Trans-Science in Torts

Wendy E. Wagner

Forty years after science established that asbestos was hazardous to humans,¹ the first plaintiff recovered damages against an asbestos manufacturer. This delay resulted from the inability of science to meet the legal, "more probable than not" causation standards that require that the effect of the hazard be quantified on humans. To determine whether exposure to a substance is a statistically significant factor in the cause of a disease, epidemiologists must compare a significant number of subjects exposed to the substance to unexposed populations.² Since the first successful epidemiological study was completed,³ over 20,000 claims have been filed nationwide against manufacturers and installers of asbestos.⁴

This pattern of delay is common to the toxic tort field.⁵ In a variety of other cases involving such injuries as adenocarcinoma,⁶ pelvic inflammation,

---

1. Cases of asbestosis in asbestos textile workers had been reported as early as 1924, see Cooke, *Fibrosis of the Lungs Due to the Inhalation of Asbestos Dust*, 2 Brit. Med. J. 147 (1924). Thereafter, numerous other studies indicated the significant peril of exposure to asbestos in asbestos textile factories. For a general discussion of these studies, see Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083-84 (5th Cir. 1973) (outlining scientific history of study of effects of asbestos on health).

2. Thus, quantification of the effects of a substance on human health is inherently retrospective. Epidemiological studies conducted prospectively exist only insofar as test individuals are free of the disease at the inception of the study (e.g., cohort studies)—a percentage of individuals must still be exposed to the hazard in question before the effects of the substance are known. See J. Kelsey, W. Thompson & A. Evans, *Methods in Observational Epidemiology* 8-9 (1986) (discussion of different research techniques in epidemiology, all of which are ultimately retrospective).

3. Selikoff and his colleagues adduced a definitive quantitative assessment of the risk of contracting asbestosis following exposure to asbestos in their seminal 1965 study. Selikoff, Churg & Hammond, *The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Industrial Insulation Workers*, 132 Annals N. Y. Acad. Sci. 139 (1965). The authors examined 1,522 members of an insulation workers union in the New York/New Jersey area and discovered that almost half of those examined exhibited signs of pulmonary asbestosis. In the subgroup of workers employed over 40 years, abnormalities were detected in over 90%.

4. By mid-1982, 11,000 health-related cases brought by 15,500 plaintiffs were pending against Johns-Manville Corporation alone. Thereafter, suits were filed at a rate of about 425 cases per month. W. Lundquist, Innovations in Mass Tort Litigation, Paper presented at the Meeting of the American Association of Law & Science, Section on Torts (Jan. 23, 1984) (on file with author).

5. Toxic torts cases are generally defined as product liability suits which arise from exposure to substances that pose a substantial risk of death or impairment either immediately or over a period of time. These cases differ from more traditional strict liability cases: often more persons are exposed to a product than actually buy it, which causes case management problems for determining and organizing plaintiffs and defendants; a longer lag time usually occurs between injury and exposure; and there is greater need for expertise and scientific studies to prove a defect in toxic substances. McGovern, *Management of Multiparty Toxic Tort Litigation: Case Law and Trends Affecting Case Management*, 19 Forum 1 (1983).

6. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924 (1980) (plaintiff daughters of mothers who took diethylstilbesterol (DES) brought suit against manufacturers of synthetic...
Trans-Science in Torts

matory disease, toxic shock syndrome, and Guillain-Barré Syndrome, the general population was exposed to known health hazards, but recovery was granted only after a statistically significant number of deaths and injuries were incurred, allowing experts to quantify the hazard. This Note discusses the inherent problems with a causation standard that requires that the hazardous nature of a substance be quantified in the general population before granting recovery. Scientific quantification requires both that an epidemiological study be conducted, a highly expensive and time-consuming undertaking, and that the study be successful in distinguishing injuries caused by the product from those induced by the general environment. These scientific barriers not only ensure that very few sub-


7. See, e.g., Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co., 764 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1985) (users of contracepti intrauterine device brought suit against manufacturer for contraction of pelvic inflammatory disease).


10. In each of these cases, the court demanded epidemiological evidence to satisfy the general causation requirement. Evidence only that the substance was risky (e.g., carcinogenic), based on animal and other non-human research, was inadequate.

11. Although there are many other serious problems inherent in toxic tort suits, such as case management, see, e.g., Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1143 (1983), they are secondary to the overriding problem of scientific uncertainty and the absence of conclusive facts for any satisfactory decision in favor of either plaintiff's recovery or manufacturer's immunity. See also infra note 48 (distinguishing this Note's trans-scientific focus from other trans-scientific issues).


13. In most cases there is no unique set of symptoms for diseases resulting from exposure to hazardous substances, and often the symptoms resemble those resulting from the natural aging process or common diseases. See, e.g., J. Kelsey, W. Thompson & A. Evans, supra note 2, at 12; Duce, In Search of Adequate Compensation for Toxic Waste Injuries: Who and How To Sue, 12 Pepperdine L. Rev. 609, 620 (1985). Additionally, many diseases result from multifactorial etiology—several factors interact together to produce harm. See, e.g., J. Kelsey, W. Thompson & A. Evans, supra note 2, at 16 (discussing "effect modification" occurring when magnitude of cause and disease varies according to a third variable); Rodricks & Tardiff, Conceptual Basis for Risk Assessment, in ASSESS-
stances will be studied adequately to meet existing legal requirements, but also make it difficult, or even impossible, for a manufacturer to predict liability in the interim period after animal experimentation indicates that a substance is dangerous, but before the hazard is quantified on humans. In order to reincorporate deterrence into toxic tort cases and to provide a basis for determining liability in this scientifically uncertain interim period, the standard for liability must be revised.

This Note proposes a causation standard that circumvents problems whose solutions are scientifically indeterminate by combining a qualitative showing of causation with proof that the manufacturer acted negligently in introducing an “abnormally dangerous” product. Qualitative evidence of a causal link would include proof of substantial exposure to the substance and injury consistent with that substance, rather than the present requirement that plaintiff prove with statistical certainty that causation was “more probable than not.” Proof that the substance is “abnormally dangerous” would involve a finding that a manufacturer acted negligently in marketing a product when it “should have known” that the product

14. The FDA has set the “adequate level of research” for some chemicals through pretesting regulations. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (1985) (regulations governing pretesting of drugs under Food and Drug Act). However, only a small minority of chemicals presently in use have been subject to these tests or have been studied even minimally. STEERING COMM. ON IDENTIFICATION OF TOXIC AND POTENTIALLY TOXIC CHEM. FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, TOXICITY TESTING: STRATEGIES TO DETERMINE NEEDS AND PRIORITIES 10-12 (1984).

15. Although Congress has supplemented tort liability with statutory and regulatory controls on hazardous substances, these legislative remedies have proven largely ineffectual. First, statutory control of toxic substances is dispensed over a dozen statutes and regulated by five agencies. This piecemeal regulation produces inconsistent and inefficient results. Second, the small budgets of these agencies preclude effective regulation of a vast number of chemicals. Third, the regulatory agencies tend to operate from a set of static rules which do not promote technological innovation or adapt to improvements in research techniques. See Trauberman, supra note 13, at 203-05. Finally, many toxic substances simply fall between the statutory cracks and are not subject to direct regulation. See Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1403 (1983).

16. See, e.g., Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 855 (1984) (“[I]n contrast to sporadic accidents, which generally result from all-too-human individual lapses of attention, mass exposure torts are frequently products of the deliberate policies of businesses that tailor safety investments to profit margins. Such risk-taking policies should be especially amenable to control through threats of liability.” (footnotes omitted)).

17. In developing the strict product liability doctrine, courts have tended to place less emphasis on determining the most equitable way to distribute losses among the parties, such as individualized rights and basic principles of fault and punishment, and instead have sought to identify the most expedient and efficient way to fulfill broader principles of societal well-being. This Note argues that the principles of strict products liability, which consider only proof that the product was defective and caused the injury, must be modified, and fundamental tort goals of deterring negligent or wrongful conduct should be given more prominence in determining liability in trans-scientific cases. See Holershade, Historical Perspective on Product Liability Reform, 1 J. PROD. LIAB. 75, 81 (1982).

18. See infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
Trans-Science in Torts

posed a serious risk, although still unquantified, to human health. The jury would determine whether the manufacturer’s marketing decision that the benefits of the product outweighed the costs to human health was reasonable.\textsuperscript{19} If a plaintiff satisfies both of these requirements—proof of a qualitative causal link and the distribution of an “unreasonably dangerous” product—then the burden will shift to defendant to prove that the product was safe, the hazards were not foreseeable, benefits outweighed potential costs at the time of marketing, or that the plaintiff was not exposed to substantial concentrations of the product.

I. THE PROBLEM IN TOXIC TORTS: TRANS-SCIENCE

At the heart of the problem presently confronted by the courts in toxic tort suits is the inability to determine causation quantitatively when trans-scientific issues\textsuperscript{20} are involved—when questions asked of science, such as the statistically significant effects of a chemical on human health, cannot be answered at the time.\textsuperscript{21} For example, early quantification of the risk a chemical poses to human health is impossible because ethical policies preclude tests on a large number of humans.\textsuperscript{22} Instead, science is capable only of indicating that a substance is generally dangerous through studies on non-human subjects or accidental spills.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, for many types of inju-

\textsuperscript{19} See infra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{20} Alvin Weinberg, a radiation specialist at Oak Ridge Laboratory, first developed the notion of “trans-science”:

The point missed . . . is that the seemingly simple question ‘What is the effect on human health of very low levels of physical insult?’ can be stated in scientific terms; it can, so to speak, be asked of science, yet it cannot be answered by science. I have . . . proposed the name trans-scientific for such questions that seemingly are part of science yet in fact transcend science . . . [E]ven any null experiment—that is, an experiment that shows no biological effect at low levels of insult—does not prove the insult is harmless, since a larger experiment might show effects. . . . I must stress that where low-level effects are concerned, there will always be a trans-scientific residue. To decide on standards when science can say neither yea nor nay requires some procedure other than the one usually used by scientists in resolving bona fide scientific questions.

Letters to the Editor, 174 SCIENCE 546-47 (1971) (letter from Alvin Weinberg); see also Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209 (1972).

\textsuperscript{21} In this crystal ball question, the tools which would be necessary for an accurate prediction would include the ability to test hazardous substances on a large number of human subjects in carefully controlled circumstances over a long period of time. In the case of the effects of Agent Orange, for example, the definitive study would examine the effects of the herbicide on large populations at various low concentrations over a period of twenty to fifty years. In addition, an epidemiologist would have to isolate control populations identical to the exposed populations to eliminate the effects of all other variables. Resulting statistics might indicate correlations between exposure to Agent Orange and resultant injuries.


\textsuperscript{23} See W. Rowe, Evaluation Methods for Environmental Standards 26-29 (1983) (discussing limited data bases for determining effects of toxic substances on human health). Most
ries, several decades may pass before harm manifests following low, but continuous exposure to the hazardous substance.\textsuperscript{24} In the following section, trans-science will be defined and its impact on the judicial system examined. Section II will investigate the legal bases for the present inadequacy of the courts to adjudicate trans-scientific issues. Section III will outline a proposal for reform that attempts to mold the judicial system to adapt to the unique characteristics of trans-science.

A. \textit{The Source of the Problem}

Unlike the traditional scientific process in which hypotheses are constantly refined by experiment and observation,\textsuperscript{25} the process involved in trans-science is frozen at an early developmental stage, consisting of a

experts agree that tests on animals, short-term tests on microorganisms, and chemical structure analyses generally provide the best, if not the only, available information about the tendency of a substance to cause chronic health impairments in humans. \textit{See Work Group on Risk Assessment, Inter-Agency Regulatory Liaison Group (IRLG), Scientific Bases for Identification of Potential Carcinogens and Estimation of Risks,} 44 Fed. Reg. 39,858, 39,862–71 (1979) [hereinafter IRLG Work Group]; Gralla, \textit{Protocol Preparation: Design and Objectives, in Scientific Considerations in Monitoring and Evaluating Toxicological Research} 1, 2 (E. Gralla ed. 1981) (Determination of toxicity of chemical on humans has “its genesis [in] the hands of a technician in the animal room of a toxicology laboratory, where the animal and chemical first come together.”); 2 G. Vettorazzi, \textit{Handbook of International Food Regulatory Toxicology: Profiles} 1 (1981) (“The possibility of causing long-term toxic effects by the use of food additives (food colors, antimicrobials, antioxidants, etc.) has alerted toxicologists to require extensive and strict animal testing prior to utilization of these substances in food, in order to protect the health of the consumer.”); \textit{World Health Organization, supra} note 22, at 74 (“Evaluation of the toxicity of chemicals in animal models of commonly occurring human diseases [is particularly valuable] . . . in evaluat[ing] experimentally the interactions between exposure to toxic chemicals and model disease conditions.”).

\textsuperscript{24} It often takes five to forty years for a disease to appear after continuous, low dose exposure to a hazardous substance. During this time, the victim may be exposed to other variables which may cause a similar disease or symptoms. \textit{See J. Kelsey, W. Thompson & A. Evans, supra} note 2, at 14–16 (discussing separation of indirect causes from direct causes of disease in epidemiology studies); Hall & Silberfeld, \textit{Reappraising Epidemiology: A Response to Mr. Dore}, 7 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 441 (1983); \textit{see also} Rodricks & Tardiff, \textit{supra} note 13, at 3, 4. Additionally, records of exposure may be lost in intervening years, which further complicates attempts to correlate exposure with onslaught of a disease.

\textsuperscript{25} Broadly speaking, competing social science theories involve adequate factual bases for judicial comparison and evaluation. Nevertheless, discontinuities between law and trans-science reemerge over such issues as insanity or addiction, where physiological or medical explanations are incomplete or frozen in hypothetical stages. For example,

Debate rages within the medical profession as to whether ‘alcoholism’ is a separate ‘disease’ in any meaningful biochemical, physiological or psychological sense, or whether it represents one peculiar manifestation in some individuals of underlying psychiatric disorders. It is one thing to say that if a man is deprived of alcohol his hands will begin to shake, he will suffer agonizing pains and ultimately he will have hallucinations; it is quite another to say that a man has a ‘compulsion’ to take a drink, but that he also retains a certain amount of ‘free will’ with which to resist. It is simply impossible, in the present state of our knowledge, to ascribe a useful meaning to the latter statement.

\textit{Powell v. Texas,} 392 U.S. 514, 522, 526 (1968). While acknowledging these more general complexities of law and trans-science, this Note focuses on the problem in toxic tort cases of science’s inability to quantify the effects of a substance on human health.
number of competing hypotheses which have never been tested or are
tested only superficially and unsystematically. The "trans-scientist"
must rely largely on short-term controlled experiments conducted on labor-
atory animals or isolated accidents to predict the potential risks of expo-
sure in the multi-variable outside environment. Accordingly, the realm of
trans-science is characterized by an extrapolatory gap which separates
the experimentally established effects of a substance on non-humans or on
humans following isolated, short-term disasters from the untested predic-
tions of the effects on humans following exposure to low doses over a long
period of time.

In the past, trans-science did not appear to pose a problem for courts,
because most personal injury suits involving the effects of hazardous sub-
stances on human health were filed several decades after the substance
had been released into the environment. By that time data had emerged to
demonstrate with statistical certainty the magnitude of impact that the
substance had on humans, and thus the probability that it caused plain-
tiff's injury. The most significant trans-scientific issues, therefore, were
resolved before the issue ever entered the court room. In contrast, many
recent toxic tort claims have been filed while the effects of the substance

26. The degree to which an issue is trans-scientific does vary, however. First, not all substances
considered in toxic torts cases are equally trans-scientific, and some are not trans-scientific in any
way. The molecular structure of a chemical or the existing literature documenting a chemical's impact
on health determine, to some extent, the level of certainty regarding that substance's effect on humans.
Second, whether an issue is more or less trans-scientific depends on the nature of the injury inflicted.
Substances that inflict diseases which are not specific to that particular chemical but instead have a
high probability of natural occurrence are more trans-scientific than substances which inflict specific
diseases. Asbestos and DES injuries are unusual and specific to these particular substances, thus proof
of mesothelioma or adenocarcinoma, coupled with evidence of exposure to the substance, indicates an
almost undeniable link. Most other substances, however, such as Agent Orange, radiation, indoor air
pollutants, and hazardous wastes, inflict injuries which are common in the everyday world and there-
fore difficult to trace to any specific cause. Finally, the substantial lag time before any injury becomes
apparent—typically several decades—adds still another trans-scientific component. In addition to the
legal problems that statutes of limitations present, often the evidence, data, and other records regard-
ing the duration or extent of exposure necessary to establish a causal relation are lost.

27. The seriousness of the extrapolatory gap depends on the strength of the assumptions, for
example, selection of the proper margin of safety for extrapolating from animal studies to humans. See
Wodicka, Use of Risk Assessment and Safety Evaluation, in ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF
CHEMICAL RISKS 138–44 (J. Rodricks & R. Tardiff eds. 1984). Choice of the multipliers used in
extrapolating from animals to humans can vary considerably within broadly defined bounds, and the
resulting choice has a profound effect on the ultimate level of safety achieved. See, e.g., Salsburg,
Statistics and Toxicology: An Overview, in SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS IN MONITORING AND

28. See, e.g., Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1984) (husband com-
menced action against tampon manufacturer for death of wife resulting from toxic shock syndrome);
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083–84 (5th Cir. 1973) (action against
asbestos manufacturer for asbestosis); Lima v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 897 (D. Colo. 1981)
(plaintiff brought suit to recover for injuries allegedly resulting from Swine Flu inoculation); see also
Black & Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732, 773–75
note 11 (questioning inference from impact on general group to harm to individual plaintiff).
are still clouded by the uncertainties of trans-science—before a statistically significant number of persons have been exposed and a conclusive epidemiological study has been done.29

B. Impact of Trans-Science on the Judicial System

When determination of the effects of a substance on human health is in this interim, trans-scientific stage, the probability that the substance might be the cause of a disease is unclear. Satisfaction of the traditional “more probable than not” standard becomes impossible, because plaintiffs cannot prove that the substance had at least a fifty percent probability of being responsible for their injuries. Courts generally deny recovery to these plaintiffs and occasionally even refuse to hear their cases.30 On the other hand, once epidemiological studies are completed and the data indicates that the substance has a statistically significant effect on exposed persons, the problems of trans-science diminish and courts grant recovery in almost every plausible instance.31

The deterrence achieved by suits which eventually do succeed is clouded considerably by the sequence of events which must occur before the more significant trans-scientific elements are resolved. The uncertainty surrounding the extent of harm a substance will cause humans,32 the chance that adequate records of exposure will be available,33 the probability that an epidemiology study will be done,34 and the probability that it will be successful,35 together reduce the likelihood that a negligent manufacturer will be found liable. The limits of the scientific process as well as finite resources to study every potential health hazard in a statistically compre-

30. See infra notes 49-50, 66-68 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
33. See Schroeder & Shapiro, Responses to Occupational Disease: The Role of Markets, Regulation, and Information, 72 Geo. L.J. 1231, 1234 (1984) (difficulties in studying occupational diseases after workers have left workplace or become unavailable); Trauberman, supra note 13, at 200 (“If a disease expresses itself long after exposure to a chemical, evidence as to its source and exposure pathways may be lost and the memories of witnesses may fade.”).
34. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
35. Exposures that present only a low to moderate risk may not be identified because the number of persons required for a statistically significant sample size must be very large. For a discussion of the methods used in calculating the necessary sample size, see J. Kelsey, W. Thompson & A. Evans, supra note 2, at 277-78.
hensive way ensure that many hazards will remain undetected and their
manufacturers undeterred. Moreover, even when the effects of a substance
are detected, compensation may be frustrated by the manufacturer’s or
insurer’s bankruptcy.36

The case of Parker v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company
of Wisconsin37 presents an excellent example of this clouded deterrence,
where the uncertainties of scientific detection impede a full assessment
of liability. Plaintiff Parker worked as a material handler and production
operator, assembling and disassembling nuclear weapons. During his four
and one-half years of employment, plaintiff was exposed daily to moderate
doses of radiation. Although radiation was determined to be highly carci-
nogenic to animals as early as 1950, there were no conclusive investiga-
tions regarding the effects of low dosages on humans. In 1965, plaintiff
was afflicted with cancer of the lymph node and sued the allegedly negli-
gent employer. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the trial court’s
judgment for defendant, however. In its holding the court stated that, re-
gardless of what isolated radiation studies might demonstrate, in the ab-
sence of a quantitative probability that radiation will cause cancer in
humans there was no evidence indicating causation. The judge ignored the
fact that he was not ruling on the weight of existing evidence, but rather
on the limits of science.38

Analyzing the troubling verdicts in the many cases like Parker, scholars
have focused on the scientific difficulty of determining recovery when sev-
eral possible causes of an injury exist.39 To resolve the problem they sug-
gest a proportional liability scheme that calculates damages according to
the probability that the injury was caused by the defective product.40 Such
an analysis, however, assumes that the risks can be quantified. It com-
pletely overlooks the more onerous, first-order problem confronting courts

36. See Epstein, The Legal and Insurance Dynamics of Mass Tort Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 475, 495–505 (1984) (discussing problems of insurance coverage in mass tort cases); Note, The
1121 (1983).
37. 440 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1969).
38. The court did note: “This requirement does in some instances place extraordinary burdens of
proof on claimants. But once the theory of causation leaves the realm of lay knowledge for esoteric
scientific theories, the scientific theory must be more than a possibility to the scientists who created
it.” Id. at 49.
39. For example, Rosenberg, supra note 16, observed:
Mass exposure cases present two distinct varieties of specific-causation questions. First, it is
often unclear which one of several manufacturers of a given toxic agent produced the particu-
lar unit of the substance that harmed the plaintiff. Second, and far more common, is the
problem of determining the origin of the victim’s disease.
Id. at 856 (footnote omitted); see also Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 28, at 750 (discussing use of
epidemiology to determine probable cause).
40. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 859 (proportional liability in relation to the probability
of causation).
which arises when science is unable to offer any numerical probability of injury upon exposure to a hazardous substance. Thus, while the problem of sorting out the potential causes of an injury is serious, this Note examines the more pervasive problem of how courts should handle substantial, yet unquantifiable, risks.\(^{41}\)

II. LEGAL BASES FOR FAILURE OF THE TORT SYSTEM WHEN CONFRONTED WITH TRANS-SCIENTIFIC ISSUES

There are two major discontinuities between trans-science and the present tort system.\(^{42}\) First, the statistical requirements for a "more probable than not" standard of causation demand a certainty in quantifying causation which trans-science is incapable of producing. Second, the rules of evidence and procedure are incompatible with the capabilities of trans-science.

A. Causation Standards Are Incompatible with the Capabilities of Trans-Science

The standard for proof of causation in toxic tort cases requires that the occurrence be large enough to make it "more probable than not"\(^{43}\) that an individual plaintiff's injury resulted from a hazard produced by defendant. This involves two types of scientific proof: 1) epidemiology studies\(^{44}\) indi-
cating that the risk that a hazard will cause a specific injury is at least twice the normal, background level of risk for that injury, and 2) medical proof which links defendant's hazard with each plaintiff's injuries. Satisfaction of these requirements is generally sufficient to shift the burden to defendant, even if plaintiff's claim did not preclude all other causes.

In cases involving trans-science, resolution of the first element is often decisive. While experimentation on animals and other organisms may indicate a plausible relationship between exposure to a substance and resulting injury, the courts' further quantitative requirement that the occurrence of the disease in those exposed to a substance be twice the background incidence creates an insurmountable obstacle in trans-scientific cases. This mandate essentially requires direct experimentation on humans, with a sample size large enough to yield statistically significant results. Consequently, when courts impose "more probable than not" or "but for" causation standards on trans-scientific issues failure is inevitable, because strong probabilistic evidence for causality is being demanded from scientists who are unable to conduct the necessary experiments.

45. The "more probable than not" standard in effect requires proof that the existence of the contested act is more probable than its nonexistence. Thus, if the normal occurrence of the injury is (y), defendant must create a condition where at least (y) additional injuries occur. The total number of injuries is then the normal occurrence (y) plus defendant's added risk (y) = 2(y) total injuries.

The rule has been accepted largely without question, perhaps because of its mathematical reasonableness. See M. Finklestein, Quantitative Methods in Law 66 (1978). In fact, most analyses of the rule consider its ability to minimize errors: For example, if the decision probability for causation is lowered to 45% in favor of the plaintiff (e.g., plaintiff must prove 45% probability that defendant caused injury), this will increase the risk of error of unnecessarily punishing defendant by 5%. The same reasoning applies, to the benefit of defendant, if the decision probability for causation is raised to 55%. See id. at 66–67.

For a causation probability of less than 50%, however, the rule has the ultimate effect of completely foreclosing any imposition of liability and thus denies victims any recovery. This makes an unwanted statement that certain risks (up to two times the risk posed by natural, background conditions—which is quite considerable) are acceptable, and that losses associated with these risks should be borne entirely by victims.

46. An even stronger version of this causation standard was employed in Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374 (D. Kan. 1984), where the court required proof of causation to a medical certainty. See infra text accompanying notes 49–50.

47. See, e.g., American Life Ins. v. Moore, 216 Ark. 44, 223 S.W.2d 1019 (1949) (jury award of death benefits under employee group accident policy affirmed even though medical experts admitted fatal pulmonary embolism might not have been caused by previous work-related injury); Smith v. Humboldt Dye Works, Inc., 34 A.D.2d 1041, 312 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1970) (affirming Workmen's Compensation Board's award of benefits to employee engaged in dying wool yarns, even though medical experts could not definitively link employee's bladder cancer to exposure to aniline dyes).

48. The determination of specific injury causation also creates trans-scientific problems, however. For example, in tobacco litigation, determining whether cigarettes cause the emphysema in a particular plaintiff may involve medical speculation not common in other diagnoses. See, e.g., Snider, Perspective on Emphysema, in 4 Clincs in Chest Medicine: Symposium on Emphysema 329, 331 (G. Snider ed. 1983) ("The problems of precise diagnosis and of accurate clinical/pathologic correlations are longstanding."). Although trans-scientific controversy may preclude recovery, the ambiguity occurs at the individual level, according to the unique strengths and weaknesses of each plaintiff's case and is thus not as momentus in scope as the trans-scientific problems posed by general causation.
The case of *Johnston v. United States* illustrates this anomalous result. In *Johnston* plaintiffs alleged that their cancers were a result of daily occupational exposure to minute amounts of ionizing radiation. In denying plaintiffs recovery, the court refused to interpret the Kansas causation standard requiring proof to meet a “reasonable degree of medical certainty” as only meaning that the bulk of scientifically available data support plaintiffs. Instead, the court held that the specification necessitated “medical certainty” that plaintiffs’ exposure to radiation was the cause of their resulting cancer—an imperative well beyond the capability of contemporary science. The court’s words are revealing: “We can see that in matters of determining the cancer risk from low occupational doses of radiation, scientists do not deal with what exists in fact and can be measured or experimentally proven. . . . Cause in tort law needs to be founded on more than a theory or hypothesis.”

Several judges have recognized that the traditional causation requirements are incompatible with trans-science and have responded by applying a weaker, qualitative standard. Because most courts have adhered to some form of “more probable than not,” however, an inconsistency between courts has ensued, further eroding any predictable basis for liability.

**B. Traditional Judicial Constraints Are Incompatible with Trans-Science**

A second problem emerges when courts are forced to evaluate and interpret trans-scientific issues under existing evidentiary and procedural rules.


50. *Id.* at 425. Although a slightly weaker burden of proof was required to establish causation in *In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), the result was the same. Plaintiffs were asked to produce epidemiological studies which could not be obtained, due primarily to inadequate records of exposure, in order to quantify the probability that plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by the herbicide: “No acceptable study to date of Vietnam veterans and their families concludes that there is a causal connection . . . .” (emphasis added).


> Judges and lawyers must approach with great care, the idea that court decisions can be justified solely on the findings of science, lest the quest for justice be lost along the way [quoting Markey, *Needed: A Judicial Welcome for Technology*, 79 F.R.D. 209, 211 (1979)].

>. . . .

> In the pragmatic world of “fact” the court passes judgment on the probable. Dispute resolution demands rational decision, not perfect knowledge.

*Id.* at 260.

52. Constitutional requirements also appear to present obstacles to the adjudication of toxic tort cases. In the recent case of *Kenney v. Scientific, Inc.*, 212 N.J. Super. 6, 512 A.2d 1142 (1986), the court was forced to balance the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial against the overwhelming complexity of the case which threatened the litigants’ Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial. *See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig.*, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980). The court concluded that since the action for injuries caused by a toxic waste landfill involved 106 resident plaintiffs and 625
Trans-Science in Torts

1. Evidentiary Standards of Admissibility

In the courts the adversarial process seeks to determine the truth from various sets of facts collected by adverse parties. The Federal Rules of Evidence were developed to distinguish necessary and relevant facts from those that are unnecessary. Unfamiliar with the terminology and principles of science, judges are nevertheless forced to make subtle distinctions between fact and nonfact, and between theories that are generally accepted within the scientific community and those that are controversial. In cases involving trans-science, precisely these questions cannot be answered by the scientific community itself. Without definitive data or experiments, there is no generally accepted or reasonable scientific basis for substantiating the finding of a causal connection, and the use of indirect

various defendants and included cross claims, third party actions, multiple issues, and complicated scientific concepts, defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' demand for a jury trial should be granted.

In order to demonstrate why this case will be too complicated and lengthy to be tried by a jury consonant with due process of law, it now becomes necessary to discuss in some detail the course that the trial will take. First, it will be necessary for plaintiffs to prove what toxic substances stored by the landfills caused the injuries or property damage allegedly suffered by plaintiffs. Next, plaintiffs will have to prove which generator produced which toxic substance, and which hauler transported same to the landfill. Furthermore, each of 106 plaintiffs must in order to establish proximate cause, prove that his or her particular injury or property damage was caused by the substance in question.

In the toxic waste case now before the court, since trial by jury will not be able to produce a fair and balanced result, the court feels impelled to protect the integrity of the judicial process by ordering that type of trial best designed to achieve justice, i.e., a trial by a judge without a jury. Otherwise, the judge would not be presiding over a fair trial, but over a game of judicial Russian roulette.

Kenney, 212 N.J. Super. at 19, 22, 512 A.2d at 1149, 1150.


54. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) ("[W]hile courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.").

55. Because of the unverifiable nature of trans-science, then, the holding of the case often becomes determined by the lawyers' persuasiveness in stressing the risks involved. Similarly, judges necessarily acquire considerable discretion in interpreting facts. For example, in In re Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 749-50, Judge Weinstein remarked repeatedly on the extensive costs and courtroom time that would be involved and indicated his preference for resolving the case in the most expeditious way—out of court; see also Peto, Distorting the Epidemiology of Cancer: The Need for a More Balanced Overview, 284 Nature 297, 297 (1980) ("The vacuum of reliable scientific knowledge is such that each side can find scientists who will maintain in courts, in public hearings or in the scientific literature whatever is politically convenient. . . . Scientists on both sides of this debate now have career interests at stake in it.").

56. In Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374, 409-15 (D. Kan. 1984), for example, the court rejected the testimony of two expert witnesses because they had no reliable or significant evidence on which to premise their opinions; neither served on national committees chosen to address the question under dispute; neither had accepted the consensus reports of the committees as reliable authorities; and both used unreliable statistical methods not commonly used in that particular field of science. The court's conclusion was abrupt: "Thus, when the doses are so low that the existence of any effect at all is only hypothetical theory, such calculations are mere speculation. In the court's view, these calculations should not, nor will they, be accepted here as valid evidence on causation." Id.
extrapolations from animal studies may not be considered relevant to the effects on humans. Thus, disputes over the admissibility of evidence center on the scientific validity of varying hypotheses rather than on the legal relation of relevant facts to facts that are irrelevant or have only minimal probative value.

Judicial opinions illustrate the courts' wildly varying views on the "fac- tual" value of trans-scientific hypotheses. In Lima v. United States the court held expert testimony to be inadmissible under Rules 702 and 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because the "smoldering Guillain-Barre Syndrome (GBS)" theory used to explain plaintiff's injury was not of the type "reasonably relied on by experts in the field." Specifically, the court noted that while the theory demonstrated the causal connection between exposure to the Swine Flu immunization shot and resulting injuries consistent with that exposure, the factual basis to support the theory was simply too incomplete—a consequence of the small database, not of the scientist's lack of credibility or methods of experimentation. Due to this inadequate factual basis, the court refused to grant recovery. In several other Swine Flu cases, however, courts have accepted the "smoldering GBS" theory and have granted relief to plaintiffs with claims similar to Lima's.

at 426. "A theory of hypothesis or assumption which yields a number like 97.6% or 8% is not yielding a real number," Id. at 425.

In contrast, the court in Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfr., 724 F.2d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 1983), admitted government epidemiological studies on Toxic Shock Syndrome, in spite of Proctor and Gamble's challenges that they were not "factual findings," not done by persons with first-hand knowledge in the field, and untrustworthy. The court ruled against exclusion on several grounds: the procedures were widely accepted in the field of epidemiology, the investigations were timely and objective, and the individuals preparing them were especially skilled. "[T]here is no reason not to admit the findings simply because they tend towards the conclusory rather than the factual end, unless . . . the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness." Id. at 618 (citing United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 498 F. Supp. 353, 360 (D.D.C. 1980)).

57. See Faulk, Strategic and Scientific Considerations in Toxic Tort Defense, 26 S. Tex. L.J. 513, 533-36 (1985) (use of animal studies "creates unique opportunities for defense counsel to challenge the admissibility of this progressive proof. If the plaintiff attempts to rely upon novel theories which have not been generally accepted by the scientific community, such evidence may be legally unreliable and, hence, inadmissible").


59. The court in Beighler v. Kleppe, 633 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1980), gave insight into the traditional application of these Federal Rules of Evidence:

Rules 702 and 704 allow properly qualified experts to testify in the form of an opinion about issues as to which their expertise may assist the trier of fact, even if the opinion embraces an ultimate issue of fact. Rule 703 permits the expert to base opinions or inferences on facts or data not admissible in evidence if they are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. Rule 705 permits an expert to give opinion testimony without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data.

Id. at 533.

60. See, e.g., Barnes v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 1065 (M.D. Ala. 1981) (government held liable under "smoldering GBS" theory even though acute GBS did not develop until many months after inoculation); see also Spencer v. United States, 569 F. Supp. 325, 329 n.2 (W.D. Miss. 1983) (citing relevant cases).
Trans-Science in Torts

Likewise, in In re Agent Orange, Judge Weinstein employed the Federal Rules of Evidence to remove much of the science which he considered either "irrelevant" or "conclusory." While one of plaintiffs' experts withstood a motion challenging his credibility, the court held his theories to be inadmissible under Rule 403. Although the court did note that the evidence might mislead "at least some members of the jury," the court based its holding more solidly on the desire to put "this prolonged litigation" to an end. "In complex and protracted litigation, waste of the trier's time is a particularly telling factor."

2. Rules of Procedure

The Federal Rules of Procedure raise even more onerous difficulties in the evaluation of trans-scientific issues. It is the general rule that summary judgment, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and judgment on the pleadings are granted only when there is no material issue of fact in dispute. When confronted with disputes over interpretation of uncertainty, courts are generally reluctant to grant summary judgment, limiting its use to situations in which the facts are based on mere pro forma denials, sham, or patently false assertions in the pleadings. These patterns

62. Id. at 1256.
63. Id. at 1256. Judge Weinstein, although properly aware of limited judicial resources, neglected to pay equal heed to the fundamental purpose of the judicial system—the preservation of justice.
64. "An issue of fact is deemed to be material if the outcome of the case might be altered by its resolution one way rather than another. A material issue of fact may be framed by an express conflict on a particular point between the parties' respective pleadings." 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1368 (1969).
65. Although not a universal trend, there has been a strong tendency for judges to defer to juries on the issue of causation in toxic tort cases rather than to grant summary judgment. For example, in Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (wrongful death action against manufacturer for pulmonary fibrosis resulting from long-term skin exposure to paraquat), the court found that

[j]n a courtroom, the test for allowing a plaintiff to recover in a tort suit of this type is not scientific certainty but legal sufficiency; if reasonable jurors could conclude from the expert testimony that paraquat more likely than not caused Ferebee's injury, the fact that another jury might reach the opposite conclusion or that science would require more evidence before conclusively considering the causation question resolved is irrelevant.

[When t]he dose-response relationship . . . is one of the most sharply contested questions currently being debated in the medical community . . . surely it would be rash for a court to declare as a matter of law that, below a certain threshold level of exposure, dermal absorption of paraquat has no detrimental effect.

Id. at 1536. Similarly, in Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1984), the court stressed the importance of a jury determination of causation and criticized those cases which leave it to the

judge's subjective ability to 'count heads' among experts in the scientific community. Critics and courts . . . have argued that the acceptability of scientific data should be debated by experts before the jury.

The weight that a juror might ascribe to the data, of course, would turn on the credibility of and persuasiveness of the experts that each side offered to explain the data.

Id. at 304.
are not followed uniformly in the toxic tort area, however. Judge Weinstein's ruling that animal studies and over one hundred privately conducted epidemiological studies were inadmissible heavily influenced the court's determination that there were no facts in dispute in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, because most of plaintiffs' remaining evidence relied, at least in part, on extrapolations from these excluded studies.

In sum, under our present system judges are called on to make scientifically delicate determinations of what is resolvable, certain, or factual in order to quantify causation under legal rules designed for more determinable situations. If lines must be drawn, they will be drawn by judges who often ignore the inherently limited capabilities of scientific research, leading inevitably to inconsistent and haphazard judgments. Such inconsistency, in turn, precludes adequate financial planning for liability by manufacturers when initially marketing the product and ultimately impairs the ability of the courts to deter wrongful conduct. Instead of providing a predictable basis for imposing liability, manufacturers will conclude that liability is based on each judge's personal perception of "fact" and "relevancy."

III. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM

In order to provide proper incentives for deterring wrongful behavior and to ensure equitable compensation to injured victims in toxic tort cases, a standard for liability must be devised which can be applied consistently

66. See, e.g., Stiles v. Union Carbide Corp., 520 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (summary judgment granted to defendants in wrongful death resulting from exposure to toxic chemicals because evidence of defendant's concealment of hazardous nature of chemicals was insufficient to toll statute of limitations); Synalloy Corp. v. Newton, 254 Ga. 174, 326 S.E.2d 470 (1985) (employees brought suit against employer for negligent exposure to carcinogenic betanaphthylamine; court granted summary judgment to defendant employer because disabilities had not yet manifested and Georgia statute of limitations barred employee claims one year following exposure).

67. "A number of sound [governmentally conducted] epidemiological studies have been conducted on the health effects of exposure to Agent Orange. These are the only useful studies having any bearing on causation. All the other data supplied by the parties rests on surmise and inapposite extrapolations from animal studies and industrial accidents." In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1231. Weinstein did not support his decision to exclude all epidemiology studies not conducted by the government except by asserting that some of the studies relied on inapposite data or were flawed. Id. at 1241. The exclusion of all animal studies was based on the fact that the concentrations used in the animal studies were higher than those in the environment and because the animal studies "involve different biological species." Id. Judge Weinstein ignored the fact that extrapolation from animal studies is a widely utilized scientific method. See supra note 23.

68. 611 F. Supp. at 1259–60. Judge Weinstein's unsupported and seemingly harsh ruling contrasts with traditional features of conclusory allegations: unsupported evidence (no connection between fact and allegations); incomplete evidence; contradiction of known facts that both parties agree on; and internally inconsistent claims. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Rendezvous, Inc., 699 F.2d 676, 678 (4th Cir. 1983) (expert hypotheses regarding sinking of vessel excluded because flatly inconsistent with uncontroversed facts); Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (expert opinion excluded because economic theory wholly unsupported by facts of case).
Trans-Science in Torts

and clearly. The standard must adjust to the inability of trans-science to quantify the effects of a substance. It must also resolve or circumvent the evidentiary and procedural problems resulting from the inherently hypothetical, rather than factual, nature of trans-science. The reform proposed by this Note would shift the burden of proof to the defendant following 1) proof of qualitative causation and 2) proof that the product was "abnormally dangerous." Together, these requirements should ensure that plaintiffs will have their cases heard, while the manufacturers will have a consistent basis for predicting future liability.

A. Qualitative Causation

Under the present "more probable than not" causation requirements, plaintiffs in toxic tort cases are unable to sustain their burden of proof because the resulting injuries have not been statistically detected by epidemiologists. The procedural burden of proof, however, should be refocussed on the underlying realities of the typical toxic tort case. Plaintiffs injured by hazardous products must have the power to be heard, despite the fact that the statistical impact of the hazard has not yet been determined. The revised causation standard should be based, then, on more qualitative elements of causation, such as proof that the plaintiff was exposed to sub-

69. Although Gold Note, supra note 11, does not address the toxic tort cases in which statistical evidence is not yet available, his proposal resembles this Note's advice for reform. First, Gold indicates that fault and negligence may become important factors in the determination of liability, even though he chooses not to include them explicitly in his standard. Second, Gold suggests a burden of proof/burden of persuasion standard which abandons the present single, numerical "more probable than not" approach and incorporates more qualitative judgments, such as a "substantial factor" test. Thus, Gold too selects a qualitative causation standard over a quantitative one. Application of Gold's "substantial factor" test to cases which are highly trans-scientific, however, may still require courts ultimately to select a winning (or "substantially" convincing) hypothesis. In contrast, the qualitative causation standard set forth in this Note seeks to avoid scientific hypothesizing by judges and juries by encouraging the production of more scientifically established criteria for determination of causation, including proof of exposure to a hazardous substance and proof of an injury consistent with such exposure.

70. Reincorporating notions of negligence while simultaneously weakening the necessary proof of causation may cause earlier imposition of liability—before the risk is tested on humans—to the disadvantage of manufacturers. But, many manufacturers may prefer a more predictable basis for risk, perhaps even at the cost of imposing liability earlier. Additionally, since manufacturers often are both in more informed positions and are imposing their products on involuntary, non-purchasing plaintiffs, there is potentially less cost in attaching greater burdens on defendant manufacturers. Finally, fairness demands that a risk of error falling on plaintiffs should be partially shifted to defendants because, at present, a substantial number of deaths are necessary before liability is imposed.

71. In fact, the Restatement (Second) of Torts mentions causation, but does not specifically intersect proximate cause requirements into the strict products liability doctrine.

(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.

(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought
stantial concentrations of the substance and was afflicted with an injury consistent with the known hazards of that substance. In fact, this qualitative causation standard, standing alone, was used to shift the burden of proof to defendants in *Allen* and has been suggested in Congress as a statutory reform.\(^7\)

This qualitative standard, unlike its present quantitative counterpart,\(^7\) utilizes all available information regarding the hazardous substance, as well as extrapolatory techniques, to determine potential effects on humans. The difficulty of resolving trans-scientific problems is also eased by a requirement that plaintiffs need only prove that a substance is capable of causing an injury consistent with their injury. This burden may be satisfied by a thorough search of studies on the effects of the substance on animals or on humans in occupational settings and following disasters.\(^7\)

---

72. 588 F. Supp. at 428. *Allen* involved the effects of atomic radiation on human health, a trans-scientific issue similar to Agent Orange in which the relevant epidemiological studies are not complete. In *Allen* the court shifted the burden of proof upon a showing that ionizing radiation was hazardous (based on animal studies and reports of human injuries resulting from occupational exposures and industrial accidents); that plaintiff was exposed to substantial concentrations of the radiation; and that plaintiff's injury was consistent with such radiation. In setting forth the rationale for this burden shifting, the court stated:

This shift in burden of proof reflects a sound application of important legal policies to the practical problems of trying a lawsuit: where a strong factual connection exists between defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury, but selection of "actual" cause-in-fact from among several "causes" is problematical, those difficulties of proof are shifted to the tortfeasor, the wrongdoer, in order to do substantial justice between the parties. *Id.* at 411.

73. Several bills introduced in Congress in 1979 and 1980 proposed similar qualitative causation standards: 1) Claimant must have been exposed to a hazardous substance released by the defendant; 2) Exposure must be in sufficient concentration and of sufficient duration to create a "reasonable likelihood" that it caused or contributed to the claimant's injury; and 3) There must be a "reasonable likelihood" that exposure to the substance causes or contributes to the type of injury sustained by the claimant. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1980); see also H.R. 1049, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101-116 (1979); H.R. 5291, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 211-215 (1979). In contrast to the reform set forth in this Note, however, these legislative proposals specify that negligence or some showing of fault are not necessary for compensation. Although these bills were not passed into law, a Senate Committee did undertake a formal study of the problems unique to toxic torts and made recommendations for a compensation scheme which were similar to those set out in the Senate bill. Under this proposal, proof of causation is shifted to defendant once proof is adduced showing that claimant was exposed to a hazardous substance and suffered injury that is known to result from such exposure. S. REP. No. 12, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 214 (1982).

74. *See supra* notes 44-47 and accompanying text.


Focusing litigation on the qualitative, resolvable aspects of causation also avoids the evidentiary problems presented by trans-science. Under the present “more probable than not” standard, admissibility is dependent upon 1) whether each court wishes to view unverified hypotheses of a substance’s effect on humans as accepted as reasonable within the scientific community, and 2) whether extrapolations from the effects of a substance on animals are relevant to humans. Under the proposed qualitative standard, however, evidentiary questions will involve more commonplace disputes over the facts related to exposure and to diagnosis of injuries in plaintiff that are consistent with the known hazards of the substance. Similarly, procedural rulings will be based on the weight of all evidence, unlike the present rulings which consider only the scant evidence that remains after all non-human and inconclusive or irrelevant human studies have been ruled inadmissible.

B. Abnormally Dangerous

Under the existing strict liability standard, relaxing plaintiffs’ burden of proof on causation, however necessary from the standpoint of fairness, would subject manufacturers to inordinate liability. Manufacturers would be overdeterred and held accountable for injurious effects that were undetectable when the products were marketed. Hence, before the burden of proof shifts to defendant, plaintiffs ought to be required to prove that the product was “abnormally dangerous” in light of the manufacturer’s knowledge at the time of marketing. The standard suggested here employs “abnormally dangerous” as a gauge for unreasonable conduct, which differs from the term’s strict liability use in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In short, the two-tiered requirement for liability based on quali-
tative causation and unreasonable conduct ensures that incentives to create necessary products for human use are properly balanced with the need to deter the manufacture of unsafe products. The "abnormally dangerous" standard rests on foreseeability of harm and thus incorporates traditional negligence concepts. First, the jury must determine whether a hazardous substance was marketed after the manufacturer "should have known" of its hazardous nature. If the jury confirms such knowledge, it will then

(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.


80. One of the basic goals of strict liability is to discourage the manufacture of commodities dangerous to the public and encourage the development of higher safety standards by placing the costs of accidents on those who control the production and distribution of products. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (soft drink bottler and distributor liable for explosion of bottle of Coca-Cola, despite neither clear showing of cause of explosion nor proof of plaintiff's due care). As Justice Traynor noted:

It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find their way into the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the market.

Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).

81. In contrast with this proposal, other courts impose complete liability, without regard to prior knowledge or foreseeability. For example, in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 532 (1982) the court found that "negligence is conduct-oriented, asking whether defendant's actions were reasonable; strict liability is product-oriented, asking whether the product was reasonably safe for its foreseeable purposes." Id. at 200, 447 A.2d at 544. In addition, the court noted that "a major concern of strict liability—ignored by defendants—is the conclusion that if a product was in fact defective, the distributor of the product should compensate its victims for the misfortune that it inflicted on them." Id. at 204, 447 A.2d at 546; see also Little v. PPG Indus., 19 Wash. App. 812, 821–22, 579 P.2d 940, 946 (1978) (in wrongful death action resulting from use and exposure to manufacturer's chemical product, court dismissed negligence action noting that "strict liability (as distinct from negligence) for a manufacturer's failure to provide adequate warnings does not depend on the manufacturer's knowledge of the danger"), aff'd as modified, 92 Wash. 2d 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979).

82. Traditional negligence differs from the abnormally dangerous standard proposed in this Note only insofar as "reasonableness" is concerned. Whereas the negligence standard holds defendant to the level of a "reasonable man," the "abnormally dangerous" standard holds manufacturers to the level of an expert—responsible for all information available when products are marketed. Whether a particular manufacturer is aware of the hazards is immaterial since expert knowledge is imputed to every manufacturer.

83. The standard is based on all relevant information; that is, the supplier is presumed to know all the dangers that exist in a product at the time it is marketed. Since much of this imputed knowledge will be present in the published toxicology and medical literature, see supra text accompanying notes 75–76, discovery generally will be unnecessary in the early stages of trial. In addition, the manufacturer will have a duty to test at least to the level required by the relevant statute. Presently, pre-testing requirements under a variety of statutes are not met—a consequence of weak or nonexistent enforcement. See supra note 14. With liability based on the duty of manufacturers both to consult the literature and also to perform all appropriate regulatory tests, as this Note urges, private parties will not only enforce their own rights in bringing toxic tort suits, but will aid in the policing and enforcement of a manufacturer's statutory responsibilities.
employ more traditional strict liability concepts to determine liability, weighing the costs of the uncertain hazardous risk which the product presented at the time of marketing against its apparent benefits to society. The jury will proscribe a product as "abnormally dangerous" if it makes both findings: 1) the manufacturer "should have known" of the hazardous nature of a product; and 2) the costs of the hazard outweighed its benefits to society at the time of marketing.

Although the cost/benefit approach to "abnormally dangerous" requires case by case inquiry, in most cases juries are likely to weigh the quantity and quality of animal studies and disaster or occupational reports existing at the time of marketing against the economic and social utility of the product at that time. These determinations do not involve complex numerical weighting, but require only that the jury consider qualitatively which sorts of risks society wishes to assimilate and which it chooses to deter.

Because it relies on deterring knowable but unreasonable risk, this "abnormally dangerous" standard also comports with traditional cost spreading notions. Manufacturers will be held liable for, and thus have financial incentives to internalize, the costs of the unreasonable and preventable risks which their products create. If, on the other hand, the jury determines that the benefits of the product are considerable, the product may still be marketed with adequate warnings to alert the user. When the

84. Factors to be considered include the normal expectations of the consumer as to the manner in which the product will be used, complexity of the procedures consumers must follow to use it, magnitude of the danger to which the user will be exposed, and likelihood of harm to the user. See Sales, The Duty To Warn and Instruct for Safe Use in Strict Tort Liability, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 521, 527 (1982).

85. The court in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984) (action against manufacturer of tetracycline drug for side effect of tooth discoloration) undertook a similar analysis of "abnormally dangerous," camouflaged as a discussion of strict liability:

[O]nce the defendant's knowledge of the defect is imputed, strict liability analysis becomes almost identical to negligence analysis in its focus on reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. [The standard is] would a person of reasonable intelligence or of the superior expertise of the defendant charged with such knowledge conclude that defendant should have alerted the consuming public?

Id. at 451-52, 479 A.2d at 385-86.


87. Warnings are adequate if they provide users with complete information regarding risks, see, e.g., Henderson, Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 946-48 (1981); but cf. Cooper, Freedom of Choice in the Real World, 34 FOOD DRUG COSM. L. J. 612, 618-23 (1979), but federally mandated warnings, standing alone, may not be adequate under the common law, see, e.g., Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1539-43 (EPA approved warnings on herbicide did not make warnings adequate as matter of law); Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 624 F.2d 652, 658 (1st Cir. 1981) (manufacturer held liable for failing to include warning that oral contraceptives
potentially dangerous nature of the product is within reasonable contemplation and knowledge of the user, however, the product may not need a warning.88

This "abnormally dangerous" standard will also avoid the evidentiary problems posed by trans-science. The current focus by courts on the viability of competing trans-scientific hypotheses, which attempt to quantify the untested effects of a substance on humans, will shift to negligence questions of reasonable conduct. Moreover, such conduct will be adjudicated in light of the published literature and the manufacturer's satisfactory completion of necessary tests—issues which are determinable. As a result, deterrence will be enhanced in a predictable manner by shifting the burden of proof to manufacturers who negligently market hazardous products, despite the trans-scientific inability to quantify such hazards with certainty.

In sum, basing liability on a qualitative showing of causality and on proof that the manufacturer acted negligently in marketing an "abnormally dangerous" product will provide a firm basis for deterrence while conforming to traditional tort requirements.89 It should also be noted that although the proposed liability standard is intended to address trans-scientific problems, its use need not be so limited.90 Revising the criteria upon which a shift in the burden of proof is based insures that negligent manufacturers must prove that a trans-scientific substance is safe. Thus, when the issue is no longer trans-scientific and the relevant epidemiological studies have been done, or when the manufacturer is able to prove that the product is not hazardous, that the product did not cause plaintiff's injury, or that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, then the manufacturer may rebut the presumption and shift the burden of proof back to plaintiff. Although this process may involve an additional burden shift in

taken in high dosages substantially increased risk of cerebral thrombosis, despite fact that existing warnings were drafted by FDA).


89. While this Note's proposal does set forth novel proof requirements for "abnormally dangerous" products and qualitative causation, these requirements comport with the basic goals of the strict liability doctrine—cost-spreading and incentives to maximize safety. See, e.g., Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 Hofstra L. Rev. 859, 905-06 (1981).

90. This proposed standard does not address one set of cases—those in which plaintiffs were injured by a hazardous substance but the manufacturer cannot be held negligent because detection of the hazardous nature of the product was beyond the capabilities of contemporary science. Though the victims deserve compensation, imposing liability on the manufacturer would obviously not further deterrence. But cf. supra note 81. When a strict liability theory would not provide compensation, the legislature may wish to intervene and provide a compensation fund for the victims of certain unforeseen risks which society chooses to incur in pursuit of technical innovations and scientific progress. For a brief discussion of such compensation funds, see Trauberman, Compensating Victims of Toxic Substances: An Analysis of Existing Federal Statutes, 7 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 3-4 (1981).
Trans-Science in Torts

cases where the most significant trans-scientific elements have been re-
solved, it does not affect the ultimate basis for imposing liability.

IV. CONCLUSION

Trans-science in toxic torts presents an obstacle in traditional tort litiga-
tion which not only produces confusing and inconsistent judgments, but
also makes it difficult or impossible to preserve the goal of deterrence. In
order to accommodate trans-science, the judicial framework must change.
A proposal for reform is suggested in which trans-scientific obstacles can
be circumvented by referring to more predictable notions of qualitative
causation and unreasonable conduct. By adopting such a proposal, the
courts may be able to reincorporate the principle of deterrence into the
adjudication of toxic torts.