### States Formerly Prohibiting Miscegenation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Reference</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>Omitted in 1851.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>Repealed 1883. See Laws, p. 16 (1883).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>Repealed 1840. See Acts, c. 5 (1843).</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>Repealed 1886. See Laws, p. 90 (1886).</td>
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<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Repealed 1887. See Laws, p. 34 (1887).</td>
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### VENUE IN ANTITRUST CASES: APPLICABILITY OF THE NEW DISCRETIONARY TRANSFER PROVISION

included in the recently revised Judicial Code is a new provision, Section 1404(a), permitting transfer of venue in civil actions to accommodate the convenience of parties and witnesses.1 The legislative history of the section, despite the use of the broad phrase “any civil action,” leaves unsettled the question of whether antitrust actions are included.

The Sherman Act,2 although it made no special venue provision for Government antitrust actions, expressly permitted private treble damage suits to be brought wherever the defendant “resides or is found.”3 In Section 12 of the Clayton Act, Congress enlarged the plaintiff’s choice of forums to include those in which the defendant “transacts business.”4 While the enlarged choice was made available to all plaintiffs, including large corporations and the Government,5 apparently the main purpose of the provision

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3. Prior to enactment of the Clayton Act (see note 4 infra), § 7 of the Sherman Act provided: “Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act, may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”
4. “That any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found,” 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1946).
5. By including the phrase “or transacts business,” § 12 expands § 4 of the Act, 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1946), which specifically provides that treble damage suits may be brought where the defendant “resides or is found or has an agent.” It also expands § 7 of the Sherman Act, which dealt wholly with treble damage actions brought by private plaintiffs. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Material Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
6. Although there had been little difficulty in the past in bringing actions in the
was to prevent the escape of wealthy corporate defendants to jurisdictions where an impecunious plaintiff could not afford to sue. Underlying the provision was the emotional aura which surrounded, and still surrounds, the picture of an abused David slaying the corporate Goliath with a legal slingshot.

An unfortunate corollary of permitting an impecunious plaintiff to sue even where the venue is inconvenient to the defendant is that any plaintiff, impecunious or not, can deliberately choose such a forum in order to make defense of the suit unnecessarily expensive, usually in an effort to force a settlement. Thus, while this risk may be justified where the plaintiff cannot afford to sue elsewhere, an inherent defect in the statute has been that wealthy corporate plaintiffs or the Government would benefit unduly from the opportunity to shop around for the most advantageous forum. A dual problem exists of providing for antitrust venue in such a way as to give the

home jurisdiction of the defendants, the Attorney General requested that venue be broadened to permit greater freedom in bringing suits. There was some fear that this might lead to abuse, but this was allayed by pointing to the fact that the same policies would be followed as under the Sherman Act, and that on the whole antitrust actions under that Act had been brought in the defendants' home districts. 51 Cong. Rec. 9414-7 (1914). Attempted amendments to prevent the opportunity of abuse were attacked successfully on the same grounds. Id. at 9466-7.


7. See HAMILTON AND TILL, ANTI TRUST IN ACTION 82-85 (TNEC Monograph 16, 1940).

8. The very size of many antitrust suits makes transportation of documents, witnesses and counsel a costly operation. See Comment, 49 YALE L. J. 234, 290 (1939). The Government has used the threat of the expense of defending antitrust suits with telling effect. "Indeed, it has been the unvarying experience of the Antitrust Division that a pending prosecution has the same effect in breaking up restraints of trade as a conviction—that even the acquittal makes the defendants draw a breath of relief and resolve never to undergo such an expensive hazard again." ARNOLD, THE BOTTLENECKS OF BUSINESS 210 (1st ed. 1940).

9. While the Government may once have been deserving of the same special assistance as the indigent private plaintiff, the Antitrust Division seems to have outgrown such status. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1949, the appropriation for the Antitrust Division was $3,411,700, Pub. L. No. 597, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 3, 1949), as compared with $580,060 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1939, 52 STAT. 260 (1938). The Government was spending roughly $100,000 to $150,000 on its biggest antitrust suits even before the war. HANDLER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST ACTIONS 92 (TNEC Monograph 38, 1941). In 1947 the Antitrust Division counted 175 lawyers, 21 experts, 97 stenographers, 41 typists, and 10 messengers on its staff. 93 Cong. Rec. 9082 (1947). In addition to its regular personnel the Antitrust Division draws heavily on the Federal Bureau of Investigation for assistance in investigations and in interviewing witnesses. The Division can reach any forum with relative ease from one of its nine regional offices. See UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 206 (1948).
indigent plaintiff special assistance and at the same time close the door to possible abuse.

In criminal antitrust proceedings the broad choice of venue has been abused in at least one instance. In United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co.11 prosecution of an alleged conspiracy to fix prices of oil products was brought in Madison, Wisconsin—hundreds of miles from where prices allegedly were set, where the conspiracy allegedly was executed, and where the witnesses lived.12 Largely because of this case Rule 21(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was adopted in 1946 providing for transfer "in the interest of justice" to any other forum in which the offense had been committed.13

But while Rule 21(b) effectively checks abuse of venue in criminal antitrust actions, provisions to prevent the possibility of abuse in civil antitrust actions have lagged behind.14 Although the Supreme Court in 1947 recog-
nized the doctrine of *forum non conveniens*, thus permitting courts to dismiss civil suits brought in an inconvenient forum, the attempts of antitrust defendants to obtain dismissal under the doctrine have generally been unsuccessful, even where made in good faith. Motions for dismissal have been overruled on the merits, or because courts have felt that the doctrine did not apply to antitrust venue, or on both of these grounds.

A final decision that *forum non conveniens* does not apply to antitrust venue was made by the Supreme Court in *United States v. National City Lines*. The case involved nine corporations charged with conspiracy to restrain competition in motorbus transportation and in the purchase of essential supplies. The action had been dismissed on a showing that the Southern District of California was an inconvenient forum. For the same reason, the criminal antitrust action against the same defendants had already been transferred to the Northern District of Illinois under Rule 21(b). The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the venue section of the Clayton Act made choice of forum a statutory "right" which could not be limited by the judicial doctrine of *forum non conveniens*. The Court went further to point out important considerations militating against such a dismissal: it would not only initially delay the suit, but might also result in a "merry-go-round of litigation" by leading to dismissal in other courts.

Since this decision, however, the new Judicial Code has come into effect.
Section 1404(a), in providing for the transfer of civil actions for the convenience of parties and witnesses, codifies *forum non conveniens*, but with the important difference that it provides for transfer instead of dismissal. Under this provision the Southern California District Court has now transferred the *National City Lines* case to the Illinois District on the same grounds on which it had dismissed it prior to the Supreme Court's reversal.

The decision in this latest phase of the *National City Lines* case, that Section 1404(a) applies to venue in antitrust cases, resolves a question left unanswered by the legislative background. To the extent that the section codifies *forum non conveniens* it may be argued that antitrust cases are excluded, for they were so excluded from the application of that doctrine itself. Yet the reviser's notes cite a case under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, which was also excluded from *forum non conveniens,* "as an example of the need" for enactment of the section, so that FELA cases would appear clearly subject to its operation. Any inference as to antitrust cases, how-
ever, is not conclusive.50

The essential difference between Section 1401(a) and *forum non conveniens*, that transfer rather than dismissal is provided, strongly supports the conclusion that antitrust actions were meant to be, and should be, included.51 This difference counters the objections expressed by the Supreme Court in the *National City Lines* case when it was considering *forum non

the venue is improper, clearly applies to all civil actions even though it is located in Chapter 87. Thus the position of § 1404(a) in Chapter 87 does not in itself show a limited application. *See* Hayes v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 79 F. Supp. 821, 825 (D. Minn. 1948).

Judge Rayfiel also argues that § 1404 is no more than consolidation of § 119 [24 STAT. 425 (1887), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 119 (1940)] (providing for transfer of civil actions upon stipulation of parties) and § 163 [39 STAT. 851 (1916), 28 U.S.C. § 163 (1940)] (permitting transfer from one division to another within a district) of the Judicial Code, that these sections do not apply to FELA actions, and therefore that § 1404 does not so apply. In any event, § 163 is embodied in § 1404(b), and § 119 in § 1404(c); § 1404(a) is a new provision independent of these sections.

It might be argued that Congress' failure to enact the Jennings Bill, H.R. 1659, which was designed to change FELA venue, shows that Congress did not intend to affect FELA venue when it enacted § 1404(a). The bill, however, was passed by the House, 93 Cong. Rec. 9193 (1947), and was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary just ten days behind the revision of the Judicial Code, which included § 1404(a) complete with the reviser's notes signifying the contemplated application to cases like the *Keiper* case, note 27 supra. *Id.* at 8422, 9249. *See* Hayes v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 79 F. Supp. 821, 825 (D. Minn. 1948). Furthermore, discussion of the Jennings Bill before a subcommittee included recognition of the fact that § 1404(a) would permit transfer of FELA actions, and this does not appear to have been questioned. *Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1567 and H.R. 1659, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (1948).* This leads to the very fair inference that Congress thought that § 1404(a) adequately achieved the end sought by the Jennings Bill.

30. There was no specific need for the reviser's notes to consider abuses in antitrust venue, since no case had yet been decided by the Supreme Court involving the question of discretionary relief from an inconvenient antitrust venue. The reviser's notes were ordered printed on April 25, 1947. 93 Cong. Rec. 4114 (1947), whereas the Supreme Court did not decide the *National City Lines* case, until June 7, 1948.

In any event, the words "any civil action" would seem to be all inclusive. When exceptions were intended in the new Judicial Code they seem to have been specifically spelled out. E.g., § 2680 (listing exceptions to c. 171). *See* 3 Moore's *FEDERAL PRACTICE* 2141 n. 107 (2d ed. 1948): "'Any' action in § 1404(a) includes suits subject to special venue statutes, as suits for patent infringement and suits under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, as well as actions subject to the general venue statute."53

31. It might be argued that Congress was not thoroughly apprised of the impending changes in § 1404(a) from the fact that the new Judicial Code was enacted by way of the consent calendar without debate on the floor. But an interested Congressman could easily have spotted the change by reading the reviser's notes and records of the committee hearings. On Mar. 7, 1947, Prof. Moore testified before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary: "Venue provisions have not been altered by the revision. Two changes of importance have, however, been made. Improper venue is no longer grounds for dismissal of action in the federal courts. Instead the district court is to transfer the case to the proper venue. See section 1406. And section 1404 introduces an element of convenience which gives the court the power to transfer a case for the convenience of parties and witnesses to another district." 28 U.S.C. Cong. Serv. 1969 (1948).
conveniens: there is no longer the chance of a chain of dismissals, and the possibility of delay is greatly diminished. The Supreme Court in the National City Lines case raised another potential difficulty by speaking of the broad choice of venue provided in the Clayton Act as a "right" which could not be limited by the exercise of judicial discretion. Since the provisions of Section 1404(a) also contemplate judicial discretion, the Supreme Court might reiterate this principle as limiting the application of the Section's provisions. But here discretion, being authorized by act of Congress, is not a wholly judicial development as in the case of forum non conveniens. And while reference to the choice of venue as a "right" may suggest that the choice can be modified only by specific amendment of the Clayton Act, courts can easily reach the opposite decision by labelling the "right" as procedural; other courts, moreover, have obviated the problem by construing choice of venue as a "privilege." Yet in terms of practical effect, the label is immaterial: since Section 1404(a)

32. Under the new provision the court to which an action is transferred is, by the law of the case, the convenient forum. Only new evidence could change the finality of such a transfer.

33. The time which the Court feared would be consumed in review of a dismissal (334 U.S. 573, 590 (1948)) should be avoided under §1404(a), for transfer of an action does not seem to be a final disposition which can be appealed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a) (b). Only by a decision of the Supreme Court that transfer under §1404(a) is a final judgment can the delay to which the Court objected in the case of dismissal (a final disposition) become a reality. The Court has agreed to hear arguments on the question in the form of a motion for leave to file a petition for certiorari in the National City Lines case. 17 U.S.L. WEEK 3188 (U.S. 1948). If the motion is granted, not only would delay in antitrust actions result from transfer under §1404(a), but similar delays would result in all civil actions of every description. There is some indication, however, that the Court does not consider transfer to another forum a reviewable final order. See United States v. National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573, 594 and note 43 (1948) (expressing doubt that transfer of a criminal action under Rule 21 (b) could be appealed).

Of course where the decision on the motion to transfer has been extremely unfair to either plaintiff or defendant there is a possibility of delay if a petition for prerogative writ of mandamus is entertained by the Supreme Court. Pub. L. No. 773, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., §1651 (a) (June 25, 1948). But considering the purpose of the writ, that of correcting glaring and extreme inequities, any delay stemming from its issuance seems justifiable.

Another possible source of delay would be transfer to a district with a crowded calendar. It is probable, however, that in actions by a private litigant this is an element to be considered by the trial judge in determining "interest of justice." As for the Government's actions, no delay need result; Congress has provided that these actions may, upon request of the Attorney General, "be given precedence over others and in every way expedited. . . ." 32 STAT. 823 (1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §28 (1940).


35. "No one obtains any vested right in venue. It is granted by legislative enactment and can be withdrawn by the same power. The right is procedural and not substantive." Hayes v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 79 F. Supp. 821, 824 (D. Minn. 1948) (holding that §1404(a) limits the right under FELA).

operates only when venue is proper,

venue under Section 12 of the Clayton

Thus no amendment is necessary.

It would be a curious anomaly to have a provision for the transfer of
criminal antitrust actions and then to exclude civil antitrust actions from
a similar provision. The purposes of transfer are fundamentally the same in
both cases. Furthermore, when both a civil and criminal action are
brought by the Government, the defendant is effectively prevented from
obtaining a transfer of the criminal action unless the civil action can similarly
be transferred. By moving to transfer the criminal action, he invites the
burden of defending two suits in different parts of the country at the same
time. And while the Government might pursue only one action at a time,
it could still choose the civil action which cannot be transferred from the
inconvenient forum; moreover, the Government would have its choice of
the more favorable judge of the two available.

The application of Section 1404(a) to antitrust actions provides a check
against possible abuse of venue without disturbing the purpose behind the
broad venue provisions of the Clayton Act. That courts will not misuse the
power to transfer is assured by standards and precedents already established
in cases involving forum non conveniens. The requirement that transfer

37. Where venue is improper, § 1406 applies. See Prof. Moore's statement before the
Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee quoted in note 31 supra. See Hayes v.

38. Forum non conveniens has also been held inapplicable to FELA and antitrust ac-
tions on the ground that they involve "special venue statutes." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501 (1947); Tivoli Realty v. Interstate Circuit, 167 F. 2d 155 (5th Cir. 1948).
Fifth & Walnut v. Loew's, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 64, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). And see Mr. Justice
But § 1404(a) seems applicable to special as well as general venue statutes, the implied re-
quirement being only that the venue is proper. Moore, op. cit. supra note 30, at 2141 n. 107.

39. The guiding principle in both Rule 21(b) and § 1404(a) is "the interest of justice."
The difference between whether an antitrust action is criminal or civil seems insufficient to
result in material variation between the factors determining the "interest of justice" as to
venue in either type of case.

40. In judging whether a forum is convenient "important considerations are the rela-
tive ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that
make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to
the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh relative advan-
tages and obstacles to fair trial. It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an
inconvenient forum, 'vex,' 'harass,' or 'oppress' the defendant by inflicting upon him ex-
 pense or trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy. But unless the bal-
ance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be
men's Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 526 (1947); Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum
Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 380, 416 (1947); Comment, 56 YALE L. J. 1234, 1247
(1947).

Lower courts in considering applications for dismissal under forum non conveniens

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