Local government law has fallen behind the times. Over the past two decades, economists have developed a deep understanding of “agglomeration economics,” or the study of how and why mobile citizens and firms locate in cities. Their work argues that people decide to move to cities because of the reduced transportation costs for goods, increased labor market depth, and intellectual spillovers cities provide—that is, individuals and firms locate in cities in order to get the benefits of being near one another. Economically minded local government law scholars have largely ignored this burgeoning literature and instead have continued to examine exclusively a separate set of benefits people get from their location decisions, the gains from “sorting.” As analyzed in the well-known Tiebout model, individuals move between local governments in a region in order to receive public policies that fit their preferences.

This Article seeks to develop the framework for a modern law and economic method for analyzing local government law. Specifically, it claims that there is an inverse relationship between the gains from agglomeration and sorting. Having many small local governments, and enabling individuals to choose their local public policies by sorting among them, affects the organization and density of people in metropolitan areas, creating movement away from economically optimal location decisions. Sorting thus reduces agglomerative efficiency. Similarly, the existence of agglomerative gains means that individuals are making location decisions for reasons other than matching their preferences for public policies. Agglomeration, therefore, causes a reduction in the efficiency of sorting.

States face a trade-off between maximizing agglomerative and sorting efficiency in deciding how much power, and which responsi-
bilities, to allocate to local governments. The need to balance these two conflicting sources of efficiency and changes in the nature of agglomerative gains over the last hundred years explains a great deal about the history of American local government law, current allocations of power between local governments and state legislatures, and judicial decisions about local governmental power. Further, understanding the systemic failures in the ways states balance this trade-off suggests a way to determine the proper role for the federal government in policy areas, like housing and transportation, that are primarily regulated at the local level.

I. INTRODUCTION: LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

The study of the relationship between local government law and economics has long had one central text: Charles Tiebout’s famous 1956 article, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. Tiebout developed an ingenuously simple model showing that, if local governments provide purely local public services and mobile individuals move to the local government that best fits their preferences for public policies, local public services will be provided at the efficient level. The substantial body of scholarship that followed Tiebout’s original work has rendered the model more believable by incorporating factors like zoning, property taxation, and local political incentives. Further, empirical work has shown that a main prediction of the Tiebout model—that the quality of local policies will be “capitalized” into housing prices—actually occurs, although this effect is stronger in rural areas and suburbs than in dense urban cities. The normative takeaway from the Tiebout model literature is clear: metropolitan regions should be divided into many local governments that are free to provide local public services in an unrestricted


2. See Tiebout, supra note 1, at 419-24.


4. See Fischel, supra note 1, at 11 (“[T]he Tiebout model tests best in the suburbs rather than in central cities.”); Oates, supra note 3, at 21-33. It should be noted that the Tiebout model only predicts capitalization if new cities cannot be created easily.
way, as this will ensure that mobile citizens receive their desired package of public services.\(^5\)

For decades, local government law scholars have alternatively used the Tiebout model to assess local government law proposals and criticized its use, with its detractors claiming it relies on untenable assumptions, ignores the value of political participation, and fails to consider the distribution of benefits among the citizenry.\(^6\) What these critics have failed to do, however, is offer a coherent alternative story about how to assess the economic costs and benefits of local government laws. Instead, they have either argued that efficiency should not be our primary concern in judging the normative attractiveness of a local government regime or have poked holes in the Tiebout model without proposing an alternative metric.\(^7\)

The Tiebout model, however, is only a piece of the economic literature about cities. A massive body of work, often called “The New Economic Geography” or “agglomeration economics,” has developed in the last twenty years, which studies why people decide to locate in cities.\(^8\) This field—developed by an ideologically mixed group of scholars, including Edward Glaeser, Paul Krugman, Robert Lucas, and David Romer—starts with the basic claim that individuals and businesses make their location decisions on the basis of where other individuals and businesses decide to locate.\(^9\) By locating near specific others, an individual or business can pay reduced transportation costs for goods, capture information, and benefit from the economies of scale.\(^9\)

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5. See Oates, supra note 3, at 41-42.
7. See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 167-73 (1999) (critiquing Tiebout and the public goods literature generally for understanding city services as being like a consumption good for residents); Schragger, supra note 6, at 1834.
mation spillovers, and participate in larger and more specialized labor and consumption markets.\textsuperscript{10} Cities develop because they provide these "agglomeration" gains, that is, they provide residents with the advantages of big, diverse, and productive markets and creative ferment. Because of this, cities will draw residents and businesses even if all local governments provide identical local policies.\textsuperscript{11} When people decide where to move, these agglomeration benefits are weighed against the costs of "congestion," particularly the high price of property in dense areas.\textsuperscript{12} As Lucas points out, "What can people be paying Manhattan or downtown Chicago rents for, if not for being near other people?"\textsuperscript{13}

This discussion, so prominent among economists, largely has been ignored by legal scholars.\textsuperscript{14} This Article will provide the first comprehensive exploration of the relationship between these two understandings of the efficiency effects of individual location decisions on local government law. That is, it will attempt to develop a modern understanding of the economics of local government law.\textsuperscript{15} In so doing, it will show that much

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{10} See Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, supra note 9, at 140–49 (providing a summary of the forces that generate agglomeration).
  \item \textsuperscript{11} See GLAESER, supra note 8, at 5–9; Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, supra note 9, at 140–49.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} See Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, supra note 9, at 150–53.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Lucas, supra note 9, at 39 (emphasis omitted).
  \item \textsuperscript{15} It should be noted that this Article is not addressing questions of political participation, interlocal equity, racial discrimination or environmental harm, and how they interact or conflict with economic efficiency. This is not because these issues are unimportant—they clearly are. But since the publication of the most well-known piece in the field, Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980), these concerns, and their conflict with a Tieboutian vision of local governments, have been front and center in most of the literature on local government law. The centrality of these concerns has crowded out sustained discussion of the conflict between different visions of efficiency in local government law. Further, Frug's (and Tiebout's) focus on the importance of law to city
of the work analyzing local governments and local government law—both by proponents of the Tiebout Model and by its critics—is seriously flawed or, at least, substantially incomplete.

The Article makes two central claims:

First, any economic analysis of a local government law or policy must account not only for its effect on how well local policies fit local preferences, but also how it changes where people and businesses locate in relation to one another. "Sorting" in the Tiebout model and agglomeration are two distinct sources of gains that derive from the same source: individuals and businesses making decisions about where to reside. In the Tiebout model, individuals move to get access to attractive local government policies, whereas in an agglomerative model, people and businesses move to get the benefit of being near others who provide them with social, consumption, and employment options or informational spillovers. Local government law—both structural decisions about what powers to allocate to local governments and individual local policies—affects individual location decisions and hence which people and businesses are near one another, as well as how much the residents of a local government like its policies. As a result, local government law impacts the efficiency of both sorting and agglomeration. Unless preferences for neighbors and policies are identical, the Tiebout model is flawed because it ignores both the effect laws have on the identity of which individuals and businesses are physically proximate and the degree to which this proximity is factored into individual decision making.

Second, agglomeration and sorting are not merely distinct, but often have an inverse relationship. Where there are local gains from agglomeration, sorting over local policies will be less efficient. The existence of agglomeration gains means that people are making decisions about where to live for reasons other than moving to a place that has a local government with policies that match their preferences. Agglomeration gains at the local level give otherwise mobile residents a reason not to move, even when governmental policies affect them in a negative way. When people and businesses are unwilling to move from the combination of neighbors in their town or city, they are less able to discipline local government policies they dislike through the threat of exit. This is why,

development has led to a widespread lack of attention to the implications of the fact that concentrated agglomerations of people are a relatively natural occurrence in a market economy. See JANE JACOBS, THE ECONOMY OF CITIES 27–31 (1970) (arguing that cities are a necessary component of the development of market systems). This Article addresses cities as a subject and not merely as a "concept."

16. These are "gains" relative to a situation in which individuals were equally spaced across the country. See infra notes 41–48 and accompanying text.
17. Compare Tiebout, supra note 1, at 419 ("Consumer-voters are fully mobile and will move to that community where their preference patterns [for local government services] are best satisfied."); Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, supra note 9, at 140–49 (describing the agglomerative method).
18. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 403–05 (noting widespread agreement that local government law effects individual location decisions).
19. See GLAESER, supra note 8, at 5–9.
for instance, wealthy individuals continue to reside in New York City despite high local income taxes—they receive more benefits from their collection of neighbors than they lose from local policy. As such, wherever there are strong localized agglomeration gains, there will be a negative effect on the degree to which local political preferences match local policies. Further, this conflict will have distributional consequences. Individuals, groups, and industries that have strong needs or wants for dense (and hence agglomeration-rich) areas will have less control over, and likely be less happy with, local services than those without such preferences.

Similarly, the existence of sorting undermines the gains from agglomeration. For there to be gains from sorting, people have to move in response to local government policies, which changes the geographic distribution of people in (and between) metropolitan areas. Sorting thus generates incentives for people to move away from where they would have located if public services were provided by a state or federal government. Where the government induces people to move from the market-determined combination of people and places, it causes deadweight loss—the lost transactions between people who would have lived near one another absent government intervention. Moreover, as economist Bruce Hamilton has shown, the Tiebout model can only produce a stable equilibrium in a world with property taxes if local governments use zoning laws to restrict property owners from subdividing their land into cheaper parcels. As a result, a local government law regime that encourages sorting will cause development to be less dense and housing to be more expensive. This will have a negative effect on all sources of agglomerative efficiency, which derive from interactions between physically proximate individuals and business (although it will have greater effect on some forms than on others). Therefore, sorting produces both random movement away from where individuals would have located in an unimpeded property market and systematically less dense development,

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20. See infra notes 208–13 and accompanying text.

21. This point needs qualification. Agglomeration generates externalities which are not captured necessarily in individual location decisions. Therefore, the market-determined location decisions are not necessarily optimal. Sorting for public policies, however, has nothing to do with the size or direction of these externalities. It is generating movement away from the market location but not in the direction of curing any defect with the market location. See infra note 233 and accompanying text. Further, as I argue infra note 236 and the accompanying text, the movement generated by sorting will exacerbate rather than cure the externalities generated by agglomeration.

22. The reason for this is that residents on the cheaper subdivided parcels will still consume local services at the average rate, but will contribute less-than-average tax revenue. In order to achieve the benefits of Tiebout sorting, local governments must pass restrictive zoning rules, like large minimum lot sizes or maximum height restrictions, in order to control the size of their population. Hamilton, supra note 3, at 211.

23. This effect can be dramatic. For instance, in the San Francisco region, nearly fifty percent of the cost of any given house is due to the restrictions on housing supply caused by zoning. Edward L. Glaeser et al., Why Is Manhattan So Expensive? Regulation and the Rise in Housing Prices, 48 J. L. & ECON. 331, 333 (2005).

24. See infra notes 200–14 and accompanying text.
a form of movement away from unimpeded property market location decisions with particularly severe costs for agglomeration. Put together, sorting reduces the degree to which metropolitan regions are agglomeratively efficient.

Understanding this dynamic is a necessary component of assessing the economic effects of local government law. Internally, local governments try to achieve some balance between the goals of meeting local preferences for services and maximizing the gains from having attractive neighbors for producing agglomeration gains. The many small local governments that are necessary for optimal Tiebout sorting, however, are not well-placed to achieve the socially optimal balance, as each government's residents get all the benefits of having their preferred local policies but only capture part of the gains from agglomeration, which are felt across jurisdictional boundaries. As a result, allocations of power to and among local governments that maximize gains from Tiebout sorting are unlikely to produce regulation of economic activity at the local level that maximizes agglomeration. Although there are some local government laws that may enhance both sorting and agglomerative efficiency, the decision about where and to whom to allocate the power to decide local policies will often involve a trade-off between these sources of efficiency.

While this provides the framework for determining the overall economic costs and benefits of any local government law regime, determining the effects of a specific local government policy will turn on exactly how the policy interacts with specific forms of agglomeration and the propensity to sort. This Article will analyze the two central policies in the history of American local government law—Dillon's Rule, which governed local government power for much of American history, and current "home rule" regimes.

Under Dillon's Rule, local governments only have those powers specifically granted to them by a state government, and when there is doubt about whether a state government has allocated power to a local government, courts are instructed to resolve the ambiguity against local government authority. It has been noted that Dillon's Rule limits the ability of local governments to create externalities on other cities—that is, it ensures that local government competition creates sorting benefits rather than intercity conflict. This Article claims that, when Dillon's Rule was enacted, local government beggar-thy-neighbor policies not only reduced sorting efficiency, but also had an extremely negative effect on agglomerative efficiency, but that this is no longer the case.
When Dillon's Rule was first proposed in the middle of the nineteenth century, transport costs for goods between cities were very high. As a result, the dominant economic force driving the location decisions of firms was the desire to reduce these costs—manufacturers had to locate near their suppliers and customers or face the substantial cost of shipping items across the country. Final-good manufacturers clustered in cities that were transportation hubs to reduce their costs, and this created strong incentives for intermediate-good suppliers to locate there as well, turning transportation hubs like Chicago and Buffalo into industrial powerhouses. As such, when Dillon's Rule was first enacted, reducing transportation costs for goods was the primary driver of urban agglomeration.

This created incentives for cities to provide subsidies to railroads in hopes of becoming hubs and also to subsidize local industry, as both would create increasing local returns. Although these policies could create local agglomerative benefits if only one local government engaged in them, they did not produce net national economic gain, as they created inefficient subsidy competition, political manipulation of the railroad industry, and overinvestment. Dillon's Rule promoted efficiency by removing from local governments the power to engage in these policies without state approval, limiting this type of internecine battle for agglomeration.

This same story helps explain why Dillon's Rule became agglomeratively inefficient. In the second half of the twentieth century, transportation costs for goods fell dramatically. As a result, manufacturing moved out of major urban areas and forces other than the desire of producers to reduce transportation costs—like deep skilled-labor markets and information spillovers—became the strongest drivers of urban agglomeration. These economic changes removed much of the incentive cities had to manipulate domestic trade or to subsidize industry (and the likelihood that doing so would have substantial negative effects), hence removing the reason why Dillon's Rule contributed to agglomerative efficiency.

As the agglomeration-based case for Dillon's Rule ebbed, most states supplanted it with one form or another of "home rule," state constitutional grants of power to local governments. How much actual.
power this change provided to local governments is a subject of much debate. As David Barron has noted, the limits on local power set by states under home rule systems are not neutral—they do not just allocate a certain degree of power to local government, but instead permit specific types of local decision. Contrary to Barron’s claims about which types of powers are allocated to local governments, however, this Article argues that the division of power between state governments and local governments in home rule regimes is best explained by the difference between sorting gains and agglomerative efficiency. As implemented by state legislatures and state courts, the powers home rule regimes allocate to local governments are largely intended to (and do) create sorting efficiencies. State legislatures retain control over those policies that limit the negative effect of Tiebout sorting on agglomerative efficiency and those public polices where the optimal provision would result in increased agglomerative efficiency. That is to say, one way to understand current local government law—both statutory and case law—is as a response to the need to balance the gains from agglomeration and sorting.

This overall regime, however, often ends up doing too little to enhance agglomerative efficiency. Agglomeration benefits are felt at the regional and sub-regional levels, but states do not necessarily cover the entirety of a region and usually cover territory beyond one region. Accordingly, state governments frequently have incentives other than promoting regional agglomerative efficiency. This suggests that federal spending in areas primarily regulated by local governments, like housing and transportation, should be reformed in order to counter this tendency in state government systems.

This Article is organized as follows. Part II discusses the agglomeration economics scholarship. Part III explains the Article’s first major thesis: that the gains in the Tiebout model and agglomeration economics are distinct. Part IV shows how agglomeration and sorting conflict. Finally, Part V analyzes Dillon’s Rule and home rule.

II. THE CITY AS AN ECONOMIC SUBJECT: SOURCES OF AGGLOMERATION

Agglomeration economics begins with a simple question: Why are there cities? Although this might seem like a silly question, it is actually quite a challenge for neoclassical economics. "If we postulate only the cities but grants state legislatures the ability to preempt local policies. Scholars question how different these formal distinctions are in practice. See Richard Briffault & Laurie Reynolds, Cases and Materials on State and Local Government Law 332-36 (7th ed. 2008) ("The classification of home rule provisions as imperio or legislative may seem somewhat academic.").

38. Id. at 332 ("The scope of [local] autonomy is often quite limited.").
40. See id. at 2346.
41. "The foremost question of urban economics is why cities exist. Almost everything else that urban economists do can be seen as part of answering this question." Glaeser, supra note 8, at 1.
usual list of economic forces, cities should fly apart. . . . A city is simply a collection of factors of production—capital, people and land—and land is always far cheaper outside cities than inside.\textsuperscript{42} Models that include only these economic forces—meaning there is an implicit assumption that economic activity is spread evenly throughout the country—are the workhorses of international trade and macroeconomic theory. Most economics textbooks did not mention the location of economic behavior inside a country, at least until the last ten or so years.\textsuperscript{43} Although modeling always requires simplification, and obviously much useful work can be done without incorporating the domestic location of industry into international and macroeconomic models, the absence of any explanation of location in modern economics was a bit of a problem. Urbanization is a dramatic fact of both the American and world economies. Globally, while only ten percent of the world’s population lived in cities in 1900, fifty percent do today, and seventy-five percent likely will by 2050.\textsuperscript{44} In this country, 220 million (out of 280 million) Americans live in the four percent of the country that is urban or suburban.\textsuperscript{45}

The existence of cities can only be explained through some idea of external effects—gains people and firms see from being located near one another that offset the increased cost of land.\textsuperscript{46} More than a hundred years ago, the leading economist of the second half of the nineteenth century, Alfred Marshall, developed a theory of what these external effects might be.\textsuperscript{47} He suggested three effects that created the increasing returns to city size that made the existence of cities possible: (1) reduced transportation costs for goods, (2) insurance and specialization gains from large labor and consumption markets, and (3) information spillovers.\textsuperscript{48} This Section, following much modern work in urban economics, is organized around Marshall’s three explanations.

One note on the intellectual history of agglomeration economics, though, is necessary. After Marshall’s magisterial treatment, very little was written on the subject.\textsuperscript{49} Although there was some work done in the

\textsuperscript{42} Lucas, \textit{supra} note 9, at 38.

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{See} FUJITA \textit{et al.}, \textit{supra} note 8, at 1–2.

\textsuperscript{44} Ricky Burdett & Philipp Rode, \textit{The Urban Age Project, in The Endless City} 8, 9 (Ricky Burdett & Deyan Sudjic eds., 2008).

\textsuperscript{45} GLAESER, \textit{supra} note 8, at 1.

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{See} Lucas, \textit{supra} note 9, at 38–39.

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{See} ALFRED MARSHALL, \textit{PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS} 267–77 (8th ed. 1953).

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{See id.; see also} Guy Dumas et al., \textit{Geographic Concentration as a Dynamic Process}, 84 REV. ECON. & STAT. 193, 193–97 (2002) (describing the three explanations for agglomeration in Marshall’s work); Glaeser, \textit{Are Cities Dying?}, \textit{supra} note 9, at 139–50.

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{See} FUJITA \textit{et al.}, \textit{supra} note 8, at 2–5; PAUL KRUGMAN, \textit{DEVELOPMENT, GEOGRAPHY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY} 79–85 (1995). It is not the case that there was no formal economic work on urban economics. Much of the research of this period, however, assumed away the central question of why cities exist. Economists like William Alonso, Richard Muth, and Edward Mills developed models that argued that residents and firms located in concentric circles around a central business district, building on Johann von Thünen’s insight that rents include the cost of transportation. \textit{See} FUJITA \textit{et al.}, \textit{supra} note 8, at 15–17; GLAESER, \textit{supra} note 8, at 11–14. Although these “monocentric city” models produced some interesting work, they simply assumed cities existed and went from there.
field, for the most part the theoretical aspects of urban economics were left untouched until the late 1980s. There are a variety of explanations for why there was such a long fallow period, but whatever the reason, this is likely why agglomeration economics has been ignored by local government law scholars. Just as local government law was taking off as a field in the 1970s, urban economics was in a dead patch. One of the only legal scholars to address this type of scholarship, Robert Ellickson, devoted two pages of his classic article, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, to some of the small amount of work generated during the 1970s on agglomeration economics, before noting that “the evidence on the relative costs and benefits of urban growth is still fragmentary.” As we will see below, the evidence is far more extensive today.

A. Transport Costs for Goods

Marshall’s first explanation for why cities exist is the simplest: packing economic activity into cities reduces transportation costs for goods. If there are real costs associated with shipping goods and some degree of increasing returns to firm size, firms will be attracted to areas that provide “backward and forward linkages” to consumers and input suppliers. That is, being physically proximate to input suppliers and customers can reduce a firm's costs by reducing the cost of shipping goods.

This insight is perhaps the most intuitive explanation for why producers, and hence labor and residents, cluster in cities. It also explains

They also failed to capture the continuous nature of agglomeration—they assumed agglomeration only happens in the central business district. See infra note 241. Also during this period, Vernon Henderson did important research linking city size to differences in industry type. See FUJITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 19–22; J. V. Henderson, The Sizes and Types of Cities, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 640, 655–56 (1974). This work, though, treats cities as if they were just big central business districts, and hence is somewhat removed from the concerns addressed in this Article.

Paul Krugman has offered the most widely accepted theory. Any model seeking to determine where economic activity will locate necessarily includes increasing returns to scale and will inevitably feature multiple equilibrium solutions. Where people and businesses locate today is heavily influenced by where people already are, and hence any set of variables—e.g., transport costs, level of technology—will generate a number of different distributions in space depending on where they were before and the effect they had in the past on location decisions. The mathematical and computational tools available at the turn of the century were not up to solving problems like this, and, as a result, economists addressed topics that could be solved with the tools they had. See FUJITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 2–4; KRUGMAN, supra note 49, at 1–3.

Many of the central texts of the modern local government law literature were written right on the cusp of the development of agglomeration economics. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L. J. 385, 429, 475–89 (1977); Frug, supra note 15, at 1057.

Ellickson, supra note 52, at 441–43.

See Dumais et al., supra note 48, at 193 (discussing the Marshall, Arrow, and Romer Model, or MAR Model).

If there are no increasing returns to firm size, a person in every town would just start a local firm and avoid the transport costs. See FUJITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 4–6. “[B]ackward and forward linkages” are just modern terminology for Marshall’s point. Id. at 5.

See id. at 5.
why you see linkages between the types of firms in cities—e.g., auto parts suppliers and car companies both locating in Detroit. It was, however, difficult for economists to figure out exactly how and when industry would cluster, because determining how transport costs affect location decisions necessarily implicates increasing returns to scale at the level of firms and cities. And increasing returns are hard to model using neoclassical economic tools.

Paul Krugman, Masahira Fujita, and Anthony Venables developed a way of thinking about this problem. Using developments in scholarship in international trade, they argue that the key to understanding the problem is thinking about location decisions in the context of models of "monopolistic competition," or the situation in which firms sell distinct brands, and thus have some pricing power, but where competition drives long-term profits to zero. Such models feature some increasing returns to firm size and, more importantly, increasing returns to the number of firms in the market. The reason for this is that more brands mean more customer satisfaction, as the diffusion of choices results in customers being happier with their choices, and reduction in the cost prior entrants can charge.

Krugman et al. imagine a situation with two countries or cities and ask where mobile manufacturing firms that sell both intermediate goods to each other and final goods to consumers will choose to locate. They note that if transportation costs between the two places are infinitely high, manufacturing will divide evenly between the two countries, as there can be no trade. The same is true if transportation costs are zero,

57. See Dumais et al., supra note 48, at 199.
58. Work in international trade theory in the 1980s produced a methodology for coming to terms with the implications of increasing returns to market size. See Steven Brakman & Ben J. Heijdra, Introduction to THE MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION REVOLUTION IN RETROSPECT 1, 1–41 (Steven Brakman & Ben J. Heijdra eds., 2004); J. Peter Neary, Monopolistic Competition and International Trade Theory, in THE MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION REVOLUTION IN RETROSPECT, supra, at 159–60. It did so in order to explain why trade among developed countries was in the same good—cars from the United States being sold in Germany and vice versa. The key to the "new trade theory" was understanding this trade as a species of monopolistic competition. Speaking very generally, the gains from trade came in terms of the increased variety of choices available to consumers in both countries. The existence of a bigger market with more brands made it more likely that each customer's preferences were satiated—some Germans preferred Fords and some Americans preferred BMWs. The key formal innovation permitting this kind of research was the Dixit-Stiglitz equation. See generally Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297 (1977). Dixit and Stiglitz modeled utility functions in an oddly stylized way: it is assumed people gain, and gain equally, from the introduction of new varieties of goods. (These are called constant elasticity of substitution equations for this reason.) Although this utility function is a bit odd, it is necessary for making these models tractable.
59. For a discussion of how the problems of trade in a monopolistic competition model led to the "new economic geography," see Brakman & Heijdra, supra note 58, at 32–35.
60. The Fujita, Krugman, and Venables model is simply an extension of the Dixit-Stiglitz framework discussed supra note 58. See FUJITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 6.
61. Id. at 45, 51.
62. See id. at 45, 48–52.
63. Id. at 61.
64. See id. at 67–68, 74.
as it will not matter where they locate because they would have no desire to drive up rent (or the cost of labor) by concentrating in one place.\textsuperscript{65} The question is what happens if transportation costs are real but not infinite.

Krugman et al. argue that real but not infinite transportation costs create a strong incentive for manufacturing firms to locate in the same country or city.\textsuperscript{66} By colocating, firms can capture the benefits of the increasing returns to the number of brands on their sales to each other, without having to pay the cost of shipping between regions.\textsuperscript{67} As a result, the effective cost of intermediate goods will be lower in the country they locate in, which will drive new firms to locate there as well.\textsuperscript{68} New entrants will drive local costs down further, inspiring more new entrants (or existing firms from the other region) to move there, and so on. Further, wages will rise in that market, meaning that the producers will be closer to wealthier consumers and can sell their final goods to them without paying transport costs. Producers will only have to pay the transportation costs once—when they ship final goods to consumers in the country or city where the producers have not located.\textsuperscript{69} Auto parts and car companies, for instance, will locate in Detroit so that they can buy and sell from one another without paying shipping costs on anything but the sales of cars around the country.

If transportation costs begin to fall, however, manufacturing firms will eventually stop colocating, as the situation becomes more like the no transportation costs example.\textsuperscript{70} For awhile, the historic clustering of firms will hold on, as they will continue to provide the benefits of increasing returns to market size.\textsuperscript{71} This means that a historic cluster of manufacturing firms will survive even if transportation costs fall to the point where those firms never would have clustered in the first place.\textsuperscript{72} If transport costs continue to fall, however, there will be some point at which the gains from locating close to other entrants will evaporate. At that point, the manufacturing firms will move to being relatively evenly dispersed between the two countries.\textsuperscript{73} This is one of the key insights of the model. Location decisions will feature "break points," or moments when industry de-clusters and will not necessarily re-cluster even if the basic variables—transport costs, demand for manufactured goods—return to where they were before, because there will not be the cluster of

\textsuperscript{65} Id. at 68.
\textsuperscript{66} See id. at 66–67, 66 fig.5.2.
\textsuperscript{67} Id. at 67–68.
\textsuperscript{68} Id. at 52.
\textsuperscript{69} See id. at 49–50, 66–68.
\textsuperscript{70} See id. at 69–76. The same is true in reverse as transport costs rise. Id. at 67 fig.5.3.
\textsuperscript{71} Id. at 67–68.
\textsuperscript{72} See id. at 69–75.
\textsuperscript{73} See id. at 34–41, 74–76.
firms creating an external benefit for new entrants that there had been before the break point.\footnote{See id.}

One can spin many stories out of this model. For instance, Krugman et al. argue that it explains why, at the outset of industrialization, some countries became rich exporters of manufactured goods while others remained predominantly agricultural, but then, as transportation costs fell over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, manufacturing spread throughout the world.\footnote{See id. at 239–60} Similarly, that American manufacturing clustered in cities that served as transportation hubs in the nineteenth century, when transportation costs were high, fits this model exactly.\footnote{See id. at 227–36; Glaeser & Kohlhase, supra note 30, at 197–98.} Getting the vast agricultural and natural resources produced in the heartland to the coasts for consumption and export required a national system of rail, road, and water transport, which was built according to a hub and spoke system.\footnote{See FUJITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 227–36.} Because transport costs were high, it made sense for manufacturers to cluster where transport costs were lowest—the transport hubs.\footnote{Id.; see also GLAESER, supra note 8, at 7–9.} Once agglomerations started forming, they created incentives for other firms to cluster in these cities as well.\footnote{See Glaeser & Kohlhase, supra note 30, at 199–200.} The result was that transport hubs like Buffalo, on the Erie Canal, and Chicago, the center of the national rail network, became manufacturing centers.\footnote{See id. at 197–99.}

As transportation costs fall, though, this type of agglomeration ceases to be a force. In the American economy, this point likely has been reached. "While transport costs for goods continue to matter, they have become much less important. . . . Today, the costs of urban location for most manufacturing industries are clearly much higher than the benefits. If cities' only advantage was eliminating transport costs for manufactured goods, then cities would indeed cease to exist."\footnote{Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, supra note 9, at 145; see also Dumais et al., supra note 48, at 194–98, 202 (finding that labor market pooling variables explain industry location decisions better than input and output linkages).} Further, major urban centers increasingly rely on industries like technology, management, finance, publishing, and entertainment, and their "exports" often are transported by email or phone.\footnote{See GLAESER, supra note 8, at 8.} The cost of shipping goods cannot serve to explain the clustering of these industries. Other explanations are needed.

\section*{B. Market Depth}

Marshall also claims that individuals and firms locate in cities to participate in deep labor markets with lots of potential workers in any
given field. The substance of Marshall's analysis, however, is not limited to labor markets; it also explains why deep consumption markets and social "markets," like the dating market, create agglomeration gains.

The key to understanding Marshall's analysis is that these markets are regional, or even more local than that. This is because traveling between cities or regions takes time, and, as a result, there are large opportunity costs that make it difficult to commute to a job, eat at a restaurant, or date someone in another region (or across a region). To participate, say, in a regional labor market, you have to live there, and if that market is attractive, it will spur migration to that region.

Marshall argues that the deep labor markets in large cities provide residents and firms with two separate benefits—insurance and specialization. Deep labor markets provide workers with benefits of risk pooling, or insurance "against firm- or industry-specific shocks." If there is only one factory in a town, its employees face a great deal of risk, as a downturn either for the firm or for the industry in which the firm participates means that the employees will have to bear the costs of moving in order to find suitable employment. In contrast, if an employer in a big city goes belly-up, its workers have more options. This effect is particularly important if, as is ordinarily assumed, workers are risk averse.

Deep local labor markets also permit increased specialization. In *The Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith argues that cities provide workers with the ability to specialize, whereas in "the Highlands of Scotland, every farmer must be butcher, baker and brewer for his own family." This specialization is highly efficient, as workers can focus on what they have comparative advantages in producing. Further, deep markets reduce search costs, allowing laborers to find more easily the job in which they can be most productive, increasing overall economic performance. Labor market depth also has dynamic effects. As urban workers develop new skills, they can switch to suitable jobs easily and this creates incentives for investments in human capital. Market depth, and the resulting

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83. MARSHALL, supra note 47, at 271–72.
84. See Glaeser & Kohlhase, supra note 30, at 208–10. Although the cost of traveling has fallen, the opportunity cost of time increases along with economic growth, meaning that the effective cost of moving people is increasing. Id. at 208–09.
85. See MARSHALL, supra note 47, at 271–72.
86. Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, supra note 9, at 146.
87. Cf. id. (noting that labor market pooling is important even if workers are not risk averse).
90. See Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, supra note 9, at 145–46.
specialization, creates incentives for both firms, which want to access specialized labor, and residents, who want to participate in such deep markets, to locate in cities.

The depth of local markets also matters outside of labor markets. Urban consumption markets feature a wider range of products—from shopping to cultural amenities—that make it more likely that a consumer will find a particular good. This drives people to shop and live in cities. Marshall notes that this should have a stronger impact on markets for expensive or unique items, as people care more about getting insurance and specialization when they are spending a lot of money. This explains why, for instance, diamond merchants often group together in the same city and even on the same street.

Even social “markets” feature gains from pooling and specialization. Dating markets provide strong agglomeration effects, giving single people strong incentives to move to a big city. The large number of people in big cities provides single people with a huge variety of types of people to date, the ability to meet lots of people in a short period of time, and insurance that breaking up with someone will not require moving to another place to find new romantic opportunities. In other words, deep dating markets feature low specialization, low search costs, and risk pooling. Not surprisingly, young singles are substantially more likely to live close to city centers. As Clay Shirky pithily notes, “Anyone who’s predicting the decline of big cities has already met their spouse.” Although Marshall did not discuss the gains from deep dating markets, they too generate agglomeration.

There is substantial empirical evidence that the desire to access deep labor markets provides much of the impetus for company location decisions and hence explains a great deal of industry-level co-agglomeration. It also explains some of the higher wages seen in cities, as workers are able to better match their skills to employment, both statistically and as skills grow. Further, the advantages of deep markets ex-
plain the development of high-end retail in urban areas, the desire of young singles to move to urban areas, and many other urbanizing forces.

C. Information Spillovers

The final category of agglomeration economies is information spillovers. Marshall famously wrote that, in cities, "[t]he mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were in the air . . . ."\(^{101}\) He focused on the ability of a firm in an industry to learn from others in the same industry by adopting best practices and sharing in industry-specific knowledge.\(^{102}\) In cities where a single industry concentrates, [g]ood work is rightly appreciated, inventions and improvements in machinery, in processes and the general organization of the business have their merits promptly discussed: if one man starts a new idea, it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their own; and thus it becomes the source of further new ideas.\(^{103}\) Information spillovers, therefore, generate not just increases in wealth, but annual economic growth.\(^{104}\)

Marshall thereby linked growth in the overall economy to the location decisions of individuals and firms. The spillovers he considered important were spillovers inside an industry, one manufacturer of cars learning from another.\(^{105}\) Nearly one hundred years later economists studying economic growth in the 1980s picked up this insight as explanation for why some rich areas—be they cities or countries—were able to grow at rates faster than poorer ones.\(^{106}\)

Neoclassical models of economic growth assumed that the state of technology, or the ability to turn capital and labor into goods, was easily copyable by any firm anywhere and grew at a constant exogenously determined rate.\(^{107}\) These models did quite a good job of explaining growth in the United States, which, factoring out business cycles, had rather constant growth rates.\(^{108}\) Because the model assumed "technology" was a perfectly copyable set of ideas, however, the only factors that made countries different from one another was the amount of physical capital and

\(^{101}\) MARSHALL, supra note 47, at 271.
\(^{102}\) The chapter on agglomeration economies has the subtitle “The Concentration of Specialized Industries in Particular Localities.” Id. at 267.
\(^{103}\) Id. at 271.
\(^{104}\) See GLAESER, supra note 8, at 149.
\(^{105}\) See MARSHALL, supra note 47, at 271–72.
\(^{106}\) See Lucas, supra note 9, at 39.
\(^{108}\) See Lucas, supra note 9, at 7.
labor. As a result, such models predicted that, as they developed capital (or as mobile capital flowed there, drawn by low labor costs), poor countries would see fast growth, and eventually there would be "convergence" in growth rates from sub-Saharan Africa to the United States. By the 1980s, it was relatively clear that there was no convergence in overall wealth or in growth rates, or even substantial capital flow to poor countries, as predicted by these models.

Building on work by Kenneth Arrow, Paul Romer produced an important model explaining why and how growth rates could diverge. His basic idea is that any given firm’s ability to produce goods was not based on endlessly copyable ideas, but instead was a function of private research (which had a diminishing marginal return) and spillovers from the research of others, which were captured locally, rather than internationally, and developed into a stock of local knowledge which had increasing returns to scale. A firm’s ability to convert labor and capital into goods thus depends on its own research, from which a firm captures most but not all of the benefits and the state of local knowledge, or the sum of the spillovers from all other local firms’ private research. Romer argues, however, that as new ideas are added to old ideas, they get progressively better. This means that a developed country could grow more quickly than a developing one because as it develops its stock of knowledge, there are increasing returns. Growth rates diverge across countries, as they depend on local levels of research over time.

Romer’s model is in essence a formalization of Marshall’s claim—the mysteries of trade were in the air in a place and caused growth. These intra-industry informational spillovers are now called “Marshall-Arrow-Romer” externalities.

109. See id. at 13–14.
111. As Easterly explains: The most important evidence against the Solow vision applied across countries was the failure of growth in many poor countries. With high return to scarce capital, the poor countries had every incentive to grow faster than the rich countries. . . . The poor shall inherit the growth. It didn’t work out that way.
    Id. at 59. For a discussion of the use, and misuse, of the Solow model by development officials see id. at 48–84.
112. Romer, supra note 9, at 1006.
113. For some ideas, location might not matter. Romer’s later work focused on patentable ideas that were the function of R&D, which should be equally available to all, at least after intellectual property runs out. See Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. 571, 575 (1990). This is also affected by location, however, people from a given location cite “home” patents far more often than others in their new innovations. See GLAESER, supra note 8, at 149.
114. See Romer, supra note 9, at 1005.
115. See id. at 1003.
116. See id. at 1032–33.
117. See id. at 1030–34. There is not exponential growth in the model because of the diminishing returns to research.
118. Glaeser et al., Growth in Cities, supra note 9, at 1127.
Romer's model also has another claim. The inability of creators to keep all of the fruits of their ideas also means that although there exists an optimal amount of investment in research, this social optimum is not reached through unregulated competition (knowledge spillovers are a positive externality). The greater the degree of capture by inventors, however, the closer to the social optimum you get. Monopoly or oligopoly control over production and the invention of ideas is likely to create increased growth. Thus, the model predicts that cities with only a few firms will grow quickly.

An alternative view of knowledge spillovers in cities was developed first by urban activist Jane Jacobs and extended by noted economist Robert Lucas. Rather than focusing on spillovers between firms in a single industry, this view argues that diversity causes spillovers and growth. Jacobs' first book, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, did not address economic theory directly, but instead developed a critique of the urban planning of the 1950s, modernist architectural theory, and the policies of the then all-powerful public works czar of New York, Robert Moses. These ideas all focused on creating dedicated spaces for working and living, and on separating urban residents from the perceived problems of urban life: crowded city streets, proximity to crime, "slums," and "blight." Jacobs argues that this preference for order and organization actually caused the problems of cities rather than solving them.

A mix of retail and residential uses on streets reduces crime by providing "eyes on the street" that deter criminals. Further, what urban planners of the time described as "blight" was exactly what generated their economic activity and their excitement, "an intricate sidewalk ballet" of different types of activities that generated new businesses and cultural ferment. "[C]ities may fairly be called natural economic generators of diversity and natural economic incubators of new enterprises . . . ."

This final insight led to Jacobs' next book, *The Economy of Cities*, which argues that new ideas and businesses are usually the outgrowth of a combination of new work and old activities. In her famous example, the brassiere was not invented by the process of consumer research and heavy investments in research and development; instead, it was invented

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119. See Romer, supra note 9, at 1020–25.
120. See id.
121. See Glaeser et al., *Growth in Cities*, supra note 9, at 1127–29; Romer, supra note 9, at 1025.
122. See Glaeser et al., *Growth in Cities*, supra note 9, at 1127–29; Romer, supra note 9, at 1025.
123. See Jacobs, supra note 15, at 137–40, 159–64.
126. See id. at 31–41, 145–77.
127. See id. at 30–57.
128. See id. at 44, 50–54.
129. Id. at 148.
130. See JACOBS, supra note 15, at 50–51, 122.
by an urban dressmaker who wanted her dresses to fit better and was then able to find a business partner, capital, and varied suppliers nearby.\textsuperscript{31} Cities are essential to this process of adding new work to old work—they are where activities collide and where new business ventures spring from old ones.\textsuperscript{32} Diversity causes growth.

In a central chapter in the book, Jacobs compares two English cities, Birmingham and Manchester.\textsuperscript{33} In the 1840s, Manchester was the fastest growing city in the world as a function of the immense and extremely efficient textile mills that dominated its local economy and was considered the city of the future, for good or ill.\textsuperscript{34} Birmingham was considered a city of the past in which no industry dominated, and household trades provided most of the economy.\textsuperscript{35} Despite active intervention in the economy by the British government to subsidize supposedly efficient cities like Manchester, Birmingham puttered along and continued to grow while Manchester stagnated.\textsuperscript{36} What Jacobs takes from this is that the growth of cities like Birmingham was a direct result of the inefficiencies of their industry, as their numerous small firms in diverse industries provided many opportunities for innovation.\textsuperscript{37} "Is it not possible for the economy of a city to be highly efficient, and for the city also to excel at the development of new goods and services? No, it seems not."\textsuperscript{38}

Lucas ties this argument to work done on the development of "human capital," or education and skills, by economists like Gary Becker and Theodore Schultz and thus generates another way out of the convergence trap.\textsuperscript{39} Lucas argues that people have a choice between investing in human capital and physical capital.\textsuperscript{40} Like physical capital, investing in human capital increases the amount of production for any given amount of labor (but does so at a diminishing rate).\textsuperscript{41} In Lucas's model, however, investing in human capital has an externality that is not captured by private actors; smarter people develop ideas that can be used by others.\textsuperscript{42} The rate of human capital investment determines the rate of technological growth and hence the overall growth rate.\textsuperscript{43} This provides another way out of the convergence hypothesis. Technology in any given country will depend on the level of human capital development in that country—something that is not transferrable across borders—but be-
cause the private rate of return on human capital must equal the return on physical capital, any given country will see consistent growth rates.

Lucas needed an explanation for why human capital investments were an externality. That is, if someone gets an education, why are there returns for someone else? Lucas argues market participants developed ideas that were copied and used for new ideas, and that this was the essence of creativity in a competitive economy. "New York City's garment district, financial district, diamond district, advertising district and many more are as much intellectual centers as is Columbia or New York University." Lucas does not provide a formal explanation for how this type of innovation spread, but instead states that the best treatment of the external effect of human capital was given by Jane Jacobs in The Economy of Cities. The spillovers from human capital are captured by people who interact with the inventors. This explains why rents are so much higher in cities—people are paying to be "near other people" from whom they can learn.

Jacobs's theory was thus given prominence as an explanation for how whole economies, and not just cities, grow. The key to growth in this understanding is diversity among types of production. The spillovers across industries, or rather, the ways in which ideas travel among diverse urban residents, have been called Jacobs externalities. As Lucas argues, these spillovers help urban residents develop human capital.

The work of these scholars on urban growth has been the subject of extensive empirical examination, most famously by Ed Glaeser, who has become the high priest of this empirically driven side of agglomeration economics. In the article Growth in Cities, Glaeser and several other economists test three theories of urban growth: the Marshall-Arrow-Romer theory that concentrating a single industry with few firms in a city will produce fast growth; Michael Porter's related theory that a concentrated industry will produce growth, but that having many firms will produce competition and hence more idea generation; and, finally, Jacobs's idea that urban diversity produces the information spillovers. Using industry data from cities, the article finds that industries grew more quickly in diverse areas where they were not heavily represented and where there were many smaller firms. Jacobs' theory was thus confirmed by Glaeser's research, but the data was inconsistent with the Marshall-Arrow-Romer theory. Although other work has found that intra-

144. Id. at 37.
145. Id. at 38.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 37.
148. Id. at 39.
149. See, e.g., Vernon Henderson, Externalities and Industrial Development, 1 CITYSCAPE 75, 75 (1994).
150. See Lucas, supra note 9, at 35–39.
151. Glaeser et al., Growth in Cities, supra note 9, at 1127–28.
152. See id. at 1142, 1150–51.
industry spillovers can have strong effects, it has also shown that diversity is a powerful force for growth.\textsuperscript{153} Scholarship on patents has revealed the effect of both kinds of spillovers.\textsuperscript{154} New patents cite other patents developed in the same metropolitan area at a far higher rate than other patents, both inside an industry and across industries.\textsuperscript{155}

Glaeser also tests Lucas's claim that informational spillovers in cities promote faster development of human capital. Using a data set that tracked individual incomes across time and location, Glaeser and David Mare show that the well-known fact that urban workers are paid more than rural employees is likely a result of faster human capital growth in cities.\textsuperscript{156} They show that individuals who moved to a big city did not see an immediate increase in their wage level but eventually migrants, like other city residents, had substantial wage growth.\textsuperscript{157} Further, urban-to-rural migrants saw negligible decreases in wages when they left.\textsuperscript{158} This is an important confirmation of the idea that living in an urban area causes individuals to develop human capital at faster rates. People become more productive by moving to a city and retain that productivity even if they leave—a fact that is reflected in wages.\textsuperscript{159}

Information spillovers—both Marshall-Arrow-Romer spillovers inside one industry and Jacobs spillovers between industries—explain why cities develop and why they grow.

\textbf{D. Congestion, or Why Cities Do Not Expand Forever}

If there are gains from locating near one another, there must be a contrary force keeping things apart—otherwise, all population would locate in one place. Marshall noted that rents are higher in the center of a city.\textsuperscript{160} Economists working in Marshall's tradition use a catch-all term for the forces that are the opposite of agglomeration—congestion.\textsuperscript{161} This category includes a few different costs caused by density like the added

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{154} See Adam B. Jaffe et al., \textit{Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations}, 108 Q. J. ECON. 577, 577 (1993).
  \item \textsuperscript{155} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{157} Id. at 319.
  \item \textsuperscript{158} Id. at 318-19.
  \item \textsuperscript{160} MARSHALL, supra note 47, at 272.
  \item \textsuperscript{161} Glaeser, \textit{Are Cities Dying?}, supra note 9, at 150.
\end{itemize}
cost of rent, traffic on the roads, and things that might be better called negative agglomerations—factors that have increasing returns to scale but a negative effect, like crime.\textsuperscript{162}

Little needs to be said about these forces, as they flow from basic microeconomic assumptions. If demand for property goes up, prices will go up, and the increased prices will limit the extent to which the good—property in the city—is consumed.

III. THE CITY AS A LAW AND ECONOMIC SUBJECT: SORTING AND AGGLOMERATION ARE DISTINCT

The previous Section explained the development and claims of the economics of agglomeration. Although it has become an enormous research project inside economics departments,\textsuperscript{163} agglomeration economics has not made its way, for the most part, into discussions of the economics of local government law. Instead, legal scholars have focused exclusively on the efficiency of sorting for government benefits, as explained by the Tiebout model.

This Section will present the first, and simpler, thesis of the Article, that agglomeration gains are distinct from the gains people receive from living in their favored local government, and that both must be taken into account when assessing the efficiency of local government policies. The Tiebout model is flawed because it fails to capture how agglomeration gains matter in individual location decisions.

Although the Tiebout model will be familiar to most readers, it is worth laying out the model and its more modern extensions to highlight those aspects that interact with the agglomeration literature. Tiebout's original paper is extremely simple. It begins with a thought experiment in which a large number of local governments are arrayed along a beachfront.\textsuperscript{164} Tiebout makes certain simplifying assumptions about the "consumer-voters" that populate his beach area; they can move costlessly from community to community, will move to the community that provides the public services they most prefer, are fully informed about the range of policies undertaken by localities, and are unconstrained by job opportunities.\textsuperscript{165} Further, he assumes there is an "optimal size" for a

\textsuperscript{162} See id. at 150-55.

\textsuperscript{163} See Fu & Ross, supra note 159, at 3.

\textsuperscript{164} Tiebout, supra note 1, at 419.

\textsuperscript{165} See id. It is important to note that these are "public services" and not "public goods." As Truman Bewley notes, the Tiebout model does not work if the goods provided by local government are public goods in the proper sense of being nonrival and nonexcludable. Rather, they must be "public services" in the sense that the cost of providing the services must be proportional to the number of people benefiting from them. If local governments provided nonrival public goods that were nonexcludable at the local level, all people would want to live in the same locality. The provision of public goods at the local level would create a trade-off between sorting and the optimal scale of the service. See Truman F. Bewley, A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures, 49 ECONOMETRICA 713, 717-18 (1981); see also Glaeser, supra note 8, at 205-08. Even if local services were pure public goods, sorting can reduce agglomerative efficiency in ways that are similar to the
community in which the provision of those public services can be provided at the lowest average cost, and that communities below the optimum size for their preferred set of public policies will try to attract new residents (and that communities that are too big will try to do the opposite). With these assumptions, he argues that local public services are provided at the optimal level for residents: any consumer-voter who is unhappy will move to another city and, as long as there are no costs associated with moving, and there are many places to move, each offering different options in terms of the amount and type of public services offered. The gains in the model come from one source—people are happier about the level of public services provided to them by local governments.

Later developments fleshed out the model and rendered it testable and more believable. Wallace Oates noted that if households shopped for their optimal baskets of tax and public service provisions, increases in the quality of public goods should increase housing values, ceteris paribus. Oates’s work generated a substantial amount of scholarship on this issue of “capitalization,” or the degree to which the quality of local public policies are incorporated in housing values. The result of this literature is that capitalization should be expected if there are limits on the creation of new governments, which seems to be the case. Further empirical studies show that capitalization does indeed occur, but the effect of capitalization is stronger in suburban areas than it is in urban areas.

Bruce Hamilton addresses another problem in the Tiebout framework. If local government services are funded by property taxation, the Tiebout model has no steady equilibrium. This is because property-tax funded public services give the residents of a local government an incentive to subdivide their property into smaller and cheaper parcels because

166. Tiebout, supra note 1, at 419.
167. Id. at 418.
168. See id. at 418-19.
171. See Oates, supra note 3, at 25-27 (describing how the number of jurisdictions is important in determining whether capitalization will occur).
173. See Hamilton, supra note 3, at 207-08.
buyers of these parcels can consume local government services at the average level (e.g., they send their kids to school) but pay less than the average level of taxes (because property taxes are a function of property values). If the services are attractive—i.e., the town is a high tax, high service town—this will provide every homeowner with the ability to increase his property value by subdividing because buyers will pay a premium to get access to services in excess of their property taxes. Even if all residents of a town would prefer high taxes and high benefits, they will face a collective action problem; each resident would be better off by subdividing even if everyone in town would be better off if no one did so. As a result, towns are unable to fit their policies to local preferences because doing so creates incentives to subordinate, and there is no steady equilibrium. Hamilton notes that this problem can be solved if towns use zoning laws to mandate a minimum level of housing consumption—e.g., by requiring a minimum lot size—which would bar owners from subdividing their property.

Thus, in order for there to be equilibrium in a Tiebout model, zoning or some other tool must be used to limit each town’s population to ensure that the property tax per resident equals the average cost of services.

William Fischel also argues that zoning provides a local government with a way to enforce something like a “collective property right” on behalf of residents. Absent zoning, if a new development causes housing values in a town to go down by more than the value of the project, individuals in the town acting alone could not organize to pay the developer not to build even though it would be optimal to do so—they would face high transaction costs and collective action problems. Unless a new project fits within preapproved guidelines, zoning ordinances require developers to get permission from a town’s zoning board in order to build. The resulting negotiations give towns a way to force developers to pay for the effect their projects have on the property values of existing properties. Because it reduces transaction costs, allocating the property right to the town, rather than to the developer, is efficient. It should

174. See id.
175. See id. at 206, 208.
176. Even when Hamilton reformed his model to permit some mix in the types of housing in each community, he still argued that communities had to use zoning to limit their population for the model to achieve equilibrium. Bruce W. Hamilton, Capitalization of Intrajurisdictional Differences in Local Tax Prices, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 743, 748 (1976).
178. See generally id. (discussing restrictive requirements imposed on developers as a result of the conflict between developers and communities).
179. For Coasean reasons, changing the property right should not change the amount of development. Id. at 130–31. But see Edward L. Glaeser & Bryce A. Ward, The Causes and Consequences of Land Use Regulation: Evidence from Greater Boston, 65 J. URB. ECON. 265, 277 (2009) (noting that towns in the Boston region zone more restrictively than that which would achieve maximize property values).
be noted, however, that zoning does not force developers to internalize the effect they have, positive or negative, on properties in other towns.

Fischel also supplements the so-called "supply-side" of the model by developing a Tiebout-consistent theory for how localities come up with public policies.\(^{180}\) He notes that most American households have extremely undiversified financial portfolios, and almost all of their savings are locked up in one asset: their home.\(^{181}\) Being involved in local government is how they protect the value of that asset.\(^{182}\) Tiebout's "citizen voters," are actually "home voters," according to Fischel, concerned exclusively with the value of their home.\(^{183}\) This means that in small towns, where each voter is more likely to make a difference and where the policies are particularly crucial to housing values, local elections are likely to produce representative policies designed to maximize the value of the homes of existing property owners. Bigger cities do not have similar political dynamics, as voters become more distant from local officials, and developers, rather than home owners, are the largest political players.\(^{184}\)

There is, of course, far more in the Tiebout literature than these contributions. This brief review, however, should be enough to see a few aspects of how the model interacts with the economics of agglomeration. In both models what creates gains (in comparison to a world in which people are spread evenly) are the location decisions of individuals and firms. By locating near specific other people, agglomeration gains—and congestion costs—are created. By locating in a particular political subdivision in the Tiebout model, residents gain access to public policies that fit their preferences and some degree of protection against the costs to their property values imposed by new entrants into their town.

Although they have the same source, the gains in each model are different in kind. Agglomeration gains come from the existence of other people in close proximity and are not dependent on governmental action. People would locate near one another even if all government services were provided at the national level.\(^{185}\) These location decisions might not be absolutely optimal, as agglomeration gains (and congestion costs) imply externalities. But they will be the best location decisions absent some cure for these externalities, and there are reasons to think that, except for some big investments, like new factories, these individual decisions will approach the optimal organization of people in space.\(^{186}\)

\(^{180}\) See Fischel, supra note 3, at 1–10; Oates, supra note 3, at 29–32 (referring to this as the "supply side" of the Tiebout model).

\(^{181}\) Fischel, supra note 3, at 4.

\(^{182}\) See id. at 4–12.

\(^{183}\) Id. at 4.

\(^{184}\) See id. at 14–16, 89–94.

\(^{185}\) See Glaeser, supra note 8, at 6–8.

\(^{186}\) For individuals, this is likely not a problem, although it can be for large firms who make fixed investments. For individuals who are relatively frequently deciding whether to move (even if they do not), location decisions can be seen as having something like a reflexive equilibrium. Each entrant is not counting his or her own agglomeration-producing externalities, but is considering those of others,
ing gains come from governmental action, both in terms of services pro-
vided and by demanding payment for the external effects of new develop-
ment in the same political subdivision.\footnote{187}

Government policies affect where people live, both where in the
country and where in any individual metropolitan area.\footnote{188} To the extent
that policies affect where people live, and importantly, which people live
near which others, it is important to analyze how these policies affect
both the efficiency of agglomeration and the efficiency of sorting. Al-
though both are rooted in individual location decisions, there is no rea-
son to assume that the government policies that would permit efficient
sorting will also result in the efficient location of people in terms of ag-
glomeration. Unless there is a strong degree of correlation between
people's preferences for public policies and their preferences for neigh-
bors, there is no way that a local government law system could maximize
both, as people and business can only locate in one place and near one
group of people.\footnote{189}

This is a simple point, but it has a rather dramatic effect on the Tie-
bout model. Tiebout explicitly assumes that "[r]estrictions due to em-
ployment opportunities are not considered."\footnote{189} Were it the case that all
privately available economic gains were equally available to all people
who lived in a region, this assumption would not be particularly prob-
lematic. Some agglomeration economies work that way—as Tiebout sug-
gests, many labor markets are regional and hence do not limit decisions

\begin{itemize}
 \item and the effects are likely worked out in equilibrium as long as the transaction costs of moving are low
 enough (and as long as no one individual or class of individuals is creating a large degree more external
 benefit than she or they are receiving). The market result will approach efficiency. For firms that
 make fixed investments, there can be substantial external effects that are not counted in their location
 decisions. For these actors, the market will not necessarily produce efficient location decisions. \textit{See
 Teresa Garcia-Milà \\ & Therese J. McGuire, Tax Incentives and the City, 2002 Brookings-Wharton
 Papers on Urb. Aff. 95, 103. As I argue infra note 236, however, Tiebout model-style policies ex-
 acerbate rather than cure this problem.}
 \item 187. This presumes that local policies take the form prescribed in the Tiebout model—generally
 applicable public services. To the extent that localities can use local tax funds to subsidize the entry of
 firms or individuals that will create location-specific externalities, it complicates the analysis some-
 what. \textit{See Garcia-Milà \\ & McGuire, supra note 186, at 123 (claiming that local tax incentives for ag-
glomeration-producing industries could be both locally and globally efficient, but it is unlikely that it is
 efficient in practice).}
 \item 188. This is axiomatic in the Tiebout model. \textit{See Tiebout, supra note 1, at 418. The effect across
 regions—particularly when local governments engage in heavy zoning to raise local housing prices—
can be extremely large. \textit{See Edward L. Glaeser, Houston, New York Has a Problem, 18 City J. 72
 (2008).}}
 \item 189. This Article works from an assumption that there is not a strong degree of correlation be-
tween preferences for policies and neighbors. I can think of no reason not to make this assumption—
that there is at the very least a wedge between these two tastes is apparent to anyone who has ever
 seen someone struggle with leaving a big urban city for a suburb for the public schools. This has some
 empirical support. Jonathan Levine notes that developers, who presumably know consumer pref-
erences relatively well, find that zoning is the major limit on building dense buildings like townhouses
 and apartments, indicating that regulation does not merely replicate tastes. \textit{See Jonathan Levine,
 Zoned Out: Regulation, Markets, and Choices in Transportation and Metropolitan Land-Use 125-32
 (2006).}
 \item 190. Tiebout, \textit{supra} note 1, at 419.
\end{itemize}
about which town to live in—but others do not.191 People do move to get things like information spillovers as well as access to consumption, social and certain very localized labor markets. Thus, the basic assumption of the Tiebout model—that people move exclusively in order to receive public policies they prefer—is almost certainly false.192 That is, the Tiebout model is not flawed because it misunderstands local governments; it is flawed because it incorrectly specifies individual utility functions.

Further, agglomeration gains and sorting gains interact in several ways. Local agglomeration gains—those gains that come from locating near someone and where the effects are felt locally—are in some ways just another category of attributes over which people sort, just as individuals sort to bundles of public policies, not just a tax or housing policy.193 Lee Fennell calls these “gains from grouping,” and notes that sorting occurs over neighbors as well as over policies.194 Local agglomeration gains, however, are somewhat different in kind from the public policy attributes over which individuals sort in the Tiebout Model, as Part IV.A will explore.

Agglomeration gains, moreover, are not felt exclusively, or even primarily, within local government boundaries. First, we care not only about what is very near to us, but also about what is within bands of distance from us—what is in the next town over, how far we are from downtown, etc. Second, our location decisions have effects that are felt beyond our locality. For instance, if two people are able to work together because of their proximity to make a new invention that results in new jobs for others, their location decision has effects beyond their locality. Some of these effects will be regional, and some will be more concentrated than that, affecting people who are in nearby towns but not across a metropolitan area. Unlike sorting gains which are defined by political boundaries, agglomeration gains are a function of distance between people.195

In order to understand the effects of local government policies, we need to understand their effects on both sorting and agglomeration. Further, as the next Part argues, we need to understand how agglomeration and Tiebout-model style sorting interact.

192. See Tiebout, supra note 1, at 418.
194. See id. at 132, 138–39.
195. Cf. GLAESER, supra note 8, at 6 ("Another way to understand agglomeration economies is to go back to a fundamental definition of cities: the absence of physical space between people and firms.").
IV. THE CITY AS A LAW AND ECONOMIC SUBJECT: AGGLOMERATION AND SORTING CONFLICT

The previous Section showed that agglomeration economies and sorting provide two distinct types of gains that occur as a result of individual-and firm-level location decisions. This Part turns to the interaction between sorting and agglomeration. This Article claims that the relationship is usually inverse. Where we see agglomeration, there will be fewer gains from sorting, particularly if governments are sized in a way that fits the natural or efficient scope for providing public services. More importantly, in metropolitan areas where there is sorting, agglomerative efficiency will be harmed. Sorting for policies inherently distorts the markets for location.

A. Agglomeration Reduces the Efficiency of Sorting

To the extent that people make their location decisions for reasons other than local policy choices, it throws a wrench into the operation of Tiebout sorting. Agglomeration models explain why people would locate near one another for reasons other than public policy—to capture reduced transportation costs, information spillovers, and market size effects.196 The attraction of other people creates a stickiness in individual location decisions that limits the degree to which housing prices will be sensitive to local policy changes.197 This means that agglomeration is interfering with Tiebout sorting; the existence of agglomeration gains reduces the degree to which people sort between local governments on the basis of their policy preferences.

Further, not all areas feature the same gains from agglomeration. Dense areas, which feature more interaction between individuals, will likely feature stronger gains from agglomeration for their residents than less dense ones (and also higher congestion costs).198 This is why the capitalization of public policies into housing values is more complete in smaller cities than in dense urban areas.199 Public policy variables, like

196. See Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, supra note 9, at 145–49.
197. See infra notes 200–14 and accompanying text.
198. "Conceptually, a city is just a dense agglomeration of people and firms. All of the benefits of cities come ultimately from reduced transport costs for goods, people and ideas." Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, supra note 9, at 140.
199. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. This depends on the relatively safe assumption that dense areas will also have bigger local governments (by population). It is possible, however, to imagine a situation in which governments were equally small throughout big cities and small towns. If there were such micro-governments, agglomeration effects would not interfere with sorting unless they were extremely local. But in the densest areas, this would mean a new government every few blocks perhaps—more than 230,000 people live on the Upper East Side of Manhattan, more than double what William Fischel thought was the absolute maximum size a locality could be to still be governed by Tiebout model principles. See Uppereast.com, Demographics, http://www.upper east.com/demographics (last visited July 11, 2010) (citing the 2000 U.S. Census); see also FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 61–63. Absent this type of extreme balkanization in dense areas—which would have a substantial
the quality of schools or tax rates, will be the biggest factor in someone's
decision to pick one suburb over another but will only be one factor
among many in a decision about whether to move from a big city to the
suburbs (which, at least substantially, will be driven by the cost of hous-
ing and the attraction of downtown amenities).

While all three of the classic sources of agglomeration—reduced
transport costs for goods, the advantages of deep markets, and intel-
lectual spillovers—have broad regional effects, their effects decrease as dis-
tance between people and firms increases. And hence, all will interfere
with sorting between localities in the same metropolitan area to some
degree. That said, several types of agglomerative gains are particularly
local in effect and will have a particularly strong impact on the efficiency
of sorting.

The first is intellectual spillovers. We are not exactly sure where
spillovers come from, but it is likely that information is traded through
personal contact with others—who people go to lunch with, who they
overhear on the street, or which meetings or conferences they attend.
These effects are likely to be highly local, as who you grab lunch with is
almost entirely dependent on who is nearby. As such, industries and
individuals in highly creative industries have extremely high incentives to
colocate. If ideas are the lifeblood of an industry, it would take ex-
tremely bad governmental policies to make a company or employee in
that industry move from the center of ideas. This is why "idea" indus-
tries are willing to locate in areas that do not provide particularly hospit-
able policy atmospheres. For instance, in the 1970s, when New York
City was raising taxes and cutting services and still going bankrupt, indus-
tries like finance, book and magazine publishing, and law firms did not
move. To the extent that city economies have become more dependent
on these industries, the degree to which the threat of exits limits city pol-
icy has likely decreased.

Another area where agglomeration economies are likely to create
extremely sticky populations, even in the face of bad public policies, is
among the poor. The poor have less access to transportation and, as
such, are less able to move outside of a central business district and still
access deep labor markets. Further, the poor, by definition, have fewer

200. See Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, supra note 9, at 140.
201. See infra notes 202–14 and accompanying text.
202. See Glaeser, supra note 191, at 103 ("The effect ... proximity on nonmarket transactions
is large.").
203. Cf. Glaeser, supra note 8, at 1 ("Artistic movements are often highly localized; they usually
thrive because of the speedy exchange of new ideas along city streets.").
204. See Glaeser, supra note 191, at 107.
205. See JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL
206. See id. at 91–93.
resources than others and are hence more dependent on the deep reservoirs of social capital available in dense areas than other groups are.207

Finally, those who put a very high value on social interactions and cultural amenities are likely to be very sticky populations. For instance, the very wealthy have a strong desire for density,208 as do young singles.209 This is despite policy atmospheres that are not necessarily hospitable. Large cities tend to spend far more on redistributive programs than smaller ones.210 New York City, for instance, has a progressive income tax211 and places heavy restrictions on bars and dancing, an issue of some import to young singles.212 The reason the wealthy stay in cities is that they value the large number of social interactions and cultural events more than they disfavor local taxes.213 Similarly, young singles care more about where other young singles locate than they do about a negative policy atmosphere.214 These preferences limit sorting. Under the Tiebout model, it is hard to imagine anyone rich living in New York City.

For these groups particularly, but also generally, the existence of agglomeration benefits reduces the degree to which sorting for public policies occurs. Having many independent local governments will produce fewer benefits in a region with lots of agglomeration gains, and this will be crucial for determining when and what powers to grant to local governments.

Empirical evidence backs up the claims in this Section. Paul Rhode and Koleman Strumpf challenge the idea that Tiebout sorting can explain most decisions by individuals to move, either inside or between regions.215 First, they report pure polling data—according to the Annual Housing Survey, only five percent of moves are primarily motivated by public policy concerns.216 Instead, social and employment factors drive most decisions to move.217

Second, they present a challenge to the Tiebout model from its own logic. Under the Tiebout model, increases in mobility—decreases in

208. See Glaeser, supra note 191, at 106.
211. Id. at 1061 n.20.
213. See Gillette, Local Redistribution, supra note 14, at 1061–62 (“[T]here is a threat of exit by those who do not receive offsetting gains . . . from economic development.”).
216. Id. at 1649. It should be noted that merely because people do not report that they care about public policies does not mean that public policies do not affect their decisions to move, as public policies will affect a variety of variables (e.g., how pretty the neighborhood is) that do affect moving decisions.
217. Id.
transport costs—should increase heterogeneity in local policy options.\textsuperscript{218} This is straightforward; the more cities any one citizen can reach, the more options they will have. Where individuals can choose among a greater number of local governments, there should be greater variation among city policies. But the evidence shows that this does not occur. Using municipality-based data from the Boston Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and nationwide data at the county level, Rhode and Strumpf show that the fall in transportation times across the twentieth century is associated with decreases in local school tax heterogeneity.\textsuperscript{219} That is, local governments have over time become more similar, even as it has become easier to sort between local governments. Further, cities with higher commuting costs feature higher cross-municipality heterogeneity than cities with low commuting costs, which again is contrary to the predictions of the Tiebout model.\textsuperscript{220}

These results show the importance of localized agglomeration economies. If increased mobility is not associated with sorting, it means that the attractions of other people—agglomeration economies—are causing people to move (or not to move) despite an increased ability to commute to work from a greater set of towns. Agglomeration reduces the degree to which people sort for public policies.

One way to think about this is that localized agglomeration benefits are another category of things over which individuals sort. Local governments provide a bundle of goods, and even in a pure Tiebout world, individuals will be forced to choose a bundle rather than each of their idealized packages—an entrant may choose between the town that best fits her preferences for schools but not for roads, or vice versa.\textsuperscript{221} Individuals also sort between towns based on the quality of one's neighbors, for instance choosing cities with better restaurants over cities with worse restaurants in the same way they choose cities with better schools over cities with worse schools (better, of course, meaning a better fit for their preferences).\textsuperscript{222} Further, many government services are co-produced by neighbors, meaning that the quality of neighbors is not even distinct from sorting for services.\textsuperscript{223} "Sorting for agglomeration," however, is different in kind from sorting for services. As an ex ante matter, one cannot say anything systematic about individual preferences for different service in local government bundles—whether people are trading off roads for schools, or are happy with the mix provided, is a black box. One \textit{can} say,

\textsuperscript{218} See \textit{id.}.
\textsuperscript{219} See \textit{id.} at 1664–66.
\textsuperscript{220} See \textit{id.} at 1661–64.
\textsuperscript{221} In a perfect world for sorting, there would be as many bundles as there were types of preferences, but that is even more stylized than the model in the original Tiebout paper, which suggests that towns have to be of a certain size (and means that, unless all citizens in the town have the same preferences for all public services, there will be at least some compromise).
\textsuperscript{222} See Fennell, \textit{Exclusion's Attraction}, supra note 14, at 163–68.
however, systematic things about individual preferences for agglomeration.\textsuperscript{224} Local agglomerative benefits (and congestion costs) correlate with density and are more important to certain parts of the population (e.g., people in creative industries, young singles, the rich, the very poor) than they are to others.\textsuperscript{225} As such, the decision to provide services at the local level has distributional effects on these groups—they get fewer benefits and are less likely to be happy with their local governments. It also has efficiency effects. Sorting benefits are more available in less dense areas, and this will tend to make metropolitan areas less dense than an unimpeded property market would. This artificial reduction in density reduces overall regional productive efficiency (as will be discussed in the next Section). Finally, the conflict between agglomeration and sorting does not depend on which powers (or how many) are devolved to local governments, as long as those powers are exercised territorially. Although it is a political decision whether to devolve a bunch of powers to the same local governments (and hence creating trade-offs among local preferences), a state government cannot decide the optimal location of people in a metropolitan region. This means that even if only one power were devolved to local governments, sorting for that policy would still not be perfect or efficient. This contrasts with sorting for policies that do not depend on anyone moving, like state-based sorting for corporate law, which will not be limited by local agglomeration effects (and will not harm the efficiency of local agglomeration).\textsuperscript{226}

Two scholars, Clayton Gillette and Richard Schragger, have recently based arguments about the effects of exit on local policy on a discussion of agglomeration economies. Gillette argues that local efforts at redistribution are far more frequent than would be predicted under the Tiebout model, and the reason for this is agglomeration.\textsuperscript{227} This, he claims, can lead to benign or malign effects depending on the quality of local democracy.\textsuperscript{228} Courts should take local political incentives into account when deciding whether a local redistributive policy goes beyond local powers.\textsuperscript{229} Schragger claims localities have not only a desire to attract mobile capital, but also a desire to tax capital once it becomes fixed;

\textsuperscript{224} Fennell notes that associational gains—a term she uses for what this Article would call localized agglomerations—matter in location decisions, but that “it is unclear precisely how much association matters . . . .” Fennell, Exclusion’s Attraction, supra note 14, at 189. By breaking out the sources (or some of the sources) of localized associational benefit, this Article seeks to push the ball forward both on the questions of “how much” and “to whom” association matters.

\textsuperscript{225} See id. at 191–92.

\textsuperscript{226} This is a point of some substantial import. Ceteris paribus, the benefits from decentralizing power—either from the federal government to state or from states to localities—will be higher for policies that do not require people to move. Giving many jurisdictions the ability to create policies that individuals can opt into through contracts or incorporation decisions will have all the benefits of sorting without creating the same type of conflict between agglomeration and sorting as the decentralization of powers that require territorial application.

\textsuperscript{227} See Gillette, Local Redistribution, supra note 14, at 1060–62.

\textsuperscript{228} See id. at 1084–87.

\textsuperscript{229} See id. at 1067, 1094.
as a result, local regulation often tends towards excessive "giveaways" to mobile capital but then "exploits" capital that becomes fixed in a locality.\textsuperscript{230} He argues that localities should take advantage of the stickiness imposed by agglomeration economies to impose restrictions on entry by capital because this will help them limit the boom-and-bust nature of capital flows and flight and achieve regulatory ends that may be politically impossible at the national level.\textsuperscript{231}

While they aim at different normative questions, their analysis is similar in one respect—they both argue that the degree to which exit limits local economic regulation is affected by agglomeration gains. This effect, however, is not specific to any single type of local policy. The presence of agglomeration limits the degree to which either residents or businesses are likely to move in response to a change in local policy, no matter what type of policy is changed. The same dynamic they discuss with respect to redistributive policies or regulation of industry will apply to any provision of public services. Where there is agglomeration, sorting will impose less of a restriction. For an individual or firm with strong economic reasons to stay in a city based on the identity of its neighbors, the mere fact that garbage collection has gotten worse or crime has gone up may not be enough of a reason to leave, even if some other government is offering services that person or firm prefers. What limits the degree of movement is how much the person or firm needs to be located near its neighbors.

Further, studying the effect of agglomeration on exit (and entry) can take us beyond simply stating that agglomeration limits sorting. By looking at the types of agglomeration, we can understand how and when agglomeration is likely to affect sorting.

This Section should have made clear that the existence of agglomeration can reduce the gains from sorting. The next Section will discuss the converse effect, how sorting affects agglomeration.

\textbf{B. Sorting Reduces Agglomerative Efficiency}

Just as agglomeration reduces the efficiency of sorting, sorting likely reduces agglomerative efficiency. This is because sorting forces changes in location and density and provides differential benefits to dense and less dense areas.

By its very nature, Tiebout sorting requires people to move in order to get their preferred set of local public policies. Were what we now consider to be local public services provided by the federal government in a location-neutral way, people would decide where to live in a way that maximized agglomeration economies to them, minus congestion costs.\textsuperscript{232}

\textsuperscript{231} See id. at 521–24.
\textsuperscript{232} See Glaeser, \textit{Are Cities Dying?}, supra note 9, at 150.
Movement away from that point can generate costs, specifically all the transactions and other interactions that would have occurred had individuals and businesses located in their ideal location (more specifically, the cost is the difference between the value of the transactions undertaken in each location). As Tiebout sorting will cause people to move away from their optimal location decision, it will reduce agglomerative efficiency. Of course, no individual will move to get public policies that are worth less to her than the value of the agglomeration she is giving up. As the location of one person or firm affects others, however, the harm to agglomeration caused by sorting can either reduce or completely eliminate (or even make negative) the gains from sorting.

Put another way, Tiebout sorting encourages individuals and businesses to scatter, moving around a metropolitan area away from where they would have located if local governments did not affect the market for property. This scattering reduces the overall productivity of a region.

Further, local policies that are necessary for Tiebout sorting to work properly do more than merely cause random scattering—they systematically reduce density in metropolitan areas. Just like scattering, this causes people and firms to move away from where they would have located in an unimpeded property market, but because these policies cause people to locate further apart from one another, they have a particularly strong effect on agglomerative efficiency.

For Tiebout sorting to produce gains, there have to be a lot of localities. Otherwise, it is likely that in any given locality, there will be a lot

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233. This is subject to the assumption that local governments are not (a) very small throughout a metropolitan region, and (b) without the power to use land use or other policies to exclude. To the extent that there are very small local governments—say, dozens in each downtown—individuals can sort among them without actually moving very far away from their optimal location in space, unless the local government uses policy tools to restrict entry. Sorting would still disrupt local property markets, and hence limit agglomerative efficiency, but if there are, in fact, dozens of places in each built-up area, it seems unlikely that this would have a substantial economic effect.

234. See Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, supra note 9, at 150 (explaining that large cities eventually stall in growth when overwhelmed by the costs of congestion and “will indeed perish if these forces of congestion rise extraordinarily”).

235. See id. at 154-57 (noting that local government attempts at redistribution create spatial distortions that limit the poor’s exodus from cities and cause the wealthy to leave instead).

236. There is no reason to think that these shifts will cure any defects in the efficiency of property markets caused by the fact that individuals and firms generate externalities felt by others. First, individuals and firms likely solve these externality problems privately over time. See supra note 186. Second, to the extent that big firms do not solve these problems it is because they create external benefits in excess of whatever external benefits they receive (and congestion costs they cause) and do so by means of somewhat fixed investments. See supra note 186. To the extent this is true, the spreading caused by zoning or other population limitations almost certainly exacerbates rather than cures these problems. If firms do not receive the full benefits from density, they are less likely to locate near others than would be socially optimal, and zoning or other population spreading policies only makes this worse.

237. Truman Bewley argues that, to reach an optimal match between preferences and policies in the Tiebout model, there must be an equal number of governments and preferences. See Bewley, supra note 165, at 717-19. Even if this condition is not met, however, there can be gains from sorting,
of dissatisfaction with government policies. Hamilton's work shows that these localities have to take up a lot of space, as they have to limit their population in order to stop subdivisions of property that would impair their ability to set an average level of public services. Given relatively fixed jurisdictional boundaries, this means regions have to spread out, as lots of towns limiting entry will result in lots of space being used. If towns use zoning—like minimum lot requirements—as the tool to limit entry, this will cause spreading out inside towns, as well as throughout a region, causing further movement away from where people would locate in an unimpeded property market. The spreading caused by zoning will systematically reduce density below the density that would be generated by an unimpeded property market.

The spreading caused by zoning in a region reduces all types of agglomerative efficiency. As people spread out in space, the degree to which they are part of the same labor, consumption, and social markets goes down. Spreading causes transportation costs inside a metropolitan region to go up, limiting the gains from forward and backward linkages. And spreading reduces information spillovers because it has a negative


238. See supra notes 173–76 and accompanying text. It should be noted that this will be true, although to a lesser extent, if towns use means other than zoning to limit their populations. For instance, a per-head tax will limit entry without directly affecting property markets. But if towns have relatively fixed boundaries, the mere fact of limiting population at all will cause spreading out, even if a head tax does not distort location decisions inside a local government.

239. See Fennell, Exclusion's Attraction, supra note 14, at 182 (noting that zoning will distort housing choice both among non-residents of a jurisdiction, by barring them from entering, and among residents, by affecting their housing choices inside the jurisdiction).


241. In a little-discussed chapter of his classic work, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS, William Fischel notes similar costs. See FISCHEL, supra note 177, at 252–65; see also Eric Hanushek & Kuzey Yilmaz, The Complementarity of Tiebout and Alonso, 16 J. HOUSING ECON. 243, 257–59 (2007). Using a model that assumes agglomeration happens only in the central business district (CBD), Fischel argues that low density suburban development can cause metropolitan areas to either spread out or to become excessively congested, as people forced out of near-in suburbs either flock to the city or to the exurbs. He notes, however, that there are limits on moving to the city, particularly the quality of the housing stock and, as such, he says that "my working hypothesis is that the deleterious effects of large-lot suburban zoning are excessive amounts of suburbanization." FISCHEL, supra note 177, at 264. This reduces agglomerative efficiency. See id. at 264–65. While this Article largely agrees with Fischel's analysis, his use of a CBD-centric model is problematic. First, it ignores the costs of spreading in the suburbs themselves. Even if each suburb maximizes its own property value using zoning, it does not pay attention to the costs on its neighbors, and artificially low densities in neighboring suburbs generate lost agglomeration efficiencies. Second, the central city (or cities) in a region faces similar pressures as the suburbs. Although central cities are somewhat more willing to sacrifice sorting gains in return for agglomeration gains, they too make substantial efforts to use zoning to restrict entry to juice local housing prices. This does not suggest that Fischel is incorrect (just the opposite, in fact), but rather that the CBD agglomeration model on which his model rested is too limited. Agglomeration and zoning to preserve Tiebout sorting gains happen throughout a region, not just in some areas.
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effect on the number of interactions people have.\textsuperscript{242} This is not to say that all of these effects will be the same: it is relatively safe to assume that, given current transport costs, the effect of spreading on industry co-location is very small, whereas the effect on information spillovers, which are premised on personal contact with neighbors, is likely large.\textsuperscript{243} It is certain, however, that extensive zoning has a negative effect on agglomeration efficiency.

This effect is national as well as local. In the United States, there is heavier zoning in the most productive regions of the country—particularly in coastal areas like Boston and San Francisco—than in less productive regions.\textsuperscript{244} This substantially increases the cost of housing in these coastal regions and thereby drives population away from the most productive regions and towards less heavily zoned regions.\textsuperscript{245} Ed Glaeser notes:

[I]t's a bad thing for the country that so much growth is heading to Houston and Sunbelt sister cities Dallas and Atlanta. These places aren't as economically vibrant or as nourishing of human capital as New York or Silicon Valley. When Americans move from New York to Houston, the national economy simply becomes less productive.\textsuperscript{246}

Sorting also reduces density and hence agglomeration gains by providing relatively high benefits to rural and suburban areas. What the discussion in Part IV.A should make clear is that the gains from sorting will not be available equally to the entire citizenry. Those people who value density—whether its firms that gain from locating close to other suppliers or people who like downtown amenities—do not receive the same type of gains from sorting as people who do not. There are only a few big dense cities in any given metropolitan area, meaning those desiring a high-cost-per-square-foot, high-density-of-other-people living situation have fewer choices among local governments. Also, the stickiness created by agglomeration reduces the degree to which policies are sensitive to preferences, and dense areas feature more agglomeration (and

\textsuperscript{242} This spreading may also reduce some congestion costs, but it does not reduce the major form of congestion—increased rents. While reducing density, restrictive zoning does not permit more housing to be built, increasing the cost of housing. Edward Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko, and Raven Saks have shown that in the most heavily zoned metropolitan areas, more than fifty percent of the value of housing is due to the “zoning tax” or the effect zoning has on restricting housing supplies. Glaeser et al., supra note 23, at 366–67.

\textsuperscript{243} See supra notes 202–05 and accompanying text. The effect on information spillovers will be particularly dramatic if Glaeser and Jacobs are right that diversity is a major source of spillovers. See supra notes 151–53 and accompanying text. Tiebout sorting reduces diversity in policy preferences in any given community, and to the extent that this diversity is correlated with the type of diversity in the agglomeration literature (diversity of types of output), sorting will reduce information spillovers.

\textsuperscript{244} Glaeser, supra note 188; Jon Gertner, Home Economics, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 5, 2006, at 94, 98.

\textsuperscript{245} See generally Glaeser, supra note 188.

\textsuperscript{246} Id.
When living away from centers of agglomeration, residents get to pick the mix of public services they receive, which makes these areas more attractive relative to dense areas, where that choice is not available. This reduces overall density.

It should be noted that this effect is separate from any effect having to do with how rich the people who live in any of these political subdivisions are. It is often assumed that the negative effect for cities generated by restrictive zoning and local financing of schools comes from the fact that they provide to the wealthy the opportunity to receive premium public services by grouping together in small suburbs, thereby avoiding policies that might serve to redistribute resources to poorer residents. This often is the case, but there is no reason to think that this bias is necessarily aimed toward providing benefits to far flung parts of a metropolitan area. It is not hard to imagine a story that is the exact opposite of the usual "rich flee the city to avoid taxes that aid to the poor" story, with rich citizens flocking to the city and driving prices up (and supply down, by means of exclusionary zoning, regulation, and preservation of landmarks) and driving out the poor. Regardless of which way it cuts, the incentives that local taxation creates for the wealthy to colocate will produce additional movement away from the naturally occurring density and distribution of people.

It should be made clear that I am not claiming that local governments do not take agglomerative efficiency into account at all when making policy. They surely do. Instead, I am claiming that sorting between local governments for packages of public services harms agglomerative efficiency, and that the full costs of sorting on agglomerative efficiency are not factored in, in whole or even in large part, by local governments. The benefits from agglomeration accrue across local government boundaries, as, for instance, people learn from others in a neighboring town, but all the benefits of sorting are felt inside a local government. This means that individual towns are unlikely to set their policies to maximize the combined efficiency of sorting and agglomeration.

The effects discussed in this Section are thus closely related to the argument that the Tiebout model is flawed because local policies gener-

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247. The differential quality of local elections makes this problem bigger. See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text. As William Fischel argues, in smaller towns, "home-voters" control local governments and the result is efficient Tiebout-style policies. In big cities, voters are more removed from local decision making and hence policies do not necessarily maximize property values. The benefits of sorting in rural and suburban areas, in which governments are smaller, are greater relative to the benefits it provides big cities. This difference is compounded by the lack of political party competition at the local level, which denies big city voters the tool—a useful party heuristic—voters rely on in elections in other large jurisdictions (e.g., federal, state) to partially overcome their lack of information about politics. See David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections?: The Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419, 430–54 (2007).


249. For a discussion of whether this is currently occurring, see Alan Ehrenhalt, Trading Places: The Demographic Inversion of the American City, The New Republic, Aug. 13, 2008, at 19.
ate externalities felt by other communities. These arguments, however, generally point to distributional externalities—things like reducing another city's tax base or refusing to accept locally unwanted land uses—which are important but are not related directly to overall efficiency. This Section explains the core economic harm not factored into local decisions, namely the degree to which a system that creates happiness with local policies (sorting gains) reduces the overall economic productivity of a region (agglomeration gains). A system that permits and encourages sorting will reduce agglomerative efficiency regardless of which policies people prefer (and cities enact). That people have different preferences for policies and for their neighbors is the driver of the conflict between sorting and agglomeration. Local policies have externalities because no city has the proper incentive to balance the benefits it creates by providing its residents with their preferred policies with the harm local policy variation has on the efficiency of the market for location in a region.

Also, describing the problem as a conflict between agglomeration and sorting ties the external effects of local policy to the internal questions facing a city. Cities have to make trade-offs between promoting a perfect allocation of government services to tastes for services and agglomerative effects—e.g., does it make sense to raise commercial property taxes to fund schools if that would result in popular restaurants and cafes that residents like moving out of town? Local governments are unlikely to make an optimal balance between agglomeration and sorting, however, as their residents get all the benefits if they match services to preferences, but they only get a portion of the benefits from regional agglomeration.

As this Section has shown, having a system of local governments which people can sort themselves among based on preferences about local policies reduces the overall agglomerative efficiency of a region, and individual cities will not internalize the costs that providing locally-preferred policies has on a region's overall economic activity.

V. APPLYING A LAW AND ECONOMIC APPROACH TO THE CITY: DILLON'S RULE, HOME RULE, AND THE "THIRD TALE OF THE CITY"

As the existence of agglomeration reduces the gains from sorting, and sorting reduces the gains from agglomeration, it is not surprising that it is difficult to allocate power to local authorities in a way that maximizes both. Decisions about how much, and which, power to give to local governments will have different effects on agglomerative and sorting efficiency, and the efficiency of these effects will affect each other. This
trade-off is easiest to see in the debate over whether to form regional
governments. Having regional governments would reduce or eliminate
Tiebout sorting gains, but it would also remove any incentive for individ-
uals to move away from their market-optimizing location, and it would
allow policy to be made at the level at which agglomerations are fully
felt.\textsuperscript{253}

The debate over regionalism is both important and extensive.\textsuperscript{254} Ra-
ther than address it directly, this Section will attempt to show how under-
standing the relationship between agglomeration and sorting can and
should change our understanding of every debate in local government
law. Specifically, it will analyze two of the central issues in local govern-
ment law—Dillon's Rule, the traditional American rule governing local
government power, and current "home rule" regimes.

A. The "Two Tales of the City": Current Understandings of Dillon's
Rule

Among local government law doctrines, perhaps the most central
and one of the most controversial is Dillon's Rule. Formulated by John

\textsuperscript{253} This second point, about the content of regional versus local policy, requires one coda. Clay
Gillette, in two brilliant articles, advanced an argument that the gains from sorting and the gains from
He argues that the interdependence of regional economies gives suburbs some incentives to agree to
contract with cities to provide regional services, and their status as repeat players can solve any pris-
Instead, the problem is high contracting costs—localities cannot monitor each other's behavior and
courts are loath to interfere with local budgetary decisions, making enforcing contracts difficult. See id. at
257–60. "My underlying claim . . . is that the most significant obstacles to cooperation lie in high
contracting costs rather than in myopia or an absence of altruism." Gillette, \textit{Interlocal Cooperation},
\textit{supra} note 14, at 367.

\textsuperscript{254} For reviews of this debate, see Briffault, \textit{supra} note 6, at 425, 451–53; Cashin, \textit{supra} note 6, at
Dillon in his *Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations*, Dillon's Rule provides:

[A] municipal corporation possesses, and can exercise, the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation—not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied.255

Under Dillon's Rule, local governments have sharply circumscribed powers.

Dillon's Rule operates as a standard of delegation, a canon of construction and a rule of limited power. It reflects the view of local governments as agents of the state by requiring that all local powers be traced back to a specific delegation: whenever it is uncertain whether a locality possesses a particular power, a court should assume that the locality lacks that power.256

Through a series of decisions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Dillon's Rule became the default rule governing city power throughout the country.257 When combined with the specific allocations of power to localities, the establishment of the rule meant that courts enforced a regime of "city powerlessness."258

In addition to being a judge and a scholar, Dillon was a corporate lawyer, serving as counsel to Union Pacific Railroad, Western Union, and famed industrialist Jay Gould.259 It is his work as a railroad attorney that provided the raw material for Dillon's Rule. Railroads were the largest industry in the United States just before and after the Civil War, and their growth required a great deal of capital investment.260 Entrepreneurs frequently went into business with localities.261 The reasons for these subsidies were clear: "[L]ocal commercial interests and municipal leaders... hoped to increase business activity and divert trade from rival cities."262

Unsurprisingly, many of these railroad ventures went bust.263 This round of defaults led some cities to attempt to revoke the bonds and others to face enormous tax burdens.264 Dillon formulated his rule in direct

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255. DILLON, supra note 27, at 101-02 (emphasis omitted).
257. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 37, at 314-17.
259. See Williams, supra note 33, at 91-92.
260. See id. at 92-93.
261. Id. at 93.
263. See Williams, supra note 33, at 93.
264. See id. at 93-95, 93 n.65.
response to the efforts of cities to manipulate the transportation system. "It has, unfortunately, become quite too common with us to confer upon our [municipal] corporations [extraordinary] powers, such as the authority to aid in the construction of railways, or like undertakings, which are better left exclusively to private capital . . . ."

Much modern local government law scholarship has aimed its sights directly at Dillon's Rule. Gerald Frug famously attacked Dillon's Rule as the fullest expression of a classically liberal, anti-democratic, anti-localist view of the State. Frug argues that the elite backers of Dillon's Rule sought to disempower city governments because they were intermediate actors, neither wholly private nor wholly State, and thus undermined a liberal market order. Elites also backed limits on city power because of their discomfort with the ethnic political machines that led cities. To Frug, Dillon's Rule is a limit on true democratic governance and, thereby, on individual fulfillment.

Dillon's Rule has been supported, though, as an important limitation on local power to ensure that local governments only provide local services, a crucial component of the Tiebout Model. If local public services have external effects, the Tiebout model breaks down. Dillon's Rule limits localities to those powers assigned to them by a state government. State governments likely will only assign to localities those powers that are local in effect, preserving the efficiency of Tiebout sorting. Rick Hills summarizes the argument clearly:

The vast majority of municipalities govern relatively small territorial jurisdictions and therefore have both the capacity and incentive to impose external costs on nonresidents immediately outside their sharply circumscribed boundaries. . . . It makes sense to require some larger jurisdiction—say, the state legislature—to monitor municipal actions and ensure that they are not efforts to exploit nonresidents or internal minorities. Dillon's rule and analogous doctrines serve such a purpose: they require state legislatures to review each category of municipal action and expressly authorize it.

Dillon's Rule, on its own, of course, does not limit local power to purely local public services. As Hills notes, however, "there will tend to be a high correlation between those activities that municipalities have clearest

265. See id. at 90, 99.
266. DILLON, supra note 27, at v–vi.
267. See Frug, supra note 15, at 1109–20. To avoid confusion about Frug's point, it should be noted that the "State" refers to the government broadly speaking and not to one of the United States specifically.
268. See id. at 1110–13.
269. See id. at 1118.
270. See id. at 1119; see also FRUG, supra note 7, at 45–49.
271. Hills, Jr., supra note 28, at 1275.
272. Id.
authority to perform based on state statute and tradition, and those activ-
ities that are least likely to impose external costs. Thus, Dillon’s Rule limits local power to ensure that local competition leads to efficient sort-
ing and not to intercity conflict that reduces the degree to which people are happy with the policies that affect their lives.

Richard Briffault argues that the Tiebout model and Frug provide two tales of the city, with respect to the question of whether cities, in fact, have power and whether their exercise of the powers they do have is normatively good. These two tales provide us with two very different conceptions of the normative status of Dillon’s Rule. They do have one thing in common, though. Under both understandings, the utility of Dil-
lon’s Rule is ahistorical—it is either bad, and has always been bad, or it is good, and has always been good. The next Section will provide a third tale of the city, one that examines the benefits of Dillon’s Rule when it was first enacted and looks at how changes in the American economy over the past 150 years have changed the effects of the rule.

B. Applying a Law and Economic Approach to the City: A Third Tale About Dillon’s Rule

Approaching Dillon’s Rule from the perspective of agglomerative efficiency provides a different, historically contingent view of the benefits and costs of Dillon’s Rule. This is a story about transportation costs. Shipping goods across the country in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth century was extremely expensive and, as a result, railroad and shipping hubs became manufacturing hubs to reduce transport costs on in-
termediate goods. This gave local governments enormous incentives both to subsidize railroads so that they went through their jurisdiction, and thereby distort the railroad network, and to subsidize industry, which could generate agglomeration but at the cost of development elsewhere in the economy. Dillon’s Rule served to check these impulses and hence provided gains for the overall economy.

The basic logic of the case for Dillon’s Rule in the economy of the middle-to-late nineteenth century is built around the Fujita, Krugman, and Venables model, which is based on the first of Marshall’s three ex-
planations for agglomeration, the desire of companies to be near their suppliers and customers in the face of high transportation costs.

Let’s go back to the model, which examines where mobile manufac-
turing firms decide to locate. In the model, there are two regions, and it

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274. Hills, Jr., supra note 28, at 1275 n.224.
275. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 393–403.
276. See Glaeser & Kohlhase, supra note 30, at 198.
277. Ely, Jr., supra note 262, at 934; Williams, supra note 33, at 93.
278. Williams, supra note 33, at 94.
279. See supra notes 48, 59–62 and accompanying text.
is costly to ship manufactured goods between the regions.\textsuperscript{280} If these transport costs are real but not infinite, a manufacturing firm that locates in one region will create increasing returns, as the new entrant will provide that region with a new variety/lower cost of the manufactured good, and other manufacturing firms will want to locate in that region to take advantage of new varieties and lower costs for manufactured goods (which they use as inputs).\textsuperscript{281} Moving to the region with more manufacturing firms will also give any new entrant access to wealthier consumers—the people who work for the manufacturing firms.\textsuperscript{282} As transportation costs fall, though, there is less incentive to agglomerate—the gain from locating near other suppliers is less.\textsuperscript{283} The manufacturing sector will reduce its concentration, but exactly when that will occur is unclear, as the history of development provides lots of gains (there are a lot of suppliers already there, so companies are loath to leave even if the cost of being further from them has fallen).\textsuperscript{284} At some point, though, the manufacturing sector will hit a "break point" and will uncluster.\textsuperscript{285}

As such, it is important to look at the state of transportation costs during the Dillon’s Rule period and today. It is hard to overstate the changes in transportation costs and communication in the United States in the past century. The historical record shows very clearly that transport costs at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century were high as a percentage of the cost of producing goods overall and much, much higher than they would be forty or fifty years later.\textsuperscript{286} This fact explains much of the development of American cities. Ed Glaeser and Janet Kohlhase document the change in transportation costs from the turn of the century to today and its effect on city form, noting the following facts:

- The cost, in real dollars, of transporting a ton of goods one mile in 1890 was 18.5 cents, as opposed to 2.3 cents today.
- The cost of transporting goods was 9% of U.S. GDP the first year records were kept, in 1929, as opposed to 2.3% today, exclusive of shipping costs internal to firms.
- In 1900, the twenty largest cities in America were all on waterways to permit easy shipping.\textsuperscript{287}

These facts are only illustrative—one could cite an endless number of statistics showing that the real costs of transporting goods fell dramatically over the course of the twentieth century and particularly during the

\textsuperscript{280} See Fujita et al., supra note 8, at 66–79.
\textsuperscript{281} See id. at 67.
\textsuperscript{282} Id.
\textsuperscript{283} Id.
\textsuperscript{284} See id. at 68.
\textsuperscript{285} Id.
\textsuperscript{286} See Glaeser & Kohlhase, supra note 30, at 198–99.
\textsuperscript{287} See id.
second half of the century. The keys to this story have been the rise of
the combustion engine, the jet airplane, and the shipping container,
which made sea, rail, and road transportation interoperable and far more
efficient. Further, these facts largely do not capture another massive
change in transportation costs, the rise of communications technology,
from the telephone to the Internet, which have rendered intercity com-
munication effectively costless.

One area where transportation costs have remained high is in mov-
ing human beings. Naturally, this too has become more efficient, but,
as opposed to the shipping costs of goods domestically, which are now
small enough to be ignored in most economic models, the cost of moving
people is still very high. The reason for this is not only that people do
not fit into shipping containers particularly well; most of the economic
cost of transporting people does not come from the direct costs of oper-
ating planes or cars, but from the opportunity costs of people’s time.
We are not producing much economic activity when we sit in traffic or in
airport lounges. As people get more productive over time, in economic
terms, inter-city travel (and commuting inside a region) becomes more
costly.

The fall in the cost of transporting goods, particularly when com-
bined with the still-high costs of transporting people, has had dramatic
effects on the form and content of city economies. Indeed, in 1870, there
was an eighty-seven percent correlation between the percentage of citi-
zens in a state living in cities and the percentage employed in manufac-
turing. Even as late as 1950, seven of the eight largest cities in the
country had a larger share of their residents employed in manufacturing
than the national average. Today, the opposite is true. Manufacturers
now increasingly locate in less dense areas, and most big cities have less
manufacturing employment than the national average. As falling
transportation costs for goods harmed big city manufacturing, service
and high-tech industries became strong agglomerating forces in metro-
politan areas. This change determined which cities have been economi-
cally successful. Glaeser and Giacomo Ponzetto summarize this effect

288. For another excellent summary of the decrease in transportation costs, see Rhode &
Strumpf, supra note 215, at 1650, 1655-57.

289. MARC LEVINSON, THE BOX: HOW THE SHIPPING CONTAINER MADE THE WORLD SMALLER

290. See Rhode & Strumpf, supra note 215, at 1657; see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Social

291. See id. at 208-09.

292. See id. at 208.

293. Id. at 208-09.

294. Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, supra note 9, at 144.

295. Id.

296. See id. at 144-45; Glaeser & Kohlhase, supra note 30, at 220-22.

297. Edward L. Glaeser & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, Did the Death of Distance Hurt Detroit and

298. See id. at 303.
in the title of their paper, *Did the Death of Distance Hurt Detroit and Help New York?* In the second half of the twentieth century, almost all large American cities lost population, but those cities with high human capital like San Francisco, Boston, and New York rebounded after the 1970s and grew substantially, whereas manufacturing and domestic transportation hubs like Cleveland and Detroit have continued to suffer. The decrease in transportation costs for goods hurt manufacturing cities but helped cities with lots of innovators, who can disseminate their ideas more quickly and thus affect a larger share of the economy. Further, the things that drive agglomeration in cities like New York, Boston, and San Francisco—deep skilled labor markets, knowledge spillovers, consumption and cultural opportunities—are protected by the high opportunity cost of transporting people, as firms and individuals need to locate in these cities to access these gains. (Notably, these cities have been remarkably successful despite further decreases in certain transportation and search costs associated with the rise of the Internet.) Sociologist Saskia Sassen describes a similar trend happening globally with an added wrinkle. The added complexity of supply chains generated by globalization has led to a greater deal of centralization in information processing, with cities that have advantages in high-level service industries due to historical factors, like London, New York, and Tokyo, receiving most of the gains and becoming, in her formulation, “Global Cities.”

This simplified history of the American economy fits the Fujita, Krugman, and Venables model. Manufacturing first clustered in the face of high transportation costs and then unclustered, leaving cities that relied on manufacturing, like Cleveland and Detroit, high and dry.

This story has implications for the efficiency of Dillon’s Rule. Under the Fujita, Krugman, and Venables model, cities have strong incentives to manipulate transportation costs. Their model does not feature a government, but if it did, it is clear that, in their simple two-region model, the government of the region in which manufacturing is located has an incentive to increase transport costs if it can, so long as it does not risk increasing to the point where trade is impossible. Each government further has an incentive to subsidize industry, as manufacturing interests

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299. *Id.*
300. *Id.* at 308–09.
301. Many have predicted that technological advances like the Internet would mean the destruction of most forms of agglomerative benefit, as individuals can telecommute and telecommunicate through the Internet. See Glaeser, *Are Cities Dying?*, supra note 9, at 139. That has not turned out to be the case, at least yet. See id. Further, there is little reason to think it will. The fields that are most reliant on new technology—and hence the most likely to see the effects of the Internet on reducing agglomeration gains—are heavily concentrated. (Think Silicon Valley or Wall Street.) This suggests that new technology will not destroy agglomeration, although it is likely to change which cities are successful in ways we can only guess now. As this Article suggests about Dillon’s Rule, optimal local government rules must adapt to changes in the drivers of location decisions, and what creates agglomeration gains in the future will not necessarily, or even likely, be the same as what does so today.
create increasing returns, even when it would be inefficient if both regions did so.

Of course, in the 1860s and 1870s, cities were not directly increasing the cost of transportation. In fact, cities were subsidizing railroads, which were essential to reducing transport costs. The story still fits, however. If you move to a multi-region version of the Krugman et al. model, it becomes clear that there will be multiple manufacturing centers. Firms will locate where outbound transport costs are the lowest—they still want to sell their final goods to all locations. Attracting these firms will cause agglomeration, as other firms will move to where the first firms locate. Because transport costs are still high, these hubs will be centers of manufacturing agglomeration, even if the hub falls out of use.

Thus, local governments in the nineteenth century had strong incentives to subsidize railroads, as doing so would have created increasing local returns. Collectively, though, these subsidies were likely inefficient even if it made sense for each town, as it would result in over-investment. Further, to the extent that only one stretch of rail could succeed economically in a region, shaping the route according to which cities were willing to subsidize it would be inefficient, as it would be responsive not to economic conditions but rather to political interests. The rail system, which was the largest industry in the United States and the method of shipping almost all goods, would be bent out of shape by city subsidies.

The use of local money to subsidize railroads led to waste and distorted transportation lines. This imposed costs on the entire economic system. Limiting the ability of cities to do so would increase overall economic efficiency. Dillon's Rule did this by removing from cities the default power to do whatever they wanted, and as states were more likely to care about broader economic concerns, states were less likely to approve of city investments in railroads.

This explanation fits Dillon's own reasoning. There is no indication that he was concerned with promoting the efficiency of intercity policy competition; he was no Tieboutian. He was worried, however, about the

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304. See id. at 202-03.
305. See FUJITA ET AL., supra note 8, at 151-79.
306. See id. at 227-36.
307. "The hub provides some continuing advantages to a city, but the main thing it does is provide the city's site with an advantage over other sites during that critical period when the economy's growth has made the emergence of a new city necessary." Id. at 236.
308. "Cities had visions of metropolitan greatness, and they indulged in numerous ill-considered enterprises. They competed with each other for railroad transportation and subscribed freely for railroad stocks." E. Blythe Stason, State Administrative Supervision of Municipal Indebtedness, 30 MICH. L. REV. 833, 837 (1932).
309. See Williams, supra note 33, at 93-94 (explaining that cities in the 1850s were forced to repudiate bonds because of railroad failures, leading to financial system pandemic).
310. See id.
311. See Ely, Jr., supra note 262, at 934-35.
312. See Williams, supra note 33, at 94.
interference of cities with the nation's most important industry—railroads.313

This alone, though, does not explain the scope of Dillon's Rule. Surely, Dillon could have devised a rule that stopped cities from subsidizing railroads without dramatically limiting other forms of city power. But, the transport-costs story also explains the broad ambit of Dillon's Rule. Although funding railroads was the most dramatic way to grow a city at the expense of other places, it was not the only way. In a high transportation costs situation, there are substantial increasing returns to city size—each new manufacturing entrant increases local variety and reduces local costs, inspiring new entrants.314 Thus, cities have an incentive to subsidize businesses or develop their own public businesses in order to generate city size, which in turn would generate agglomeration. The resulting subsidy competition would reduce national efficiency, as this tax and subsidy competition would move industry, not create growth.315

Dillon himself was clearly concerned not only with the power of cities to invest in railroads, but also their ability to invest or subsidize other types of companies as well. "[T]here is no implied power in a municipal corporation to take stock in a manufacturing company located in or near the corporation, or to aid or engage in other enterprises, essentially private."316 Dillon's Rule certainly did not end tax competition or infrastructure enhancements to subsidize new entrants, but by limiting the powers of cities to directly invest in companies or to provide more direct kinds of subsidies, Dillon's Rule served to limit inefficient competition to lure industry.317 By limiting public policies to those approved by the state legislature, it also limited other more indirect forms of subsidy. States were unlikely to give local governments the power to make investments that would only harm other areas of the same state.

Thus, Dillon's Rule limited the ability of local governments to reduce the efficiency of industry and transportation through subsidy competition. It is also relatively clear that, in our new, low-transportation-costs world, Dillon's Rule, where it is still applied, no longer contributes to agglomerative efficiency in the same way. Limits on local authority still may promote the efficiency of sorting by ensuring that localities do not create policy externalities that reduce the control individuals have over the policies that affect their lives. They may also inhibit sorting gains by limiting the issues over which local governments can differ, and

313. See id. at 94–95.
314. See supra notes 276–84 and accompanying text.
315. This might not be true if local subsidies are targeted at industries that would provide unique benefits to that city (as opposed to where they would have located otherwise). See Garcia-Mila & McGuire, supra note 186, at 107. There is no evidence that the industrial policies of the period were tied to local advantages.
317. It has not, of course, ended such activities. See Schragger, Free Trade Constitution, supra note 14, at 1134–45.
hence over which individuals can choose their preferred set of policies. To the extent they limit sorting, they may have a positive effect on agglomerative efficiency for the reasons discussed in Part IV.B. Nevertheless, the unique support it provided to agglomerative efficiency by inhibiting subsidy competition for manufacturing entities has likely passed.

C. Applying a Law and Economic Approach to the City: The Third Tale and Home Rule

The economy for which Dillon’s Rule was designed is no more. Then again, neither is Dillon’s Rule, at least in its original incarnation. Nearly as soon as Dillon’s Rule became established, a movement for “home rule” began, with Missouri granting home rule to St. Louis in 1875 and California granting home rule to San Francisco in 1879.318 This original form of home rule—often referred to as “imperium in imperio” home rule—consisted of a state constitutional grant of power to cities to initiate laws governing local affairs and provided cities with a sphere of immunity from state legislation.319 The determination of what was “local,” and hence what home rule cities could do, however, was in the hands of state courts, which often interpreted the concept narrowly.320 The 1950s and 1960s (roughly contemporaneous with the beginning of the end of the transport-cost-driven urban agglomeration of manufacturing) saw the rise of “legislative home rule.”321 Under this concept, home rule cities were free to make policy in any area where the state legislature did not bar or preempt them from acting.322

All but two states now have some form of home rule for at least some cities, and thirty-seven states have some type of home rule for some of their counties.323 Home rule differs in form from state to state and inside states, however, with many states dividing cities between home rule cities and others, which are governed by Dillon’s Rule or some variant.324 Further, categories like “imperio” or legislative home rule tend to bleed into one another, with judicial attitude towards local power and the power of cities in state legislatures often proving more important than the state constitutional system in determining how much power is available to local governments.325

As might be expected, this variety of rules also generates a variety of opinions. Gerald Frug claims that home rule did little to empower localities. “[S]tate control of cities has not been affected significantly by

318. BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 37, at 317.
319. See id. at 332.
320. Id.
321. See id. at 333.
322. See id. at 333–34.
323. Barron, supra note 39, at 2260 n.7.
324. BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 37, at 317.
325. See id. at 334–35.
state constitutional protection for home rule.

Richard Briffault argues that, in fact, cities were granted substantial autonomy under home rule and exercise that power to engage in all sorts of regulation, public ownership of utilities, and other acts simply inconsistent with Frug’s claim of city powerlessness. “Certainly, whatever the technically limited status of local units and their formal subservience to the state, local governments have wielded substantial lawmaker power and undertaken important public initiatives.” He argues, however, that this enhanced local power exacerbated the problems of inter-local externalities.

Recently, David Barron has given a new take on the meaning of home rule that has provided much of the impetus for the reexamination of home rule in recent legal scholarship. He argues that home rule has not proved to be a neutral device that provides power for local governments, but rather is a way of shaping the way local governments can and cannot use power. “Current law is for this reason best understood as itself producing (or perhaps reflecting) a substantive idea of local power, rather than protecting local legal autonomy as such.”

Barron is right to focus not on the extent of power granted to cities, but instead on what powers are given to cities and how that shapes local policy. His description of what home rule does and does not do is questionable, however. He claims that “[c]urrent law produces a vision of local power that privileges the right of a local government either to promote private development that favors ‘exchange values’ over ‘use values’ or to prevent development that undermines exclusivity.” But the ideas on either side of the “or” in that sentence are very, very different. The clause before the “or” refers to claims by sociologists John Logan and Harvey Molotch that cities are “growth machines” that excessively promote monetizable things like property development or “exchange values” at the cost of destroying non-market “use” values like open space that are in the interests of residents. The clause after the “or” argues that towns excessively limit development by promoting open space and big housing lots, which renders them more valuable to their residents but

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326. Frug, supra note 15, at 1117.
327. See Briffault, supra note 256, at 15.
328. Id.
329. See id. at 23–24 (discussing how problems with school financing and zoning are exacerbated by enhanced local autonomy).
330. See generally Barron, supra note 39.
331. See id. at 2362.
332. Id. at 2345.
333. Id. at 2345–46 (quoting LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 205, at 1) (footnote omitted). The distinction between “use values” and “exchange values” is problematic when capitalization is taken into account. “Use values,” like nice nearby open spaces, end up showing up in housing values, as anything current residents value will likely be valued by others who would be willing to pay for it as well and become “exchange values.”
excludes others. It seems odd that state law would permit two diametrically opposed types of local policy and nothing else. Barron recognizes this conflict, but claims that home rule provides local governments with an either/or choice that precludes many options that would promote social values he would prefer, like using inclusionary zoning and anti-discrimination laws to reduce exclusionary development without encouraging runaway urban growth. Barron notes that he is unsure whether these policies will achieve his ideal of mixed-use communities, but argues that state law makes finding out impossible.

It is unclear, however, that state law regularly forces cities into this either/or choice. Cities engage in all sorts of regulations that interfere with either untrammeled urban expansion or sprawling development, from using zoning to keep big box retailers or chain stores out of cities, to forcing developers to negotiate with local groups to create community benefits agreements. More importantly, cities regularly use their ordinary zoning and regulatory powers to balance the gains and costs of density in different ways, resulting in cities of ranging densities and diversity. Finally, Barron’s dichotomy simply does not address some of the most important local powers, like primary education or policing.

A clearer theory of what is and what is not included in the home rule power springs out of the different sources of efficiency discussed in this Article. States generally give local governments power over an issue if having different policies in each town will promote the ability of mobile citizens to choose their preferred package of policies. That is, local governments are given powers in order to promote sorting efficiency. State governments generally reserve for themselves both the ability to limit the harm of sorting on agglomerative efficiency and to provide and locate public goods that will substantially affect agglomerative efficiency. This division does not explain all the divisions between state and

335. See Barron, supra note 39, at 2357.
336. See id. at 2345-46. As Barron notes, this is only true for some states—some states permit the very things he thinks they should.
337. See id. at 2350. Barron never quite explains exactly why mixed-use communities are superior to, say, dense urban areas or woody suburbs. He states that sprawl is bad, but does not provide a definition of sprawl, or explain what factors should be used to determine whether land use is too spread out or too dense (or a way to figure out whether communities are sufficiently diverse). Without a metric, it is difficult to assess his claim that state law is normatively unattractive.
339. Glaeser and Gyourko have calculated a figure for what percentage of housing costs are attributable to zoning and other regulatory costs. The Chicago region, for instance, imposes a “zoning tax” on the increased cost of building a house over construction and land costs, equal to roughly five percent of the average value of a home. The San Francisco region imposes a zoning tax of fifty-three percent. Glaeser et al., supra note 23, at 359. The result is that Chicago has cheaper, denser housing.
340. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 400.
341. See id. at 399.
local power—no parsimonious explanation could—but it largely seems correct, at least as a first approximation.

This division of power can be seen in a number of areas. Consider transportation policy. For instance, in New York state, home rule cities have the power to regulate traffic, parking, and to repair roads, but cannot regulate their streets in ways that are biased against outsiders or charge tolls without state authorization. That is, policies aimed at promoting the relative quality of the roads is a local function, but policies meant to promote the ease of travel between cities or to reduce congestion through charging fees is a state function. This division of power can also be seen with respect to housing. Cities generally have the power to engage in zoning, which, as discussed above, is necessary for effective sorting, but the state retains for itself the power to restrain excessive zoning restrictions in the name of agglomerative efficiency.

This is a positive claim. If it is correct, however, there is an important normative implication. If state governments are responsible for ensuring a proper balance between sorting gains and agglomerative efficiency, there are strong reasons to believe that they will not do so efficiently. States are not coextensive with regions—they include many regions and many regions cross state lines—and hence do not make policy with the sole goal of maximizing regional development. State governments have no interest in furthering regional development that goes on in other states. Further, state governments are often quite concerned with redistributing money from urban areas to rural ones (and between urban areas) based on their relative influence in the state legislature. As George Washington Plunkitt, the famous bard of New York’s Tammany Hall political machine, explained New York State’s relationship with New York City: “New York City [i]s [p]ie for the [h]ayseeds.”

Education policy reveals the division of power between states and local governments. Providing elementary and secondary education is one of the most central local governmental responsibilities, and local governments—either school boards, general purpose local governments, or some combination—have a great deal of discretion over funding levels.

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343. See FRUG & BARRON, supra note 342, at x-xi.

344. This power is often used to limit the ability of local governments to exclude affordable housing. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-30(g) (West 2001) (establishing review process whereby developers of affordable housing have the right to develop unless a state court determines that town’s interest in barring them is sufficient); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40B §§ 20–23 (LexisNexis 2006) (setting up alternative zoning review structure for developers seeking to introduce affordable housing into areas that otherwise lack it). These policies are likely agglomeration-promoting as they do not require inclusionary zoning, but rather provide developers with an alternative, more liberal zoning regime if they plan to build low income housing.

CITY AS A LAW AND ECONOMIC SUBJECT

and the content of elementary and secondary education policy. Although states and the federal government provide substantial aid, primary and secondary education in this country is primarily governed at the local level. This provides gains from sorting and competition. It is clear that when people move, they take into account the quality of schools and property tax rates, and these factors are thus capitalized into housing prices. Schools, and the taxes people have to pay to provide them, are the major reason why people sort among local governments.

Schools also provide a clear example of how sorting harms agglomeration. The parents of school-age children face strong incentives to move to better school districts, particularly given the large disparities in local educational performance. Where this occurs, it means that parents are moving from their otherwise preferred location and this produces a loss—the difference between the value of the transactions they would have made in the preferred location and the transactions they make in their new location. States retain the power to limit the gains from local sorting by taxing local school districts and redistributing that money, reducing the benefits from living in a high benefit locality. On average, states provide roughly 47.1% of school funding. Whether this is sufficient to balance the gains from sorting and the gains from agglomeration is, at best, difficult to determine.

On the other hand, primary and secondary education does not directly affect agglomeration. Contrast this with higher education. Robert Inman and Andrew Haughwout have shown conclusively that having a large university in a city center or a suburb of a major city provides economic gains and increases property values throughout a region. These are gains from agglomeration. Universities help create a deep local labor market. Also, the ideas that spring from universities can be developed into businesses if there is a fertile urban capital and product market. The creation and growth of Silicon Valley has been credited to the combination of top research universities like Stanford and the University of Cali-

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349. See id.
350. See BLUESTONE ET AL., supra note 347, at 248–49.
351. See id. at 260.
352. See id. at 249.
fornia-Berkeley and the financial resources of the San Francisco region.\footnote{355. See 1 MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY 391 (1996). There is a joke that to create the next Silicon Valley what needs to be done is to “‘[t]ake one part great university, add two parts sunshine and three parts venture capital: shake vigorously.” FLORIDA, supra note 97, at 207.}

But higher education policy is entirely controlled by states.\footnote{356. See GORDON K. DAVIES, THE NAT’L COLLABORATIVE FOR HIGHER EDUC. POLICY, SETTING A PUBLIC AGENDA FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE STATES 20 (2006), http://www.highereducation.org/reports/public_agenda/public_agenda.pdf.} This makes sense: funding a major university is outside of the abilities of any one locality. That said, there are costs related to state control of higher education (as opposed to control by, say, a regional government). For the reasons discussed above, it is unlikely that state governments will adequately take into account agglomerative gains when making university funding and location decisions. Looking at current state practice, this certainly seems to be the case. A government seeking to maximize agglomeration gains would locate universities in big cities—that is where the value of their spillovers would be felt most dramatically. Of seventy-five state flagship universities (some states have more than one), however, only fifteen are located in the largest metropolitan area in the state.\footnote{357. See USA Today, 2006 College Tuition & Fees Survey, http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2006-08-30-tuition-survey_x.htm (last visited July 11, 2010). This slightly understates the number of urban flagship universities, as it fails to include flagship universities like the University of California-Berkeley, which is the second largest MSA in the state (but the twelfth largest nationally).}

One can tell very similar stories about any number of other policy areas.\footnote{358. The one major exception is mass transportation, in which twenty-seven major American regions have regionally-funded governing bodies. See Cashin, supra note 6, at 2028–30. Even these entities are often governed by boards selected by state officials.} The distinction I propose also can help explain doctrinal questions, like why courts are more willing to grant local governments power to regulate non-market behavior than interventions in broader markets. For instance, the Supreme Court of Illinois held in Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove\footnote{359. 470 N.E.2d 266, 273–77 (Ill. 1984).} that a local law barring possession of handguns did not exceed the town’s home rule power, against a challenge claiming that permitting such laws would create a patchwork of inconsistent local regulations.\footnote{360. 520 N.E.2d 316, 322–23 (Ill. 1988).} Four years later, the same court held in People ex rel. Bernardi v. Highland Park\footnote{361. 520 N.E.2d 316, 322–23 (Ill. 1988).} that a locality’s decision to hire a public works contractor who paid less than a prevailing wage, when state law required such wages, went beyond the bounds of the locality’s home rule powers because a contrary ruling “would put at risk all of the State’s labor laws and invite increasingly localized definition of workers’ rights.” Under Barron’s understanding of home rule powers, neither of these decisions makes sense—in Kalodimos, the court upheld local power to promote a “use value,” while in Bernardi, it struck down a local effort to promote market forces. If one considers home rule a protection of powers over
which sorting is likely or possible, however, then this distinction makes sense. People can move to places where their substantive interests in gun possession (or the lack thereof) are protected but local labor laws would interfere with the proper functioning of regional economic markets, one of the essential sources of agglomeration.

More importantly, a proper understanding of the normative underpinnings of modern home rule regimes provides a way to understand and analyze federal spending in areas that are primarily regulated by local governments, like housing policy and transportation. There is not space enough to discuss the entirety of federal policy in these areas, but it will suffice to say that the federal government spends vast sums of money promoting home ownership and building roads. In these areas, states will sometimes do a poor job of balancing the gains from agglomeration and sorting for the reasons discussed above. Where states are doing a bad job of balancing agglomeration and sorting gains, federal monies theoretically could cure the problem. This is not to say the federal government is well situated to properly balance agglomeration and sorting, but rather that thinking of federal involvement in this way provides a method of assessing the quality of federal policies. Put differently, one way of determining whether federal spending in these areas is useful is trying to see whether it fixes consistent problems in the way states generally, or certain regions specifically, balance agglomerative and sorting gains.

One example of a federal policy designed to address certain failures by states in balancing agglomeration and sorting is funding for congestion pricing. Congress has given the Department of Transportation the authorization to approve pilot projects in connection with state and local governments that provide for congestion pricing of roads. As discussed above, although Tiebout sorting creates gains, it also drives a spreading out of the metropolitan area. Congestion pricing—charging motorists tolls when they drive on crowded highways for the cost they impose on drivers behind them—is a policy intended to force residents to internalize some of the cost generated by that spreading. It is a pro-agglomerative policy that is difficult to pass under many state law regimes. The federal government is using these grants to directly target regions where the pro-sorting bias of state local government law policy is causing substantial harms.


362. See Nash, supra note 361, at 719–23.

363. See id. at 676.

An even more attractive possibility is directly tying federal aid to local decisions to forgo policies that promote sorting but harm agglomeration. The largest federal intervention in housing markets is the home mortgage interest tax deduction, which benefits home owners based on the value of their mortgage and their income level. This provides outsized benefits to towns that maintain high average housing values and have residents with high incomes, as low-income, low-mortgage home owners get less of a benefit from the tax deduction (particularly those who do not itemize). That is, the localities that benefit most from the home mortgage deduction are those high-price areas that use their zoning powers extensively. The federal government is thus subsidizing sorting, and particularly, the benefits sorting provides to the wealthiest residents in a region.

Ed Glaeser and Joe Gyourko argue that the home mortgage interest tax deduction should be capped at $300,000 rather than the ordinary cap of $1,000,000 in counties that have high housing prices and zoning policies that substantially restrict the supply of housing. The money pulled back from this reform should be given in block grants to localities in these counties on the basis of how many new housing units they allow developers to build. This would create incentives for local governments to permit more building, limiting the degree to which restricting new development provides a higher tax base. Further, it would only affect those areas where the combination of zoning policies and housing prices suggest that state governments are doing a bad job of balancing the benefits of agglomeration and sorting.

These proposals are wise. To the extent the federal government is involved in housing and transportation policy, it should use its influence to counteract the anti-agglomerative bias of state policy when and where it occurs.

VI. CONCLUSION: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND THE CITY

This Article is not intended to represent a comprehensive model of the effects of agglomeration economies and Tiebout sorting on local government law. It is a beginning, not an end. Hopefully, though, it will point the way forward on how to understand the interaction between competition between localities and broader questions of regional economic development. Local government law has ignored developments in economics for far too long, to the detriment of legal and economic scho-
larship and national public policy. We need a new law and economics understanding of local government law and this Article is an effort to begin to provide it.