Forum Non Conveniens and the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Law

Mais pour l’amour de Dieu, ne laissons pas des querelles de pêcheurs dégénérer en querelles de nations.
—le Duc de Choiseul, 1763

Expansive extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law has precipitated a political crisis with America’s major trading partners. Hostility toward United States policy has prompted these nations to enact retaliatory legislation insulating their corporations from the reach of American courts. The political and economic effects of this ongoing dispute demand attention in order to restore amicable relations and increase the free flow of trade.

This Note reassesses antitrust jurisdiction in international transactions, recognizing that the present dispute is essentially a political one that courts lack the power and competence to resolve. After tracing the dimensions of the problem, this Note discusses the present interest-based revisionist approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction of antitrust law, and finds it incapable of effectively resolving the tensions produced by expansive

1. Letter from le Duc de Choiseul to Lord Halifax regarding controversy over Newfoundland fisheries following the Seven Years’ War, 1763, quoted in Soltau, Le Chevalier d’Eon et les Relations Diplomatiques de la France et de L’Angleterre, in MÉLANGES D’HISTOIRE OFFERTS À M. CHARLES BÉMONT 655 (1913), cited in Viner, Power versus Plenty as Objective of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, in Revisions in Mercantilism 80 (D. Coleman ed. 1969).

Two comprehensive, continuously updated treatises have been written in recent years that provide helpful commentaries on the law in this area. J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (2d ed. 1981); B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE (1979).
application of United States competition laws to international transactions. The Note advocates instead an approach based on the traditional judicial doctrine of *forum non conveniens*. Such an approach is capable of accommodating political and economic interdependence, while sparing the courts the difficult analyses of law and diplomatic concerns of respective nations that interest analysis entails.

I. DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM

America's current international antitrust policy reflects America's economic dominance after World War II. This dominance enabled American courts to enforce a political preference for free trade and maximum competition. An expansive interpretation of American antitrust laws based on a theory of extraterritoriality was consistent with these developments. This theory, formulated in *United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa)*, determined that American courts had subject matter jurisdiction over acts taking place entirely abroad, if the actions were both intended to and did have a demonstrable effect on American commerce.

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3. See Hawk, supra note 2, at 206.
5. The relevant language of the Sherman Act states:

> Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. . . .

> Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony. . . .

6. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The Second Circuit was sitting on certification from the Supreme Court because the high court was unable to constitute a quorum of justices who were not, for various reasons, disqualified from hearing the case. 1 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, *Antitrust and American Business Abroad* 147 [hereinafter cited as Atwood & Brewster].
7. *Alcoa*, 148 F.2d at 444. Confusion exists over whether the intent requirement of *Alcoa* is one of purpose or of foreseeability. Compare *Atwood & Brewster*, supra note 6, at 152 (noting that Hand's concern with international complications arising from expansiveness of effects test suggests that he would favor showing of purposive conduct) with Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, *Antitrust Guide for Int'l Operations* 6 (1977), quoted in *Atwood & Brewster*, supra note 6, at 152-53 (reading *Alcoa* as requiring conduct with "substantial and 'foreseeable'" effects).
Alcoa has led American courts to take jurisdiction over cases where the effects on the United States are significantly less compelling than those on the other country. The easy entry into American courts allowed by the effects test, combined with other factors, has made American courts attractive for both foreign and domestic plaintiffs. These factors include more stringent antitrust laws, the attraction of treble damages, more comprehensive discovery rules, jury trials, contingency fees, class actions, and suits by private parties. America's expansive extraterritorial antitrust policy has generated

9. The status of the effects doctrine in international law remains unresolved. Compare B. Hawk, United States, Common Market and International Antitrust: A Comparative Guide 16 (Supp. 1983) ("[G]enerally . . . public international law today does not preclude reliance on an effects doctrine . . . for jurisdiction.") with Sornarajah, supra note 4, at 136 ("[T]he effects doctrine of jurisdiction . . . does not accord with international law rules relating to jurisdiction."). Revisionists and foreign observers argue that the effects doctrine is inconsistent with general principles of international law, which require that findings of jurisdiction be confined to a territorial basis in order "to reduce the chaos that would result if several States claimed jurisdiction over an event." Id. at 136; see also sources cited infra note 44.


11. Many of these attractions were specifically recognized by the Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 & n.18 (1981).


14. See Smith Kline & French Laboratories v. Bloch, [1983] 2 All E.R. 72, 74 (Opinion of Lord Denning, M.R.) ("As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States . . . . There is . . . in the United States a right to trial by jury. These are prone to award fabulous damages. They are notoriously sympathetic to plaintiffs.").

15. See Note, supra note 2, at 1103.

16. See id.

17. Only the U.S. provides a cause of action under its competition law to private plaintiffs. In all other developed countries only the government may undertake such proceedings. See Rosenthal, Antitrust Commission, supra note 12, at 378. When a government contemplates an antitrust prosecution it can consider more objectively than a private plaintiff the whole host of economic and political effects that such a suit would have on other nations as well as its own foreign policy. Because the individual plaintiff is concerned only with his own welfare, many suits are brought in U.S. courts that other governments have made affirmative choices not to institute. The result has been a series of ongoing diplomatic crises. See id. at 378. For a discussion of the availability of private rights of action in the U.S. for both American and foreign plaintiffs, see Huntley, The Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980: Some Jurisdictional Aspects of Enforcement of Antitrust Laws, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 213, 218-21 (1981).
international tension for two reasons. First, the intrusive relief that American courts regularly grant significantly disrupts the economic policies of United States trading partners. Foreign commentators have protested the absurdity of jurisdiction based on economic effects, arguing that in a systemic world economy effects on the exports of one state a force have reciprocal effects on the economy of the importing state.

Second, and more importantly, the American free trade policy ignores political decisions made by other nations to advance competing and sometimes inconsistent trading policies. Many American trading partners have moved toward "neo-mercantilist" regulatory policies that are contrary to American notions of free trade. Other nations encourage export cartels, dictation of market arrange-


19. In applying antitrust law to international transactions, American courts frequently "order (or enjoin) conduct either in foreign countries or which [has a] substantial effect or impact in foreign countries." Examples of court-ordered relief include:
1. divestiture of stockholdings in foreign corporations or joint ventures
2. reasonable or good faith efforts to sell abroad
3. reasonable or good faith efforts by foreign competitors to sell in the United States
4. transfer of foreign patent and trademark rights, including compulsory royalty-free licensing of foreign patents and knowhow
5. enjoining the exercise of foreign patents, knowhow and trademark rights.

B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 345-46; see generally id. at 344-64 (detailed discussion of extreme examples of relief and remedies imposed by American courts).


21. See Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 111 RECUPEL DE COURS L' HAGUE ACADEMIE DES DROIT INTERNATIONALE 1 (1964 i), reprinted in F. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 91 (1973); see also Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953) (recognizing need for mutual forbearance in international cases because of reciprocal nature of bases of jurisdiction); Katzenbach, supra note 18, at 1150 ("[A]nything that affects the external trade and commerce of the United States also affects the trade and commerce of other nations, and may have far greater consequences for others than for the United States.").

22. See ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 6, at 4 (noting significant growth of antitrust regimes abroad, which are often different than that of U.S.); Feinberg, supra note 20, at 324.

23. Dunfee & Friedman, supra note 2, at 887.

24. See ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 6, at 4; Rosenthal, Antitrust Commission, supra note 12, at 376 (noting conundrum of whether jurisdiction should be taken over acts that violate U.S. law but are in furtherance of policies of foreign governments); Shenefield, Thoughts on Extraterritorial Application of the United States Antitrust Laws, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 350, 354 (1983) (commenting that American preference for competition collides with "regulatory regimes" of other nations).

25. Rosenthal, Antitrust Commission, supra note 12, at 376. In many cases, foreign governments have made conscious policy choices to foster anticompetitive export associations in order to increase their share of world trade. See Pettit & Styles, supra note 13, at 699 (noting that United States, United Kingdom, Canada, West Germany, Japan, and Australia promote such associations).
ments, and significant cooperation among competitors. The legitimacy of these policy choices is ignored and their purposes undermined when plaintiffs use liberal jurisdictional rules and stiff American competition laws to drag foreign companies into United States courts, exacting treble damages for conduct that is not only legal but affirmatively encouraged by the corporation's parent state.

Several controversial antitrust cases recently brought in American courts have intensified this tension. In the litigation surrounding the collapse of Laker Airways, engaged American and British courts in a jurisdictional tug-of-war—each trying not only to take jurisdiction but affirmatively to deny the jurisdiction of the other tribunal. Similarly, hostility resulted in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation both because American courts sought to disrupt the affirmatively collusive policies of other governments, and because four of these governments tried to cooperate


27. See Shenefield, supra note 24, at 354 (discussing various perceptions of role of competition).

28. While the Justice Department notifies and consults with a foreign government when pending antitrust actions might affect that nation's policies, this attempt at accommodation has "frequently . . . been deemphasized in favor of the United States national interest in enforcing the antitrust laws to protect domestic consumers or exporters." Hawk, supra note 2, at 227. Thus America's challenge to Canadian price-setting for potash prompted a Canadian official to denounce the "arrogant stupidity on the part of the Government of the United States." Id. at 237-38.

Many foreign governments tend generally to discount American claims that its antitrust policies are grounded on neutral values favoring competition and free trade, viewing these laws instead as a "tool of United States commercial interests." Rosenthal, Antitrust and Overseas Investment, supra note 18, at 1195.

29. The ongoing controversy surrounding the collapse of Laker Airways has become notorious. The American court characterized the British law on competition as "offensive" and designed "only to quash the practical power of the United States courts," Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which would lead to "unfettered chaos," id. at 941. The court found itself attempting to resolve "a head-on collision between the diametrically opposed antitrust policies of the United States and the United Kingdom," id. at 916, and concluded that the constraints of United States reliance on the effects doctrine lead inevitably either to capitulation by one party or to deadlock, id. at 954.

30. The British Court of Appeals (Civil Division) in British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, [1983] 3 All E.R. 375, ruled that since the British defendants in Laker's pending antitrust suit in America were barred by the Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, reprinted in [Apr.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 959, at F-1 to F-2 (Apr. 10, 1980) [hereinafter cited as POTI Act], under order of the Secretary of State for Trade, from cooperating with American courts, an injunction would issue preventing Laker from proceeding in his American action.

31. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 1980) (twenty-nine domestic and foreign defendants haled into American court over allegations of world-wide uranium cartel); see also Dunfee & Friedman, supra note 2, at 887-89 (discussing uranium cartel controversy at greater length).
with the court by appearing as amici curiae to contest American jurisdiction, only to be dismissed\(^{32}\) with language so disparaging as to prompt the embarrassed State and Justice Departments to file a joint protest with the court.\(^{35}\)

Yankee "jurisdictional jingoism" has created wide-spread resentment\(^{34}\) and prompted America's closest allies to retaliate\(^{35}\) by adopting legislation limiting the reach of the Sherman Act in foreign jurisdictions.\(^{36}\) Controversy over the proper scope of American law led Britain\(^{37}\) to adopt a comprehensive statute\(^{38}\) attacking both the substance and the process of American antitrust law\(^{39}\) by limiting the ability of American courts to reach

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32. 617 F.2d at 1256.
34. See Atwood & Brewster, supra note 6, at 4–5, 11 (differing antitrust policies have precipitated political resentment resulting in "overt conflict"); Note, supra note 26, at 261 (assertion of jurisdiction over case involving collusive marketing of potash, despite Canadian protests, caused more damage to U.S.-Canadian relations than it benefited plaintiff by increasing competition). In response to foreign objections, America has repeatedly, though unsuccessfully, sought to negotiate agreements with other nations and to cooperate in antitrust enforcement, but that consultation has not reduced the scope of American law. See Davidow, Extraterritorial Antitrust and the Concept of Comity, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 500, 501 (1981) ("By informal estimate, there have been five diplomatic protests of U.S. antitrust cases for every instance of express diplomatic support, and three blocking statutes for every cooperation agreement.").
38. POTI Act, supra note 30. For a thorough, well-reasoned analysis of this Act and its validity under principles of international law, see Note, supra note 2.
39. The POTI Act is colloquially known as the Blocking and Clawback Statute. The blocking portion allows the British Secretary of State for Industry to excuse British nationals from compliance with foreign antitrust judgments, § 1–(3), strictly limits discovery, § 2–(1), and grants the Secretary power to force British plaintiffs to withdraw from foreign antitrust actions if the judgment received would be enforceable against British defendants, § 1–(3), -(-5).

Clawback refers to two sections of the Act. Section 5 declares foreign multiple damage judgments unenforceable for reciprocal enforcement in British courts. In the case of an American antitrust action, this would deny enforcement of both the punitive two-thirds of the damages and the compensatory one-third. The effect of the Act has been to insulate British defendants from treble damage liability. See Note, Enjoining the Application of the British Protection of Trading Interests Act in Private American Antitrust Litigation, 79 Mich. L. REV. 1574, 1577–78 (1981).

Section 7 provides that the British will reciprocate in enforcing judgments to clawback punitive damages for nations extending
defendants or documents abroad. Other nations have followed suit.

Because expansive application of United States antitrust policy in the international context ascribes little legitimacy to countervailing foreign policy choices, it has created a situation of international political tension. Judges have responded to this political conflict either by ignoring completely the international dimensions of their actions (by reliance on the effects test), or by recognizing the diplomatic implications of the controversy and attempting to resolve the controversy by application of fundamentally political criteria to achieve a politically desired result (by means of interest analysis). The former approach generates needless diplomatic tension; the latter thrusts courts into a role that they cannot perform effectively and should not play in a democracy.

II. THE FAILURE OF THE INTEREST-BASED REVISIONIST APPROACH

Some American courts have chosen to recognize rather than to ignore the disruptive political implications of expansively applied competition law. These courts have resolved international antitrust controversies by analyzing and balancing political and diplomatic criteria called "interests." Case law flowing from this "revisionist" approach at one time seemed to offer the promise of mollifying tensions by adopting a balancing of government interests for its jurisdictional analysis. But interest analy-"
sis is both inappropriate and unworkable because it involves courts in weighing sensitive political and diplomatic concerns traditionally considered nonjusticiable.

A. Timberlane and Interests

Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association[46] (Timberlane) is the seminal revisionist case. Having established jurisdiction by a showing of substantial effect, as in Alcoa, the Timberlane court based its decision to exercise jurisdiction on an analysis of comity.[47] The court viewed comity not as a jurisdictional test per se, but rather as a factor that gave the trial judge some discretion to decline jurisdiction in the interest of harmony with other nations.

To evaluate comity, the court employed a conflict-of-laws[48] analysis of relative governmental interests,[49] specifically offering eight factors to be considered in striking such a balance[50] once the extent of the conflict was
determined. A court would exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction only if the forum government’s interests in adjudicating the controversy were sufficiently compelling. This list of factors constituted a “jurisdictional rule of reason” requiring the courts to ascertain the potential degree of conflict that an American trial would precipitate.

B. The Limits of Timberlane

Interest analysis, as proposed by Timberlane and the other revisionist cases, is neither legitimate nor workable. Interest analysis is inappropriately applied to extraterritorial antitrust cases because the “interests” it purports to examine properly fall within the domain of the political branches. Timberlane directs courts to weigh relative conflicts between the law and policy of the respective states, the likelihood of compliance by foreign states with American court decisions, and the relative effects on the various nations. These “interests” are not legal principles of the sort courts normally apply; they plainly require a court to take account of sensitive diplomatic matters and require qualitative assessments of the political choices and economic policies of foreign governments.

The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad. A court evaluating these factors should identify the potential degree of conflict if American authority is asserted.

51. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613. Kingman Brewster coined the phrase. K. Brewster, supra note 18, at 446.

52. Rosenthal, Antitrust and Overseas Investment, supra note 18, at 1193–94.

53. See cases cited supra notes 44–45.

54. Despite the initial praise for Timberlane’s break with the Alcoa effects test, and speculation that it indicated a shift away from the expansive jurisdiction of the effects test toward a more limited interest approach, see B. Hawk, supra note 2, at 44, many courts and commentators have found the balancing of interests approach useless. See, e.g., Sabena, 731 F.2d at 951 (rejecting interest approach because no correlation between economic realities of transactions at issue and interest-balancing formula); cf. Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 392, 392 (1980) (“Interest analysis merely substitutes one set of metaphysical premises for another.”); Gerber, supra note 2, at 781 (interest analysis lacks “a conceptual structure”); Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International Law, 76 Am. J. Int’l L. 280, 317 (1982) (interest analysis “will usually reflect an understandable bias in favor of the forum’s policy”); Reese, Book Review, 16 U. Toronto L.J. 228, 229 (1965) (reviewing B. Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (1963)) (criticizing Currie’s governmental interest theory as simplistic) [hereinafter cited as Reese, Book Review].

55. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614.

56. Sabena, 731 F.2d at 949 (balancing “generally incorporate[s] purely political factors which the court is neither qualified to evaluate comparatively nor capable of properly balancing.”); K. Brewster, supra note 18, at 446; Dunfee & Friedman, supra note 2, at 906.


58. These are not simple cases where one state’s interests are obviously paramount. Instead, they
The traditional response of American courts when presented with such matters has been to declare them nonjusticiable and to leave their resolution to the political branches.9 This reflects the view both that a determination of competing interests of two sovereign states is "a political function of a very high order"80 which is properly committed to the elected branches,61 and that courts are functionally ill-equipped to undertake this sort of analysis.

1. The "Political Function" of Interests

Courts avoid rendering determinations beyond their constitutional competence by using the political question doctrine. Relevant indicia of a nonjusticiable question include the court's inability to secure information necessary for reasoned decision,62 the implication of the responsibilities of the political departments,63 the dearth of well-defined criteria for judicial decisionmaking,64 and the appearance that the courts are no longer able to act as neutral arbiters of law.65 Timberlane's method of decision implicates each of these aspects of nonjusticiability.

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require a complex analysis of the stated policies and underlying, often unstated, policy objectives of entirely different national systems. J. CASTEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS 45 (2d ed. 1968). Even identically worded statutes adopted by two different governments should not be presumed to represent identical interests, for "different policies or policies of different intensity may underlie" such statutes. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315, 316 (1972) (discussing general problem of resolving transborder choice of law questions) [hereinafter cited as Reese, Choice of Law]. The result is not a generally applicable choice of law rule, but rather a prescription for case-by-case adjudication.

59. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 71-72 (1978). Professors Dunfee and Friedman have likewise argued that the only feasible way to resolve the problem of extraterritorial application is through "legislation [rather] than through adjudication." Dunfee & Friedman, supra note 2, at 917. They trace a number of possible legislative responses. Id. at 916-22.

60. Cf. Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, 176 (assessing value of competing legislative interest "is a function which should not be committed to courts in a democracy. It is a function which the courts cannot perform effectively, for they lack the necessary resources.").


62. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1939) (noting large volume of information needed on "political, social and economic" conditions in order to resolve certain legal questions suggests such matters are more "appropriate for the consideration of the political departments of Government."); (Court will not review propriety of contested state legislative procedures used in vote on proposed amendment to U.S. Constitution).

63. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (while not completely beyond scope of judicial cognizance, courts are usually reluctant to review questions implicating foreign policy determinations because "resolution of such issues frequently turn[s] on standards that involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature.").

64. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 226 (political questions characterized by "lack of judicially manageable standards" for resolving them); Coleman, 307 U.S. at 453-54; see also Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1304 (1961) ("question is one for the decision of which there are no well-developed principles").

65. See Scharpf, supra note 61, at 576 ("As an unfalling support for the rightness of American claims . . . would jeopardize the integrity of the judicial process, the political question doctrine is a
First, proper resolution of international antitrust cases requires access to a great deal of reliable information on the internal policy determinations of foreign governments. Hostility to American law has made procuring such data directly from governments extremely unlikely. Further, the limits that other governments have imposed on discovery inhibit necessary fact-finding.

Second, the President, with the approval of Congress, has responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations. Ultimately, these policies must be "defined, presented and defended by the political departments of the government." The courts have only a limited role in unsettled areas of foreign affairs.

Third, as Chief Justice Hughes recognized more than forty-five years ago, "the Court to delimit its responsibility in international conflicts."
ago, one hallmark of a political question is the need for “appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic” where there are simply no useful criteria for judicial determination.73 Such matters are non-justiciable and belong to the political departments.74 Cases implicating foreign affairs constitute paradigmatic political questions because resolution of such cases requires policy determinations where there are no well-developed guiding principles.75 The lack of useful principles for interest analysis is exemplified by the failure of courts and commentators to agree even on a definition of an “interest” and its constituent elements.76

Finally, no matter how carefully done, it is unseemly for courts to enter the political thicket of foreign relations.77 Unquestioning support for the executive branch calls into question the courts’ institutional integrity.78 If judges act independently, however, they may preempt the formulation of policies by the Executive or the Congress for which the latter two branches are together accountable.79 Conversely, any efforts by the political branches to ignore or defy court decisions will diminish the respect and authority upon which the courts’ legitimacy depends.80

74. Chicago & S. Air Lines Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (courts will not apply usual principles of judicial review to presidential decisions as to international air routes because cases impinging on foreign policy “are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility.”).
75. See Jaffe, supra note 64, at 1304.
76. See, e.g., Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614 (eight factors define interests); Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297-98 (ten factors); K. BREWSTER, supra note 18, at 446 (six factors); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (five factors).
77. Professors Dunfee and Friedman, supra note 2, recognize the undesirable nature of court involvement in these political questions and argue for a legislative solution. But, surprisingly, they offer an “interim” proposal to focus attention on the problem through congressional passage of a statute forcing courts to run straight into the political thicket. The proposed statute would mandate that jurisdiction be found as broadly as possible so as to precipitate a diplomatic crisis that would in turn force Congress to address the main issue. Id. at 932.

This proposal is misguided for two reasons. First, it is illogical, both for the reasons developed in this Note at text accompanying notes 53-80, and for those that Dunfee and Friedman themselves develop, supra note 2, at 916-22, to thrust the courts into a diplomatic role that they are not competent to perform. As these authors themselves argue, courts are simply not capable of reading and responding to the vicissitudes of foreign policy. Id. at 906 (“Courts will have no reference points when analyzing the political questions. Precedent is of little value because foreign relations and policies constantly shift and change.”).

Second, the proposal requires congressional adoption of an amendment to strip American courts of their ability to decline cases on comity grounds. Id. at 924-25. How this provides a solution to the present problem is a mystery. The goal should not be to make American laws even more annoying so as to chide foreign governments into recognizing the need for revision of the Sherman Act; rather it must be to get the United States Congress concerned enough to reconsider the problem. Once congressional inertia is overcome, it is more plausible to expect that Congress will act to craft a solution, rather than merely to create a mechanism that will force it to act a few years later.

78. See Scharpf, supra note 61, at 576.
79. See id.
80. See Jaffe, supra note 64, at 1307.
2. The Unworkability of "Complex Exercises in Comparative Law"

Beyond the fact that the court role entailed in interest analysis is prudentially inappropriate, the approach itself is unworkable. First, as noted above, procuring the necessary information is difficult given foreign hostility to American law. Second, even if all of this information could be aggregated, a court faces the daunting task of assigning relative weights to standardless factors of unequal importance and arriving at a reasoned judgment as to whether United States jurisdiction should be exercised. The Timberlane factors serve only to identify the existence or absence of a conflict; they do nothing to guide courts in choosing the appropriate disposition of a conflict. The Supreme Court has said that courts must not attempt "complex exercises in comparative law" and courts cannot do so effectively.

Third, even if courts were able to undertake such a balancing, the overwhelming tendency when presented with a request to balance interests is for courts to resolve the conflict, not by seeking to determine if the foreign forum is actually interested in the case, "but rather by asking whether—in light of forum policy—that declared interest seems reasonable." The result, predictably, is the application of the lex fori. Of the

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81. As one commentator dryly noted, determining jurisdiction by interest analysis is "more akin to tottering than to balancing." Olmstead, Concluding Remarks, in EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAWS AND RESPONSES THERETO, supra note 69, at 235. The complexities of full-scale interest analysis under the Timberlane criteria are set out in Kadish, supra note 66, at 156-62.

82. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.

83. See Sabena, 731 F.2d at 916 ("The intersection of these issues confronts us with the Herculean task of accommodating conflicting, mutually inconsistent national regulatory policies while minimizing the amount of interference with the judicial processes of other nations that our courts will permit."); cf. Currie, supra note 60, at 176 (when several states have different policies, court is in no position to weigh competing interests); Gerber, supra note 2, at 781 (noting that interest analysis gives courts standardless factors that cannot be used predictably); Reese, Choice of Law, supra note 58, at 317 (interest analysis ultimately requires courts to use standardless factors to render ad hoc decisions).

84. Sabena, 731 F.2d at 948-49 (interest factors are neutral and provide no guidance in resolving the conflict of law question).

85. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 251 (1981) (Court declines to resolve choice of law question; instead dismisses tort claim arising from airplane crash in Scotland on forum non conveniens grounds.).

86. See Sabena, 731 F.2d at 949-50 (rejecting use of interest factors noted in Timberlane as unworkable "[g]iven the inherent limitations of the Judiciary"); Baxter, Antitrust in an Interdependent World 6-7 (Sept. 29, 1981) (speech before American Bar Association Section on International Law) reprinted in 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 36 (2d ed. Supp. 1984) (courts should not take on executive branch responsibilities by making this type of judgment as most are unequipped to do so); Shenefield, supra note 24, at 353-54 ("[T]he flaws in this three-step [Timberlane] approach begin to emerge almost as soon as the threshold inquiry into personal jurisdiction is begun.").

87. Westen, supra note 66, at 85.

88. Cf. Akehurst, supra note 47, at 185-86 (discussing the "homeward trend" to apply domestic law, if possible, in choice of law determinations); Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori—Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 637, 643 (1960) (resolution of political factors leads to application of lex fori); Maier, supra note 54, at 317 (attempting to balance interests yields "homing ten-
recent decisions of American courts using the interest analysis suggested by Timberlane, there are "none where United States jurisdiction was declined when there was more than a de minimis United States interest."80

Fourth, were courts able to overcome this lex fori tendency, the fact that there is no way to standardize the relative importance of interest factors would undermine the predictable application of United States law.81

Only if the factors that prompt an American court to decline extraterritorial jurisdiction are relatively unambiguous and easily applied can economic actors predictably structure transactions. The largely standardless balancing required by Timberlane cannot yield such results.91

Finally, Timberlane fails to achieve its underlying objective of alleviating the political tensions surrounding extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act because its proposed solution is merely comity. Comity means only that a balancing of foreign government interests is appropriate; it in no way dictates the proper outcome of that balancing.92 An approach that focuses only on process cannot reduce hostility that ultimately derives from outcome. Only the dismissal of suits to more convenient foreign tribunals can reduce the present political tensions.

III. FORUM NON CONVENIENS

Interest analysis represents one possible, albeit misplaced, judicial response to the tensions arising from the expansive Alcoa jurisdictional test. A better response to the challenge of selecting cases appropriate for United States jurisdiction, that would also obviate the need for "complex exercises in comparative law,"93 would be to return to the juridical princi-
Forum Non Conveniens

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A. The Proposed Approach

A grant of a motion of forum non conveniens results in the dismissal of an action brought in one court, allowing the plaintiff to take the case to another forum where greater availability of witnesses and evidence suggests that the case can be heard more effectively, efficiently, and conveniently. The defendant's objection in such a motion is typically not a chal-

94. At least one other author has argued that the proper reach of American antitrust law can be settled by means of a forum non conveniens analysis. See FORDHAM Note, supra note 66. Significant differences exist between that approach and the approach taken in this Note, however, despite use of similar nomenclature.

That author argues that the weakness of the Timberlane interest analysis lies in its failure properly to regard the need for an "adequate alternative forum," and in Timberlane's solicitude for "national concerns [which] ignores the litigants' interests." Id. at 418. The author of the Note would merely expand the list of interest factors, which Timberlane previously identified for determining the appropriateness of the forum, by considering two additional factors.

This Note advocates a significantly different approach. Rather than rely on an interest-based conflict of laws analysis, this Note argues for a contacts analysis based on the forum non conveniens factors identified by the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). The distinction is not merely academic. As discussed supra at text accompanying notes 53-92, the processes of balancing interests and conducting "complex exercises in comparative law" are both difficult and disfavored by the Supreme Court. The author of the FORDHAM Note aims to remedy this by factoring in additional considerations. Having to consider more interests can only make the balancing even more unwieldy.

The analysis becomes more problematic when the FORDHAM Note argues, supra note 66, at 419, that courts should balance interests against effects—an ill-advised amalgamation of the standards of Timberlane and Alcoa. Finally, that Note's concern for adequacy of alternative fora, id. at 418, misapprehends the clear holdings of Reyno and Gilbert which make this a virtually insignificant concern. See infra note 126.

95. For definitions of forum non conveniens, see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) ("The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute."); Dalnow, The Inappropriate Forum, 29 ILL. L. REV. 867, 869 (1935) (court may refuse jurisdiction over case brought in forum not "appropriate" for such suit); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 589 (5th ed. 1979) ("Term refers to discretionary power of court to decline jurisdiction when convenience of parties and ends of justice would be better served if action were brought in another forum.").

96. The general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982), states, "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought."). That statute does not preclude a forum non conveniens approach. Although § 1404(a) substituted a transfer requirement for a provision allowing dismissal of a suit, Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964), this transfer of law requirement applies only under the venue statute—not under common law. See Reyno, 454 U.S. at 253-54 (permitting dismissal under forum non conveniens). Forum non conveniens, rather than § 1404(a), applies in cases where the action should have been brought in a foreign tribunal rather than an American court. See Miskow v. Boeing Co., 664 F.2d 205, 207 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982); Prack v. Weissinger, 276 F.2d 446, 450 (4th Cir. 1960); Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 645 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956).
lenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court per se, but rather an assertion of the impropriety of that particular court’s exercising its jurisdiction over the case because litigation in such an inconvenient forum amounts to an illegitimate exercise of state power. Courts consider the motion before reaching any of the underlying legal issues of the case.

American courts have relied upon *forum non conveniens*, even if not always by name, as part of their inherent power to control their own docket and expedite court business, as well as to define the “territorial limits on national legislation.” The criteria relevant to *forum non conveniens* dismissals are not rigid, thus allowing courts flexibility to respond to various fact situations. Nevertheless, the *forum non conveniens* criteria are more manageable and suited to judicial capabilities than are the *Timberlane* factors. Rather than balancing conflicting economic and political interests by parsing foreign statutes and legislative histories, as *Timberlane* requires, *forum non conveniens* involves comparing “the burdens of suit in this forum to those of suit in the home forum” in order to determine whether trial in the American forum would “establish... oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant... out of all proportion to plaintiff’s convenience.”

The Supreme Court clearly set forth the factors for striking such a balance in *Gulf Oil v. Gilbert*:

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98. See F. MANN, *supra* note 21, at 40 (quoting DAHM, VÖLKERRECHT (1958–61)).


100. As one author noted, American courts had long relied on the doctrine “with such little consciousness of what they were doing as to remind one of Molière’s M. Jourdain, who found he had been speaking prose all his life without knowing it.” Blair, *supra* note 97, at 21–22 (referring to Molière, *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme*, act II, sc. vi).

101. See Blair, *supra* note 97, at 1. At least one author has argued that courts do not have and should not exercise discretion in determining their jurisdiction. See Fordham Note, *supra* note 66, at 417. This approach is clearly incorrect for the reasons identified infra at notes 127–37 and accompanying text. Further, such an argument cuts against that author’s own proposal in that any attempt to scale back application of American law runs contrary to the traditionalist claim that Congress intended to create jurisdiction running to the limits of the law.


103. See Reyno, 454 U.S. at 249–50.


Forum Non Conveniens

Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; . . . and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained.107

B. Advantages of the Forum Non Conveniens Approach

The Gilbert factors are especially useful in determining convenience in international antitrust cases. Such actions are among the most complex to litigate because they rely so heavily on massive amounts of documentary108 and testimonial109 evidence. Subpoena and discovery of corporate records is necessary to prove or refute the existence of agreements to engage in concerted action, boycotts, predatory pricing, and the like.110 Various corporate officers must be available for testimony or deposition.111 Both parties must be able to marshall large numbers of documents112 and subject them to computer-assisted analysis113 by economists retained as expert witnesses in order to determine relevant markets, degrees of concentration, anticompetitive effects, levels of competition and competitive injury, price elasticity, and price leadership.114 Indeed, expert testimony can be excluded in American courts unless the expert has thorough knowledge of industry conditions in order to attest to the accuracy of the data.115 Absent access to the relevant data through discovery and absent opportunity for the experts of each party to analyze this data,116 a meaningful court decision is impossible.117 Access to testimony and evidence is precisely what makes a trial most “easy, expeditious and inexpensive” in antitrust cases. When meaningful access is not possible, courts should decline jurisdiction and send the parties to courts better positioned to obtain the information necessary for a decision.

Determining which forum is most convenient, based on Gilbert criteria,
is more in keeping with the court's proper role in approaching jurisdictional questions with international implications. This is because *forum non conveniens* utilizes purely juridical rather than political factors. Gilbert affirmatively directs courts to refuse to decide cases where adequate access to documents or testimony of witnesses or defendants is unavailable. It removes from the court the responsibility for balancing policy interests of various nations, a salient feature of nonjusticiable questions. It provides the "well-developed principles" necessary to resolve cases in a principled fashion. Finally, because the Gilbert factors direct courts to consider the enforceability of any judgment rendered, *forum non conveniens* allows explicit consideration of the effects that a decision might have on court integrity. Because the *forum non conveniens* approach is consistent with the court's proper role in cases having diplomatic consequences, it is preferable to interest analysis.

Where the factors of convenience counsel that a case is better heard elsewhere, courts should decline jurisdiction. *Forum non conveniens* is a method of analysis that courts can and have applied to dismiss sensitive cases. Because application of *forum non conveniens* will lead to dismis-

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118. See Jaffe, supra note 64, at 1304.


120. As noted supra note 50, *Timberlane* does provide for consideration of the enforceability of American court judgments as part of its interest analysis. But there is little reason to assume that the enforceability question would prompt a court to decline jurisdiction, given the political emphasis of the interest factors, and the fact that no court to date has assigned significant weight to enforceability. On the other hand the *forum non conveniens* analysis, taken as a whole, places the presumption more strongly against going forward in American court; to that extent such a determination would more likely tip the presumption against American court jurisdiction.

121. The *forum non conveniens* approach would also result in predictability because when a forum is inconvenient, courts would refuse jurisdiction. Foreign governments can structure their economies without fear that erratically applied American law will upset their long-range policies. See Barrett, supra note 104, at 402-03.

122. In addition to those cases cited supra note 119, see Reyno, 454 U.S. at 257-61 (affirming dismissal of tort claim to Scotland); Mizokami Bros. of Arizona v. Baychem Corp., 556 F.2d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 1977) (dismissal on *forum non conveniens* grounds of suit by American plaintiff against Mexican and German defendants over chemical contamination of goods purchased by plaintiff), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); Paper Operations Consultants Int'l v. Steamship Hong Kong Amber, 513 F.2d 667, 672 (9th Cir. 1975) (suit dismissed because necessary documents, unobtainable in United States court, could be had in foreign forum); Fitzgerald v. Westland Marine, 369 F.2d 499, 501 (2d Cir. 1966) (cost of transporting witnesses from alternate forum caused court to dismiss suit); Abouchalache v. Hilton Int'l, 464 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd mem. sub nom. Collins v. Hilton Int'l, 628 F.2d 1344 (2d Cir. 1980) (suit dismissed under *forum non conveniens* because premises in question in England); Mitchell v. General Motors, 439 F. Supp. 27, 28 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (suit dismissed on *forum non conveniens* grounds because of necessity of applying Ontario law); Texaco Trinidad v. Astro Exit Navegacion S.A., Panama, 437 F. Supp. 331, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting *forum non conveniens* motion dismissing maritime action to Trinidad); Dorozs v. Lemos & Pateras, Ltd., 437 F. Supp. 120, 123 (S.D. Ala. 1977) (suit dismissed due to cost of bringing witnesses from alternate forum); Papageorgiou v. Lloyds of London, 436 F. Supp. 701, 703 (E.D.
sal of those cases not properly tried in American courts, it deals with the fundamental foreign objection—the opposition to American jurisdiction over cases involving fundamental decisions by foreign governments about how to structure their economies. *Forum non conveniens*, by refusing certain parties their desired forum, leaves them to pursue their claims in foreign tribunals or with the political departments where such claims more properly belong. The nation whose courts are best able to render a just verdict, as determined by convenience factors, would bear the obligation of trying the case in accordance with its own laws, and will prescribe the remedy available to the plaintiff.

The most recent decision of the Supreme Court on the subject, *Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction*, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 77, 92. Courts may allocate this burden because an American citizen does not have an unqualified right to sue in American court on his own behalf, *Mizokami Bros.*, 556 F.2d at 977; *Vanity Fair Mills*, 234 F.2d at 645. Further, *Reyno* makes clear that the individual plaintiff has no right to an equally advantageous alternate forum, see infra note 126.

An awareness of the need to adjust our traditional legal doctrines to "the expanding horizons of American[s]. . . who seek business in all parts of the world" is evident in the Supreme Court's ruling in *The Breman v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.*, 407 U.S. 1, 11 (1972). The Court there upheld a forum selection clause in a contract between an American oil drilling operation and a West German towing corporation. The Court recognized that we live "in an era of expanding world trade and commerce," and that a rigid doctrine of expansive jurisdiction for American courts "would be a heavy hand indeed on *larger policies*."

The Court only generally discussed how inadequate the remedy available elsewhere must be before courts should evince concern. "Of course, if the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law may be given substantial weight; the district court may conclude that dismissal would not be in the interests of justice." *Id.* at 254. The Court offered no explanation or criteria as to what constituted a remedy "so
throughout the United States antitrust law should extend to the very cases that courts would refuse to hear on forum non conveniens grounds, courts need not hesitate to apply the forum non conveniens approach to international antitrust cases. First, Congress has not spoken unequivocally to the issue of ex-

C. Propriety of the Forum Non Conveniens Approach

Although one might argue that Congress has determined that United States antitrust law should extend to the very cases that courts would refuse to hear on forum non conveniens grounds, courts need not hesitate to apply the forum non conveniens approach to international antitrust cases. First, Congress has not spoken unequivocally to the issue of ex-

Clearly inadequate" as to be "no remedy at all." The Court eschewed reliance on any one factor, fearing that such recognition would destroy the flexibility that is the hallmark of the forum non conveniens doctrine. Id. at 249-50. Given this extremely low requirement, the question of remedy ordinarily will be irrelevant to a court's consideration of a forum non conveniens motion. An alternative forum must be provided, but it apparently need not be a sympathetic one.

Thus, Sabena is in error when it suggests that forum non conveniens is inapplicable on the grounds that the doctrine requires a "second forum that can fully resolve the plaintiff's claims." 731 F.2d at 936 (emphasis supplied). Such an assertion is contrary to Reyno. 454 U.S. at 254.

For example, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in an appeal of the on-going Laker suit, recognized that the Anglo-American antitrust dispute was a festering one reflecting a conflict "between deeply felt and long held economic and political policies," Sabena, 731 F.2d at 941 n.121, but conceded that the court was powerless to act in the face of "strongly mandated legislative policies" embodied in the Sherman Act, 731 F.2d at 916. But see Kintner & Griffin, supra note 10, at 202 ("It was left to the courts, however, to decide the circumstances under which the Sherman Act would apply to what effectively were foreign transactions.").

Some question the legitimacy of attempts by courts to dismiss actions where there exists a plausible claim of a congressional requirement that the case be heard. Professor Maier, for example, has argued that:

[s]ince courts in these cases are always operating under legislative language that on its face suggests that the statute is applicable to the foreign events or persons involved, there is some anomaly in a court's finding that a regulation may be applied without violating international jurisdictional standards but that the congressional command will not be followed if the court determines that as a matter of policy the regulation is inappropriately applied.

Maier, supra note 54, at 299 (emphasis in original); see also Kadish, supra note 66, at 149 ("dissatisfaction with the effects test . . . does not provide a principled basis of authority for restricting the statutory language of the Sherman Act . . . . [M]ere judicial dissatisfaction with a legislative enactment does not give the judiciary the authority to rewrite the law."); Rahl, supra note 66, at 363 (same).

128. Although the Fifth Circuit has held that forum non conveniens is not available in any antitrust action, Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui, 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982), its reasoning is erroneous. In Mitsui, the court denied a motion to dismiss an action to be tried in Indonesia by relying on an older Supreme Court opinion, United States v. National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573 (1948) [hereinafter cited as National City Lines I], handed down before Congress enacted the venue statute 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

But Mitsui misread a subsequent Supreme Court decision following the enactment of § 1404(a), United States v. National City Lines, 357 U.S. 78 (1949) [hereinafter cited as National City Lines II], which effectively rejected the reasoning of National City Lines I, and removed the proscription against reliance on forum non conveniens in an antitrust context. In National City Lines II, the court concluded that by enacting § 1404(a) Congress intended to apply the transfer statute only to "any civil action," 337 U.S. at 80-81, and hence that National City Lines I was not a bar to transferring an antitrust action from Los Angeles to Chicago on forum non conveniens grounds.

Mitsui attempted to distinguish National City Lines II by arguing that since the Court did not explicitly extend its ruling to the common law doctrine, that portion of National City Lines I precluding application of forum non conveniens still stands. 671 F.2d at 890-91 & n.18. It cannot reasonably be argued, however, that Congress or the Court sought to preserve the goals outlined in National City Lines I—avoiding denial of the plaintiff's choice of forum, protracting litigation, and scattering defendants while concomitantly allowing change of venue. The same problems are as relevant in a transfer as in a dismiss.

Moreover, to impose a per se rule against applying forum non conveniens to an antitrust case would result in burdensome restrictions on the courts, in direct contradiction of the Supreme Court's
traterritorial Sherman Act jurisdiction, leaving the courts to decide the reach of the Sherman Act. Hence, courts are free to scale back Judge Learned Hand’s effects test. Alcoa, which has been viewed as a touchstone, crumbles to dictum.

Second, it is simply inherent in the doctrine of forum non conveniens that courts will exhaust adjudicative jurisdiction and dismiss a case even where legislative jurisdiction would go further. Were this not so, the convenient forum doctrine would be meaningless, for how could a court both exercise the full measure of legislative jurisdiction, and at the same time decline to hear a case because it could better be heard elsewhere?

recent recognition of the “need to retain flexibility” in applying forum non conveniens, and of its refusal to “lay down a rigid rule to govern discretion.” Reyano, 454 U.S. at 249. Given the confusion over the precise holdings of National City Lines I and II, and the longstanding tradition of extending forum non conveniens to all civil actions, unless and until Congress explicitly acts to restrict the free exercise of a forum non conveniens motion, courts should not unilaterally do so.

129. See K. BREWSTER, supra note 18, at 72-73 (unclear what Congress meant; Alcoa merely once interpreted by Hawk, supra note 2, at 202 (“In 1890 Congress paid little or no attention to the Sherman Act’s application in international trade. . . . The legislative history provides no effective guidance as to either the application of the Sherman Act in international trade or the policies and national interests that should inform that application.”)); Ongman, “Be No Longer a Chaos”: Constructing a Normative Theory of the Sherman Act’s Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Scope, 71 NW. U.L. REV. 733, 738 n.20 (1977) (legislative history of Sherman Act spare to begin with, but “simply useless in dealing with specific fact situations in American foreign trade.”).


132. Adjudicative jurisdiction comprehends “the willingness of a . . . society to furnish the law—applying agency—usually, but not necessarily, a court—for the adjudication of a matter involving significant elements that are not domestic to that society.” A. von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63 B.U.L. REV. 279, 283 (1983); cf. FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-à-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1315-18 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (uses terms “jurisdiction to prescribe” and “jurisdiction to enforce”).

133. Legislative jurisdiction “is the power of a state to apply its law to create or affect legal interests,” Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1587 (1978), and it marks the “outer limits for choice of law,” Stevenson, The Relationship of Private International Law to Public International Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 563 n.13 (1952).


In Sabbatino the Court upheld abstention based on the act of state doctrine. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (“[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government.”).
Indeed, one can only make sense of the *Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno* decision by accepting the validity of incongruent legislative and adjudicative jurisdiction.

Third, as developed above, separation of powers considerations provide courts with power to decline jurisdiction in international antitrust cases on *forum non conveniens* grounds. These international cases turn largely on political and diplomatic considerations that courts are simply not competent to resolve. Applying interest analysis calls into question the competence and legitimacy of the Third Branch as an institution. Courts can and must decline to become entangled in such litigation.

**CONCLUSION**

This Note proposes that courts substitute juridical factors of *forum non conveniens* for political decisionmaking in resolving extraterritorial antitrust suits. This approach represents the only means by which courts can effectively and legitimately render verdicts, and it removes judges from the political thicket that, under both the expansive effects test of *Alcoa* and *Timberlane*’s interest analysis, is unavoidable.

Moreover, the approach set forth in this Note may provide an effective means of mitigating the international controversy that usually attends the application of the Sherman Act to international business transactions. Plaintiffs would find American courts less available as vehicles to disrupt or thwart the political and economic choices of other sovereign governments. Convenience analysis would allow courts to dismiss nettlesome cases, with only tangential American contacts, to foreign tribunals better positioned to secure the evidence and witnesses necessary to a meaningful adjudication of the controversy. By minimizing diplomatic conflict while enhancing the possibility of a proper determination of the claim, convenience analysis will help prevent the quarrels of commerce from degenerating into the quarrels of nations.

—John Byron Sandage

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