E. THE MECHANICS OF SECTION 820

With the above discussion of the theory underlying Section 820 as a background, we may proceed to a consideration of the mechanics of the section. The exposition will be intricate, because the Congressional device with which it deals is an elaborate one. This elaboration is intended to forestall any abuse of equitable possibilities which Congress has for the first time presented to taxpayers and the Treasury. It was obviously anticipated that Section 820 would by its very completeness discourage the kind of juggling which had become so unpleasant a feature of income tax administration where doubtful timing or proprietorship of income was encountered. Obviously the legislators realized that the section would be a liability rather than an asset if it were so frequently invoked as to increase the bulk of litigated controversies. Hence the reader should at all times consider the details of this legislation in the light of safeguards against and discouragements to litigation.

The basic conditions to the operation of the section are: (1) The case must fall within one of the categories specified in subsection (b); (2) there must be a “determination under the income tax laws” within the meaning of subsection (a)(1); (3) correction of the “error” by means of the normal procedure must be prevented; (4) an inconsistent position must have been asserted in the manner described in subsection (b); (5) the amount of the adjustment must be computed in accordance with subsection (d); (6) the adjustment must be made in the manner prescribed in subsections (c) and (e) and be with respect to a taxable year beginning on or after January 1, 1932.
initial condition—the types of cases in which relief is provided—is post-
poned to a later point; the other conditions will first be considered in
detail.

1. Determination under the Income Tax Laws.

Section 820 is designed to offer relief where the tax results of an
earlier year and a later year combine to present an inequitable burden or
avoidance in the manner described in subsection (b). It would be im-
possible to ascertain whether the prescribed inequity exists until the tax
result for the later year has become final, for an inequity resulting from a
decision in a prior stage of consideration with respect to the tax for the
later year may disappear upon final action. Consequently, Section
820 does not become operative until there has been a final determination
with respect to the later year. Three types of such a determination are
recognized in subsection (a) (1) defining the term “determination under
the income tax laws” — a final court or Board of Tax Appeals decision,
a closing agreement, and a final disposition by the Commissioner of
a claim for refund. The designation of judicial action as providing the
requisite determination requires no comment, except to note that in each
particular case it is necessary to ascertain whether the decision, judg-
ment, decree, or order has become final.\footnote{Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure For Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes—a Criticism and a Proposal (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 1393.} The remaining two “deter-
minations” relate to administrative action and their limited number is
an interesting commentary on the extent to which finality is delayed
under present tax procedure.\footnote{As the Regulations under this section indicate [Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(a)-2], the date upon which a Board of Tax Appeals decision becomes final is prescribed in §1005, Revenue Act of 1926, as amended. Since a variety of statutory provisions and court rules affect the question as to when a court decision becomes final, the Regulations merely state that while the date must in each case be determined upon the particular facts, ordinarily a decision of a lower court becomes final upon the expiration of the time for taking an appeal. Section 407(a), Revenue Act of 1938, in providing for a deficiency dividend credit, similarly rests upon a final Board decision, a final judgment in a suit to which the United States is a party, or a closing agreement to establish the deficiency. Under both § 820 and § 407(a), a final Board decision entered upon stipulation after settlement of the proceeding without the necessity of a hearing by the Board would satisfy the requirement of a final determination. Cf. Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure For Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes—a Criticism and a Proposal (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 1393.} Thus, the assertion of a deficiency in a 90-day letter does not mark a final step, as the taxpayer may appeal
to the Board of Tax Appeals; even payment of the deficiency does not
end the controversy, as a claim for refund may be filed within two years.
Consequently, neither the issuance of a notice of deficiency nor payment of tax is accepted by Section 820 as a final determination. The disposition by the Commissioner of a claim for refund, however, if acquiesced in by the taxpayer as respects the items as to which the disposition is unfavorable to him, is considered final action. As the taxpayer's acquiescence must be evidenced by his failure to bring suit within the time allowed for instituting suit with respect to a denial of a refund claim, further action with respect to the tax liability is largely impossible and a definitive decision exists. Where the disposition with respect to an item favors the taxpayer, no waiting period is required and such disposition becomes final for the purposes of Section 820 upon the date of allowance of refund or credit, or upon the date of mailing notice of disallowance if the allowed items have been offset by other items advanced by the Commissioner. In accepting such a disposition as a final determination, the section disregards the right of the Commissioner to upset the determination by a successful suit for erroneous refund. Two reasons for such disregard may be advanced—the relative infrequency of suits for erroneous refund, and the fact that in the rare case where the determination is upset, the correct result may be reached under Section 820 through a second adjustment.

The complexity of the language designating the time when a disposition of a claim for refund becomes final results from the necessity of covering both the items with respect to which the taxpayer is seeking refund, as to which his contentions (the statutory term is "claim") may be allowed or disallowed in whole or in part, and the items which the Commissioner is applying, either in partial or full reduction of those claims of the taxpayer which are allowed, or even to establish a deficiency. The statutory language utilized to solve this problem is based upon what

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53. The date on which the schedule of overassessments is signed by the Commissioner is the date of allowance of refund or credit. Cf. §1104, REVENUE ACT OF 1932; McEachern v. Rose, 302 U. S. 56 (1937); United States v. Wurts, 303 U. S. 414 (1938).

54. § 610, REVENUE ACT OF 1928.

55. Thus, suppose the taxpayer failed to include an item of income in his return for 1935. He included the item in his return for 1936, but after the expiration of the period of limitations on assessments for 1935, filed a refund claim for 1936. The claim is allowed, and the Commissioner secures an adjustment for 1935, under subsection (b)(3). The Commissioner then files suit for erroneous refund with respect to the refund for 1936 and recovers such refund, as the item of income properly belongs in gross income for 1936. The taxpayer may then secure an adjustment for 1935, under subsection (b)(1), as an item of income has been included twice, once erroneously by reason of the previous adjustment under § 820 and a second time by reason of the court decision with respect to 1936. It may be observed that § 407(a) chose the other alternative and did not consider a disposition of a claim for refund as a final determination. See note 51, supra.

56. The Regulations under this section expressly provide for the varying combinations which may occur. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(a)-3.
may be termed the “item” aspect of tax liability. Thus, if a taxpayer files a refund claim for $5,000, this section requires a breakdown of that claim into the various “items” making up the total claim, e.g., a deduction for interest not claimed in the return, exclusion of dividend income erroneously included in the return, a credit for dependents not claimed in the return, etc. Each item, and the contention made with respect to it, is considered a separate matter for the purpose of this section, so that while the fate of the refund claim as a whole may be significant in ascertaining the time when the disposition of the contention with respect to an item becomes final, the section concerns itself primarily with that disposition. As a consequence, several determinations whose times of finality differ may result from action on a single refund claim. If the contention as to deduction for interest be allowed and the contentions as to the exclusion of dividend income and the credit for dependents disallowed, either in whole or in part, the former disposition becomes final on the date of allowance of refund or credit, while the latter disposition becomes final on the expiration of the time allowed the taxpayer for instituting suit. If the refund claim as a whole had been disallowed by reason of offsetting items applied by the Commissioner, as the failure to include rental income in the return, the disposition as to the allowed deduction for interest would become final upon the date of mailing notice of disallowance of the claim for refund; the disposition as to the remaining two contentions would become final, as in the previous situation, on the expiration of the time allowed the taxpayer for instituting suit; the disposition as to the rental income would similarly become final at that time, unless such offsetting item resulted in a deficiency, in which case its finality would depend upon its future course.

57. See Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(a)-3(b)(iii), indicating that any difference in the extent of the deduction or in the computation of the over-payment which produces an amount less than the taxpayer’s claim with respect to the deduction constitutes a disallowance.

58. The phrase “items applied by the Commissioner in reduction of the refund or credit,” used in subsection (a)(1)(C)(ii), covers a reduction of the amount of the claims allowed down to and including zero, but does not extend to items whose application produces a minus result and consequently a deficiency. In the latter case, the deficiency is treated as if any other deficiency, i.e., it may eventuate in a determination by way of court or Board decision, closing agreement, or even disposition of claim for refund (where the deficiency is later paid and another claim for refund filed), depending upon the subsequent action with respect to such deficiency. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(a)-3(c), in stating that such subsequent action may result in a determination under subsection (a)(1)(A) or (B) fail to account for the last possibility mentioned above. The disposition as to the item, with respect to which the claim was allowed but the amount thereof was reduced by the offsetting items, is affected only as to the date of its finality by the question whether the offset produces a deficiency—if some refund or credit is allowed, the date is the date of mailing notice of disallowance. See Statement of the House Managers, H. R. Rep. No. 2330, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 57.
The other type of administrative action designated as a determination for the purposes of this section, a closing agreement, permits the parties at any time to dispense with the necessity of running the gamut of administrative procedure through to a disposition of a claim for refund, or of resorting to final judicial action, in order to obtain a determination. A taxpayer who desires to acquiesce in a deficiency letter and pay the tax need not, in order to secure a determination, pay such tax and then file a refund claim, or refuse to pay the tax and obtain a Board decision, but may telescope the entire procedure by entering into a closing agreement. Similarly, after a claim for refund has been denied, the necessity of waiting for the expiration of the two-year period provided in Section 3226 may be avoided by a closing agreement. Inasmuch as the party desiring a closing agreement is in effect offering to concede the issue with respect to the later year in order to secure an adjustment under Section 820 with respect to an earlier year, and as he could in any event force the issue for the later year eventually to a conclusion in the form of one or the other of the specified determinations, it is to be expected

59. § 606, Revenue Act of 1928, as amended. A closing agreement becomes final on the date of its approval by the Secretary, Under Secretary, or an Assistant Secretary.

60. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(a)-1, state that a closing agreement may be used if "it becomes necessary or desirable to effect a determination in order to obtain or accelerate an adjustment authorized by section 820," and (Art. 820(a)-3), points out that the two-year waiting period provided in § 3226 may be avoided by the use of a closing agreement. A Commissioner's Mimeograph with respect to closing agreements, No. 4821, August 19, 1938, states that "a closing agreement should be executed and submitted for approval whenever such action is deemed appropriate under the provisions of section 407 or section 820 of the Revenue Act of 1938." Cf. Regulations 101, Appendix T. D. 4855.

It has been contended [see note 98, infra] that § 820 is an open invitation to litigation as the taxpayer, in order to be in a position to obtain an adjustment, must litigate to a finish the controversy for the open year. This criticism plainly overlooks the specification of a closing agreement as a determination, and the fact that through such agreement the parties may avoid all litigation for the open year.

61. Thus, if the taxpayer erroneously includes an item in gross income for 1935 and, after the expiration of the period of limitations for refund claims for 1935, the Commissioner asserts a deficiency because of the failure to include the item in gross income for 1938, the taxpayer in requesting a closing agreement for 1938 on the basis of the inclusion of the item in gross income is thus conceding the deficiency. If the Commissioner, in order to prevent an adjustment under § 820, refuses the closing agreement, the taxpayer can refuse to pay the deficiency, and litigate the issue in the Board, or pay the deficiency and file a refund claim, obtaining a determination in either event. As a closing agreement need not relate to the total tax liability for a particular year but may concern itself with one or more separate items affecting that tax liability (Form 906), the closing agreement for the purposes of § 820 need not be impeded by the desire of either party to avoid entering into a closing agreement with respect to the total tax liability. Cf. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(a)-1; Commissioner's Mimeoograph No. 4821, August 19, 1938.
that closing agreements for the purpose of the section will be employed frequently.\ footref{62}

2. Prevention of the Correction of the Error.

An adjustment under Section 820 is authorized only if correction of the effect of the error under normal procedure is impossible on the date the determination becomes final,\ footref{63} so that if correction may be accomplished under other sections of the internal revenue laws, Section 820 is inoperative. Section 820, accordingly, does not prescribe an exclusive method for correcting errors.\ footref{64} For example, if an interest deduction were erroneously allowed for 1934 and again taken for 1936, and at the time the determination authorizing the allowance for 1936 became final, the period of limitations with respect to assessments for 1934 had not expired, Section 820 would not be applicable inasmuch as the Commissioner could correct the error by asserting a deficiency for 1934.\ footref{65}

\footnote{62. Under Secretary Magill, in approving the Regulations under §820, stated that "closing agreements would be entered into wherever necessary to effect an adjustment under the section." Treasury Press Release No. 14-38, 383 C. C. H. 1938 Fed. Tax Serv. §6502. This announcement, together with the statements quoted in note 60 supra, should allay taxpayers' fears, based on prior experience with closing agreements, that such agreements will not be forthcoming from the Bureau for the purposes of §820. The necessity, from the taxpayer's side, for assurance that such agreements will be entered into derives in part from the Bureau practice of closing settlements by a special form 870 waiver, under which the taxpayer, in addition to waiving his right to petition to the Board, also waives his right to file a refund claim. See Baldwin v. Higgins, 383 C. C. H. 1938 Fed. Tax Serv. §6093 (S. D. N. Y. 1937). Such a specialized waiver would prevent the taxpayer from obtaining a determination through either route, so that a determination by way of closing agreement is his only method of securing an adjustment under §820. The Commissioner's Mimeograph, referred to in note 60 supra, indicates that a form 906 closing agreement may be used along with the waiver in these cases.

63. The terminology in subsection (b), "on the date the determination becomes final," was not well chosen, inasmuch as "determination" in subsection (a) (1) is defined in terms of a final determination: e.g., a decision "which has become final," a "final disposition" of a claim for refund, a closing agreement (as §606 of the REVENUE ACT OF 1928, as amended, provides that if an agreement is approved, such agreement shall be final and subsection (a) (1) in effect refers to an approved agreement). Consequently, when the action forming the basis for the determination becomes final, a determination results, so that it is tautologous to say that a determination becomes final. In a later part of subsection (b), the phrase "time of the determination," and in subsection (c), the phrase "date of the determination," are used to connote the same point of time as the phrase "on the date the determination becomes final"; Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-0, use the phrase "date of the determination." Moreover, the phraseology in subsection (a) (1), "The term 'determination under the income tax laws' means," is also not well chosen as that phrase appears only at the beginning of subsection (b), whereas elsewhere only the word "determination" is used. The term "determination" alone should have been defined in subsection (a) (1). The Regulations throughout use only the word "determination."


65. In the example in the text, if the period of limitations with respect to deficiency assessments for 1934 had expired, but the taxpayer had obtained the deduction for 1934
Section 820 is not confined to statute of limitations cases, although they will undoubtedly form the largest group of cases in which it will be involved. Although the period of limitations may not have expired with respect to the earlier year, the taxpayer and the Commissioner may have entered into a closing agreement with respect to the tax liability for that year, which agreement, under Section 606 of the Revenue Act of 1928, as amended, would prevent correction of any error for that year. Section 820 thus adds the successful maintenance of an inconsistent position to the fraud, malfeasance, or misrepresentation of a material fact which render vulnerable a closing agreement. While at first thought such an inroad upon the finality of closing agreements may seem undesirable, it will be recognized that a party seeking shelter behind a closing agreement for the earlier year at the time he asserts an inconsistent position in the later year is in reality making use of that agreement in a manner no different from the conduct thought undesirable where the statute of limitations is the protective shield. The finality which

by way of refund and such refund at the time the determination became final could be recovered by a suit for erroneous refund, § 820 would not be operative; while one method of correcting the error is prevented, another avenue is open and correction of the effect of the error is therefore not prevented. This argument stresses the word "prevented" in the phrase "correction of the effect of the error is prevented by the operation . . . of any provision of the internal-revenue laws" and assumes that the word "any" was used merely to indicate that not all of the provisions barring correction had to be operative, i.e., both the expiration of the statute of limitations and a closing agreement were not required, if the operation of one alone resulted in the closing of all methods of correction.

66. Cf. the examples given in the Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 64, at 50; Statement of the House Managers, op. cit., supra note 58, at 56, and Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-0.

67. Section 606 of the Revenue Act of 1928 in its original as well as its amended form expressly provides for the finality of closing agreements; endowed with this quality, such agreements constitute by virtue of the internal revenue laws a bar to the correction of errors. It is specious to regard the bar as arising simultaneously from the principles of the law of contracts and to argue accordingly that § 820 removes only the bar of the statute but not that of contract law. The binding effect of a closing agreement arises from the authority granted under § 606. The particularity with which that section defines the formalities, scope and effect of closing agreements is clear evidence that it contains within itself the complete law governing such agreements. In any event the reports of the Congressional Committees [see Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 64, at 56] leave no room for doubting that Congress intended that adjustments should be made under § 820 in these cases and that it considered the bar of a closing agreement as arising from the operation of a provision of the internal revenue laws. Where an adjustment would operate to the detriment of the taxpayer and the barrier to correction of the error is a closing agreement executed prior to the effective date of § 820, it may be argued that the binding force of the agreement cannot be impaired without violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Cf. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665 (1911). Only by virtue of the taxpayer's own inconsistent conduct would the closing agreement be affected by § 820, which seeks to hold the parties to the positions taken and prohibits an inequitable use of the agreement. Certainly that section lacks the unreasonable, arbitrary and whimsical characteristics that usually must be present to find an act of Congress in violation of due process.
the closing agreement sought with respect to the treatment of the items making up the tax liability has not resulted; as one party has in effect departed from the agreement by again utilizing one of the items to obtain a tax advantage in a later year, the other party is entitled to avail himself of such departure to correct the error. Sections 607, 608, and 609 of Revenue Act of 1928, relating to payments, refunds or credits after the period of limitation has expired, likewise constitute obstructions to the correction of errors.

Sections 272(f) and 322(c) of the Revenue Act of 1938, and corresponding provisions of the earlier Revenue Acts, prohibit deficiency letters or credits or refunds after the taxpayer has duly filed a petition with the Board of Tax Appeals. Here again provisions of the internal revenue laws prevent the correction of errors. In the cases in which such sections would apply, the doctrine of res judicata, including the doctrine with respect to split causes of action, may also operate as a bar to correction. Under these circumstances there may be uncertainty as to whether or not an adjustment could be made under Section 820. Because of its bearing upon the operation of Sections 272(f) and 322(c) and because it may constitute the only bar to the correction of errors that does not arise from the operation of a provision of the internal revenue laws, res judicata must be considered in some detail in its relation to Section 820.

Where the same right or fact is placed in issue and directly adjudicated and is again at issue between the same parties or their privies in a subsequent suit, it is well established that the first determination concerning

68. See Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 64, at 49.
69. These provisions were recently applied by the Supreme Court in MeEachern v. Rose, 302 U. S. 56 (1937). The decedent had sold stocks and elected to return the profit on the installment basis. After his death in 1928, his administrator erroneously reported annually a profit on each yearly payment and then brought suit for overpayments of income tax for 1929, 1930, and 1931. Under § 44(d), Revenue Act of 1928, the capital gain included in the value of the unpaid installments was income taxable to the decedent for 1928. While collection of the unpaid tax for 1928 was barred, as it exceeded the sum of the overpayments for 1929, 1930, and 1931 the collector contended that the administrator could not recover. The Court held that, while equitable principles might preclude recovery in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, §§ 607 and 609(a), Revenue Act of 1928, made void a credit against a barred liability, and consequently the overpayments could not be credited against the unpaid 1928 tax. See discussion of this case in Traynor, Tax Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1937 Term (1938) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 371; Comment (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 496. Section 820 would authorize adjustment under these circumstances, assuming that it could be said that the relationship of decedent and decedent's estate existed with respect to the year as to which the error was made. See note 186, infra.
70. See the excellent discussions of this subject in Griswold, Res Judicata in Federal Tax Cases (1937) 46 Yale L. J. 1320 and Paul, Selected Studies in Federal Taxation (2d Series 1938) 104 et seq.
that right or fact is conclusive upon the parties and their privies with respect to the same or a different taxable year.\footnote{72} The doctrine of res judicata does not stop there but goes on to embrace the rule against splitting causes of action. If the right or fact involved in the subsequent suit might have been put in issue to sustain the claim or demand involved in the previous suit, the previous judgment concludes the parties and their privies as to this fact or right as well as to those which actually were put in issue. In a federal income tax case the cause of action is ordinarily the tax liability of the taxpayer for a particular year; matters which are or might be put in issue to sustain or defeat that action must be presented at that time for consideration for they cannot be raised again in a subsequent action relating to the same year.\footnote{73} "Whether the second suit involves an income tax on the same year's income, or an estate tax on the same estate, the courts quite consistently hold that a cause of action cannot be split up and litigated in separate parts."\footnote{74}

It should be observed at the outset that res judicata may prevent the successful maintenance of an inconsistent position—the sine qua non of an adjustment under Section 820. If, for example, the inclusion of an item of income in a particular year were governed by res judicata because it had already been in issue and adjudicated, the defense of res judicata, if established, would prevent its inclusion in a later year and there would be no occasion for Section 820 to operate.\footnote{75} If, however, res judicata were not relied upon, even though it might well have been,\footnote{76}

\footnote{72} For example, the taxpayer received a dividend, and there was a controversy as to whether he received it in 1932 or 1933. The Commissioner won either a Board of Tax Appeals or court decision holding that it was received in 1932. After the judgment has become final the Commissioner attempts to include the dividend in gross income for 1933, the correct year, using the deficiency machinery for this purpose. Res judicata will block this move.

\footnote{73} For example, the taxpayer received in 1932 a stock dividend of common on preferred in the sum of $10,000. He returned the dividend as taxable income for 1932. Later he sought a refund because he had included in his gross income for 1932 compensation paid him by a State for special legal services. He wins this refund by a district court judgment but does not raise, at any time in the progress of the case, the overpayment resulting from the inclusion of the stock dividend. Res judicata will bar subsequent recovery on a suit for that overpayment as the judgment in the suit on the compensation adjudicated the tax liability for 1932.

\footnote{74} Griswold, supra note 70, at 1338-9.

\footnote{75} Thus, in the example in note 72 supra, while there is a determination with respect to the year 1933, that determination, as a consequence of res judicata, prevents the inclusion of an item previously included for 1932, and the case therefore does not fall within subsection (b) (1).

\footnote{76} "Very little attention has been paid to the question whether a prior judgment claimed to be conclusive must be pleaded, offered in evidence; or whether it may be the subject of judicial notice. One court has determined that it will take judicial notice of its own records for the purpose of res judicata [Booe-Burke Mining Co. v. Willecuts, 45 F. (2d) 394 (D. Minn. 1930)] and the Board has taken judicial notice of a prior decision 'under the circumstances' [Woodley Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 16 B. T. A. 253}
and a determination were obtained under which the item was again included in gross income, res judicata would then present a serious obstacle to the effective operation of Section 820. If the determination were obtained by way of a closing agreement or final disposition of a claim for refund (as distinguished from judicial action), it could not be established, in view of the decision, that the item was erroneously treated in the earlier year. If the determination again including the item were obtained by way of a final decision of the Board of Tax Appeals or of a court of competent jurisdiction, this second decision would control if the question again arose and would establish that the item was erroneously treated in the earlier year, but it would not impeach the earlier judgment insofar as the purpose of the proceeding in which the prior judgment was rendered is concerned, i.e., the determination of tax liability for the year with respect to which it was rendered. That liability being fixed by res judicata, correction of the error would be prevented and an adjustment would be made under Section 820 if such prevention arises from the operation of a provision of the internal revenue laws, a problem subsequently considered.

Res judicata in its aspect of forbidding the splitting of a cause of action cannot prevent the successful maintenance of an inconsistent position. The year with respect to which the determination may be sought is a different year from that of the previous adjudication, so that a different cause of action is involved. The split cause of action rule becomes applicable, however, after the determination with respect to an item in a later year, whenever an effort is made to correct the erroneous treatment of that item for the year affected by the previous adjudication with respect to other matters for that year.

77. Donald v. J. J. White Lumber Company, 68 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934) and cases cited therein at page 442.

78. See FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) 1327, § 629. The opposing contention is that the second decision has become the controlling judgment, completely displacing the first decision and therefore wiping out altogether the possibility of claiming res judicata on the basis of that decision.

79. Thus, in the example in note 73 supra, suppose that the taxpayer in 1938 sold the dividend stock and claimed $10,000 as its basis. As a different cause of action is involved, the tax liability for 1938, and as the treatment of the stock dividend was not in issue in the cause of action with respect to 1932, the taxpayer obviously cannot rely on res judicata when the Commissioner claims a deficiency for 1938 on the ground the stock had a zero basis.

80. Thus, in the example in note 79 supra, after the determination that the stock has a zero basis, indicating thereby the erroneous treatment of the dividend upon receipt in 1932, the fact that the suit on the compensation adjudicated the taxpayer's liability for 1932 would bar correction of such error.
could not be affected by the determination, even where the latter is in the form of a court or Board decision, the former would prevent any further adjudication with respect to the tax liability of the previous year and consequently would bar correction of the error. The problem is therefore squarely presented, in any attempt to secure an adjustment under Section 820, whether the barrier to correction of the error thus created by res judicata arises from the operation of a provision of the internal revenue laws.

In the case of court decisions equally plausible arguments may be advanced for the proposition that res judicata arises independently of any provision of the internal revenue laws and for the proposition that it arises from the operation of such laws. In support of the former it may be urged that res judicata is a doctrine inherent in the judicial process owing neither its origin, scope nor force to any provision of the internal revenue laws. In support of the latter it may be urged that the judicial process with respect to internal revenue taxes is very closely linked with provisions of the internal revenue laws and that court decisions are rendered in income tax cases pursuant to the authorization and limitations prescribed in such provisions. While they do not ex-

81. See Freeman, loc. cit. supra note 78.
82. The Tucker Act, 24 Stat. 505 (1887), 28 U. S. C. §41(20) (1934) grants authority to sue the United States in the District Courts upon claims founded upon "any law of Congress," interpreted to authorize suits for the recovery of internal revenue taxes [Greenport Basin Construction Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 512 (1923)], and expressly provides for recovery of sums wrongfully collected "under the internal revenue laws" even if the claim exceeds $10,000 when the collector is dead or out of office. Another act gives the right to sue in the Court of Claims [10 Stat. 612 (1855), 28 U. S. C. §250(1) (1934)] upon claims founded upon any law of Congress, interpreted to authorize suits for claims which may arise under the internal revenue laws. United States v. Savings Bank, 104 U. S. 728 (1881). While suits against collectors for the recovery of internal revenue taxes are personal [Sage v. United States, 250 U. S. 33 (1919)] they are authorized by acts of Congress. See George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 380 (1933), and cases there cited. Rev. Stat. §3148 [28 U. S. C. §1544(b) (1934)] provides that "each collector shall in every respect, be responsible both to the United States and to individuals, as the case may be, for all moneys collected, and for every act done or neglected to be done, by any of his deputies while acting as such." Rev. Stat. §771 [28 U. S. C. §485 (1934)] imposes the duty upon district attorneys to defend suits against collectors for the recovery of internal revenue taxes and Rev. Stat. §989 [28 U. S. C. §842 (1934)] authorizes the payment by the United States of a judgment against a collector where there was probable cause for his act or where he acted under the directions of a proper superior officer, and prohibits the issuance of execution against him in such cases. Even if some of the provisions cited in this note were held not to be provisions of the internal revenue laws, despite their authorizing or determining the scope and effect of suits for the recovery of internal revenue taxes, there can be no doubt that Rev. Stat. §3148 supra, is a provision of the internal revenue laws. Nor can there be any doubt that Rev. Stat. §3226, supra, is a provision of the internal revenue laws, governing all suits for the recovery of internal revenue taxes, including suits against collectors. Tucker v. Alexander, 275 U. S. 228 (1927). It should be noted that the Revenue Act of 1924, §1014, amending Rev. Stat. §3226, supra, to provide that pay-
pressly provide for the doctrine of res judicata, they set in motion the judicial process with all the trappings of judicial doctrines. When one of these doctrines is the finality of court decisions rendered pursuant to a statutory provision, it is difficult to determine where the operation of the statute ends and that of the doctrine begins. The existence of the doctrine antedates that of the statutory provision, yet the provision is necessary to animate the doctrine for the particular situation which the provision controls. Any provision authorizing judicial determinations inevitably operates to bring into action judicial doctrines involved in that procedure. Section 820 authorizes an adjustment whenever correction would otherwise be prevented not simply by the express language of any provision of the internal revenue laws but by its "operation." Hence it could plausibly apply when the correction is barred by res judicata.83

New considerations arise when correction of an error is prevented by the conclusive effect of a Board of Tax Appeals decision. Whatever the rule may be with respect to decisions of the courts, which are part of the judicial structure and have internal revenue tax cases within the ambit of their general jurisdiction, the Board of Tax Appeals is an integral part of the internal revenue tax structure designed exclusively for the consideration of internal revenue taxes. It seems well established that a decision of the Board under the Revenue Act of 1924 is not res judicata in subsequent controversies.84 It seems equally settled that decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals under the Revenue Act of 1926 and subsequent Acts are conclusive, both as to a later case involving the same tax year and as to a later case involving the same issues arising in a different tax year.85 The basis for the change after 1926 is found...
in the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1926 enlarging the jurisdiction of the Board. Since 1926 "the Board of Tax Appeals, while not a court . . . has by statute been endowed with capacity to render decisions final and binding on both Commissioner and taxpayer unless reversed on appeal." The Board has been so endowed by provisions of the internal revenue laws. It is believed, therefore, that an adjustment must be made under Section 820 when correction of errors is prevented by the operation of Sections 272(f) and 322(c). These sections provide expressly for the split cause of action rule in the case of Board decisions and seem definitely designed to occupy the whole field in this respect. Whatever question there may be as to whether the bar of res judicata in its split cause of action aspect arises from the operation of provisions of the internal revenue laws in the case of court decisions, there can be none here where provisions of the internal revenue laws expressly provide for the application of that doctrine. Certain it is evident from the Committee Reports that Congress intended Section 820 to apply where correction of errors was prevented by the operation of Sections 272(f) and 322(c). While the application of Section 820 may be clouded by doubts where res judicata involves a court decision, it would seem to be beyond question in the case of a Board decision.

If the bar of res judicata can be maintained against the application of Section 820, therefore, it will be only because of the fortuitous choice of the tribunal rendering the judgment constituting the bar. The Commissioner has no way of controlling which course the taxpayer will follow in initiating litigation. Should the latter elect to conduct the action in the courts rather than the Board, the Commissioner would be forever precluded from correcting any errors which might later appear to have occurred with reference to the year affected by the judgment. A taxpayer who found himself in doubt about the deductibility of a particular item claimed in his return might contemplate a later change of position with regard to this item. Under such circumstances he would find it greatly to his advantage to conduct any litigation concerning an unrelated item of the same return in the courts rather than before the Board so as to preclude the application of Section 820 by the Commissioner in the event of a subsequent change of position.

87. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-0, list §§272(f) and 322(c) as provisions of the internal revenue laws preventing the correction of errors. Art. 820(b)-1, Example 2, and Art. 820(b)-2, Example 2 indicate that adjustments would be made where §§272(f) and 322(c) were applicable.
88. See Report of Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 64, at 50; Statement of the House Managers, op. cit. supra note 58, at 56. The Senate Committee referred to §§272(f) and 322(c) as the "collateral consequences of a board of tax appeals proceeding."
Conversely, situations might arise where the taxpayer would be at a disadvantage because he could not invoke the application of Section 820 in his particular case. Whenever litigation had been initiated before the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1938, the availability of Section 820 to the taxpayer would depend upon the manner in which that litigation was conducted. The taxpayer not being able to foresee the result might unwittingly have precluded himself from obtaining the benefits of Section 820. Even with regard to litigation initiated subsequent to the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1938 he might similarly place himself at a disadvantage, because of an unawareness of the effect of res judicata upon Section 820 or because other considerations controlled the choice of the tribunal.

Certainly Section 820 did not contemplate anomalous consequences. It is unlikely therefore that it will receive a judicial interpretation creating such an eccentric obstruction to the accomplishment of its objectives. All the reasons for the enactment of Section 820 to supplement “the equitable principles applied by the courts” by “taking the profit out of inconsistency” despite the bar of the statute of limitations, of closing agreements and of the “collateral consequences” of a Board decision apply with full force to the collateral consequences of court decisions. The doubts on this matter, however, might well be removed by an amendment to Section 820 eliminating “by the operation of any provision of the internal revenue laws.” The section would then clearly require an adjustment whenever correction of the effect of errors was prevented regardless of the sources of the prevention. It should be noted that such an amendment would disturb the conclusive force of res judicata where proper treatment of the item in question had been in issue and adjudicated only, as pointed out above, in the rare instance of inconsistent Board or court decisions arising from the failure to rely upon res judicata in the later proceeding. If a determination other than by court or Board decision were obtained sanctioning inconsistent conduct, no adjustment could be made under Section 820 as by its terms an adjustment is possible only in the event of an earlier erroneous treatment of the item and the adjudication would conclusively establish that the item had not been previously erroneously treated.

Section 820 is operative even though the correction of the effect of the error was prevented prior to the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1938, for subsection (b) refers to the operation of any provision of the internal revenue laws, “whether before, on, or after the date of enactment of this Act,” and is thus in a sense a retroactive section. But although the barrier preventing correction may have existed at the time of the passage of the Revenue Act of 1938, as where the error was made with respect to the year 1932 and the period of limitations for that year had expired prior to 1938, the section is not operative unless
there is inconsistent conduct after the enactment of the section, so that
the retroactive application of the section is entirely in the control
of the party who is protected by the expiration of the period of limitations.
In this sense the section is prospective in operation.

As in many instances more than one of the provisions mentioned above
may prevent correction of the error, Section 820 lifts all the barriers,
with the exception of a compromise, to such correction. This is true
even where at the time the determination becomes final only one barrier
is present but thereafter other barriers appear, as where at such time
the expiration of the period of limitations with respect to the earlier year
prevents correction and one week later a final Board decision would also
prevent correction under Section 272(f). If the prerequisite of a barrier
closing all methods of correction at the time the determination becomes
final is satisfied, the mandatory language of the section—"then the effect
of the error shall be corrected by an adjustment made under this section"
suffices to override other barriers that may spring up to prevent cor-
rection, for otherwise the section would defeat its purpose. The method
of adjustment prescribed by the section, however, permits the prevention
of adjustment by such barriers as may arise from inept conduct in pur-
suing such method, as where the Commissioner fails to mail a deficiency
letter within the time prescribed in subsection (c). Finally, the barrier
of Section 3229 of the Revised Statutes, relating to compromises, is
not lifted by Section 820.

89. Where the inconsistent position was asserted prior to the enactment of § 820, as
the section provided in subsection (a)(1) for a ninety-day waiting period in which either
taxpayer or Commissioner might withdraw from a previously asserted inconsistent
position, continuation of the proceeding to a final determination which adopts the inconsis-
tent position is thus the equivalent of assertion of such position after the enactment of
§ 820. See Statement of the House Managers, op. cit. supra note 58, at 58. The
waiting period is provided by excluding from the definition of determination any conduct
otherwise constituting a determination if it became final prior to ninety days after the
date of the enactment of this Act. In interpreting this provision, the Regulations restrict
the section to determinations made on or after August 27, 1938. Regulations 101,
Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820-1. Both the section and the Regulations tacitly assume that
a claim for refund could be safely withdrawn by the taxpayer in the ninety-day period
under these circumstances.

90. The Statement of the House Managers, op. cit. supra note 58, at 56, states
that the section becomes operative if correction is prevented "by the operation of one
or more provisions of the internal revenue laws." See note 65, supra.

91. Rev. Stat. § 3229, as amended by § 815, Revenue Act of 1938, permits the com-
promise of any civil or criminal case arising under the internal revenue laws. The Com-
misioner, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, or an Under Secretary
or Assistant Secretary, may effect the compromise prior to the institution of suit; if suit
has been instituted, the compromise may only be effected by the Attorney General. Executive
Order, No. 6166, June 10, 1933, § 5. Section 820 makes no reference to the other
statutory provision for compromises made by the Secretary of the Treasury, Rev. Stat.
§ 3469, or to compromises made by the Attorney General under the powers inherent in
his office. It is expected that compromises so effected will also provide a barrier to adjust-

This phase of the subject may best be introduced by an example. Suppose that the taxpayer had erroneously included in his gross income for 1934 an item of interest which increased his tax $500 and that the period of limitations for refund claims had expired. The taxpayer then voluntarily included such item in his gross income for 1938, increasing his tax, however, by only $100. If the taxpayer were permitted to claim that an adjustment was authorized because an item of income was included in gross income which had been erroneously included in an earlier year now closed, the statute of limitations on refund claims would be a nullity in many tax cases. Similarly, if the Commissioner by voluntarily allowing a deduction in a year in which it was not claimed by the taxpayer could thereby obtain an adjustment for an earlier closed year in which the deduction had been erroneously allowed, the statute of limitations on assessments would offer little protection to taxpayers. This danger was recognized by Congress, as the following quotations from the Report of the Senate Committee on Finance indicate:

"The legislation here proposed is based upon the following principles:

"(1) To preserve unimpaired the essential function of the statute of limitations, corrective adjustment should (a) never modify the application of the statute except when the party or parties in whose favor it applies shall have justified such modification by active inconsistency . . . "92

This problem was met in two ways. As pointed out above, a determination is prerequisite to the operation of Section 820. In neither of the examples just presented is a determination present, as a return and a voluntary refund because of an overpayment are not determinations under subsection (a) (1), so that an adjustment would not be authorized. The definition of determination thus serves to exclude most of the situations where the remedy afforded by Section 820 is not justified. As a precaution, the section in addition specifically provides in subsection (b) that:

92. Supra note 64, at 49.
"Such adjustment shall be made only if there is adopted in the determination a position maintained by the Commissioner (in case the amount of the adjustment would be refunded or credited in the same manner as an overpayment under subsection (c)) or by the taxpayer with respect to whom the determination is made (in case the amount of the adjustment would be assessed and collected in the same manner as a deficiency under subsection (c)), which position is inconsistent with the erroneous inclusion, exclusion, omission, allowance, disallowance, recognition, or nonrecognition, as the case may be."

Thus, if the Commissioner would, under the adjustment, obtain a deficiency for the barred year, such adjustment is not permitted unless the taxpayer has taken the inconsistent position in the later year. The Commissioner may not therefore use Section 820 as a lever to pry open the statute of limitations and correct erroneous action where the taxpayer is quite content to leave the past undisturbed. Likewise, if the Commissioner does not awaken the sleeping dog, the taxpayer cannot under Section 820 obtain a refund as a consequence of his own inconsistent action.

The inconsistency of the position is ascertained by reference to what was actually done in the earlier year rather than to what the taxpayer or the Commissioner may have urged at that time. Thus, suppose the taxpayer in his return for 1934 included a rental item in gross income. The Commissioner, however, voluntarily refunded an overpayment on the ground that the item was income for 1935. The taxpayer then included the item in gross income for that year but later, after the expiration of the period of limitations with respect to deficiencies for 1934, filed a claim for refund based on the ground that the item was properly includible in 1934 and the claim is allowed. Although the taxpayer with respect to 1935 has successfully maintained a position consistent with the position taken by him with respect to 1934, an adjustment is nevertheless authorized under subsection (b)(3), as the taxpayer's later position is inconsistent with the tax result reached for 1934, the erroneous exclusion of the item from gross income.\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{93} It is arguable that the section fails to cover cases where an officer of the United States other than the Commissioner maintains the inconsistent position. Suppose that the taxpayer erroneously included an item in gross income for 1934, included it again in gross income for 1938 and then is allowed a refund claimed for 1938 because of such later inclusion. Suit for erroneous refund is then instituted in which it is maintained that the item properly belonged in gross income for 1938. As this suit is in the name of the United States, \textsection{610}, \textit{Revenue Act of 1928}, and is conducted by the Attorney General, is not that official the one who is maintaining the inconsistent position? As the intent of the section is clear, the adjustment should be obtained under such circumstances.

\textsuperscript{94} The disposition of a claim for refund may under some circumstances constitute the maintenance of an inconsistent position by the Commissioner, as where the taxpayer has erroneously included an item in gross income for 1934, has again included such item in gross income for 1935 and then filed a refund claim which is denied by the Commis-
A problem is suggested by an example in Article 820(b)–7(a) of the Regulations under this section. It is there stated that if, in the case of a taxpayer who had been erroneously allowed a deduction for a closed year, the Commissioner issued a deficiency for a later year based upon other items and then in his answer to the taxpayer's petition to the Board of Tax Appeals voluntarily proposed the allowance of the same deduction for the later year, no adjustment is authorized if the Board, referring to the answer of the Commissioner, takes the deduction into account in its redetermination of the tax for the later year "as the Commissioner, and not the taxpayer, has maintained a position inconsistent with the allowance of" the deduction for the earlier year. The Regulations thus assert that silence on the part of the taxpayer and his acquiescence in the allowance of the deduction under such circumstances are not equivalent to the maintenance of an inconsistent position. By inference, if the taxpayer had objected to the allowance of the deduction but had accepted the benefit of the allowance under the Board's redetermination of tax liability, the case would not be altered. Presumably, however, if the taxpayer before the Board affirmatively adopted the inconsistent position taken by the Commissioner in the latter's answer, an adjustment would be authorized. While it is arguable that silence plus acceptance of benefits does not differ materially from this last case, it must be remembered that we are discussing a normally unreal situation made real only if the Commissioner, or the taxpayer in the converse situation described in Article 820(b)–7(b) of the Regulations, attempts to use Section 820 in an inequitable manner. The statutory language in question must consequently be so interpreted as to prevent the taxpayer or the Commissioner from unfairly forcing the other party into an inconsistent position so as to obtain a pecuniary advantage through an adjustment under this section.

It has been said that the section authorizes adjustment where an inconsistent position asserted by the appropriate party during the course of the proceeding has later been withdrawn prior to its termination. Thus, suppose a taxpayer who erroneously obtained a deduction for interest for 1937 claimed, inter alia, the same deduction in a claim for refund filed for 1938 after the expiration of the period of limitations on assessment on the ground that the item properly belonged in 1935. Speaking generally, the determination and maintenance of the inconsistent position are here embodied in the same action; more precisely, the disposition of the claim for refund constitutes both a determination and the maintenance of the inconsistent position, and such disposition becomes a determination upon the expiration of the time for instituting suit with respect to the denial of the claim for refund.

95. If the Commissioner did not place the deduction in issue through his answer but chose to leave it undisturbed and the Board sustained the deficiency and in its redetermination of the tax allowed the deduction on its own motion, there is a determination which allows the deduction, but no adjustment is authorized as the taxpayer has not maintained an inconsistent position. Such action on the part of the Board, however, would be contrary to the purpose of Congress in enacting § 820. See discussion infra, p. 738 et seq.
ments for 1937. The refund claim constitutes an assertion of an inconsistent position. The taxpayer, however, then notifies the Commissioner that he withdraws the claim with respect to the interest deduction, but that the refund claim should remain in force as regards the other items. The Commissioner nevertheless allows the refund claim for the full amount claimed, including the interest deduction, and then asserts that Section 820 authorizes an adjustment with respect to 1937. It has been stated that such adjustment is permitted and that the section thus constitutes a trap for the unwary taxpayer. But an interpretation that would make meaningless and ineffective a withdrawal from an inconsistent position previously taken appears unwarranted. The requirement of adoption in the determination of a position "maintained" by the taxpayer presupposes a position persevered in to the end by the taxpayer and not a position abandoned in the course of the controversy. Thus, the Statement of the House Managers explains that the inconsistent position must be "successfully maintained." While the Regulations do not consider this question, Under Secretary Magill in approving them pointed out that "Section 820 was designed to provide equitable relief and will not be applied to penalize taxpayers in cases in which an inconsistent position is inadvertently taken and then withdrawn prior to a determination." This policy, which implies that the section permits the safe withdrawal of an inconsistent position, is a frank recognition of its purpose and should lay at rest any fears that may have been aroused.

Section 820 is designed to nullify the advantages which ordinarily followed shifts of position by either taxpayer or Commissioner and to operate in such fashion that when a shift is made an adjustment is

96. Op. cit. supra note 58, at 58; also Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 64, at 50. As indicated in note 89, supra, a waiting period was provided in which inconsistent positions asserted prior to the enactment of § 820 could be withdrawn. As the purpose of this waiting period was to avoid the unfairness that would exist if an inconsistent position antedating § 820 were to result in an adjustment if the determination occurred after enactment of the section but before the party had a chance to appreciate its potentialities and withdraw, this provision does not offer support to a contention that withdrawals after the expiration of the ninety-day period are not effective. Rather, it merely assumes that with respect to any determination occurring after the ninety-day period, the parties will have had sufficient time to withdraw from the inconsistent position if they so desired and thus avoid adjustment.

97. Treasury Press Release, supra note 62. Consideration is given later to the problem whether the Commissioner can refuse a refund where the taxpayer to avoid an adjustment withdraws from a position taken in a claim for refund and it is clear that the claim is a proper one. Infra, p. 740.

98. The Report of the Committee on Federal Taxation, ADVANCE PROGRAM OF AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 61st Annual Meeting (1938) 104, included in its parade of horrors under § 820 the hosts of taxpayers who innocently take inconsistent positions. Experience would seem rather to point to the conclusion that it is generally the shrewd taxpayer, or rather his attorney or accountant, who sees the tax advantage to be gained from the inconsistent position and consequently asserts it.
authorized which, interest considered, might not only cancel but outweigh any advantage gained by the subsequent shift. So far as the taxpayer is concerned, he would be discouraged from taking inconsistent positions if the end result were a net loss. While taxpayers might soon become aware that it cost more to commit than to forego shifts of position, the effect of Section 820 upon the Commissioner is not so clear. The taxpayer is concerned merely with protecting his own interest, and is free to change his position or maintain it, according to what best serves his interest. The Commissioner, on the other hand, is bound to two purposes: the protection of the revenues and the administration of the internal revenue laws uniformly in accordance with their terms. Usually the two purposes coincide but they sometimes conflict. Under normal circumstances the obligation to protect the revenues must yield. Does Section 820 require a different answer in the circumstances in which it applies? The nature of this problem can perhaps be best illustrated by an example. A taxpayer erroneously included an item of rent in gross income for 1933 and failed to include it in gross income for 1934 where it properly belonged. If the Commissioner were to assert a deficiency with respect to the rent for 1934, after the expiration of the period of limitations for 1933, and a determination requiring its inclusion in gross income for 1934 eventuated, the taxpayer would be able to secure an adjustment. If the amount of the deficiency for 1934 were $100 and the amount of the adjustment $300, has the Commissioner the right to withhold a notice of deficiency with respect to 1934 and thereby avoid the pecuniary disadvantage consequent upon an adjustment? Or suppose the taxpayer had again included the item in gross income for 1934 but had filed a claim for refund so that a denial of the claim would permit the taxpayer to secure the adjustment for 1933. Could the Commissioner avoid this consequence by allowing the claim for refund?

It has been contended that in such cases the Commissioner must follow the mandate of the substantive statute and is obligated to assert the deficiency or deny the refund, although such action results in the maintenance of an inconsistent position. At the outset, however, it must be realized that in fact few cases of this type clearly call for the assertion of a deficiency or the denial of a refund, the answer usually being so debatable as to turn on opinion. The examples above present a typically doubtful question as to the correct year for which the item should be returned. Usually neither Commissioner nor taxpayer could state with confidence that inclusion in 1933 was erroneous and inclusion in 1934

99. The taxpayer does not have this problem. Even assuming that a negligence or fraud penalty might be imposed for failure to include the rent item in 1934 a way is always afforded the taxpayer to avoid the problem by including the item and filing a claim for refund, thereby throwing the burden of taking an inconsistent position upon the Commissioner.

100. Report of the Committee on Federal Taxation, op. cit supra note 98.
would be proper. The taxpayer himself usually has plausible reasons for
including an item in the one year rather than the other by which the
Commissioner may be convinced despite other reasons for including
the item in a different year. Even if the Commissioner were not so
convinced he may nonetheless believe that the very difference of opinion
so beclouds the issue that he is free to follow whichever reasoning best
serves the protection of the revenues. Certainly he would be warranted
in taking the position that as the item has actually once been included
the doubts may be resolved by closing the matter on that basis. This
position would involve an exercise of the same reasonable discretion
that precedes the daily decisions as to whether a particular deficiency
letter should be issued or claim for refund allowed.

In rare cases, however, the issue may be clear—as where an existing
regulation, or stronger still, a Supreme Court decision is directly in point.
Such cases would squarely present the problem whether the Commissioner
is compelled to shift his position or is authorized by Section 820 to
refrain from doing so. The Congressional Committee Reports make four
things plain:101 (1) The taking of inconsistent positions by either taxpayer
or Commissioner is deplored; (2) the taking of inconsistent positions is
to be discouraged by making them pecuniarily inadvisable where the
amount of the adjustment plus interest is greater than the tax advantage
gained by the shift of position; (3) shifts of position are nevertheless
permissible and presumably will still be made where a monetary advantage
would be gained, though here equitable relief by way of an adjustment
will be afforded to the other party; and (4) the section is to operate
even-handedly as respects Commissioner and taxpayer. Section 820 thus
offers definite directions by which the Commissioner may chart his course,
and seems clear Congressional authorization for the Commissioner, in
the exercise of his duty to safeguard the revenues, to be governed by
the same tests that control the taxpayer. The Commissioner would be
free, therefore, to follow in these situations the course financially most
profitable to the Treasury under Section 820, even where the result would
be the assertion of a deficiency with respect to one taxpayer and the
withholding of such assertion against, or even the granting of a refund to,
another taxpayer, solely to avoid the taking of an inconsistent position
which Congress so strongly disapproved.102 Although Congress did not
prohibit shifts of positions entirely for reasons given above, it clearly
thought that the undesirable effect of such shifts demanded corrective
action by nullifying the advantages which formerly they created, even
where it meant a departure otherwise from the command of the statute.

101. See Report of Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 64, at 48-52; State-
ment of the House Managers, op. cit. supra note 58, at 50-59.
102. The criticism of § 820(b)(1) in Comment (1938) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 300, 304,
fails to take account of the fact that the deficiency need not be asserted.
To achieve its purpose it adopted a single standard for both taxpayer and Commissioner, namely the pecuniary test implicit in Section 820, making this adoption practically explicit by the 90-day provision for the withdrawal of pending proceedings.\textsuperscript{103} The justification for authorizing this departure from an otherwise uniform application of the law lies in the conditions, described in the early part of this article, which gave rise to the need for Section 820.

The foregoing discussion concerning the right of the Commissioner to depart from an otherwise uniform application of the law to avoid the maintenance of an inconsistent position would seem likewise to indicate that Section 820 authorizes the Commissioner, as well as the taxpayer, to take the necessary procedural steps to secure an adjustment even though such steps involve action for which there would otherwise be no justification. Thus, if a taxpayer took a deduction erroneously for 1933 and took it again for 1934, the Commissioner, even in the rare case where it was clear that the deduction was properly taken for 1934, could assert a deficiency for the sole purpose of obtaining a determination to pave the way to an adjustment for 1933. Likewise, Section 820 authorizes the Commissioner to withhold voluntary refund of an overpayment with respect to which the taxpayer could have claimed a refund had he been willing to take an inconsistent position. Thus, in the preceding example if the taxpayer had not taken the deduction in 1934 the Commissioner on audit of the return would not be obligated to refund the overpayment.


The principle underlying subsection (d), which deals with the ascertainment of the amount of the adjustment, is a simple one: the tax for the year with respect to which the error was made is determined, the error is then corrected, and the difference between the corrected tax result and the first figure constitutes the amount of the adjustment. Whether the datum point—the tax previously determined for the taxable year with respect to which the error was made—may be readily ascertained depends on the extent to which the tax liability of the taxpayer for that year was altered after the return was filed. Subsection (d), by providing that alterations by way of deficiency should be added to the amount shown on the return and those by way of refund or credit should be subtracted, adopts, nearly verbatim, the language used in Section 271 to define the term "deficiency" and to this extent is on familiar ground.\textsuperscript{104}

\begin{footnotes}
\item 103. "It is provided that the section will not become operative by reason of determinations made prior to 90 days after the effective date of the act. This affords taxpayers and the Commissioner a reasonable time to decide whether they desire to discontinue proceedings already begun which may lead to determinations as defined in this section."
\item STATEMENT OF HOUSE MANAGERS, op. cit. supra note 58, at 58.
\item 104. Cf. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 64, at 51; Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(d)-1. Subsection (d), by increasing the
\end{footnotes}
in the computation that may prove difficult is the correction of the error in the tax previously determined. Subsection (d) states that "There shall then be ascertained the increase or decrease in the tax previously determined which results solely from the correct exclusion, inclusion, allowance, disallowance, recognition, or nonrecognition, of the item, inclusion, deduction, credit, gain, or loss, which was the subject of the error." The key word in this provision is "solely," and when reference is made to the Committee Reports to ascertain its significance, it will be seen that "solely" bears a heavy burden. The Report of the Senate Finance Committee includes as one of the principles underlying Section 820 the policy that the corrective adjustment should "under no circumstances affect the tax save with respect to the influence of the particular items involved in the adjustment." Further in the Report there appears the statement that "correction is made only with respect to the item involved in the determination" and examples are given wherein erroneous treatment of other items, as to which there was no inconsistent position, is not corrected when the amount of the adjustment is ascertained. It was thus clearly the desire of Congress to depart from the principle of Lewis v. Reynolds in so far as the operation of Section 820 is concerned. The amount shown on the return by amounts previously assessed as a deficiency, would literally require addition of any addition to the tax assessed under § 293, as it is assessed "in the same manner as if it were a deficiency." Section 271, however, has never been so construed.

To a large extent, subsection (d) assumes that records are available with respect to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1931 [see subsection (f)], and, more important, that in any settlements made with respect to the tax liability for those years lump-sum dispositions were avoided and the various changes in the tax return were carefully detailed. Both assumptions appear justifiable as general propositions. The present Bureau practice favors such treatment of tax settlements and § 820 will undoubtedly encourage it for the future.

105. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 64, at 49.
106. Id. at 51. If the taxpayer erroneously included an item of rent and an item of interest in gross income for 1934, and erroneously took a deduction for depreciation, and the Commissioner by way of deficiency sustained by the Board again included the rent item in gross income for 1938, the adjustment would be with respect to the rent item, and the error as to the interest item and the depreciation deduction would not be corrected. Similarly, if deductions for a casualty loss and a bad debt loss were erroneously allowed for 1934 and an item of salary erroneously included in gross income, and the casualty loss again allowed for 1938, the adjustment would correct the error as to the casualty loss but not as to the bad debt loss or the salary item.

107. 284 U. S. 281 (1932). In this case, the Court said: "While the statutes authorizing refunds do not specifically empower the Commissioner to reaudit a return whenever repayment is claimed, authority therefor is necessarily implied. An overpayment must appear before refund is authorized. Although the statute of limitations may have barred the assessment and collection of any additional sum, it does not obliterate the right of the United States to retain payments already received when they do not exceed the amount which might have been properly assessed and demanded." Id. at 283. Under this case, in the first example stated in note 106 above, the Commissioner could presumably, if § 820 had been silent on this point, offset the adjustment with respect to the rent item.
justification for this departure has been stated earlier in the article; our concern here is with the manner in which the statutory language expresses such Congressional policy.

The term "solely" in subsection (d), aided by the language of subsection (e), discussed infra, was used to reach the desired result. While that term would seem adequate for this purpose, its use may give rise to difficulties, which an example will illustrate. Suppose the item erroneously included is the taxpayer's salary for 1937. In his return for that year the taxpayer had naturally included such salary in computing his earned income credit. In ascertaining the amount of the adjustment must the earned income credit be recomputed—in the words of subsection (d), does "correct exclusion" of the salary item cover both the elimination of the salary item from gross income and the collateral consequences of that elimination? The Regulations, following closely the language of the Statement of the House Managers, answer this inquiry in the affirmative:

"If the treatment of any item upon which the tax previously determined was based, or if the application of any provisions of the internal revenue laws with respect to such tax, depends upon the amount of income (e.g., charitable contributions, foreign tax credit, earned income credit), readjustment in these particulars will be necessary . . . in conformity with the change in the amount of the income which results from the correct treatment of the item or items in respect of which the error was made." This interpretation, which emphasizes the word "correct" in subsection (d), is a desirable one. Such correction of the collateral by the amount of tax due because of the erroneous deduction for depreciation. And a taxpayer might argue that the principle of Lewis v. Reynolds should be extended to allow him, in the second example, an offset based upon the salary item. Cf. Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247 (1935), crediting a barred overpayment under the estate tax against a deficiency in income tax where the same item was involved. See Comment (1938) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 300.

108. The policy underlying subsection (d) may work a hardship in cases where the taxpayer has a large number of deductions but only takes on his return deductions sufficient to produce no tax liability, and the adjustment has the effect of disallowing one of the deductions taken, so that a tax becomes due; or where the taxpayer has taken many deductions and the Commissioner does not check all as a few of them are sufficient to create no tax liability and the adjustment has the effect of including an item in gross income but it is still offset by the unchecked deductions which turn out to be improper. It must be remembered that the requirement of inconsistent position permits a party to avoid adjustment in most of these cases; the taxpayer in the illustration above by simply not asserting the inconsistent position could allow the matter to stay at rest. Cf. p. 734 supra.


111. The correction of the error may, of course, have the effect of placing the taxpayer in a higher, or lower, surtax bracket. Other matters, not mentioned in Regulations
consequences of the error, however, is limited to the year with regard to which the error was made, and does not extend to the influence of the error on other years. While subsection (b) states broadly that "the effect of the error shall be corrected by an adjustment made under this section", this mandate is qualified by the requirement of subsection (d) that the amount of the adjustment be determined with reference to the year with respect to which the error was made, which requirement in turn refers to the specific errors described in subsection (b) (1)-(5).\textsuperscript{112}

101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, affected by the adjustment in net income are percentage depletion and taxation as a personal holding company. If the return of a corporation for 1938 showed that it had received 65 per cent of its income from the sources specified as material to taxation as a personal holding company under Title IA, \textit{Revenue Act of 1938}, and, as a result of the inclusion of an item of income under the adjustment, the percentage is increased to 80 per cent, the corporation would be taxed as a personal holding company if the other requisites under Title IA were present, even though such taxation involves proof of matters not previously involved in the computation of the tax, as the fact that more than 50 per cent in value of the outstanding stock was owned, directly or indirectly, by or for not more than five individuals [see § 402(a) (2), \textit{Revenue Act of 1938}]. The Regulations, and likewise the \textit{Statement of the House Managers, op. cit. supra} note 58, thus do not distinguish between a case where, for example, a charitable deduction has been claimed on the return, computed by taking 15 per cent of the net income therein shown, and the adjustment either increases or decreases such net income, so that the amount of the deduction must be increased or decreased if the proper percentage is to be maintained, and the case where the return shows a gift to a supposed charitable organization but no deduction for such gift as the return shows no net income, and the adjustment, by including an item in gross income, produces net income, so that a charitable deduction to the extent of 15 per cent of such net income becomes allowable if it can be shown that the organization was in fact a charitable organization. In the first case, as a deduction has already been allowed by the Commissioner, he could not in the computation of the amount of the adjustment raise the question whether the recipient of the gift was in fact a charitable organization, and the problem of computing the amount of the adjustment is simply a mathematical one; in the second case the question of the status of the recipient of the gift for the first time becomes important and the computation of the amount of the adjustment involves proof by the taxpayer on this issue. It might be argued that as the return did contain an enumeration of the gift as a charitable one, although no deduction was claimed therefor, the Commissioner could not assert that the gift was not in fact to a charitable organization.

112. For example, taxation of a corporation as a personal holding company in a given year depends upon the percentage of income derived from certain sources in previous years. \textit{Revenue Act of 1938}, § 402(a) (1). Thus, if a corporation receives 89 per cent of its income from the designated sources in its taxable year beginning in 1937 and only 70 per cent in 1938 it remains taxable in 1938 as a personal holding company under Title IA of the \textit{Revenue Act of 1938} because of the 80 per cent in 1937. Suppose that a corporation was taxed as a personal holding company for 1937 but an adjustment for that year under § 820 reduced the percentage to 60 per cent, the corporation being allowed a refund on account of both the erroneous inclusion of an item in gross income and the consequent erroneous taxation of the corporation as a personal holding company. If the corporation had already been taxed as a personal holding company for 1938, where the percentage in that year was 70 per cent, and that year is closed, the adjustment for 1937, being restricted by the terms of § 820 to 1937 would not extend to a reopening of the return for 1938. If the 1938 taxable year were still open, no problem arises under § 820 regarding the effect of the
Subsection (d) provides that there be added to the amount of the decrease in tax any amounts wrongfully collected, as additions to the tax or interest, as a result of the error. Thus, if the item erroneously included in gross income had not been stated by the taxpayer on his return but was later included by way of deficiency assessment, together with six per cent interest, the amount of the interest is to be added to the decrease in tax resulting from exclusion of the item. An addition to the tax under Section 293(a) on account of negligence would be similarly treated.

The discussion so far has been in terms of the income tax under Title I. As the unjust enrichment tax, the excess-profits tax, and the Title IA surtax on personal holding companies are all income taxes, the question arises whether Section 820 is applicable to these taxes, and if so, in what manner. The heading of the section speaks of “income adjustment upon the tax for 1938, as the taxpayer or the Commissioner could, as respects the 1938 tax, prove the proper percentage in 1937 whether or not the year 1937 was closed. The existence or nonexistence of the proper percentage in 1937 is a question of fact, proof of which is not affected by the expiration of the period of limitations on refunds or deficiencies for 1937. Thus, in the above example, where the 1938 taxable year is still open, the taxpayer, independently of § 820, could prove that the proper percentage in 1937 was 60 per cent; or, regardless of the reduction to 60 per cent effected by the adjustment, the Commissioner could prove that the proper percentage was 80 per cent or more, if a larger item of income, not involved in the adjustment, had been improperly omitted.

113. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(d)-1, omit the word “wrongfully,” implying that all interest or additions to the tax collected as a result of the error were “wrongfully collected.” As § 292 of each Revenue Act since 1932 authorizes interest on “the amount determined as a deficiency,” it is arguable that interest collected in literal compliance with that section has not been “wrongfully collected,” so that the term “wrongfully” would have meaning where there has been a departure from § 292. This narrow interpretation, however, would seem contrary to the purpose of § 820 to restore to the taxpayer those sums of money which had been taken from him as a consequence of the error, here both the amount of the erroneous deficiency and the interest thereon. But as this broad interpretation would render meaningless the inclusion of the term “wrongfully,” it may be that subsection (d) proceeds on the assumption that the failure to include an item of income erroneously included by way of deficiency in the earlier year might under some circumstances be negligent and thus justify a § 293(a) addition to the tax, which addition would not be “wrongfully collected.”

While the Regulations are silent, the word “collected” would seem to refer to interest collected by the Commissioner from the taxpayer and not to the reverse situation, so that interest obtained from the Commissioner by the taxpayer on an erroneous overpayment is not added to the amount of the adjustment. The presence of “additions to the tax” which are obtained only by the Commissioner, is persuasive; moreover, the Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 64, at 51, unqualifiedly refers to “amounts wrongfully collected from the taxpayer, as additions to the tax or interest.”

See note 123, infra.

114. Title III, Revenue Act of 1936.

115. Section 602 of Title III, Revenue Act of 1938, and corresponding provisions of prior Revenue Acts.

116. Title IA, Revenue Act of 1938, and corresponding provisions of prior Revenue Acts.
Section 820 of the Revenue Act tax cases” and it is applicable to determinations under the “income tax laws.” Moreover, each of the titles imposing the above taxes contains a provision making applicable thereto all provisions of law applicable in respect of the taxes imposed by Title I, in so far as not inconsistent. Section 820 itself appears in Title V of the Revenue Act of 1938, covering “Miscellaneous Provisions.” As there is no express language in that section limiting its applicability to the Title I tax, and as its provisions are consistent with the other income taxes, the section would seem operative with respect to determinations under those taxes. While the Committee Reports are silent on this point, the Regulations take this position with respect to the determination and state that a determination may occur with respect to any one or more of these taxes. A more difficult question arises in connection with the extent of the adjustment. Suppose that an item of income was erroneously included in gross income for 1934 and a Title I tax and an excess-profits tax were paid for that year. A determination with respect to only the Title I tax for 1938 again requires the inclusion of the item in gross income. Does the adjustment under Section 820 extend only to the Title I tax for 1934, or to both the Title I tax and the excess-profits tax? On the one hand, it may be argued that the effect of the erroneous inclusion cannot be fully corrected unless both taxes are adjusted as both depend on the same income. On the other, it may be contended that subsection (d) speaks of the tax to be adjusted in the singular—“the tax previously determined,” “the tax shown by the taxpayer . . . upon his return” and the Committee Reports use similar terminology, implying an adjustment within the framework of a single tax. Moreover, the first position would lead to difficulties where correction of the Title I tax

117. E.g., § 409, Revenue Act of 1938 (Title IA); § 602(c), Revenue Act of 1933 (excess-profits tax); § 503(a), Revenue Act of 1936 (unjust enrichment tax).

118. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4836, Art. 820(b)-0. Although the tax on transfers of silver bullion [48 Stat. 1178, § 8 (1934)] was validated as an income tax in United States v. Hudson, 299 U. S. 498 (1937), it is phrased as an excise stamp tax and its exclusion from the group of income taxes reached by § 820 seems proper. See also I.T. 2899, XIV-1 Cum. Bull. 67 (1935); I.M. 4587, 1937-1, Cum. Bull. 74 (1937). While the excess profits under the Vinton Act, 48 Stat. 503 (1934), 49 Stat. 1925 (1935), are collected in accordance with the methods employed to collect Federal income taxes, the tax is not considered an income tax.

119. While “the tax” might be stretched to mean all of the income taxes paid for the year with respect to which the error was made, “return” would not permit such construction. While the Title I tax and the excess-profits tax are filed on one physical return, this is not true of the other taxes, and even in the case of the former taxes, two legal returns are present. Cf. Will County Title Company, 38 B. T. A. No. 183 (1938), holding that where the Commissioner had determined a deficiency in income tax for 1934 and an overassessment of excess-profits tax for the same year, a notice of deficiency with respect to the income tax had been issued, and the taxpayer had filed a petition with the Board, it had jurisdiction over the deficiency in income tax but not the overassessment of excess-profits tax.
was prevented but the excess-profits tax could be adjusted under the customary methods, as where the periods of limitations had expired only with respect to the former tax. The Regulations resolve this question in favor of the second position and provide:

"Section 820 may be applied to correct the effect of the error only as to the tax or taxes for the year with respect to which the error was made which corresponds to the tax or taxes with respect to which the determination relates. Thus, if the determination relates to the tax imposed by Title I of the Revenue Act of 1938, the adjustment may be only with respect to the tax imposed by Title I of the Revenue Act applicable to the year with respect to which the error was made; if the determination relates to section 602 of Title III of the Revenue Act of 1938, the adjustment may be only with respect to the tax imposed by the corresponding provisions of the Revenue Act applicable to the year with respect to which the error was made." 120

5. Method of Adjustment.

Subsection (c) provides the method of adjustment. As in the case of the computation of the amount of adjustment, the plan is a simple one: if the amount is an increase over the tax previously determined, it is recovered in the same manner as a deficiency determined by the Commissioner; if a decrease in that tax, in the same manner as an overpayment claimed by the taxpayer. The deficiency or overpayment, as the case may be, is for the taxable year with respect to which the error was made, and the coordination with the procedural tax machinery relating to that year is accomplished by the expedient of assuming that on the date of the determination one year remained before the expiration of the period of limitations upon assessment or filing claim for refund for such year. Thus, if the error is with respect to the year 1933, the determination became final in 1938 and the amount of the adjustment is an increase over the tax previously determined for 1933, it is to be assessed and collected in the same manner as would a deficiency for 1933 if properly asserted by the Commissioner in 1938—a notice of deficiency, unless waived, must be sent to the taxpayer 121 (within one

120. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-0. The language in Art. 820(d)-1(1) to the effect that the tax previously determined may consist of tax imposed by Title I, Title IA, etc., or "by any one or more of such provisions" must be construed in harmony with the explicit rule of Art. 820(b)-0 to refer in the latter regard to a case where the determination related to more than one of these income taxes.

121. Subsection (c), in using the language "as if it were a deficiency determined by the Commissioner," thus ties in with §272(a) of the REVENUE ACT OF 1938 and corresponding provisions of prior Revenue Acts, "If in the case of any taxpayer, the Commissioner determines that there is a deficiency . . . the Commissioner is authorized to send notice of such deficiency to the taxpayer by registered mail." The Senate Draft, in stating [subsection (d)] that the amount of adjustment "shall be considered as a deficiency," left it doubtful whether there could be any possibility of recourse to judicial review with respect to the deficiency.
year from the date of the determination); if he fails to petition to the Board within 90 days the tax may be assessed, etc. The deficiency letter would, in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions, suspend the running of the one-year period of limitation provided by subsection (c), and similarly the period of limitations upon collection would commence to run from the date of assessment of the amount of the adjustment. If the taxpayer paid the deficiency, he could file a claim for refund within two years from the date of payment, and if such refund were denied, suit could be brought within two years of the denial. In similar fashion, where the amount of the adjustment represents a decrease in tax and consequently is treated as if it were an overpayment claimed by the taxpayer, the customary refund procedure would be followed—filing of refund claim, allowance or disallowance by Commissioner, suit for refund by the taxpayer in the event of a disallowance. As the adjustment is assessed and collected as if it were a deficiency, or refunded or credited as if it were an overpayment, the amount of the adjustment will bear the same interest and be subject to the same additions to the tax, as would orthodox deficiencies and overpayments for the year with respect to which the error was made. In some instances, the one-year period


The Committee Reports and the Regulations are silent on the question whether subsection (c), by assuming that one year remained before the expiration of the period of limitations upon assessment, authorizes the Commissioner to proceed under § 311 of the Revenue Act of 1938, and corresponding provisions of prior Revenue Acts, against a transferee of the taxpayer with respect to whom the deficiency is authorized by § 820, although previously the period of limitations on assessment had expired as respects such transferee. As § 311 provides that the period of limitations for assessment of transferee liability is one year after the expiration of the period of limitations against the taxpayer, and as § 820 assumes for the purpose of the adjustment that one year of such later period still remains, it is arguable that the period of limitations for assessment of transferee liability has not expired. On the other hand, it may be said that express language is necessary to make a transferee liable for the amount of the adjustment where the normal period of limitations provided by § 311 had expired. Where that period had not expired, transferee liability for the amount of the adjustment would exist.

123. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 122, at 51-52; Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 456, Art. 820(c)-1. The statutory justification for the imposition of interest and additions to the tax is the phrase “in the same manner as if it were a deficiency... or an overpayment.” Even if “manner” be defined as referring to the method or machinery of assessment and collection so that subsection (d) incorporates only the notice of deficiency procedure, as §§ 291 and 292 are an integral part of that machinery, they are included within the sweep of subsection (d); a similar contention can be made with respect to interest on the overpayment. A contrary conclusion would force Congress to provide specifically for interest and additions to the tax, and such specification would in turn cast doubt on the incorporation of the other sections relating to the deficiency procedure which were not specifically mentioned. Moreover, § 293, Revenue Act of 1938, after requiring that an addition to the tax shall be assessed in the same manner as if it were a deficiency, specifically states that “section 292, relating
of limitations thus provided may operate to shorten the otherwise applicable period of limitations, as where the error is with respect to the taxable year 1937, correction is barred by a closing agreement executed in 1938 and the determination occurs in March, 1939, so that two years of the normal period of limitations for 1937 remain unexpired. Under such circumstances, the Commissioner would nevertheless have only one year within which to assert the deficiency.124

Subsection (e) provides an exception to the rule of subsection (c) that the established procedure is to be utilized in making the adjustment. The exception, however, is introduced solely to buttress the principle of subsection (d) that the adjustment is only with respect to the item which was the subject of the error. Thus, subsection (e) provides that (1) the amount of adjustment cannot be diminished by any credit or set-off based upon any other item and (2) that if the amount is paid, it cannot be recovered by a claim or suit for refund, or suit for erroneous to interest on deficiencies, shall not be applicable," thus indicating that without this exception the treatment of an addition to the tax as a deficiency would result in interest on the addition to the tax.

The specific inclusion of interest previously collected by the Commissioner in the amount of the adjustment under subsection (d) is made necessary by the different dates specified in the Revenue Acts for the computation of interest. As interest on an overpayment runs from the date of the overpayment (§ 614, Revenue Act of 1928), so that the interest in effect provided for by subsection (c) where the amount of the adjustment is an overpayment runs from the date the taxpayer paid the erroneous deficiency and the interest thereon, the interest so paid on the deficiency would not have been recovered by the taxpayer unless it were included in the amount of the adjustment; interest on interest thereafter is proper as the taxpayer has been wrongly deprived of the use of the interest paid by him on the erroneous deficiency. In view of the reason for the specific mention of interest in subsection (d), it therefore does not follow from such explicit reference that Congress did not intend to provide for interest in connection with subsection (c). Interest on a deficiency, however, runs from the date prescribed for payment of the tax (§ 292), so that if an amount had erroneously been refunded in the earlier year together with interest thereon, subsection (c), by providing in effect, where adjustment is by way of deficiency, for interest, on the amount erroneously refunded, for the period between the date the tax was due and the date of the refund payment, as well as for thereafter, restores to the Commissioner the interest wrongly paid to the taxpayer with respect to that period and thereby makes it unnecessary to add that amount to the amount of the adjustment. If the amount of such interest had been added to the amount of the adjustment, as in the case of an overpayment, the Commissioner would have twice obtained interest for the period between the payment of the tax and the date of the refund. But the Commissioner fails to obtain interest on such interest for the period from the date of the prior refund to the date of assessment of the amount of the adjustment, although the taxpayer by virtue of subsection (d) would obtain interest on such interest for the corresponding period.

124. Regulations 101, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(c)-1. The Statement of the House Managers, op. cit. supra note 122, at 59, that "the Commissioner has at least one year within which to issue a notice of deficiency in respect of the amount of the adjustment" would seem inaccurate unless the "at least" assumes that a waiver of the one-year period has been obtained.
refund, based upon any other item. The Commissioner cannot offset against the taxpayer's claim for refund of the amount of adjustment, where it is a decrease in tax, the amount of tax due on account of erroneous treatment of another item; nor can the Commissioner, after the amount of the adjustment is refunded, accomplish the same result in a suit for erroneous refund. Similarly, the taxpayer cannot, where the adjustment is treated as if it were a deficiency, in a contest of such deficiency before the Board claim an offset because of erroneous treatment of another item; nor can he, if he paid such deficiency, utilize such payment to support a claim for refund with respect to that item. This subsection also operates as a limitation upon the powers of the courts and the Board of Tax Appeals. While the established procedure is thus made available under subsection (c), careful safeguards have been inserted to prevent the amount of the adjustment from being affected by other items.\textsuperscript{125}

While Section 820, in utilizing established procedure to effect the adjustment authorized, provides for a notice of deficiency or a claim for refund, with the possibility of subsequent litigation in the Board or the courts with respect to the adjustment,\textsuperscript{126} it does not follow that this procedure must be pursued in its entirety to obtain an adjustment. In most cases, as a consequence of the determination, there will be no question as to the propriety or amount of the adjustment, so that the parties may accomplish in one transaction both the settlement of the tax liability for the year with respect to which the determination is made and the adjustment authorized under Section 820. If there is a deficiency for the later year because the item is required to be included in gross income, the amount of the adjustment will represent a decrease in tax, because of correction of the erroneous inclusion of the item in gross income for the earlier year, and that amount, treated as if it were an overpayment, may be credited against the deficiency in accordance with the customary practice.\textsuperscript{127} Similarly, if there is an overpayment for the year with respect to which the determination is made because of the allowance of a deduction, such overpayment may be credited against the amount of the adjust-

\textsuperscript{125} Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 122, at 52; \textit{Statement of the House Managers, op. cit. supra} note 122, at 57-58; \textit{Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(e)-1}, and examples therein.

\textsuperscript{126} See p. 752 \textit{infra}, pointing out that litigation may be necessary to establish the error with respect to the earlier year. Other controversial questions relating to the adjustment may also arise in particular cases, e.g., whether the amount of the adjustment was properly computed, whether at the time the determination became final correction under the usual methods was barred, etc.

\textsuperscript{127} Section 322(a) of the \textit{Revenue Act} of 1938, and corresponding provisions of prior Revenue Acts, provide that "Where there has been an overpayment of any tax imposed by this title, the amount of such overpayment shall be credited against any income, war-profits, or excess-profits tax or installment thereof then due from the taxpayer, and any balance shall be refunded immediately to the taxpayer."
ment, here an increase in tax. This crediting of or against the amount of the adjustment is not limited to tax due, or overpayments, for the year with respect to which the determination is made, but extends to any year, even the year of the adjustment, provided that any tax due for that year or any overpayment has been ascertained and is still collectible. As such action does not constitute a departure from the principle expressed in subsection (d), it is not prohibited by subsection (e). Adjustments under Section 820 may consequently be made expeditiously and without the necessity of a separate proceeding.

We proceed now to consider the kinds of cases, enumerated in subsection (b), to which the section extends.

F. Classes of Cases in Which Adjustment Is Authorized

Double Inclusion of an Item in Gross Income.

Subsection (b)(1) specifies the case where the determination requires "the inclusion in gross income of an item which was erroneously included in the gross income of the taxpayer for another taxable year or in the gross income of a related taxpayer." The general situation falling under subsection (b)(1) is illustrated by the example given in the Regulations: a lessor-taxpayer, who kept his books on a cash basis, erroneously included an item of accrued rent in his return for 1933. In 1938, after the expiration of the period of limitations on refunds for 1933,
the Commissioner ascertained that the rent was received in 1934 and asserted a deficiency for that year, which is sustained in 1941 by the Board of Tax Appeals. As the determination—the Board decision—requires the inclusion in gross income of an item—rent received in 1934—erroneously included in gross income for another year, an adjustment is authorized. As the Regulations point out, the determination need not arise from the assertion of a deficiency in the later year, for if the taxpayer himself had included the rent in gross income for 1934 and had filed a claim for refund which was denied, an adjustment would also be authorized. Nor need the erroneous inclusion be made by the taxpayer in his return, for if the inclusion in gross income for 1933 had resulted from the taxpayer's payment of a deficiency asserted for 1933 because of the non-inclusion of the rent in the return for that year, an adjustment would still be authorized.

Subsection (b)(1) emphasizes the reliance placed by Section 820 upon the “item” concept of tax liability. The tax liability for a year is generally a unitary matter, and the concern is whether the correct dollars and cents total has been determined. Section 820, however, fastens upon the treatment accorded a particular item in different years regardless of the correct dollars and cents tax liability for those years. Some difficulty, therefore, may arise in ascertaining what is an “item.” The term is not a new one in the income tax—Section 42 refers to the “amount of all items of gross income,” Section 22(b) provides that the “following

132. The term “requires” in subsections (b)(1) and (3), like the term “allows” in subsections (b)(2)(3) and (4), and the terms “denies” and “disallows” in subsections (b)(4) and (5), refers to action compelled by the determination and not, for example, to what should be done in accordance with dicta in a court decision. Thus, if an item of income is included in gross income for 1933 and the Commissioner asserts a deficiency stating that the item belongs in gross income for 1935, no adjustment is authorized if the court rules that the item does not belong in 1935 as it is properly includible in 1934. If, however, the taxpayer had brought suit for refund for 1934 based upon an unrelated item and under Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U. S. 281 (1932), the Commissioner successfully offset the refund by the amount of tax owing because of the failure to include the item in gross income for 1934, the determination here requires the inclusion of an item in gross income and an adjustment is authorized; this follows even if such amount of tax is greater than the refund sought.


134. While it may be argued that the taxpayer has maintained an inconsistent position in his return, the Commissioner, by the denial of the claim for refund, has clearly maintained an inconsistent position, and the condition in subsection (b) is therefore met. See note 94, supra.

135. The concepts of deficiency and overpayment clearly envisage tax liability as a unitary matter. The rules that a notice of deficiency may be sustained if tax is owing on a theory different from that relied upon in the notice, that only a single suit for refund may be maintained, that set-off is permissible in a suit for refund or erroneous refund, similarly rest upon such a unitary concept.
items shall not be included in gross income.” The term “item” thus refers in a qualitative sense to the various matters which make up gross income—salary, dividends, rent, gain on sale of a capital asset, distributed trust income, interest, etc. Salary for 1937 and salary for 1938 are two different items, though in each case the amount may be $10,000. But if the item is qualitatively the same, as salary for 1937 included in gross income for 1937 and again for 1940, it is immaterial that there is a quantitative difference. Hence, if the salary was paid in property and when included for 1937, the property was valued at $10,000 and when again required to be included in 1940 it was valued at $8,000, the inclusion of the entire $10,000 is to be adjusted under Section 820. But if a salary of $5,000 was received from A and a salary of $5,000 received from B, and both are included for 1937, and if later the $5,000 salary from B is included again for 1940, an adjustment is authorized only with respect to the $5,000 salary from B included for 1937—salary from A and salary from B are different items, even though they relate to the same year.

It will be observed that subsection (b)(1) refers to the erroneous inclusion of the item in the earlier year, and the remaining categories in subsection (b) also turn on erroneous action. The inclusion required by the determination with respect to the later year does not under Section 820 ipso facto establish the error for the earlier year. The coverage

136. The term “item” is used in this sense—an item of gross income—in subsections (b)(1), (b)(3), (d) and (e). In subsection (a)(1)(C), however, the term “items” is used loosely to cover not only an “item,” as used in the above subsections, but also a deduction, a credit, an inclusion [as used in subsection (b)(3)], etc. As pointed out above, subsection (a)(1)(C), in its tracing of the disposition of the various items in the claim for refund, likewise departs from a unitary tax concept.

137. Where an item of income such as bond premium is erroneously included in its entirety for a single year and thereafter the bond premium is properly allocated over a number of years, the inclusion in gross income for a later year of the amount allocated to that year would provide the identity of items required in subsection (b)(1) and an adjustment would be authorized with respect to the entire sum erroneously included. Conversely, if the amount had previously been erroneously allocated over a number of years, and the entire amount is properly included in a later year, an adjustment would be authorized for each of the prior years in which an allocated amount had been included.

138. While the discussion throughout has assumed that the adjustment is made with respect to a year chronologically earlier than that with respect to which the determination is made, subsection (b)(1), as well as subsections (b)(2) and (3), do not impose such a temporal limitation. Although most of the cases under these subsections will follow this time pattern, it is possible that the determination may be with respect to the earlier year and the adjustment for the later year, where the former has been held open, by waiver for example, even after the latter has been closed. See also note 140, infra. In subsections (b)(1)(2) and (3), where related taxpayers are involved, determination and adjustment may relate to the same calendar year. In subsection (b)(4), determination and adjustment will generally relate to the same calendar year (see note 157, infra) and in subsection (b)(5), the determination will relate to the same or a later year, but never an earlier year, because of the special cases covered by these subsections.
of related taxpayers within the scope of the section made any such automatic rule impossible, as will be explained later. Accordingly, even after the determination requiring the inclusion in gross income is obtained, the adjustment depends upon the question whether the earlier inclusion was erroneous. But, while the structure of Section 820 thus permits two proceedings, in practice the proceeding culminating in the determination will usually establish the error. If the determination is a court or Board decision, res judicata will tie the error to the determination;\footnote{139} if the determination is a closing agreement or disposition of a claim for refund, the joint conduct of the parties (a disallowed claim for refund must be acquiesced in by the taxpayer) for the year of the determination will serve to link determination and error.\footnote{140} While the determination will thus generally dispose of the question whether the earlier action was erroneous, where the question must be decided independently of the determination, the standard is that of the internal revenue laws applicable to the year with respect to which it is alleged the error occurred. The fact that at the time the item was included in gross income for the earlier year such inclusion was in accordance with the then prevailing administrative or judicial interpretation of the internal revenue laws is not finally determinative of the question, for if such interpretation is later authoritatively altered, by court decision, the inclusion is erroneous within the

\footnote{139} See p. 728 \textit{supra}. Where related taxpayers are involved, however, see p. 773, \textit{infra}.

\footnote{140} The text assumes that in most situations involving a determination by way of closing agreement or disposition of a claim for refund, the parties will likewise be in agreement as to the adjustment for the earlier year. In cases where such complete agreement is not present, an additional step may be necessary under $\S$ 820. Thus, suppose the taxpayer by closing agreement acquiesced in the inclusion of an item of rent in gross income for 1935, although he had erroneously included such item in gross income for 1934 and the period of limitations for refund claims for 1934 had expired. The taxpayer then files a refund claim for the amount of the adjustment for 1934, but the Commissioner contends that the inclusion in 1934 was proper and that it is the inclusion for 1935 which was erroneous. The court agrees with the Commissioner. An adjustment would then be authorized for 1935 under subsection (b) (1). In some instances, however, $\S$ 820 may not permit the second adjustment. Suppose the taxpayer has erroneously taken a deduction for 1934 and after the period of limitation on assessments for 1934, files a claim for refund for 1935 in which he again claims the deduction. The deduction is allowed, but the Commissioner offsets the amount of the refund by a deficiency based upon other items, so that the claim for refund is disallowed and a deficiency asserted. As the allowance of the deduction is a determination under subsection (a) (1) (C) (i), the Commissioner is entitled to an adjustment for 1934 under subsection (b) (2). Assume that such adjustment is obtained. Thereafter, the taxpayer contests the deficiency for 1935 before the Board. The Commissioner then asserts in his answer an additional deficiency for 1935 because of the allowance of the deduction, now stating such allowance was erroneous. The Board sustains the Commissioner. As the failure to obtain a deduction in any year is not covered in subsection (b), no adjustment is authorized. The taxpayer, however, could protect himself in this rare case by refusing to pay the adjustment for 1934 until he obtained a closing agreement with respect to the deduction for 1935.
meaning of Section 820. Any other interpretation would in large part nullify the effect of the section, for it is just such shifts in judicial interpretation which principally give rise to the successful maintenance of inconsistent positions.

Double Allowance of Deduction or Credit.

Subsection (b)(2) is the complementary paragraph to subsection (b)(1), for it covers the case where the determination allows a deduction or credit erroneously allowed to the taxpayer for another taxable year or to a related taxpayer. The terms “deduction” and “credit,” like the term “item,” embody the same divisible concept of tax liability and follow the terminology of Section 23 (“there shall be allowed as deductions”) and Section 25 (“there shall be allowed . . . the following credits against the net income.”). Also, as in subsection (b)(1), the manner in which the allowance occurred or in which the proceeding leading to the determination arose are immaterial. The taxpayer in the earlier year may have taken the deduction in his return, or obtained it by way of claim for refund or voluntary refund on the part of the Commissioner; he may have again taken the deduction in his return for the later year, or obtained it by way of a refund.

Exclusion of Item of Gross Income With Respect to Which Tax Was Paid.

Subsection (b)(3) deals with a more difficult situation—the determination requires “the exclusion from gross income of an item with respect to which tax was paid and which was erroneously excluded or

141. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-6. Cf. the language in the Statement of the House Managers, op. cit. supra note 122, at 56, that there is required “a final ‘determination’ . . . which . . . indicates that the previous treatment of the item was erroneous under the applicable provisions of the internal-revenue laws.” The word “indicates” merely refers to the effect that will be given to the determination in general practice.

142. Suppose that an item of gross income were erroneously omitted for 1934, though its omission was thought proper at that time. Thereafter, the taxpayer included such item in 1935 and then was successful in a refund suit, the Supreme Court stating that the item should properly have been included in gross income for 1934. For administrative reasons the Commissioner acts under § 506 of the Revenue Act of 1934 and prescribes that the decision should be applied without retroactive effect. While the omission of the item for 1934 is erroneous, whether the Commissioner will seek an adjustment depends upon whether his action under § 506 extends to § 820 situations.

143. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-2. Comment (1938) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 300, 306, contends that § 820 may not apply where the deduction in the later year is taken in the return, as the determination following the assertion of a deficiency would not provide a credit which the taxpayer could apply against the adjustment for the earlier year. It is difficult to see any basis for this contention. The taxpayer obtained a monetary advantage by taking the deduction in the return; § 820 does not necessitate that the determination requires a passage of money. Cf. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-1, Example (1), last sentence.
omitted from the gross income of the taxpayer for another taxable year or from the gross income of a related taxpayer." Here again the manner in which the error occurred is immaterial—the taxpayer may not have included the item in his return or he may have returned it and obtained its exclusion by a claim for refund, or the refund may have been made voluntarily by the Commissioner. But the manner in which the exclusion in the later year occurred is highly important, for the subsection applies only where a tax has been paid for the later year with respect to the item. The tax may have been paid in only two ways—the item was included by the taxpayer in his return or he paid a deficiency which was asserted because of his failure to include the item. Consequently, where the item was not included in the return and any deficiency asserted because of such omission has not been paid but contested as a deficiency throughout, this subsection will not be applicable.144

While the taxpayer who thus wishes to avoid an adjustment under Section 820 is required to contest the matter in the Board145 and may not proceed by way of refund suit in the District Courts or the Court of Claims, a sound reason exists for such rigid dichotomy. Suppose the following case: a taxpayer received payments in 1937 under a contract for the performance of services and included the payments in his return for that year. After the expiration of the period of limitations on assessments for 1936, the taxpayer filed a claim for refund for the year 1937, asserting that he kept his books on the accrual basis and that, as the payments had accrued in 1936, they were properly taxable in that year. Although the taxpayer may have honestly thought he was acting properly when he included the payments in his return for 1937, such inclusion may well have lulled the Commissioner into not taking action with respect to 1936 while such action would have still been timely. The omission for 1936 and the inclusion for 1937 are objective indications that the taxpayer intended to pay some tax on the payments: he first thought 1937 was the proper year, and then realized that he could take advantage of the running of the statute of limitations to avoid tax entirely. Consequently, the shift of position properly gives rise to an adjustment. But suppose the taxpayer either thought he did not owe a tax at all with respect

144. Where the taxpayer has filed claim for refund on an unrelated deduction and the Commissioner allows the claim but reduces the amount claimed by the amount of tax allegedly due because of the failure to include the item in gross income, and the taxpayer thereafter successfully recovers the difference between his original claim and the amount allowed, the court holding that the item does not belong in gross income, tax has not been paid with respect to that item—rather, the proper amount due the taxpayer because of the deduction had not been refunded.

145. The taxpayer cannot avail himself of §§ 322(d) and 809 of the Revenue Act of 1938, permitting the filing of a petition even where there is payment of the deficiency after the mailing of the notice of deficiency, and authorizing the Board to find an overpayment, if otherwise proper, in such case, as such payment would bring the case within subsection (b) (3). Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-3, Example (1).
to the payments and consequently omitted them from his returns for 1936 and 1937, or negligently failed to include them for 1936, the proper year. In either case, after the period of limitations has expired, the policy underlying the statute of limitations would give repose to such a situation. The taxpayer here has not taken an inconsistent position—he has simply failed to pay a tax. But if subsection (b)(3) were extended to the case where a determination required the exclusion of an item from gross income which had previously been erroneously excluded or omitted, so that an adjustment would be authorized without regard to the payment of tax with respect to the item, the statute of limitations would be swept aside. In the second situation presented above, if the Commissioner discovered the omission after the period of limitations had expired on assessments for 1936, he could simply assert a deficiency for 1940, or 1941, and so on, although knowing full well that such deficiency could not be upheld, thereby forcing the taxpayer to contend that the item belonged in 1936, and thus to take a position inconsistent with its omission in that year. After the Board had ruled against the deficiency, the Commissioner could then claim an adjustment for 1936. Section 820 would thus have offered an easy method to open the statute of limitations on assessments, with the result that there would simply be no statute of limitations on assessments for failure to include items in gross income. In restricting subsection (b)(3) to the case where the tax had been paid in the later year, Congress was simply acting to "preserve unimpaired the essential function of the statute of limitations," though this meant

146. In view of the prima facie effect of the notice of deficiency, the risk of simply defending on the ground that the item did not belong in the year asserted by the Commissioner would generally be too great, so that the taxpayer would be forced to defend on the ground that the item belonged in the year in which it was erroneously omitted. If his defense did not rest upon the ground that the item properly belonged in such year, there would be no maintenance of an inconsistent position.

147. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 122, at 49. Subsection (b)(3) may in part be analogized to decisions of the Supreme Court to the effect that it would be inequitable to permit the taxpayer to recover money from the Government when tax is still owed to it on the same transaction. "It must be owned that there is much justice in this; and the argument would be particularly strong, were the taxpayer seeking to get back what he had paid, since he could then recover only ex acquo et bona. Stone v. White, 301 U. S. 532 . . . Yet even then, McEachern v. Rose, 302 U. S. 56 (1938), would stand in the way, since under . . . section § 609(a) of the Revenue Act of 1928 the credit of any sums due in the later year would be 'void' against an assessment, payment of which would have to be refunded under . . . section § 607 of the Revenue Act of 1928. But no deficiency is justified for another and more fundamental reason. The question is of the validity of a tax, in computing which the net income—calculated by deducting what the statute allows—must be the multiplicand, regardless of whether any of the deductions have already been wrongfully taken in earlier years. The doctrines of a court of equity are irrelevant to the levying of taxes; Congress alone lays down the conditions, and has not attempted to bring other years into hotch-pot. Quite other considerations decide whether a sum, once paid as a tax, shall be recovered; the mere payment creates no obligation to return it, the taxpayer makes it at the peril of showing that in
allowing some taxpayers—as the taxpayer who thought in 1936 that the payment belonged in 1937 but then changed his mind before filing his return for 1937—to avoid a tax. Where the taxpayer failed to include the item in his return for the later year but paid when the deficiency was asserted for the later year solely because he preferred to litigate in the District Court rather than the Board, it may seem that no adjustment should be authorized as the payment of tax does not here serve as an objective manifestation of the course of conduct charted by the taxpayer. Another taxpayer, however, may have paid the deficiency because he thought it correct but later decided to change his position because of the favorable opportunity presented by the expiration of the period of limitations for the earlier year. As there is no feasible method of differentiating between the two cases, and as the taxpayer against whom the deficiency is asserted can protect himself from an adjustment under Section 820 simply by not paying the deficiency, no unjustifiable hardship is worked by the rule adopted in subsection (b)(3).

This underlying desire of Congress to maintain unimpaired the purpose of the statute of limitations is evidenced when we consider the complementary case of deductions. The report of the House Subcommittee stressing the need for corrective action in cases involving misuse of the statute of limitations, noted the following situation:

"Taxpayers frequently claim deductions which the Commissioner denies because he believes that, although the deductions are allowable under the revenue act, they should be taken in a different year" and recommended that "there be prepared suitable provisions under which the statute of limitations should be so adjusted as to insure the taxation of income, and common justice it ought not to be retained." Schmidlapp v. Commissioner, 96 F. (2d) 680, 683 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).

148. An interesting situation may develop in this connection under subsections (b)(1) and (2). Suppose a deduction has been taken in 1937 and again in 1938 but the period of limitations with respect to both years has expired. A deficiency is then asserted with respect to 1938 on the ground that the deduction was improper. The taxpayer contends that the period of limitations had expired and the Board sustains this position. Section 906(e) of the Revenue Act of 1924, as amended, provides that "if the assessment or collection of any tax is barred by any statute of limitations, the decision of the Board to that effect shall be considered as its decision that there is no deficiency in respect of such tax." May the Commissioner then contend that by virtue of this section there is a determination that allowed the deduction for 1938, as there is no deficiency for 1933, and accordingly an adjustment is authorized with respect to 1937? It is obvious that Congress did not intend the answer to be in the affirmative. As the taxpayer has not maintained an inconsistent position and as the determination does not adopt an inconsistent position even if the taxpayer had defended on the double ground of the statute of limitations and the propriety of the deduction in 1938, § 820 would seem inapplicable. It may be noted that in the complementary situation, that of overpayments, there is no provision comparable to § 906(e) of the Revenue Act of 1924, as amended.

the allowance of deductions, in the year to which properly allowable." 150 And the Senate Report stated that "Corrective adjustments should produce the effect of attributing income or deductions to the right year and the right taxpayer . . . ." 151 As a result, many tax attorneys thought that Section 820 would remedy the bad debt situation 152 by providing an adjustment where a taxpayer who claimed a bad debt deduction for 1938 finally discovered, after controversy with the Commissioner or litigation in the courts, and after the expiration of the period of limitations for 1935, that the debt had become worthless in 1935. Section 820, however, in neither initial nor final form, covered the situation where the determination disallows a deduction which was erroneously disallowed or omitted in another taxable year. The omission of this case from Section 820 has given rise to severe criticism of the section, and yet from the discussion above it is clear that its inclusion would have had the effect of destroying the statute of limitations with respect to deductions. The taxpayer who neglected to take a deduction properly allowable for 1935, as to which year the period of limitations on refund claims had expired, could take that deduction in his return for 1940, or 1941, etc., or claim a refund for those years, force the Commissioner to take a position inconsistent with the omission of the deduction in 1935, 153 and then, after the Commissioner had won the case, claim an adjustment for 1935. Congress recognized that Section 820 was not the proper vehicle for solving the bad debt problem, for the cure would have been worse than the disease, and consequently the "failure to obtain a deduction" case is not found in subsection (b). 154 Congress, however, did

150. Id. at 79.
151. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 122, at 49.
152. For a discussion of the bad debt problem and suggestions for its solution, see Paul, Studies in Federal Taxation (1st Series 1937) 255 et seq.
153. The text assumes that the Commissioner to win the case would be forced to specify the year in which the deduction was properly allowable, here 1935, so that he would thereby be maintaining an inconsistent position. If, as is the situation in most bad debt and stock worthlessness cases, the Commissioner successfully defended solely on the ground that the debt did not become bad, or the stock worthless, in the year claimed by the taxpayer, and did not specify the year in which the deduction was properly allowable, there would not be a maintenance of an inconsistent position by the Commissioner and an adjustment could not be obtained by the taxpayer even if the "failure to obtain a deduction" situation were covered in subsection (b).
154. While a shift of position was evident in the omission of income cases where tax was later paid, so that subsection (b)(3) could be included, Congress apparently thought that there was no comparable standard in the deduction cases. It may be possible to provide that, if the deduction had been denied by the Commissioner for the earlier year, later disallowance, where the Commissioner had maintained that the deduction was allowable for the year for which it had previously been claimed and denied, would result in an adjustment, as here the earlier denial indicates the shift of position on the part of the Commissioner and thus provides a standard whereby the case in which the Commissioner took no action with respect to the earlier year may be differentiated. If, however, the later disallowance did not involve the maintenance of an inconsistent position, but simply
attempt to ameliorate the problem by providing in Section 801 that a closing agreement could relate to a taxable year not yet closed.\textsuperscript{155} Under this section, a taxpayer who claims a bad debt deduction for 1938 which is disallowed in 1939 on the ground that the debt has not yet become worthless can protect himself to some extent against a later shift in position by obtaining a closing agreement providing that if the deduction is disallowed when claimed again for a later year on the ground that it was properly allowable for 1938, an adjustment would be made for 1938.\textsuperscript{156}

Correlative Deductions and Inclusions Specified in Section 162(b) and (c), Revenue Act of 1938, and Corresponding Provisions of Prior Revenue Acts.

Subsection (b)(4) covers the special class of cases involving the allocation of tax between trust or estate on the one hand and beneficiaries, heirs and legatees on the other. Section 162(b) of the Revenue Act of 1938, in harmony with prior Acts, provides that the trust shall be allowed as an additional deduction in computing net income the amount which is to be distributed currently to the beneficiaries, but that the amount so allowed as a deduction shall be included in computing the net income of the beneficiaries whether distributed or not. Similar treatment is provided by Section 162(c) for income received by the estate during the period of administration and income which may be either

resulted from the successful assertion by the Commissioner that the deduction was not allowable in the later year, no adjustment could be secured. See note 153, supra. It has been suggested, Comment (1938) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 300, 304, that adjustment be allowed to the taxpayer who claimed a deduction in the wrong year when he could prove that he had acted in good faith. The academic merit of such a plan is outweighed, however, by practical administrative difficulties.

\textsuperscript{155} Section 801, \textit{Revenue Act of 1938}, amending §606(a), \textit{Revenue Act of 1926}, which limited closing agreements to years “ending prior to the date of the agreement.”

\textsuperscript{156} Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4855; Commissioner’s Mimeoograph, No. 4821, August 19, 1938, stating that “A closing agreement as to specific matters, Form 603, should be secured whenever the taxpayer and the Commissioner have concurred in the disposition of an item and such closing agreement is considered necessary to insure consistent treatment of such item in any other taxable period.” Here again, however, compare note 153, supra.

Similarly, the closing agreement device may be used in the “failure to include income” cases not covered by subsection (b)(3) as tax has not been paid. Another administrative device has been suggested to ameliorate situations in which taxable items have been completely omitted or the benefit of lawful deductions denied. This proposal in substance is that a deficiency letter with respect to the alleged improper omission of an item of income for a particular year shall have the same effect in tolling the statute of limitations as if corresponding deficiency letters had been duly issued for every taxable year then open; and, correspondingly, that a claim to the benefit of a deduction made in a return or a claim for refund shall be given like effect with respect to every open taxable year. Full consideration of this suggestion would involve a prolonged excursion into matters foreign to the main topic of the present article.
distributed or accumulated in the discretion of the fiduciary. Subsection (b)(4) relates solely to the special deductions and inclusions thus provided for in Section 162(b) and (c), and by authorizing an adjustment makes possible the correct allocation of trust income in situations where such allocation is prevented by the statute of limitations or some other provision of the internal revenue laws. Thus, suppose a trustee claimed in the trust return for 1935 a deduction for amounts distributed to the beneficiary. The beneficiary included the amounts in his return for that year. In 1938, the Commissioner asserted a deficiency against the trustee on the ground that the amounts distributed to the beneficiary represented a charge against the trust corpus and did not constitute a distribution of income. The deficiency is sustained by final decision of the Board of Tax Appeals in 1941, after the expiration of the period of limitations for filing claim for refund by the beneficiary for 1935. Subsection (b)(4) authorizes an adjustment with respect to the beneficiary’s tax for 1935. 157

All of the tax possibilities inherent in the trustee-beneficiary relationship are not covered by Section (b)(4). As fiduciary and beneficiary

157. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-4, indicate the various types of cases that may arise under subsection (b)(4). Suppose the beneficiary erroneously failed to include income distributable by the trust but the trustee properly took the additional deduction. The beneficiary’s case is closed by a closing agreement but the period of limitations has not yet expired with respect to the trustee. The Commissioner asserts a deficiency against the trustee, claiming that the deduction was improper but final decision of the Board is rendered against the contention. The Commissioner may secure an adjustment with respect to the beneficiary. As the Commissioner, however, could have asserted the deficiency against the trustee, although realizing it would fail, solely for the purpose of securing a determination with respect to the deduction which he could then use under § 820 to pry open the beneficiary’s closed year, it may be thought that subsection (b)(4) permits a procedure which was deemed improper under subsection (b)(3). In the normal case, however, the periods of limitations with respect to trustee and beneficiary expire at the same time, so that if it is too late to proceed directly against the beneficiary, it will likewise be too late to proceed against the trustee solely to obtain a determination. A safeguard is thus generally present in these cases which does not obtain in subsection (b)(3) cases, or in the total failure to obtain a deduction situation, for in the latter no such temporal limitation prevails with respect to the proceeding to obtain a determination. The net result of subsection (b)(4) is that, with respect to the additional deductions and inclusions specified in § 162(b) and (c), taxpayers and the Commissioner may avail themselves of the longer period of time within which action is permitted either with respect to the trustee’s or beneficiary’s tax liability, so that if the trustee’s return may still be affected by assessment or refund, the beneficiary’s return may likewise be affected. Suppose, however, that where the trustee took an additional deduction for 1934 but the beneficiary did not return the income in his return for that year, after the expiration of the period of limitations with respect to both trustee and beneficiary for 1934, the Commissioner then, with malice aforethought, asserted a deficiency for 1936 against the beneficiary on the ground that the 1934 distribution should be included in gross income for that year. After the Commissioner loses, he claims an adjustment against the trustee under subsection (b)(4). No adjustment would be authorized as the beneficiary could here defend on the ground that the income was not taxable in 1936 but, if taxable to him at all, properly taxable in 1934, and thus avoid maintaining a position inconsistent with the deduction by the trustee.
constitute related taxpayers, they are also affected by subsections (b)(1), (2) and (3), and, in addition, they may fall under subsection (b)(5) in an appropriate case. For example, if the beneficiary erroneously obtains an allowance for depreciation and later, after the expiration of the period of limitations on assessment against the beneficiary, a determination requires that the trust be given the deduction for depreciation, an adjustment is authorized by subsection (b)(2) with respect to the beneficiary.\textsuperscript{158}

As Section 162(b) and (c) provide for the special deduction of amounts which must in any event be included in the gross income of the trust and as the complementary item for the beneficiary is an inclusion, these situations could not be subsumed under subsections (b)(1), (2) and (3) and a special category was necessary.\textsuperscript{159}

\textit{Determination of Basis of Property Where There Has Been Erroneous Treatment of a Transaction Upon Which Such Basis Depends.}

Subsection (b)(5), which relates to basis problems, involves by far the most difficult cases covered by Section 820. It provides an adjustment where the determination establishes the basis of property, either for gain or loss on its disposition or for depreciation or depletion, and in respect of any transaction upon which such basis depends there was an erroneous inclusion in or omission from gross income or an erroneous recognition or nonrecognition of gain or loss. It thus deals with situations where either a stepped-up or reduced basis is obtained by reason of a determination of basis predicated on proper treatment of the transaction upon which the basis depends and prompted by the assertion of a position inconsistent with the earlier, and erroneous, treatment of that transaction. The subsection carefully provides, however, that while the person, either transferee or vendee, who acquired the property in that transaction is affected by later inconsistent action either on his own part, or that of his successors in title, or the Commissioner, such inconsistent action does not affect the transferor or vendor in that transaction. Stated

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(h)-2, Example (2).}
  \item \textit{The language of subsection (b)(4) includes a specific reference to \S 162(b) and (c) of the Revenue Act of 1938, so that each succeeding Revenue Act containing provisions similar to that section will necessitate amendment of subsection (b)(4) to bring it up-to-date. Rewriting of the subsection to eliminate such reference is a difficult task. The following phrasing may be helpful as a suggestion:}
  \begin{quote}
    "(4) Allows or disallows to the fiduciary in computing the net income of the trust or estate an additional deduction in respect of income included in the gross income of the trust or estate and the correlative item has been erroneously excluded or omitted from, or included in, as the case may be, the gross income of the beneficiary, legatee, or heir; or requires the inclusion in or the exclusion from the gross income of a beneficiary, legatee, or heir of an item of income and the correlative additional deduction has been erroneously disallowed to or omitted by, or allowed to, as the case may be, the fiduciary in computing the net income of the estate or trust; or . . . ."
  \end{quote}
\end{itemize}
differently, the error must have been either with respect to the taxpayer as to whom the determination is made or with respect to a person who, in the transaction erroneously treated, acquired title to the property involved in the determination and from whom, mediately or immediately, the taxpayer with respect to whom the determination is made derived title, with a substituted basis, subsequent to the transaction. As a consequence, the transferor and transferee of the erroneous transaction cannot affect each other by later inconsistent conduct but can only subject themselves to an adjustment; any successor in title whose basis depends on the basis in the hands of the party to the erroneous transaction from whom his title is derived may affect that party, with the proviso that the chain of title is not traced through the transaction.

These situations can best be expressed by a series of examples:160 Suppose that in 1934 taxpayer A exchanged his Blackacre property, having a $10,000 basis and a fair market value of $20,000, for the Whiteacre property of taxpayer B, having a $15,000 basis and also a fair market value of $20,000. In their returns for that year both taxpayers treated the exchange as one in which gain or loss was not recognized, under Section 112(b)(1). The period of limitations with respect to 1934 having expired:

(1) In 1939, taxpayer B claims that gain should have been recognized on the exchange and that Blackacre has a $20,000 basis for depreciation in his hands. His contention is sustained in a final Board of Tax Appeals decision. An adjustment is authorized with respect to B's tax for 1934 as the basis for depreciation depends on the transaction in 1934 and, as concerns that transaction, there was an erroneous nonrecognition of gain with respect to the taxpayer, B, as to whom the determination is made.161 No adjustment is authorized as to A, however, although there had also been an erroneous nonrecognition of gain in his case, as A was not the taxpayer with respect to whom the determination is made, nor does the determination relate to property which A acquired in the exchange, but rather to property which he transferred. While B derived title to the property from A, the derivation was not subsequent to the transaction but in the transaction itself. Likewise, if B had for the first time claimed the higher basis on a sale to C in 1940, adjustment would be authorized with respect to B but not to A.162

160. See the examples in Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-5.
161. The amount of the adjustment would be the full amount of the tax on the gain from the exchange even though the taxpayer in claiming the higher basis for depreciation purposes did not, unlike the effect of a claim of higher basis on a sale, obtain in the year to which the claim related the full effect of the higher basis.
162. If B had previously claimed a higher basis for the purpose of depreciation and the Commissioner had obtained an adjustment, use of the higher basis by B on the sale to C would not result in a second adjustment, since, as a result of the earlier adjustment (see note 161, supra), there is neither an inconsistent position nor an erroneous nonrecognition of gain with respect to the transaction in which B acquired the property.
(2) In 1940, A gives Whiteacre to D. Thereafter, in 1941 D sells this property and claims a $20,000 basis, stating that as gain should have been recognized on the 1934 transaction the basis in the hands of A, his donor, was $20,000. This position is sustained by a final Board decision. An adjustment is authorized with respect to A's tax for 1934, as the basis in the hands of D depends on the 1934 transaction and with respect to that transaction there was an erroneous nonrecognition of gain to A, a person who acquired title to Whiteacre in the transaction, and from whom immediately the taxpayer, D, derived title subsequent to the transaction. But as subsection (b)(5) does not permit tracing of title through the erroneously treated transaction, there is no adjustment authorized with respect to B because of D's action.

The words "or any person who acquired title to such property in such transaction and from whom mediately or immediately the taxpayer derived title subsequent to such transaction" thus perform two functions: (1) Together with the words "any transaction upon which such basis depends" they provide that the subsequent conduct of a donee or other taxpayer with a substituted basis shall affect the predecessor in title who acquired the property in the transaction; (2) They ensure that the subsequent conduct of the transferee or vendee who acquired title in the transaction, or of any of his successors in title, shall not affect the transferor of the property in the transaction. With respect to the first result, the section has been criticized on the ground that where the donee of property takes a position, to his advantage, inconsistent with the treatment accorded the transaction in which his donor acquired the property, an adjustment is authorized with respect to the donor under which he will be obliged to pay a deficiency. While it is recognized that most donees would not thus bite the hand that fed them, it is argued that an embittered donee might well advance an advantageous claim although its success would mean that the donor would be subjected to a deficiency. Such critics do not deny the merit of subsection (b)(5) where the taxpayer who adopts the inconsistent position is the one that is thereby subjected to the adjustment. But it is obvious that if the subsection had not been extended to the donee, a serious loophole would have been afforded.

163. The words "who acquired title to such property in such transaction" were added to the Senate draft to accomplish this purpose. See the STATEMENT OF THE HOUSE MANAGERS, op. cit. supra note 122, at 58. It would seem that this addition makes the words "subsequent to such transaction" superfluous as the derivation of title would necessarily be subsequent. While the wording of the Senate draft prevented the transferee's action from affecting the transferor, it did not protect the transferor from adjustment where the inconsistent position was taken by a transferee of the transferee.
avoid the adjustment. Congress quite properly recognized that the advantage of tax stability afforded by this subsection was not to be sacrificed because in a rare case a donor who misplaced his trust might come to grief.

The second result of the words quoted in the preceding paragraph is significant in exchanges under Section 112(b). If partners A, B, C, and D transfer their business to corporation X in return for an original issue of its stock and all parties treat the exchange as tax-free, a subsequent successful claim by A that the exchange was one in which gain should have been recognized, as the stock each partner received was not substantially in proportion to his interest in the property, will result in an adjustment with respect to A but not to B, C, D, or corporation X. A contrary rule would have made the scope of adjustments too broad: corporation X’s depreciation account, for example, would be uncertain until all of the partners had disposed of the stock by sale or death; likewise, each partner would be insecure until all of the others had parted with their stock. The limited scope of the subsection in this regard may be clearly seen in connection with the change in interpretation effected by the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Hendler. Previous to this decision, an assumption of indebtedness by the transferee was not considered other property or money received as taxable boot by the transferor under Section 112(d), so that tax was not paid by transferors with respect to such assumptions of indebtedness. The Hendler decision, however, held such a construction was erroneous, and while it may be argued that the decision is restricted to the facts of immediate payment by the transferee of a due debt, there are indications that it may extend to all assumptions of indebtedness. As a consequence, transferors and transferees are now in a position to claim a stepped-up basis to the extent of the gain that should have been recognized because of the assumptions of indebtedness. If the transferor claims such basis, he will be subject to an adjustment under subsection (b) (5); but if the transferee claims the higher basis, the transferor will not be affected nor will the transferee itself be subject to an adjustment, as

164. See Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 122, at 50. By adopting this rule, however, the subsection fails to cover other exchanges where adjustments would seem proper, as where a parent corporation liquidates a subsidiary by acquiring its assets and later successfully claims a stepped-up basis. No adjustment is authorized with respect to the tax of the subsidiary, although as the parent corporation in practice assumes the liability of the dissolved subsidiary, the adjustment would have been borne by the parent.
165. 303 U. S. 564 (1938).
under the circumstances there could be no erroneous nonrecognition of gain to it at the time of the transfer.\footnote{168}

While it was apparently contemplated that subsection (b) (5) extended only to cases where the transaction erroneously treated involved the acquisition of property,\footnote{169} it literally covers certain cases where the transaction affecting the basis occurred after the acquisition of the property. Suppose a corporate distribution has been erroneously taxed as a dividend. Later, when the stockholder sells the stock, the Commissioner successfully contends that the basis of the stock should have been reduced under Sections 115(d) and 113(b) (1) (d), Revenue Act of 1938, as the distribution was applicable in reduction of basis. An adjustment would seem authorized, as there has been an erroneous inclusion in gross income in respect of a transaction upon which the basis depends. But if the stockholder had made a gift of the stock and the determination had been with respect to the donee, no adjustment would be authorized, as the donor did not acquire the stock in the erroneously treated transaction upon which the basis depends. Consequently, the description of the predecessor in title as a person "who acquired title to such property in such transaction" is too narrow when applied to transactions affecting basis occurring after the acquisition of the property. In the converse situation, where the corporate distribution had been erroneously treated by the stockholder as non-taxable, but he later successfully obtained the full basis by contending that the distribution should have been taxed, no adjustment is authorized with respect to the previous treatment of the corporate distribution; while with respect to the receipt of such distribution there was an erroneous omission from gross income, it was not in respect of any transaction upon which the basis depends, for correct treatment of such distribution divorces the basis from the distribution.\footnote{170} Thus, where the previous transaction is erroneously treated as resulting in taxable income and not as affecting basis, adjustment is authorized; where it

\footnote{168} Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-5, Examples (1)(a)(b) and (c).

\footnote{169} Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 122, at 49, states that one of the principles upon which § 820 is based is that "Disputes as to the basis of property should not allow the taxpayer or the Commissioner to obtain an unfair tax advantage by taking one position at the time of the acquisition of property and an inconsistent position at the time of its disposition." The title of the Article in the Regulations dealing with subsection (b) (5), Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-5, is "Determination of basis of property in case of erroneous treatment of transaction relating to acquisition thereof." Subsection (b) (5) includes all types of acquisition within its scope, whether by purchase, exchange, receipt of property as payment for services rendered [Example (3) under Art. 820(b)-5 of the Regulations], etc.

\footnote{170} The text thus strictly interprets the phrase "any transaction upon which such basis depends" as limited to transactions upon which the basis actually depends—transactions which have the effect of increasing or reducing the basis—and as not including transactions with respect to which there is a controversy over whether they do or do not affect basis and it is finally determined that they do not.
is erroneously treated as affecting basis, and not as resulting in taxable income, adjustment is not authorized. As an adjustment would seem desirable in the latter situation where the taxpayer claims the full basis, subsection (b)(5) is also too narrowly drafted in this regard. It should be noted, however, that while the first situation is similar to subsection (b)(1)—an item is taxed once because of its inclusion in gross income and again as part of the gain on the sale, the second is similar to subsection (b)(3)—an item is erroneously omitted from gross income and later excluded from the gain on the sale, so that to preserve the statute of limitations in this case an adjustment would be proper only if tax calculated upon the reduced basis had first been paid by the stockholder and he then had claimed the full basis.

Transactions intermediate between the acquisition and disposition of property may also serve to increase the basis. Suppose an expenditure in connection with property is erroneously deducted from gross income as an ordinary expense but on later sale of the property the taxpayer  

171. While these situations are similar to subsections (b)(1) and (3), they are not covered by those subsections. Thus, although the item included in gross income when the distribution is made is also deducted from the basis of the stock when it is sold, it is not thereby again included in gross income as a separate item, but rather, as the basis is reduced by the item, a larger profit on the sale results and it is this item—gain on the sale—that is included in gross income in the later year.

172. It may be noted, however, that subsection (b)(5) in respect to errors pertaining to the acquisition of the property disregards the limitation effected in subsection (b)(3) through the requirement that tax be paid. Thus, in a case where a taxpayer who had acquired stock in a transaction erroneously treated as nonrecognizable later sells the stock and uses the stepped-up basis, the Commissioner may utilize § 820 to open the statute of limitations with respect to the year of the earlier transaction simply by asserting a deficiency, admittedly unfounded, urging the lower basis, thereby obtaining a determination and consequent adjustment. In objective outline the situation involves merely the failure to include an item, here the gain on the earlier transaction, in gross income and in this sense does not differ from the basic situation considered in subsection (b)(3). The fact that but for the payment of tax requirement in subsection (b)(3) the Commissioner could in any later year have used § 820 to pry open the statute of limitations, whereas in subsection (b)(5) he is forced to wait until the taxpayer claims the stepped-up basis perhaps does not distinguish the two situations. It may be argued, however, that as the basis accorded by the revenue acts to property for the purpose of gain or loss or other disposition assumes proper tax treatment of the transaction upon which such basis depends, departures from the statute of limitations are justified whenever a basis predicated upon proper treatment has been obtained, but in fact such treatment of the earlier transaction had not been made. Thus, § 113(a)(6), in increasing the basis by the amount of gain to the taxpayer “that was recognized upon such exchange under the law applicable to the year in which the exchange was made,” assumes that in fact such gain will be taxed. If it is not taxed and the increased basis is later obtained, proper functioning of the basis provisions requires the opening of the statute of limitations effected by subsection (b)(5). Similarly, subsection (b)(5) permits a taxpayer who failed to take a loss on an exchange erroneously treated as nonrecognizable to open the statute of limitations, after unsuccessful claim of the higher basis on later disposition, and obtain the deduction for the loss, although the situation involves a “failure to obtain a deduction” case.
successfully contends that it should have been capitalized and the basis increased. In this situation no adjustment is authorized; although the basis depends upon a transaction erroneously treated, the error is not of the nature described in subsection (b)(5), an erroneous allowance of a deduction not being specified. This case is similar to subsection (b)(2), a deduction erroneously allowed has been allowed again as an increase in basis, and consequently should have been included in subsection (b)(5). The converse situation is also not covered by subsection (b)(5), so that if the expenditure had erroneously not been deducted as ordinary expense, the taxpayer believing it to be a capital expenditure, and later the Commissioner had successfully contended that the basis was not increased, no adjustment is authorized; the basis, as evidenced by the Commissioner's contention, does not depend upon the transaction erroneously treated, and, moreover, an erroneous omission of a deduction is not one of the described errors. But this situation is similar to the case of a complete failure to obtain a deduction—a deduction erroneously omitted has not been allowed as an increase in basis, and proper preservation of the statute of limitations would make adjustment undesirable in this situation.

Subsection (b)(5) presents an interesting problem where the transaction erroneously treated concerns the disposition of only part of the

173. The case is not covered by subsection (b)(2) for the deduction erroneously allowed is not again allowed as an independent deduction, but serves instead to reduce or increase the amount of the item or deduction, gain or loss on the sale, that is included in or deducted from gross income.

174. The treatment of depreciation under subsection (b)(5) is governed by the rules stated in the text. Where the taxpayer successfully claims a higher basis because of erroneous nonrecognition of gain with respect to the transaction in which the property was acquired, and the claim relates either to the basis for depreciation or for gain or loss on a sale of the property, he would not obtain adjustment with respect to the intervening years in which depreciation was taken at the lower basis, as such depreciation is not a transaction upon which the basis later determined depends. While the incorrect allowances for depreciation are traceable to the error for the year of acquisition, such collateral effects of an error in other years are not corrected by §820. See p. 743, supra. In the case of the sale, as the adjustment of the basis for depreciation cannot be less than the amount allowable in the intervening years [§113(b)(1)(B), Revenue Act of 1938], an amount greater than that previously allowed would be deducted from the basis where the taxpayer claimed the stepped-up basis. The taxpayer, however, invited these consequences by voluntarily asserting the inconsistent position. Similarly, if the error were a failure to recognize a loss on the earlier exchange, and the Commissioner with respect to the basis for sale successfully contended that it should be reduced because of the loss that should have been recognized, no adjustment would be made for the intervening years in which depreciation had been taken on the higher basis. Where the Commissioner, in adjusting the basis for the sale, deducts for depreciation an amount greater than that actually allowed in accordance with the provision that the adjustment for depreciation cannot be less than the amount allowable, no adjustment is authorized by §820 for the intervening years. Section 113(b)(1)(B), Revenue Act of 1938, reinforces the period of limitations on annual deductions for depreciation and the situation is thus in effect similar to the complete failure to obtain a deduction, discussed supra, p. 757.
property. Suppose that the taxpayer in 1932 acquired land at a cost of $100,000. In 1934 he sold one-half of that land and computed his gain on a cost basis of $50,000. In 1938 he sold the remaining portion but claimed that as in 1934 it was the more valuable half, it should have a $65,000 basis, computed on an allocation based upon the market values in 1934 of the respective portions. If his contention is sustained, subsection (b)(5) would permit the Commissioner to obtain an adjustment with respect to 1934, as the basis for the 1938 sale depends upon the transaction in 1934.175 Would the result be different if the property originally acquired consisted of two distinct lots, and after an erroneous allocation of basis for the purpose of computing gain on the sale of one of them, the properly allocated basis is obtained on the sale of the second lot? It would appear that no adjustment would be authorized; the basis for the second lot does not depend on the sale of the first inasmuch as the erroneous allocation in legal effect antedates the sale of the first lot, being based on the respective market values at the time the lots were acquired, while in the preceding example the allocation was made at the time of, and because of, the sale of a portion of the previously undivided lot.176 This contention would be forcefully illustrated if depre-

175. But, as previously indicated, if a donee of a taxpayer had made the sale in 1938, no adjustment would be authorized as the donor did not acquire title in the erroneously treated transaction.

A similar situation is presented in the following example: the taxpayer in 1934 assigned his interest, which had a $100,000 cost basis, in oil and gas property in return for a cash payment of $100,000 plus an additional $300,000 to be paid out of the oil and gas, if and when produced. The transaction was treated as a sale of the taxpayer's entire interest in the property and no gain was recognized as the cash payment did not exceed the basis. In 1936 the taxpayer received $100,000 out of the proceeds of the sale of oil and gas and claimed that, as the original transaction really involved a sale of his interest only to the extent of the cash payment, he had retained an economic interest in the oil and gas in place to the extent of the additional consideration to be paid out of the proceeds of the oil and gas later sold, and therefore the basis should be allocated one-fourth to the cash payment and three-fourths to the later payments. Accordingly, as respects the 1936 payment, he was entitled to a deduction for depletion based on one-fourth of the original basis. Cf. Fleming v. Commissioner, 82 F. (2d) 324 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936). If the taxpayer is successful, the Commissioner could claim that the basis for depletion depends on the erroneously treated transaction of 1934 and that an adjustment is authorized under subsection (b)(5), in that as the portion then sold had a basis of $25,000, there was an erroneous nonrecognition of $75,000 gain.

176. Suppose the taxpayer received a stock dividend in 1934 which he treated as non-taxable under §115(f), Revenue Act of 1934. He sold the stock dividend in 1935 and computed his gain in accordance with the basis resulting from the allocation of the basis of his original stock between it and the dividend stock. He then sold his original stock in 1938 and claimed its entire cost as the basis, relying on Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 441 (1936). If he is successful, is an adjustment authorized with respect to the sale of the dividend stock, assuming that it properly had a zero basis? Cf. Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U. S. 238 (1937). Apparently not, as the decision that the dividend stock has a zero basis establishes that the basis of the original stock does not depend upon either the receipt or sale of the dividend stock. Next, suppose that the method of allo-
ciable property were involved. The argument against adjustment is even stronger where the property acquired consists of separate identical units, so that the allocation is purely arithmetical. As such an interpretation, however, would prevent an adjustment in that no transaction is present upon which the erroneous allocation may be said to depend, and as the sale is a transaction which is directly affected by the erroneous allocation, it is possible that a contrary construction may be adopted. Where the error is not with respect to the method or manner of allocation of a correctly determined basis, as in the above situations, but involves a mistake in the basis to be allocated, a different question is presented. If the allocation qua allocation is correct but the erroneous original basis has been used for allocation purposes on the first sale and the proper original basis on the second, so that the second sale is inconsistent with the treatment of the transaction involving the acquisition of the property, while an adjustment is authorized under subsection (b) (5) with respect to such transaction, no adjustment would seem authorized with respect to the first sale, even in the situation where allocation was necessary because of such sale.

Related Taxpayers.

The discussion so far has been largely in terms of a single taxpayer and the Commissioner as the parties to a determination and an adjustment. Section 820, however, is also applicable to "related taxpayers," so that the determination may involve one of the taxpayers in the relation and the adjustment involve the other. Our first inquiry here is as to the relationships covered by Section 820.

(1) Relationships Subject to Section 820. Six relationships are specified in subsection 820(a)(3): husband and wife, partners, decedent and decedent's estate, and the trust relationships of grantor and fiduciary, grantor and beneficiary, fiduciary and beneficiary, legatee or heir.
Congress thought that the nature of these relationships was such that in most cases in which they were present it could safely be presumed that the parties would act in unison and would present a single approach to their tax problems. In most part it was merely reiterating for the purposes of Section 820 a conclusion earlier reached with respect to the tax consequences of other transactions. Thus, among other cases, losses are now disallowed if they result from sales or exchanges of property between members of a family, a grantor and a fiduciary, a fiduciary and a beneficiary.\textsuperscript{180} Again, a somewhat similar presumption is made in the case of a trust which is revocable by the grantor in conjunction with a person not having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of its corpus or income.\textsuperscript{181} Moreover, as these relationships give rise to difficult problems concerning the allocation of income to the proper party, especially where the relationship is further complicated by assignments between the parties, the ensuing tax litigation has frequently resulted in the inequities sought to be eliminated by Section 820.\textsuperscript{182} The proper background for this phase of Section 820 is therefore not that presented by the problem of correctly taxing partner $A$'s dividend income from stock which he owns and partner $B$'s rental income from his personally owned property, but by the question of the proper apportionment of partnership income between partners $A$ and $B$; nor is it the taxation of the husband on income from property owned by his wife merely for the purpose of treating the family as a unit, but rather the problem of properly taxing insurance commissions assigned by the husband to the wife.\textsuperscript{183}

Related taxpayers are specifically covered in the first four types of cases specified in subsection (b). The fourth case, however, deals only

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item The inclusion of the fiduciary as a related taxpayer has been criticized on the ground that an executor who closes an estate may years later become personally liable for an adjustment under § 820 because of the provisions of Rev. Stat. § 3467 (1875), as amended, making an executor personally liable for debts due to the United States by the estate where he pays any other debt of the estate prior to satisfaction of the former debt. If the adjustment, however, were authorized after the payment of the debts of the estate, the amount of the adjustment would not be a debt due to the United States at the time of such payment, so that personal liability may occur only where the adjustment was authorized prior to payment of the other debts of the estate.\textsuperscript{180} Section 24(b), Revenue Act of 1938.
\item Sections 166 and 167, Revenue Act of 1938.
\item Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 122, at 50; Statement of the House Managers, op. cit. supra note 122, at 58.
\item The erroneous transaction need not be one possible solely by reason of the existence of the relationship, but rather need only concern taxpayers who are related, so that the erroneous treatment of an assignment of rents from partner $A$ to partner $B$ is covered, though neither the rents nor assignment were partnership matters. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(a)-4. See Statement of the House Managers, op. cit. supra note 122, at 58, stating that assignor and assignee, donor and donee, lessor and lessee, and claimants to ownership of the same property are eliminated as "independent categories" of related taxpayers.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
with one of these relationships, that of fiduciary and beneficiary, legatee or heir, as it is limited to the special situations considered in Section 162(b) and (c). While subsection (b)(5) in effect extends to taxpayers who are related by reason of a substituted basis, such as donor and donee, transferor and transferee in Section 112(b)(4) and (5) transactions, etc., it does not concern itself with related taxpayers as the term is defined in Section 820. For the purposes of subsection (b) the term “taxpayer” refers to the individual with respect to whom the determination is made, the term “related taxpayer” refers to the individual with respect to whom the adjustment is authorized.

(2) Time at Which Relationship Must Exist. The principal problem in connection with related taxpayers concerns the time at which the relationship must exist. Subsection (a)(3), by including in the definition of “related taxpayer” the words “in the taxable year with respect to which the erroneous inclusion, exclusion, omission, allowance, or disallowance . . . was made” specifies one temporal requirement. The Regulations interpret these words to mean “at some time during that taxable year,” so that it is not necessary for the relationship to exist throughout the entire taxable year. This requirement in reality is little more than a restatement of the existing situation, as it is the presence

184. Consequently, the omission of the donor-donee category from the definition of related taxpayers (see notes 179 and 183, supra), does not prevent the application of subsection (b)(5) to donor-donee cases.

185. Cf. subsection (a)(3), indicating that as to subsections (b)(1), (2), (3), and (4) the “taxpayer” is the person with respect to whom the determination is made. While the wording is not explicit, the term “taxpayer” in subsection (b)(5) is similarly used. In subsections (c) and (d) the term “taxpayer” is used generally to refer to the taxpayer with respect to whom the error was made. STATEMENT OF THE HOUSE MANAGERS, op. cit. supra note 122, at 59. The definition of “taxpayer” in subsection (a)(2) was necessary to cure the problem created by § 901, which confines the term, when used in the REVENUE ACT OF 1938, to persons subject to a tax imposed by that Act.

186. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(a)-4. The relationship of decedent and decedent’s estate presents an interesting problem in connection with this requirement. If the error occurred in respect of a taxable year during which the decedent was alive and the determination is with respect to the return filed by the decedent’s estate on behalf of the decedent, no problem of related taxpayer would seem to be present, but rather the error and determination relate to the same taxpayer, the decedent. If, however, the determination is with respect to the return of the decedent’s estate, related taxpayers are involved but obviously the relationship could not exist with respect to the year as to which the error was made, so that no adjustment would be possible in this case. If the error occurred with respect to the return of the decedent’s estate and the determination is with respect to the return filed by the decedent’s estate on behalf of the decedent, the relationship existed at the requisite time. But if the reverse is the case, the error occurring with respect to the return filed by the decedent’s estate on behalf of the decedent and the determination is with respect to the return of the decedent’s estate, it would seem that the case is no different from that where the error occurred with respect to a return filed by the decedent during his lifetime and that the temporal test of subsection (a)(3) is not satisfied.
of the relationship which results in the doubt as to the choice of the proper taxable person, which doubt, in turn, causes the error requiring adjustment.\footnote{187} The second temporal requirement is specified in the latter part of subsection (b) where it is provided that if the adjustment constitutes a deficiency, the relationship must exist when the inconsistent position is maintained. In such a situation it is the taxpayer who has maintained the inconsistent position, and as the inclusion of the related taxpayer categories rests on the presumption that with respect to the original error and the later inconsistent treatment the two taxpayers will act in unison, it follows that the requirement of the existence of the relationship at the later time is essential. If the relationship had terminated prior to the taking of the inconsistent position, no adjustment is authorized although the result of the successful maintenance of the inconsistent position is that both taxpayers obtain a deduction, for example, to which only one is entitled.\footnote{188} Where, however, the inconsistent position is taken by the Commissioner, so that the adjustment would constitute an overpayment, the basis for the adjustment is not the presumption of unison but the fact that the Commissioner by his inconsistency has in effect taxed two persons on the same income, or disallowed to each a deduction which one properly should have. In this situation, the adjustment should be made even though the relationship has been terminated;\footnote{189} Section 820 so provides by limiting the requirement of continuation of relationship to cases where the adjustment constitutes a deficiency. In those cases, the time at which the relationship must exist

\footnote{187. As explained previously, supra note 157, subsection (b) (4) disregards the limitation of payment in an “income never included” situation, and permits adjustment in a “deduction never allowed” situation. Inasmuch as the period of limitations will normally expire at the same time as respects both trustee and beneficiary, an adequate safeguard is present. It is arguable that the same situation exists with respect to other classes of related taxpayers, so that § 820 is thus too narrowly drafted, both because in subsection (b) (3) it applies the limitation of payment to related taxpayers, and it also fails to cover a “deduction never allowed” with respect to related taxpayers.

188. The \textit{STATEMENT OF THE HOUSE MANAGERS, op. cit. supra} note 122, at 58, in limiting the requirement to cases where the relationship is “terminable” overlooks the fact that all of the relationships specified in subsection (a) (3) are terminable, so that no limitation-actually results from such requirement. The Regulations are not so qualified. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-8.

Section 820 would seem operative in the rare case where the taxpayers stood in one relationship in the earlier year, as that of partners, and in a different relationship, as that of husband and wife, at the time of the inconsistent position, inasmuch as either relationship is presumed under subsection (a) (3) to result in unity of action. Query, if in the case of the fiduciary-beneficiary relationship, the fiduciary in the earlier year had been replaced by a different fiduciary, would an adjustment be authorized under the wording of subsection (a) (3) ?

189. For the same reasons, the careful selection of the categories covered by the term “related taxpayer” likewise seems excessively cautious where the Commissioner has maintained the inconsistent position, for, regardless of the nature of their relationship, an adjustment should be made.
is described as follows: if the inconsistent position is asserted in a return, claim for refund, or petition (or amended petition) to the Board of Tax Appeals, the requisite date is the date of filing of the document in which the position was asserted, or, if asserted in more than one such document, the date of filing of the document in which it was first asserted. While these documents are the typical documents in which the inconsistent position would be maintained, it is possible that it may be otherwise maintained, as where a closing agreement allows the taxpayer a deduction not claimed in any of the above three documents. Consequently, if the inconsistent position is not so maintained, the requisite relationship must exist on the date of the determination. Section 820, finally, affords an additional safeguard where the related taxpayers become unfriendly, in that the determination with respect to one of the taxpayers is not conclusive as to the error with respect to the other. Under subsection (c) the Commissioner, unless a waiver is obtained, must proceed by way of notice of deficiency against the other taxpayer in order to establish the error and obtain the amount of the adjustment, so that the latter is afforded a judicial hearing in which he can assert any defenses at hand, regardless of the prior determination.

Effect of Section 820 Upon Judicial Doctrines Previously Applied.

There remains for consideration the effect of Section 820 upon the doctrines applied by the courts in this field prior to the enactment of Section 820. Three broad questions may be asked: (1) Does Section 820 displace the judicial solution in those situations described in subsections (b)(1)-(5); (2) Does it prevent application of the judicial solution in those cases intentionally excluded by Congress from a general class to which Section 820 applies; (3) Does it prevent application of the judicial solution to those classes of cases to which Section 820 does not purport to apply? The following example illustrates the first ques-

190. The document must relate to the year with respect to which the determination is made, so that an inconsistent position taken in a return for an earlier year is not to be considered in fixing the time at which the relationship must still be in existence.

191. Suppose partner A took a deduction for 1935 to which he was properly entitled. Partner B claims the deduction in a refund claim and the Commissioner erroneously allows the deduction. He then seeks to obtain an adjustment with respect to A under subsection (b)(2), claiming that A erroneously took the deduction. A contests the adjustment and is successful in the Board of Tax Appeals. The Commissioner may then seek an adjustment with respect to B, likewise under subsection (b)(2). B may also contest the adjustment, and while it is probable that the decision in A's case will be persuasive, it is not binding and the court or Board may decide that B is entitled to the deduction. In that event, the Commissioner can proceed no further, as res judicata would bar another attempt at adjustment with respect to B. Similarly, if A had in the first instance obtained a court decision, the Commissioner could not proceed under §820 after B had successfully defeated the adjustment.

192. See 48 YALE L. J. 509, 511 et seq.
tion: Suppose a taxpayer had erroneously failed to include an item in gross income for 1936, had erroneously included it in gross income for 1938 and had then brought suit for refund. Assume that the facts were such that a court would hold prior to Section 820 under established principles that the taxpayer was estopped from claiming that the item belonged in the barred year, so that his suit must fail. After the enactment of Section 820, should the court follow the precedents and estop the taxpayer or should it permit recovery of the refund on the ground that Section 820 was intended by Congress to provide an exclusive solution for this case, as it falls under Section 820(b)(3)? By its terms Section 820 applies only after a determination of the specified type has been made; it does not prescribe any rules as to when or in what cases such a determination shall be reached. It may be argued, therefore, that this section does not require a departure from any rules governing the determination established prior to its enactment. Accordingly, if the precedents require an estoppel, the court should deny the refund in the above example. Under this argument, Section 820 would apply only where the precedents would not justify an estoppel, i.e., where the court allowed the refund and thus brought about a determination under subsection (b)(3). This argument rests upon too narrow a conception of the purpose of Section 820. It is evident from the Committee Reports that Congress was motivated by three considerations: (1) the judicial doctrines offered an inadequate solution because of their uncertainty and one-sidedness; (2) a uniform, systematic statutory solution was desirable in those situations which lent themselves to such treatment; (3) for reasons previously described, the solution to be made uniform by the section in those situations was not to be that offered by the judicial doctrines but a procedure which enabled the party, either Commissioner or taxpayer, to shift his position if he so desired and thereby reach the correct result under the tax law, with the proviso that a compensatory adjustment was to be made. The Congressional purpose, therefore, can be fully executed only if the statutory solution thus adopted is permitted to operate exclusively in the classes of cases designated by Congress in subsections (b)(1)–(5) as permitting such uniform treatment. It necessarily follows from this view of Section 820 that it is a Congressional declaration that the judicial doctrines previously evolved are not to be applied by the court in those situations described in subsections (b)(1)–(5). In other words, if strict application of the revenue acts would produce a determination of the type enumerated in subsection (b)(1)–(5), the statutory law shall be applied. Moreover, a judicial estoppel is a matter of last resort. It will not be created where the aggrieved party

194. See supra, p. 737 et seq.
can otherwise be saved from unjust damage. Section 820 provides orderly and adequate relief in the cases which it covers. Consequently, as to those cases, the need for the estoppel doctrine is removed. In the foregoing example, therefore, the refund should be allowed by the court inasmuch as upon allowance, there would be a determination within the category described in subsection (b)(3).\(^{195}\)

The second of the questions above would be present if in the example given the taxpayer had correctly omitted the item from gross income for 1938 but the Commissioner had asserted a deficiency for that year. Assume, again, that the facts were such that a court would allow the deficiency by estopping the taxpayer from asserting that the item belonged in gross income for 1936.\(^{196}\) Should the court still allow the deficiency or should it deny the deficiency on the ground that, as Congress had intentionally excluded from subsection (b)(3) a case where tax was not paid, it intended thereby that a strict application of the revenue acts should be made in such a case? It is believed, however, that these cases were excluded because, for the reasons stated above,\(^{197}\) Congress realized they did not lend themselves to this particular systematic statutory solution. The solution in each case, therefore, was left to depend as formerly upon its particular facts. Accordingly, the established judicial doctrines are here left unaffected by Section 820.\(^{198}\) For like reasons, and even more unhesitatingly, the same answer must be given to the third question above stated.\(^{199}\)

**Conclusion**

Obviously no attempt should be made to summarize the foregoing discussion in the ordinary sense. It is, however, in order to state very generally the conclusions toward which our exposition tends. First we desire to reiterate the hope and belief that the presence of Section 820 in the internal revenue laws will have the effect of tranquillizing most con-

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195. While this view would require the court not to apply the judicial doctrines otherwise applicable where it found that a strict application of the revenue acts would result in a determination under subsections (b)(1)-(5), it does not necessitate the court's determining whether all the conditions to the operation of § 820, e.g., maintenance of an inconsistent position, prevention of correction of error, have been satisfied.


197. See supra, p. 755 et seq.

198. Similar considerations apply to cases involving related taxpayers not enumerated in subsection (a)(3), the "failure to obtain a deduction" situation, and determinations in which an adjustment would be made were it not for the limitations of subsection (f). See, however, Comment (1938) 52 HARV. L. REV. 300, 306.

199. Cases involving interaction of the estate tax and the income tax [see Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247 (1935)], and cases involving disputes concerning a single taxpayer where only one year is in question [see Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U. S. 281 (1932)] are examples of the situations included in this category. See Comment (1938) 52 HARV. L. REV. 300.
troversies about double allowance of deductions, double inclusion of items of gross income, and such related matters as fall within the scope of the legislation. So far as difficult and doubtful cases which may come within the field of Section 820 necessitate litigation, it is the part of frankness to admit that formidable problems of interpretative application may arise. Some of these problems, omitted from or inadequately guarded against by the original terms of the enactment, should be met by clarifying and supplementing amendatory action. The section deserves fair trial and for the purpose of testing its utility the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Department of Justice, and to such extent as is practicable private practitioners as well, should collect and collate statistics and practical experience.

APPENDIX


(a) Definitions.—For the purpose of this section—

(1) Determination.—The term 'determination under the income tax laws' means—

(A) A closing agreement made under section 606 of the Revenue Act of 1928, as amended; 2

(B) A decision by the Board of Tax Appeals or a judgment, decree, or other order by any court of competent jurisdiction, which has become final; or

(C) A final disposition by the Commissioner of a claim for refund. For the purposes of this section a claim for refund shall be deemed finally disposed of by the Commissioner—

(i) as to items with respect to which the claim was allowed, upon the date of allowance of refund or credit or upon the date of mailing notice of disallowance (by reason of offsetting items) of the claim for refund, and

(ii) as to items with respect to which the claim was disallowed, in whole or in part, or as to items applied by the Commissioner in reduction of the refund or credit, upon expiration of the time for instituting suit with respect thereto (unless suit is instituted prior to the expiration of such time).

Such term shall not include any such agreement made, or decision, judgment, decree, or order which has become final, or claim for refund finally disposed of, prior to ninety days after the date of the enactment of this Act.3

(2) Taxpayer.—Notwithstanding the provisions of section 901, 4 the term 'taxpayer' means any person subject to a tax under the applicable Revenue Act.

(3) Related Taxpayer.—The term 'related taxpayer' means a taxpayer who, with the taxpayer with respect to whom a determination specified in subsection (b) (1), (2), (3), or (4) is made, stood, in the taxable year with respect to which the erroneous inclusion, exclusion, omission, allowance, or disallowance therein referred to was made, in one of the following relationships: (A) husband and wife; (B) grantor and fiduciary; (C) grantor and beneficiary; (D) fiduciary and beneficiary, legatee, or heir; (E) decedent and decedent's estate; or (F) partner.

(b) Circumstances of Adjustment.—When a determination under the income tax laws—

(1) Requires the inclusion in gross income of an item which was erroneously included in the gross income of the taxpayer for another taxable year or in the gross income of a related taxpayer; or

(2) Allows a deduction or credit which was erroneously allowed to the taxpayer for another taxable year or to a related taxpayer; or

(3) Requires the exclusion from gross income of an item with respect to which tax was paid and which was erroneously excluded or omitted from the gross income of the taxpayer for another taxable year or from the gross income of a related taxpayer; or

(4) Allows or disallows any of the additional deductions allowable in computing the net income of estates or trusts, or requires or denies any of the inclusions in the computation of net income of beneficiaries, heirs, or legatees, specified in section 162 (b) and (c) of this Act, and corresponding sections of prior revenue Acts, and the correlative inclusion or deduction, as the case may be, has been erroneously excluded, omitted, or included, or disallowed, omitted, or allowed, as the case may be, in respect of the related taxpayer; or

(5) Determines the basis of property for depletion, exhaustion, wear and tear, or obsolescence, or for gain or loss on a sale or exchange, and in respect of any transaction upon which such basis depends there was an erroneous inclusion in or omission from the gross income of, or an erroneous recognition or nonrecognition of gain or loss to, the taxpayer or any person who acquired title to such property in such transaction and from whom mediately or immediately the taxpayer derived title subsequent to such transaction—

and, on the date the determination becomes final, correction of the effect of the error is prevented by the operation (whether before, on, or after the date of enactment of this Act) of any provision of the internal-revenue laws other than this section and other than section 3229 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (relating to compromises), then the effect of the error shall be corrected by an adjustment made under this section. Such adjustment shall be made only if there is adopted in the determination a position maintained by the Commissioner (in case the amount of the adjustment would be refunded or credited in the same manner as an overpayment under subsection (c)) or by the taxpayer with respect to whom the determination is made (in case the amount of the adjustment would be assessed and collected in the same manner as a deficiency under subsection (c)), which position is inconsistent with the erroneous inclusion, exclusion, omission, allowance, disallowance, recognition, or

5. Now §162(b) and (c) of Chapter 1.
nonrecognition, as the case may be. In case the amount of the adjustment would be assessed and collected in the same manner as a deficiency, the adjustment shall not be made with respect to a related taxpayer unless he stands in such relationship to the taxpayer at the time the latter first maintains the inconsistent position in a return, claim for refund, or petition (or amended petition) to the Board of Tax Appeals for the taxable year with respect to which the determination is made, or if such position is not so maintained, then at the time of the determination.

(c) Method of Adjustment.—The adjustment authorized in subsection (b) shall be made by assessing and collecting, or refunding or crediting, the amount thereof, to be ascertained as provided in subsection (d), in the same manner as if it were a deficiency determined by the Commissioner with respect to the taxpayer as to whom the error was made or an overpayment claimed by such taxpayer, as the case may be, for the taxable year with respect to which the error was made, and as if on the date of the determination specified in subsection (b) one year remained before the expiration of the periods of limitation upon assessment or filing claim for refund for such taxable year.

(d) Ascertainment of Amount of Adjustment.—In computing the amount of an adjustment under this section there shall first be ascertained the tax previously determined for the taxable year with respect to which the error was made. The amount of the tax previously determined shall be (1) the tax shown by the taxpayer, with respect to whom the error was made, upon his return for such taxable year, increased by the amounts previously assessed (or collected without assessment) as deficiencies, and decreased by the amounts previously abated, credited, refunded, or otherwise repaid in respect of such tax; or (2) if no amount was shown as the tax by such taxpayer upon his return, or if no return was made by such taxpayer, then the amounts previously assessed (or collected without assessment) as deficiencies, but such amounts previously assessed, or collected without assessment, shall be decreased by the amounts previously abated, credited, refunded, or otherwise repaid in respect of such tax. There shall then be ascertained the increase or decrease in the tax previously determined which results solely from the correct exclusion, inclusion, allowance, disallowance, recognition, or nonrecognition, of the item, inclusion, deduction, credit, gain, or loss, which was the subject of the error. The amount so ascertained (together with any amounts wrongfully collected, as additions to the tax or interest, as a result of such error) shall be the amount of the adjustment under this section.

(e) Adjustment Unaffected by Other Items, Etc.—The amount to be assessed and collected in the same manner as a deficiency, or to be refunded or credited in the same manner as an overpayment, under this section, shall not be diminished by any credit or set-off based upon any item, inclusion, deduction, credit, exemption, gain, or loss other than the one which was the subject of the error. Such amount, if paid, shall not be recovered by a claim or suit for refund or suit for erroneous refund based upon any item, inclusion, deduction, credit, exemption, gain, or loss other than the one which was the subject of the error.

(f) No Adjustment for Years Prior to 1932.—No adjustment shall be made under this section in respect of any taxable year beginning prior to January 1, 1932."