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Review Essay

Why Do Nations Obey International Law?


_Harold Hongju Koh†_

Why do nations obey international law?

This remains among the most perplexing questions in international relations. Nearly three decades ago, Louis Henkin asserted that "almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time."¹ Although empirical work since then seems largely to have confirmed this hedged but optimistic description,² scholars

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† Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law; Director, Orville H. Schell, Jr., Center for International Human Rights, Yale University. This Essay sketches arguments to be fleshed out in a forthcoming book, tentatively entitled _Why Nations Obey: A Theory of Compliance with International Law._ Parts of this Review Essay derive from the 1997 Waynflete Lectures, Magdalen College, Oxford University, and a brief book review of the Chayeses volume in _91 Am. J. INT'L L._ (forthcoming 1997). I am grateful to Glenn Edwards, Jessica Schaefer, and Douglas Wolfe for splendid research assistance, and to Bruce Ackerman, Peter Balsam, Geoffrey Brennan, Paul David, Noah Feldman, Roger Hood, Andrew Hurrell, Mark Janis, Paul Kahn, Benedict Kingsbury, Tony Kronman, Anthony Lester, Katya Lester, Laurence Lustgarten, Frances Milliken, Gerald Neuman, David Parkin, and Alex Wendt for most valuable advice. My deepest thanks go to the Warden and Fellows of All Souls College, Oxford, the President and Fellows of Magdalen College, Oxford; the Guggenheim Foundation; the Twentieth Century Fund; Gene Coakley; Renee DeMatteo; and Mary-Christy Fisher for so generously supporting the research underlying this Review Essay and the book toward which it is directed.

2. In recent years, scholars of both international law and international relations have begun to conduct broad empirical studies regarding the conditions under which compliance with international treaty obligations will occur, particularly in the fields of international trade, _see, e.g., Adjudication of_
have generally avoided the causal question: If transnational actors do generally obey international law, why do they obey it, and why do they sometimes disobey it?

The question is fundamental from both a theoretical and practical perspective. It challenges scholars of international law and international relations alike. It vexes all subfields in international affairs, from international security to political economy; from international business transactions to international trade; from European Union law to international organizations. It poses a critical ongoing challenge for United States foreign policy, for if we cannot predict when nation-states will carry out their international legal obligations respecting trade retaliation, environmental protection, human rights, global security, and supranational organizations, how can we count on “multilateralism” to replace bipolar politics as the engine of the post-Cold War order? Not least, it remains the daily practical question facing nongovernmental organizations that challenge governmental officials on behalf of victims of human rights abuse.

International law and relations scholars have inquired into the power of rules in international affairs for centuries, but the Cold War’s demise, and its implications for the possibilities of international law, have dramatically sharpened interest in the “compliance question.” Within the last decade, the


3. Throughout this Review Essay, I will distinguish among four relationships between stated norms and observed conduct: coincidence, conformity, compliance, and obedience. Suppose that after living my life in the United States, I arrive in England, only to notice that both the law and the practice are that everyone drives on the left-hand side of the road. One could conceive of at least four possible relationships between the legal rule and the observed conduct.

First, and least likely, is that no causal relationship exists: It is simply a massive coincidence that everyone appears to “follow” the rule. A second possibility is that people loosely conform their conduct to the rule when convenient, but feel little or no legal or moral obligation to do so. See, e.g., Robert F.
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Two recent books, which cap the careers of three eminent international lawyers, represent the most comprehensive and sophisticated efforts to date to address this demanding question. In *The New Sovereignty*, Harvard Law Professor Abram Chayes, former Legal Adviser to the U.S. State Department, and Antonia Handler Chayes, former Undersecretary of the U.S. Air Force, argue that compliance with international law is best fostered, at least within treaty regimes, by a "managerial model." In the Chayeses' view, nations obey international rules not because they are threatened with sanctions, but because they are persuaded to comply by the dynamic created by the treaty regimes to which they belong. "[T]he fundamental instrument for maintaining compliance with treaties at an acceptable level," they argue, "is an iterative process of discourse among the parties, the treaty organization, and the wider public." In *Fairness in International Law and Institutions*, New York University Law Professor Thomas Franck argues that the key to compliance is not so much the managerial process as the fairness of international rules themselves.
Threaded with philosophical arguments from his earlier work, and based on his 1993 Hague Lectures in Public International Law, Franck's *tour d'horizon* of international law asserts that nations "obey powerless rules" because they are pulled toward compliance by considerations of legitimacy (or "right process") and distributive justice.

Both volumes are works of adepts. Both recognize that the modern transformation of sovereignty has remade international law, so that international law norms now help construct national identities and interests through a process of justificatory discourse. Moreover, the Chayeses' managerial approach and Franck's fairness approach give cogent modern expression to two prominent intellectual traditions in international legal scholarship, which I will call the "process" and "philosophical" traditions. These intellectual traditions have historically defended the discipline against two divergent claims: on one hand, the realist charge that international law is not really law, because it cannot be enforced; on the other, the rationalistic claim that nations "obey" international law only to the extent that it serves national self-interest.

Yet both books, instructive as they are, give shape to only parts of the blind men's elephant. Both the managerial and the fairness accounts of the compliance story omit, in my view, a thoroughgoing account of *transnational legal process*: the complex process of institutional *interaction* whereby global norms are not just debated and *interpreted*, but ultimately *internalized* by domestic legal systems. Both the managerial and the fairness accounts fail

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8. Cf. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 4, at 26 ("[T]his justificatory discourse is expressly recognized as a principal method of inducing compliance."); FRANCK, supra note 6, at 14 (explaining that fairness inquiry is "a process of discourse, reasoning, and negotiation leading, if successful, to an agreed formula").
9. See Terry Nardin, Ethical Traditions in International Affairs, in TRADITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 1, 13 (Terry Nardin & David R. Mapel eds., 1992) ("Every student of international affairs has encountered the view that international law is 'not really law' because it lacks effective institutions for making and applying laws, and that it is therefore of negligible importance in international affairs."); see also GEORGE F. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900–1950, at 95–103 (1984). Typically, detractors of legalism in international affairs make two claims. First, "[t]here can be no authentic rule of law among nations until nations have a common political morality or are under a common sovereignty." Robert Bork, The Limits of "International Law", NAT'L INTEREST, Winter 1989/90, at 3, 10 (dismissing international law as device serving "both internationally and domestically, as a basis for a rhetoric of recrimination directed at the United States"). Second, critics deem it absurd for powerful nation-states to allow their policies to be dictated by legalistic formulations, because such rules disserve the national interest. See, e.g., Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, Law and Reciprocity, 78 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. Proc. 59, 67 (1984) (purporting to redefine rule of international law by arguing that "we cannot permit . . . ourselves to feel bound to unilateral compliance with obligations which do in fact exist under the [United Nations] Charter, but are renounced by others"); Charles Krauthammer, The Curse of Legalism, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 6, 1989, at 44, 44 (declaring entire notion of "an ordered international system regulated by international law" to be fictional).
10. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 49 (labeling as "cynic's formula" suggestion that "since there is no body to enforce the law, nations will comply with international law only if it is in their interest to do so; they will disregard law or obligation if the advantages of violation outweigh the advantages of observance").
11. For elaboration of this argument, see Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 181 (1996); and infra Part III.
to describe the pathways whereby a "managerial" discourse or "fair" international rule penetrates into a domestic legal system, thus becoming part of that nation's internal value set. Both books thereby avoid explaining the evolutionary process whereby repeated compliance gradually becomes habitual obedience. In my view, this overlooked process of interaction, interpretation, and internalization of international norms into domestic legal systems is pivotal to understanding why nations "obey" international law, rather than merely conform their behavior to it when convenient.

Part I of this Review Essay examines the history of scholarly efforts to grapple with the compliance question. Part II locates the Franck and Chayeses volumes amid this intellectual landscape, and suggests what they have gotten right, wrong, and incomplete. Part III sketches what I believe to be a more complete approach toward understanding why nations obey, one that combines the managerial and fairness approaches with deeper analysis of how transnational legal process promotes the interaction, interpretation, and internalization of international legal norms.

I. THE ROOTS OF THE COMPLIANCE PROBLEM

Like most laws, international rules are rarely enforced, but usually obeyed. Although this phenomenon has been studied in the domestic law context by psychologists, philosophers, anthropologists, and domestic lawyers, it has received far less direct attention in the international realm.

12. Even Hans Morgenthau, a prominent critic of international law, conceded that, "to deny that international law exists as a system of binding legal rules flies in the face of all the evidence." HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 249–52 (2d ed. 1954).

13. The study of compliance with and obedience to domestic law has been a broadly multidisciplinary enterprise. See, e.g., SANCTIONS AND REWARDS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH (Martin L. Friedland ed., 1989). In recent years, the topic has attracted the attention of criminologists, see, e.g., MALCOLM K. SPARROW, IMPOSING DUTIES: GOVERNMENT'S CHANGING APPROACH TO COMPLIANCE (1994); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Raymond Paternoster et al., PERCEIVED RISK AND SOCIAL CONTROL: DO SANCTIONS REALLY DETER?, 17 L. & SOC'Y REV. 457 (1983); students of corporate compliance, see, e.g., Marc I. Steinberg & John Fletcher, COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS FOR INSIDER TRADING, 47 SMU L. REV. 1783 (1994); Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pynch, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 605 (1995); Kevin B. Huff, Note, THE ROLE OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS IN DETERMINING CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY: A SUGGESTED APPROACH, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1252 (1996); advocates of regulatory reform, see, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); social psychologists, see, e.g., STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1969); anthropologists, see, e.g., MICHAEL BARKUN, LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS: ORDER IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1968); SALLY FALK MOORE, LAW AS PROCESS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL VIEW (1978); legal and moral philosophers, see, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Robert S. Gerstein, THE PRACTICE OF FIDELITY TO LAW, 4 L. & SOC'Y REV. 479 (1970); PAUL HARRIS, THE MORAL OBLIGATION TO OBEY THE LAW, in ON POLITICAL OBLIGATION (Paul Harris ed., 1990); ROSCOE E. HILL, LEGAL VALIDITY AND LEGAL OBLIGATION, 80 YALE L.J. 47 (1970); M.B.E. SMITH, IS THERE A PRIMA FACIE OBLIGATION TO OBEY THE LAW?, 82 YALE L.J. 950 (1973); and sociologists and law-and-society scholars, see, e.g., LAUREN B. EDELSTAIN, LEGAL AMBIGUITY AND THE POLITICS OF COMPLIANCE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION OFFICERS' DILEMMA, 13 LAW & POL'Y 73 (1991); HAROLD G. GRASMICK & ROBERT J. BURSICK, CONSCIENCE, SIGNIFICANT OTHERS, AND RATIONAL CHOICE: EXTENDING THE DETERRENCc MODEL, 24 L. & SOC'Y
Indeed, the very way that the compliance question has been treated over the years as, in turn, a religious, moral, philosophical, political science, process, and now empirical question, itself provides a fascinating window into how internationalists have chosen to think about the role and function of international law. This evolution in academic thinking reflects the fact that this serial examination has transpired against the backdrop of an epochal transformation of international law. That transformation has been characterized by the marked decline of national sovereignty; the concomitant proliferation of international regimes, institutions, and nonstate actors; the collapse of the public-private distinction; the rapid development of customary and treaty-based rules; and the increasing interpenetration of domestic and international systems. These trends have restructured the planetary stage on which international law performs, making way for what Franck calls “the post-ontological era” of mature and complex international law.

A. Ancient and Primitive International Law

During the classical period of international law, the causal question of why nations obey was generally conflated with the normative question of why they should obey, which was in turn usually answered by “semi-theological” reference to “the higher law—the ‘law of nature,’ of which international law was but a part.” Before the Roman empire, religion served as the paramount source of the law of nations. In Roman law, Gaius defined jus gentium in terms of “law ‘common to all men.’” The Preface to Justinian’s Institutes, published in 533 A.D., began with observations about the relationship between the law of nations and natural law. During the Middle Ages, international or universal law merged with ecclesiastical law, and even positive treaty law was considered to have legal force only because treaties were confirmed by

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14. As I note below, these two trends make up what the Chayeses call “the new sovereignty.” See infra text accompanying notes 189–91.

15. FRANCK, supra note 6, at 6.


18. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 1 n.2 (1988) (citation omitted). Francisco Vitoria, a Dominican professor of theology at Salamanca from 1526 until 1546, later reconceptualized Gaius’s notion of jus gentium “as what natural reason has established among nations,” rather than Gaius’s original formulation “among all men.” ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 58–59 (1947); see also id. at 59 (explaining that Vitoria’s text does not acknowledge novelty or importance of his crucial change in language, which seems not planned but "rather to have been a momentary flash of Vitoria’s mind").

19. See J. INST. 1.2 (De Iure Naturali et Gentium et Civili).
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oath, which “being a ‘sacrament,’ subjected the obligation incurred to the jurisdiction of the Church.” Nor did medieval legal scholars distinguish municipal from international law, instead viewing the law of nations, understood as jus naturae et gentium, as a universal law binding upon all mankind. Thus in these early years, the public/private, domestic/international categories that later came to dominate classical international legal theory had not been developed. The law of nations was thought to embrace private as well as public, domestic as well as transborder transactions, and to encompass not simply the “law of states,” such as rules relating to passports and ambassadors, but also the law between states and individuals, including the “law maritime” (affecting prizes, shipwrecks, admiralty, and the like) and the “law merchant” (lex mercatoria) applicable to transnational commercial transactions. The system was “monistic,” inasmuch as international and domestic law together constituted a unified legal system, with domestic institutions acting as important interpreters and enforcers of international legal norms.

As one scholar has noted, “the most fundamental difference between ancient and modern international law” was “antiquity’s complete elimination of process as an essential link between sources and substance.... [T]he ancient mind could not conceive of norms of State behavior apart from the admittedly diverse sanctions for non-compliance with those rules.” This began to change in the fourteenth century, as the theoretical distinctions that came to dominate international legal discourse began to appear. Italian commentators such as Perugian Professors Bartolus of Sassoferrato (1313–1357) and Baldus of Perugia (1327–1400) first inaugurated private international law as the branch of international law centering on “the rights and duties of individuals where the relevant [sic] facts are wholly or in part foreign,” a subject later subsumed by English and American law under the heading of “conflict of laws.” In Six livres de la république (1576),

20. NUSSBAUM, supra note 18, at 24.
22. See id. at 27; Harold J. Berman & Colin Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 19 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 224–29 (1978) (explaining that law merchant was transnational private law based not on any single national law but on mercantile customs generally accepted by trading nations).
24. Bederman, supra note 17, at 6 (emphasis added).
25. NUSSBAUM, supra note 18, at 47.
26. See id.; JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1834). Story understood his treatise to be the first on Conflict of Laws.
Frenchman Jean Bodin advanced a general theory of the state that gave rise to the modern concept of sovereignty as a driving force in international law. In a famous passage in the second book of *De Legibus ac Deo*, Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) introduced the notion of the customary practice of nations as an important supplementary source of rules in international law. Italian Alberico Gentili, writing from Oxford, became “perhaps the first writer to make a definite separation of international law from theology and ethics and to treat it as a branch of jurisprudence.” Finally, Hugo Grotius, the Dutchman generally acclaimed as the “father of international law,” was the first writer to express *jus gentium* not simply as natural law, derived from right reason, but as the consequence of volitional acts, generated by independent operation of the human will. Grotius posited the notion of what has become known as “international society,” a community of those participating in the international legal order, whose fabric was interwoven with international law. Thus, by the mid-seventeenth century, the theoretical

written in English. See *Story*, supra, at v.


28. See *Nussbaum*, supra note 18, at 67 (quoting Francisco Suárez, *De Legibus Ac Deo* (1612)) (“[Nations] need a law by which they are guided and rightly ordered in respect to communication and association. To a great extent this is done by natural reason but not so sufficiently and directly everywhere. Hence, certain special rules could be established by the customs of these nations.”); JAMES B. SCOTT, *The Spanish Conception of International Law and of Sanctions* (1934); see also JAMES LESLIE BRIERLY, *The Basis of Obligation in International Law* 362 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 1958). Brierly explains:

> *Jus gentium* is needed to fill the gap that *jus naturale* leaves. . . . [Suárez is] . . . saying that there are a few matters for which *jus naturale* does not sufficiently provide, and that therefore, for reasons of practical convenience, it has been supplemented by the addition of certain customary rules, the rules of *jus gentium inter se*.

Brierly, supra, at 362.


31. See *Nussbaum*, supra note 18, at 104; see also HUGO GROTIIUS, *De Jure Belli Ac Pacis* (1625); HUGO GROTIIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 29. The “necessary and voluntary” character of the law of nations was also an important theme in the works of Christian Wolff (1676–1756) and Emmerich de Vattel (1714–67). See generally *Nussbaum*, supra note 18, at 150 (discussing Wolff’s theory about the obligations and rights of nations); Andrew Hurrell, *Vattel: Pluralism and Its Limits*, in *Classical Theories of International Relations*, supra note 30, at 233 (discussing Vattel’s theories of international society).

32. For a sampling of the extensive literature discussing the relationship between Grotius and the “international society” tradition, discussed infra text accompanying notes 73–76, see, for example, Hedley Bull, *The Grotian Conception of International Society*, in *Diplomatic Investigations* 51 (Herbert Butterfield & Martin Wight eds., 1966); Benedict Kingsbury & Adam Roberts, *Introduction: Grotian
foundations that came to govern traditional international law had been laid: The discipline was now deemed a branch of jurisprudence, born of both nature and of human will, driven by sovereignty concerns, and segmented into public and private components.

B. Traditional International Law

The shift from the primitive to the traditional accompanied a fundamental change in conceptual thinking about the nature of transborder obligations. As Friedrich Kratochwil has noted:

Traditional scholars tend to draw a fundamental conceptual boundary between municipal and international law, and view international law largely in terms of contractual relations, therefore assigning to the "sovereign" a central place in the construction of the two orders. Primitive texts on the other hand, envision a set of universal ordering principles, be they moral, divine, or natural, to which sovereigns and individuals alike are subject. Consequently, in assessing the obligatory character [of international law], traditional scholars have to begin with the sovereign act, and proceed to their analysis by ascertaining its public or private character in order to come to conclusions about the legitimacy of the act [while the] primitive scholar . . . begins with the notion of "justice" while proceeding from there to the capacities of the various actors, and then to the assessment of the acts.33

In 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War by acknowledging the sovereign authority of various European princes. This event marked the advent of traditional international law, based on principles of territoriality and state autonomy.34 Sovereign states functioned as the chief actors within the system, while intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations played relatively minor roles. Custom and state practice came to be seen as primary sources of the law of nations, which largely mirrored and ratified state conduct. Those who wrote about the power of rules in international affairs during these years remained less concerned with why nations obey than with what national rulers should do, viewing the compliance
question as ethical and philosophical, not scientific or empirical. Within this system, the concept of legal obligation (so-called opinio juris sive necessitatis) emerged as the keystone for distinguishing customary international law from voluntary practice to which states might conform, but which they felt legally free to disregard. The very concept of obligatory custom assumed that nations, by virtue of their sovereign statehood, had de facto consented to compliance with customary practices out of a sense of legal obligation.

C. The Dualistic Era: From Natural Law to Positivism

From this understanding, it was but a short step to positivism, which viewed international law not as natural law, but as a construct of man-made law, treaties, and custom. Early positivists such as Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), Richard Zouche (1590–1661), and Samuel Rachel (1628–1691) rejected natural law reasoning, instead asserting that the “law of nations... is a law among nations, [which] consists of customs and treaties.”

In 1789, as considerations of sovereignty came to dominate international discourse, Jeremy Bentham coined the phrase “inter-national law.” The very term rejected the monistic vision of a single, integrated transnational legal system in favor of a notion that the public law of nations operates on a separate horizontal plane for states only. Equally important, Bentham “assumed that foreign transactions before municipal courts were always decided by internal, not international rules.” By breaking the normative link between international and domestic legal systems, Bentham helped initiate the era of dualistic theory, in which the bases for compliance with domestic and international law expressly diverged.

Unlike the ethical tradition, which had blurred the issues of whether nations should and would obey international law, the positivist, scientific challenge brought into focus the causal question of why nations obey. The English analytical school of jurisprudence, led by such legal positivists as Bentham’s disciple, John Austin, soon concluded that international law rules

35. See Percy E. Corbett, Law and Society in the Relations of States 20 (1951) (citation omitted).


37. Nussbaum, supra note 18, at 123; see also id. at 112–25 (discussing early positivists).


39. Id.; see BENTHAM, supra note 38, at 296 (“Now as to any transactions which may take place between individuals who are subjects of different states, these are regulated by the internal laws, and decided upon by the internal tribunals, of the one or the other of these states...”).
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are not really law, because unlike domestic norms, they are not enforced by sovereign coercion. "The duties which [international law] imposes," Austin wrote, "are enforced by moral sanctions: by fear on the part of nations, or by fear on the part of sovereigns, of provoking general hostility, and incurring its probable evils, in case they shall violate maxims generally received and respected."\(^\text{40}\)

Yet contemporaneously, both dualism and positivism were challenged in practice and in theory. In practice, deep interpenetration of domestic and international systems and strong blending of public and private remained key features of the legal system. Contrary to Bentham's assertions, Blackstone's Commentaries had declared that the common law fully internalized the law of nations, which Blackstone described as "a system of rules, deducible by natural reason and established by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world . . . to insure the observance of justice and good faith, in that intercourse which must frequently occur between two or more independent states, and the individuals belonging to each."\(^\text{41}\) Particularly as England became the preeminent global power, the law of nations became domesticated into English common law, was applied to the American colonies, and subsequently came to be incorporated into U.S. law.\(^\text{42}\) Until the mid-nineteenth century, the leading American treatises on international law, particularly the Commentaries of Chancellor James Kent (1763–1847) and Henry Wheaton's Elements of International Law (1785–1848), presented the

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40. John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 201 (Wolfefield & Nicolson 1954) (1832); see also id. at 127 (defining law as enforced command of sovereign to subject and concluding that international law is thus not law, but merely "positive international morality") (emphasis omitted)

41. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *66 (emphasis added); see also id. at *67 (stating that law of nations was "adopted in it's [sic] full extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land"). As Mark Janis notes, "Blackstone . . . not Bentham, reflected the reality of practice." Janis, supra note 38, at 410, because "Bentham was attempting mostly to reform the law, Blackstone mostly to restate it," id. at 410 n.31.

42. The Declaration of Independence announced that the new United States was declaring the causes of its separation out of a "decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind." The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776); see Daniel Patrick Moynihan, On the Law of Nations 20 (1990) ("Twenty-three of the fifty-six signers of the Declaration were lawyers, and they were a clear majority at the Constitutional Convention."); Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 Yale L.J. 39, 39 (1994) (discussing this language); id. at 49 ("[E]arly Justices such as John Jay and John Marshall . . . were familiar with the law of nations and comfortable navigating by it."); see also G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and International Law: The Piracy Cases, 83 Am. J. Intl'l L. 727 (1989) (recounting Marshall's familiarity with law of nations). For accounts of how international law became U.S. law, see Dickinson, supra note 21; Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 819 (1989); and Harold H. Sprout, Theories as to the Applicability of International Law in the Federal Courts of the United States, 26 Am. J. Intl'l L. 280 (1932).

law of nations, as discussed by Grotius, Vattel, Bynkershoek, and Pufendorf, as fully internalized first principles of the American legal system, whose
“faithful observance . . . is essential to national character.”

Among theorists, Immanuel Kant’s famous 1795 essay, To Perpetual Peace, constituted the principal response to the positivists. Kant specifically urged governments to take advice from philosophers, and to follow international law as a route toward “perpetual peace.” Kant predicated his understanding of international law not on Benthamite utilitarian concerns, but on a vision of international law as a purposive system dedicated toward securing peace, and built on the cornerstones of justice, democracy, and a liberalism focused on the centrality of human rights. Kant argued not for world government, but for a law-governed international society among sovereign states, in which the strong ties existing among individuals create mutual interests that cut across national lines. Kant believed these transnational ties would create moral interdependence, and lead to greater possibilities for peace through international agreement.

Once framed, these debates between natural law and positivism, utilitarianism and Kantianism came to dominate traditional discourse.
Coincidentally, at almost the same time that Kant’s essay appeared, Bentham authored his own essay entitled *A Plan for Universal and Perpetual Peace*. In that essay and another entitled *Objects of International Law*, Bentham put forward a strikingly procedural and positivistic proposal to combat war, which he termed “a species of procedure by which one nation endeavours to enforce its rights at the expense of another nation.” Bentham recommended codification of unwritten laws that had become established by custom, the making of new conventions “upon all points which remain unascertained [and] ... in which the interests of two states are capable of collusion”; “[p]erfecting the style of the laws of all kinds, whether internal or international”; and creating “a common court of judicature” to settle differences of inter-state opinion by circulating rulings “in the dominions of each state.”

Thus, by the end of this period, four identifiable strands of thinking had emerged about the compliance question. The first was an Austinian, positivistic realist strand, which suggests that nations never “obey” international law, because “it is not really law.” The philosophical tradition of analyzing international law obligation had bifurcated into a Hobbesian utilitarian, rationalistic strand, which acknowledged that nations sometimes follow international law, but only when it serves their self-interest to do so, and a liberal Kantian strand, which assumed that nations generally obey international law, guided by a sense of moral and ethical obligation derived from considerations of natural law and justice. Bentham’s international law writings suggested a fourth, process-based strand, which derived a nation’s incentive to obey from the encouragement and prodding of other nations with whom it is engaged in a discursive legal process.

As the nineteenth century closed, state practice exhibited increasingly robust norm-enunciation and procedural institution-building. The period marked the development of such incipient global humanitarian norms as treaties prohibiting piracy and privateering, slave trade, prostitution (or “white slavery”), certain acts in wartime, and the harboring of fugitives. Even as the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 accorded special legal protection to religious minorities (which served as a model for the Minorities System later created under the auspices of the League of Nations), the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899 established the Permanent Court of Arbitration (which the League of Nations shortly followed by fashioning the Permanent Court of


49. 2 BENTHAM, supra note 48, at 540, 552–54.


These strands came together in what would become the nascent law of international human rights. Particularly critical to these norm-generating developments was the work of such nineteenth-century "transnational moral entrepreneurs" as William Wilberforce and the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society; Henry Dunant and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); and Christian peace activists, such as America's William Ladd and Elihu Burritt, who promoted public international arbitration and permanent international criminal courts.

The first World War interrupted this momentum, and forced scholars to reflect on the new legal order that emerged from the Treaty of Versailles. The interwar years marked three watersheds. The Charter of the League of Nations sought to place limits on a sovereign state's freedom to pursue war as an instrument of national policy; the International Labour Organization (ILO) became the first permanent intergovernmental organization devoted specifically to improving conditions of social welfare; and the Paris Peace Conference sought to generate proposals to remedy nationalist conflict.

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53. Nadelmann, supra note 50, at 482 (defining "transnational moral entrepreneurs" as nongovernmental transnational organizations who (1) "mobilize popular opinion and political support both within their host country and abroad"; (2) "stimulate and assist in the creation of like-minded organizations in other countries"; (3) "play a significant role in elevating their objective beyond its identification with the national interests of their government"; and (4) often direct their efforts "toward persuading foreign audiences, especially foreign elites, that a particular prohibition regime reflects a widely shared or even universal moral sense, rather than the peculiar moral code of one society"); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 929 (1996) (describing similar domestic concept of "norm entrepreneurs" who "can alert people to the existence of a shared complaint and can suggest a collective solution ... by (a) signalling their own commitment to change, (b) creating coalitions, (c) making defiance of the norms seem or be less costly, and (d) making compliance with new norms seem or be more beneficial").

54. On the transnational work of Wilberforce and the British anti-slavery movement, see generally BETTY HENRY FLADELAND, MEN AND BROTHERS: ANGLO-AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY COOPERATION (1972); and Nadelmann, supra note 50, at 495. On the work of Dunant and the ICRC, which spurred the Geneva Convention of 1864 and the Hague Convention of 1899 and the movement toward codified rules of wartime conduct, see generally PIERRE BOISSIER, HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS: FROM SOLFERINO TO TSUSHIMA (1985); MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 69–88 (1996); and Michael Ignatieff, Unarmed Warriors, NEW YORKER, Mar. 24, 1997, at 54. On the work of Ladd and Burritt, see Mark W. Janis, Protestants, Progress and Peace in the Influence of Religion: Enthusiasm for an International Court in Early Nineteenth-Century America, in INFLUENCE OF RELIGION, supra note 17, at 223. These cases demonstrate "the role of a few morally committed private individuals—individuals without government positions or political power—and the elite networks they were able to use to build an international organization," FINNEMORE, supra, at 86.


56. As David Kennedy has noted, 1918 marked the break between the eras of international "law" and international "institutions." See David Kennedy, The Move to Institutions, 8 CARDozo L. REV. 841, 844 (1987). The constitution of the ILO signaled "the end of an era in which international law was, with few exceptions, confined to the regulation of relations between the states." HENKIN ET AL., supra note 34, at xi; see also VIRGINIA LEARY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND NATIONAL LAW (1981). On the influence of the Paris Peace Conference on European nationalism, see Nathaniel Berman, "But the Alternative Is Despair": European Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of International Law, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1792 (1993).
These early political steps toward institution-building stimulated interwar academic thinking about international community as a key factor in promoting compliance with international norms. One of the first modern works specifically to address the question of why nations obey, Alfred Verdross's 1927 Hague Lectures, *Le Fondement du Droit International,* identified the central cause of compliance as a Grotian commonality of values and interest which drives states to agree to honor the agreements they enter. The following year, Oxford's James Brierly lectured at the Hague on *The Basis of Obligation in International Law* ("Le Fondement du caractère obligatoire du droit international"). Building on Verdross, Brierly eschewed strict reliance on either natural law or positivist consent as sources of legal obligation, suggesting instead the need to preserve "solidarity" with one's fellow states as an explanation for compliance.

Thus, the interwar years modified the process-based strand of thinking about the compliance question by mixing process with reputation: the "solidaristic" strand that emerged derived a nation's incentive to obey from the encouragement and prodding of other nations with whom it is engaged in a managerial, discursive legal process. In short, by the time World War II began, thinking about the compliance question had diverged into four different schools, resting on assumptions based on realism, rationalism, Kantianism, and process (including considerations of "solidarity" with other members of "international society"). As we shall see, these lines of argument laid down the basic pathways along which subsequent analysis of the compliance question has proceeded.

57. 16 RECUEIL DES COURS 244 (1927).
58. Verdross argued that "the duty of states in their reciprocal relations" derives from "a supra-consensual norm [pacta sunt servanda], the content of which enshrines consent at the foundation of the legal system." Berman, supra note 55, at 585.
59. 23 RECUEIL DES COURS 458 (1928).
60. BRIERLY, supra note 28, at 56 (ascribing this view to Duguit). Brierly ascribed to Ksabbe an alternative theory, which asserts that obligation "proceeds from men's sense of right." Id. at 61. Brierly's two explanations for compliance—based on solidarity and legitimacy, respectively—bear a striking resemblance to the "managerial" and "fairness" explanations later elaborated by the Chayeses and Franck. See infra Part II. Fitzmaurice later connected the reasoning of both Verdross and Brierly to the Grotian "international society" school. See Gerald Fitzmaurice, *The Foundations of the Authority of International Law and the Problem of Enforcement*, 19 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1956). He wrote:

As Verdross, Brierly and others have conclusively shown, it is not consent, as such, that creates the obligation . . . . The real foundation of the authority of international law resides . . . . in the fact that the States making up the international society recognise it as binding upon them, and, moreover, as a system that *ipsa facto* binds them as members of that society, irrespective of their individual wills.

Id. at 8–9.
61. The academic writing of this era, however, remained unabashedly dualistic. See, e.g., Starke, supra note 23, at 70–74 (citing work of leading dualist theorists, Triepel and Anzilotti); id. at 73 n.2 (discussing I ANZILOTI, CORSO DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 51 (1928)) ("In Anzilotti's view, there is such a complete separation between the two systems that one system cannot contain binding norms emanating from the other.").
D. The Era of Institutions

In the wake of the Allied victory in World War II, the architects of the postwar system replaced the preexisting loose customary web of state-centric rules with an ambitious positivistic order, built on institutions and constitutions: international institutions governed by multilateral treaties organizing proactive assaults on all manner of global problems. These global "constitutions" sought both to allocate institutional responsibility and to declare particular rules of international law. Political conflict, for example, was to be regulated by the United Nations and its constituent organs—the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the World Court—under the aegis of a United Nations Charter premised on abstinence from unilateral uses of force. The United Nations system was supplemented by an alphabet soup of specialized, functional political organs and regional political and defense pacts based on respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. Destructive economic conflicts, by contrast, were to be mitigated through the Bretton Woods system, which provided that the World Bank would supervise international reconstruction and development, the International Monetary Fund would monitor balance of payments, and the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) would manage international principles of economic liberalism and market capitalism. These global economic institutions were buttressed by regional economic communities such as the European Economic Community, each governed by its own constitution-like treaty.

This complex positive law framework reconceptualized international law as a creative medium for organizing the activities and relations of numerous transnational players, a category that now included intergovernmental organizations with independent decisionmaking capacity. Within this intensely regulatory global framework, it was imagined, legal rules would reflect international systemic concerns, rather than parochial interests. The globalization of economic regulation made sharp inroads into now-established distinctions between public and private law. Meanwhile, the prospect of European regional integration of domestic and international law, along with the post-Nuremberg growth of international human rights law and its potentially deep incursion into domestic jurisdiction, posed powerful theoretical challenges to the dualistic municipal-international distinction. One of the best-known

62. For descriptions of this heady period, see generally TOWNSEND HOOPES & DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, FDR AND THE CREATION OF THE UN (1997); and BRIAN URQUHART, A LIFE IN PEACE AND WAR 90-130 (1987).

63. The GATT, of course, was only an interim document intended to apply provisionally until the charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO) was ratified. See HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 49. In fact, the failure of the requisite number of nations to ratify the ITO’s Charter left the GATT as the world’s trading regulator until the creation of the World Trade Organization in 1994, “a defining moment in the evolution of international economic law.” Reitz, supra note 2, at 557.

64. The judgments of the Tokyo and Nuremberg war crimes tribunals not only galvanized the
legal tracts of this era, Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn’s *World Peace Through World Law*, even proposed a criminal law enforcement model to enforce international rules, with the great powers of the United Nations acting jointly as the policemen of the world.65

Yet almost immediately, the intense bipolarity of the Cold War era rendered this positivistic vision a Potemkin Village. With respect especially to the use of force, the Cold War order soon resembled a “revolutionary system,” one “wracked by inexpiable power rivalries and ideological conflicts . . . in which international organization [was] reduced to impotence as a force of its own.”66 The system remained dualistic, particularly in the United States, as international and domestic law continued as separated systems.67

During these years, international law fell into tremendous public disrepute. Particularly in the United States, the positivistic, realist strand came to dominate thinking on the compliance issue. Meanwhile, the Kantian strand fell into particular disrepute, dismissed as a kind of utopian moralizing about world government, which, like the strategy of appeasement, played into the hands of the Communist bloc. One leading critic, George F. Kennan, memorably attacked “the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems,” that is, “the belief that it should be possible to suppress the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of governments in the international field by the acceptance of some system of legal rules and restraints,” as an approach that “runs like a red skein through our foreign policy of the last fifty years.”68

Particularly in the United States, the realists’ Cold War disdain for the utopianism of international law helped trigger the odd estrangement between the fields of international law and international relations. Although the two fields cover much of the same intellectual territory, they began to evolve independently, pursuing different analytic missions, and reaching different

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65. See GRENVILLE CLARK & LOUIS B. SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW (2d ed. 1960) (discussing “World Police Force”). For accounts of contemporaneous political discussions of this issue, see 2 CORDELL HULL, MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 1642–43 (1948).


68. KENNAN, supra note 9, at 95.
conclusions about the influence of law in international affairs. Over time, the fields came to adopt an unspoken division of labor regarding the intellectual projects that they would pursue. International relations scholars, suffused with realism, treated international law as naive and virtually beneath discussion. International lawyers, meanwhile, shifted their gaze toward modest tasks: description of international legal norms; application of these norms to particular cases; and occasional prescription of what the rule of law should be. Legal scholars therefore largely avoided the difficult tasks of causal explanation and prediction.

During this era, legal philosophers mounted the most sustained theoretical critique of the obligatory force of international law. Hans Kelsen modified John Austin’s rejection of international law as a system not enforced by sovereign command, claiming instead that international law constitutes a primitive form of law, based on self-help. H.L.A. Hart refined that challenge, arguing that international law lacks two features that he deemed central to the very concept of law: first, “the secondary rules of change and adjudication which provide for legislature and courts”; and second, “a unifying rule of recognition, specifying ‘sources’ of law and providing general criteria for the identification of its rules.” Until actors within the international system internalize both a rule of recognition and secondary rules for orderly change and interpretation, Hart argued, international law will consist only of a set of primary rules with which nations will comply out of a sense of moral, not legal, obligation. In effect, Hart defined the very notion of “obedience” out of international law, for under his description, international rules are ones with which nations may conform or comply, but never “obey,” in the sense of internally accepting or incorporating those rules into national law.

Yet even during this era, international law had its defenders. Within the international relations field, a Kantian American school of liberal internationalists69 and a Grotian British School of “International Society”70. See Francis Anthony Boyle, World Politics and International Law 3–76 (1985).

69. For an intriguing intellectual history of the schism, see Francis Anthony Boyle, World Politics and International Law 3–76 (1985).

70. See Hans Kelsen, Principles of Public International Law 417–18 (1952) (“[S]tates must eventually evolve from their present non-coercive primitivism to become a genuine, organized community in which ‘real’ obligations are enforced by judges and a police force deployed by a supranational executive.”). See generally David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 7, 29–59 (discussing Kelsen’s 1941 lectures on Law and Peace in International Relations).

71. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 214 (2d ed. 1994); see also Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory 284 (1978); J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 Yale L.J. 105, 110 (1993) (“Since H.L.A. Hart, jurisprudence has been grounded on the so-called ‘internal point of view’—the perspective of a participant in the legal system who regards its laws as norms for her behavior.”).

72. Stanley Hoffman has called liberal internationalism, along with Communism, one of the two great postwar ideologies. See Stanley Hoffmann, The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism, 98 Foreign Pol’y 159 (1995); see also Michael Joseph Smith, Liberalism and International Reform, in Traditions of International Ethics, supra note 9, at 201. For other prominent writings in this school, see Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares (4th ed. 1971); and The Relevance of International Law (Karl Deutsch & Stanley Hoffman eds., 1968).
theorists[73] continued to argue for the relevance of international law. Both, however, remained vague about precisely why nations obey. Writing about “International Systems and International Law” in 1965, for example, one prominent liberal internationalist wrote, “[t]he basis of obligation is the same in every legal order: a consciousness among the subjects that this order is needed if one is to reach a common end.”[74]

European theorists, perhaps less emotionally driven by a need to support American hegemony, never fully accepted a schism between international law and international relations.[75] English scholars such as Martin Wight (1913–1972) and Hedley Bull (1932–1985) developed the notion of a common consciousness among states. Building upon the “solidaristic” strand identified by Brierly and Verdross, they expressly invoked the Grotian notion of “international society.”[76] Within this international society, they reasoned, nations comply with international law for essentially communitarian reasons: not solely because of cost-benefit calculations about particular transactions, but because particular rules are nested within a much broader fabric of ongoing communal relations.

Within the American legal academy, a new defense of international law

73. See, e.g., Bull, supra note 32. Bull argued elsewhere that (if states today form an international society . . . this is because, recognizing certain common interests and perhaps common values, they regard themselves as bound by certain rules in their dealings with one another . . . [and] co-operate in the working of institutions such as the forms of procedures of international law, the machinery of diplomacy and general international organization, and the customs and conventions of war.


74. Stanley Hoffmann, International Systems and International Law, in Hoffmann, supra note 66, at 149, 171.

75. Andrew Hurrell argues that “one of the most striking features of European thought before 1914 was just how few theorists actually accepted” a dichotomy between domestic “society” and international “anarchy . . . . It was perhaps only the extreme nature of post-war US realism that produced a situation in which co-operation came to be seen as an ‘anomaly’ in need of explanation.” Hurrell, supra note 73, at 50.

76. They defined “international society” as a group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.

Hedley Bull, The Emergence of a Universal International Society, in THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 117 (Hedley Bull & Adam Watson eds., 1984); see also Kingsbury, supra note 30 (arguing that intellectual link between Grotius and modern European theorists lies less in Grotius’s specific elaboration of the concept of international society than in their common focus on need for theory in international relations).
arose, based less on Kant or Grotius than on emerging American notions of legal process. This defense followed two distinct paths: the so-called Policy Science or New Haven School of International Law, pioneered at Yale by Myres McDougal, Harold Lasswell, and their associates, and a lawyering approach founded at Harvard, crystallized in the International Legal Process School of Abram Chayes, Thomas Ehrlich, and Andreas Lowenfeld. Both strands argued that transnational actors' compliance with transnational law could be explained by reference to the process by which these actors interact in a variety of public and private fora. Through this interactive process, they suggested, law helps translate claims of legal authority into national behavior.

The two schools of legal process theory grew from disparate roots. The New Haven School grew from the American theory of legal realism, which focused on the interplay between rules and social process in enunciating the law. The School sought to develop "a functional critique of international law in terms of social ends . . . that shall conceive of the legal order as a process and not as a condition." McDougal and Lasswell wrote, "our chief interest is in the legal process, by which we mean the making of authoritative and controlling decisions." In its modern incarnation as the "World Public Order" school, New Haven School leaders Myres McDougal and W. Michael Reisman argued that international law is itself a "world constitutive process of authoritative decision," not merely a set of rules, whose goal is a world public order of human dignity, designed to serve particular ends and values by establishing regimes of effective control.

77. Like most "schools," the New Haven School does not include all international lawyers who live in New Haven, nor do all of its members reside there. As one student of the School put it: "International law is most realistically observed, not as a mere rigid set of rules but as the whole process of authoritative decision in which patterns of authority and patterns of control are appropriately conjoined.


78. See, e.g., Abram Chayes et al., International Legal Process (2 vols., 1968).


81. Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 1, 9 (1959); see also id. ("Authority is the structure of expectation concerning who, with what qualifications and mode of selection, is competent to make which decisions by what criteria and what procedures. By control we refer to an effective voice in decision, whether authorized or not.").

82. As a prominent member of the school, Dame Rosalyn Higgins, recently put it: "International law is a process, a system of authoritative decision-making. It is not just the neutral application of rules. . . .
Almost contemporaneously, Chayes, Ehrlich, and Lowenfeld published a series of case studies entitled *International Legal Process*, which sought to illustrate the role of law in the process of policy decisions in the international realm. Unlike the New Haven School, which drew on Yale's domestic school of policy science, Chayes and his colleagues drew explicitly upon Henry Hart and Albert Sacks's famous unpublished domestic materials on *The Legal Process*. The Chayes materials deliberately "cut across the categories of international legal studies as they are sometimes conceived—'public international law,' 'international organizations,' 'legal problems of international business,' and the like." They asked explicitly: "How and how far do law, lawyers and legal institutions operate to affect the course of international affairs? What is the legal process by which interests are adjusted and decisions are reached on the international scene?"

The Hart and Sacks school had made the relatively narrow claim that legal techniques and doctrine are not self-defining, but rather develop from the interaction of institutions and procedures, as brought to bear in particular cases pending before both public and private decisionmaking fora. Applied to international law, Chayes and his colleagues argued, this interactive process operates in a largely unspecified way to allocate resources, organize activity, and to resolve and contain conflict. Like the Hart and Sacks materials before them, the Chayes materials were more descriptive than prescriptive, making the modest claim that law is rarely determinative in international affairs, but that "law is relevant and the role of lawyers is important." Without denying the importance of substantive legal norms, the Chayes team argued that in case after case, the legal process allocates decisionmaking competence between national and international decisionmakers, specifies particular regulatory arrangements for particular subject matters, restrains and organizes national and individual behavior, and interacts with the political, economic, and cultural setting. As Chayes himself later put it, international legal process theorists believed that international and domestic law affect political action by operating "'[f]irst, as a constraint on action; second, as the basis of justification or legitimation for action; and third, as providing organizational structures, procedures, and forums" within which political decisions may be reached."
Although few international legal scholars openly affiliated themselves with the international legal process school, the two faces of legal process soon became the defining tradition within which most American postwar international law scholars began to operate.\(^7\) The New Haven School consistently argued that international law is not a body of rules, but a process of authoritative decisionmaking.\(^8\) Myres McDougal and W. Michael Reisman elaborated the claims of policy science in various fields of public international law,\(^9\) along with scholars of such diverse political orientation as Richard Falk,\(^10\) John Norton Moore,\(^11\) Rosalyn Higgins,\(^12\) and Burns Weston,\(^13\) who shared the School's process methodology without adopting its social ends or policy values.

Meanwhile, Abram and Antonia Chayes pursued applied international legal process analysis in the areas of arms control and use of force;\(^9\) Roger Fisher did the same for international negotiations;\(^9\) Milton Katz, Kingman Brewster,\(^9\) and Andreas Lowenfeld\(^9\) for international business transactions;

87. See Koh, supra note 11, at 207 ("[F]or more than forty years, international legal scholars have been studying transnational legal process without knowing it."); see also Kennedy, supra note 70, at 21 (noting that "scholarly canon" of 1950s comprised mainly "scholarship focusing on policy-making, institutions, administration, and what was called the 'international legal process'").

88. See Symposium, supra note 77, at 283; see also Richard A. Falk, Casting the Spell: The New Haven School of International Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1991, 1997 (1995) (relating how McDougal and Lasswell converted core insight of legal realism, "its critical focus on the interplay between rules and social process in the enunciation of law in authoritative form . . . into a comprehensive framework of inquiry").

89. For representative works within this vast literature, see, for example, Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 79; Myres S. McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order (1980); Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, International Law Essays (1981); W. Michael Reisman, Nullity and Revision: The Review and Enforcement of International Judgments and Awards (1971); and Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, International Law in Policy-Oriented Perspective, in The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory (Ronald St. J. MacDonald & Douglas Johnston eds., 1983). See also Morton Kaplan & Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, Political Foundations of International Law 356 (1961) (citing McDougal's work as view that "most clearly approximates the view taken in this book, and which has most influenced the authors' approach").


92. See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 82.


94. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 86 (discussing role of law in U.S. foreign policy decisionmaking); Abram Chayes, An Inquiry into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 905 (1972).


Richard Lillich for international human rights;\textsuperscript{98} Frederick Kirgis for international organizations;\textsuperscript{99} and John Jackson\textsuperscript{100} and Robert Hudec for international trade law.\textsuperscript{101}

Yet during these years, surprisingly few scholars attempted direct answers to the question of why nations obey. For the International Legal Process school, the most complete attempt appeared in Louis Henkin’s oft-quoted \textit{How Nations Behave}, first published in 1968.\textsuperscript{102} A close reading of Henkin’s discussion of the “politics of law observance” shows that his defense of international law rests largely on utilitarian, rationalistic premises.\textsuperscript{103} Starting with the assumption “that nations act deliberately and rationally, after mustering carefully and weighing precisely all the relevant facts and factors,” Henkin posited “that barring an infrequent non-rational act, nations will observe international obligations unless violation promises an important balance of advantage over cost.”\textsuperscript{104} He went to identify numerous foreign policy and domestic factors that weigh into law observance, without separating out those factors that rest on national interest or concern for reputation.\textsuperscript{105} Nor did his “domestic reasons” clearly distinguish among those factors that vary with national identity,\textsuperscript{106} that result from domestic legal incorporation of international norms,\textsuperscript{107} or that constitute bureaucratic or psychological reasons for “internal acceptance.”\textsuperscript{108} Henkin acknowledged that “[w]ith

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{98} See, e.g., RICHARD B. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1991).
  \item \textsuperscript{99} See, e.g., FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING (1977).
  \item \textsuperscript{100} See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1989); JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (3d ed. 1995). For an analysis of Jackson’s work, see Kennedy, supra note 70, at 59–82.
  \item \textsuperscript{101} See, e.g., HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 2. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 2.
  \item \textsuperscript{103} See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 49–87.
  \item \textsuperscript{104} \textit{Id.} at 47.
  \item \textsuperscript{105} Among “foreign policy factors,” Henkin includes a common interest in keeping international relations orderly and friendly, \textit{see id.} at 46–48; a desire for a reputation for principled behavior, for propriety and respectability, \textit{see id.} at 48–50; reciprocity, \textit{see id.} at 50–52; tacit agreements, \textit{see id.} at 52–54; and fear of communal response, \textit{see id.} at 58–59.
  \item \textsuperscript{106} Henkin mentions in passing separation of powers and national constitutions as “domestic legal factors” favoring observance of international law. \textit{Id.} at 63–68. His argument is fleshed out more thoroughly in the revised edition of his classic foreign affairs work, \textit{LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION} (rev. ed. 1996).
  \item \textsuperscript{107} See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 58 (“[I]t seems permissible to suggest that some nations are more law-abiding than others by reason of their national ‘morality’ and ‘character’ . . .”); \textit{Id.} at 59 (“In general, Western-style democracies tend to observe international law more than do others. . . .”)
  \item \textsuperscript{108} \textit{See id.} at 58–63 (citing habit imitation, existence of nongovernmental organizations, political personalities, and legal advisers to foreign office as factors favoring law observance)
\end{itemize}
acceptance [of international rules] comes observance, then the habit and inertia of continued observance." Yet he nowhere explored the extent to which observance of international law is itself a constructivist activity, which feeds back to modify domestic law, reshape domestic bureaucracies, and change the attitudes of domestic decisionmakers.

The New Haven School, by contrast, pursued a course that was both more expressly normative and avowedly scientistic. In the same year that Henkin's analysis appeared, his Columbia colleague Oscar Schachter sought to answer the question of why nations obey by applying the Lasswell-McDougal framework for inquiry into the global process of authoritative decisionmaking. Schachter offered "a 'processive' definition of the formation of obligation," arguing that "five processes constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for the establishment of an obligatory legal norm." But in the end, Schachter concluded: "The whole process [of generating obligations] is purposive, directed to the satisfaction of interests and demands, hence pervasively 'value-oriented.'" Over time, the New Haven School's overriding focus on value-orientation came to trouble even those who

109. Id.
110. By arguing that international law is the end result of an authoritative decision-making process . . . embedded in social context . . . [the New Haven School] argue[d] that a scientifically grounded answer to any given policy problem may be reached that is likely to promote the common interest in achieving a world order founded on fundamental principles of human dignity. Falk, supra note 88, at 1992 (citations omitted). In 1981, Michael Reisman argued that the New Haven School's "communications model"—which sees the legal process as comprising three communicative streams, "policy content, authority signal and control intention"—"liberates the inquirer from the . . . distorting model of positivism, which holds that law is made by the legislature," in favor of the notion that "any communication between elites and politically relevant groups which shapes wide expectations about appropriate future behavior must be considered as functional lawmaking." W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 101, 107, 113 (1981).


112. Schachter, supra note 111, at 319.

113. Id. at 307 (emphasis omitted). Schachter's factors were: (1) the designation of a behavioral requirement; (2) the indication that persons with competence and authority have made the designation; (3) an indication of the capacity and willingness of those concerned to make the designated requirement effective; (4) transmittal of the requirement to the target audience; and (5) creation in the target audience of psychological and operational responses that indicate that the designated requirement is regarded as authoritative and hence, as likely to be complied with in the future. See id. at 308. On examination, these factors bear a family resemblance to Thomas Franck's later notion that rules have "compliance pull" because of a perception that they have been promulgated through a legitimate, or "right process." See infra Part II. Moreover, the fifth of Schachter's factors—the requirement of a response within a domestic audience that an international rule is authoritative—represents a nascent effort to begin to address the question of norm-internalization.

114. Schachter, supra note 111, at 319. Schachter acknowledged that the New Haven School consistently argued that international law is not a body of rules, but a process of authoritative decision. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 77, at 283 (remarks of Myres S. McDougal); see also Falk, supra note 88, at 1991 (maintaining that McDougal and Lasswell converted "the core insight of legal realism"—"its critical focus on the interplay between rules and social process in the enunciation of law in authoritative form"—"into a comprehensive framework of inquiry").
sympathized with its methodological ambitions. By connecting process and context with an overriding set of normative values, critics argued, the New Haven School came to support the notion "that a clear and specific rule of law or treaty obligation may be disregarded if it is not in accord with a fundamental goal of the international community," a goal too often set by reference to U.S. national interest. Some years later, Schachter himself came to lament that "by subordinating law to policy, the McDougal approach virtually dissolves the restraints of rules and opens the way for partisan or subjective policies disguised as law."

Thus by the end of this era, the process tradition had diverged into two distinct streams: the International Legal Process School's focus on process as policy constraint versus the New Haven School's focus on process as policy justification. The New Haven School viewed international law as itself a decisionmaking process dedicated to a set of normative values, while the International Legal Process School saw international law as a set of rules promulgated by a pluralistic community of states, which creates the context that cabins a political decisionmaking process.

In the end, neither school attempted, much less offered, a convincing explanation of why nations obey. Until the Chayeses returned to the question decades later, the International Legal Process School suggested, but never explained why, participation in process leads nations to obey. The New Haven School merged law into policy, and by so doing, too readily concluded that what constitutes right policy is per se lawful. By implying that the powerful cannot disobey international law, the New Haven School's analysis "miss[ed]

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115. Symposium, supra note 77, at 271 (remarks of Oscar Schachter). He further noted: the tendency on the part of McDougal and others in the policy-oriented school to apply their theory in a highly selective manner to override the constraints of law in favor of the "higher ends" sought by present U.S. policy. . . . If applied with a nationalist bias, [the New Haven approach] becomes an ideological instrument to override specific restraints of law . . . [I] a unilateralist vision of policy jurisprudence in which law plays a secondary role and policy is determined by the perception of self-interest of a particular state.

Id. at 272–73; see also id. at 281 (criticizing "the 'miraculous element' in the McDougal jurisprudence—that uncanny capacity he has to apply the eight values in a manner that consistently accords with U.S. foreign policy") (remarks of Richard A. Falk).

116. See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 80, at 197 ("Policy science is premised [sic] on the development, in the future, of a single international community, a world public order, within which there exist certain common political interests—interests which, though supposedly divorced from national interests, turn out to be the embodiment of post-war American foreign policy."); Symposium, supra note 77, at 267 (remarks of Oscar Schachter); see also id. at 280 (remarks of Richard A. Falk).

117. See Symposium, supra note 77, at 268 (remarks of Oscar Schachter). Schachter argued that viewing international law "as an order concerned with binding rules and obligations and with their principled use in defining choices and justifying action," as international legal process scholars did, "need not lead us to accept Austinian positivism or a 'rule-oriented' approach," as McDougal claimed. "We can still recognize," said Schachter, "that the processes of creating and applying such rules and obligations necessarily involve conditions, determinants and values that fall outside the law." Id. at 268–69 (remarks of Oscar Schachter).
the distinctiveness of law as a method of social control . . . [.] ironing out the normative essence of law under the pretext of straightening the discipline."118

E. Interdependence and Transnationalism

By the 1970s and '80s, the legal landscape had altered significantly. The growth of international regimes and institutions,119 the proliferation of nonstate actors,120 and the increasing interpenetration of domestic and international systems inaugurated the era of "transnational relations," defined by one scholar as "regular interactions across national boundaries ar[i][sing] when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization."121 Multinational enterprises, nongovernmental organizations, and private individuals reemerged as significant actors on the transnational stage. In particular, the oil crisis of the early 1970s highlighted the interdependence of politics and economics in the new transnational economy, and created the discipline of international political economy.122 Instead of focusing narrowly on nation-states as global actors, scholars began to look as well at transnational networks among nonstate actors, international institutions, and domestic political structures as important mediating forces in international society. The question now forced upon international relations scholars was why, despite the bipolarity of the Cold War regime, had interstate cooperation persisted? These scholars could not ignore the remarkable growth of formal and informal, public and nonpublic regimes, which promoted the evolution of norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures in such "transnational issue areas" as international human rights, arms control, international economic law, and international environmental law. In response, liberal institutionalists and

121. Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction, in BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN 3 (Thomas Risse-Kappen ed., 1995) (emphasis omitted); see also Samuel P. Huntington, Transnational Organizations in World Politics, 25 WORLD POL. 333 (1973) (defining "transnational organization" as "relatively large, hierarchically organized, centrally directed bureaucracy . . . that performs a set of relatively limited, specialized, and in some sense, technical functions . . . across one or more international boundaries and, insofar as is possible, in relative disregard of those boundaries"). As Risse-Kappen notes, the subject of transnational relations "rose to a certain prominence during the early 1970s, but then withered away, while state-centered approaches to international relations carried the day." Risse-Kappen, supra, at xi. For contemporaneous discussion of the question, see JAMES N. ROSENAU, THE STUDY OF GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE (1980); TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS (Robert O. Keohane & Joseph J. Nye, Jr. eds., 1972); and Karl Kaiser, Transnationale Politik, in Die anachronistische Souveränität (Ernst-Otto Czempiel ed., 1969).
international political economists developed "regime theory," the study of principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures that converge in given issue areas. In so doing, they shifted the focus of inquiry from the functioning of international organizations per se to the broader phenomenon of international cooperation, as exemplified by the regimes of "international peacekeeping" or "debt management" as they transpire both within and without institutional settings.

In one fell swoop, this analysis created new theoretical space for international law within international relations theory, as political scientists came to recognize that legal rules do, in fact, foster compliance with regime norms by providing channels for dispute-settlement, signaling and triggering retaliatory actions, and requiring states to furnish information regarding compliance. The major theoretical work on compliance in this era was done by political scientists Robert Keohane, Robert Axelrod, and Oran Young. But as the Chayeses wryly note, what strikes an international lawyer reading this literature is the political scientists' persistent reluctance ever "to say the 'L-word,'" (law) even though "'principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures' are what international law is all about." Moreover, regime theorists chose to explain cooperation almost entirely in rationalistic terms: They understood compliance with international law to result almost entirely from the functional benefits such compliance provides.

The rationalists dominated international relations theory in the 1980s with their functionalist analysis of why nations obey international law. Yet in the

123. For the foundational text, see INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).
128. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 4, at 303 n.3.
129. See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, Jr., International Institutions: Two Approaches, in KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER, supra note 125, at 158, 159. Keohane wrote: "International cooperation does not necessarily depend on altruism, idealism, personal honor, common purposes, internalized norms, or a shared belief in a set of values embedded in a culture. At various times and places any of these features of human motivation may indeed play an important role in processes of international cooperation, but cooperation can be understood without reference to any of them.
Id.; see also Hurrell, supra note 73, at 56 ("The core claim is that regimes are created and that states obey the rules embodied in them because of the functional benefits that they provide")
United States, the study of legal process continued to dominate the study of international law. Following the lead of Chayes, Ehrlich, and Lowenfeld, legal scholars began to eschew, as artificially constraining, the traditional public/private, domestic/international categories in favor of what Philip Jessup called "transnational law," defined to embrace "all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers" and including "[b]oth public and private international law . . . [plus] other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories." In revising the Harvard casebook originally developed by Milton Katz and Kingman Brewster, Henry Steiner and Detlev Vagts chose to focus on "Transnational Legal Problems." The category expressly mixed public and private, domestic and international, and cut across issue areas ranging from international human rights, to trade, environment, international business transactions and the law of U.S. foreign policy. All transnational legal issues, they reasoned, "occupy different positions on a spectrum between the extremes of 'national' and 'international' law, or on one between 'private' and 'public' law," and can be analyzed in generic process terms.

The Steiner and Vagts casebook inaugurated what I now call the explicit study of transnational legal process: the theory and practice of how public and private actors including nation-states, international organizations, multinational enterprises, nongovernmental organizations, and private individuals, interact in a variety of public and private, domestic and international fora to make, interpret, internalize, and enforce rules of transnational law. What distinguished transnational legal process from its "international legal process" forebears was its focus on the transnational, normative, and constitutive character of global legal process. By focusing on transnational transactions, the

130. In the postwar years, the theoretical study of international relations became predominantly an "American social science." Stanley Hoffmann, An American Social Science: International Relations, 106 DAEDALUS 43 (1977). Similarly, an examination of the Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law during these years reveals that European scholarship in international law throughout this period continued largely in the traditional, nontheoretical, doctrinal vein. International legal scholarship in other countries followed this doctrinal, Eurocentric pattern. Cf. Yasuaki Onuma, "Japanese International Law" in the Postwar Period—Perspectives on the Teaching and Research of International Law in Postwar Japan—, 33 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 25, 44 (1990) ("[M]ost [postwar] Japanese scholars have shown little interest in methodology and the general theory of international law. They have basically followed the major trends of Western international lawyers (another example of [the] passivism of Japanese international law) . . . ."). One exception came in the Third World, where "the McDougal and Lasswell framework has had more influence . . . than any other American jurisprudential perspective." Falk, supra note 88, at 1997.

131. PHILIP JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956); see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict of Laws, International Law, and Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DES COURS 311, 321 (1979) (stating that "public international law has been too rigid, too rule-orientated, and therefore too abstract, in part because it has been insulated from the more flexible, approach-orientated developments of private international law").


133. STEINER & VAGTS, supra note 132, at xvii.

134. See Koh, supra note 11, at 183-84.
approach was expressly nontraditional—cutting across historical private/public, domestic/international dichotomies—and nonstatist, inasmuch as the actors studied were not just, or even primarily, nation-states. By focusing on legal, as opposed to political or social, process, the approach examined the distinctiveness of law as a means of authority and social control. The approach emphasized law’s normativity: how legal rules generated by interactions among transnational actors shape and guide future transnational interactions. By focusing less on particular substantive issue areas than on the transsubstantive continuities of process, the approach emphasized that transnational law is both dynamic—mutating from public to private, domestic to international and back again—and constitutive, in the sense of operating to reconstitute national interests.135

Much of the writing in international law journals during the 1970s and 1980s embraced studies of incidents, cases, lawsuits, and institutional episodes that revealed the richness of transnational legal process.136 Yet the only monograph to address the compliance question in transnational legal process terms was Roger Fisher’s overlooked Improving Compliance with International Law.137 Rejecting both the private/public, domestic/international distinctions, Fisher adopted an expressly transnational focus.138 His argument recognized the importance to promoting compliance of regular institutional interaction,139 norm interpretation,140 and norm-internalization.141


137. ROGER FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW (1981).

138. Fisher explicitly disaggregated the concept of government. See id. at 17 (“[I]n seeking to influence a government, we are seeking to influence the official conduct of one or more human beings acting pursuant to institutional arrangements.”). He similarly rejected “a view of law which distinguishes sharply between domestic and international legal obligations.” Id. at 18; see also id. (“[T]he line between laws that are obeyed and laws that are broken does not correspond to the line between domestic law and international law.”).

139. Fisher distinguished between “first-order compliance”—encouraging respect for standing rules through deterrence against governments and individuals, rule drafting, reciprocity, and enlightened self-interest—and “second-order compliance,” coping with apparent noncompliance by creating fora where transnational players may interact, with the goal of obtaining and following up determinations that violations of international law have occurred. See id. at 29. His major procedural proposals promote second-order compliance, namely, compliance resulting from repeated interaction of transnational actors.

140. In examining such fora, he gave special attention to domestic institutions and domestic courts as appropriate fora for enunciating violations of international law norms. For other treatments of this issue, see RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1964); KAPLAN & KATZENBACH, supra note 89, at 270; Thomas M. Franck, International Law: Through National or International Courts?, 8 VILL. L. REV. 139, 150 (1962-63); Friedrich Kratochwil, The Role of Domestic Courts as Agencies of the International Legal Order, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 236 (Richard Falk et al. eds., 1985).

141. As Fisher explained:
If Fisher's book marked the Process School's answer to the rationalists, Thomas Franck's *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations* supplied the answer from legal philosophy. These same years saw a resurgence of Kantianism across the breadth of Anglo-American jurisprudence, and with it, a revival of the Kantian philosophical tradition in both international relations and international law. Applied to international relations, the turn to Kant called for "[a] commitment to a threefold set of rights": First, "freedom from arbitrary authority, often called 'negative freedom'"; second, "those rights necessary to protect and promote the capacity and opportunity for freedom, the 'positive freedoms'"; and "[a] third liberal right, democratic participation or representation, [as] necessary to guarantee the other two," Applying these values, Franck's *Legitimacy* asked directly, "Why do powerful nations obey powerless rules?" Explicitly adapting the theory and terminology of Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas, Franck answered: "Because they perceive the rule and its institutional penumbra to have a high degree of legitimacy." He defined legitimacy as "a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process." Asserting that "legitimacy exerts a pull to compliance which is powered by the quality of the rule," Franck suggested four indicators of a norm's legitimacy: its rule-clarity or "determinacy"; its symbolic validation by rituals and other formalities; its
conceptual coherence; and its adherence to "right process," or conformity with the "organized normative hierarchy" of the international rule system.\textsuperscript{148}

Predictably, Franck's analysis attracted criticism from each of the other compliance schools. Functionalists like Robert Keohane argued that Franck's effort to link "legitimacy" and compliance was essentially circular and begged the important causal question.\textsuperscript{149} Other self-styled Kantians criticized Franck for exalting legitimacy over justice, and thereby constructing a principle "that sacrifices morality and the primacy of respect for individual autonomy in favor of procedural regularity."\textsuperscript{150}

The fiercest critique came from the "New Stream" of international critical legal studies theorists, who rejected Franck's claim of "compliance because of legitimacy" as just another version of neo-Kantian liberal positivism.\textsuperscript{151} By their own concession, very few New Stream scholars sought to address the compliance question Franck framed, in part because they viewed international law as indeterminate and thus found incoherent the notion of state behavior as "compliance" with indeterminate international law doctrines.\textsuperscript{152} By thus embracing the "law is powerless" position, the left-wing critical scholars of the legal academy made strange bedfellows with the right-wing political realists.\textsuperscript{153}

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\textsuperscript{148} See id. at 26, 41–207. Franck analogized legitimate norms to social conventions or rules of a social club, "secular rule[s] supported by the perceived needs of society for an orderly, peaceful community." Id. at 37.
\textsuperscript{149} See Robert O. Keohane, Jr., International Relations and International Law Two Optics 9 (Sherrill Lecture, Yale Law School, transcript on file with author) ("[L]egitimacy is difficult to measure independently of the compliance that it is supposed to explain. . . . Franck describes a rule's compliance 'pull power' as 'its index of legitimacy.' Yet legitimacy is said to explain 'compliance pull,' making the argument circular.").
\textsuperscript{150} Tesón, supra note 45, at 95 ("By requiring that a legitimate norm satisfy the four part test of determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and adherence, Franck constructs his own principle of international justice that sacrifices morality and the primacy of respect for individual autonomy in favor of procedural regularity."); see also Dencho Georgiev, Letter, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 554, 555 (1989) (stating that Franck's approach "runs the danger of equating legitimacy with effectiveness")
\textsuperscript{152} See Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 81, 110 (1991) ("Very few CLS academics have attempted to address this [compliance] issue."); Critical scholars have thus tended to focus more on the rhetorical structure of international law than on its causal impact. But see id. at 109–16 (attempting to explain international law's authority in terms of its cultural self-validation).
\textsuperscript{153} Compare Kennan, supra note 9, with Purvis, supra note 152, at 110 (explaining that nations do not obey international law, they only "on occasion, . . . seem to act [as] if they actually were 'complying' with international law"). At the same time, the New Stream's views conflicted with those of their similarly leftist and critical, "constructivist" counterparts in the international relations field, who reasoned that norms constitute the international game by determining who the actors are and what rules they must follow. See Ngaire Woods, The Uses of Theory in the Study of International Relations, in EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE 1945, at 26–27 (Ngaire Woods ed., 1996). Like the New Stream, constructivists believe that "norms do not cause a state to act in a particular way, but rather provide reasons for a state to do so." Id. At the same time, however, constructivists resemble the Kantians, inasmuch as they believe that "rules and norms are valid even if they fail to guide action in one or several cases." Friedrich V Kratochwil,
F. After the Cold War: The New World Order

The end of the Cold War and the ensuing collapse of bipolarity initiated the era of global law in which we now live. In the heady days after the Berlin Wall fell, the future seemed unusually bright for the new "New World Order." Democracy was breaking out all over.\textsuperscript{154} Multilateralism and international law seemed resurgent with the United Nations's defeat of Saddam Hussein in Operation Desert Storm.\textsuperscript{155} The Soviet Union did a remarkable about-face, first embracing international law,\textsuperscript{156} then disintegrating, leaving the United States as "the world's indispensable nation."\textsuperscript{157} The conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Maastricht Treaty all signalled new vitality for regional organization and trade liberalization.

But the euphoria faded, as reality dampened the possibilities for new global law.\textsuperscript{158} As Communism collapsed, states fragmented, triggering violent waves of ethnic nationalism and brutal war and genocide in the former Yugoslavia. Regional organizations like NAFTA and the European Union and global regimes of trade and the environment faced difficult challenges brought on by the global recession. The dissolution of failed states like Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti triggered refugee outflows that challenged compassion and vexed policymakers.\textsuperscript{159}

The post-Cold War era has seen international law, transnational actors, decisional fora, and modes of regulation mutate into fascinating hybrid forms. International law now comprises a complex blend of customary, positive, rules, norms, and decisions: on the conditions of practical and legal reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs 100 (1989). Constructivists accordingly place little value on the compliance question, because they reason that "[a]lthough norms and rules might function in certain contexts like causes, their influence on human action is not adequately captured in probabilistic statements about future conduct." Id. See generally text accompanying notes 179–80 (discussing constructivism).

155. No less an initial skeptic than President George Bush referred to "international law" six times in a single press conference responding to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. See Transcript of News Session by President Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1990, at A16.
158. See Hoffmann, supra note 72, at 169 ("Sovereignty . . . self-government or democracy, national self-determination . . . and human rights . . . [became] norms in conflict and a source of complete liberal disarray.").
declarative, and "soft" law, which seeks not simply to ratify existing practice, but to elevate it. As sovereignty has declined in importance, global decisionmaking functions are now executed by a complex rugby scrum of nation-states, intergovernmental organizations, regional compacts, nongovernmental organizations, and informal regimes and networks. The system has become "neomonistic," with new channels opening for the interpenetration of international and domestic law through judicial decision, legislation and executive action. New forms of dispute resolution, executive action, administrative decisionmaking and enforcement, and legislation have emerged as part of a transnational legal process that influences national conduct, transforms national interests, and helps constitute and reconstitute national identities.

In the last five years, these developments have returned the compliance question to center stage in the journals of international theory. A significant number of international relations scholars have tackled pieces of the problem, particularly in the environmental and arms control areas. International ethicists have continued to examine the question, usually from a Kantian/Rawlsian perspective. A small but increasing number of international law scholars have come to explore compliance issues from an interdisciplinary perspective. Among international law and relations

163. See generally Steiner, Vagts, & Koh, supra note 132, at 514-994 (providing examples of this interpenetration).
164. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 23 (discussing "transnational public law litigation")
165. See Harold Hongju Koh, Refugees, the Courts and the New World Order, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 999, 1014-18 (describing transnational legal process); Koh, supra note 11; Koh, supra note 23, at 2398-402, 2400 n.278.
167. See, e.g., Chris Brown, International Relations Theory, New Normative Approaches (1992); Doyle, supra note 46; David R. Mapel & Terry Nardin, Convergence and Divergence in International Ethics, in Traditions of International Ethics, supra note 9
168. In addition to the Chayeses and Franck, legal scholars who have recently addressed these questions include Kenneth Abbott, Jose Alvarez, Richard Bilder, Michael Byers, Mark Janis, David Kennedy, Benedict Kingsbury, John Setear, Edwin Smith, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Phillip Trimble, and Edith Brown Weiss. See also James Cameron et al., Improving Compliance with International
scholars interested in norms, much of the recent talk has been of interdisciplinary collaboration, with some even suggesting an emerging “joint discipline” to examine the compliance question and related issues.169

The compliance literature has followed three distinct explanatory pathways, each having origins in one of the historical roots of compliance theory.170 The first, not surprisingly, is a rationalistic instrumentalist strand that views international rules as instruments whereby states seek to attain their interests in wealth, power, and the like.171 International relations scholars such as Robert Keohane, Duncan Snidal,172 and Oran Young, and legal scholars such as Kenneth Abbott173 and John Setear,174 have applied increasingly sophisticated techniques of rational choice theory to argue that nation-states obey international law when it serves their short or long term self-interest to do so. Under this rationalistic account, pitched at the level of the international system, nations employ cooperative strategies to pursue a complex, multifaceted long-run national interest, in which compliance with negotiated legal norms serves as a winning long-term strategy in a reiterated “prisoner’s dilemma” game. While hard-core rationalists tend generally to embrace some

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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1996); Compliance with International Standards: Environmental Case Studies, 89 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 206 (1995). One measure of the growing interest in these matters is that the theme of the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law was the implementation, compliance, and effectiveness of international law.


170. See supra text accompanying notes 47-61.

171. See Keohane, supra note 149, at 2 (“The ‘instrumentalist optic’ puts little weight on a major theme of students of international law: the impact that shared norms, and the processes by which those norms are interpreted, have on state policies.”).


174. See, e.g., Setear, supra note 169 (arguing that law of treaties should encourage repeated interactions among nations to lead to international cooperation). But see Michael Byers, Response, Taking the Law out of International Law: A Critique of the “Iterative Perspective”, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 201, 203 (1997) (criticizing Setear’s “reductionism”).
A variant of Henkin’s “cynic’s formula,” the more sophisticated instrumentalists are willing to disaggregate the state into its component parts, to introduce international institutions and transnational actors, to incorporate notions of long-term self-interest, and to consider the issue within the context of massively iterated multiparty games.

A second explanatory pathway follows a Kantian, liberal vein. The Kantian thread divides into two identifiable strands: one based on Franck’s notion of rule-legitimacy, and another that makes more expansive claims for the causal role of national identity. “Liberal international relations” theorists, such as Andrew Moravcsik and Anne-Marie Slaughter, have argued that the determinative factor for whether nations obey can be found, not at a systemic level, but at the level of domestic structure. Under this view, compliance depends significantly on whether or not the state can be characterized as “liberal” in identity, that is, having a form of representative government, guarantees of civil and political rights, and a judicial system dedicated to the rule of law. Flipping the now-familiar Kantian maxim that “democracies don’t fight one another,” these theorists posit that liberal democracies are more likely to “do law” with one another, while relations between liberal and illiberal states will more likely transpire in a zone of politics.

The third strand is a “constructivist” strand, based broadly on notions of both identity-formation and international society. Unlike interest theorists, who tend to treat state interests as given, “constructivists” have long argued that states and their interests are socially constructed by “commonly held philosophic principles, identities, norms of behavior, or shared terms of discourse.” Rather than arguing that state actors and interests create rules

175. See, e.g., JOSEPH M. GRECO, COOPERATION AMONG NATIONS: EUROPE, AMERICA, AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE (1990); Krasner, supra note 34; see also HENKIN, supra note 10.
176. See, e.g., Keohane, supra note 149, at 4 (“Subtler instrumentalist arguments recognize that rules, as part of the environment faced by a state, exert an impact on state behavior” because “they alter incentives, not merely for states conceived of as units but for interest groups, organizations, members of professional associations, and individual policymakers within governments.”).
177. For a discussion of Franck’s rule-legitimacy argument, see supra text accompanying notes 142–48; and infra Section II.B.
179. FINNEMORE, supra note 54, at 15; see also INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 166, at 4–8, supra note 153. Leading constructivists include Friedrich Kratochwil, John Ruggie, Nicholas Onuf, Hayward Alker, Richard Ashley, Ernst Haas, and Alex Wendt. For samples of their work, see, for example, KRATOCHWIL, supra note 153; ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (forthcoming 1997); Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 384 (1994); and Alexander Wendt, Constructing International Politics, 20 INT’L SECURITY 71 (1995). For a recent, systematic treatment of norms from a constructivist perspective, see THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1995)
and norms, constructivists argue that "rules and norms constitute the international game by determining who the actors are, what rules they must follow if they wish to ensure that particular consequences follow from specific acts, and how titles to possessions can be established and transferred." Thus constructivists see norms as playing a critical role in the formation of national identities.

The predominantly American constructivist school has close familial ties to the English "international society" school of Grotian heritage. Like the constructivists (and unlike sophisticated instrumentalists), the international society scholars see the norms, values, and social structure of international society as helping to form the identity of actors who operate within it. Nations thus obey international rules not just because of sophisticated calculations about how compliance or noncompliance will affect their interests, but because a repeated habit of obedience remakes their interests so that they come to value rule compliance. In Andrew Hurrell's words, "[a] good deal of the compliance pull of international rules derives from the relationship between individual rules and the broader pattern of international relations: states follow specific rules, even when inconvenient, because they have a longer-term interest in the maintenance of law-impregnated international community."

Each of these explanatory threads has significant persuasive power, and strongly complements the others. Yet my own view, elaborated in Part III below, is that none of these approaches provides a sufficiently "thick" theory of the role of international law in promoting compliance with shared global norms. The short answer to the question, "Why do nations obey international law?" is not simply: "interest"; "identity"; "identity-formation"; and/or "international society." A complete answer must also account for the importance of interaction within the transnational legal process, interpretation of international norms, and domestic internalization of those norms as determinants of why nations obey. What is missing, in brief, is a modern version of the fourth historical strand of compliance theory—the strand based on transnational legal process.

Yet this claim, which is fleshed out below, begs two important questions. First, what is the current understanding of the process by which nations and other transnational actors promote compliance, and ultimately, obedience? Second, what determines the legitimacy of the norms that are internalized through this process? The Chayeses' managerial approach and Franck's fairness approach help answer these questions.

181. Modern scholars working in this vein include Andrew Hurrell, John Vincent, Barry Buzan, Gerritt Gong, Richard Little, and Michael Donelan.
182. Hurrell, supra note 73, at 59.
II. MANAGERIAL AND FAIRNESS APPROACHES

Both the Chayeses and Franck seek to throw off the realist paradigm in an effort to explain what role international law plays in the post-Cold War world in which we now live. Their books are important landmarks in the compliance debate and in important ways culminate the process and philosophical traditions to which they are heir. Each chooses to view the compliance question through a single analytic filter: management and fairness, respectively. Yet like all lenses, these filters clarify at the same time as they distort, simplifying at the cost of oversimplification. What do they see and what do they miss?

A. Compliance Without Enforcement: The Chayeses’ Managerial Approach

The New Sovereignty draws together the Chayeses’ vast practical life experience, as well as numerous threads pursued throughout their extensive teaching and writing about the architecture of international regimes and patterns of treaty compliance in the arms control and environmental fields. Deliberately both descriptive and prescriptive, the book seeks to describe how international regulation is accomplished through “treaty regimes.” The authors set as their goal a concise explanation of why certain kinds of treaty regimes succeed where others fail in promoting compliance with treaty norms.

Their framing chapter posits that three factors—efficiency, national interest, and regime norms—foster a general propensity for nation-states to comply with treaty rules. Why, then, do nations deviate from those rules? The Chayeses explain such noncompliance as stemming from the ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language, limitations on the capacity of parties to carry out their treaty undertakings, and what they call “the temporal dimension”: avoidable and unavoidable time lags between a state’s undertaking and its performance.

Yet given these impulses to noncompliance, how can deviance be contained within acceptable levels? The Chayeses derive and contrast two alternative strategies for promoting treaty compliance. They first develop an “enforcement” model, and after reviewing the various coercive devices available—treaty-based military and economic sanctions, membership, and


184. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 4, at 15.
unilateral sanctions—conclude that it is usually doomed to failure. They argue that “sanctioning authority is rarely granted by treaty, rarely used when granted, and likely to be ineffective when used.” Repeated use of sanctions entails high costs to the sanctioner and can raise serious problems of legitimacy.

As an alternative, they offer a “management” model, whereby national actors seek to promote compliance not through coercion but, rather, through a cooperative model of compliance, which seeks to induce compliance through interactive processes of justification, discourse, and persuasion. Sovereignty, they contend, no longer means freedom from external interference, but freedom to engage in international relations as members of international regimes. "The New Sovereignty" thus comprises not territorial control or governmental autonomy, but “status—the vindication of the state’s existence as a member of the international system.” Now, the impetus for compliance is not so much a nation’s fear of sanction, as it is fear of diminution of status through loss of reputation.

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185. See id. at 2–3 (arguing that political costs of imposing sanctions is high, therefore efforts to impose such sanctions will be intermittent and ad hoc, not systematic and even-handed, leading to deficiencies in legitimacy, for only weak states and not strong ones can be made to comply with their undertakings).

186. Id. at 32–33.

187. See id. at 54 (noting difficulty “of assembling and maintaining a coalition capable of and willing to apply forceful economic and military sanctions when costs and risks of intervention are high, results are uncertain, and impetus of American or other great-power leadership is lacking”). Treaty-based military and economic sanctions are almost never invoked, they find, for an organization’s decision actually to trigger a sanction may destroy the sanction if it fails to work. See id. at 85. Nor are membership sanctions often employed by international organizations because of the “membership dilemma”: Failure to sanction leaves the rogue member “in good standing while continuing to flout the regime,” while expulsion of an outlaw may leave it embarrassed but newly free to act without legal constraint. See id. at 74. Similarly, unilateral sanctions are employed infrequently and sporadically to redress violations of treaty obligations, and even when employed, rarely prove effective. See id. at 32.

188. See id. at 109–11.

189. Sovereignty, the Chayeses suggest, has nowadays become the residual category and international commitment the rule. “[W]hat we mean by the new sovereignty,” they conclude, is “that no single country, no matter how powerful, can consistently achieve its objectives through unilateral action or ad hoc coalition.” Id. at 123. This status is highly contingent upon a nation’s web of international ties and obligations. Cf. HART, supra note 71, at 305 (“Sovereignty is only a name given to so much of the international field as is left by law to the individual action of states.”).

190. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 4, at 27. They elaborate:

[F]or all but a few self-isolated nations, sovereignty no longer consists in the freedom of states to act independently, in their perceived self-interest, but in membership in reasonably good standing in the regimes that make up the substance of international life. . . . In today’s setting, the only way most states can realize and express their sovereignty is through participation in the various regimes that regulate and order the international system.

Id.

191. No state can blithely ignore international norms because “there are too many audiences, foreign and domestic, too many relationships present and potential, too many linkages to other issues to be ignored.” Id. at 119. Furthermore, “in the last analysis, the ability of a state to remain a participant in the international policy-making process—and thus its status as a member of the international system—depends in some degree on its demonstrated willingness to accept and engage the regime’s compliance procedures.” Id. at 230.
Given the contingent nature of the new sovereignty, how precisely do treaty regimes “manage” state compliance with international law? Here the Chayeses display their policy science heritage by giving functional, not philosophical, answers. They repeatedly suggest that an “iterative process” of “justificatory discourse” among regime members—good old-fashioned “jawboning,” not sanctions—is the principal method of inducing compliance with regime norms. Much like Roger Fisher’s 1981 monograph, the Chayeses close with a policymaker’s toolkit of devices designed to foster greater compliance with regime norms: “instruments of active management,” such as transparency, reporting and data collection, verification and monitoring, dispute settlement, capacity-building, and strategic review and assessment. With prudent use of these tools, they argue, nongovernmental and intergovernmental institutions can be revitalized as instruments of managing treaty compliance.

The Chayeses’ book is a classic refurbishment of international legal process. It is the most insightful and complete, transsubstantive description of the role of law in the international regulatory process currently available. It bristles with mini-case studies, cutting across the traditional realms of both private and public international law.

Yet for all of the book’s virtues, two questions linger. First, how, precisely, does a managerial approach to treaty compliance work? Second, what relevance, if any, does their managerial strategy have for the enforcement of the vast realm of customary, as opposed to treaty-based, international law?

The Chayeses’ managerial approach requires both a manager (the regime) and a process (the discourse). The authors correctly reject the simplistic depiction of the regime as “a switching system, facilitating the independent interactions of independent states” in favor of “the active role of the regime in modifying preferences, generating new options, persuading the parties to move toward increasing compliance with regime norms, and guiding the evolution of the normative structure in the direction of the overall objectives of the

192. See id. at 25.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 137–41.
194. Examples are drawn, inter alia, from use of force, economic sanctions, international trade, environmental law, maritime law, international transport and communications, human rights, nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, expropriation, international commodity agreements, labor, and sovereign debt reduction. The most interesting examples are drawn from the Chayeses’ rich experiential base as government and private lawyers participating in such incidents as the Cuban Missile Crisis. See CHAYES, supra note 86; the ABM Treaty controversy, see Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, Testing and Development of “Exotic” Systems Under the ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caper, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1956 (1986); and before the International Court of Justice, see Certain Expenses of the United States (Advisory Opinion), 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July 20), in which Abram Chayes appeared as agent for the United States; and Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), in which Abram Chayes appeared as agent against the United States. See also Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1445 (1983).
195. Or, as the Chayeses put it, a “discourse among states, international organizations, and, to some extent interested publics, elaborating the meaning of [treaty] norms.” CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 4, at 110.
regime."  The treaty regime manages an “interactive process for dealing with compliance” that proceeds in seven stages: (1) development of data about the situation and parties under regulation; (2) identification of behavior that raises significant compliance questions; (3) diagnosis of the sources of apparently deviant behavior; (4) examination of the noncomplying party’s capacity to carry out its obligations; (5) offers of technical assistance to redress any undercapacity; (6) the threat or invocation of dispute-settlement mechanisms; and (7) sometimes, the conclusion that the treaty norms themselves should be modified to accommodate the noncompliant conduct.

In so arguing, The New Sovereignty becomes strongly reminiscent of Abram Chayes’s classic article on domestic legal process, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation. There, Chayes the proceduralist argued that in the post-Brown era, domestic litigation had shifted from a retrospective, private law paradigm to a prospective, public law mode. Within the new paradigm, the judge sheds her passive and blinkered umpireal role in favor of an open-ended, managerial role, interpreting constitutive text, demanding and receiving information, declaring norms, and using broad supervisory equitable tools to persuade and prod the parties before her into legal compliance. The primary power of Chayes’s public law judge, like Richard Neustadt’s President, is the power to persuade, with the formal powers of legal office serving as leverage points and bargaining chips in a discursive, norm-creating process. In The New Sovereignty, the Chayeses similarly contend that the treaty regime has assumed a managerial role with regard to the compliance of its member states. Like public law litigation and the judges who manage it, “[t]he [regulatory] treaty and the regime in which it is embedded are best seen not as a set of prohibitory norms, but as institutions for the management of an issue area over time.”

In both cases, the key role of the overseer of the legal process—the judge in domestic litigation and the treaty regime in international regulation—is managing an interactive, dialectic process of justificatory discourse, in which norms are invoked, interpreted, and elaborated in a way that generates pressure for compliance.

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196. Id. at 229.
197. See generally id. at 109–286.
200. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 4, at 228.
201. See id. at 112 (“The essence of the international legal process is a dialectic that, by emphasizing assent at every stage, operates to generate pressure for compliance.”); id. at 123 (“The discursive elaboration and application of treaty norms is the heart of the compliance process.”); id. at 231 (stating that treaty process has evolved from “review and assessment of past discrete actions to the shaping of future plans, policies, and programs”). Indeed, the Chayeses even analogize the managerial process to a lawsuit, arguing that the formal structure of the discourse [within the treaty regime] may be compared to that of a lawsuit, in which the claims and defenses of the parties are stated serially, exchanges of
While appealing on one level, the managerial model seems incomplete in four respects. First, by emphasizing the power of the managerial model and the weakness of the enforcement model, the Chayeses create the false impression that the two are alternatives. In fact, they strongly complement one another. The public law litigation model succeeds not just because the parties talk through the judge, but because the judge wields the power of ultimate sanction. In treaty regimes, the managerial model similarly succeeds not just because of the power of discourse, but also because of the possibility of or "shadow of" sanctions, however remote that prospect might be. As I elaborate in Part III, a fuller picture is needed of the range of possible institutional interaction that can trigger discourse among the parties to a treaty regime, thus leading to norm-enunciation, settlement, compliance, and eventually obedience.

Second, the Chayeses suggest that the ultimate impetus for compliance comes from fear not of sanction, but of loss of reputation. But as they elsewhere recognize, this loss of reputation will not occur unless the noncomplying party defies a mutually accepted interpretation of the treaty norm. Indeed, a key function of the treaty regime is to serve as a definitive interpreter of regime norms. Much as the public law judge construes a statute, the regime interprets the treaty to see if a violation has occurred. Yet with respect to many norms of international law, in areas such as international human rights, the interpretive community that determines whether a norm has been violated is far larger than just the nation-states who are parties to the treaty. Take, for example, the global norm against

"pleadings" and pretrial procedures narrow and refine the issues, and the resulting framework limits both the scope of the argument and the range of relevant proof.

Id. at 122.


204. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 4, at 120 (noting that in treaty context, "[t]he parties have agreed in advance to the standards by which the conduct is to be judged: the text not only identifies relevant norms but also provides an authoritative formulation for them").

205. See id. at 118 (suggesting that "interpretation, elaboration, application, and ultimately, enforcement of international rules is accomplished through a process of (mostly verbal) interchange among the interested parties"); id. at 123 ("The dynamic of justification is the search for a common understanding of the significance of the norm in the specific situation presented."). Nor does a norm have any prospective power unless it is clearly enunciated and plausibly interpreted by a forum whose interpretation is entitled to political deference.

206. See Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 202, at 45 (contending that in creation of legal meaning, interpretive "community posits a law, external to itself, that it is committed to obeying and that it does obey in dedication to its understanding of that law"); Nadelmann, supra note 50, at 479-86 (describing how interpretive communities build "global prohibition regimes" which "amount to more than the sum of the unilateral acts, bilateral relationships and international conventions that constitute them")

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genocide. Although the state parties to the United Nations Convention on the subject (the treaty regime) may have authority to construe its words, that authority does not also give them exclusive authority definitively to interpret the contours of the broader norm. Other credible interpreters of the norms of genocide are domestic, regional, and international courts; ad hoc tribunals; domestic and regional legislatures; executive entities (such as the U.N. Security Council or the President of the United States); international publicists; and nongovernmental organizations. In short, the norm's "interpretive regime," that is, those who interpret and elaborate upon the meaning of the norm, often embraces a far larger and more complex group than those institutions and parties that comprise the treaty regime.

Third, the Chayeses' process picture omits any detailed description of how the member states internalize the constraining norms. It says nothing about means such as judicial incorporation, legislative embodiment, or executive acceptance, by which a complying state will signal its internal acceptance of the relevant international standard. As the authors recognize, the process of treaty compliance must be understood as a two-level game, in which a member's relations with its treaty partners occur on an international chessboard, and its bargaining about compliance with its internal domestic

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207. The norm against genocide, for example, is set forth in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force for the United States, on Feb. 23, 1989) [hereinafter Genocide Convention]; but also has been implemented by the United States Congress in a statute, the Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (1994); been construed by a U.S. federal appellate court, see Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); been condemned by the U.N. General Assembly, see G.A. Res. 96 (I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., pt. 2 at 188–89, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946); been the subject of U.N. Security Council Resolution 827, which established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, see U.N. SCOR, 3217 mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); been the subject of a number of indictments and arrest warrants before that tribunal, see International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: International Arrest Warrants and Orders for Surrender for Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić (July 11, 1996), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 92 (1997); been made the subject of an ongoing suit before the International Court of Justice, see Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serbia & Montenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Order of Sept. 13); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serbia & Montenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. 3 (Order of Apr. 8); and is the concern of numerous human rights organizations as well as the subject of massive examination by various official and quasi-official scholarly groups, see, e.g., Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility provisionally adopted by the International Law Commission, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 32 (1980); 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 36, at § 702 reporter's note 3.

208. The Chayeses recognize this when they broadly define a treaty regime as "a hugely complex interactive process that engages not only states and their official representatives but also, increasingly, international organizations and their staffs, nongovernmental organizations, scientists, business managers, academics, and other nonstate actors, and that . . . penetrates deeply into domestic politics." CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 4, at x.

209. Although the Chayeses are themselves experts on the nature and functioning of domestic courts, ironically, their discussion of the "instruments of active management" says nothing about the role that domestic courts—for example, those U.S. courts construing the Alien Tort Statute—can play as enforcers and internalizers of international norms. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that Paraguayan human rights victims may sue Paraguayan official under Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, in U.S. court for civil damages arising from official torture).
Why Do Nations Obey International Law?

constituencies transpires on a domestic chessboard. Yet the Chayeses do not closely examine how the transnational legal link between the domestic and international levels operates, even though it is that very link that often determines the extent to which the "managerial process" of interstate bargaining at the global level will actually reshape the national interests and identities of the participants. As I elaborate below, a greater focus on internalization would have allowed the Chayeses to apply their procedural and managerial insights outside the realm of positive, treaty-based law to the vast and growing realm of customary and declarative international law.

Fourth and finally, by focusing so intensely on process, the Chayeses pass too lightly over the substance of the rules being enforced by the managerial process. Yet all treaties are not created equal. Nor is securing greater compliance with treaties always good per se. Indeed, securing compliance may even be undesirable if the treaties are themselves unfair or enshrine disingenuous or coercive bargains. Cognizant of this critique, the Chayeses concede that the "legitimacy" of their managerial approach depends on the procedural fairness, equal and nondiscriminatory application, and substantive fairness and equity of the rules being applied. But what remains unspecified is precisely how the process should account for such fairness considerations. By what means can managerial processes be adjusted to improve compliance with underenforced treaties with which states may have low incentives to comply (for example, human rights treaties), and by what means should unfair or illegitimate regime norms be rendered unenforceable? It is on this linchpin of "fairness," understood both as "legitimacy" and as distributive justice, that Franck's book appropriately turns.

B. Legitimacy and Distributive Justice: Franck's Fairness Approach

The question posed by Thomas Franck's magnum opus, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, is not "Why do nations obey?" but "Is international law fair?" Franck asks that question against a background assumption that nations have little incentive or obligation to obey rules that fail

210. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 4, at 201-07.
211. Cf. Robert D. Putnam's influential Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988). I am suggesting that the Chayeses could and should have devoted more analysis to the logic and interaction of two-level legal, as opposed to diplomatic and political, games
212. See infra Part III.
213. This is the most common critique of process-based theories. See, e.g., Laurence H Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J 1063 (1980)
214. States may have greater incentives to comply with some treaties, but greater obligations to comply with others, for example, those enforcing jus cogens norms.
215. They specifically acknowledge that "fairness considerations can hardly fail to play a major role in [the discursive] process." CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 4, at 127.
216. FRANCK, supra note 6, at 6.
his fairness criteria. In his universe, illegitimate rules have little “compliance pull.”

Like The New Sovereignty, which grew out of the Chayeses’ earlier work on international legal process, Fairness must also be read in light of its intellectual progenitor, Franck’s influential The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations. Like the Chayeses, Franck emphasizes the transformation of international law since World War II, which has accompanied the transformation of sovereignty. Yet unlike the Chayeses, Franck does not restrict his gaze to treaty-based law, reviewing as well the power of customary rules. Because international law has entered its “post-ontological age,” Franck optimistically asserts, we no longer must defend its existence and can afford to look to its content to evaluate whether existing rules of law are effective, enforceable, understood, and fair. Although the core of Franck’s answer remains Kantian liberalism, his argument draws eclectically upon each of the dominant historical strands of compliance reasoning.

Like the rationalists, Franck acknowledges that nations obey rules when the benefits of complying exceed the costs. But like international society theorists, he sees a transnational actor’s impulse to comply as deriving not from a multitude of cost-benefit calculations regarding particular rules, but as more broadly rooted in the solidaristic, “communitarian peer pressure” that nations feel as members of a club. Moreover, like the constructivists, Franck accepts the power of norms to reshape national interests. Finally, like process theorists, Franck sees the legitimacy of rules as largely dependent upon state perceptions of whether they were promulgated in accord with accepted principles of fair process. Like the Chayeses, Franck embraces what one might call “the discourse discourse,” understanding international law more as a process than as a system of rules, whose fairness is determined by a “process of discourse, reasoning, and negotiation.”

217. FRANCK, supra note 7. Indeed, Fairness’s opening and closing theoretical chapters draw directly from the analysis in Legitimacy.

218. See FRANCK, supra note 6, at 3 (“Sovereignty has historically been a factor greatly overrated in international relations.”); id. at 4 (noting “concomitant opportunity and challenge: not only to assess the extent to which international law has modified ‘sovereign’ state behavior, but also to examine critically whether this advance represents genuine progress, and how ‘progress’ is to be measured”).

219. As Franck has recently observed, the international system is “the progenitor of a vast amount of specialized law that has very little to do with the law of international organizations or the constitutional law of the global system.” Thomas M. Franck, Book Review, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 519, 519 (1996).

220. See FRANCK, supra note 6, at 6, 9 (arguing that new maturity and complexity of international law call for more thoroughgoing critique of its content and consequences); id. at 11 (noting that “moment is ripe for fairness discourse”).

221. International “[o]bligation,” he asserts, is “uniquely rooted in the notion of community.” FRANCK, supra note 7, at 196; id. (“Nations, or those who govern them, recognize that the obligation to comply is owed by them to the community of states as the reciprocal of that community’s validation of their nations’ statehood.”). Cf. INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 166, at 21 n.10 (suggesting that Franck “arguably fits within the International Society approach”).

222. See FRANCK, supra note 6, at 7.

223. Id. at 14. Franck acknowledges that “much of the attempt at interaction is discursive: an interlocutory process of exhortation, expiation, explanation, and exposition.” Id. at 477; see also Franck,
Yet while the Chayeses volume is a quintessential exercise in applied legal process theory, Franck's book fundamentally represents applied Rawlsian philosophy, with occasional policy recommendations sprinkled throughout. The most controversial aspect of Franck's *Legitimacy* analysis came in his prior effort to deal with the issue of justice in international law. Responding to early critics, Franck's final chapter, entitled "Why Not Justice?," applied the methodology of Rawls' theory of justice to international law and concluded that justice among nations cannot be constructed by analogy to the Rawlsian original position. Legitimacy, not justice, he reasoned, should be the prime goal of an international rule system. "[L]egitimacy, which is about process, has its own morality," and is unlike "the moral order manifest in justice, because it is a belief in right process rather than in right (substantive) outcomes."

Franck's "denial of justice" aroused considerable criticism, particularly from other Kantian analysts, who charged that he had privileged barren process values and the appearance of legitimacy over Rawls' own ideal of justice as fairness. In *Fairness*, Franck finally revisits the question, and takes a more adventurous course. Following *Legitimacy*, Franck isolates two aspects of fairness: his prior concept of legitimacy, or "right process" in the creation and enforcement of rules, and a substantive Rawlsian notion of distributive justice. These two aspects of fairness, he notes, are frequently in tension: The former favors the status quo, while the latter favors change. Franck then uses this bifocal concept of fairness as his analytical filter to unveil a large body of international law doctrine and institutions.

Franck examines the procedural and institutional structures of the United Nations, including the Secretary General, the role of the Security Council, and the International Court of Justice, under the rubric of procedural

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219. supra note 219, at 519 ("Above all, this system . . . is a process.")
224. See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 6, at 483-84 (recommending "modest proposal" to reform U.N General Assembly into two-chamber forum in which one chamber is constituted as present, and the other is elected by proportional universal suffrage).
226. FRANCK, supra note 7, at 288 n.545. Franck reasoned that the Rawlsian analysis sensibly applies only to persons, not states. See id. at 233. The existence of different values and radically different conceptions of right, he concluded, made it imperative to postpone considerations of justice, and to establish the "lexical priority of legitimacy over justice." Id. at 236; see also Franck & Hawkins, supra note 225, at 161 ("[L]egitimacy of a rule or principle does not necessarily ensure its justice, and conversely, the justice of a rule need not correlate with its degree of legitimacy.").
227. See, e.g., Tesón, supra note 45, at 93-99. Franck's earlier work was criticized for excluding considerations of justice from the definition of legitimacy. See Georgiev, supra note 150, at 555 (stating that Franck's approach "runs the danger of equating legitimacy with effectiveness")
229. For prior Franck work on the Permanent Court of the International Justice and the World Court, see THOMAS M. FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT (1986) [hereinafter FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT]; THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE STRUCTURE OF IMPARTIALITY: EXAMINING THE RIDDLE OF ONE LAW
fairness, in a manner resembling the generic process examination found in the Chayeses book. The substantive international law rules of equity, self-determination and territoriality, war and collective security, environmental law, trade and development, and international investment, by contrast, Franck presents and criticizes by reference to their effectiveness as agents of distributive justice.230

Like The New Sovereignty, Fairness shows a remarkable mastery of the divergent public and private fields of global law.231 As one might expect from a synthetic treatise of this type, various chapters derive from earlier important work.232 Despite undeniable defects,233 taken as a whole, Franck’s volume admirably mirrors and complements the Chayeses’ approach. Indeed, Franck displays depth precisely in the substantive issues that the Chayeses skirt and less rigor in the process area that is their forte. Fairness shows a striking shift and expansion in Franck’s thinking—from legitimacy to fairness—in an effort to try to find an ever broader rubric through which to understand international rules. For if Legitimacy was fundamentally positivistic and process-oriented, focused on developing a test to assess the compliance pull of international norms as a function of their perceived procedural legitimacy, Fairness deliberately invokes Kant, Rawls, and Dworkin in an effort to tackle normative questions, and to hazard opinions on emerging substantive issues of distributive justice.

IN A FRAGMENTED WORLD (1968) [hereinafter FRANCK, THE STRUCTURE OF IMPARTIALITY].

230. FRANCK, supra note 6, at 351–473.

231. Franck was formerly Director of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), served as counsel for Chad in the Libya-Chad case before the International Court of Justice, and is currently counsel for Bosnia in the Bosnia-Yugoslavia case before the International Court. As director of the Center for International Studies at New York University School of Law, Franck has organized regular seminars with United Nations officials on a wide range of substantive international law problems. In the same way as the Chayeses’ volume reveals their practical background as U.S. government lawyers and policy officials, Franck’s sharp observations about the strengths and weaknesses of the United Nations system evoke his past as a U.N. insider and advocate before the International Court of Justice.

232. For example, chapter 6 on the U.N. Secretary-General borrows from Thomas M. Franck, The Good Offices Function of the U.N. Secretary-General, in UNITED NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD (Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingzley eds., rev. ed. 1993); FRANCK, supra note 228, at ch. 7 (“The Secretary General Invents Himself”), id. at ch. 8 (“Filling the Void: Action by the Secretary General in the face of inaction by everyone else”). Chapter 10 on the International Court of Justice similarly draws on FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT, supra note 229; and FRANCK, THE STRUCTURE OF IMPARTIALITY, supra note 229. Chapter 4 on the Democratic Entitlement draws on Franck’s pathbreaking 1992 piece, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 Am. J. INT’L L. 46 (1992), which places his work squarely in the tradition of Kant’s To Perpetual Peace. See supra text accompanying notes 44–46.

233. Fairness’s philosophical analysis at times borrows too heavily from the work of Franck’s NYU colleague Ronald Dworkin. See FRANCK, supra note 6, at 45. It says relatively little, for example, about human rights, almost nothing about refugees and regionalism in international trade, and too little about emerging questions of ethnic conflict, all dominating features of the post-Cold War world. The last topic, however, is the focus of Franck’s current research. See Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan Loyalty, Identity, and Community in Law and Practice, 90 Am. J. INT’L L. 359 (1996). Moreover, the Hague Academy “General Course” format creates inevitable stylistic awkwardness, as each chapter opens by briefly addressing the fairness theme before venturing off into a new and discrete doctrinal realm. One senses, accurately, that the core theory has been worked out elsewhere, and summarized at the start of each chapter as a necessary prologue to bring the slower students up to speed.
Unfortunately, for all the range and force of Franck's substantive discussion, his description of why a discursive process adds to the obligatory force of norms is even less well-specified than the Chayeses' account. Apart from the various fora created by the United Nations and its attendant institutions, Franck says little about the various modes of institutional interaction that lead to interpretation of norms in a post-ontological age. Although Franck, too, is a bona fide expert on the foreign relations law of the United States, and the role of domestic courts and other institutions in the transnational order, he also declines to illuminate here the mode by which international norms are internalized into, or otherwise interpenetrate, domestic legal systems.

"If a decision has been reached by a discursive synthesis of legitimacy and justice," Franck argues, "it is more likely to be implemented and less likely to be disobeyed." But why is this so? By what process does this "implementation" take place, and how does this "discursive synthesis" end up modifying the incentives and priorities of transnational actors? In the end, I believe, the missing causal element is neither management nor fairness, but transnational legal process.

III. TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS

Despite their methodological differences, both Franck and the Chayeses ultimately reach the same intuitive answer to why nations obey. If our goal is better enforcement of global rules, they reason, voluntary obedience, not coerced compliance, must be the preferred enforcement mechanism. If nations internally "perceive" a rule to be fair, says Franck, they are more likely to obey it. If nations must regularly justify their actions to treaty partners in terms of treaty norms, suggest the Chayeses, it is more likely that those nations will "voluntarily" comply with those norms. Both analyses suggest that the key

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235. FRANCK, supra note 6, at 481.

236. Not surprisingly, this is also the conclusion reached by social psychologists who study why individuals obey the law. See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 13 (concluding, after extensive empirical study, that people comply with law not so much because they fear punishment as because they feel that legal authorities are legitimate); see also id. at 4 (urging authorities who seek to promote voluntary compliance with laws to apply "[a] normative perspective [which] leads to a focus on people's internalized norms of justice and obligation," rather than "an instrumental perspective [which] regards compliance as a form of behavior occurring in response to external factors"); cf. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 126 n.8 (1991) ("Whatever the origin of self-enforced moral rules, there is broad agreement that the overall system of social control must depend vitally on achieving cooperation through self-enforcement."); id. at 132 ("A person who has 'internalized' a social norm is by definition committed to self-enforcement of a rule . . . ."); ROBERT C. ELICKSON, BRINGING CULTURE AND HUMAN FRAILTY TO RATIONAL ACTORS: A CRITIQUE OF CLASSICAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 44 (1989) (arguing that primary system of social control is "first-party system of social control that would operate without external enforcers").
to better compliance is more *internalized* compliance, or what I have called *obedience*. But by what process does norm-internalization occur? How do we transform occasional or grudging compliance with global norms into habitual obedience?

As I have already suggested, such a process can be viewed as having three phases.237 One or more transnational actors provokes an *interaction* (or series of interactions) with another, which forces an *interpretation* or enunciation of the global norm applicable to the situation. By so doing, the moving party seeks not simply to coerce the other party, but to *internalize* the new interpretation of the international norm into the other party's internal normative system. The aim is to "bind" that other party to obey the interpretation as part of its internal value set. Such a transnational legal process is normative, dynamic, and constitutive. The transaction generates a legal rule which will guide future transnational interactions between the parties; future transactions will further internalize those norms; and eventually, repeated participation in the process will help to reconstitute the interests and even the identities of the participants in the process.238

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Reinterpretation Debate represents one recent example of this phenomenon from United States foreign policy.239 To simplify a complex story, in 1972, the United States and the U.S.S.R. signed the bilateral Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty), which expressly banned the development of space-based systems for the territorial defense of our country.240 Thirteen years later, in October 1985, the Reagan Administration proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly called "Star Wars," which amounted to a space-based antiballistic missile system for American territorial defense. To skirt the plain language of the

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237. What follows is a necessarily sketchy view of my position, which will be fleshed out in much greater detail in my forthcoming book. That book will sketch a broader theory of compliance with international law, treating the various explanations described above as complementary, not competitive. The book will seek to specify: (1) what constitutes "compliance" with international law; (2) the various factors that influence compliance (such as level, magnitude, and complexity of interaction among actors, variety of actors and interests involved, receptivity of different societies to internalization of international norms, and so forth); (3) a causal mechanism (such as internalization and institutionalization of norms) whereby these factors will produce or fail to produce compliance in particular situations; and (4) predictions that follow if the theory is correct (for example, the form and content of the norms and actions that will emerge). The argument will necessarily span both a wide range of disciplines, including game theory, international relations theory, political economy, and sociological and anthropological theories of legal compliance; and a range of contextual settings, such as international trade, human rights, environment, arms control, and peacekeeping.

238. Upon examination, this process explanation comports with both the Chayeses' managerial approach and Franck's fairness approach. The "discursive process" to which the Chayeses refer is simply a multiply iterated version of the transactional approach I describe. Moreover, the parties to the transaction will typically view an internalized rule that emerges from such a process with the "internal" sense of fairness and legitimacy that Franck deems necessary for that rule to have "compliance pull."


240. For a detailed analysis of the text and purpose of the ABM treaty, see Chayes & Chayes, *supra* note 194.
ABM Treaty, the Reagan Administration proposed to "reinterpret" it to permit SDI, essentially amending the treaty without the consent of either the Senate or the Soviet Union. That decision triggered an eight-year battle in which numerous present and former government officials, including six former Secretaries of Defense and numerous key Senators (principally Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee),
241 rallied in support of the original treaty interpretation. One key player in the fight against the ABM treaty reinterpretation was Gerard C. Smith, the chief American negotiator at SALT I and principal negotiator of the ABM Treaty, who chaired the boards of two influential nongovernmental organizations, the Arms Control Association and the National Committee to Save the ABM Treaty.242

The ABM controversy raged in many fora: Senate hearings, debates over other arms control treaties, journal articles, and op-ed columns. In the end, Congress withheld appropriations from SDI tests that did not conform with the treaty; the Senate reported the ABM Treaty Interpretation Resolution, which reaffirmed its original understanding of the treaty; and in 1988 the Senate attached a condition to the Intermediate-Range Missile Treaty, which specified that the United States would interpret the treaty in accordance with the understanding shared by the President and the Senate at the time of advice and consent.243 In response, the Reagan and Bush Administrations maintained that their broad reinterpretation was "legally correct," but announced that they would comply with the original understanding as a matter of "policy." In 1993, the episode ended, when President Clinton repudiated the unilateral Reagan reinterpretation and announced that his administration would abide by the original ABM treaty interpretation.244

None of this legal dispute reached any court. Indeed, had one stopped tracing the process of the dispute in 1987, one might have concluded that the United States had violated the treaty and gotten away with it. But in the end, the ABM Treaty Reinterpretation Debate demonstrates how the world's most

244. During a May 1993 hearing on the START II Treaty, the then-Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked the Acting Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency whether the Clinton Administration held the position that the narrow interpretation was the proper and legally correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty. In a written response for the record, the Acting Director sent the Chairman the following statement:

It is the position of the Clinton Administration that the "narrow" or "traditional" interpretation of the ABM Treaty is the correct interpretation and therefore that the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems and components without regard to the technology utilized.

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Traditional Interpretation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Endorsed by Clinton Administration (July 14, 1993) (press release, on file with author)
powerful nation, the United States, returned to compliance with international law.

Standing alone, neither interest, identity, or international society provides sufficient explanation for why the United States government obeyed the original ABM Treaty interpretation. Presumably, the U.S. national interest in deploying SDI remained roughly the same under either legal interpretation, as did the liberal identity of the American polity. If the response of international society, in the form of allies’ and treaty partners’ resistance to the reinterpretation, was not enough to block the reinterpretation in 1985, it is unclear why that resistance should have become overwhelming by 1993.

In my view, a transnational legal process explanation provides the missing link. Transnational actors such as a U.S. Senator (Sam Nunn), a private “norm entrepreneur” (Gerard Smith), and several nongovernmental organizations (the Arms Control Association and the National Committee to Save the ABM Treaty) formed an “epistemic community” to address the legal issue. That community mobilized elite and popular constituencies and provoked a series of interactions with the U.S. government in a variety of fora. They challenged the Administration’s broad reinterpretation of the treaty norm with the original narrow interpretation in both public and private settings, and succeeded in internalizing the narrow interpretation into several legislative products. In the end, the executive branch responded by internalizing that interpretation into its own official policy statement. Thus, the episode proved normative (or to use Robert Cover’s term, “jurisgenerative”) and constitutive of U.S. national interests supporting the original ABM treaty interpretation. In this dynamic process, the episode established a precedent for the next debate over the antiballistic missile issue, which may arise again during the second Clinton term.

245. See supra note 53 (defining this term).

246. Peter Haas has defined an epistemic community as a “network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.” Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (1992). Haas’s Introduction leads off a volume of ten articles that explore the role that various epistemic communities play in the making and coordination of international policy.

247. See Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 202, at 40 (describing “jurisgenerative process” as one in which real interpretive “communities do create law and do give meaning to law through their narratives and precepts”); see also Cover, Violence and the Word, supra note 202, at 1602 n.2 (arguing that legal interpretation or “the creation of legal meaning is an essentially cultural activity which takes place (or best takes place) among smallish groups”); cf. Albert S. Yee, The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies, 50 INT’L ORG. 69, 94–101 (1996) (making similar point with respect to intersubjective meanings of language among members of community).

248. For a fascinating parallel case study of how norm entrepreneurs and norms reconstituted U.S. interests with respect to South Africa, see Klotz, supra note 135, which states that “[t]ransnational anti-apartheid activists’ extraordinary success in generating great power sanctions against South Africa offer ample evidence that norms, independent of material considerations, are an important factor in determining states’ policies.” Id. at 451.

249. During the last Congress, the Defense of America Act was introduced, which would once again have authorized Congress to select and deploy an antiballistic missile system. Through filibuster,
This example reveals that the various theoretical explanations offered for compliance are complementary, not mutually exclusive. In his classic statement of neorealism, *Man, the State and War*, Kenneth Waltz posited three levels of analysis, or "images," at which international relations could be explained: the international system (systemic); the state (domestic politics); and the individuals and groups who make up the state (psychological/bureaucratic). These images are not mutually exclusive, but sit atop one another like a layer cake; thus, interest and international society theorists seek to explain compliance primarily at the level of the international system, while identity theorists seek to explain it at the level of domestic political structure. Transnational legal process analysts, by contrast, seek to supplement these explanations with reasons for compliance that are found at a *transactional* level: interaction, interpretation, and internalization of international norms into domestic legal structures. While the interest, identity, and international society approaches all provide useful insights, none, jointly or severally, provides a sufficiently thick explanation of compliance with international obligations.

Instrumentalist interest theories, by specifying variables such as payoffs and costs of compliance, discount rates, and transactions costs, seek to reduce complex habits and patterns of compliance into a large reiterated game-theoretic, in which all societies are the same and decisionmakers respond only to sanctions, not norms. The theory works best in such global issue areas as trade and arms control law, where nation-states remain the primary players, but essentially misses the transnational revolution. Not surprisingly, interest theory has thus far shown relatively little explanatory power in such areas as human rights, environmental law, debt restructuring, or international commercial transactions, where nonstate actors abound, pursue multiple goals in complex nonzero-sum games, and interact repeatedly within

Democratic opponents prevented the bill from reaching the Senate floor, but it may yet resurface during the second Clinton term. *See Does America Need a Missile Defense?*, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 5, 1996, at 6 (detailing views of various defense experts debating the need for such system). Significantly, however, the debate has now shifted away from the question whether the ABM Treaty should be reinterpreted to whether the United States should withdraw from the treaty in order to deploy an ABM system, a mark of the jurisgenerative power of the earlier reinterpretation episode.


253. *See Risse-Kappen, supra note 121, at 7 (arguing that domestic structures and international institutionalization interact in determining ability of transnational actors to effect policy change).
informal regimes.\textsuperscript{254}

Similarly, "liberal" identity theory, in my view, has missed the \textit{neomonist} revolution represented by both human rights and international commercial law. Its essentialist analysis treats a state's identity as somehow exogenously or permanently given. Yet as constructivist scholars have long recognized, national identities, like national interests, are socially constructed products of learning, knowledge, cultural practices, and ideology.\textsuperscript{255} Nations such as South Africa, Poland, Argentina, Chile, and the Czech Republic are neither permanently liberal nor illiberal, but make transitions back and forth from dictatorship to democracy, prodded by norms and regimes of international law.\textsuperscript{256} Identity analysis leaves unanswered the critical, constructivist question: To what extent does compliance with international law itself help \textit{constitute the identity} of a state as a law-abiding state, and hence, as a "liberal" state?\textsuperscript{257} Furthermore, the notion that "only liberal states do law with one another" can be empirically falsified, particularly in areas such as international commercial law, where states tend to abide fastidiously by international rules without regard to whether they are representative democracies.\textsuperscript{258} Moreover, like the discredited "cultural relativist" argument in human rights,\textsuperscript{259} the claim that nonliberal states somehow do not participate in a zone of law denies the universalism of international law and effectively condones the confinement of nonliberal states to a realist world of power politics.

A constructivist, international society approach at least recognizes the positive transformational effects of repeated participation in the legal

\textsuperscript{254} See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 4, at 123 (noting new prominence on international agenda of "the environment and human rights—"third wave" issues that do not yield so readily to the calculus of power and interest, in contrast to "first and second wave" preoccupation with physical and economic security").

\textsuperscript{255} See, e.g., \textit{The Culture of National Security}, supra note 179; FINNEMORE, supra note 54; WENDT, supra note 179.

\textsuperscript{256} For numerous illustrations of how this occurs, see generally the case studies presented in \textit{The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas} (Laurence Whitehead ed., 1996).

\textsuperscript{257} See Klotz, supra note 135, at 478 ("Constructivist theory argues that global norms are part of the explanation for the definition of state and individual interests.").

\textsuperscript{258} An example is the uniform execution of transnational letters of credit around the world under the "new law merchant." See Harold J. Berman, \textit{World Law}, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1617, 1620 (1995). He states:

The exporters and importers of the world, the shipowners of the world, the bankers of the world, the marine insurance underwriters of the world, and others associated with them... form a world community that, over the centuries, has made, and continues to make, the law by which their various types of transactions are governed.


process. But it does not isolate, much less fully account for, the
importance of process factors that arise, not merely from the existence of
international community, but from countless iterated transactions within it. As
governmental and nongovernmental transnational actors repeatedly interact
within the transnational legal process, they generate and interpret international
norms and then seek to internalize those norms domestically. To the extent that
those norms are successfully internalized, they become future determinants of
why nations obey. The international society theorists seem to recognize that
this process occurs, but have given little close study to the "transmission belt,"
whereby norms created by international society infiltrate into domestic
society.

These explanations can be used together as complementary conceptual
lenses to give a richer explanation of why compliance with international law
does or does not occur in particular cases. Take, for example, a recent episode
in the evolving Middle East peace process: the signing of the 1997 Hebron
disengagement agreement. As opposition leader of Israel's right-wing Likud
party, Benjamin Netanyahu had pledged never to meet Palestinian Authority
leader Yasser Arafat. Netanyah declared himself unalterably opposed to
the extension of Palestinian sovereignty and ran for and won the Prime
Ministership on a platform opposing any negotiation with the Palestinians. In
particular, he denounced as "failed" the so-called Oslo Accords, a series of
peace agreements signed by the Labor government starting in 1993. Even after
those accords were concluded, Netanyahu urged their abrogation and even led
street protests against the signing of further Oslo agreements. Yet
remarkably, as Prime Minister of Israel in January 1997, Netanyahu completed
and implemented an agreement with Arafat and the Palestinian Authority called
for by the Oslo accords: to redeploy Israeli troops from the Arab sections of
the West Bank town of Hebron. Yet under Netanyahu's leadership, a Likud-

260. See, e.g., Hurrell, supra note 73, at 59.
261. See Judith Colp Rubin, Diverging Roads: Hard Line to Cross, JERUSALEM POST, May 23, 1996,
at 11 (stating that Netanyahu had "vowed never to meet with Palestinian Authority head Yasser Arafat,
whom he branded as a murderer").
263. See, e.g., Sarah Honig, Netanyahu: Elections Are Referendum for Peace, JERUSALEM POST, Mar.
20, 1996, at 1 (reporting Netanyahu speech to Likud central committee, in which he stated that "[t]he Oslo
case is what failed"); Sarah Honig, Netanyahu: Likud Won't Honor Oslo Since PLO Has Breached
Agreement, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 4, 1994, at 1 (reporting Netanyahu statement that future Likud
leader government would not honor Oslo); Herb Keinon & Liat Collins, Zion Square Flooded with Oslo 2
Protesters, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 6, 1995, at 1 (reporting Netanyahu address to Jerusalem crowd of 30,000
protesters against Oslo II accord).
264. See Serge Schmemann, Mideast Accord: The Overview, Netanyahu and Arafat Agree on Israeli
265. See Serge Schmemann, Mideast Accord: The Implications, A Softening of the Hawk, N Y TIMES,
agreement that was signed here today is a complete capitulation by Benjamin Netanyahu.") Science
Minister Ze'ev Begin resigned from Netanyahu's cabinet immediately following the Cabinet's 11 to 7
led coalition of religious and nationalist conservatives acquiesced in a process that they had fiercely resisted for nearly four years.

Why did Israel choose to obey the Oslo accords? Interest, identity, and international society each provide parts of the explanation. Before becoming Prime Minister, Netanyahu had expressed his doubts as to whether continued extension of power to the Palestinian authority served any Israeli interest. Yet Oslo brought economic benefits to Israel in the form of foreign investment and improved relations with Europe and moderate Arab states. Once the Oslo process began, it came to involve other actors besides Israel and the Palestinians, most significantly the United States, Jordan, and Egypt. These countries developed strong expectations that Oslo provided the only framework within which peace could be achieved and greeted Netanyahu's early attempts to back away from Oslo with strong pressure and criticism. Thus, Israel's entry into an "international society," not just with the Palestinians, but with other nations committed to the peace process, helped to reshape and reconstitute its national interests.

Once this interest-shaping process began, the relative openness of Israel's liberal democratic society created multiple channels to spur it forward: through public opinion, the news media, and other mechanisms of public accountability faced daily by Netanyahu and his party. As important, the transnational approval of the Hebron accord, charging that Netanyahu had "ceded the historic 'Jewish homeland.'"

David Makovsky & Jon Immanuel, Knesset to Vote on Hebron Pact Today; Cabinet Passes Accord, Begin Quits, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 16, 1997, at 1. According to one commentator:

To say yes to Hebron, Mr. Netanyahu had to jettison 50 years of revisionist orthodoxy about the indivisibility of the Land of Israel. He had to renounce his own previous writings and speeches, to break ideologically with the father he venerates, to alienate the West Bank settlers who helped elect him and to infuriate many in his Likud Party.


266. Bruck, supra note 262, at 84.

267. As one reporter noted, Israel has much more to lose today than it did when it was a quasi-pariah state in the early '90s.

In the wake of Oslo, it now has relations with a good portion of the Arab world, and therefore the risk of isolation and deterioration with unexpected consequences is much more evident.

David Makovsky, Netanyahu's Road to Oslo, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 27, 1996, at 7. Another observed:

To Mr. Netanyahu's dismay, the Hebron issue all but paralyzed his Government. The tender ties with moderate Arab states froze, and feelers to Syria produced nothing. Relations with Europe worsened. The American Administration said nothing, but it left no doubt whom it held responsible for the heightening tensions.

Schmemann, supra note 264.

268. See David Grossman, Israel's Flight from Real Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1996, at A23 ("The peace process has created another decisive fact. Israel has become a part of the Mideast, part of the region's political system, not just its military system.").

269. Thomas Friedman described Netanyahu's action as a response to democratic forces:

Mr. Netanyahu's willingness to withdraw from Hebron, in accordance with Oslo, is . . . the rational (but grudging) act of a politician who understands where the majority of his people want to go. Mr. Netanyahu knows that some 50 percent of Israelis, those on the left who voted Labor, already embrace Oslo and accept any Hebron deal. He knows another 25 percent—the security hawks to the right of center—voted for him because they wanted a better Oslo, with stronger security, and he's satisfied them.

legal process set in motion under the Oslo accords called for and established a negotiation mechanism and structure that committed the parties to interact with each other repeatedly over many months.\textsuperscript{270} The repeated interaction of the parties against the shadow of the future interpreted the core norms of the Oslo accords, which came to frame the relationship between the parties. Israel and Palestine began repeatedly to invoke the terms of the accords against one another, and thus became further bound to obey the core interpretation.\textsuperscript{271} A third step came when the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset) formally approved Oslo under the predecessor Rabin government, thereby legislatively internalizing the norms required under the Oslo agreement.\textsuperscript{272} This legal internalization had the effect of making Oslo a \textit{fait accompli}, dramatically raising the domestic costs of Netanyahu's noncompliance.\textsuperscript{273} These factors worked together to impel Netanyahu to sign the Hebron deal with Arafat, which forced the Likud party effectively to “take ownership” of Oslo. The Hebron deal made it even more difficult for Israel to attack frontally a process with which it had become so tightly enmeshed.\textsuperscript{274} In short, an interactive process linking state interest, national identity, international society and internalization worked to override the vehement political opposition that

\textsuperscript{[hereinafter Friedman, \textit{What Hebron Tells Us}] ("When the Israeli silent majority felt that Mr. Peres was going too quickly and incautiously in the peace process, it yanked him back, and when it felt Mr. Netanyahu was going too reluctantly into that test, it yanked him forward.")

\textsuperscript{270} Much of the significance of the Oslo agreements was a commitment by both Israel and the Palestinian Authority to resolve further issues (such as the Hebron pullout) at later dates. The Hebron deal itself specified a timetable for three more stages of Israeli troop withdrawals from the rural areas of the West Bank, save for a yet-to-be-negotiated troop presence as necessitated by Israel's security. Most importantly, perhaps, Oslo committed both parties to “final status” talks beginning in 1997, with an ultimate goal of reaching agreement by 1999. See Serge Schmemann, \textit{Middle East Accord: The Overview. Netanyahu and Arafat Agree on Israeli Pullout in Hebron, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1997, at A11 (describing background of Hebron accords); Middle East Accord: Looking Ahead: Two U.S Documents, N Y TIMES, Jan 17, 1997, at A12 (describing future negotiations).}

\textsuperscript{271} See, e.g., Evelyn Gordon, \textit{Gov't: PA Charter Must Be Amended, JERUSALEM POST, Jan 27, 1997, at 12 (reporting Netanyahu government statement that PLO failure to amend its charter was a “gross violation of the Oslo accords”); David Makovsky & Jon Immanuel, PM, \textit{Arafat Trade Accusations, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 29, 1996, at 1 (“Arafat has frequently called on the superpower sponsors who are signatories of the Oslo agreements to arbitrate in the Hebron dispute and has even threatened to take the case to the International Court in the Hague since he views the Oslo agreement as a document sanctioned by international law.”); Serge Schmemann, \textit{Middle East Conflict: The Overview, Leaders of Israel and Palestinians Due in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 30, 1996, at A11 (noting Netanyahu's insistence on tighter security provisions in Hebron deal due to Palestinian violations of Oslo); Serge Schmemann, \textit{Tension in the Middle East: The Israelis; Netanyahu Reported Ready to Make Gesture to Palestinians, N Y TIMES, Oct. 4, 1996, at A12 (“[W]e are insisting [Israeli] implement accurately and honestly what has been agreed upon and what was signed.”) (remarks of Yasser Arafat).}

\textsuperscript{272} See David Makovsky & Jon Immanuel, \textit{Knesset to Vote on Hebron Pact Today, JERUSALEM POST, Jan 16, 1997, at 1.}

\textsuperscript{273} See Sarah Honig, \textit{Netanyahu: We'll Continue Peace Process, JERUSALEM POST, Apr 22, 1996, at 12 (reporting Netanyahu's comments that he considered Oslo "a bad deal, though we cannot ignore the \textit{faits accomplis} it has yielded").}

\textsuperscript{274} See \textit{One Battle Over, On to the Next, ECONOMIST, Jan. 18, 1997, at 41 (“By concluding the [Hebron] agreement, Mr Netanyahu has enmeshed his government, his Likud party and himself in the Oslo peace process.”); Friedman, \textit{What Hebron Tells Us, supra note 269, at A19 (“From here on, [Netanyahu] becomes an owner of Oslo . . . .")}
Netanyahu had initially voiced against Oslo. The episode shows the power of transnational legal process to promote interaction, generate and reinforce norms, and to embed those norms into domestic legal systems.

Process is not panacea, of course, and at this writing, the future of the Mideast peace process remains shaky. But even if the Oslo process ultimately collapses, the Hebron incident still illustrates how international norms and transnational process can permeate and influence domestic policy. As transnational actors interact, they create patterns of behavior that ripen into institutions, regimes, and transnational networks. Their interactions generate both general norms of external conduct (such as treaties) and specific interpretation of those norms in particular circumstances (such as the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty), which they in turn internalize into their domestic legal and political structures through executive action, legislation, and judicial decisions. Legal ideologies prevail among domestic decisionmakers and cause them to be affected by perceptions that their actions are, or will be seen as, unlawful. Domestic decisionmaking becomes "enmeshed" with international legal norms, as institutional arrangements for the making and maintenance of an international commitment become entrenched in domestic legal and political processes. Domestic institutions adopt symbolic structures, standard operating procedures, and other internal mechanisms to maintain habitual compliance with the internalized norms. These


276. Shortly before this Review Essay went to press, Netanyahu and his cabinet voted to break ground on Har Homa, a controversial Israeli housing project in Arab East Jerusalem. While making it clear that he did not necessarily approve of Netanyahu's action, President Clinton vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Israel for this act, even while a similar resolution passed the U.N. General Assembly by a vote of 130 to 2. Arafat called a conference of American, European, and Arab diplomats, but pointedly excluded the Israelis. Peace talks have been suspended, and Netanyahu himself just narrowly avoided indictment on a charge of corruption in the appointment of an Attorney General. It remains unclear whether the opposition Labor Party will attempt to bolster the sagging Netanyahu government in an effort to save the Oslo process. According to polls, 75% of all Israelis continue to support the peace process. Meanwhile, Netanyahu complained that he was "fed up with the idea that everything we do is a violation of the [Oslo] agreement, and everything the Palestinians say is in compliance." See Russell Watson & Joseph Contreras, Bringing Up Bibi, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 24, 1997, at 52. Yet by so saying, he only demonstrated how far he had moved from outside to inside the interpretive framework established by those agreements. Cf. Klotz, supra note 135, at 462 (using anti-apartheid example to show how "global norms can affect the reconstitution of interests directly through transnational processes, without interstate interaction or multilateral coercion"); Jeffrey W. Legro, Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism, 51 INT'L ORG. 31 (1997) (demonstrating how norms changed domestic policy with respect to use of force during World War II). Although domestic and regional politics undeniably affect, and may even force the eventual dissolution of, the Oslo process, the micro-example of Netanyahu's participation in the Hebron agreement shows how transnational legal process can help explain compliance in a particular instance where other theoretical explanations appear inadequate.

277. See Robert O. Keohane, Jr., Compliance with International Commitments: Politics Within a Framework of Law, 86 AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 176, 179 (1992) (discussing "institutional enmeshment," which "occurs when domestic decision making with respect to an international commitment is affected by the institutional arrangements established in the course of making or maintaining the commitment").

278. For treatment of this phenomenon, see generally the work of Lauren Edelman and her colleagues, cited supra note 13, and the work of Charles O'Reilly and his colleagues, cited supra note 3.
Why Do Nations Obey International Law?

Institutions become "carriers of history," and evolve in path-dependent routes that avoid conflict with the internalized norms.279

These institutional habits lead nations into default patterns of compliance. Thus, in Henkin's words, "almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law. . . almost all of the time."280 When a nation deviates from that pattern of presumptive compliance, frictions are created.281 To avoid such frictions in a nation's continuing interactions, national leaders may shift over time from a policy of violation to one of compliance. It is through this transnational legal process, this repeated cycle of interaction, interpretation, and internalization, that international law acquires its "stickiness," that nation-states acquire their identity, and that nations come to "obey" international law out of perceived self-interest. In tracing the move from the external to the internal, from one-time grudging compliance with an external norm to habitual internalized obedience, the key factor is repeated participation in the transnational legal-process. That participation helps to reconstitute national interests, to establish the identity of actors as ones who obey the law, and to develop the norms that become part of the fabric of emerging international society.

As I have described it, transnational legal process presents both a theoretical explanation of why nations obey and a plan of strategic action for prodding nations to obey. How, then, to study this process? Although a full account will require book-length interdisciplinary treatment, let me identify some basic inquiries, using international human rights as an example. In the human rights area, treaty regimes are notoriously weak, and national governments, for reasons of economics or realpolitik, are often hesitant to declare openly that another government engages in abuses.282 In such an area, where enforcement mechanisms are weak, but core customary norms are clearly defined and often peremptory (jus cogens), the best compliance


280. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 42.

281. Thus, when a developing nation defaults on a sovereign debt, for example, that activity impairs its ability to secure new lending. When a government denies the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in a suit in which it is a defendant, that decision impairs its ability to invoke the Court's jurisdiction as a plaintiff.

282. For that reason, in this area, neither Franck's fairness approach nor the Chayes'es managerial strategy had much compliance "bite." As the debacle in Bosnia shows, the mere fact that the NATO allies perceived the norm against genocide as "legitimate" does not ensure that they would seriously inconvenience themselves to apprehend or prosecute its perpetrators. Nor, as I have suggested above, did the existence of a treaty regime surrounding the Genocide Convention, see supra note 207, ensure that gross violators would be called to account by the Chayes'es managerial process of "discursive elaboration and application of treaty norms," CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 4, at 123.
strategies may not be "horizontal" regime management strategies, but rather, vertical strategies of interaction, interpretation, and internalization.

If transnational actors obey international law as a result of repeated interaction with other actors in the transnational legal process, a first step is to empower more actors to participate. It is here that expanding the role of intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private business entities, and "transnational moral entrepreneurs" deserves careful study. How, for example, do international human rights "issue networks" and epistemic communities form among international and regional intergovernmental organizations, international and domestic NGOs on human rights, and private foundations? How do these networks intersect with the "International Human Rights Regime," namely, the global system of rules and implementation procedures centered in and around the United Nations; regional regimes in Europe, the Americas, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East; single-issue human rights regimes regarding workers' rights, racial discrimination, women's rights; and "global prohibition regimes" against slavery, torture, and the like? Within national governments and intergovernmental organizations, what role do lawyers and legal advisers play in ensuring that the government's policies conform to international legal standards and in prompting governmental agencies to take proactive stances toward human rights abuses?

Second, if the goal of interaction is to produce interpretation of human rights norms, what fora are available for norm-enunciation and elaboration, both within and without existing human rights regimes? If dedicated fora do not already exist, how can existing fora be adapted for this purpose or new fora, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, be created?

Third, what are the best strategies for internalization of international human rights norms? One might distinguish among social, political, and legal internalization. Social internalization occurs when a norm acquires so much public legitimacy that there is widespread general obedience to it. Political internalization occurs when political elites accept an international norm, and

283. See supra notes 53–54.
286. See Antonio Cassese, The Role of Legal Advisers in Ensuring that Foreign Policy Conforms to International Legal Standards, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 121 (1992); Robert C. Clark, Why So Many Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 275, 282 (1992) (calling lawyers "specialists in normative ordering").
288. For example, consider the norm of global racial equality, discussed in Klotz, supra note 135; or in Israel, the norm of compliance with the Oslo Accords, discussed supra text accompanying notes 261–76.
adopt it as a matter of government policy. Legal internalization occurs when an international norm is incorporated into the domestic legal system through executive action, judicial interpretation, legislative action, or some combination of the three. The ABM Treaty controversy thus exemplified the incorporation of a norm (narrow treaty interpretation) into U.S. law and policy through the executive action of the President, acting through his delegate, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Administration. Judicial internalization can occur when domestic litigation provokes judicial incorporation of human rights norms either implicitly, by construing existing statutes consistently with international human rights norms, or explicitly, through what I have elsewhere called “transnational public law litigation.” Legislative internalization occurs when domestic lobbying embeds international law norms into binding domestic legislation or even constitutional law that officials of a noncomplying government must then obey as part of the domestic legal fabric.

The relationship among social, political, and legal internalization can be complex. In the Haitian refugee case, for example, U.S. human rights advocates failed to achieve judicial internalization of an international treaty norm, but in tandem with the growing social outrage about the treatment of Haitian refugees, eventually achieved political internalization: a reversal of the Clinton Administration’s policy with respect to Haiti. Similarly, beginning with *Filartiga v. Pena-Irala*, U.S. human rights litigators began to promote domestic judicial incorporation of the norm against torture in a manner that eventually helped push President Bush to ratify the U.N. Convention against Torture and Congress to enact the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991.

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290. See generally Koh, supra note 23 (discussing efforts of victims of human rights abuse to use “transnational public law litigation” in United States federal courts to enforce norms of international human rights law against their abusers). For an example of such litigation, see *Kadic v. Karadžić*, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).

291. The national constitutions of Ireland, the Netherlands, and Italy, for example, refer to the recognition of international legal principles as a broad policy goal, thereby requiring policymakers to take account of foreign policy guidelines deriving from international law. See Const. art. 29, § 3 (Ir.); COST [Constitution] art. 10 (Italy); GRW. NED. [Constitution] art. 90 (Neth.).


293. See Koh, supra note 11 (discussing this process); see also Klotz, supra note 135 (discussing social, political, and eventually legal internalization of norm favoring global racial equality and sanctions against South Africa).

294. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).

In the United Kingdom, the issue of legislative internalization has similarly been brought to the fore by the first general election in five years, in which the opposition Labour party has promised, if elected, to incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into U.K. law. This issue has been a major human rights issue in British politics since the Clement Attlee government first ratified the Convention in the early 1950s. Since then, the Convention has been internalized in part through judicial construction. Yet judicial refusal to recognize explicit incorporation has given new impetus to a political internalization movement that at this writing seems likely to bring about legal internalization of the European Convention into U.K. law by an act of Parliament.\textsuperscript{296}

Thus, the concept of transnational legal process has important implications, not just for international relations theorists, but also for activists and political leaders. For activists, the constructive role of international law in the post-Cold War era will be greatly enhanced if nongovernmental organizations seek self-consciously to participate in, influence, and ultimately enforce transnational legal process by promoting the internalization of international norms into domestic law. Nor can political leaders sensibly make foreign policy in a world bounded by global rules without understanding how legislative, judicial and executive branches can and should incorporate international legal rules into their decisionmaking.\textsuperscript{297}
IV. Conclusion

"Why is it," Oran Young asked in 1992, "that an actor acquires and feels some sense of obligation to conform its behavior to the dictates or requirements of a regime or an institution?... I think that there are differences in being obligated to do something because of a moral reason, a normative reason and a legal reason."298 Although Young did not further specify, I would argue that these moral, normative, and legal reasons are in fact conjoined in the concept of obedience. A transnational actor's moral obligation to obey an international norm becomes an internally binding domestic legal obligation when that norm has been interpreted and internalized into its domestic legal system. Both Franck and the Chayeses, exemplars of the philosophical and process traditions, respectively, recognize that transnational actors are more likely to comply with international law when they accept its legitimacy through some internal process.

It was precisely this "internal acceptance" that H.L.A. Hart found to be missing when he denied that international law satisfied the concept of law. Yet in Hart's own terms, a transnational legal process of interaction, interpretation, and internalization of global norms can provide both the "secondary rules" and the "rules of recognition" that Hart found missing from the international legal order.299

This Review Essay has demonstrated that, far from being novel, domestic obedience to internalized global law has venerable historical roots and sound theoretical footing. Participation in transnational legal process creates a normative and constitutive dynamic. By interpreting global norms, and internalizing them into domestic law, that process leads to reconstruction of national interests, and eventually national identities. In a post-ontological age, characterized by the "new sovereignty," the richness of transnational legal process can provide the key to unlocking the ancient puzzle of why nations obey.

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299. See supra text accompanying note 71.