise of individualized discretion, and thus, built into the federal rules of 1938 is a feature that works against the aspiration of uniformity.

Many commentators have decried what they term the “balkanization” of civil procedure, and charged Congress with abetting disuniformity with the enactment of the CJRA. But as Dean Daniel Coquillette, Stephen Subrin, and

249. 1938 Rules, supra note 15, at 299.


252. Charles Wright argued in the 1960s that local rules were the “soft underbelly” of federal procedure.” See Local Rules Survey, supra note 94, 1012 n.6 (quoting a letter from Prof. Wright to the law review) and recently reiterated that comment in Charles Alan Wright, Foreword: The Malaise of Federal Rulemaking, 14 REV. LITIG. 1, 10 (1994). For him, the CJRA “dashed” all hopes of progress toward limiting local rules; “[p]rocedural anarchy is now the order of the day.” Id. at 11. See also Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure, supra note 245, at 1159-60 (the CJRA as a “blow to uniformity”).
Mary Squires documented in the Local Rules Project they undertook in the late 1980s, local rule proliferation predates the CJRA. By the late 1980s, more than 5000 local rules existed, many of which were at wide variance from the national rules. Professor Subrin takes us back further, to the report of disuniformity in the early 1940s and to authorization for local rule variation by “at least 39 provisions” of federal statutes. A 1966 empirical project documented the extent at that time, not only providing examples of variation but also of an ongoing tradition of disloyalty to national rules, including the example with which I began this essay. Further, variation is also substantial at the appellate level, to which the CJRA does not apply.

The Federal Rules of the 1930s are founded upon judicial discretion, and now that 645 Article III district judges have lived under that regime, one should not be surprised to find their exercise of discretion typified by the creation of local variations, as well as the creation of what some districts call “local, local rules” or “standing orders”—individual directives from

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253. Daniel R. Coquillette & Mary P. Squires, Report of the Local Rules Project (1988). See also Subrin, Local Rules, supra note 68, at 137; Paul D. Carrington, Learning from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 299 (1994). See also Anne M. Burr, Building Reform from the Bottom Up: Formulating Local Rules for Bankruptcy Court-Annexed Mediation, 12 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 311 (1997); Local Rules Survey, supra note 94, at 1012 (in which the authors report that, in the 1960s, a “cursory examination of the currently effective local district court rules reveals a maze of decentralized directives, encumbered by trivia and often devoid of explanation”). That 1966 survey (relying on questionnaires and receiving a fifty percent return) found many variations; for example, “[d]espite the admonition that a district court afford a modicum of latitude when determining a temporal allotment for discovery, many districts have imposed rigid timetables”). Id. at 1044.


255. Id. at 2019.

256. Local Rules Survey, supra note 94, at 1011.

257. Recall that, in 1973, 54 district courts had local rules in contravention of the national rule on the size of the civil jury. See supra text accompanying note 16. The Local Rules Survey also reports that, as of the 1960s, several areas of local rulemaking departed from the national regime, including that despite Rule 16’s then discretionary pretrial process, several local rules required it in all civil cases. Supra note 94, at 1055.

258. Sisk, supra note 251, at 7-24 (detailing the differences among circuit rules).

individual judges about how they like cases to be processed before them. Further, the lack of enthusiasm that RAND found for differential case management (DCM) is also explained by the individualization permitted to judges under the Federal Rules. DCM is a form of very specific local rulemaking about case management; for that practice to go into effect in a district, judges must concur on the allocation of kinds of process to kinds of cases. Interestingly, the FJC's 1996 report on demonstration districts discussed the desirability of DCM because it is a source of uniformity.260 Judicial hesitation in using DCM stems from a fear of a loss of discretion. In one district, with a small number of judges, those judges reported that creation of a DCM regime enabled them to share in a joint process of articulating which cases fit which rule regimes.261

While the CJRA is yet further ratification of local variation,262 it is not the creation of such variation, which is itself deeply interwoven with the system of discretion.263 And if one doesn't like local variation, one will have to sort out not only how to pull back from the CJRA but also from the assumptions that undergird the current rules.264 To the extent rule drafters have hoped to channel discretion by leaving certain arenas plainly open to variation (such as the original version of Rule 16 and the current version of Rule 26), the report from RAND reminds us that discretion, once authorized, is difficult to cabin.

260. FJC DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS REPORT, supra note 62, at 15.
261. Id. at 56 (discussing work within the Western District of Michigan).
262. Contrast this reading with that of Lauren Robel, in Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447 (1994), who argued that the CJRA should not be read as a broad warrant to depart from national, uniform rules and that local rulemaking should be constrained.
263. See also Shapiro, Rule 16, supra note 75, at 1977-78 (discussing the tension between "flexibility and discretion" and uniformity).
264. Echoes of this view can be found in the judiciary's own evaluation of its rulemaking process; while recommending inquiry into the use of "opt out" procedures from national rules and noting that "uniform rules would facilitate a national practice, this belief should be investigated rather than treated as a shibboleth." A Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking—A Report from the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 168 F.R.D. 679, 701 (1995).
IV. DISCRETIONARY PROCESSES, CONSTRAINED ADJUDICATION: AGREEMENTS AND CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE FIRST AND THIRD BRANCHES

A. Shared Agendas: Procedural Discretion, Its Amplification, and Its Delegation to “Judicial Officers”

RAND’s interpretation of its finding of relatively little change stemming from the enactment of the CJRA rests in part on what it terms the “less than precise wording of most of the act”265 and its “vague” language.266 The “vague” language is not happenstance but rather an illuminating facet of the statute. Here we see agreement between Congress and the judiciary, sharing a joint project that vests power in judges to make decisions about the shape of litigation. While Congress has, from time to time, intervened in civil rulemaking,267 in the CJRA of 1990, Congress and the federal judiciary were not genuinely at odds about how to process civil cases; Congress and the judiciary were really only disputing who should be announcing that the mode of civil processing has changed and who might get credit for a new national rule regime trumpeted as a “reform.”268

265. RAND’S EVALUATION OF THE CJRA, supra note 57, at 33.
266. Id. at 31.
268. Note that I am also not arguing that all federal judges embrace the modes of the CJRA but that the segment supportive of the direction of the CJRA has been more vocal than the objectors. For such objections, see the Hon. G. Thomas Eisele, Differing Visions—Differing Values: A Comment on Judge Parker’s Reformation Model for Federal District Courts, 46 SMU L. Rev. 1935 (1993) [hereinafter Eisele, Differing Visions].
this instance, unlike that of the shrinking size of the civil jury, Congress did not hesitate to claim itself the reformer of the civil justice process (the subject of popular criticism debated in presidential and congressional politics about "tort reform\(^{269}\)). The CJRA and the federal rules together weave a national commitment to trial court discretion.\(^{270}\)

Other recent ventures by Congress into rulemaking, specifically those altering civil practice rules in securities and prisoner litigation, are also not exemplary of radical variation between congressional and judicial instincts.\(^{271}\) Members of the federal judiciary have been in the forefront of questioning the utility of both forms of litigation. Federal judges have long crafted doctrines and procedures to limit prisoner filings.\(^{272}\) Further, even Congress' current nibbles at the principle of transsubstantive civil rules can find precedents crafted by federal judges, who promulgated special procedures for multi-district litigation,\(^{273}\) for "complex cases,"\(^{274}\) and for prisoners.\(^{275}\)


\(^{270}\) Again, this claim is not absolute. Congress did, for example, include the mandate in the CJRA that public disclosure be given of judges who have cases pending more than three years. RAND found that, since the disclosure requirement has been in place, the percentage of cases pending over that time period declined. RAND's Evaluation of the CJRA, supra note 57, at 24-25. (That finding, like others, raises questions of causation; other variables, such as the composition of that case load and the activities that occur during the three year period, would have to be assessed to discern the effect of the disclosure requirement.)


\(^{272}\) See Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 69; see also Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia Dep't of Corrections v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1552 (1997) (reversing a district court's order on prison conditions for women prisoners, "emphasiz[ing] that federal courts must move with caution when called upon to deal with even serious violations of the law by local prison officials[,]" and remanding for review of whether the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits the other claims raised by the prisoners).


Another set of agreements between the judiciary and the Congress is on the need for more judges but the unwillingness to create more life-tenured judges. While many federal judges bespeak their commitment to a very small federal judiciary and argue against adding life-tenured judges, federal judges have in practice been supportive of a three decade expansion program that largely depends on the creation of whole other sets of judges who, while not having all the authority of life-tenured judges, have a lot of their job.

While one might have anticipated that life-tenured judges would have been fierce guardians of their distinctive mandates, the pressures of the docket and the desire to alter aspects of their work has resulted in a series of opinions upholding the authority of an array of judges. Both the Supreme Court and the Judicial Conference have sanctioned a good deal of delegation of tasks from life-tenured judges to non-Article III judges, some chaired by the Hon. Ruggero J. Aldisert, proposed processes for handling “conditions of confinement” litigation. Thus, congressional efforts to limit prisoner access in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915, are congruent with some barriers imposed by courts. See, e.g., Marie Cordisco, Pre-PLRA Survey Reflects Courts’ Experiences with Assessing Partial Filing Fees in In Forma Pauperis Cases, 9 DIRECTIONS 26, 26 (1996) (noting that the general aims of such programs were congruent with those of Congress in the PLRA, to “discourage frivolous cases by requiring plaintiffs to consider the costs of their suits”); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1285 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding the limitations on prisoner in forma pauperis filings and noting its past approval of “assessments of costs against indigent prisoners” and of a district court order requiring partial filing fees). But see Lyon v. Vande Krol, 940 F. Supp. 1433 (S.D. Iowa, 1996) (finding unconstitutional aspects of the PLRA that preclude repetitive filings after three previous dismissals on specified grounds).

For consideration of the relationship between judicial and legislative lawmaking and revision specifically in the context of the PLRA, see Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 69.


Judicial Conference appreciation of magistrate judges’ work comes in many documents, including its report on the CJRA. See, e.g., 1997 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE CJRA REPORT, supra note 3, at 20 (in which magistrate judges are recognized as
of whom are full-time employees within the judicial branch (magistrate and bankruptcy judges), others (administrative law judges and hearing officers) in agencies, and yet others are privately employed but work within courts as “early neutral evaluators,” “mediators,” and “arbitrators.” Evidence of the expansion of judges comes from a change in nomenclature; no longer are judges described in many rules and statutes as “district judges” but rather as “judicial officers,” a phrase that spans a group of similarly-situated government employees authorized to control the pretrial process and to issue dispositions.

What do these judicial officers do? Their primary job is to move cases rapidly and inexpensively through a system.

“indispensable resources . . . readily available to supplement the work of life tenured district judges in meeting workload demands”). See also Judicial Conference of the United States, Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts Recommendation 65 (1996), approved by the Judicial Conference and calling for use of magistrate judges.

278. The Court has also embraced private arbitration, not only because it provides an alternative to adjudication but also because it is described as being much like adjudication. See Resnik, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, supra note 151; see also Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996) (finding a Montana statute requiring special notice of arbitration clauses to be preempted); Painewebber, Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding the question of arbitrability appropriately determined by the arbitrator). Cf. Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Mills, 944 F. Supp. 625 (W.D. Tenn. 1996) (describing the rule in the Sixth Circuit as requiring a judicial determination of arbitrability); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 331 (1997).


The term “judicial officer” appears in the United States Constitution three times, all in discussions of executive and judicial officers. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3 (discussing oaths to be taken by members of legislatures and “all executive and judicial Officers”); U.S. Const. amend. XIV (twice referring to voting for executive and judicial officers). In addition, there are more than 150 references in federal statutes to that phrase.

280. See RAND's Evaluation of Judicial Case Management, supra note 57, at 244.
Through national and local rulemaking, through educational programs, through joint ventures with the bar and Congress, federal judges have fashioned a position for themselves as "litigation managers," as power brokers, as what Frances McGovern and I have both argued could be termed "players" at the table among competing negotiators.

In addition to successful insulation of discretion in case processing and in delegating duties, federal judges are also seeking to expand their authority; they may soon return to Congress with requests for other discretionary charters. For example, the Honorable Judge Jon O. Newman of the Second Circuit believes that district judges should have some power to select the cases they process by means of a discretionary docket; he proposes that federal judges be authorized to decline cases within certain categories and send them to state court.

Also afloat over the past decade have been several proposals for the end of appeal as of right. The most recent were contemplated by the Long Range Plan of the United States Judicial Conference, but rejected.

While appellate oversight remains at a formal level, commentators have begun to document its erosion in practice. Given that some federal circuits have a system of appeals that decide


282. As Paul Carrington puts it: "The conscious mission of many district judges is less to make decisions applying law to the facts, and more to preside over the manufacture of dispositions." Describing an increase in judicial discretion, Carrington's descriptor is that the "district judge is each year less a judge of a law court and more a local chancellor or lord of the manor, more to be feared and less to be respected." Carrington, Disunionism, supra note 37, at 943 (footnotes omitted).

283. Jon O. Newman, Determining the Proper Allocation of Cases Between Federal and State Courts, 79 JUDICATURE 6 (1995) (describing a proposed "discretionary access" procedure by which federal judges could "exercise discretion as to whether a particular case within federal jurisdiction ought to be litigated in federal or state court").

284. Martha A. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 45 (outlining some of the proposals); Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 605-24 (1985) (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's suggestion that the time may have come to consider abolishing appeal as of right in the federal system).

285. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 43-44 (Dec. 1995) ("[t]o ensure the continued fairness and quality of federal justice, the principle of allowing litigants at least one appeal as of right to an Article III forum should be upheld").
many cases without oral argument and without publication of opinions, Professor Lauren Robel argues that a kind of discretionary appellate system may well have begun.\textsuperscript{286} Professors William M. Richman and William L. Reynolds add that such discretion has resulted in a tracking system, in which “important cases” receive more attention.\textsuperscript{287} Within a bit more than a century, we may be about to come full circle, from a system before the Evarts Act of 1891 that did not provide appeal as of right in every case to such a system once again.\textsuperscript{288} Here may be another example of practice that predates formal revisions; in practice, judges have installed a system of discretionary review, and its statutory ratification may not be too far in the distance.

\textbf{B. The Purposes of Discretionary Processing and the Powers of Judicial Officers}

What do we know about the results of the transformation of the role of judge? RAND’s work powerfully questions the utility of the general trajectory over the decades of reform of the civil

\textsuperscript{286} Lauren Robel, Private Justice and the Federal Bench, 68 IND. L.J. 891, 898-906 (1993) (discussing how arguments and publication of opinions are optional with the appellate court and that, in the subset of cases that are neither argued or published, “judges’ involvement . . . is marginal”). \textit{See also} Dragich, \textit{supra} note 284, at 12-14.

\textsuperscript{287} William M. Richman \& William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 275, 293 (1996) (terming the appellate courts “the new certiorari courts,” and arguing that “important” is often defined by “monetary value” and that “powerful litigants” receive more attention whereas smaller value cases, such as social security appeals, are often handled primarily by staff and receive little judicial time). \textit{See also} Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1264 (1996) (agreeing with much of the description but disagreeing about the role played by federal judges in framing the revised appellate system and questioning the proposed responses); William L. Reynolds \& William M. Richman, Studying Deck Chairs on the Titanic, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1290 (1996) (responding that federal judges who lobby against expansion of the judiciary and who make policies about oral argument and delegation of decisionmaking have played a key role in framing a new appellate tiered process and that the expansion of the appellate courts is needed to restore judicial review in all cases).

\textsuperscript{288} \textit{See} Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 1028-30 (1984) (discussing the evolution of Supreme Court doctrine reducing appellate oversight in a variety of contexts); Carrington, Disunionism, \textit{supra} note 37, at 934-35 (discussing the Evarts Act of 1891 and its goal of curbing what federal legislators then termed the “kingly power” of unsupervised federal judges).
process. The report tells us that some rules and practices of management aimed at cost reduction are not well designed for the purpose, that they do not in fact reduce costs. RAND teaches us that, to go after cost and time, judges would have to limit (not manage) discovery and shorten the interval to trial. The disturbing core of RAND's conclusion is that, if the goals of the civil process are speed and cost reduction, the way to achieve them is to "1) monitor cases to ensure that deadlines for service and answer are met; 2) wait a short period after the joinder date before beginning judicial case management to see if a case will terminate; 3) set a firm trial date early; and 4) set a reasonably short discovery cutoff time." In short, were "judicial officers" to adopt the posture of calendar clerks, imposing and enforcing time limits on disputants, the goals of speedy, inexpensive dispositions might be achieved.

These developments are, in my view, significant; instead of being distracted by debates focused on disagreements between the judiciary and Congress over civil processes, our interest should be centered on federal judges' commitment to their own discretion over civil processes, the melange and trajectory of jobs now termed "judicial," and the relationship of that work to the role of judges as adjudicators.

One set of concerns implicates the general issue of rules and standards, and in this specific context, revolves around longstanding questions of visibility, accountability, and supervision. As Stephen Subrin, Stephen Yeazell, Paul Carrington, and I have elsewhere observed, these past...
decades have witnessed the expansion of federal trial court discretion—of which RAND's report provides important further proof. From a variety of intertwined sources (expansion of equity practice, promulgation of the 1938 rules, and celebration of managerial judges) comes the same bottom line: relatively little superintendence of the trial court by appellate judges.

In addition to the age-old question of how to oversee the exercise of discretion, another concern, yet more fundamental, should engage us: at issue are the purposes to which that discretion is attached. Federal trial judges have, over this century, achieved a roving commission, but to do what? Federal district judges believe in, are protective of, and have been successful on the civil side in persuading others, and specifically Congress, to let them keep a vast amount of discretion in the handling and processing of the civil case load: including discretion to pick the numbers of jurors to listen to a civil case; discretionary procedures to process "protracted" cases; discretionary procedures to manage ordinary civil cases; discretion to try to manage lawyers; discretionary affiliations with national rule regimes; and now, proposed discretionary appellate review and proposed discretion to determine which cases to admit to federal courts. Federal judges have also agreed to become part of a cadre of judicial officers, and further, have conferred some of their discretionary authority on others both in and outside of the judicial branch.

While the breadth of powers of a federal district court judge over the civil docket is thus exposed, with support for it coming from both the judiciary and Congress, the purposes for which the exercise of these discretionary powers are put is much harder to "sight" (as in see) and to "cite" (as in quote from authoritative sources). While the district judge is a looming figure in contemporary processes, judicial attributes—other than powerful discretion—remain sketchy. Where is the vision for the judge? the sense of purpose? the ends served by the discretionary powers conferred? If the dominant agenda of the life-tenured

296. Of course, it would be a disservice to describe the actual rulemaking—both judicial and statutory—as singular in focus and only expanding judicial authority. Amendments to rules such as Rule 16 have not only increased discretion but have also included mandates, obliging judges to engage in certain forms of pretrial superintendence. But my point is about judicial views of the desirability of broad discretion, not its invariable actualization.
trial judiciary is to manage, settle, and dispose of litigation and further, if its work is readily transferrable to other, non-tenured members of the judicial workforce, and in addition done as well by private providers (whom some litigants seem to prefer to the judiciary), it is difficult to argue about the distinctive import of the federal courts, let alone for special funding and prerogatives of this purportedly unique national resource.297

Of course, the response to such concerns is insistently to note that only federal judges can adjudicate, and moreover, that some of that adjudication demands the participation of an Article III judge.298 But, while academics have made arguments in recent years about the necessity of Article III judges at some point in the federal adjudicatory process,299 the literature by trial judges on their work as adjudicators is notably thin.300 Federal judges have told us no story over these last decades to sustain the peculiar and particular form of decisionmaking, public adjudication, that is their domain exclusively.301 In-


299. Comments from a group of law professors (of whom I am one) have raised concerns that judges increasingly share what Paul Carrington calls a “collective sense that the enforcement of legal rights and duties is their primary business.” Carrington, Disunionism, supra note 37, at 938. See also Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules, supra note 250; Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and When, 49 ALA. L. REV. 221 (1997); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 188, at 423-32.

300. One brief essay comes from the Hon. William R. Wilson, Jr., of the Eastern District of Arkansas, who wrote in, Where Has All the Civility Gone?, ARKANSAS TRIAL LAWYER MAGAZINE, Summer, 1990 at 5, in which he notes that “The word judge is a verb as well as a noun and adjective.” See also Eisele, Differing Visions, supra note 268 (protesting proposals for increased use of tracking and ADR and commenting that, were those suggestions successful, “the federal judicial power in most civil cases would be delegated out, or sub-contracted, to non-judges and in some cases to non-lawyers”).

301. See generally Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986). Paul Carrington makes a parallel point, describing the changes as a decline in “judicial professionalism” and includes as one of the factors that contribute to it the “growing preoccupation of district judges with administration, as distinct from enforcement, or, in other words, with moving cases rather than deciding them.” Carrington, Disunionism, supra note 37, at 940-44.

While a few judges have vocally protested, see, e.g., Eisele, Differing Visions,
stead, judicial leaders have transformed the practices of judging and shifted the center to the pretrial phase, during which they offer advice and make informal decisions.302

Having just read three lengthy volumes about civil processes in the United States federal courts in the 1990s, and having read much of the literature about the need for and changes in civil processes, I can report almost no discussion of adjudication. The lengthy descriptions of RAND's intense study of the last four years of civil processes provide little insight into the judiciary as a unique and precious institution to preserve. Moreover, not only is little attention paid to the work of deciding disputed issues, but also missing from the conversation are words we might have aspired to include, when judges and civil procedure are the focus: judgment, wisdom, fairness, the difficult, angst-ridden problem of rendering judgment, the distinctive role of the deliberative judge.

In the early 1980s, Judge Patrick Higginbotham noted the trend toward proliferation of judges and worried about the "conversion of hearing examiners to judges, commissioners to magistrates, and referees in bankruptcy to judges."303 Today's worry may well be the reverse: the conversion of judges into referees. For example, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently explained that a court-appointed mediator enjoyed judicial immunity from suit because there was nothing different between what the mediator did and what a "judge might ... have" done.304 While one can marvel at the creation of all these

supra note 268, as noted above, the judges who run institutions such as the Federal Judicial Center have been some of the most prominent promoters of a managerial/settlement regime.

302. Recall that Wayne Brazil reports that lawyers like judicial involvement in settlement when judges make decisions, assessing the value of cases. See supra note 173.

303. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Bureaucracy—The Carcinoma of the Federal Judiciary, 31 ALA. L. REV. 261, 264 (1980) (arguing that while all these groups were doing a good job in their assigned roles, it was unwise to delegate the judicial task). He accurately predicted that this group would "grow not just in number, but in function and power." Id. at 269.

"judicial officers" and the delegation of work to them as an innovative response to the longstanding need for more judges and the political limitations on enlargement of the life-tenured judiciary, the transition of the entire workforce of judges into "judicial officers" makes it difficult to explain why some of them should continue to have either life-tenure or awesome authority, much of it discretionary.

C. Real Conflicts: The Power to Adjudicate

Why worry about diminished rationales for special powers to reside in a life-tenured judiciary? Because despite the agreements on civil processing, Congress and the judiciary are not easy co-venturers on fundamental questions of judicial authority to adjudicate. The troubling conflicts between the federal judiciary and Congress are not about how the judiciary moves the civil docket but about how the judiciary decides cases and how it functions as a branch of government. At issue is the exercise of power over outcomes (such as the judiciary’s authority to judge cases involving the environment, securities regulation, habeas corpus, and prisons) and its authority to govern itself. Over the last few years, these conflicts have become vivid. For example, many proposals described as “court stripping” (depriving the federal courts of jurisdiction over particular kinds of arbitrators’ decision-making process and judgments to those of judges and agency hearing examiners[,] the New York Stock Exchange, when acting through its arbitrators, has quasi-judicial immunity also shared by its arbitrators).

305. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992) (finding that legislation directing the “management of areas . . . in Oregon and Washington” and stating that agreements about the spotted owls were “adequate . . . for the purpose of meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for” then pending litigation, specified by name in the statute, had not impermissibly ordered an outcome in lawsuits but rather had changed the law involving logging and preservation of animal habitats). Id. at 434-35.


307. See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996) (determining that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act does not repeal the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over habeas corpus and that the restrictions do not constitute a ‘suspension’ of the writ”). Id. at 2340.

308. See the Prison Litigation Reform Act, discussed supra note 267 and infra notes 310-315.
of cases, such as those involving abortion rights or school prayer) have been advanced over the past several decades but, until recently, they have not passed. But, given recent legislation, the once “academic” exercise that federal courts teachers engaged in, of exploring whether such legislation could be constitutional, is now no longer hypothetical.

Some of the statutes limit judicial review, while others create rules for remedies and alter remedies and decisions already in place. For example, in 1996, Congress restricted judicial review of deportation orders and of asylum denials. In addition, Congress has mandated sentences for certain kinds of offenses and, more generally, ordered judges to rely on sentencing guidelines created by a congressionally-charted commission. With the enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Congress comes close to dictating how to decide certain categories of claims; litigation about that act centers around the constitutionality of provisions of the PLRA about termination of consent decrees and automatic stays of injunctions. Pending


310. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1276-79, § 440 (1996), (codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252 (West Supp. 1997)); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-128, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 607-12 § 306, (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (1996)) (“no court may enter declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief in any action pertaining to an order to exclude an alien . . . .” or certify class actions in litigation except via limited habeas proceedings, also circumscribed), 699 (§ 604(b)(2)(D), amending 8 U.S.C. 1158) (West Supp. 1997). Thus far, several courts have upheld various of these provisions, in part by noting that other avenues of judicial review may be open. See, e.g., Mansour v. INS, 123 F.3d 423, 426 (6th Cir. 1997) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction an effort to obtain review of the final order of deportation and concluding that the constitutional issue—of “whether the Constitution requires independent judicial review of a deportation order where a question of law is raised”— can be avoided because of the availability of review through habeas jurisdiction); Turkhan v. INS, 123 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (concluding that § 440(e)'s language is “not so broad as to preclude judicial review of claims brought pursuant to other statutes”). See also Auguste v. Attorney Gen., 118 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 1997) (“because the Constitution does not give aliens the right to judicial review of deportation orders,” § 1252 is constitutional).


312. See, e.g., Taylor v. Arizona, 972 F. Supp. 1259 (D. Ariz. 1997) (holding un-
are yet other efforts to limit judicial authority to approve consent decrees that involve the expenditure of public funds.\textsuperscript{314} Congress also intervened directly in a particular case involving criminal proceedings against defendants charged with bombing a federal building in Oklahoma. Congress overruled the district judge's decision on televised proceedings and on the attendance of witnesses.\textsuperscript{315}

\textsuperscript{313} See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (e)(2) and Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1362, 1366 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (finding automatic stay provisions unconstitutional because they are akin to making decisions in cases without individual determinations and factfinding). Further, the PLRA instructs judges about the requisite findings to be made and limits their otherwise expansive settlement authority and powers to appoint special masters. \textsuperscript{314} See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (a)(6) (providing that no consent decrees may be entered without findings that the relief is "narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right"); id. at § 3626 (f) (specifying procedures for special master appointments, interlocutory appeals of such appointments, and limiting the authority of masters and their compensation).

315. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 235 (requiring courts to order closed circuit televised proceedings to enable persons to view proceedings that become distant because of a change in venue);
Yet other illustrations of conflicts between Congress and the judiciary come from ongoing battles about the configuration of courts, the salaries of judges, and the confirmation of nominees. In the last several months, members of Congress have attempted, over the objections of most of the judges of the court and its lawyers, to split the Ninth Circuit. In 1995, members of Congress sought to halt ongoing studies sponsored by several of the circuits on gender, racial, and ethnic fairness. Another arena of conflict is congressional processing of judicial appointments and congressional control over judicial pay. In addition, federal judges have objected to what some term "micro-management" of the federal judiciary, including the receipt of a questionnaire, from the chair of a Senate subcommittee, about how federal judges use their time and what they do in their extra-judicial activities. Commentators report on an

Victim Rights Clarification Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-06 (prohibiting a district judge from ordering a victim of an offense excluded from the trial because of a possible subsequent need to testify at sentencing); see also Jeffrey Toobin, Victim Power, THE NEW YORKER 40, 42 (Mar. 24, 1997) (describing the victims of the bombing as "going over the judge's head and getting [an] act of Congress").


317. 141 CONG. REC. S14,691-92 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (three Republican senators criticizing the efforts and urging federal funds be withdrawn). A rebuttal can be found at 141 CONG. REC. S18,127-05 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1995) (nine Democratic senators voiced support for the efforts).

318. According to the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, as of September 1, 1997, "103 vacancies, or 12% of the 837 positions among the federal appellate and trial courts, and 52 nominations are awaiting Senate action." Statement of the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law on Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary (Sept. 1997) (on file with author). In 1994, the University of Virginia established the Miller Center Commission on the Selection of Federal Judges; its work was prompted by concern about delays in filling judgeships. See Statement of Daniel J. Meador before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on behalf of the ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, FED. NEWS SERV. (May 21, 1996).


320. AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, supra note 319, at 31-32.
increased acrimony in the interactions between judges and attorneys; as Professor Charles Geyh puts it: “As the judiciary’s profile in the legislative process has risen, so too have attacks on the judiciary’s credibility.”

Most recently, individual federal and state judges have found themselves the brunt of sustained personal attacks, launched either in an attempt to have them removed from office or intimated in the discharge of their duties while in office. In 1996, the ABA created a special “Commission on the Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence” to respond to attacks on the judiciary, its report, issued in July of 1997, concluded that a “new cycle of intense judicial scrutiny and criticism is now upon us” and objected to what it termed “demagogic attacks.” While noting that United States’ history has had other such cycles and that the judiciary has itself not always been restrained in its responses, the ABA described new aspects to the debate, including congressional interest “in the internal management and operational efficiencies of the judiciary” and the “unfortunate shrillness” that has marked the “tenor of interbranch discussions.” The Commission reported on “mounting evidence not only of a loss of confidence and respect but also a diminished understanding of the role of judges and an indepen-

322. Some of these incidents are catalogued in AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, supra note 319, at 15-19. See also Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to Intimate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 309 (1997); Judicial Independence, 80 JUDICATURE 155-183 (1997) (discussing attacks on individual judges, including those on Penny White, who lost a retention election for her seat on the Supreme Court of Tennessee and on Rosemary Barkett, formerly of the Florida Supreme Court and now sitting on the Eleventh Circuit); Katharine Q. Seelye, House G.O.P. Begins Listing a Few Judges to Impeach, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1997, at A24; David Barton, Impeachment! Restraining an Overactive Judiciary (on file with author) (a memorandum circulated in Washington, D.C. in the spring of 1997 and offering arguments from the “founders” on why impeachment is appropriate; further, arguing that “[e]ven if it seems that an impeachment conviction against a certain official is unlikely, impeachment should nevertheless be pursued. Why? Because just the process of impeachment serves as a deterrent.”). Id. at 53.
324. AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, supra note 319, at i.
325. Id. at 46.
326. Id. at ii.
dent judiciary in protecting and enforcing the rights of the people."\textsuperscript{327} The American Judicature Society has launched a special project on judicial independence; its goal is to "promote and safeguard the principle of judicial independence."\textsuperscript{328}

Consider this series of incursions on the legitimacy and authority of judges against the background of the federal judiciary's success in rewording the CJRA to confirm its discretionary powers over civil case processing. That juxtaposition provides reason to wonder about the wisdom of the transformation of judicial practices. Decades of judges as managers, negotiators, super-senior partners, and settlement mediators do not equip them well for such conflict. While powerfully imbued with discretion over how to process cases, federal judges seem all too vulnerable to oversight in the exercise of their judgment. It is not that the judiciary's adoption of a managerial stance towards its work has caused these battles but rather that, by turning the role of the judge into that of a bureaucratic manager, by explaining that the judge's job is just like that of a mediator,\textsuperscript{329} by permitting ever-increasing delegation of the judicial task,\textsuperscript{330} by becoming individual case tailors, the federal judiciary has not provided much argument for its special charter or why its constitutional role is worth cherishing. When the federal judiciary shifts its focus from adjudication and its consequential remedial authority, it loses a key identifying element of what constitutes a judge, and hence it loses reasons for protesting against congressional intervention.

Moreover, the charter of discretionary powers over civil pretrial processing rests on the special role of the judge, the unique vantage point, not only of disinterest but also of knowledge and experience of what adjudication offers in contrast to other forms of disposition.\textsuperscript{331} If judges have altered the practice of judging and made it a kind of manager-facilitator job that

\textsuperscript{327} Id. at vii.
\textsuperscript{328} Interview with Sandra Ratcliff Daffron, \textit{Independent Judiciary is Key Issue for AJS}, 29 \textit{THIRD BRANCH} 10-11 (Aug. 1997).
\textsuperscript{329} Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d at 1249.
\textsuperscript{331} See \textsc{Brazil}, \textit{Settling Civil Disputes}, supra note 173, arguing that it is judges' training at decisionmaking that makes them effective at bringing about settlements.
many officials of courts and private parties can do, why give them either substantial discretion in pretrial processing or in adjudication? At issue is the role of the judge, the practice of judging, and the reason for celebrating or limiting the work of the Third Branch.

Hence, I close with a comment made in 1956 by Harry Nims, a lawyer-proponent of pre-trial processes:

Pre-trial may have changed our concept of the function of our judges. Perhaps they are to be no longer regarded only as impartial moderators or umpires in courtroom duels; but in addition, as wise, understanding friends of those who seek relief in courts, ready to help with their common sense, wisdom and their knowledge of the law and of human nature, to adjust differences quickly and with just as little expenditure in time and money as is possible.332

He concluded his comments by stating: “Surely this is an end greatly to be desired.”333 That enthusiasm is what I cannot share.

332. Nims, Some By-Products of Pretrial, supra note 89, at 191. Nims also authored a book, PRE-TRIAL, supra note 77, published under the co-sponsorship of the Committee on Pre-Trial Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States and the Council of the Section on Judicial Administration of the ABA.

333. Nims, Some By-Products of Pretrial, supra note 89, at 191.