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Making the Old Federalism Work: Section 1983 and the Rights of Grant-in-Aid Beneficiaries

In 1980, the Supreme Court held for the first time that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivations of federal statutory rights. Because the Court had previously held only that section 1983 embraced constitutional claims, this holding appeared to expand dramatically the scope of section 1983. In particular, it appeared that section 1983 might provide a universal private right of action for enforcing the conditions imposed upon states by federal grant-in-aid programs—a right of action that courts had granted only sporadically before.

Two subsequent decisions, however, suggest that section 1983 may extend less broadly. In these decisions, the Court precluded section 1983 claims when the underlying statute does not confer substantive rights and when it provides an exclusive remedy for their violation. The Court has also suggested that some individual interests in state compliance with a grant condition may be insufficient to make that condition a "right secured" under section 1983. Although the scope of these qualifications remains largely uncertain, they severely threaten the usefulness of section 1983 in enforcing grant conditions.

This Note argues that section 1983 should be available as a mechanism for ensuring that states administer grant programs in conformity with federal requirements. In many cases, alternative means of enforcing grant conditions are inadequate to protect either the rights of grant beneficiaries or the interests of the federal government in state compliance. Because the

   Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.


3. Although the Court had suggested in dictum that § 1983 might embrace statutory claims, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675 (1974), and had decided statutory claims brought pendent to constitutional claims under § 1983, see infra p. 1004, it had never decided whether suits challenging state action because of its inconsistency with federal statutory law could be brought under § 1983.


history and purposes of section 1983 evince a congressional intent to pro-
tect federal rights of the kind at stake in grant programs, this Note argues
that any judicially imposed limitations on that cause of action should be
construed narrowly. It concludes by proposing rules to govern the applica-
tion of section 1983 to grant claims.

I. The Rights of Grant-in-Aid Beneficiaries

To understand the importance of the Court’s recent section 1983 deci-
sions, it is essential to explore the nature of grant-in-aid programs and the
private rights they establish, as well as the Court’s treatment of private
enforcement efforts prior to 1980. Before that time, private parties who
could benefit from grant conditions had only limited means by which to
secure them. Courts generally viewed grant beneficiaries as powerless in
relation to the enforcement of their statutorily defined rights.

A. The Nature of Grants-in-Aid

Grants create a relationship of “cooperative federalism.” The national
government retains substantial control over the aided programs, but state
and local governments bear responsibility for directly shaping and ad-
ministering those programs. Congress employs grant programs when it
believes that benefits and services can be better provided through state and
local governments than through direct federal intervention. Because the
goals underlying such arrangements would be defeated were Congress to
abrogate control over program expenditures, courts have long upheld Con-
gress’ power to attach conditions to these funds.

9. Grants often involve all levels of government in providing services. In order to achieve uniform
national program standards as well as to assume part of the financial burden, Congress provides funds
to assist the states in carrying out programs within the bounds established by federal law. This has
been termed a “marble cake” model of federalism, M. Grodzens, The American System 8 (1966),
in which “no important function of government is the exclusive province of one of the levels,” Note,
five reasons why Congress has created grant-in-aid programs in such great number, rather than pro-
viding benefits and services directly: (1) in many areas, federal administrative machinery would dupli-
cate state or local agencies already providing comparable services; (2) direct federal administration
may foster local jealousy and hostility, while grants-in-aid to state and local governments may en-
courage support for federal intervention; (3) matching grants may be particularly useful for drawing
upon local government revenues to serve federal priorities; (4) grants-in-aid can improve state and
local government administration by conditioning the grant of federal funds on compliance with man-
agement directives; and (5) grants-in-aid may avoid federalism problems by respecting state and local
autonomy while allowing the national government to set policy priorities. Id.
11. The Constitution empowers Congress to expend funds in order to “provide for the . . . gen-
eral Welfare.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Congress’ power to condition funds is limited, in theory,
by the requirements that funding restrictions provide for the “general welfare” and be reasonably
related to the purposes of the program itself. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66, 69 (1936). In
practice, these requirements have rarely invalidated grant conditions. The Court has held that Con-
Although grant conditions primarily define the relationship between state and federal agencies, they also create expectations for private parties about how services or benefits will be provided. Congress, of course, can change the requirements conditioning state participation in a grant program or change the services the program provides, and states may reject federal funding if they do not want to accept the accompanying obligations. Within the terms of the federal-state funding agreements, however, private parties must receive benefits or services in the manner established by the funding statute. The Court has recognized that grants, by imposing obligations on both federal and state governments, create for individuals a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to grant benefits. Thus, public grant conditions translate into the language of individual rights.

B. Judically Created Means of Enforcing Grant Conditions

As a rule, grant statutes provide little guidance on how private parties can enforce “entitlements.” Seldom does Congress explicitly authorize suits by beneficiaries against either the grantee or the federal grantor. In
the absence of express private rights of action, courts have sometimes fash-
ioned remedies on the basis of three different theories. First, and most
significant, courts have implied a private right of action in the substantive
statute itself on the ground that Congress intended to provide a remedy
that it neglected to write into the statute.17 Second, courts have sometimes
treated grants as contracts between the federal and state governments and
permitted certain private parties to enforce their rights as third-party ben-
eficiaries.18 Finally, courts have occasionally allowed statutory claims pen-
dent to colorable constitutional claims to be brought under section 1983.19

These judicially created remedies, however, have not helped private
plaintiffs a great deal. For one thing, courts have not always recognized
private rights of action.20 And when they have, they have severely re-
stricted the kinds of plaintiffs who can assert such rights,21 the kinds of
statutory provisions such plaintiffs can enforce,22 and the kinds of relief

Cir. 1981); Local Div. No. 714 v. Greater Portland Transit Dist., 589 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979); Euresti
v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972); Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967). In general, a third-party beneficiary may enforce contractual
duties when two conditions are met: the beneficiary's right to performance is "appropriate to effectu-
ate the intention of the parties" and the circumstances "indicate that the promisee intend[ed] to give
the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
20. For example, in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), the Court adopted a four-part inquiry
for deciding whether a private right of action should be implied from a statute. Four members of the
Court recently criticized the test in these terms:

Surely it cannot be seriously argued that a mechanical application of the Cort analysis lends
"predictability" to implied right of action jurisprudence: including today's decision, five of the
last six statutory implied-right-of-action cases in which we have reviewed analysis by the
Courts of Appeals after Cort resulted in reversal of erroneous Court of Appeals decisions.
While this may be predictability of a sort, it is not the sort which the Court in
Con v. Ash, supra, or in any other case seeking to afford guidance to statutory construction intended.

21. Under the Cort test, supra note 20, only a plaintiff "of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted" could assert any implied private right of action. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
22. For example, the courts' restrictive reading of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§
701-796 (1982), has led to inconsistencies in private enforcement. Section 503 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §
793, requires that certain federal contractors take affirmative action to employ and advance in employ-
ment qualified handicapped individuals. Section 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794, prohibits discrimination on the
basis of handicap in programs receiving federal financial assistance. A majority of the circuits has
found that § 504 creates a private right of action. See Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658
F.2d 1372, 1377 (10th Cir. 1981). But see Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d
672, 674-75 (8th Cir.) (no private right of action), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980). The Supreme
Court has indicated that it agrees with the majority view. See Campbell v. Kruse, 434 U.S. 808
(1977). On the other hand, the courts have unanimously held that § 503 does not create a private
right of action. See, e.g., Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 889 (1981); Note, Private Rights of Action for Handicapped Persons Under Section 503 of the
available. The courts have also applied strictly the requirements for enforcement of statutory provisions by third-party beneficiaries. Furthermore, a plaintiff cannot always manage to bring colorable constitutional claims along with statutory ones. As a result, individuals have been able to obtain only sporadic and inadequate enforcement of grant conditions through such means.

C. Section 1983 and Grant Claims

It was against this background that the Court decided Maine v. Thiboutot. In that case, the Court allowed private welfare recipients to bring suit under section 1983 to challenge a denial by state officials of federal social security benefits. Although the Court asserted that it was merely stating explicitly what it had established sub silentio in prior opinions, it held for the first time that section 1983 “means what it says” and provides a private cause of action for violation of federal statutory law by state and local officials. The Court avoided saying, however, that section 1983 provided a remedy for the violation of all federal statutes.

One year after Thiboutot was decided, the Court retreated from any such broad theory. In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, the Court considered whether the Bill of Rights section of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (DDA Act) created substantive rights enforceable by mentally retarded individuals housed in state institutions. The Court decided it did not. It viewed the DDA Act

27. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4.
28. Id. Justice Brennan, for the majority, wrote:
   "The question before us is whether the phrase "and laws," as used in § 1983, means what it says, or whether it should be limited to some subset of laws. Given that Congress attached no modifiers to the phrase, the plain language of the statute undoubtedly embraces respondents' claim that petitioners violated the Social Security Act.
Id.
29. The Court held only that § 1983 "undoubtedly embraces the respondents' claim" in the case before it. Id. It did not explicitly state that § 1983 would be available for all statutory claims. The holding has, however, been so interpreted. See id. at 11 (Powell, J., dissenting); Comment, Statutorily Based Federal Rights: A New Role for Section 1983, 14 J. MAR. L. REV. 547, 551 (1981).
as a "mere federal-state funding statute," intended to encourage, but not to coerce, the states to develop certain programs. The Court balked at the idea of imposing affirmative obligations on the states in the context of a "cooperative program of shared responsibilities." If Congress wants a grant program to create substantive rights, the Court held, Congress must clearly state that those rights are a condition of the statutory "contract."

The Court did acknowledge, however, that the DDA Act imposed some obligations upon states. In particular, it found that the DDA Act required states to submit assurances that they would administer state programs so as to protect the rights of those defined by the Act as "developmentally disabled." The Court nevertheless raised, without answering, the question of whether an individual's "interest" in these assurances constituted a "right secured" by federal law and enforceable by means of section 1983.

Later that year, in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, the Court retreated still further from Thiboutot. In this case, the Court considered whether an express remedial provision in a statute could preclude a section 1983 cause of action. The Court found that by providing "unusually elaborate enforcement provisions, conferring authority to sue . . . both on government officials and

the Secretary has approved it, the states receive funds that must be spent in accordance with the plan and the requirements of the statute. Id. § 6062(a). The DDA Act requires, in particular, that the state have "in effect for each developmentally disabled person who receives services from or under the program a habilitation plan." Id. § 6011(a). In addition, the Act's "bill of rights" provision requires that "[t]he treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with developmental disabilities . . . be designed to maximize the developmental potential of the person and . . . be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the person's liberty." Id. § 6010(2). At issue in Pennhurst was whether providing "appropriate treatment" in the "least restrictive environment" constituted a right enforceable against the states. See 451 U.S. at 2.

34. Id. The Court drew an analogy between grant-in-aid programs enacted pursuant to the spending power and contracts: "[i]n return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the Spending Power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract.'" Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 22 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 309 (1980)).
36. Id. at 17. The voluntary nature of the grant relationship requires that "if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously" so that states may "exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation." Id.
private citizens," Congress had foreclosed a section 1983 action under the two acts at issue. To the Court, these enforcement provisions meant that "Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate." Because the Court found that the statutory remedies excluded private suits under section 1983, it did not reach the question of whether the acts created enforceable substantive rights.

These cases leave two important questions unanswered. First, what must the nature of one's "interest" in the enforcement of a grant condition be in order to bring suit under section 1983? Second, under what circumstances will a grant statute's express remedy preclude section 1983 relief? Although the Court decided to preclude section 1983 claims in Sea Clammers, it left open in Pennhurst the question of whether the DDA Act's own enforcement remedy, withdrawal of federal funds, excluded section 1983 claims.

II. The Broad Scope of Section 1983

The Supreme Court has discerned in section 1983 a broad intent to restructure federal-state relations. Such intent supports not only the statute's expanded application to a wide range of constitutional claims, but also its use in protecting the federal rights at stake in grant programs. In Pennhurst and Sea Clammers, however, the Court held that when Congress creates these rights, it may intend that they not be strictly enforceable or that they be enforceable through only certain means. Thus, only by exploring the Court's two unanswered questions is it possible to determine the scope of section 1983 in enforcing grant conditions.

A. Evolution of the Section 1983 Remedy

Section 1983 was originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, a congressional response to the failure of Southern states to suppress Ku Klux Klan violence against blacks during the Reconstruction

42. Id. The Court reasoned that "[w]hen the remedial devices provided in a particular act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983." Id. at 20.
43. Id. at 21. One member of the Court found, however, that because both of the statutes at issue contained a savings clause preserving enforcement rights under other statutes, it was "remarkable" that the Court could discern a congressional intent to withdraw § 1983 coverage. Id. at 30 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Because the environmental statutes were enacted on behalf of the general public and not for the protection of a special class, Stevens accepted the majority's holding that Congress had created no new private damages remedy under § 1983. Id. at 32-33.
44. See supra p. 1006.
45. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 22 n.11 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("the only exception [to the application of § 1983 in the statutory context] will be in cases where the governing statute provides an exclusive remedy for violations of its terms").
period.\textsuperscript{47} Although its immediate aim was narrow, Congress framed the statute in general terms, providing a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of state law, of "any rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States.\textsuperscript{48}

Although the Court construed section 1983 narrowly at first,\textsuperscript{49} it has since expanded the section's scope beyond the particular problem it was designed to correct.\textsuperscript{50} The Court has declared that section 1983 engendered a "vast transformation" of earlier concepts of federalism\textsuperscript{51} and was evidence of Congress' intent to "interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights."\textsuperscript{52}

Developments in judicial doctrine over the past twenty years have provided further reason for reading section 1983 expansively. First, as the Court gave new life and content to the due process and equal protection clauses,\textsuperscript{53} it extended section 1983 to provide a remedy for deprivation of those rights, even when the issues raised did not fall within the statute's traditional "civil rights" focus.\textsuperscript{54} Second, it treated more actions as "under color of" state law\textsuperscript{55} for purposes of section 1983. Third, it narrowed the

\textsuperscript{47} See Note, supra note 9, at 1153-56.


\textsuperscript{49} Despite its broad language and purpose, § 1983 was initially given extremely limited application; it was primarily confined to deprivations of voting rights, and even that use was largely ineffective. See Note, supra note 9, at 1161 n.139, 1167-69.

\textsuperscript{50} In Thiboutot the Court acknowledged that the legislative history of the provision is somewhat ambiguous. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 7 (1980). Nonetheless, the Court has, over time, broadened the scope of § 1983. See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 87-92 (1973) (citing wide sweep of claims covered by § 1983); Note, supra note 9, at 1167-75.

\textsuperscript{51} Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (legislative history of § 1983 "makes evident that Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights"); see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1980) (debates surrounding enactment of Civil Rights Act of 1871 show that strong motive for passage was congressional concern that state courts inadequately protected federal rights).

\textsuperscript{52} Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).

\textsuperscript{53} On the expansion of the due process clause, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-9 (1978); on the expansion of equal protection, see Note, Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969). The Court has also held that many of the provisions of the Bill of Rights have been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus are now applicable to the states. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968).


\textsuperscript{55} Section 1983 applies to deprivations of rights "under color of" state law, regulation or practice. See supra note 1. Initially, the courts interpreted that phrase to cover only actions within a state officer's legal authority. Thus, § 1983 applied only if the state law providing the officer's authority itself violated the federal Constitution. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). In United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), however, a criminal case, the Court expanded the coverage of the
Section 1983

immunities available to both state agencies and officials as a defense to liability under section 1983. Thus, the Court's conception of the remedial purposes of section 1983 has provided a basis for extending it beyond its initially limited application.

These jurisprudential developments were themselves the product of changing perceptions of the government's role in relation to its citizens. Two changes have been particularly influential. First, the federal government has moved beyond the role of passively protecting a small set of individual rights through the courts. Instead, Congress has used its regulatory and spending powers to create and effectuate new individual rights. Grants-in-aid have been, of course, one of its most important tools. Second, demands for governmental accountability have become increasingly strident, and new mechanisms have been developed to control abuses of governmental power. In response to these trends, the courts have broadened section 1983's protection against state deprivations of federally guaranteed rights. Both these policies apply with equal force to federal rights created by grant legislation.

B. Defining the Contours of Section 1983 in the Grant Context

This is not to suggest that section 1983 should be available to any plaintiff who seeks to enforce any grant condition. Rather, as the Court itself has suggested, some limitations must exist along two dimensions: Standards must be developed to identify those plaintiffs who may utilize section 1983 to enforce a given grant provision and to determine which grant provisions may be enforced by means of section 1983 litigation.

"under color" requirement to actions involving abuse of legal authority. That principle was extended to civil claims under § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).

56. Under § 1983, the Court has allowed plaintiffs to bring damage actions against state officials subject to a qualified "good faith" immunity. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974). Further, the Court has held that prospective relief is permissible even when it may have a significant effect on state treasuries. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668-69 (1974). The Court has even withdrawn the good faith immunity to § 1983 suit once available to municipalities. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); see Greenhouse, After 111 Years, Federal Rights Law Faces Grilling, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1982, at E2, col. 1 (describing congressional move to restore municipal "good faith" defense).


59. One federal judge has argued that § 1983 requires even more radical restructuring if it is to serve as an effective deterrent to unlawful action by state officials. See Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447 (1978).
1. Identifying the Appropriate Section 1983 Plaintiff

In addition to limiting the rights created by grant statutes, the Court in *Pennhurst* raised an elusive question: When is a particular plaintiff’s interest in enforcing a grant condition sufficient for that condition to become a “right secured” to him or her within the meaning of section 1983?60 As thus formulated, this question raised concerns traditionally discussed under the doctrine of standing.61 In this context, the Court has read the “case or controversy” clause of Article III of the Constitution62 to require, at minimum, a showing of “distinct and palpable injury” and some causal relationship between the defendant’s illegal act and that injury.63 Thus, to satisfy the Article III standing requirement in a section 1983 claim, a private party must show that a statute creates a right and that a state has violated this right, thereby injuring the individual.

In certain circumstances, the Court has imposed prudential limits that are even more demanding than those imposed by Article III.64 The Court has, for example, imposed prudential standing restrictions in cases in which the asserted harm is shared nearly equally by most citizens.65 In such “public” disputes, the Court has used standing to determine whether the provision on which the claim rests allows judicial review for the class of persons in plaintiff’s position.66 In this sense, standing doctrine closely resembles the doctrine of implied private rights of action.67 In implied

60. See *supra* pp. 1006-07.

61. The standing doctrine limits the right to bring suit in federal courts. A party has standing to sue if he has “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharply focuses the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult . . . questions.” *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); see *Davis v. Passman*, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979) (“[S]tanding is a question of whether a plaintiff is sufficiently adverse to a defendant to create an Art. III case or controversy, or at least to overcome prudential limits on federal-court jurisdiction.”); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 156 (2d ed. 1973) (standing concerns whether plaintiff has “sufficient personal interest” to warrant relief if he establishes illegality alleged and doctrine is thus “inextricably bound up with the whole law of rights and remedies”).


67. In deciding whether to imply a private cause of action, courts apply the four-factor test articulated in *Cort v. Ash*, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), to determine the “ultimate issue” of whether Congress intended to create a private right of action. See *California v. Sierra Club*, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). The “threshold” inquiry is whether the statute was enacted for the benefit of a special class of which the plaintiff is a member. *Cannon v. University of Chicago*, 441 U.S. 677, 689-94 (1979). The Court’s standing inquiry in public disputes—whether the statutory provision on which plaintiffs rely creates a right to judicial review for a certain class of persons—focuses on the same point.
private action cases, courts have effectively prevented private parties from enforcing statutory provisions, the violation of which caused them injury, if those statutes create duties not for particular groups, but for the benefit of the public at large.68

It would be inappropriate, however, to apply these prudential requirements to suits brought under section 1983. Section 1983 provides an express private right to judicial review of state action. Having demonstrated that a funding statute creates enforceable “rights,”69 a plaintiff should not also be required to show that Congress enacted the statute or imposed the grant conditions in order to benefit a small group of which he or she is a member. That test, which may be useful in limiting judicially created remedies, is inappropriate when suit is brought under an express statutory remedy, like section 1983, containing its own cause of action requirements.70 In short, the congressionally defined elements of a section 1983 action—the violation of federal rights under color of state law—should not be constricted by extra-constitutional standing requirements.

2. The Presumption in Favor of Enforcement Through Section 1983

Courts usually permit private enforcement of grant conditions when they find in the grant statute a legislative intent to permit such enforcement.71 Without evidence of such intent, courts typically refuse to imply private remedies.72 Thus, statutory silence creates a presumption against private enforcement.73

The limitation on the courts’ remedial power rests on the theory that

69. See supra p. 1003.
70. Indeed, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine for whom Congress enacted a grant statute in many cases. Grants-in-aid are designed to benefit individuals, states and localities, and to promote the general welfare. Grants must provide for the general welfare in order to serve as a legitimate exercise of the spending power. See supra note 11.
71. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689, 709 (1979) (implying private right of action under statute aiming to benefit clearly identifiable group); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420 (1970) (implying private right of action because Congress unlikely to have intended to provide no effective remedy to those directly affected by grant program); Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1981) (tenants of housing subsidized by Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had enforceable third-party beneficiary rights under statute authorizing HUD to make subsidy payments to landlord).
73. See generally Hazen, Implied Private Remedies Under Federal Statutes: Neither a Death Knell Nor a Moratorium—Civil Rights, Securities Regulation, and Beyond, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1333, 1386 (1980) (arguing that implied private right of action cases illustrate judicial restraint except in compelling circumstances); Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 33, 51 (1979) (noting that Court has placed burden on Congress to express clearly its intent to provide private right of action); Note, Implied Causes of Action: A New Analytical Framework, 14 J. MAR. L. REV. 141, 166-67 (1980) (concluding that recent implied right of action doctrine restrains judiciary in filling gaps left by legislature).
Congress itself should specify remedies when it creates rights and not leave to the courts the task of matching rights and remedies in a piecemeal fashion.\textsuperscript{74} This theory changes the long-prevailing presumption that remedies follow rights\textsuperscript{75} into the new presumption that silence rules out judicially created private enforcement mechanisms. This new presumption, however, should not affect section 1983 analysis. This section provides for private enforcement on its face, and, as an express remedy, should overcome any presumption created by silence in the underlying substantive statute.\textsuperscript{76}

The broad availability of section 1983 as a remedial device, however, raises the many concerns that have prompted the Court's recent search for doctrines to confine it. This search is premature, for it is possible to address these concerns without limiting the scope of the statute.

III. Section 1983 and the Grant Enforcement Scheme

Some courts have reasoned that applying section 1983 to grant claims disrupts the enforcement procedures established by Congress in the grant statutes themselves.\textsuperscript{77} There are two typical remedial provisions in such statutes. One empowers the federal agency that administers the grant to terminate or reduce funding if states fail to comply with grant conditions.\textsuperscript{78} The other specifies judicial review procedures for private parties

\textsuperscript{74} Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); id. at 749 (Powell, J., dissenting); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579 (1979).

\textsuperscript{75} See, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) ("[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."); Kendall v. United States, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 524, 624 (1838) ("monstrous absurdity in a well organized government, that there should be no remedy, although a clear and undeniable right should be shown to exist"); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy . . . whenever that right is invaded."). See generally Note, Implied Rights of Action in Federal Legislation: Harmonization Within the Statutory Scheme, 1980 DUKE L.J. 928 (discussing presumption that statutory rights should be enforceable).

\textsuperscript{76} Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 27 n.11 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Fennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981) (Thiboutot held that "§ 1983 provides a cause of action for state deprivations of 'rights secured' by 'the laws of the United States'").


\textsuperscript{78} Almost all grant statutes allow the federal agency administering the program to terminate or reduce federal funds if the grantee fails to comply with the funding conditions. The statute usually provides the state agency with notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to terminating its funds. See, e.g., Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 101(c), 29 U.S.C. § 721(c) (1982); Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 § 108, 29 U.S.C. § 818 (1976); Public Health Service Act § 315(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 247(c)(3) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Some statutes bar cutting off a state's funding as long as the state makes good-faith efforts to comply with the grant conditions. See 42 U.S.C. § 604(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Aid to Families with Dependent Children). Recently Congress has also provided for federal recovery of illegal grant expenditures as a further penalty for
Section 1983 to enforce grant conditions. The issue is whether Congress intended these statutory remedial provisions to be exclusive, and, therefore, whether section 1983 should be precluded as a means of enforcement.

A. Federal Agency Enforcement

The traditional arguments for relying exclusively upon federal agencies to ensure state compliance with grant conditions is that these agencies have expertise in the subject matter of the grant programs and are able to apply uniform standards. Certain practical obstacles, however, prevent federal agencies from adequately overseeing grant programs. The number, complexity, and size of the programs make effective monitoring difficult. Furthermore, when an agency discovers noncompliance, it may be reluctant to cut off or reduce funding lest it jeopardize state participation in the grant program. As a result, federal agencies often engage in protracted negotiations to avoid funding sanctions and seldom actually enforce funding conditions.  


79. See supra note 16.


81. See R. CAPPALLI, supra note 10, at 65 (finding important conditions ignored because of huge volume of grants and contracts).

82. Cutting off funding is too drastic a remedy to be frequently employed. See id. at 90-94; Tomlinson & Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REV. 600, 620 (1972); Wilcox, The Function and Nature of Grants, 23 AD. L. REV. 125, 131 (1970); Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 84, 91 (1967); see also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 426 (1970) (Douglas, J., concurring) (finding HEW reluctant to cut off funds to noncomplying states); United States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. 1079, 1083 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (arguing cutoff would punish beneficiaries rather than enforce grant conditions), modified sub nom. NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974). In contrast, specific performance of grant conditions may be available through a § 1983 suit, at least within the term of the congressional appropriation. Compare United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 440-41 (7th Cir.) (court not limited to prohibiting action in violation of statute, but may also require affirmative action to assure compliance with grant conditions), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977) and United States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. at 1083 (United States may seek judicial enforcement of terms and conditions of grants of federal property; administrative remedy of termination of assistance is not exclusive) with PAAC v. Rizzo, 502 F.2d 306, 314-15 (3d Cir. 1974) (federal requirements in grant statutes binding on question of eligibility, but not substantively binding on grantee), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975). In general, courts have substantial flexibility in the relief they afford and can avoid imposing drastic sanctions against state grantees, while preserving for private parties the benefits of the grant program. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 54 (White, J., dissenting) (citing approach taken in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420-21 (1970)).

83. See Note, supra note 82, at 91.
In the face of the growing number and complexity of federal grant programs, any federal agency expertise provides limited safeguards. Federal agencies often cannot determine accurately whether a state has complied with grant terms. Private parties from whom the agency could easily obtain information about the program may be entirely excluded from the agency compliance proceedings. Even when individuals do register their complaints, so long as state performance appears adequate on report forms, the monitoring agency may believe the problem is limited and non-systemic.

In addition, federal agency enforcement proceedings may prejudice the interests of states. Entrusting the resolution of conflicting federal and state interpretations of the grant statute to the federal agency makes the agency both arbiter and participant in the same proceeding. Federal courts, on the other hand, are "relatively more expert" than agencies in interpreting federal law, have discretion to weigh the state's reading of grant requirements as well as to solicit the views of the federal agency, and are thus more likely to reach an unbiased decision.

Private enforcement of grant conditions through section 1983 supplements federal agency enforcement. Nothing suggests, moreover, that private enforcement would undermine either the agencies' expertise or their ability to apply uniform standards. Section 1983 enforcement would also

84. See R. Cappalli, supra note 10, at 81; Tomlinson & Mashaw, supra note 82, at 619-30.
85. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 706-08 n.41 (1979) (complaint procedure adopted by HEW in Title IX cases makes no provision for complainants to participate in investigation or enforcement proceedings). In general, private parties have no formal means by which they can bring their complaints before a federal agency. Note, supra note 82, at 90-91.

One theoretically useful vehicle for private instigation of agency action suits, § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982), has proved of little practical effect. Although courts have on rare occasions ordered agencies to initiate enforcement proceedings, see Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc), agency failure to enforce is generally unreviewable, see, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Moog Indus. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413-14 (1958); FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 25 (1929). Moreover, judicial review of such failure may be limited to the reasons the agency offers for its refusal to act. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975); DeVito v. Schultz, 300 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1969).

86. See R. Cappalli, supra note 10, at 65-66. In monitoring grantees, it is standard practice to rely on their good faith reporting. Those states conscious of their own noncompliance are often able to prepare reports that on their face do not reveal any deficiency; required reports do not comprehensively disclose program conditions.
87. See id. at 66-67.
90. Cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 708 n.42 (1979) ("HEW's enforcement capabilities under Title IX are especially limited in precisely those areas where private suits can be most effective.")
not disrupt the goals and programs of federal agencies as much as private actions to force agencies to supervise grant programs.\textsuperscript{91}

B. \textit{Express Judicial Remedies}

Whether section 1983 enforcement disrupts an express private remedy is a more difficult question. Whenever Congress expressly provides an avenue for judicial review, it can be argued that it intends that remedy to be exclusive. This argument rests upon the presumption of exclusivity encapsulated in the maxim \textit{expressio unius est exclusio alterius}.\textsuperscript{92} Thus, courts generally refuse to imply a private right of action when the underlying substantive statute itself contains an express remedial provision, regardless of whether this provision provides adequate relief.\textsuperscript{93} The presumption may be overcome, however, when there is evidence of legislative intent to provide an additional private remedy,\textsuperscript{94} for then it is clear that Congress intended to provide more than a single remedy. Because section 1983 is such an express remedy, it should not be presumptively precluded by alternative express statutory judicial remedies in the grant context.\textsuperscript{95}

This is not to say that application of section 1983 is never barred by a statutory scheme. However, because section 1983 overcomes the presumption of the statute’s remedial exclusivity, the burden should fall on the party asserting the preclusive effect of a statute’s remedial provisions to show that Congress in fact intended to withhold section 1983 relief.

That burden could be met in two circumstances: (1) when the statute contains a statement expressly excluding section 1983 or private rights of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{91} Cf. \textit{id.} at 707 n.41 (alternative to agency enforcement, suit under Administrative Procedure Act to compel agency to investigate and cut off funds, is more disruptive of HEW’s efforts to allocate enforcement resources than private suit against recipient would be).
\item \textsuperscript{92} See \textit{National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass’n of R.R. Passengers}, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (“When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any other mode.”) (quoting \textit{Botany Mills} v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929)).
\item \textsuperscript{95} At least one lower court has gone so far as to find the cause of action under § 1983 to be excluded by an implied private right of action in a grant statute. \textit{Garrity v. Gallen}, 522 F. Supp. 171 (D.N.H. 1981). Implied remedies should never be allowed to preclude § 1983 actions. Because Congress has created an express vehicle for challenging violations of a federal statute in § 1983, that remedy should be available in the first instance, making resort to an implied private right of action unnecessary.
\end{itemize}
action in general, or (2) when the statute provides for judicial review but restricts the private relief available. In the first case, congressional intent is clear. In the second, the court may infer that Congress considered private judicial relief in drafting the statute, but chose a particular remedial scheme for the law in question. These circumscribed remedies, moreover, often conflict directly with the requirements imposed by section 1983. In such cases, the courts should hold plaintiffs to the more stringent requirements of the specific statutory scheme. In cases where no conflict arises between the statutory scheme and section 1983, however, there is no reason for courts to infer exclusivity.

96. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150-51 n.5 (1970) ("very doubtful" whether § 1983 relief available when statute provided that injunction was "exclusive means of enforcing the rights based on this title").

97. The adequacy of the review provided must, of course, be assessed before precluding a cause of action under § 1983. In Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981), for example, the Court stated that when the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983. . . . It is hard to believe that Congress intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action when it created so many specific statutory remedies including the two citizen-suit provisions. Accord Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832 (1976) (balance, completeness, and structural integrity of § 717 of Civil Rights Act of 1964 make it exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973) (specific remedy of habeas corpus is appropriate remedy and must override general terms of § 1983); cf. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 378 (1979) (granting relief under § 1985 would impair effectiveness of Title VII's specific private remedy).

98. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979) (entirely appropriate for Congress, in creating statutory rights, to determine who may enforce them and in what manner). Congress may, of course, preserve other remedies even when creating specific private suit provisions. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20-21 n.31, 27-31 (1981) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (arguing that savings clause provisions provided expression of congressional intent to preserve availability of § 1983 remedies).


100. Compare Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981) with Quackenbush v. Johnson City School Dist., 716 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1426 (1984). The Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1453 (1982), at issue in both cases, provides an avenue of judicial review for plaintiffs who have satisfied certain procedural prerequisites. After finding that Congress had not made damages available under the EAHCA, the Anderson court held that plaintiffs could not circumvent the statute's restrictions by resort to § 1983. The court reasoned that to allow plaintiffs to elect a § 1983 remedy, thereby obtaining damages, would impair the effectiveness of the EAHCA's carefully constructed enforcement system. Anderson, 658 F.2d at 1213.

In Quackenbush, however, the Second Circuit found that the judicial remedy provided by the EAHCA was exclusive only for purposes of reviewing final administrative decisions about the placement of handicapped children. It held that defendants who had prevented plaintiffs from exhausting the procedural requirements of the statute could not assert the unavailability of § 1983 relief. If plaintiffs had no meaningful recourse to the statutory remedy, then they must have access to § 1983 and the relief provided by that statute.

C. Infringement of State Autonomy

Justice Powell has expressed the fear that applying section 1983 broadly will disrupt the relationship between federal and state agencies in administering grant programs.\(^{101}\) He has warned that the Thiboutot decision will burden federal courts with cases harassing state and local officials responsible for implementing federal assistance programs.\(^{102}\) In addition, he fears that federal courts will use section 1983 to gain “unprecedented authority” over state actions\(^{103}\) and interfere with the states’ judicial and administrative remedial processes.

1. Burden on State Administration

Specifically, concerns have been raised that allowing individuals to hold state and local officials liable under section 1983 for violations of federal grant requirements would unfairly impose upon the states full liability for the deprivation of rights in programs established as joint federal-state ventures.\(^{104}\) It should be noted, however, that section 1983 imposes no greater obligations on states than are contained in the grant statute itself. By accepting funds, states also accept the accompanying statutory requirements. In injunctive suits against state officials under section 1983, private parties ask no more than to insure that those requirements are met;\(^{105}\) in damage actions, they seek compensation for injury caused by the illegal actions of state officers, where those actions lie outside the scope of the “good faith” immunity from liability.\(^{106}\)

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102. Id. at 23. After noting that the United States Code contains “literally hundreds of cooperative regulatory and social welfare enactments,” Justice Powell found that “those who might benefit from these grants now will be potential § 1983 plaintiffs.” Id. at 22-23.
103. Id. at 23-35.
105. Concerns about judicial interference with state autonomy loom largest where a court determines that an injunction is necessary to bring about systemic relief in a § 1983 case. It was relief of this sort that the lower courts had determined to be necessary in Pennhurst. In such cases, the court’s duty is only to insure that the minimal requirements of the law are met. Cf. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 376 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (prescribing minimum “medical and Constitutional” standards of treatment for civilly committed mental patients), enforcing 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, decision reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 54 (1981) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that appropriate procedure once liability under § 1983 was determined would be for court to announce what state must do to comply with DDA Act and then allow appropriate period for state to decide whether to comply with conditions set by court or to give up federal funding).
106. See supra note 56.
2. Conflict with State Judicial Remedies

Some states provide for judicial review in state courts of state agency decisions. These state review provisions, however, do not bar section 1983 claims. The Court has repeatedly held that plaintiffs need not exhaust state judicial remedies before asserting section 1983 claims in federal court. The fundamental purpose of section 1983, it has recognized, is to provide individuals with a supplemental remedy for violation of their federal rights.

Policy considerations support this scheme. First, federal courts are better equipped to resolve federal statutory claims. Federal judges are more familiar with federal law and are more likely to be insulated from political pressures. Second, federal courts are more likely to apply federal law to the states uniformly. Finally, to the extent that state court judgments are binding in subsequent federal litigation, exhaustion of state judicial remedies might preclude meaningful federal judicial review.

3. Interference with State Administrative Remedies

States often establish administrative procedures for handling grievances or investigating allegations of noncompliance either in response to specific federal statutory directives, federal administrative regulations, constitutional due process requirements, or practical necessity.

Section 1983, however, does not require exhausting these state administrative remedies before suit in federal court. Congress, the Court has found, intended not to require exhaustion in order to create an effective supplemental remedy.

108. This principle was first established in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
109. Id. at 183.
112. As a general rule, the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to § 1983 claims relitigated in federal court except when state law does not provide fair procedures or the state court fails even to acknowledge the principle on which the litigant based its claim. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 104 S. Ct. 892, 896-98 (1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101, 105 (1980).
117. Id. at 502-12 (reviewing legislative history of § 1983). Prior to this decision, courts had sometimes performed the task of evaluating the adequacy of state processes before determining
Several policies counsel against an absolute exhaustion requirement. First, most state administrative processes are inherently defective in that they cannot generate a uniform or binding body of law establishing the rights of grant beneficiaries in particular programs. Second, administrative relief may be so limited in scope that some valid claims are effectively without remedy. Even when administrative procedures can address a particular grievance, they are in most cases incapable of effecting systemic reform. Third, it is unlikely that agency administrators considering a claim will be able to provide independent judgments when parties challenge the policies their own agency has adopted.

Where Congress requires states to establish administrative procedures to adjudicate claims, it may also choose to require exhaustion of those procedures. Any such requirement should not be lightly adopted, however, and must respect the purposes of section 1983. A plaintiff should be compelled to exhaust administrative procedures only where such procedures are fully capable of providing the relief sought by his claim. The defendant arguing exhaustion should bear the burden of demonstrating that state administrative remedies are indeed adequate. Furthermore, even when the court determines that state procedures are satisfactory as an initial matter, it should retain jurisdiction over the section 1983 claim pending the outcome of the administrative procedures. In this way, a court can make


118. See Note, supra note 82, at 94 (most fundamental inadequacy of the state fair hearing procedure is that it generates no uniform and binding body of law).

119. In most states, agencies are either unwilling or ineffective forums for adjudicating challenges to state regulations or regulatory practices. They are best equipped to hear claims involving application of state or federal law to a particular plaintiff. Furthermore, although state agencies can usually take some corrective measures, they may not be able to grant injunctions, declaratory relief, or damages.

120. This incapacity flows from the administrative agencies' inability to produce a uniform body of law, and their severely limited ability to grant relief.

121. See Note, supra note 82, at 92. Some state agencies have held that they have no power to decide the legality of state regulatory provisions. In those states which consider such challenges, it seems difficult to obtain effective adjudication on the merits, since “[t]he persons responsible for the final decision in a fair hearing are generally the persons who have promulgated the regulations under attack.” Id.

122. By keeping a § 1983 claim on its docket pending exhaustion of administrative or similar remedies, a court can exert pressure upon the state administrative process and ensure that it is efficient as well as effective. Furthermore, when a court retains a § 1983 case pending exhaustion, the plaintiffs may be able to collect attorney's fees for the state administrative action. See Maher v. Gagné, 448 U.S. 122, 128-29 (1980) (attorney’s fees available under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in a § 1983 case involving statutory violations, even though respondent prevailed through settlement rather than through litigation); cf. New York Gas Light Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980) (award of fees for attorney's efforts in state administrative proceeding that must be pursued under Title VII prior to filing charge with EEOC). But see Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968, 984 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (plaintiff may not obtain attorney's fees when the court determines that § 1983 cause of action basically redundant to private cause of action provided by statute's remedial scheme).
certain that the state has adequately considered the claim, and can also provide additional relief if necessary. Retaining jurisdiction would fully protect the rights of grant beneficiaries while providing scope for the operation of state administrative remedies.125

D. Burden on the Federal Courts

Finally, concerns have been voiced about how applying section 1983 to claims under grant-in-aid statutes might increase the caseload of the federal courts.126 Without question, the expansion of the scope of section 1983 has increased federal court litigation over the past two decades,127 and extending section 1983 to grant claims might indeed increase the courts’ caseload even further. Caseload, however, is small reason to deny grant beneficiaries the same protection afforded other holders of federal rights. The federal courts should not evade their duty to vindicate endangered federal rights merely because their dockets are overloaded. That failure would “implicitly express a value judgment on the comparative importance of classes of legally protected interests.”128 The proper way to ease the federal docket lies in proper court administration, not in discriminating among federally-protected rights.

Conclusion

Courts should give full scope to the individual rights created by Congress in grant-in-aid legislation, and section 1983 should be broadly available to remedy state noncompliance with federal grant conditions. So long as a party meets the injury-in-fact test for standing, no more demanding a test of the plaintiff’s “interest” in the enforcement of grant conditions should be imposed. The presumption in favor of the application of section 1983 should be overcome only where a party clearly shows that Congress intended to exclude it from a particular remedial scheme. This requirement might be satisfied under one of two conditions: (1) where the grant-

123. Congress has recently adopted this type of exhaustion requirement in § 1983 suits brought by state prisoners. The Civil Rights for Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (Supp. V 1981) requires that prisoners, who constitute a significant proportion of all § 1983 claimants, exhaust administrative procedures if exhaustion “would be appropriate and in the interest of justice.” The Attorney General of the United States must have certified or the court itself have determined that the procedures meet certain standards specified by the statute. Id. § 1997a(b)(2). The court must retain the case on its docket during administrative review, which may take no longer than 90 days, id. § 1997e(a)(1).


125. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 50, at 87-90; Note, supra note 9, at 1172. The size of this possible increase is unclear. Even if the number of § 1983 grant claims could be determined, some would presumably be brought under different legal theories, see supra p. 1004, were § 1983 unavailable.

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in-aid statute expressly provides an exclusive remedy for its violation, or (2) where the statute provides for more restricted judicial review of the individual's claim.