Book Reviews

How Did It All Begin?

Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition.

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Professor Berman’s book tells a story within a story. His central theme is the emergence of Western legal culture, but he places his narrative within the framework of a visionary scheme about the destiny of Western civilization. This larger story is merely adumbrated in the book and not ripe for serious critical examination. But because Berman’s larger story intersects with his fully developed narrower one, the all-encompassing scheme of the larger narrative must quickly be summarized before we turn to the proper subject matter of this review—Professor Berman’s interpretation of the origins of Western legal culture.

Berman’s thesis is that distinctively Western legal institutions came to life about nine centuries ago in a violent upheaval, or revolution, in which the Church of Rome established its independence from domination by em-

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1. Berman has since fleshed out his skeletal story. See Berman, Law and Belief in Three Revolutions, 18 VAL. U.L. REV. 569 (1984). But at the root of his theory one can still recognize the scheme of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, as presented in his book OUt OF REVOLUTION: AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WESTERN MAN (1969). Like Spengler before him, Rosenstock-Huessy, whose range of reading is immense, creates strange kaleidoscopic patterns by throwing facts together as in free association; like Spengler too, Rosenstock-Huessy assembles loosely integrated yet occasionally brilliant insights into fascinating collages. But unlike Spengler, Rosenstock-Huessy sees the history of the West as arising from the “papal revolution,” see infra note 3, growing linearly, and punctuated by a series of six revolutions. The history is one of progressive secularization in the course of which more and more of the divine is put into men. Complete secularization signals the approach of the last phase of history. “When we put all the divine power into man . . . man’s truly human side evaporates.” Id. at 723–24. Berman openly acknowledges Rosenstock-Huessy’s influence. See H. Berman, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 20, 27, 574 n.1 (1983) [hereinafter cited by page number only].

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Berman claims, Western law has undergone a series of dramatic changes, each linked to a revolution that was a creative moment in history. (He lists the Lutheran, Puritan, American, French, and Russian revolutions.) But throughout momentous revolutionary transformations, Berman detects an ongoing evolution, an “organic growth.” This growth reflects assumptions about the mission of history in general and of law in particular that were implanted in the law by religious beliefs dominating the West nine centuries ago. After an initial *Sturm und Drang* of revolutionary exuberance, legal institutions never rejected the past *in toto*; instead, reinterpretation of inherited institutions enabled the “tradition” to live on. For example, throughout all major revolutions, law continued to be viewed both as an “engagement” entrusted to a specialized corps of professionals, and as a discipline differentiated from ethics, politics, and religion. Legal scholars also continued to conceptualize the law, give it integrity as a coherent whole (a *corpus*), and create interpretative networks. Ideologically, jurists continued to imagine law, at least in some of its parts, as binding even the highest political authority. Common modes of categorization also survived, as well as many important postulates.

Events since the outbreak of the First World War, Berman insists, have disrupted this “organic growth.” The Western legal tradition displays symptoms of a terminal illness, associated with the collapse of the belief systems and assumptions that sustained and nourished Western legal sensibility. The idea that law transcends and binds political power is no longer taken seriously; the belief in the relative autonomy of legal from other social institutions is seriously weakened. Scholarly efforts to order the law are everywhere in retreat; scholars no longer imagine the normative universe of law as a coherent whole capable of continuous growth, but rather as an assembly of discontinued fragments, growing irregularly, like dandelions. The very idea of a Western legal tradition that transcends national systems has lost its meaning. Berman’s large story ends with a deep conviction about the impending doom of Western legal culture. In fact, some passages seem to suggest that we may already be living in the post-Western era: A new emerging culture, common to mankind, may be rendering intercivilizational clashes obsolete. Precisely because he sees an era ending, Berman thinks he can clearly discern its beginnings: The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only at dusk.

I.

Berman dates the inauguration of Western legal culture to the late eleventh, twelfth, and part of the thirteenth centuries, following the increasing recognition that the waning Middle Ages saw explosive innovations and
breakthroughs in various spheres of social life. Indeed, many now view the late Middle Ages as a seedbed of modernity, an epoch more crucial to the West than the Renaissance. Some “mutational” changes in governmental and legal structures in the late eleventh century illustrate the importance of the era for the rise of the Western legal tradition. While there were hardly any governmental writing offices in the West prior to the late eleventh century, centralized bureaucratic institutions (chanceries) suddenly began to sprout and act as nerve centers of government. Professional lawyers and judges appeared and were entrusted with “judicial matters.” Where law had hardly been differentiated from the conscience and the customs of the community, newly founded universities developed a specifically legal technique of analyzing legal problems. Ordeals and similar “mythical” modes of proof began a retreat before new evidentiary techniques that relied on perception and rational inference.

Berman recognizes, of course, that he cannot properly explain, or even describe, these events in isolation from the broad currents of change that engulfed European society. He notes the rapid economic development after invasions into the West ceased, population growth, cultural revival, and the like. But he chooses to focus on the political and intellectual spheres, and more particularly on the Roman Catholic Church’s political and legal institutions. For him, the influence of the Church holds the key to the emergence of distinctively Western legal institutions. This focus is

2. Already Henry Sumner Maine stressed the cardinal importance of the passage in the 12th century from the family to the individual as the unit governed by civil laws in progressive societies. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 163–64 (10th ed. 1963) (1st ed. London 1861). Italian and French historians call the second half of the Middle Ages not the Renaissance, but the age of “the legal renaissance.” See, e.g., David, Sources of Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 99 (R. David ed. 1984). But especially in the past few decades the belief seems to be spreading that our present circumstances should be viewed against the background of wider horizons which include reference to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The late Benjamin Nelson, better known in West Germany than in the United States, has persuasively argued that even the roots of the Western advances in science should be sought in this period. See B. NELSON, ON THE ROADS TO MODERNITY 192–93 (1981). For a different view, locating the roots of modernity at a later period, see, for example, J. FRANKLIN, JEAN BODIN AND THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY REVOLUTION IN THE METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND HISTORY (1963); R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY (1976).

3. See p. 87. His thesis is somewhat obscured by shifts in the meaning of his key concept—the “papal revolution.” Most of the time the term refers to changes within the Church and in the Church’s relation to secular authority which occurred from the late 11th century to sometime in the 13th century. When Berman uses “papal revolution” in this sense, there is room for questions about the relation of the revolution to changes in other sectors of social life. For example, was the revolution a response to socioeconomic change, a stimulus for these changes, or both? But Berman also uses the term to encompass the “totality” of social change in the period. Pp. 100–03. When he does that, his synecdoche prevents clear and meaningful questions concerning causation.

Notwithstanding occasional obscure passages, Berman leaves no doubt about his refusal to assign causal priorities: To him multiple factors interact in complex ways. Law itself can sometimes be an agent transforming the social environment rather than a mere product of the socioeconomic matrix. It is also clear that he sees no evidence of the influence on the formation of Western law of intercivilizational encounters in the 12th and 13th centuries. See, e.g., p. 588 n.85. Especially if the
rare, but not unprecedented: Some social theorists have found the religious factor crucial in the rise of the West, and several historians have traced the great contribution of medieval canonists to specific areas of the law. But Berman weaves these scholars' insights into novel patterns, adds his own ideas, and offers a novel perspective on the origins of Western legal culture. His contribution can best be presented by distinguishing three separate ways in which the Church may have influenced the legal culture.

A.

One argument is that the Church undermined the early medieval worldview, creating a propitious intellectual climate for the rise of Western institutions. Berman makes this argument by showing how Christianity affected the culture of the Germanic peoples and by describing the impact of certain liturgical and doctrinal changes of the Western Church in the eleventh century. He maintains that old Germanic perceptions of the world coexisted with Christianity; like Catholicism in today's Bahia, so Christianity in the European Middle Ages failed totally to dislodge mythical visions of reality in which the world of Gods continuously interpenetrated the human world. The contact of the two discrepant worldviews created a strain in the intellectual spheres with great dynamic potential and produced a reservoir of creative energy to be released in the late eleventh century.

Berman also finds significant the expansion of solidarity beyond tribal limits through loyalty to a common faith. The idea of populus christianus, no matter how abstract, prepared the West for emergence as an ideo-

“papal revolution” is extended into the 13th century, the problem requires more elaboration. For example, to the extent one recognizes the influence of Greek philosophy on early legal scholars, one must note that much of this philosophy reached the West in Arab dress. Even Abelard, in his later works, cites to parts of Aristotle's “new logic” that originated in translations from Arabic. See D. Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought 189–90 (1962); see also A. Ehrenzweig, Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence 135 (1971) (intercivilizational conjectures); G. Mardiss, The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West (1981) (Moslem influence on scholastic method and modes of education in West).


Among legal historians Walter Ullmann has repeatedly stressed the importance for the West of “biblically engendered legalism.” To him the Bible, at least since the Vulgate, is the harbinger of Roman law revival. But his interpretation of events differs considerably from Berman's. See W. Ullmann, Law and Politics in the Middle Ages 45–49, 151 (1975).

Specialized studies on the canonist contribution are legion. Outstanding among more recent publications are those by Steven Kuttner, to whom Berman frequently refers. See, e.g., pp. 189, 201, 585 n.53, 598 n.44, 601 n.7, 605 n.22.

5. See pp. 49–84.


7. Ordeals, for example, which rest on this vision of reality, were not abolished, but the clergy enlisted in their administration.

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logically identifiable unit, and planted the seeds of some peculiar attitudes toward the law, such as the belief that the law binds even the highest political authority.

Changes in Western Christianity during the eleventh century are of even greater importance to Berman's interpretation of events. Up to the end of the first millennium, perhaps haunted by the collapse of classical civilization, Christian faith was essentially apocalyptical, with little concern for secular life. Related to this general apathy about the *saeculum* was the belief that man, totally dependent on God for salvation, could do very little to save himself. Mysticism permeated theology; divine mysteries were objects of veneration rather than subjects for human reason. In the eleventh century, these earlier Christian positions lost prominence. The attitude toward the *hic et nunc* (the here and now) began to change, as the belief grew that life on earth could be ameliorated. Man was increasingly viewed as responsible for his actions and capable of avoiding sin through exertion of his will. Theologians began to discuss the sacred in terms of rational arguments that could persuade even a nonbeliever.

Berman links this remarkable transition from otherworldliness to the Church of Rome's increasing emphasis on the Second Person of the Trinity. He sees this emphasis on the divine Saviour and his humanity as a decisive move in the direction of an anthropocentric view of the world. New conceptions of purgatory, the eucharist, and penitence implied man's own responsibility for the state of his soul and his actions: A tribunal of conscience was set up, reducing the significance of the Last Judgment itself. Theological thought was also affected; if God could assume the human form, why should theologians not try to fit the mysteries of faith into constructs of the human intellect, subjecting the sacred to rational reflection.

Berman imaginatively links these developments in the religious sphere to specifically legal problems. Consider, first, that the new attitude toward the sacred may have helped to unleash the rationalist forces that many scholars have found crucial to the emergence of characteristically Western legal, political, and social institutions as of the late eleventh century. If God's existence could be rationally understood, so could all the cosmos He had created. To be sure, the belief continued that reason and faith can be

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8. "Only when the effort was made to study God objectively, and God's laws, did it become possible to attempt to study secular life, and secular laws, objectively . . . ." P. 158.

R.C. Van Caenegem is right in asking those historians who emphasize the importance of "rationalization" in the genesis of Western legal institutions about the source of this will to rationalize. Van Caenegem, *The State, Society and Private Law*, in 37 *Tijdschrift voor RechtsGESchiedenis* 236, 243–44 (1969). Of course, believers in the primacy of economic determinants will find the impetus for the increased use of reason in the revival of economic activity (mystics do not engage in commercial transactions). But even they might be willing to concede that religious factors contributed to the inten-
reconciled, but their analytic separation proved to be the first long step toward their ultimate divorce. The separation created the room for the differentiation of philosophy and law from the theological matrix, and for the conception of law as an independent discipline.

Theology also gave the emerging body of legal thought its method: Clashing legal propositions, like religious ones, could be reconciled through subtle distinctions and related procedures. And only a short step separated Abelard's juxtaposition of contrary propositions of the faith from the juxtaposition of conflicting legal propositions by the canon lawyers. In both instances, like a composer writing a sonata, the scholar would commence by exposition of the theme, develop its complications, and then resolve them.

Second, the new and less reverential attitude toward the sacred could have combined with the Church's new interest in life in the saeculum to generate a propulsive conception of law. The ius novum, with which the Church was to perform its mission in the world, was no longer sacriligious tinkering with an immutable order established by divinity: Legislative enactments could change the social structure. Berman also discusses more specific links between religious change and the law. For example, the emergence of the administration for the cure of the soul gave rise to penitential literature, and the casuistry of that literature directly influenced key concepts of substantive criminal law that we still use.

Not all of Berman's observations about the religious roots of Western legal institutions are new. He may also have failed to consider some connections between the breakthroughs in theology, the tribunals of conscience, and the law. Yet the amply footnoted pages he has written on the influence of religion on legal thought remain among the best in the book. Far from creating an impression of déjà-lu, these pages combine into a new ensemble the thesis about discontinuities in the medieval Church with findings of more recent studies in legal history. And Berman breaks the monotony of theological and legal argument with stimulating side glances at various spheres of social life, including medieval art.
A second role of the Church in the genesis of Western legal culture is its creation of a peculiar political situation in the middle of the Middle Ages that was necessary for the growth of specifically Western characteristics in the law. This indirect influence of the Church is distinguishable from the more specific influence of its canon law: Where the latter is denied, the former can still be asserted. And for the purposes of this review, this indirect influence will be examined separately, even where this is not the case in Berman's book.

The political situation that was conducive to the emergence of Western traits in the law resulted from the conflict between the Popes and temporal rulers that Berman calls "the papal revolution." Conventionally referred to as the Investiture Contest, it broke out in 1075, when Pope Gregory VII asserted the primacy of the Church in the religious sphere, and denied to the Emperor and the kings the spiritual functions that they had previously exercised. The protracted struggle that followed radically changed the political map of Europe. Western Christiandom was split into ecclesiastical and secular orders that coexisted within the same territory and claimed allegiance from the same persons. The Church became a hierarchical institution of government, with rapidly bureaucratized offices all over the West. Secular rulers were also driven to develop new governmental institutions; shorn of part of their functions by another authority, they made secular concerns, such as the maintenance of order, their first priority.

Although the military might of the papacy was no match for that of the emperor and the kings, Popes were enormously influential as custodians of ideational bonds that continued to hold medieval society together; the Church could easily shake the legitimacy of the rule of secular princes. As a result, no political authority in the medieval West exercised all-embracing power: Papal claims to plenitudo potestatis were only expressions of pious wishes. Gaps and overlaps of authority created vast opportunities for political and social differentiation that distinguished the West from the East. Urban communes and lesser communities, such as guilds, or "universities" of scholars and students, could successfully seek independence. In short, within the persisting medieval community of people bound by loyalty to the common faith, there existed a rich texture of competing political units. None was capable of exercising exclusive

13. See supra note 3.
14. Because the papal revolution was fought in the name of the freedom of the clergy, Berman finds it likely that demands for freedom revived the manors and contributed to the 15th century's abolition of serfdom in the West. See p. 331.
authority, and each was forced to recognize the legitimacy of some other power within its sphere.

Berman considers this political landscape, quite plausibly, as the incubator of many characteristically Western attitudes toward the law, including its role in public life. For example, the need to delineate and justify the respective spheres of influence of competing powers, none "sovereign" within its territory or its community, generated Western "legalism." (It is in this period that sophisticated jurisdictional thinking entered Western law.) The traditional Western belief in the superiority of law is also rooted in the constellation of political forces that Berman describes: The equilibrium of competing powers could be maintained only by casting doctrines in terms of a "law" that transcended even the most powerful political entity and received the acceptance of the whole of Western Christiandom. Even the Emperor, the *dominus mundi* of classical legal texts, was driven to legitimate his power in terms of law higher or superior to him.15

The destabilization produced by the split between the ecclesiastical and secular orders was also a potent dynamic force. Since society was in ferment, it had to be regulated, and law could no longer continue to be regarded as an immutable entity. Instead, law came to be seen as capable of growth through fresh legislation. The plurality of powers was also instrumental in generating the idea that each political unit should clearly define the law in its sphere, thus creating a "body" or a "system" of law. In contrast to most other religious laws, the law of the Church also recognized its partial character, acknowledging the legitimacy of secular legislation within its sphere.16

Conventional continental accounts of the genesis of Western law accord credit for the rise of legal scholarship to the rediscovery of ancient Roman law books. While Berman shares the view that the rise of "legal science" is indispensable for the formation of the Western legal tradition, he sees it as a response to impulses first received from the papal revolution. He finds the rediscovery of the ancient texts not wholly accidental: In an age that saw a sudden surge in the use of *ratio*, the conflicting claims of Popes and Emperors needed support in texts that were considered an "embodi-

15. It should be noted, however, that the idea of subjecting the Christian prince to higher law antedates the papal revolution by several centuries. See, e.g., W. ULLMANN, supra note 4, at 153. It has become fashionable in some quarters to dismiss this feature of Western legal tradition as a mere ideological embellishment without practical importance. But even if the restraining force of "higher" law on rulers was always marginal, it did complicate somewhat their exercise of power. In order to legitimate their designs, they had to tailor them to recognized norms.

16. Temporal law was not taken away from Caesar. For contrast with the Muslim law, see David, supra note 2, at 14; Jabara, *Islamic Law and Aristotelianism*, 51 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 403, 405, 414 (1965).
ment of reason." The papal revolution also contributed to the spreading of universities, if only because the drive of secular princes to build their governmental offices required the services of a secular profession of jurists. Finally, the method of the legal scholars derived directly from the new theology: They treated Justinian's corpus of laws as theologians treated the Bible.

Berman traces in great detail many more ripple effects of the Investiture Contest, and some of them are of greater interest to political scientists than to lawyers. But the farther the "papal revolution" progresses—Berman sees it continuing to an unidentified point in the duecento—the more difficult it becomes to disentangle the original impulse of the Gregorian reforms from the impact on Western institutions of subsequent events, including the contacts with other civilizations with which the twelfth century abounds. It may well be that Berman carries too far the effects of the Investiture Contest, or exaggerates their weight compared to other factors that influenced Western society in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. But, on the whole, his focus on the situation created by the split between ecclesiastical and secular authority is a salutary realignment of emphasis. It is high time for legal scholars to follow their colleagues from other disciplines in noting the crucial importance of this division of functions for the genesis of distinctively Western social institutions. The extreme social differentiation and political pluralism that this split prompted seem truly unique to the West.

C.

A third way to assess the role of the Church in the genesis of Western legal culture is to concentrate on the influence exercised across Europe by its canon law and by its institutions on the administration of justice. In a highly informative chapter on the structural elements of canon law, Berman sets about this Herculean task by condensing an immense secondary literature on various branches of substantive law as it evolved from the Church's jurisdiction over such matters as the censuring of sins, the performance of sacraments, and the like. But as he descends to legal detail, it is not always clear whether the law he discusses was already in

17. Chapter 3 of the book is devoted to the origin of Western legal scholarship in the universities. Berman's remarks on why this scholarship deserves to be termed "legal science" are original. See pp. 151-64. The issues he raises are important and provocative; they deserve a separate review.

18. Thus, for example, he finds that the papacy, by reducing the sacral quality of the non-ecclesiastical government, laid the foundation for the emergence of the modern secular state. See pp. 113-15, 273. To him, modern Western political science is rooted in the struggles of Guelphic and Ghibellinic forces. Pp. 275-88. Of course, it is only in the mid-thirteenth century that Thomas Aquinas coined the term scienza politica.

this form during the formative period, or only in later centuries, especially at the time of Baldus and Bartolus. One also wishes that Berman had brought out more clearly which parts of the law depended on the heritage of Roman law as transformed by university scholars (the civilians), and which parts were an original creation of canonists. Although the canonists readily acknowledged cross-fertilization of Roman and canon law,²⁰ and although a great deal of work remains to be done to tease apart the contributions of canonists and civilians, areas are already known in which the lawyers of the Church were independently creative.

One such area is the public law, and especially the legal foundations of government. Here the canonists, struggling with the practical needs of the state-like Church, enjoyed a great advantage in perspective and insight over their more bookish colleagues in the academies. Berman depicts in Chapter Five the contribution of Church lawyers to medieval constitutionalism. They elaborated the view that the Church is a “juristic person,” a corporation independent of its officers, so that intellectual space appeared for the idea that even the autocracy of the Pope was limited. In a century in which no authority was ever able totally to dictate the thrust of reflection, and in which the secular and ecclesiastical orders shared authority, it should not be surprising that doctrinal limitations on papal power crystallized and were publicly presented. Nevertheless, the same canon lawyers who elaborated the corporeal theory of the Church also developed the hierarchical-bureaucratic vision of government. According to this vision, authority comes from the top, and cascades down the echelons of offices; the ordinary person, a simple fidelis, plays no part in government. Moreover, the theory of papal plenitudo potestatis also originated in canon law scholarship of the twelfth, and thirteenth centuries. In sum, the contribution of canonists to modern constitutional thought can easily be exaggerated. While Berman does not fail to note counter-currents in the legacy of decretists and decretalists,²¹ he is not invulnerable to this criticism.

Surprisingly the author accords modest space to the influence of the Church on judicial organization, procedural law, and the law of evidence.²² With the possible exception of substantive criminal law, there is hardly any other area in which the work of the canonists has been so influential and original, as well as essentially completed in the period of the papal revolution. In addition, while there are precedents in antiquity for the theoretical ordering of substantive law, the treatises and the sum-

²⁰ Baldus stated as late as the 14th century that canon law without civil law was vidua et imperfecta scientia. For his views, gathered from a conspectus of scattered relevant utterances, see N. Horn, Aequitas in den Lehren des Baldus 58 (1968).
²¹ See, e.g., p. 213.
²² See pp. 250-53.
mae on procedure that appear in large numbers in the twelfth century are truly unequaled.

Consider briefly some major innovations of the Church in the sphere of judicial organization and procedure that Berman omits. Whereas the judge in Germanic Europe merely organized the trial and enforced the judgment made by special judgment finders, the Church accorded to its judge a much more encompassing responsibility. He was not only expected to render the judgment, but was also obligated actively to "ventilate the truth" by examining the litigants and engaging in proof-taking. The most immediate source for this conception of "officium judicis" was the role played by the clergy in the newly established tribunal of conscience.28 The judge was required to decide only on the basis of information received in court, ignoring information obtained extra-procedurally. Adjudicative and testimonial functions were thus sharply segregated in the ecclesiastical administration of justice as early as the twelfth century. This division is comparatively striking in light of the fusion of these two functions in the jury as a decisionmaker well into the sixteenth century. One already finds among early canonists a fairly sophisticated discussion about the extent to which the judge can disregard the rules of procedure, as well as an analysis of similar problems that sound modern to our ears.24 In another major departure from the past, Popes organized the judges into a hierarchy, interconnected by an elaborate system for review of judgments and even interlocutory decisions. In addition to judges, other specialized officials appear in the administration of justice, among them the precursors of modern public prosecutors and state attorneys.25

For civil litigation, canonists developed a style of proceeding through discrete court sessions, instead of through a continuous mode of trial that proceeded to its end without interruption. With incredible speed and sparkling originality, they elaborated from very scarce Byzantine sources a whole battery of concepts for the appellate process that is still firmly nestled in Western procedural systems. In the administration of criminal justice, their contribution is often unfairly identified solely with the summary

23. It should be recognized that the confessor was expected to ask questions in the confessional, and that the bishop was at once an ecclesiastical judge and a father confessor. The return to the classical Byzantine idea of the judge was thus perfectly natural.


25. It is often said that the forerunner of the modern public prosecutor was the French procureur du roi, who then influenced the Church's promotor or procurator fiscalis. See, e.g., F. Hinschius, 6 System des Katholischen Kirchenrechts mit Besonderer Rücksicht auf Deutschland 12 n.2 (1959). In fact, a promotor appears in the ecclesiastical criminal process at least at the time of Tancredus. Durantis mentions these ecclesiastical officials at several places in his Speculum. So-called audiatores also appear in the 12th century as assistants to judges with investigative responsibilities.
process for the repression of heresy before special papal delegates (*inquisitio hereticae pravitatis*). In fact, the regular criminal process of the Church, at least until the end of the papal revolution, was a peculiar kind of party-dominated, adversarial process, greatly perfected and "rationalized" by canon lawyers, and vastly superior to medieval trials by ordeal, or similar medieval forms of accusatorial justice. And when the *regular* inquisitorial procedure of the Church (to be distinguished from the Holy Inquisition) was elaborated, it contained many ideas that are still at the root of the continental nonadversarial criminal process.

The part played by the Church in the demise of the system of mythical proof can hardly be overstated. The Church encouraged proof by witnesses and documents at the expense of trial by ordeal, oath-helpers, and similar devices prevalent in Germanic Europe. Long before direct- and cross-examination were invented, the Church developed a rational technique for the examination of witnesses. Aside from exclusionary rules and rules for the weighing of evidence (both of which Berman recognizes), canonists also developed, almost from whole cloth, the theory of judicial notice (*notorium*), as well as new ideas on proof-sufficiency standards that varied according to the importance and the nature of the cause.

The especially remarkable aspect of the contribution of canonists to judicial administration and procedure is the fact that all their spade work had already been completed in the thirteenth century. And it is in the *duecento* that the ecclesiastical procedure finds a classical statement in the *Speculum* of Durantis, one of the most important books on procedure of all time. It may well be that Berman fails sufficiently to emphasize this contribution because it is much more important to continental countries than to common law systems. But this observation takes us from a cursory presentation of Berman's book to some comments about his interpretation of events leading to the formation of the Western legal tradition.

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26. This *processus per accusationem* was regarded in most continental countries as the ideal form of criminal justice throughout the practical reign in Europe of the *processus per inquisitionem*. See, e.g., B. Carpzov, *Practica Nova Imperialis Saxonica Rerum Criminalium* (Pars 3, qu. 106) 44-55 (1677). It is only in the late 18th century that it came to be recognized that the inquisitorial process is the *via ordinaria*. See Homberk zu Vack, *De diversa indole processus inquisitorii et accusatorii*, in *Analecta Juris Criminalis* 365, 402 (J. Plitt ed. 1791).

27. See Ghisalberti, *La Teoria del Notorio nel Diritto Comune*, 1 *Annali di Storia del Diritto* 403, 403-06 (1957). Here again the creative work is completed with Durantis; Antonius de Butrio only places the law into an elaborate scheme in the late 14th century. See id. at 407.

II.

As Berman’s larger story concerns the fate of the West, his account of the genesis of Western legal institutions naturally embraces the whole of Western Christendom, defined as a civilization separate from the Byzantine and Arab cultures that also sprung from the soil of classical antiquity. It seems natural to him to leave out of focus, at least when examining the inception of specifically Western institutions, the distinctive developments in the Mediterranean setting and in Northern Europe that gave rise to the contrast between continental and common law systems. Because so many comparative historians concentrate on differences, Berman’s concern with the unity of Western culture is refreshing. Echoes of the Investiture Contest indeed reverberate even in the remote corners of Western Christendom; diverse patterns of political association seem everywhere in evidence; and archaic forms of government and law are in retreat both in the North and in the South. Rationalist structures, released by developments in the Church, affect the entire West.

It is Berman’s search for unity that seems to make him see more. Everywhere, and in all branches of the law, from manorial, to mercantile, urban, and royal, he identifies the advance of the “systematizing” and “scientific” approach to law that the universities developed and the Church embraced. The disorderly mass of customs was subjected throughout Western Christendom to pruning of “irrational” elements, and brought into a system. Governmental and legal ideas pioneered by the Church of Rome exert their influence throughout Western Christendom. There are only differences in the degree of legal systematization and in the intensity of imitation of the Church’s model. And as the thirteenth century drew to a close, all legal systems of Europe carried this unilinear process to its conclusion.29 Berman does not see the native Germanic soil, affected by the turbulences of the papal revolution, as a breeding ground of an alternative force, exerting a rationalizing influence independent of the roman-canonical model.

A different interpretation of events, however, is possible. One can find an independent force that shaped legal institutions of Europe in a style different from the one disseminated by the Church. As early as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, this style can be discerned in patterns of judicial organization, in attitudes toward law making, and even in limits to the systematic construction of the law. Each should be examined in quick turn.

First, Northern Europe in the period of the Investiture Contest did not accept the conception of judicial office developed in the Church. The tri-

29. See pp. 527–36.
bunal remained divided between judgment-finders and the judge as conve-
nor and enforcer. Only the function of judgment finders changed: Rather
than relying on divine expertise (ordeals), they were expected to arrive at
a verdict by their reason and good sense. This institution, given various
names in different places, is best known by the name it has received in
England—the jury. It is said about this institution that the judicial func-
tion was in the hands of the judge, who only “took the facts” from the
jury. But because the ascertainment of the truth was of the essence of
officium judicis, it would seem to canon lawyers that the nearest analog of
the judex was the jury rather than the judge. And because canonists be-
lieved that the exercise of judicial function required suitable persons, with
special knowledge and skill, the transfer of judicial functions to personae
minores, or judices idiotae, would appear undesirable. Thus, when
Berman writes of participatory adjudication in various spheres of secular
law, he means a model of adjudication different from the one propagated
by the Church, rather than a watered-down ecclesiastical model. That dif-
derent models were involved is visible also from the fact that in most secu-
lar jurisdictions adjudication remained an essentially one-level enterprise,
whereas the Church differentiated between higher and lower judges and
insisted on the importance of appeals. And if one is to seek the roots of the
more generalizing and abstract impulses of continental lawyers, as op-
posed to their English counterparts, one can find these roots not only in
the greater influence of academic scholarship, as conventionally stated, but
also in the hierarchical hauteur of the traditional continental judicial ap-
paratus. In a single-level system of adjudication, lawyers are exposed to
the dense texture and minutiae of individual cases, whereas in higher
reaches of judicial authority particulars are never fully perceived and
human drama is muted. It is therefore easier for tone-setting higher au-
thority to concentrate on broader ordering schemes within which edited
cases and problems can consistently be fitted.

Berman is right in calling attention to the significance for the European

30. In German lands it was called veritas scabinorum; in Normandy “recognition.” Twelfth- and
thirteenth-century Normandy was the battleground between the home-grown recognition and the can-
nonical inquest, with the latter ultimately prevailing. See J. Strayer, supra note 4, at 3-12.
31. As of the 12th century, bishops began to appoint their judicial officers from among the clergy
learned in the law.
32. Pp. 307, 324, 346. While persons in secular courts were entitled to the judgment of peers, a
mere fidelis exercised no such rights in ecclesiastical tribunals. Generally, laymen had no right to
participate in the exercise of authority in the Church; this right was limited to the (hierarchically
organized) clergy.
33. It tends to be forgotten that regular appeals appeared in England only in the last years of the
19th century, while already early canonists regarded them as essential to “due process.”
Observe also that, whereas private prosecutions were in decline throughout 12th-century Europe,
the Church developed a system of official prosecution and England developed the grand jury—another
form of recruiting laymen into the administration of justice.
future of papal legislation: In a period when law was seen as expressing an immutable order willed by Providence, the *jus novum* of the Popes was indeed a revolutionary innovation. And although it did not occur to the Popes to claim that their legislation was valid because it expressed their will alone, they viewed themselves as law-makers. Not rarely in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, papal decretals were put into effect prior to ratification by church councils, much as in our own time decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet are implemented prior to adoption by the whole legislative body.

Did secular rulers view themselves as originators of a secular *jus novum*, even if on a lesser scale? There is ample evidence for the proposition that this was not yet the case in the period of the papal revolution. While the prince was to organize the administration of justice and enforce decisions arrived at in accordance with law, he was not yet the *fons et origo* of law itself. Princely ordinances dealt primarily with judicial administration rather than with substantive law. And whatever substantive law the prince created was mainly a by-product of his responsibility to maintain public order. In any event, new law was emerging more from the communities that were thought of as bearers of the right to find the law, than from the top of a pyramid of authority as was the case in the Church. The new substantive law that developed in those turbulent times reflected the views of the rationalizing elite, often drawn as law-finders in the administration of justice, as well as the logic of lawyers who framed questions to be addressed to the jury. In other words, while the Church espoused a "descending" vision of law-making, the secular polity tenaciously clung to an "ascending" vision.34

Undeniably, the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries saw a small avalanche of law books not only on the law of the Church, or the "ideal" Roman law, but also on various fields of secular law. But this abundance does not necessarily indicate that these books were of the same significance and impact everywhere, or that law was everywhere—albeit with various degrees of success—pressed into a coherently integrated system under the influence of roman-canon scholarship.

While one can imagine that a learned *summa*, or Gratian's *Decretum*, played an important role in ecclesiastical courts, it is much harder to believe that Obertus de Orto's *Libri Feodorum*, or some urban law books, occupied a similar position in the respective secular courts. One can imagine a learned ecclesiastical judge turning to intellectual techniques developed by the new legal science of the glossators, in order to solve a case within the framework of a law book. To such a judge, locked in a hierar-

34. Here we are appealing to terms used by W. Ullmann, *supra* note 4, at 30–31.
chical organization, law may have been essentially an authoritative, textually fixed norm. But this scenario is much less likely in secular courts dominated by the lay social elite. Even if they revered and had access to learned books on the law, it does not seem plausible that they applied scholars' intellectual techniques developed in using such books. More likely, they fell back on their common sense, general experience, or some similar salving device.

In addition, at least some law books—Libri Feodorum may again be a good example—may actually have distorted the living law by presenting it in the manner fashionable to those steeped in the roman-canon scholarship, and adorning it with scholarly Latin concepts in the process of translation from the vernacular. Those who, like Berman, are interested in law as a living enterprise should beware of investing these books with too much "operational" significance.

Whether most secular law of the period here under discussion can be said to have been brought into an integrated "system" depends, of course, on the meaning to be attributed to this term. Even the glossators were not system builders in the usual sense of the term; they were primarily concerned with specific problems of reconciling classical texts rather than with a systematic reconstruction of the law. In their effort to solve conflicting authoritative texts, they elaborated abstract concepts, but they did not use these concepts as building blocks in a systematic body of Roman law. They can be considered as systematizers only in the weaker sense that they tried to make sense of the law within the original framework of the Justinian's Corpus which they deemed sancrosanct. As Berman readily concedes, those who wrote secular law books, arranging the law under various headings, were even less systematic. But in still emphasizing their systematic efforts he places such minimal demands on systematization as a concept that he diminishes the discontinuity between poorly systematized

35. Even in the period after the papal revolution, decisionmakers in many European countries saw the law not so much in textually fixed norms which are logically interrelated, but rather in the experience and the reasonableness of the ruling elite spontaneously integrated in the administration of justice. See F. Wieacker, supra note 28, at 112. Berman recognizes this for German lands in an article published after the book under review. See Berman, supra note 1, at 579.

36. De Orto's Libri Feodorum appeared in 12th-century Bologna. Observe also that, after the papal revolution, one of the most brilliant discussions of feudal law originated from the pen of Baldus de Ubaldis who was, first and foremost, a great authority on Roman and canon law, deeply steeped in the "post-glossatorian" approach to law.

The relationship of some treatises on Customary law to the actual administration of justice governed by such customs may be likened to the relationship of some systematic treatises on African law, written by 19th-century Europeans, to the realities of administration of justice in the Africa of the period.

For presuppositions for a "scientific" approach to law, see Damaška, On Circumstances Favoring Codification, 52 Revista Juridica de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 355, 357-59, 360-62 (1983).
Law and Revolution

law books that appeared before the papal revolution and those that appeared in its wake.\footnote{37}

These divergent patterns of judicial organization and divergent attitudes toward the law in twelfth-century Europe suggest partial modification of Berman’s interpretation of events. We need not abandon his focus on the role of the Church of Rome in the genesis of Western institutions. His intuition that the religious complexion of Europe and the fissure precipitated by the papal revolution created the breeding ground of Western law may well be correct and turn out to be his great contribution. But one could see this revolution as unleashing not a single transforming force, but two forces, both carrying dissatisfaction with the past, yet each following a different path in changing inherited institutions. One, more “revolutionary,” could be seen as spreading the vision of government and law of the Church; the other, more “reformatory,” could be seen as spreading an adaptation of feudal and old Germanic notions of law and government. Of course, if this different interpretation of events were accepted, then the essentials of the contrast between continental and common law existed already in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, although not in exactly the same territory or form in which we can later identify them.

As it stands, Berman has difficulty harmonizing these two different forces of revolution and reform into a unitary Western tradition. For example, he stresses the importance for the West of legal science, which not only describes the law, but also shapes it by conceptualization, systematization, and interpretative techniques. But while this scholarly ingredient is indisputably central to the continental heritage, many would deny that scholarship played a similar role in the development of common law, at least in certain periods of history.\footnote{38} The situation is reversed in relation to another aspect of the Western law which Berman defines as “organic growth.” Although it is not always clear what he means by the organic process and how precisely it can be reconciled with the “totality” of revolutions, which, in Berman’s scheme, periodically rock Western society,

\footnote{37. Probably the best example of a relatively sophisticated law book antedating the papal revolution is the collection of Lombard law known as \textit{Liber Papiensis} (1019–1034). It was even an object of studies in Pavia. On Lombard laws generally, see K. Lehmann, \textit{Das Langobardische Lehensrecht} (1896).

38. Fortescue argued, in his 15th-century laudation of English law, that the laws of England cannot be constructed through the schoolmen’s method of rational deduction or learned through scholarly study. It grew and could be mastered only through the slow process of accumulating experience. \textit{See} J. Pocock, \textit{The Machiavellian Moment} 17–19 (1975). Sixteenth-century Englishmen, who had been educated in Italian law schools, bitterly complained that English law was “without order or end.” \textit{See} T. Starkey, \textit{A Dialogue Between Reginald Pole and Thomas Lupset} 173 (K. Burton ed. 1948). \textit{Inglese italianato e diavolo incarnato!} Hegel thought, of course, that common law was an “Augean stable” in dire need of cleaning, an “extensive jumble” to be cleared by legislation “framed preponderantly on general principles.” G. Hegel, \textit{Political Writings} 300, 310 (T. Knox trans. 1964).}
historians find much sharper discontinuities in continental than in common law culture. If the organic growth is indeed crucial to the law in the West, has the Continent not mortally wounded this tradition by demanding, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that all legal institutions pass muster of an ahistorical rationalism? Is Voltaire's famous remark, "if you want good laws, burn them, and make new ones," not an appropriate epitaph in memory of the tradition of organic growth? If the interpretation suggested in this review is accepted, then, of course, the continental variant of the Western legal culture was more "revolutionary" (i.e., discontinuous) from the beginning. A dramatic discontinuity occurred in the period of the French revolution, although this too can be exaggerated. (Some comparativists, wrongly, I think, trace the origin of the cleavage between common and civil law mainly to events following the downfall of the ancien régime).

One could continue this differential diagnosis of the continental and common law variants of the Western tradition. But we should resist the temptation of speculating how Western legal culture could be redefined, and its crisis relocated, in light of modifications of Berman's historical narrative. Such conjectures would inevitably lead us to the larger story in which Berman envelops his narrative, a story that we have promised to leave to one side. His account of the birth of Western law is an impressive achievement, a towering contribution to comparative legal history. It is a product of patient scholarship, and a brief review cannot do justice to its range of reference. It is also unusually bold in its conception and in some of its permeating themes. It is passionate in its desire to leave a message to the future and to bid adieu to the past. It will be indispensable to anyone who wishes to understand the distinctive features of Western civilization.

39. If the interpretation suggested in this review is accepted, then, of course, the continental variant of the Western legal culture was more "revolutionary" (i.e., discontinuous) from the beginning. A dramatic discontinuity occurred in the period of the French revolution, although this too can be exaggerated. (Some comparativists, wrongly, I think, trace the origin of the cleavage between common and civil law mainly to events following the downfall of the ancien régime).

40. VOLTAIRE, Dictionnaire Philosophique 247, 248 (1789) ("Voulez-vous avoir de bonnes lois? brûlez les vôtres et faites-en de nouvelles."). The medieval mind of the Popes did not reject the entire past, of course, but it ushered in the dynamic and transforming vision of law in the West. Indeed, papal legislation (the jus novum) planted the seeds of its own destruction at the very moment of its inception. Already the Renaissance was ready for a wholesale rejection of the Middle Ages and for a fresh start to regain the peaks that ancient Rome had already reached. The Age of Reason went even further in the belief that men are vested with ability to create new orders in the domain of secular history. The idea of "organic growth" can thus be seen as an unstable intermediate position between a static and a truly propulsive view of law.

41. For example, the idea of "plurality of legal orders" continued to be quite alive in England and in America, while its demise on the Continent began with the rise of absolutism and its ideology of unitary sovereignty. Du Moulin and Bodin are real villains who prepared the later destruction of intermediate communities by the omnivorous state.
Enduring Passion


Ernest J. Weinrib†

I.

In this magnificently written book, Roberto Unger continues his exploration of our fundamental human identity and the vision of society which is its counterpart. Here Unger takes us on a tour through the domain of the passions, outlining their relationships, their polarities and the sequences whereby one is transformed into another. The development of the passions through life’s successive stages from the workings of the infant’s imagination to the crushing realization of the inevitability of death; the reconstruction of the felicity of moral success; the viciousness of hatred and its progeny (vanity, jealousy, and envy) as contrasted with the emancipating virtues of love, faith, and hope; the elucidation of the nature of lust, luxury, despair, and obsession—all this is portrayed with power and brilliance, as if a mirror were being held up to the reader’s soul. In this work, description and evocation are tellingly combined, with passion supplying both the theme and the tone.

Unger seeks a conception of the self which supports the radical program of “superliberalism” adumbrated elsewhere.† Within this conception, the self is located at the intersection of two large issues. One, termed by Unger the problem of solidarity, concerns the contradictory demands of repulsion and attraction occasioned by the presence of others who can be neither wholly trusted nor wholly avoided. Sensing danger but longing for confirmation, the self struggles to find the truth of its own identity in the life of the passions, where virtue and vice are variations on the themes of love and hate.

The other issue Unger calls contextuality. Here Unger points both to the particularity of the context in which one finds oneself and to one’s capacity to rise above and thus be liberated from the constrictions which this particular context would otherwise impose. No one can break free

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and escape to a realm utterly devoid of context, but it is a mistake, in Unger’s view, to ascribe to any particular context the attribute of necessity. Context is the particular givenness which situates a person, but since it is not an element of any individual’s fundamental identity, he can abstract himself from it. This denial of the equation of self and context is not a station on the way to a utopian point of settled universality. It is unconditional, without goal, without term, and without ulterior point. For any context, there is always the possibility of revision.

Unger’s prescriptions derive from his interpretation of the significance of solidarity and contextuality. Since love is a more congenial treatment of the issue of solidarity than hatred, Unger urges that social life be reconceived and redesigned to bring every element of social existence, including the most prosaic, closer to the quality of our best moments of mutual acceptance. Thus, although love and its companion virtues, hope and faith, cannot fully permeate every corner of every social relationship, its more diluted form—community—can constitute a richness of interaction far beyond the bloodless and calculated self-abnegation of utilitarian altruism.

Contextuality too embodies a regulative ideal, that of heightened plasticity. Thus, on the individual level, stability of character is regarded as the frozen version of personality, a shell to be broken through self-assertion and self-renewal. On the social level, Unger argues, the shape of institutions and interactions must facilitate their continual transformation. We must soften the distinction between quotidian revision within a context and revolutionary revision of the context itself by drawing the former closer to the latter.

That the problem of solidarity issues from the opposition between the attraction of love and the repulsion of hatred restates an ancient, almost hackneyed, theme. Reflection about the person’s transcendence of context also has a long history, originating in the modern era in the thinking ego of Descartes and receiving its most significant elaboration in the moral philosophy of Kant and Hegel. Nor is the enterprise of relating a conception of the self and of society to a prescriptive view without long precedent. Although the book invites the reader to attend exclusively to its own argument by scrupulously lacking footnotes and index, Unger is well aware that his views are fashioned out of elements which have long lain at hand. Indeed, one of his purposes is to show that despite the broken promises of modern philosophy, there is still fire left in “some of the old . . . commitments of our civilization.”

The elements in Unger’s vision do not provoke so much as the manner

2. R. UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY viii (1984) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
Passion in which he combines them. In his opening paragraphs, Unger tells us that his project juxtaposes a conception of personality and a normative methodology. He regards the elucidation of contextuality and solidarity as a modernist restatement of the Christian-romantic image of human nature. The methodological concern is, in his words, the reconstruction of the ancient practice of attributing normative force to a substantive conception of personality "so that this practice can better withstand the criticisms that philosophy since Hume and Kant has leveled against it." Unger's account, then, brings together the modernist notion of the self and the ancient method of normative ascription. One would have thought that substance is so intimately tied to method that this eclectic combination of modernism and premodernism would be incoherent. Accordingly, we want to know how the two substantive elements—contextuality and solidarity—are related and how they mesh with his normative principle.

II.

Passion, in setting out a prescriptive image of human nature, can be read as a provocative attempt to confl ate what is and what ought to be. In a previous work, Unger traced the fact-value dichotomy to the antinomy in liberal psychology between reason and desire: Since only reason is sanctified for purposes of normativity, desires are to be regarded as mere facts whose understanding belongs not to ethics but to psychology.

This attitude of liberalism can, in Unger's view, be contrasted with the preliberal denial of the divided self and the consequent absence of a gap between fact and value. In preliberal philosophy this absence rested on the doctrine of intelligible essences in which each thing is conceived inchoately to be that which it ought to become. A person's intelligible essence comprehended both brute actuality and normative ideal; the ideal encompassed the plenitude of what the person essentially was and what he therefore tended to by nature.

Unger rejects the teleology of intelligible essences and the objective value it embraces. Accordingly, he must constantly struggle to keep from

4. R. Unger, Knowledge and Politics 41 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Knowledge and Politics].
5. P. 44. Cf. Knowledge and Politics, supra note 4, at 31, 239 (lack of intelligible essences precludes definite categorization of things in world and doctrine of objective value is untenable and perverse). Although Unger often describes his project as the elucidation of a "fundamental human identity," see, e.g., pp. 3, 20, 76, which is not "fatally beholden to the conceptions of a particular culture," p. 21, he does not wish this identity to be construed as an intelligible essence. An intelligible essence contains the positive elements of man's final end whereas Unger's concept of contextuality embeds a negative transcendence into the image of the self. Cf. Knowledge and Politics, supra note 4, at 246 (the concept of a unitary human nature not impervious to different historical manifestations). It is, accordingly, surprising to see Unger appeal to the correspondence of being and goodness,
sliding over the edge into nihilism and skepticism. But he professes to welcome this struggle. As he recapitulates his project in the peroration of his preface, “thought speaks with authority about who we are and how we should live only when it puts our ideals and self-understandings through the skeptic’s flame, risking nihilism for the sake of insight.”

The threshold problem for Unger’s prescriptive image of human nature is how he can ascribe normative force to a conception of personality, even as he repudiates the teleology of intelligible essences upon which this form of argument historically depended. Unger’s affirmative answer rests on two related points. First, the decisive objection to the classical teleology is that it is incompatible with the modern form of scientific explanation. Unger presumably has in mind that the Aristotelian teleology incorporated a physics which located the mainspring of movement in the essence or nature of each object. This classical view was superseded by a universal mechanics which cut across the categories of Aristotelian classification. Modern science, Unger argues, merely disqualifies the classical mode of normative argument as a procedure of science but leaves it intact as a method of normative inference. The discrediting of the classical methodology as a way to explain or control the physical world has no bearing on the different activity of understanding the normative implications of who we are. However, this defense of the classical style of argument preserves too much. It allows not only the form of argument to escape unscathed from the strictures of science, but the underlying justification as well. The doctrine of intelligible essences, no less than the mode of argument which it generated, can survive as a doctrine of moral justification, even if not as a comprehensive explanation of physical movement.

Unger requires a means of prying the method of arguing from fact to value loose from its underlying justification. Thus, his second move is to assert that the slide from fact to value responds to an inescapable human need. The practice is so intimate a part of our history, he argues, that no mode of inquiry will establish its validity. Only a radical and terminal skepticism unwilling to accede to the possibility of knowledge would lead us to challenge so ingrained a practice. Such skepticism is “as irrefutable as it is empty.”

Anyone who strongly believes in the truth of his vision may be inclined
to conflate that vision with the very possibility of truth and to comfort himself by ascribing responsibility for an unanswered question to the questioner. In this way, the more fundamental the challenge, the more self-assured is the knowledge which is vindicated by avoiding it. And yet here the question about the relation of fact to value remains reasonable and pertinent, incorporating no category mistake and, indeed, aimed at the heart of Unger's enterprise. Either fact and value are coherent constituents of a unified world or they are not. If they are, some account of that unity must be produced, as it was in classical antiquity with the doctrine of intelligible essences. If they are not, then some account must be given of the transition from one of these mutually alien modes of relationship to another. To dismiss these perplexities as originating in skepticism is beside the point, because philosophy, as the quest for an unconditional and unqualified understanding, is in its nature an engagement with skepticism.

Unger puts forth his mode of normative argument as a practice that can stand independent of its justification. The unsupported nature of this argument is common ground to the skeptic and to Unger. They disagree about the characterization of the products of this argument. To the skeptic these products are ignorance, since conclusions can be no stronger than the argument that generates them, whereas to Unger they are knowledge because to think otherwise is to be a skeptic. Thus Unger declares victory and marches triumphantly on, with tattered banners held high.

But having disavowed skepticism, Unger must confront nihilism: Can the normative insight claimed for contextuality yield a positive prescription? The fundamental human capacity to transcend context grounds Unger's pervasive motif of heightened plasticity. As an ideal for the individual, heightened plasticity requires an escape from the tyrannical grip of one's character, which Unger stigmatizes as "the routinized order of personality . . ." As an ideal for society, heightened plasticity requires that institutions be made more open to revision and that disputes within the framework of these institutions be escalated into possible transformations of the framework itself. Those who attorn to the prevailing context are "falling to their knees as idolaters of the social world they inhabit."

But plasticity of context can become so heightened that context liquifies,
making life impossibly fluid. This negative and contentless ideal\textsuperscript{14} celebrates the possibility of transformation, caring for the new order which might arise from the vestiges of the old only with respect to its potential for transformation in turn. By denying the validity of the existing context while depending on it, this ideal is merely the mirror image of the idolatry of the present. The iconoclast is no less under the icon’s spell than the true believer.

To his credit, Unger recognizes that the ideal of heightened plasticity attracts only if not pressed to its extreme. Although the ideal is the cornerstone of his philosophy, Unger denounces extreme allegiance to it as a heresy.\textsuperscript{15} Neither the individual nor society can tolerate the condition of permanent indefinition that would issue from the uninterrupted flow of conflict and transformation. Unger accordingly allows for intervals of restful stability, but he insists that even these be characterized in terms of the nihilistic extreme from which he has resiled. “[W]hat should the moment of rest be like? To a greater or lesser extent it may keep the qualities that distinguish the moment of transformation.” Unger assigns to the “visionary intelligence” the task of gauging our tolerance for the qualities of transformation when we are surfeited with its substance.\textsuperscript{16}

Unger’s conclusions are not without immediate appeal. Moving from is to ought is an inveterate practice, and who would reject a Polonian exhortation to a social and individual life prudently combining change and stability? But Unger intends more than to restate the comfortingly familiar since, in his view, thought “advances by overthrowing the tyranny of immediate experience.”\textsuperscript{17} Nevertheless, his conclusions are not as boldly radical as his aspirations. Recall that in the preface to this book, Unger trumpeted his intention to put “our ideals and self-understandings through the skeptic’s flame, risking nihilism for the sake of insight.”\textsuperscript{18} The image then was searing—the tempering of steel or perhaps the purifying baptism of fire. But when skepticism was brought onto the stage in the form of Hume’s query about the transition from is to ought, Unger backed away from the skeptic’s flame on the plea that the business of life does not permit us to be consumed by it. And when an unpalatable nihil-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{14} P. 54.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Pp. 38, 62-64. Unger’s rejection of the negativism of the heretical position is similar to Hegel’s criticism of the Terror of the French Revolution as involving, as a consequence of its representing an exclusively negative and abstract moment of will, the “irreconcilable hatred of everything particular.” \textit{Hegel’s Philosophy of Right} § 5A, at 227 (T. Knox trans. 1952).
  \item \textsuperscript{16} P. 259.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} P. 259.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} P. 263. This is an echo and a rhetorical escalation of Hegel’s dictum that “thinking is always the negation of what we have immediately before us.” \textit{Hegel’s Logic} § 12 at 17 (W. Wallace trans. 1975).
  \item \textsuperscript{19} \textit{See supra} note 6 and accompanying text.
\end{itemize}
Passion

ism emerged from his elucidation of contextuality, Unger drew back from the risk until he had diversified his portfolio with compromise and qualification.

III.

The capacity of the person to transcend his particular context is but one of the two substantive conceptions Unger deploys in his elucidation of the passions. The other conception is solidarity, the term which captures the contrary impulses of attraction and repulsion marking the person’s relations with others. After the shattering discovery of his insecure and transient place in the world, the person is torn between the need for assistance and affirmation from others, and the fear of their domination, and he oscillates between exposing his vulnerability in the experience of love and sealing himself up in hatred. Unger intends that the issue of solidarity should both dovetail with the implications of contextuality and provide a direction for the otherwise barren form of endless transformation of context. But aside from the oracular observation that the “issues of contextuality and solidarity represent two sides of the same predicament . . . of a troubled particularity,” Unger does not discursively specify the precise relationship between these two fundamental constituents of his thought. A sense of their relationship can be gleaned, however, by tracing them back to their roots in self-consciousness.

Unger explicitly locates the origin of the problem of solidarity in the ambivalence of the self as both subject and object in self-consciousness. As subject the self is at the center of the world, emanating outwards as it subordinates that world, including the other selves within it, to its jurisdiction. As object, however, the self is seen as merely one of the many selves within its purview. In this objective world it can arrogate to itself no privilege. The problem of solidarity, in Unger’s view, derives from this primordial tension between the self as one object among many and the self as subjective center.

The issue of contextuality also originates in self-consciousness, the nature of which implies the “power to stand apart.” We can thus abstract ourselves from our contexts, bring them to mind as representations, and determine to sustain or destroy them. To be able to view one’s context as

22. P. 164.
23. P. 175; Knowledge and Politics, supra note 4, at 199–200: “The capacity to be puzzled by any feature of one’s state in the world, to represent that state to one’s self, and to be guided by such representations is called consciousness.” Similar characterizations of self-consciousness appear in I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice 10 (J. Ladd trans. 1965) (1st ed. n.p. 1797), and G. Hegel, supra note 15, at § 44A.
transcendable is to be able to view one's context as a distinct object and to view oneself as separate from it.

These links with self-consciousness indicate that the problem of solidarity raises the issue of contextuality in a more specific form and that the latter is both more fundamental and more comprehensive. Both play upon the capacity of the self to conceive of itself as distinct from a domain of otherness, but, of the two, solidarity raises the more limited issue since it is concerned only with the subset of this domain constituted by other persons. This is confirmed by the equality of selves that, as Unger notes, is imposed by the self-objectifying aspect of consciousness. Since the particularity of each person's situation is both diverse and inessential, the equality cannot reflect a judgment that each person qua aggregate of particulars is of equal value. Rather, the reciprocal lack of privilege must refer to the abstract equality of beings capable of standing back from the contexts of their activity. Solidarity thus presupposes contextuality and is reducible to it, but not vice versa.24 The conceptual boundary that remains corresponds to the fault line between the right and the good which has loomed so notoriously large in the history of western reflection about law.

A theory of the good attempts to elucidate the qualities and gradations of the human good and to explain the role of law in its promotion.25 Such a theory generally recognizes as central the elements of love and friendship. Perfect love serves both as an end for personal self-realization and as a model for social organization, conceived as reflecting in a suitably attenuated form the sentiments and dynamics which mark the paradigm case. The theory thus starts with a thick conception of the person and his good, emphasizes his social nature and the value of his concrete attachments, and proceeds through a series of regrettably necessary subtractions to apply this conception to a wider and wider context. Persons are linked through the mutual wishing of each other's good, but in the identity of one person's good with another's the very notion of interpersonal distinction may be difficult to maintain, and the idea of justice as an ordering of the external relations of distinct persons may become incoherent.

The priority of what Unger calls contextuality, on the other hand, is the distinguishing mark of a theory of the right. The discontinuity of situation and identity signifies that status as an actor is not dependent on the context of activity. Here the person is conceived as a bearer of rights because as a choosing self he is prior to whatever ends he might affirm.

24. But see p. 3 (claiming "[t]he two issues are irreducible to each other").
25. This and the following paragraph summarize a longer discussion in E. Weinrib and P. Benson, The Intelligibility of Action in Natural Law (1985) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
Passion through choice.26 In rising above any context the person recognizes the context as other than himself, and there is thus available to him a realm of otherness, including other persons, which can be subject to the ordering of justice and with respect to which he can assert claims of right. But confirmation of his status as an emaciated, abstract actor seems to come at the cost of insight into how he is to live his life. Here the challenge is to break through from the unsituated personality of a bearer of rights to a more positive and concrete conception incorporating the good of friendship and community.

The context-transcending self is the equivalent of liberalism's abstract rights-bearer, and the "superliberalism"27 to which Unger lays claim reflects the fundamental place of contextuality in his thought. Qua context-transcending, this self has the negative capacity to deny the hold of a given context but has no positive attributes, so there is nothing yet to which its good can refer.28 The role of contextuality in Unger's account thus implies the priority of the right over the good. But Unger's normative assumption suppresses the structure towards which the substantive argument points. By infusing the transcendence of context with value, he immediately transforms the basis of right, which is conceptually anterior to the notion of good, into a good to be pursued. Not only is this movement from is to ought unsupported by any argument commensurate with its significance, but its use here undermines the radicalism of contextuality by incorporating it into the conceptually posterior moment of goodness.

Let us follow where Unger's categories should lead and then return to the conclusions he actually draws. In solidarity the person is poised between love and hatred, but this situation is itself a context from which, according to the postulate of contextuality, abstraction should be possible. The special quality of the passionate moments can be contrasted with those interactions in which others rank simply as others and are not embroiled in the rich tensions of solidarity. The significance of others simply as others rather than as participants in more intimate or particular relationships is central to our understanding of the notion of justice,29 and it is hard to see how the self could be sustained if it must always identify itself

26. Cf. J. Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 560 (1971) ("the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it").
27. See supra, note 1.
28. Cf. G. Hegel, supra note 15, at §§ 35–37 ("The universality of this consciously free will is abstract universality, the self-conscious but otherwise contentless and simple relation of itself to itself in its individuality . . . .").
29. Aquinas, supra note 5, II-II, Q 57, art. 4, distinguishing simpliciter alterum from alterum, non simpliciter sed quasi aliquid ejus existens and linking simpliciter justum to the former. On the significance of the adverb simpliciter, see J. Finnis, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 9–11, 363–66 (1980).
through wishing the good or ill of others.\textsuperscript{30} Plato’s republic, in which each person feels everyone’s pain as if all were constituents of a single body,\textsuperscript{31} provides a grim reminder of the implications of comprehensive solidarity. The fundamental separateness of persons is signaled by Unger himself when he postulates the capacity of the self-conscious ego to transcend context.

In order to track the priority of context-transcendence over the relationships of solidarity, we must inquire whether there is a social form in which this priority is recognized and made actual. And the answer is yes—private law. The significance of private law is that it systematizes the irrelevance of the elements of solidarity. Private law focuses on the immediate transaction between the parties, and the juridical construal of this transaction filters away their loves and hates, hopes and despairs, needs and apprehensions. Conversely, when a certain aspect of solidarity, such as love, is thought to be the defining feature of a relationship, “the King’s writ does not seek to run.”\textsuperscript{32} It is not that the parties to a private law transaction are not in fact affected by these passions. It is rather that their being so affected is not part of the transaction’s juridical meaning. Private law treats the parties as mutually external, postulating only the recognition of others as others and not the sharing of a life of passion. In private law the heart is cold.\textsuperscript{33}

The primacy of contextuality is thus presupposed by private law, which encompasses the range of interactions defined by the absence of solidarity. Private law is the realm of right which applies contextuality to solidarity. So close is private law to the elements of Unger’s thought that the denial of private law must entail incoherence throughout. If Venice is impossible, there can be no Belmont.\textsuperscript{34}

But Unger does not countenance private law; he believes that there can be no conception of law divorced from the politics of transformation.\textsuperscript{35} At most he permits the strain of what would otherwise be permanent indefiniteness to be moderated by moments of rest, with even these moments infused with the qualities of unsettled renewal.

In dismissing private law in this way, Unger fails to confront the implications of the absolutely fundamental status of contextuality. Instead, by

\begin{footnotes}
31. \textit{Plato, Republic} § 462c.
34. Cf. Unger, \textit{supra} note 1, at 622–23 (“[R]ecall the contrast between Venice and Belmont in \textit{The Merchant of Venice}. In Venice people make contracts; in Belmont they exchange wedding rings. In Venice they are held together by combinations of interest; in Belmont by mutual affection.”); W. Shakespeare, \textit{The Merchant of Venice}.
\end{footnotes}
transforming contextuality into a good to be pursued, he breaks the con-
nection between the agent's capacity to transcend context and his status as
a bearer of rights. Although he stigmatizes the prospect of endless context-
smashing as a heresy and thus equivocates about the goodness of this
good, he nonetheless adopts contextuality as a criterion in working out the
problem of solidarity. His intent is to show how contextuality in the life of
the passions is carried through in one of solidarity's poles and thus to
vindicate love over hate.

Because Unger considers love and its cognates to be modernity's version
of the virtues, he wants to demonstrate their superiority to the vicious
passions aligned with hatred. The ideal of heightened plasticity leads him
to emphasize the significance of love in the self's movement beyond its
present context. Love holds out the possibility of advancing from the ten-
sion of longing and jeopardy, which make solidarity a problem, toward
risk and reconciliation. But reconciliation cannot be the solution of the
problem. If reconciliation were stable and if the confirmation of self which
it brought were anything more than provisional, the person would have
achieved a new context beyond which there would be no need to move.
For Unger the significance of love lies rather in the opportunity it
presents for breaking out of the shell of character through the exposing of
one's vulnerabilities, the jumbling of one's routines and the creation of
surprise, the pushing of oneself into situations which shake up one's rela-
tions to others, and the putting at risk of what is most intimate and most
important. One might say that what interests Unger about love is the
qualities which it shares with Homeric warfare.

The polemical implication of treating love as the supreme instance of
context revision is that love can be paired with radicalism. But if we have
learned anything from the most shocking episodes of this century, it is that
hatred can be as potently dynamic a vehicle of transformation as love.
Indeed, Unger's sanctification of love as transformative in contrast to his
denigration of hatred as static is not true to the picture Unger himself
initially draws. This sanctification implies that until love breaks through,
a person is locked within himself and holds others at a distance. But if we
take the problem of solidarity seriously, we must recognize that hardening
oneself in hatred is as much (or as little) a transformation as opening
oneself up to love. The problem of solidarity as Unger outlines it is that
the person is confronted by the possibly threatening and possibly confirm-
ing presence of another, and is therefore torn between mutual longing and
mutual jeopardy. From the point of view of revision (and only from that
point of view) it matters not whether the ambiguous presence of the other
is eliminated in hatred or made a source of mutual confirmation through
love.

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Unger's difficulty is that he cannot mesh his two issues of solidarity and contextuality with each other and with his normative postulate in a coherent and palatable way. As suggested above, the genesis of the problem of solidarity in the tension between the subject and object of self-consciousness indicates that solidarity is only a special case of contextuality. But if the transition from is to ought were applied to contextuality alone, the ceaseless change mandated would allow no escape from the heresy of its extreme application. So Unger instead ascribes the dynamics of transcending context to one of the poles of solidarity, and holds out the idea of love as a worthy goal not because of its inherent superiority to hatred, but because love stirs the self into the risk and excitement of transformation. But on this ground hatred should also be valued to the extent that it is transformative, and a more intensely transformative hate should be accorded normative priority over a soothing and calming love. Unger's vindication of love does love no credit.

IV.

In the preface to this work, Unger remarks that "[t]he view of personality worked out here has its counterpart in a theory of society . . . ." Even though we ordinarily take our settings for granted, the ability of each person to revise and transcend his contexts allows us to act as if the frameworks and institutions of society did not bind us. Heightened plasticity is an ideal for society as well as for the individual. Since the human experience consists of a Heraclitean flux of experiments in self-discovery, we should not aspire to capture and crystallize a definitive utopia, but rather should facilitate this process of experimentation. The characteristically contemporary evaporation of substance into procedure here receives its ultimate expression: In Unger's theorizing, Ely's understanding of judicial review is rolled back into the recesses of the self and generalized into a social theory.

Unger's professed "superliberalism" implies concurrence with the foundational elements of liberal thought and, at the same time, dissatisfaction with a perceived failure of liberalism to carry through the implications of its own standpoint. By attending to the passions, Unger presumably intends to supply at least part of the deficiency resulting from liberalism's purported self-betrayal. The liberalism which Unger finds inadequate has the rationality of legal ordering as its central tenet and Kant as its greatest expositor. Unger's position can accordingly be illuminated against the background of the Kantian liberalism from which it diverges.

Unger’s notion of contextuality is the shared premise that gives point to the comparison. For Kant, however, the non-identity of the self and its context is not so much a datum of human nature as the defining feature of a free and acting being. Passivity to context is characteristic of things and not persons. Since a thing is completely determined by its situation and is therefore not self-determining, its movement is not an act of a choosing self but an event in a natural sequence of efficient causes. In contrast, the dignity of personhood lies in the possibility of differentiating oneself from one’s context. The capacity to be conscious of, and thus to abstract from, any element of context means that acts are intelligible in terms of the actor’s purpose in performing them—the actor brings the object of his action before his mind’s eye as an idea which he might or might not bring into being. Action is thereby located in the sphere of freedom, where concepts, and not merely natural stimuli, can be causitive with respect to their objects. Practical reason is this unity of action and thought as the will freely creates its world.

From the starting point he shares with Kant, Unger moves to a brute ascription of normative force and thence to the celebration of the transformative possibilities of love. For Kant, on the other hand, the agent’s capacity to rise above context is the key to the understanding of normativity itself. The agent’s capacity to draw back from any prospective object of choice and to act according to concepts shows that the essence of action is not the particularity of its content. Action is intelligible only through the concepts which specific acts instantiate, but the only concept which is necessarily instantiated in every act is the concept of action itself. This allows Kant to formulate a test of an act’s adequacy in terms of the fitness for universalization of the act’s underlying principle and thus to hold action to the requirements of its own abstractly universal form.

Whereas Unger makes an unsupported leap from contextuality to normativity, Kant elucidates the normative implications inherent in the actor’s experience of freedom.

But Unger cannot simply appropriate the Kantian analysis of normativity since it leads to a conception of law with which he profoundly dis-

38. The Kantian equivalent of contextuality is negative liberty, which Kant defined as the property of not being constrained to action by sensible determining grounds, I. Kant, supra note 23, at 13, 27. Kant was particularly concerned to assert the actor’s freedom from determination by inclination. The same idea was more broadly formulated in Hegel’s first moment of the will, “which involves the dissipation of every restriction and every content either immediately presented by nature, by needs, desires, and impulses, or given and determined by any means whatever.” G. Hegel, supra note 15, at § 5.


40. E.g., I. Kant, supra note 23, at 13, 27.
agrees. For Kant, action's causality of concept discloses the cognitive aspect of volition and makes the actor a thinking will. The function of law is to make explicit the rationality of interaction between thinking wills. Since the actor's status as a thinking will depends on his capacity to choose, and not on his making this choice or that choice, every actor is the equal of every other actor. All actors would recognize this equality and act accordingly if they made the concept of action the determinant of their specific acts. But concepts are not efficient causes of nature, and each agent has the power to ignore or rebel against the requirements of practical reason and to treat others in a way inconsistent with their equality. Law, especially private law, imposes duties upon actors which make this equality explicit, and it coerces them to respect this equality in their interactions.

Kant's notion of law as actualizing the abstract equality of actors may appear to be a paltry ideal when compared to the vibrancy and turmoil of transformation through the passionate loves and hates of Unger's solidarity. But for Kant law does not embody the highest form of rational life, it simply provides the most minimal and primitive ordering of the interactions of self-determining entities. What Kant affirmed was the link between law as an idea of reason and the freedom of a conscious and thinking being. The implication of this is that the denial that law can be a coherent conceptual possibility is a denial of the possibility of freedom itself.

Practical reason and the coherence of law are thus, for Kant, stable ideas through which thought is present to action and interaction. For Unger, on the other hand, the context-transcending self is, and ought to be, heaved about on the infinite ocean of the passions with respite only to catch its breath before the next surge of exhilaration. This vision of the empowerment of self, as Unger terms it, is one aspect of an interconnected series of differences between him and Kant.

First, Unger defines passion as "the whole range of interpersonal encounters in which people do not treat one another as means to one another's ends." It is not surprising that this formulation echoes Kant's concept of the categorical imperative, for the capacity to abstract from context entails a differentiation between ends and means, between persons and things, between self-conscious, self-determining entities and those which are exhaustively defined by their context. What is noteworthy is

41. Pp. 105-06; cf. pp. 286-87 ("The ground of passion . . . is the domain of experience in which people count for one another as more than means or obstacles to the realization of practical ends.").

42. I. Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals 46 (T. Abbott trans. 1949): "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only." (emphasis in original).
that for Unger passion comprises the *whole* range of non-instrumental encounter, thereby implicitly denying that any of this space can be occupied by a conception of law, such as Kant's, for which passion is not central. Kant interpreted law non-instrumentally as expressing the free and self-determining nature of the persons whose interactions it governs. Unger, in contrast, wishes every interaction to be infused with the tension of solidarity. But solidarity is a narrower category than context-transcendence and therefore cannot completely express the self-determining freedom of conscious beings. Whereas Kant gives full play to the notion of context-transcendence, Unger's subordination of relationships to the standpoint of solidarity is itself an instrumentalist restriction of freedom.

A second difference between Kant and Unger is that Unger ignores the significance of revenge, the passion most closely related to law. As Kant recognized, the uniqueness of revenge is that it presupposes a sphere of right that actors are under an obligation not to violate; the desire for vengeance arises out of an awareness that one has been not merely harmed but wronged. Kant regarded revenge as passion's counterpart to law's rational treatment of violations of right, but inadequate in that revenge makes the personal satisfaction of the avenger the measure of right's vindication. Since the avenger need not rise above the context of his specific hurt, the desire for revenge both illustrates the grip which context maintains on passions and points to law's more satisfactory embodiment of context revision. Unger's omission of this passion mars his account in a way that highlights what is at stake in his rejection of Kantian liberalism.

This leads to a third point. Unger's concentration upon passion should be contrasted to Kant's description of the passions as "cancerous sores for pure practical reason." Kant neither lacked an awareness of the distictively human dimension of passion nor identified passion with animal impulse. Indeed, he was no less aware than Unger of the link between passion and the transcendence of context. Kant's point was rather that the transcendence of context—and therefore the fully active nature of self-determination—could never be more than imperfectly achieved in the life of the passions since passion signifies that the actor is passive to an aspect of his given context. The challenge which Kant poses to Unger is that the

44. I. Kant, *supra* note 43, at § 81.
45. *Id.* § 80 ("Passion always presupposes a maxim, on the part of the subject, of acting in accordance with an end prescribed to him by the inclination. So it is always connected with reason, and we can no more attribute passion to mere animals than to pure natural beings."). See S. Shell, *supra* note 43, at 115, 121-22, 162.
capacity to stand apart from one's contexts may be incompatible with the centrality of the passions in the elucidation of personality.

These divergences about what is implied by their shared premise bring us back to the attribution of normative force to a conception of personality. Here lies perhaps the crucial difference from which all other differences flow. Kant's focus is not on the discerning of a fundamental human identity which can then be mysteriously seeded with normativity. His focus is instead on the nature of normativity itself, which he regards as the correspondence of action with its own intelligible nature; he is concerned with man only insofar as the conditions of normativity are embodied in him. Unger, on the other hand, both emphasizes and misunderstands the relevance of the capacity to abstract from context. For him this capacity is a feature which we are bound to honor by facilitating the exchange of one context for another. The salutary reminder of the lesson of the Enlightenment—that we are not the natural prisoners of our present situation—is turned into a call for creation of the conditions of transformation. What Unger ignores is that the capacity to negate context does not immediately tell us how we are to act but only what it is to act. Through this feature of action normativity becomes intelligible, and it is therefore not a feature to which normative force can simply be ascribed. In the experience of action "reality is asserted under the category of change," but this category is an element in a mode of understanding and not a clause in a political manifesto. Unger's vision is a vision of self-discovery through politics, but unless he agrees with Kant on the identity of action and practical reason, his journey from understanding to politics cannot even begin.

V.

Twenty-five hundred years ago political philosophy began in the West as a response to an argument reminiscent of Unger's. In Plato's Gorgias, Callicles put forward the position that the institutions of society are a shackle on free creativity; that they stifle transformative capacities under the oppressive eradication of natural differences. Callicles' paean to what Unger now labels contextuality was in its own way an appeal for the radical empowerment of self through the acting out of the passions, and it elicited from Socrates the response that there is an order in the world and in our souls and that friendship can reveal the glimmerings of this order. Thus the implications of solidarity, to use Unger's terminology, were first deployed against the demands of context transcendence.

46. M. Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes 273 (1933).
47. Plato, Gorgias §§ 482-486.
48. Id. at § 507.
Passion

The point of Socrates' criticism was that Callicles could not sustain contextuality and solidarity as a coherent and ordered set because his position bespoke a soul in disorder. Unger, on the other hand, does not adduce the virtues of solidarity for the intimations of order that they might contain, but for the transformative energies that they release. He thus thrusts us back to the ideal of ceaseless motion (or as close to it as we can tolerate) that expresses Callicles' restlessness of spirit.

We must then ask what distinguishes Unger from Callicles. It is not that Unger states a more coherent position than Callicles. Their difference is rather in what they expect will emerge from facilitating the breaking of present contexts. For Callicles the domination which the present social order embodies will yield to a new domination which will be more congenial to him, since those who are naturally superior, such as he is, will tyrannize the rest. Unger's prospect of the empowerment of self through new ventures and yet uncharted novelty sounds more benign. Both invite us to risk and to dream, differing only in whether, once we close our eyes, we will see a nightmare or a beatific vision.

Callicles thus supplies the dark underside of Unger's vision, reminding us that the transcendence of context is not unambiguously a good. This sinister potential is smothered by Unger's buoyant optimism as he summons up an ancient dream of faith and hope and love. Reveries which reassure cannot be dispelled by thought's cold criticism, but those who study this book have reason to question whether the response of the heart can be confirmed by the assent of the mind.