Thomas I. Emerson: Pillar of the Bill of Rights

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I

Thomas I. Emerson graduated from Yale Law School in 1931. He died this summer, sixty years after receiving his LL.B. In six decades as a lawyer, Tom enjoyed two distinguished—and closely-linked—careers. The mold for Tom’s two careers was set in his two years of New York practice following law school. The small firm at which Tom was an associate from 1931 to 1933 was Engelhard, Pollak, Pitcher & Stern. The partners Tom chiefly worked for were Walter Pollak and Carl Stern.1 Pollak and Stern were heavily engaged in bringing to the Supreme Court the pathbreaking right-to-counsel case, Powell v. Alabama,2 the first round of the Scottsboro Cases.3 It was the right apprenticeship for Tom Emerson.

Tom’s first career was as a government lawyer. In 1933, Tom left New York practice to go to Washington. He was one of the cohort of young lawyers who entered government service after Franklin Roosevelt’s election to help the new President fashion the New Deal. Tom started out as an attorney for the National Recovery Administration. And then, in quick steps, he moved to successively higher levels of responsibility at the National Labor Relations Board, the Social Security Board, and the Department of Justice. After American entry into World War II, Tom moved to the Office of Price Administration, first as general counsel and then as deputy administrator for enforcement. In 1945, Tom was named general counsel of the Office of Economic Stabilization and, a few months later, general counsel of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion.

In 1946, when Tom, a veteran of thirteen years of government service, retired from the public practice of law, he was all of thirty-nine.
Tom left Washington to return to Yale and start his second career—a career which was to span some forty years until, when Tom was in his late seventies, debilitating illness caught up with him. As teacher, scholar, public citizen, and occasional Supreme Court advocate, Tom—New Deal liberal and uncompromising champion of individual liberty—was the academic embodiment of the Bill of Rights.

II

There was nothing flashy about Tom’s teaching. An Emerson class—like Tom himself—was solid, intelligent, and powerful. Each day’s class discussion built with precision on what had gone before. At the end of the course, one’s class notes disclosed a strong edifice.

A characteristic aspect of Tom’s quiet teaching was his resolute unwillingness to use his classroom lectern as a “bully pulpit.” Of course, Tom was always prepared to confront, and explore in detail, the policy implications demonstrably inherent in a particular doctrinal position. But, apart from those obligatory issues, it was hard going to get that man of strong convictions to state those convictions—in class.

Outside of class, Tom was ready to—and did—engage. Over the lunch table at the Yale Commons; or when speaking under the banner of the ACLU or the Lawyers Guild; or, on the campaign trail, as Connecticut gubernatorial candidate of the Progressive Party; or as a panelist in the Law School Auditorium on Alumni Weekend; or at the bar, as counsel for an unpopular client; or in his writings—whatever the forum, Tom took, and stood, his ground.

III

A

In 1952—with Joe McCarthy on the rise, and the question of the constitutionality of racial segregation in public schools looming on the Supreme Court’s docket—the first of Tom Emerson’s two major scholarly works appeared. The work was a casebook, *Political and Civil Rights in the United States*, co-authored by David Haber. To the shame of the American law professoriate, it must be acknowledged that before the publication of the Emerson-Haber casebook no such field of systematic pedagogy and scholarship existed. As Robert Hutchins put it in his preface to the book, “This is the only comprehen-

sive collection of cases and materials on the most important subject in the world today."

In their introduction, Tom Emerson and David Haber did not undertake to advertise their book in the properly expansive terms employed by Hutchins. But they managed, with quiet eloquence, to make plain the significance of the problems canvassed in the book. Bearing in mind that the book was published just two years before Brown v. Board of Education, one cannot escape the weight of the following words:

The present status of the United States in the world today introduces a new factor into all our decisions on issues of political and civil rights. Our claim to moral leadership in world affairs is based in large part upon our principles and practices of individual freedom and equality. This is perhaps our major contribution and our principal appeal to the world. Hence the eyes of all peoples are upon us in all we do or fail to do to advance freedom among our own people. No decision we make, particularly in the area of racial equality, can ignore this direct impact upon our world position.

In the years that followed, Tom concentrated more and more of his enormous energy on problems of free speech and free press. In 1957, he persuaded the Supreme Court to set aside the New Hampshire contempt conviction of Paul Sweezy, the Marxist economist. Sweezy's conviction was based on his refusal to answer certain questions propounded by the New Hampshire Attorney General about the Progressive Party, about lectures Sweezy had given at the University of New Hampshire, and about Sweezy's own political beliefs, including whether he believed in Communism. The New Hampshire Attorney General asked the questions in his role "as a one-man legislative committee," pursuant to the New Hampshire legislature's Joint Resolution Relating to the Investigation of Subversive Activities. Chief Justice Warren's plurality opinion in Sweezy found that the state legislative mandate establishing the state's attorney general as a legislative investigative committee did not adequately define the permitted lines of inquiry.

On the same day, and on somewhat similar grounds, the Court in Watkins v. United States set aside the contempt conviction of a House Un-American Activities Committee witness who had refused to answer certain questions.

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5. Id. at iii.
7. EMERSON & HABER, supra note 4, at xi.
9. Id. at 237.
10. Id. at 235.
Taken together, *Watkins* and *Sweezy* imposed substantial and desirable procedural constraints on legislative investigations into areas of political association and opinion. Even more significant, however, than Chief Justice Warren's plurality opinion in *Sweezy* was the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter. Writing for himself and Justice Harlan, Frankfurter went beyond the procedural concerns that the Chief Justice found paramount, and addressed frontally the First Amendment implications of inquiry into political activities and associations and into the contents of lectures delivered at a university. In effect, Tom Emerson's powerful argument in *Sweezy* was mid-wife to one of Frankfurter's most significant utterances on political and academic freedom.\(^{12}\)

In 1966, Tom published *Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment*. This important essay was the precursor of *The System of Freedom of Expression*. That work of fundamental scholarship, published in 1970, is the North Star from which today's First Amendment mariners take their bearings.

IV

Fowler Harper, Tom's long-time Yale colleague, died of cancer on January 8, 1965. During his illness, Harper had asked his friend to take over as chief counsel for two Connecticut residents who were appealing to the United States Supreme Court from criminal convictions that had been affirmed by the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors. The appellants were Estelle Griswold and C. Lee Buxton, who were, respectively, Executive Director and Medical Director of New Haven's Planned Parenthood Center. They had been convicted of violating Connecticut's anti-contraceptive-use statute by providing contraceptive information and medical guidance to various married persons who had come to the Center for advice about birth control. Tom of course agreed to take over the case, and at once, in partnership with Catherine Roraback, went to work on the brief, putting into compelling form the arguments that were to bring victory in *Griswold v. Connecticut*—one of the most influential constitutional decisions of the second half of the twentieth century.\(^{13}\) *Griswold*

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\(^{13}\) 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

\(^{14}\) I have previously had occasion to assess the problems of advocacy Tom Emerson faced in fashioning the *Griswold* brief. See Louis H. Pollak, *Thomas I. Emerson, Lawyer and Scholar: Ipse Custodiet Custodes*, 84 YALE L.J. 638, 640-53 (1975).

On oral argument in *Griswold*, the shortness of time prevented Tom from developing at any length the privacy issues that were, in one form or another, to be central to the plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Given the line of doctrinal development in cases that followed *Griswold* and led to *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), it is interesting to note the lawyerly care with which, in response to the questions put during the rebuttal portion of the *Griswold* argument, Tom distinguished anti-contraceptive-use statutes from statutes regulating abortion. See 61 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 452-53 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).

Tom may not have won *Griswold* on oral argument, but he certainly avoided losing it. On the other hand, counsel for the State of Connecticut may well have clinched defeat in the following colloquy, *id* at
THE COURT: Mr. Clark, what you’re touching on now leads me to ask: What is the purpose of this legislation in Connecticut? Your basic argument in your brief, and so far in your oral argument, is that this is well within the so-called police power of the State of Connecticut. What is its purpose?

MR. CLARK: If Your Honor please, I think its purpose is to—

THE COURT: To increase the population of Connecticut, or to impair its decrease, or—

MR. CLARK: If Your Honor please, I do not hold that it is to increase the population of Connecticut. I don’t think that we could make this claim.

THE COURT: What is it? What is the purpose of this legislation?

MR. CLARK: I think that it’s to reduce the chances of immorality, if Your Honor please, and I use the word “immorality” here in a broad sense—that is, in one way, to act as a deterrent to sexual intercourse outside of the marital relationship.

THE COURT: Well, the only trouble with that argument is that, on this record, this involves only married women.

MR. CLARK: This is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So how can you make that argument?

MR. CLARK: Well, if Your Honor please, on this record, that the statute is a valid exercise of the police power.

THE COURT: For what purpose?

MR. CLARK: If Your Honor please, on this record, there is a distinction and there has to be a distinction between birth control and the use of contraceptives. That is to say that all contraceptives involve birth control, but in order to practice so-called birth control one does not have to use contraceptives, and that the State is able to take this position and able to make this distinction, that there are—if it be said, well, should married people be allowed to use these devices, would this not—is not the State going too far? I think the State can answer to that that there are other methods available to married people.

THE COURT: For what purpose under its police power, assuming we’re dealing now with married couples?

MR. CLARK: Well, if Your Honor please, going back, Connecticut in the Nelson case cited the Byrne case in New York, and one of the reasons cited by the Connecticut court and the Byrne case was that, as a matter of act, it would not be improper for the legislature to consider that Connecticut, as any State, has the right to look out for its own continuation. This is the population argument. I personally am not too happy with it, but—

THE COURT: Well, what argument are you happy with?

MR. CLARK: I think, if Your Honor please, the only argument we can honestly say is that this is a question of pure power.

THE COURT: Well, do you think the State of Connecticut could prevent marriage?

MR. CLARK: I think the State of Connecticut would prevent marriage in certain people, certain groups, yes. If Your Honor please, between idiots, say, or age in marriage. I think, if Your Honor please—
complements Tom’s two landmark books. Together they form a triad of exemplary jurisprudential accomplishment.

V

On December 15 of this year we will celebrate the 200th anniversary of the Bill of Rights. On that day we would do well to ponder what Tom Emerson and David Haber wrote thirty-nine years ago, in the introduction to their book:

The mechanisms of democracy, up to now, have on the whole operated well in the United States. We have applied them with confidence and growing skill. And the results, taken as a whole, have been as good as Milton foresaw they could be. Our people, with significant exceptions, have been more free to live and work and play than probably any other people in history. The nation as a whole has prospered. We have remained an alert and vigorous people, reasonably tolerant, ready to experiment, improvise and adjust. The crucial question before us now is whether, under the new conditions of the modern world which press upon us, we can continue to maintain the practices of democratic freedom or whether we shall abandon them for a stagnant and servile existence.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{15. EMERSON \& HABER, supra note 4, at xi-xii.}
Writings of Thomas Irwin Emerson†

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77 POL. SCI. 267 (1962) (reviewing OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR POLITICAL ENDS (1961)).


34 TUL. L. REV. 857 (1960) (reviewing S.A. DE SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1959)).

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58 YALE L.J. 1414 (1949) (reviewing HORACE E. READ & JOHN W. MACDONALD, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (1948)).

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