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Popular Legal Culture: An Introduction

Stewart Macaulay†

The Storrs Lectures at Yale have produced sharply differing views of law. In 1974, Grant Gilmore said "[t]he function of law . . . is to provide a mechanism for the settlement of disputes in the light of broadly conceived principles on whose soundness, it must be assumed, there is a general consensus among us."1 Seven years later Clifford Geertz, the anthropologist, objected to Gilmore's concept of law.2 Law, Geertz argued, "is not a bounded set of norms, rules, principles, values, or whatever from which jural responses to distilled events can be drawn, but part of a distinctive manner of imagining the real."3 Geertz pointed to legal sensibil-

† Malcolm Pitman Sharp Professor, University of Wisconsin-Madison. Dr. Jacqueline Macaulay took time from her law practice to comment on this paper. She attributes the popularity of L.A. Law among lawyers to its portrayal of their fantasies of competence and power.

3. C. GEERTZ, supra note 2, at 173.
ity, a "complex of characterizations and imaginings, stories about events cast in imagery about principles. . ." Law, he insisted, is meaning and not machinery; moreover, we all live under the overlapping jurisdictions of a pluralism of legal meanings.5

The debate, of course, is between partisans of the most sophisticated approaches of legal scholars and those who demand that we look beyond legal scholarship to understand the place of law in society.6 Historically, the subject of legal studies has expanded constantly.7 Legal scholars began by arranging rules in logical patterns, turned to seeing rules as means to social ends, and then recognized that rules are only part of a legal system. However, many law professors experience vertigo when they open the doors and look outside appellate courtrooms. There is too much to look at, and it becomes difficult to produce elegant theories of law. Neither thick description nor statistics resolve normative choices.8 The functioning American legal system involves much that many law professors want to deny. Those whose personalities need order slam the door quickly and turn back to rules and great cases decided by elite appellate courts.

If we mustered our courage and lifted our eyes from the pages of appellate reports and books written by famous dead Europeans, what might we

4. Id. at 215.
5. Id. at 232.
6. Geertz does not admire legal scholarship: "[T]he issue that faces us is . . . how we need to think about legal process as a general phenomenon in the world, now that the pieties of natural law, the simplicities of legal positivism, or the evasions of legal realism no longer seem of very much help." Id. at 224.
7. Of course, my simplified story of legal scholarship is an example of transposing a messy history into a neat pattern of linear time. Thus, it is a first example of what Carol Greenhouse talks about in her article in this symposium. See Greenhouse, Just in Time: Temporality and the Cultural Legitimation of Law, 98 Yale L.J. 1631 (1989).
8. But see G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract (1974). Gilmore says, "Professor Stuart [sic] Macaulay . . . is no doubt entitled to rank as Lord High Executioner of the Contract is Dead School." Id. at 3, n.1. Gilmore asserts that leaders of this movement say that legal scholars should "engage in sociological analysis rather than in historical or philosophical synthesis. It is at this point that I find myself not so much in disagreement with their aims as completely uninterested in what they are doing." Id. at 3. Gilmore explains "when you have finished describing something, all you really have is a list. In itself the list is meaningless—a lot of trees waiting for someone to assemble them into a forest." Id. at 3. Gilmore forgets that empirical research never is merely descriptive because the researcher must decide what to describe of all that she experiences, and she will overlook all that her explicit or implicit theory fails to make relevant. Often empirical research into legal matters reveals that in the forests assembled by scholars, the trees have the blight or are creations of fantasy. Often this research shows there are other trees which form forests overlooked by scholars who rely on appellate cases as a sample of legal problems.

In using Gilmore as an example of legal scholars, I am flattering law professors. He was one of the best scholars of his generation. Shortly before his death, I pointed out to Grant that he was partially responsible for my eccentricities. In the summer of 1957, he was teaching commercial law and Nicholas Katzenbach was teaching contracts at the University of Chicago Law School. I was a Bigelow Teaching Fellow, and I had been hired to teach contracts at Wisconsin that coming fall. Gilmore and Katzenbach had coffee after class every day, and they invited me to join them. My first classes at Wisconsin drew heavily on what I learned from the Gilmore-Katzenbach discussions. A few years ago, I told Grant that if he had only drilled me more closely, I might never have strayed from the straight and narrow. He said that he was pleasantly surprised to discover that I actually taught a contracts course.
see Jerome Frank, with little success, long ago tried to provoke the academy to pay attention to trial judges. Members of the Law and Society Association, which celebrates its twenty-fifth birthday this June, have painted a picture of a legal system that rests on discretion and power and fosters bargaining in the shadow of the law. Several writers have noted the extent to which we live in a society characterized by legal pluralism and private government. Large areas of life are subject to private police, private rulemaking, and the sanctions generated by long-term continuing relationships.

The symposium which follows takes us down still another path, the one Geertz pointed to. He argued that thinking consists of “a traffic in . . . significant symbols . . . used to impose meaning upon experience.” “Culture patterns—religious, philosophical, aesthetic, scientific, ideological—are ‘programs’; they provide a template or blueprint for the organization of social and psychological processes . . . .” Popular legal culture is another template or blueprint which we should add to his list. We cannot ignore it if we wish to fashion theories that explain anything about law operating in society.

What templates or blueprints are suggested by the symposium which follows? The papers collected here show that the phrase “popular legal culture” can cover many things. Culture is not a tangible thing with easily identifiable boundaries. It is both ideas in people’s heads and the stock of symbols and stories recognized by at least some members of a group. Professional and lay legal cultures differ: We can distinguish messages which legal officials, law professors and political theorists send to the public about the legal system from legal ideas and symbols we might find if we surveyed the regulars at a tavern or parents watching children at a playground. Moreover, we should not expect to find a single coherent legal culture at a place or in a nation. We should not be surprised to discover that legal ideas differ as we consider class, gender, race, region, religion and the amount of direct experience people have with police officers, administrative agencies or courts.

9. We do not have to forget what we find in appellate reports and scholarly monographs. We must, however, reinterpret it in light of knowledge about actual legal systems in operation and legal culture.

10. See, e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949); see also Galanter, Adjudication, Litigation, and Related Phenomena, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 151 (L. Lipson & S. Wheeler eds. 1986).

11. For my view of what law and society research has established which must be recognized by those studying law, see Macaulay, Law and the Behavioral Sciences: Is There Any There There?, 6 LAW & POL’Y 149, 152-55 (1984).


The articles in this symposium argue that popular legal culture may be
due to their discussions of sources of popular
culture; these sources range from personal experience to fiction. We might expect, although little evidence is offered here, that some
sources are more influential than others.

Most of us get some ideas about law from direct personal experience.
We pay taxes, and we encounter tax forms, instructions, procedures and
the other trappings of bureaucracy. We have driver’s licenses, and we
were introduced to another bureaucracy when we first applied for one and
when we renewed our applications. Many of us have received traffic ticket,
and the experience introduced us to the role of law-breaker. Some
have bought or sold real estate, made a will, sought a divorce or gone to a
small claims court. Experience is a great teacher, but we must ask what
these experiences teach.

Barbara Yngvesson looks at what legal professionals see as the not-
really-legal demands citizens make to courts. She points to an important
part of popular legal culture and tells us that people
come to the court with a range of problems, from the quarrels of
parents and children, lovers, neighbors, or other intimates, to conflict
with employers, local companies, landlords and others. For these
people, their understanding of “legal rights” involves the right “to
touch who is on one’s property and what happens on one’s prop-
erty...[and] rights not to be insulted, harased, or hit by neigh-
bors or family members without sufficient reason.”

Local courts respond by treating these demands as garbage cases. Clerks
and Small Claims Court Commissioners steer parties away from the
courtroom, and into coercive mediation, or towards dropping the suit. We
can guess that those who sought vindication of rights were not pleased by
these encounters.

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15. Cf. Cox & White, Traffic Citations and Student Attitudes Toward the Police: An Examination of Selected Interaction Dynamics, 16 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 105 (1988). Cox and White found that among university students tested, “receiving a traffic citation is associated with negative evaluations of police conduct, specifically, perceptions that the police sometimes behaved in abusive, even brutal ways and that these perceptions likely lower the level of citizen trust and security in the police.” Id. at 108.


17. Compare Alschuler, Mediation With a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for A Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808 (1986) (arguing that Americans are coerced to abandon their rights and settle disputes when they should be able to vindicate such rights in court) with Gibelman & Demone, The Social Worker as Mediator In the Legal System, 70 SOC. CASEWORK: J. CONTEMP. SOC. WORK 28 (1989) (arguing that mediation is positi-
shared problem solving as contrasted with adversarial procedures which impose resolutions on win-
ers and losers).
Peggy Davis' analysis of microaggressions against blacks reminds us that part of popular legal culture is formed by actual encounters with the legal system.\textsuperscript{18} Most of us have been ignored, treated rudely or had our contributions devalued by those in authority. Taken individually, these unpleasant encounters are but annoyances—what Davis calls microaggressions. However, when they happen regularly, and seemingly on the basis of one's race, class or gender, people learn that they should not expect to be treated fairly. When lawyers, jurors, judges, and others act condescendingly to blacks, and do so regularly, cynical awareness replaces legitimacy. One observer called this the Saturn's Rings Phenomenon.\textsuperscript{19} Saturn's rings are made of tiny particles of dust, particles that would cause little damage if we encountered only a few. But passage through rings of uncountable particles of dust is a bruising, painful and scarring experience for both a spaceship and a person.

Austin Sarat and William Felstiner take us to another setting where popular legal culture is formed.\textsuperscript{20} Lawyers educate their clients about the functioning legal system, and Sarat and Felstiner suggest that divorce clients, at least, do not like what they learn. Capricious judges, rather than rights and rules, control. Even when a client wins a judgment or a court order, it may not be effective. Ex-spouses fail to pay child support, and ex-spouses deny the non-custodial parent his or her right to see the children. Little can be done about it.

Adjudication is characterized by costs and delay. As is so often true, the American legal system promises justice and delivers a deal. Some get good deals, but it is hard to buy off people who see themselves as entitled to vindicate their rights. Client conferences become occasions for doses of legal realism, or cynicism, debunking the myth that law is a search for justice. As the number of divorced people increases, we can expect dissatisfaction to have a major influence on popular legal culture.

Arguably, in providing their clients with this taste of legal reality, lawyers demystify the legal system. This, however, does not empower most divorce clients.\textsuperscript{21} Clients may be given choices, but none of them offer what clients want. Indeed, the reality of the divorce system makes an aware client more dependent on his or her lawyer's skill at navigating past the reefs of discretion, bias and caprice, and at negotiating with an

\textsuperscript{21} But cf. D. Rosenthal, \textit{Law and Client: Who's in Charge?} (1974). Rosenthal classified personal injury clients as active or passive. He found that active clients who played a role in the resolution of their case got better recoveries from their legal claims, and they better protected their emotional interests as well.
unreasonable lawyer on the other side. At least in the area of divorce, it
may not be enough to change clients' expectations and ideas about the
legal system if we want to empower them. Perhaps nothing less than ma-
ajor structural change would empower them. Perhaps the changes would
have to come from far beyond the legal system.

We do not learn everything by direct personal experience. Legal offi-
cials and intellectuals who rationalize society tell stories which show that
the legal process is necessary, acceptable or just. Some might accept those
stories. Carol Greenhouse writes about a theory that appellate courts and
their interpreters offer to justify adjudication. This theory challenges
American common sense about time. The law has been, is, and always
will be there. Judges serve this timeless law, not interests or power. Su-
preme Court decisions are unrelated to such events as the elections of
Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan or to Jimmy Carter's lack of an op-
opportunity to appoint anyone. Judicial succession tests this story. "All as-
pects—biographical and political—of becoming a Justice are symbolically
suppressed. Those aspects are precisely the ones that would (though they
cannot) resolve the indeterminacies linking the times of the individual, the
law and the nation in relation to the power of the presidency and the
Congress." For example, the Senate hearings on President Reagan's
nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court became a morality play
attempting to hide a power struggle. Bork's opponents pictured him as a
man who would rely on his own eccentric views of what law ought to be
rather than act as an instrument of modern American tradition. Bork at-
ttempted to paint himself as a mainstream neutral who would bring little
to the Court other than his outstanding intellectual and technical skills.
We might use Greenhouse's approach to analyze the messages sent out by
the White House, the Senate Democrats, and Judge Bork himself.

Courts also use judicial opinions to send messages attempting to legiti-
mate their actions. Professors, newspaper columnists, politicians and law-
yers may translate the messages and offer their interpretations to the in-
terested public. Peggy Davis suggests that at least some blacks have
learned that the present Supreme Court of the United States is insensitive
to, if not biased against, their interests. They do not see the present major-
ity applying timeless law. Rather, justices appointed by right-wing presi-
dents seem to be carrying out a racist mandate that elected and reelected
those presidents. If the assumptions underlying legal opinions are foreign
to members of a particular audience, these people will see the authors as

23. Id. at 1649.
24. Karl Llewellyn offered a somewhat different story than the one analyzed by Greenhouse to
legitimate bounded judicial discretion within which a judge's "situation-sense" might operate. See K.
fools or knaves. Legal rhetoric legitimates the legal system only for those who accept the case made by such rhetoric as honest and plausible.

Davis discusses the Supreme Court’s opinion in the *McCleskey* case.26 There the Court rejected the empirical work of Baldus, Pulaski and Woodworth26 concerning bias in Georgia’s use of the death penalty.27 Baldus and his associates found what many blacks thought was obvious, but Justice Powell imposed a very high burden of proof to avoid accepting what many blacks just knew was so.

For another example of Davis’ point, consider Professor Charles Lawrence’s discussion of *City of Memphis v. Greene*:28

The city of Memphis, acting at the behest of white property owners, erected a barrier which closed the main thoroughfare between an all-white enclave and a predominantly black area of the city. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, examined the evidence developed at trial and concluded that the decision was motivated by an interest in protecting the safety and tranquility of a residential neighborhood. *One reads Justice Stevens’s words with incredulity: Could he really believe what he says? Did this man grow up in the same United States of American that I did?* There is hardly a black in the country who would not agree with Justice Marshall that the city’s action was “nothing more than ‘one more of the many humiliations which society has historically visited’ on Negro citizens.”29

Both Davis and Lawrence remind us that the stories courts tell in imagining the real work only some of the time with some people. Indeed, it is possible that Professors Davis’s and Lawrence’s angry reactions to the Supreme Court’s opinions are magnified by the Court’s claim of timeless judicial neutrality.

Most Americans, however, learn about their legal system even more indirectly. They have little personal experience with law and lawyers. Few people ever read the text of appellate opinions or statutes. Few of us ride in a squad car, play any role in litigation or participate in administrative decisionmaking. Newspapers and television news, however, take us

27. The Law and Society Association gave the Baldus project its Harry Kalven Prize for excellence after the Supreme Court’s opinion, and the negative comment on the Court’s opinion was quite intentional. LSA’s citation said, “history will look back on this work as extremely significant on the issues of the death penalty even if the present Supreme Court cannot appreciate its utility.”
to some parts of the legal system in operation. Nevertheless, news is not social science, and journalists do not offer a representative sample of the work of the legal system. Sometimes they even misreport what happens.

Moreover, most Americans read mystery novels or watch films or television that deal with dramatic aspects of the legal system. Schattenberg suggests that police and private-detective television programs send information about moral boundaries as public hangings once did. One common message is that the appropriate punishment for being a bad guy is to have police officers administer capital punishment without a trial in a shoot-out. However, Lawrence Friedman cautions that we cannot tell what people make of books, film and television programs just by reading and watching them ourselves. He sees a complex interrelationship between popular culture, the functioning legal system, and the ideas that books, films and television shows attempt to sell. Armchair self-analysis of our own reaction is not enough. People will deconstruct Miami Vice or Hill Street Blues for themselves in light of the way they imagine the real.

Friedman and Stephen Gillers look at L.A. Law, a television program which is surprisingly popular in the United States and many countries abroad. Charles Rosenberg, legal advisor to L.A. Law, responds to Giller's paper. Both Friedman and Gillers agree that the program portrays lawyers and the law unrealistically. However, Friedman argues "[t]he lawyers of L.A. Law are caricatures; but caricatures are always caricatures of something, and that something has to be real." Gillers defends the program against several charges of its critics. At its best, he says, the program is a series of moral questions that can be developed dramatically in a legal setting. He asks, "[w]hat difference does it make if McKenzie, Brackman lawyers consistently ignore the rules of evidence or if they make speeches to witnesses when they should be asking questions?" Gillers has more doubt about L.A. Law's handling of ethical questions. Nonetheless, he points to examples where "L.A. Law has taken a hard, ambiguous ethical problem and portrayed it in a serious, dramatic way without making it seem self-evident and without pretending to have solved it." Finally, Gillers asks whether L.A. Law's influence is constructive. His answer is mixed. However, he emphasizes that L.A. Law provides wonderful if unrealistic role models:

33. Friedman, supra note 31, at 1601.
35. Id. at 1614-15.
With a nearly subversive zeal, the writers and producers have populated the show's legal terrain with a rainbow coalition of characters. Women, blacks, Latinos, Asian-Americans, and individuals of various sexual orientation are shown as lawyers, judges and other persons of achievement.98

Others may construe the portrait of the rainbow coalition less favorably than Gillers.97 Friedman suggests that Americans have a love-hate view of lawyers. Some lawyers champion individuals' claims to justice, and the public applauds if it agrees with these claims. Other lawyers champion unpopular causes or serve their own interests while manipulating the legal system for the undeserving, and the public hisses and boos. Or do some people admire crafty and unscrupulous lawyers who exercise great power? Would it make any difference if J.R. on Dallas had been presented as a lawyer?98 Such questions are far easier to ask than to answer.

Gillers and Friedman can only can offer plausible suggestions about the influence of L.A. Law. We simply do not know how Americans interpret the series and why it is so popular. Rosenberg thinks Gillers may overstate the influence of the show. Rosenberg argues that Americans can distinguish fact from fiction: "[I]t is part of our culture to learn from an early age what is story and what is not. If you doubt this, ask any five year old if there are really thousand foot beanstalks and giants."99 Perhaps Rosenberg is right, but L.A. Law sends few signals that it is fantasy; it looks very real. L.A. Law's messages are complex.

Judge Richard Posner continues his new-found role as literary critic and confronts Tom Wolfe's best-selling novel, The Bonfire of the Vanities.40 He finds that the book adds little to our knowledge about how lay people view the law. He says that the book follows little to our knowledge about how lay people view the law. He says that Wolfe follows better books in arguing:

[the public] expect[s] technicalities to matter . . . [t]hey are not surprised when miscarriages of justice occur . . . [t]hey expect legal proceedings to be interminable and excruciatingly expensive; and . . . they are unillusioned about the moral and intellectual qualities of judges, lawyers, jurors, and other participants in the machinery of
legal justice, and about the corrosion of that machinery by political and personal ambitions and fears.\textsuperscript{41} Judge Posner questions whether Americans really view "their legal system in quite so bleak a light."\textsuperscript{42} Again, we might remember Friedman's comment about \textit{L.A. Law}. He saw it as a caricature, but continued "caricatures are always caricatures of something, and that something has to be real."\textsuperscript{43} The judge is right when he insists that whether Wolfe reflects popular legal culture is unclear.\textsuperscript{44} But the American audience can recognize these themes, and this suggests that there might be some there there to investigate.

This symposium raises many important questions concerning popular legal culture, a topic far too broad to exhaust in seven articles. For example, we might ask what people learn in school about law, rules, lawyers and the legal system. Here we must look at both the open and the hidden curriculum. School textbooks offer a very simple and formal view of law when they mention it at all. However, school children learn to cope with or evade authority, decide whether and when to cheat, and pick up practical views about the interplay of rights and power as they interact with administrators, teachers, coaches, and other students. We might expect that attitudes developed from encountering the micro- and the macro-aggressions of the powerful at school would be sharpened by the contrast between experience and the fantasies found in schoolbooks and in class. We might guess that those who learn to cheat on multiple-choice examinations in school are more likely than others to violate traffic laws and evade taxes later in life. This guess might be entirely wrong, but the question is worth considering.

Americans also learn from sports about breaking rules or honoring them in form but not in substance. Part of the lesson is taught in school and part by sports programs on television. Professional baseball, for example, honors tricking and intimidating umpires. A cynic might speculate that American intercollegiate athletics shows that many universities act as if they honored only the amoral principle: "Don't get caught!"\textsuperscript{45} Gambling on professional sports is illegal in almost all states. Nonetheless, newspapers regularly publish the current odds, and CBS Television long offered Jimmy The Greek, a former gambler giving us the inside dope

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{41} \textit{Id.} at 1659.
\bibitem{42} \textit{Id.} at 1659-60.
\bibitem{43} Friedman, \textit{supra} note 31, at 1601.
\bibitem{44} Posner, \textit{supra} note 40, at 1660.
\bibitem{45} An Associated Press poll shows that more than 55 percent of Americans suspect universities and athletic booster clubs of frequently making under-the-table payments to players. Half the respondents thought that professors commonly gave student athletes higher grades than they deserve so they could continue to compete. Thirty-two percent doubted that this occurs, and 18 percent were unsure. Wis. State Journal, April 3, 1989, at 2D, cols. 1-2.
\end{thebibliography}
about professional football. This, too, may be an important part of popular legal culture.

Then we might look at what political campaigns teach about law. Again our cynic might conclude that recent campaigns taught citizens that due process and civil liberties are slogans for those who champion the interests of criminals and that the death penalty is the solution to most of our civic dilemmas. Furthermore, campaigns for judicial office have become increasingly political. We can wonder how far the successful campaign against Chief Justice Rose Bird in California undercut the legitimation myth analyzed by Greenhouse.

Most of the articles in this symposium identify a source of information about legal matters and then consider the explicit and implicit messages being sent out at that place. However, all teachers who have read final examinations know that not every thing sent out is received exactly as intended. Listeners and readers must make sense out of what they perceive, and their experience colors their perceptions and interpretations. Yngvesson argues that, on one hand, legal professionals are empowered by their capacity to reveal rights and define wrongs, to construct a meaning of everyday events and thus to influence cultural understandings of fairness, of justice, and of morality. On the other hand, she tells us, law is invented, negotiated or made in local settings.

Both propositions are undoubtedly true to some unknown extent. We can draw an analogy to classic jazz. Composers such as Gershwin, Porter, and Berlin wrote songs which jazz musicians reinvented in many ways. Moreover, George and Ira Gershwin composed Porgy and Bess, an

46. Yngvesson discusses ideas of scholars such as Bourdieu. See Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 Hastings L.J. 805 (1987) (R. Terdiman trans.). Bourdieu asserts that "[l]aw is the quintessential form of the symbolic power of naming that creates the things named, and creates social groups in particular. It confers upon the reality which arises from its classificatory operations the maximum permanence that any social entity has the power to confer upon another, the permanence which we attribute to objects." Id. at 838. However, he continues, "[s]ymbolic acts of naming achieve their power of creative utterance to the extent, and only to the extent, that they propose principles of vision and division objectively adapted to the preexisting divisions of which they are products." Id. at 839. Naming works "only to the extent that the law is socially recognized and meets with agreement, even if only tacit and partial, because it corresponds, at least apparently, to real needs and interests." Id. at 840.

I think it is clear that we must take Bourdieu as saying that legal professionals have the power to attempt to construct the meaning of everyday events and influence cultural understandings of justice. However, not all their attempts succeed. If we were to read Bourdieu without noticing the important qualifications to his argument, he would seem to say that once the Supreme Court decided that states must desegregate schools, stop school prayers and allow abortions, then everyone accepted these decisions as statements of what was morally proper. While the Court's decisions put all these matters on the public agenda, Bourdieu does not say that "law creates the social world [simply] by naming it." Yngvesson, supra note 16, at 5.

47. Compare Karl Llewellyn's statement: "[w]ho in the literature or in the classroom has followed up the implications of Jerome Frank's insight that a court 'reads' a statute as a performing violinist "reads" his music or an actor 'reads' his part?" K. LLEWELLYN, The Study of Law as a Liberal Art, in JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 375, 390 (1962). I think jazz is a better metaphor. Violinists and actors tend to stay closer to the score and the script than jazz musicians to a songwriter's composition. In my view, Americans freely improvise on the law.
opera about black experience. Duke Ellington found the opera offensive. Ellington's piano version of *Summertime* is a bitter parody. The Gershwins might attempt to define black experience, but Ellington spit it back in their faces. Nonetheless, to parody *Summertime*, Ellington had to refer to Gershwin's score sufficiently so that listeners could hear what he was doing.

Similarly, judges and legal scholars compose the law of the law schools and treatises, and legislators score statutes. However, lawyers, trial judges, court commissioners, political candidates, office holders, clients, and even people standing at a working class bar are all jazz performers. They play variations on legal themes, and sometimes attempt to put new melodies to the chords. Occasionally, people such as candidates for office or newspaper columnists offer bitter parodies of appellate opinions and legislation.

Individuals in their everyday activities have an amazing variety of ways of bending the seemingly inflexible rules governing these activities. Harris, in an attack on purely cultural explanations of human societies, argues that we have rules for breaking rules. He also argues that we have rules about breaking the rules about breaking the rules. He continues:

> no matter how deviant or unexpected the act, a psychologically intact human being can always appeal to some set of rules someone else will recognize as legitimate, although perhaps as misinterpreted or misapplied.

Moreover, legal officials can reinvent the law by playing variations on its themes. Those at the trial level have a great deal of discretion. Legal rules are ambiguous or contradictory and allow improvisation. Judges and jurors can find or fudge the facts to make a case come out the right way, and some trial judges just refuse to play the tunes composed by appellate courts and legislatures. Of course, they could be reversed if the case were appealed, but cost barriers often mean that a local legal official's decision will be final. Legal scholars assume, without thinking much about it, that there is a law of Connecticut and that this thing will be enforced in all courts throughout the state. Lawyers recognize that each courthouse has its own quaint native customs. The quaint natives—the judges, clerks, secretaries, social workers, local lawyers and others—improvise on or parody the themes found in the reporters and statutes.

Few of the essays in this symposium seek to establish what Americans actually learn about what is necessary, acceptable or just from such things

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as the Bork hearings, implausible Supreme Court opinions, contact with lawyers, jury duty, episodes of *L.A. Law*, or *The Bonfire of the Vanities*. As Friedman notes:

> [t]he statements made in the text are, of course, not backed up by authority; they are interpretations of what I see and feel in society, and they stand on no better or worse plane than statements an anthropologist might make after years of thinking and living inside some distant culture. It is not that such statements are inherently beyond evidence or proof; the void is an empirical void, not a theoretical void. Unless and until the gap is filled, the only test of the correctness of an interpretation of culture is whether it produces a harmonic ringing in the reader's brain.51

We are just beginning the necessary empirical study of popular legal culture.52 Empirical work is neither easy nor cheap. Before risking the necessary resources, we must consider what questions we want to answer and whether those answers are likely to matter. This symposium is an important step in that direction.

What difference might popular legal culture make? When we know something for sure about it, what will we know? Friedman argues that if we wish to construct social theories of law, popular legal culture is of fundamental importance. Most of these theories now ignore or gloss over the way in which social forces actually affect the legal system. The American legal system has very open borders compared to most others. We elect judges or they are appointed by elected officials. We elect prosecutors, and the police are more or less accountable to political authority. Ordinary people serve as jurors, and their role affects decisions to prosecute, plea bargain and settle. Those running for and occupying public office commission and watch public opinion polls. Legislators hesitate to offend even a political minority which feels intensely about an issue, and legislators are eager to champion a popular cause. Thus, there are many paths along which popular legal culture influences legal action. Friedman concludes, "legal culture makes law. . . . [and] social forces, social movements, social change—and social statics—lead to legal change."53

This story does not claim that law necessarily represents the will of the people in anything but a rhetorical sense. The powerful can manipulate, transform or deflect legal culture in many situations. Well-paid intellectuals, both in and out of the academy, can be seen as working to rationalize

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51. Friedman, *supra* note 31, at 1586 n.11.
legal policies that defend the haves. Nor does the story necessarily suggest that legal culture is good. A lynch mob can be viewed as an expression of a legal culture, and Nazi Germany had a legal culture too.

Legal culture also includes what people see as necessary, acceptable or just, and this may be the basis for their support of the legal system. These ideas may affect how specific legal rules or the operating legal system affect society. Too often we write as if we think citizens are puppets attached to strings held by legislators and judges. However, we have far too few police, IRS auditors, customs inspectors and other administrative personnel to watch everyone always. We think of ourselves as a law-abiding nation, and we say we are not a “Banana Republic.” Yet we know that most Americans drive faster than the speed limit, many cut corners when they fill out their income tax returns, some bribe legal officials for favorable treatment, and others buy or sell illegal drugs. At best, we are selectively law abiding; we do not “really” cheat, we just cut a few corners. We have only begun to ask what working rules Americans follow, how we rationalize other-than-strict compliance, and how far we will go when there is a good chance that we will not be caught. Popular legal culture should supply some of the answers. And those questions are at least as worthy of attention as the mailbox or consideration rules so celebrated in contracts courses required in all law schools.

Finally, the study of popular legal culture has another major virtue—it promises to be fun. I think what lay people think lawyers do day to day is at least as interesting as legal rules. We may choose to put aside our latest issue of the Harvard Law Review, or even, for that matter, the Yale Law Journal, and watch an episode of L.A. Law. As I have said before, “[p]erhaps, best of all, I no longer need feel guilty as I watch the Badgers, Bucks, Brewers, and Packers struggle with so little success. It’s not wasting time. It’s research.”

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55. Many Central Americans might find our claim to be particularly offensive when we use this phrase. North Americans forget that insofar as there is truth in the image connoted by the term “Banana Republic,” North Americans are largely responsible for creating that truth. Most of us would do well to remember Neruda’s The United Fruit Company. P. Neruda, Five Decades: A Selection (Poems: 1925–1970) 78 (B. Belit ed. 1974).
56. But compare Harris’s view: “Rules facilitate, motivate, and organize our behavior; they do not govern or cause it. The causes of behavior are to be found in the material conditions of social life. The conclusion to be drawn from the abundance of ‘unless’ and ‘except’ clauses is not that people behave in order to conform to rules, but they select or create rules appropriate for their behavior.” M. Harris, Cultural Materialism: The Struggle for a Science of Culture 275 (1980).