SECURITY MEASURES AND FREEDOM OF THOUGHT: 
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF 
LOYALTY AND SECURITY PROGRAMS*

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I. INTRODUCTION

The present international conflict which splits the world into two hostile camps is generally interpreted as a threat to the national security of this country. Whether one sees at the root of this conflict predominantly economic factors or a conflict of ideas, or both, the cold war is to a large extent understood as an ideological conflict. The threat to the national security has resulted in adding to measures of physical security others designed to deal with the possibility of an enemy from within, who might convey vital information to a potential national enemy.

The consequences of these protective procedures form the subject of a continuous national debate, in which arguments on all sides are based more on the discussants' values and convictions than on factual knowledge. This is necessarily the case because such knowledge is not available.

Scope and Function of this Exploratory Study

The aim of this exploratory study is to suggest avenues of research which, if pursued, should lift the discussion of loyalty and security measures out of the arena of political accusation and counter-accusation into the sphere of scientific inquiry. It may help to acquire the knowledge necessary for a rational

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1. General MacArthur in his speech to the joint meeting of Congress on April 19, 1951, presented the economic interpretation when he said in talking about the people of Asia: “World ideologies play little part in Asian thinking and are little understood. What the people strive for is the opportunity for a little more food in their stomachs, a little better clothing on their backs, a little firmer roof over their heads, and the realization of the normal nationalist urge for political freedom.” N. Y. Times, April 20, 1951, p. 4, col. 4.
appraisal of the situation. There are, of course, many possible approaches to such a study. The expert in international relations might inquire into the seriousness of the war danger; the political scientist and public administrator might study the effectiveness of the protective measures on the actual security of the country, or, with help from the legal profession, investigate the adequacy of administrative procedures and their relation to legal and judicial precedents and traditions; the individual psychologist might focus on the motivation of spies and potential spies. As social psychologists, while trying to remain aware of all these factors, we have a different orientation. We are concerned here with the study of the social-psychological impact of the loyalty and security program upon people to whom it applies.

Toward this end, we have undertaken an exploratory analysis of the impact of the loyalty and security measures based to a large extent upon a series of intensive interviews. These interviews were conducted with 15 faculty members from different universities and with 70 federal employees of professional rank in Washington, D.C. Two factors make these groups strategic for an exploration of the problem: first, they have been exposed more directly than the general public to special measures; and second, professional people in federal employment and at places of higher learning qualify by their status in our society for taking a leading role in the shaping of the country’s cultural and intellectual climate. As always in exploratory studies the task here is to formulate questions for more systematic research rather than to provide answers. For this reason we made no attempt to select a sample of respondents which could be said to be representative of any specified population. We emphasized instead the choice of persons who were willing to engage in prolonged conversations which often took several hours. By securing a personal introduction for the interviewer from someone known to the respondent we tried to establish a sufficient level of confidence so that the respondent should feel free to discuss every aspect of the situation without fear of unpleasant consequences. We succeeded in obtaining interviews with federal employees from more than a dozen different agencies. The lowest rank was that of a junior professional, technically described as a GS 5; the highest was a GS 15. The men and women who talked to us differed also in age, length of government service and, what is perhaps particularly important for an exploration of this kind, in their political views. They described themselves mostly as Democrats or Republicans, but also as liberals, social democrats, or as not politically oriented favoring the “best man” rather than a party. This large spread in relevant characteristics gives us some confidence that we have covered a fair range of attitudes and have encountered responses as extreme in either direction as would be the case in a representative sample.

The interviews with these respondents were not conducted according to a rigid schedule but left ample room for the respondents to talk about those

2. The interviews were conducted by professional social scientists, several of whom were on the faculties of the various universities in and around Washington, D.C.
aspects of the situation which they considered most relevant. Nevertheless, one item was universally used as the beginning of the conversation. The respondent was asked to give advice in the following hypothetical situation: "Think of one of your colleagues at work whom you know well enough to be convinced of his loyalty. I want to ask you a number of questions with regard to this colleague. Don't answer in general terms, but take his special situation and characteristics into account. Suppose that this person comes to you, obviously worried, to ask for your advice. He thinks that his loyalty is suspected. He has just discovered that his neighbor with whom he is on friendly visiting terms has been accused of being a communist. Your colleague wonders what to do. The situation is complicated by the fact that he has just been offered a job outside the Government which is reasonably attractive, although he wouldn't ordinarily accept it. He is pondering the following alternatives: (1) Take the outside job. (2) Talk immediately to loyalty board or security officers about the situation. (3) Stay and wait without doing anything about it."

This situation was discussed in full detail. The respondent was then asked whether he would take his own advice. Especially where the respondents established different standards for themselves and the original colleague, the discussion of the discrepancy brought forth many interesting insights into the approach to the problem.

Another group of questions concerned human relations in the respondent's office and the support or lack of support peers, subordinates and supervisors were expected to provide should the respondent become involved in an investigation.

This often and easily led to an exploration of what federal employees consider adequate codes of behavior and precautions appropriate at present, and to the specification of those persons or groups which were most likely to become the target for unfounded suspicions. Finally the respondents were encouraged to talk in more general terms about the need for loyalty and security measures and their function in the present political situation.³

We shall raise questions and suggest hypotheses on the basis of these exploratory interviews. What we are after is a framework for research on the social-psychological impact of security measures. Such impact, social psychology suggests, is dependent not only on actual events but also on the way in which people perceive these events. Accordingly, we shall first attend to the image which federal employees form of the loyalty and security measures and their purposes. Next we shall try to glean from the material some ideas as to the most suitable dimensions in which the degree of impact could be established. At this point it will become necessary to inquire into the social processes and pressures by which these effects are mediated. And since the material demonstrates a wide range of degrees of impact, notwithstanding these processes and pressures to which presumably all federal employees are exposed, we shall

³. See appendix p. 331 infra for interview schedule.
then have to raise the question as to directions for research about the varying conditions under which such vastly different responses obtain.

Underlying this exploration is a proposition which will become more relevant after a systematic study has obtained answers to the questions here posed; the proposition that the social-psychological consequences of a social policy can, but need not, coincide with the purposes for which the policy was designed. If the study of these consequences is to be of value to those who conceived and administer the loyalty and security measures, it must raise the question as to which of these consequences are intended and which unintended; which are desirable and which undesirable.4

Before attempting to formulate the issues as they are suggested by our exploratory study, it is necessary to review briefly the measures with whose consequences we are concerned.

National Security and Federal Loyalty and Security Procedures

The need for security measures is, of course, accentuated in times of international tension when the country as a whole feels threatened by the possibility of war. Security measures are, then, introduced not for the advantage of any partisan group but for the avowed purpose of protecting the nation as a whole.

The explicit purpose of the President's security order is to determine whether a person presents a "security risk"; the explicit purpose of the loyalty order is to determine whether there exists "reasonable doubt" of his loyalty. "Security risk" and "reasonable doubt of loyalty" are treated as clearly distinct notions in all official statements. A person presents a security risk if he cannot be trusted to keep to himself information which he obtains incidental to his job. To stamp somebody as a "security risk" is less derogatory than to have "reasonable doubts" of his loyalty. The former may imply nothing worse, for example, than that the person talks too much when under the influence of drink. The latter, presumably, has more sinister implications. It implies, at the very least, that the person is not devoted to our constitutional form of government; it may also include the possibility that he may deliberately reveal information—that he is, in effect, a would-be spy. One may be judged a "security risk" even though his loyalty is not questioned. Doubts of loyalty, on the other hand, always imply potential security risks.

Ineligibility for government service because of doubts about loyalty applies to all agencies; ineligibility as a security risk applies to special agencies only. Some of the agencies to which security and loyalty procedures apply have one board dealing with both matters, others administer the two phases of the

4. For a lucid exposition of the relevance of these questions for the analysis of any social action see Robert K. Merton's codification of functional analysis in sociology in his Social Theory and Social Structure (1949).
program separately. There is no possibility of appeal outside one's agency against a security decision; loyalty decisions can be appealed. In security cases, suspension from work may occur without a communication of specific charges to the employee. In loyalty cases, appeals may be heard within the agency and also by the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission.

Executive Order No. 9835, March 21, 1947, which established the Loyalty Review Board, sets up the following standards for the determination of loyalty or disloyalty:

1. The standard for the refusal of employment or the removal from employment in an executive department or agency on grounds relating to loyalty shall be that, on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for belief that the person involved is disloyal to the Government of the United States. (This paragraph was changed by Executive Order No. 10241, May 1, 1951, to make the standard for refusal of or removal from employment ". . . on all the evidence, there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved to the Government of the United States.”)

2. Activities and associations of an applicant or employee which may be considered in connection with the determination of disloyalty may include one or more of the following:
   a. Sabotage, espionage, or attempts or preparations therefor, or knowingly associating with spies or saboteurs;
   b. Treason or sedition or advocacy thereof;
   c. Advocacy of revolution or force or violence to alter the constitutional form of government of the United States;
   d. Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person, under circumstances which may indicate disloyalty to the United States, of documents or information of a confidential or non-public character obtained by the person making the disclosure as a result of his employment by the Government of the United States;
   e. Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States;
   f. Membership in, affiliation with or sympathetic association with any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons, designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.
The application of these standards involves an inherent difficulty of considerable magnitude: there are at a number of points no objective criteria by which it can be determined to whom the standards apply. In view of this difficulty, the official program proceeds in two steps: it collects evidence through FBI investigations using criteria which are assumed to justify suspicion; these criteria, the "derogatory evidence," are then evaluated by the departmental loyalty boards.

The Attorney General's list of subversive organizations, the adequacy of which has, of course, been a subject of bitter debate, is obviously an attempt to define such criteria. There are undoubtedly many other criteria which guide the field investigators of the FBI. We shall return frequently to this problem of criteria for suspicion since, as will become evident later, much of our analysis hinges upon it.

II. SOME SOCIAL-Psychological Consequences of the Loyalty and Security Measures

The perception of the situation

The effort to describe the image which federal employees have formed of the loyalty and security measures requires the isolation of some constituent elements of that image. First the question arises as to what procedure or procedures the respondents have in mind when they comment on the situation. The distinction between loyalty and security is officially stressed at many occasions. Are federal employees aware of this distinction? Do they respond to the federal programs only or are their attitudes influenced by other official and unofficial actions which broadly resemble the federal programs? What do they see as the purpose of whatever procedures are the focus of their attention? And do they regard these purposes as in the interest of the country as a whole or of some partisan group?

During the very first interviews it became apparent that the scope of the inquiry could not be limited to the study of the impact of the official departmental loyalty and security procedures, as had originally been planned. The respondents experienced them as part of a much larger interrelated complex of formal and informal measures toward the same end. Notwithstanding the formulation of the interview guide which tried to keep specific procedures separate from others, most of the respondents made their comments in more comprehensive terms. There is hardly a respondent who did not sooner or later mention the name of the senator from Wisconsin. A college professor,

5. This inherent difficulty is further complicated by the wide diversity of views about the purposes of the executive orders. We have not been able to discover an official statement of purpose. Discussions with various experts, including high government officials, indicate that the exclusion from government service of potential spies is one purpose on which practically all agree. But many of the experts add emphatically that this by no means exhausts the purpose of the orders, though there is little consensus among them as to the nature of these additional purposes.
for example, said in the context of a discussion of an academic loyalty oath:
"I don't think that any statement that these investigations have harmful implications means much. Even Senator McCarthy might make it if he has a shred of intellectual integrity left. But he thinks matters would be worse without trying to catch those who might be on the other side."

The Hatch, McCarran and Smith Acts were brought into the field of discussions. Speeches in Congress, the role and function of the FBI, departmental routine checks, and special investigations; security procedures and loyalty procedures; state and municipal investigating programs; the Un-American Activities Committee; the procedures of broadcasting companies and of private industry; the activities of various private organizations self-appointed to improve the Attorney General's list of suspect organizations—they are all mentioned as integral parts of the security measures to which the respondents addressed their comments.

In one perhaps extreme case, a federal employee, asked whether he had ever observed a person who was exposed to an investigation—the context making it quite clear that federal loyalty procedures were under discussion—answered by telling the story of a man in a small town, employed by an industrial firm, who was asked to resign his job because his wife had attended a peace meeting. Such obvious misunderstanding of questions cannot be attributed to insufficient intellectual abilities, but rather to the fact that limited questions in this whole area are often unanswerable. People are not affected by one measure or the other but rather by the entire security situation. Even though a few federal employees distinguished between departmental procedures and other measures—"official loyalty checks are not so bad; the real danger comes from the Hill"—they all perceive the situation as being created by the whole gamut of protective provisions. One government employee formulated this fact sharply. He said: "I consider the investigations (meaning the federal programs) necessary. Given this fact, McCarthy is psychologically inevitable."

To perceive all security measures—official and unofficial ones—as inevitably linked with each other means, of course, that people respond not to one singled out for inquiry, but to the whole situation. This fact complicates the picture. For the federal programs get blamed or praised, whatever the case may be, for events and procedures which may not have been intended.

The question arises as to whether certain institutional provisions of the programs facilitate this failure to differentiate between different measures. It may well be worth the attention of political scientists to examine current procedures from the point of view of identifying aspects which may lead to confusion of various measures.

6. Words like "few" or "many" in this article refer, of course, only to frequencies within the interview material and must be understood within the limitations of our unrepresentative sample to have no necessary implications for the beliefs and behavior of federal employees as a whole.
In addition to their failure to distinguish between the various security procedures, the respondents see behind their formulation and administration a wide range of motives. At least three types of motives are mentioned: the motive of eliminating would-be spies from government service; the motive attributed to conservative people of counteracting recent trends of thought in government circles judged by them to be detrimental to the welfare of the country; and partisan political motives which serve the interest of one group rather than of the country as a whole. One federal employee, for example, said: "A very substantial amount of investigations may be considered superfluous. . . . I cannot escape the feeling that much of it represents political ends, partisan politics and an attempt to embarrass the administration for purely political reasons."

There are, of course, many people who share this suspicion of covert political motives in much of what is presented in Congress as only security-motivated. The motive of embarrassing the party in power is certainly not alien to parties in opposition. But the political purpose of some of the Congressional accusations may also go in a somewhat different direction: it is also not alien to elected representatives to pursue political lines, which they know or they assume appeal to their constituencies.

In addition to party politics reported as a covert motive for some security measures, some respondents see other motives entering into the security activities of private organizations. The previously quoted interviewee who reported that a man was asked to resign by a private firm because his wife had joined a peace movement had this to say about motives behind it: "The local newspaper had called the wife a fellow-traveler. The editor of this paper—which is backed by local industry—is trying to do what he thought his backers expected from him. The business leaders in his community were struck by a fear of socialism." Whether or not our respondent's diagnosis of what happened is correct, is almost beside the point in our discussion. What is significant is that he sees a financial motive for the behavior of the local paper which has nothing to do with the purpose of protecting this country.

Much the same motive according to one respondent prompted the sponsor of a television show to drop an entertainer from a program because that person had been listed in "Red Channels." The argument here was not that the television show might endanger the national security of the country, but rather that listeners had protested. The sponsor obviously did not want to lose his audience. He was, after all, putting on the program for business purposes.

In talking about the entire security situation some respondents use rather strong language: "Gestapo methods," "just like in Germany," "in fighting totalitarianism in Russia we are becoming totalitarian ourselves." It is interesting to note that such strong terms are used predominantly by those who believe there are partisan motives behind the loyalty program. One person who, much like the overwhelming majority of our respondents, thinks that
“security measures are, of course, necessary,” goes on to say: “Things are going to get worse. I don’t believe we can sell government officials on a program of moderation. What is happening now increases the political power and prestige of people like McCarthy. They would oppose any sensible solution. Also those in favor of war will intensify the security hysteria. They have a point: if you want to fight you have to make people angry.”

We are not in a position to test the correctness of these assumed motives—political power, financial advantage, or making the people want to fight another war. Our concern here is to illustrate the fact that many respondents believe there are such diverse motives, and to propose the idea that an individual’s reaction to the general security situation is, perhaps, largely a function of his interpretation of the motives underlying it. It seems likely that the more an individual sees partisan motives as dominant in the security program the lower is his morale with regard to it—the more resentful he is of the program, or the more hopeless or panicky in regard to it. This hypothesis seems an important one to test. On the basis of our exploratory material it has some plausibility. Most of our respondents seem to feel that a program limited to the motive of uncovering would-be spies would constitute no threat to individuals who are firm in their loyalty to this country. But when it comes to other motives, those seen as partisan and covert, some respondents are at cross-purposes with what they perceive as powerful factors which cannot be counteracted by any one individual. In fighting for one’s rights, rational argument and the presentation of evidence all become futile efforts, unavailing because irrelevant to the covert motives.

If and when this hypothesis is established, the question will again arise for lawyers and political scientists as policy makers: what institutionalized features of the official loyalty and security programs lend support to perceiving the existence of covert motives which overshadow the motive of safeguarding the security of this country?

The salience of the loyalty and security situation

The security situation thus presents to our respondents a complex system of formal and informal social controls in which they discern a variety of motives. How central is this situation in the lives of the persons who are or may be affected by it? Is it an isolated aspect of their experience to which they turn attention only when asked to do so in the course of an interview or when it touches them directly through some immediate issue? Or does it pervade large areas of their thinking and behavior, even when it is not directly the focus of attention?

On the basis of the exploratory interviews, we suggest for more thorough inquiry the hypothesis that the security situation, perceived in the global fashion we have described, is a very salient issue for federal employees in Washington; that it is not confined to an intellectual concern with the problem but pervades the entire atmosphere; in other words, that the security
issue has become part of the prevalent climate of thought, and underlies in the form of tacit assumptions many aspects of everyday behavior. This salience is furthermore evident for persons holding very diverse political views.

The discovery of the nature of tacit assumptions pervading a community is by definition limited to inferences from observable behavior. There exists, however, one form of human behavior which makes the recognition of tacit assumptions the main point of a communication: the joke.

Coming as an outsider to Washington, D.C., in October, 1951, one is struck by the frequency with which jokes referring to the security situation occur in informal conversation. At a small social gathering a federal employee, well known to his friends as an expert on oriental rugs, reported laughingly that he had just attended an auction. The auctioneer who knew him well had announced to the public, pointing at him: “Up there sits a real Far Eastern expert.” “What will this do to my position?” the employee asked his friends. The joke was highly appreciated by everyone present. An interviewer reported that, while sitting in the home of a respondent, the respondent’s wife came in and said jokingly: “You are probably collecting information for the FBI.” Another respondent reports that his colleagues jokingly parry many of his outspoken remarks with: “You sound just like a communist.” One federal employee told a joke against himself: He had a very good short wave set, and in fiddling with the set he caught Radio Moscow. “I looked over my shoulder to see whether anybody was observing me, being scared for a moment,” he said, laughing off his hysterical reaction.

Jokes, as a rule, are communicated for the purpose of entertainment and have the function of releasing tension. The frequency of security jokes, if it could be ascertained, might thus be taken as an indicator of the degree of tension in Washington with regard to security regulations.

Our material contains other isolated incidents which reveal a tacit assumption related to the security situation. One respondent, for example, mentioned an unexpected turn in a conversation with a subordinate which is to the point. He had voiced some hesitation about a possible new candidate for his department. Before he had a chance to explain that he was not convinced of the candidate’s technical qualifications, his subordinate asked: “Is he a communist?”

If further research should indicate a high salience of the security measures for federal employees, a further series of questions would arise for policy makers, administrators, and political scientists: Does preoccupation with loyalty and security measures further or interfere with the effective operation of these measures? Does it have constructive or detrimental effects with regard to other aspects of the national welfare—for example, with the ability of federal employees to perform their work efficiently and creatively? And, if it should be concluded that the high salience of the situation created by the

7. See, e.g., S. Freud, Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious, Collected Works (1940).
respondents' perception of the security measures is not desirable—what aspects of the security procedures contribute to this salience, and what changes could be made so that the security situation would assume what are considered to be more appropriate proportions in the lives of those subject to it.

**Effects on the climate of thought**

Given the security situation as it seems to be perceived, a complex of non-partisan and partisan, overt and covert motives, with high salience: in what ways, if any, does it affect the thinking and behavior of the persons who come within its scope? Or, to put the question perhaps more abstractly, what effects if any, has their perception of the security situation had on other aspects of the climate of thought among federal employees?

It is easier to convey a feeling for the powerful presence of a climate of thought than to define its constituent elements. Gilbert Murray, for example, conjures up a situation which illustrates this elusive concept convincingly even though not explaining it.

"Take three orthodox Christians, enlightened according to the standards of their time, in the fourth, the sixteenth, and the twentieth centuries respectively, I think you will find more profound differences of religion between them than between a Methodist, a Catholic, a Free-thinker, and even perhaps a well-educated Buddhist or Brahmin at the present day."

We can only speculate what aspects of religion Gilbert Murray had in mind. Perhaps the readiness to believe in miracles meets Murray's point. A Christian in the fourth century confronted with evidence that a dead person had stood up from his deathbed and lived would probably have thought immediately of miracles and divine interference. A twentieth century Christian or a free thinker confronted with the same fact would probably have his thoughts turned to the development of surgical skill in heart operations.

A federal employee before the last war when confronted in a conversation with his superior's hesitation about accepting a possible candidate in his department might have concluded that the candidate was not good enough for the job, or had an unpleasant personality. In 1951, as reported above, the question is asked: Is he a communist?

The concept *climate of thought* has not yet been sufficiently analysed so that it is possible to specify all its dimensions. At least three, however, seem clearly relevant to the present problem: (1) the codes of behavior considered appropriate for persons in given roles; (2) the feeling tone in human relations on the confidence-suspicion continuum; and (3) the number and kind of individuals and groups who are objects of suspicion. In the following pages we shall indicate the questions which are suggested by the interviews with regard to each of these dimensions.

*Codes of behavior.* Every organized group develops, of course, it own standards of expected conformity in behavior; and to some extent conformity

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in behavior based on a general acceptance of tacit assumptions is essential for every functioning society. But societies differ in the level of concreteness and specificity of conforming behavior. In a totalitarian climate of thought social conditions are such that they impel conformity even on the most specific matters. In a democratic climate of thought conformity is limited to broad underlying principles which tolerate a wide range of deviant behavior and diverse interpretation by different individuals. If conditions are, in fact, as they have been described, the phrase “Stalin has made a mistake” cannot be publicly uttered in Russia. Loyalty to the country is prescribed down to the most concrete level of thought. Loyalty to the country is also part of the American climate of thought. Nevertheless the phrase “Truman has made a mistake” can be uttered without revolutionary consequences. The question arises, has the security situation led to increased concreteness and specificity in the codes of behavior to which federal employees feel they must conform?

The exploratory interviews suggest that the codes of behavior to which our respondents adhere or to which they fear they must adhere are now more specific and concrete than the traditional American way of life would lead one to assume. Apparently these traditional standards for behavior are deemed by many respondents to be inappropriate in the present situation. New standards are being established, and traditional ones reinterpreted to provide guidance for behavior on a more concrete level.

Among the 70 federal employees approached for interviews two refused to participate in the study because they felt uncertain whether such participation was compatible with the expected behavior of one in their position. One of them said: “I don’t know whether the Government approves of this study. In an investigation I might be asked why I participated.” Implicit in this remark is more than a suspicion of the motive for the inquiry; there is an assumption that a federal employee should avoid not only what the government explicitly vetoes but also what the government does not explicitly approve, a position which inevitably limits the range of possible behavior.

9. See note 6 Supra.

10. It should be pointed out here that two other respondents hesitated to participate because they suspected that the interviewer was employed by the FBI.

11. Lest the conclusion be drawn that the refusal in this case was inevitable because of the implied suspicion, it should be noted that a few other respondents participated fully though also not free from suspicion. In the most extreme case this suspicion was worded thus: “You are spreading dirty propaganda from New York University. To suggest that charges are brought against a person because he was friendly with a neighbor who was found to be a communist, I consider a typical communist technique.” This same respondent found his own suspicion aroused against some of his colleagues because of “the behavior of a group holding little secret meetings. Whenever anyone passed them in the hall, they’d stop talking and look frightened and be silent . . . I passed this group one day and asked ‘how’s the program going?’ They looked terrified and I wondered what had caused it. . . .” It is worth noting that this respondent ended up by saying “I think people would be delighted to cooperate (in the study). I think it is feasible. . . .”
considerably. The second refusal was worded in more certain terms: "I don't think it is proper for a State Department employee to answer this at the present time."

There is an interesting psychological distinction between the two answers. That answering questions about loyalty and security regulations in an interview conducted for research purposes is unbecoming conduct for a federal employee is thought to be the government's view on the matter by the first man; while the second has adopted this position as his own. Other social-psychological studies suggest that the two types of responses may be expected in temporal sequence in one and the same individual; when confronted with a cultural climate which imposes standards new to an individual he will first adhere to them because they are externally expected or imposed. After prolonged exposure to the new climate, he will often internalize these standards and make them his own so that they are experienced not as alien or compulsory but as "voluntary" compliance.12

Most of the ideas on the range of appropriate behavior for government employees come, however, from the interviews proper and not from the few refusals. Federal employees suggest codes of behavior ranging from the somewhat obvious "you shouldn't give away information to the enemy" to the desperate statement of one who had been investigated and cleared several times, for charges none of which were dated later than 1941, and whose nerves had been badly strained through the experience: "Why lead with your chin? If things are definitely labeled I see no point in getting involved with them. If communists like apple pie and I do, I see no reason why I should stop eating it. But I would." This reaction, it should be noted, does not come from a person with strong opposition to the loyalty program. Like many of our respondents he was fully convinced of the need for having "some type of investigation of government employees to make sure we don't have subversives."

Between these two extremes there are a great number of concrete prescriptions which are suggested in varying spirits. Sometimes they are offered as prudent precautions in the effort to avoid difficulties, as deliberate adjustment to the times. Sometimes they are suggested not as an inevitable compromise with external factors, but with complete conviction that to do otherwise is to furnish not merely grounds for suspicion but actual evidence of unsuitability for government service. And sometimes they are "admitted"; i.e., respondents who feel strongly convinced that they should not alter their standards and behavior recount with expressions of shame and guilt feelings, with some self-contempt and confusion, that they catch themselves restricting their behavior for irrational reasons without really wanting to do so.

Among the more familiar precautions are: drop membership in organizations on the Attorney General's list; do not subscribe to their literature; be

careful in political conversations with strangers; do not discuss your work outside the office; do not associate with communists; do not sign petitions without being convinced of a bona fide sponsorship; do not read in public the *Daily Worker* or the *New Masses* or, as some of our less well-informed respondents call it, "The Daily Masses."

Other restrictions involve reading habits and ownership of books. Some respondents who accept such restrictions as reasonable were undisturbed about the security situation in general; others reported them with embarrassment or confusion or distress. Two respondents who apparently had no desire to read anything out of the common run, and who themselves felt no restriction, nevertheless implied limits in the choice of reading matter which might be felt by others as severe restrictions. One respondent said in the context of pointing out that the haphazardness of charges was much exaggerated: "If there is only a rumor that a person reads Marx nothing will happen to him. Of course, if the rumor turns out to be true, this is a different matter." Another one, indicating that there were really no restrictions worth mentioning stated: "There is no reason to refrain from reading the *Saturday Evening Post* and *Collier's*."

Other respondents were aware of restrictions, in a sense self-imposed. Several people commented on the changing character of the books displayed at the homes of their friends. "The book shelves of some of my friends have changed their nature in the last ten years. Books usually stay on the shelves year after year unless somebody is deliberate in moving them around." One person said that when moving to another house he came across the first few years of the *New Masses*. "I didn't know what to do with it; it seemed dangerous. So in the end I burned it." Several persons consider it better to buy the *Nation* from a newstand than to be on the subscribers' list.

One respondent told the following story: "A friend and I were riding on a streetcar and he read a newspaper reporting about the American Legion and began to mock it so that our immediate neighbors could hear him. I thought to myself: why doesn't he shut up before we are accused of being communists. Several friends have told me that they found themselves in similar situations and that they had experienced feelings similar to mine." This person was a convinced anti-communist of some standing. He recalled with pride that he had been approached while in college about 15 years ago with an invitation to join the Young Communist League and had refused to do so because of his political philosophy; he called himself a democrat in outlook, emphasizing the small *d*.

Prescriptions on a very concrete level of conformity pertain also to the subject matter of conversation and to opinions held and voiced. One person, for example, says he would "hesitate to defend Russia even if I had an argument to make for a Russian stand, for fear of being misunderstood as a red." One person remembered that a year or two ago he used to have discussions with his colleagues about the advisability of admitting Red China to the U.N. All points of view were represented then in these office dis-
discussions. He added: "If someone walked into my office today and would advocate admission, I would not believe my ears." Another one feels that governmental decisions should not be questioned as one did before, but "what's handed down" should be accepted. Several respondents recommend that federal employees keep out of discussion on any controversial subject. And by those who are more specific in this respect the following tabooed subjects are mentioned (among others): atomic energy, religion, equal rights for Negroes, etc. One person carried his avoidance of conversations involving controversial subjects so far that he decided to take an earlier bus to work every morning because he had overheard some regular bus riders on his original route discussing politics.

It is, of course, very difficult to ascertain how such change in the subjects of conversation relates to the content of private thought. But it has often been observed that the ability to think differently from the way one talks does not come easily to people. People living under totalitarian regimes have only in very rare cases been able to maintain the integrity of their private thought in the face of the overwhelming social enforcement of the official point of view. In the long run, their power of intellectual resistance breaks down and they start, often unwittingly, to make compromises with the official view. Whether the undoubtedly less forceful and less enforced pressures of the current security situation have similar results, we are not in a position to say, though some introspectively inclined respondents noticed with dismay these processes in themselves.

However this may be, most of the interviews convey the impression that socially relevant thought, i.e., thought which can be publicly expressed and converted into action, follows more conforming lines today than it did several years ago. To what extent this is the case is, of course, a matter for more carefully controlled research.

Confidence and suspicion in personal relations. Several years ago a public opinion poll in this country and in Germany asked: "Do you think most people can be trusted?" Sixty-six percent in this country, but only six percent in Germany, agreed. The difference can be understood as indicating a profound difference in the two national climates of thought. It seems reasonable to ask whether tension induced by security measures has reduced the size of the difference, whether Americans today—and particularly those living in an atmosphere where security problems are very salient—have become more suspicious of others.

Students of the large-scale administrative machines of modern society have pointed out that they tend to produce close cooperative working relations. Merton, for instance, describes the institutional aspects of a bureaucracy as functioning to create "strong sentiments which entail devotion to one's duties"; elsewhere he states: "Functionaries have the sense of a common

destiny for all those who work together. They share the same interests, especially since there is relatively little competition. . . . In-group aggression is thus minimized. . . . Esprit de corps . . . typically develops. . . .

14 This state of affairs is not at all conducive to feelings of personal mistrust against one another.

In part this “good atmosphere” is borne out by what our respondents report about social relations within their work groups. There is an overwhelming consensus that “relations are good,” that the office consists of a “congenial group of people”; that people get along with each other “surprisingly well”; that “the atmosphere is one of give and take”; that “arguments are resolved by discussion and compromise”; quite frequently work relations develop into social contact outside working hours; etc.

Yet when the loyalty and security program is discussed in the context of work relations, it appears that for some respondents inroads have been made into this atmosphere of mutual trust. In an extreme case one respondent, asked to think of a colleague of whose loyalty he was convinced, said: “There is no such person. Everybody can be bought.” In less extreme cases suspicion and mistrust toward individuals whom one knows well are mentioned only when an investigation is actually pending. We asked respondents what they expected from their peers, subordinates and superiors if an unjustified accusation of disloyalty were made against the respondent. One of them said he would expect little help. But he was not disturbed about it, for he was not prepared to give any help where someone else was concerned: “I would be afraid to come to the aid of someone else because you can never tell who is another Fuchs.”

But this, again, may be an exceptional case. Other federal employees and faculty members whom we interviewed expect their peers to rally to their side as character witnesses, to give them moral support by intensifying social contact with them, and also, though less frequently, to offer financial help.

The situation is less clear-cut with respect to manifestations of confidence by superiors. The importance of support from the top is obvious in most difficult situations involving job security, in government as well as in the academic world. Many respondents, especially those in academic positions, point out that the success of a fight against an unjustified accusation depends largely on the attitude of an administrative superior. Some went so far as to say that unless they were sure of support from above they would much rather leave their positions immediately than risk a fight which was lost before it started.

It would appear that especially in government work support is less frequently expected from superiors when a respondent is relatively high up in the federal hierarchy than by respondents on a lower echelon. Thus one relatively high-placed government employee says: “My subordinates and my colleagues would offer their assistance—as much as they dared. My superiors would

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Probably become aloof.” One said he thought his chief might confidentially express to him his personal conviction about his loyalty but he would not be in a position to do this officially. The fact that top officials are often not expected to manifest any show of public confidence in their subordinates is of course not due to a peculiar selection of personalities for top positions. Rather, it is more probably due to the double pressure to which top administrators are exposed because of the nearness of their positions to political power problems. They are understandably more concerned with and aware of such covert political purposes as may enter into the various security measures. When they are said to be particularly cautious, “never take a risk,” or “never to stand up for someone,” they may be oriented to the political pressure which they see as a secondary motive in the situation. For them the problem is not only one of individual support to a person of whose loyalty they are convinced; the reputation of the department for which they are responsible is at stake. One respondent described this quite clearly. He told of a friend in a relatively high position in his department who became involved in an investigation because he had once contributed $1.00 to an organization which turned out to be infiltrated by communists. He was ultimately cleared of the charge, and has since been promoted. In the course of the investigation “his close fellow employees ridiculed the charges and paid no further attention to them, in view of his impeccable character. However, the administrators of the organization were quite disturbed over the incident. Their concern was mainly to protect the reputation of the organization.”

On the other hand, another high-ranking government employee thought that the political pressure and the concern for the reputation of his department might not interfere with support from the top because the superiors concerned had great confidence in their subordinates and were convinced of their loyalty. In this department, however, the pressure on top officials led, according to this respondent, to giving way in another direction: “The official loyalty programs for people in this department are not so terrible. The unofficial ones with their origin on the Hill are disastrous. The worst impact of the situation on a department like ours arises over new appointments. People here say: Let’s not take a chance on a new man; don’t hire him if there is the vaguest doubt that he is anything but a conservative. The trouble is that they don’t have to give a reason for not hiring an applicant. They only inform him that the job has been filled otherwise. I’m sure we are losing many first-rate applicants this way. The people in charge of hiring are afraid of Congress. They are all very loyal to this department and proud of the fact that it has not harbored many cases which came up in Congress. They don’t want to take a risk, they want above all to keep their department clean. It is not the official loyalty program but the impact of Congressional interference which prevents non-conservative people from getting jobs.”

Whether or not this is characteristic of current government hiring practices, it suggests the hypothesis that a certain proportion of those in administrative
positions are seen by other professional employees as adjusting to security measures by narrowing considerably the pool of potential candidates as well as by withholding public support from such of their present subordinates as come under suspicion. To what extent this occurs and to what extent it is believed to occur are questions to be determined by a more systematic inquiry. If it occurs, the fact that urgently needed manifestations of confidence are not available from high-placed superiors may color other work relations in government service since persons on top of the hierarchy will often be taken as a model.

There is evidence in some of the interviews to suggest that in the experience of some respondents the atmosphere of suspicion is not limited to work relations but carries over into casual and intimate social relations. Comments on this point suggest that federal employees are less eager to meet new people, less eager to attend large parties, and more ready to curtail casual and friendship relations.

Targets for unfounded accusations. In one of our first exploratory interviews, a university professor was asked to think of one of his colleagues of whose loyalty he was convinced, but to assume that this colleague had learned that his loyalty was doubted. In discussing this hypothetical situation it emerged that the respondent had selected among several possible candidates a colleague who was Jewish and foreign born. The respondent explained that his selection was guided by a desire to keep the situation as "natural" as possible. He assumed that a foreign-born Jew was more likely to be the target of an unfounded accusation than anyone else among his colleagues.

This incident suggested the possibility that one of the consequences of the loyalty and security programs has been the development of a social atmosphere in which individuals are subject to unfounded suspicion on the basis of certain personal characteristics or group memberships. Such a development would not be surprising in view of the inherent difficulty with which the security measures must deal: Specifically, that of identifying, in the absence of adequate objective criteria, those to whom the measures apply. It would not be hard to understand if under such circumstances different people developed different criteria; nor if every area touched upon by professional field investigators were regarded as relevant to the establishment of guilt by more excitable and apprehensive persons. Such consequences would have particularly unfortunate implications from one point of view, in that certain sections of the population would systematically suffer from unfounded accusations to a greater extent than others.

As background for a more detailed formulation of this point we asked all federal employees interviewed in Washington what kinds of people they thought might form the target for unfounded suspicions. Some of the respondents described mainly personality attributes, such as awkwardness or arrogance. Others named a wide range of socially defined target groups. And in spite of the emphasis in the question formulation there were those who forgot the word "unfounded" and came forward with their own suspicions.
An example might illustrate how closely associated justified and unjustified target groups are in peoples’ minds. The following excerpt from an interview starts with the respondent obviously keeping in mind the qualification “unfounded.” He talks about idealistic people, and uses the word “misinterpreted.” But he continues, in the same breath, to mention groups he sees as justified targets of suspicion: e.g., those who through the use of violence want to overthrow the government. “[Targets for unjustified accusations are] those persons who have been dissatisfied with the general way of life, or those who may have an idealistic point of view misinterpreted by others. Of course anyone that sees communism as a better form of government, anyone who doesn’t appear to be the American type. Basically those who through the use of violence want to overthrow the government. Also people who spread false information.”

As one would expect, those groups which have frequently been ascribed marginal status by some segments of the population in other contexts were frequently named as targets of unfounded suspicion: Jews, Negroes and foreign-born persons. Other groups were named, however, which traditionally have not been regarded as marginal or as objects of distrust in our society. Perhaps a list taken at random from the interviews will best convey the diversity of the groups said to be targets for unfounded accusations:

“Union members because they are in the minority in government.”
“Those who join organizations.”
“Natural joiners.”
“Those who are useful in organizations. If you don’t do anything you are never questioned.”
“Those who actively work in election campaigns.”
“People who don’t mind living next to a Negro.”
“Generous and sentimental people who might speak up on impulse for a minority group.”
“A person willing to hire a Negro secretary.”
“People vitally interested in problems such as racial conflict, reduction of poverty, and furtherance of human rights.”
“So-called free thinkers would naturally at one time or another be associated with people of communist leanings.”
“People not members of an organized church.”
“People with strong convictions.”
“Liberals.”
“Intellectuals.”
“People whose job is international affairs.”
“People who have had something to do with China.”
“People with many friends and associates.”
“Those who don’t conform.”
“Those who are socially nonconformist.”
“People with foreign sounding names.”
“People who have been in college during the depression.”
Among this formidable list one group may be singled out for comment because of the frequency with which it is named by respondents of very different outlooks; by Democrats and by Republicans; by those who regard the consequences of the investigations as entirely beneficial and by those who see harmful consequences; by those who make it quite clear that they do not belong to the group in question and by those who identify with it; by those who regard it with suspicion and by those who are outraged at the suspicion directed against it. The group we have in mind are the people who belong to voluntary organizations with definite social purposes.

Some of the respondents qualified this group to mean only those who had been taken in by a communist front organization. Others feel that joining an organization means taking a risk because if it is not now on the Attorney General’s list, it might get there in the future. Thus one respondent withdrew from the American Veterans Committee because he feared it might develop in a "radical direction." Some respondents express confusion about Consumers Union, which while not on the Attorney General’s list, apparently appears on some unofficial list; nevertheless it is being sold at newsstands on government premises, as one uncertain respondent pointed out. One person suggested (not satirically but quite seriously) that a federal employee should join nothing but "The Knights of Columbus, and perhaps, the Masons."

If persons who belong to organizations with civic and social purposes were actually to become suspect in American society, this would indicate one of the most profound and far reaching changes in the country’s climate of thought. The observation that America is a nation characterized by the existence of many citizen organizations has been made again and again in cross-cultural comparisons since de Tocqueville expressed it in his classical analysis of democracy in America 120 years ago:

In no country in the world has the principle of association been more successfully used or applied to a greater multitude of objects than in America. . . . 15

The right of association . . . has always existed in America; the exercise of this privilege is now incorporated with the manners and customs of the people. At the present time the liberty of association has become a necessary guarantee against the tyranny of the majority . . . . 16 . . . in countries where associations are free, secret societies are unknown. In America there are factions, but no conspiracies.17

To this description of the powerful place of free associations in American society, de Tocqueville added another point which appeared to him not relevant to this country in the first half of the nineteenth century, but which is relevant to this discussion:

15. de Tocqueville, 1 Democracy in America 191 (1945).
16. Id. at 194.
17. Id at 195.
When some kinds of associations are prohibited and others allowed, it is difficult to distinguish the former from the latter beforehand. In this state of doubt men abstain from them altogether, and a sort of public opinion passes current which tends to cause any association whatsoever to be regarded as a bold and almost an illicit enterprise.¹⁸

At present voluntary associations are not prohibited in this country. Yet our material suggests the possibility that because membership in some organizations can have dire consequences for federal employees, "a public opinion passes current which tends to cause any association whatsoever to be regarded as a bold and almost an illicit enterprise."

Our material with regard to objects of suspicion suggests a number of challenging hypotheses for further research. The first of these is that the distinction between unfounded and founded suspicion is easily blurred, so that groups which are at first considered by most people as being liable to unjustified suspicion gradually slip over into general objects of suspicion. It would be fruitful, in the second place, to investigate whether persons who join voluntary organizations are being placed in the position of a marginal social group, in the sense of being shunned by individuals and groups who would otherwise have accepted them. Finally, one might investigate the effect of designating such persons as a suspect group on the associative behavior of persons subject to the security program; that is, further research might determine whether the security situation has actually brought about a curtailment of participation by federal employees in voluntary organizations.

III. Social Pressures Reinforcing the New Climate of Thought

It appears that there are two types of social pressures which enforce conformity: those which are institutionalized, which are built into current procedures; and those which are more in the nature of psychological mechanisms not formally established but operating informally among federal employees. Among the former, we shall consider the penalties incurred during the investigations, and the lack of relief from penalties following clearance. The informal social pressures present something akin to the model of the vicious cycle: the consequences of the security situation on behavior, perceptions and beliefs may become, in turn, an additional source for intensifying these consequences.

The penalties incurred during the investigations

To make the punishment fit the crime presupposes that the nature of the crime be known before punishment is meted out. According to most of our respondents, however, punishment starts long before the legal process of investigation has been completed. One respondent described the case of a

¹⁸ 2 id. at 117.
colleague who had been investigated: "It was an elderly lady about to retire. She was accused of having belonged to organizations for helping the Negro, aid to Spain, and other welfare organizations. She did this on a strictly Christian basis with a Christian attitude of wanting to do good. There wasn't anything political about it. She was completely panicked—afraid of losing her retirement and too old to start over again on another job. She became violently ill. The attitude of the loyalty board which heard her case was very circumspect. It was a necessary procedure as far as they were concerned. The case hung fire for over a year. The woman was given a hearing and acquitted."

The punishment in this particular case was a year of personal agony and damage to physical health. The fairness of the loyalty board could do nothing against this punishment which preceded its final action.

Another respondent reports that a colleague "who had been born in Russia and came to this country at the age of twelve was asked to show cause why he should not be suspended, with no recitation of precise charges. This man hired an attorney at considerable expense. The charges against him were then ascertained, satisfactory answers were given at a hearing and he was cleared." In this case, as in others reported by respondents, a "fine"—the fee for a lawyer—is added to the penalties incurred during investigation. Apparently this financial burden leads many to feel that they cannot afford to stay and contest the charges. In the hypothetical case asked about in the interview, leaving the government at the first inkling of a possible charge was recommended by a few respondents because of the expense. "I am thinking of a stenographer with a family to support. It might be better for her to get a job somewhere else, preferably when she receives a letter of inquiry before actual charges are made." Actually the hiring of a lawyer is the most frequent recommendation respondents offer to a friend under suspicion.

To the mental agony, the possible damage in physical health and the "fine," some respondents add another advance punishment: the loss of reputation. One person commented that he knew of a case very similar to the hypothetical one we presented: "We knew he wasn't guilty of anything, but he was scared to death over being investigated, having investigators talking to neighbors and friends who didn't know him too well. He decided to fight it. He was losing money that way. After he was cleared, he found that some of the people he was working with didn't trust him, simply because they had been interviewed by the FBI and from those interviews got the impression that he was guilty. So he quit the government after all and took an outside job."

Loss of reputation is said by other respondents not to be restricted to the accused's present federal position: "Will an outside employer today hire a man whose loyalty has been questioned? Even if cleared by the board he might have a hard time to get other people to trust him."

Punishment preceding the final verdict of guilt is probably a frequent occurrence in many legal procedures involving prolonged investigations before a trial. But this factor is probably socially more powerful in loyalty and
security investigations than in most court procedures, in part because the number of innocent people involved in the former is many times greater than is generally true for other legal cases,\textsuperscript{19} and in part because the criteria for determining guilt are less clear, thus increasing the uncertainty of the outcome even for one who knows he is innocent.

The lack of relief from penalties following clearance

Many respondents maintain that not only are the penalties incurred during investigation not undone in the cases eventually acquitted, but, what is worse, clearance does not end the punishment. Talking about a colleague, one respondent says: “He was cleared but he is always frightened that this thing will be reopened and he will never know whether any charges of the same type will be made again.” Or, another case: “He was glad that he fought it because in a sense he cleared his name. But at the same time even though he was cleared there are some people who still react to him as though he had not been cleared. The suspicions aroused during the investigation are not easily erased by a loyalty board decision. The damage continues.” Another respondent remarks: “A lot of people think that even if you are cleared you are left with a black mark.” It is in this connection that the phrase “where there is smoke, there is fire” is used by one respondent after the other. It is said factually as a description of general opinion, or as an expression of personal conviction, or with bitter resentment.

Several respondents comment that the repetition of the same charges after clearance, frequently in connection with a transfer from one department to another, indicates the ineffectiveness of current procedures for clearance. Here is one example: “This person had a low-level professional job in a non-sensitive agency doing statistical work. The material he handled was not classified but actually published. This person had been accused once before but had been cleared after a written explanation. More recently he was again accused for basically the same reason, i.e., for once having lived with a person now charged with being a communist. The accused hired a lawyer at the expense of several hundred dollars and the case dragged on for several months before a hearing was granted. During this period he was continuously in a nervous state which affected the quality of his work. Eventually he was cleared. Now he wonders when it will come up again.”

In this context a remark by Kurt Lewin is appropriate. “Not present hardship in the usual sense of the term, then, but rather certain aspects of the psychological future and the psychological past, together with feelings of being treated fairly or unfairly, are most important in determining the amount of one’s suffering.”\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{19} According to an official statement, there are about 60 employees who are cleared in full field loyalty investigations for every one who is not cleared. Only 1\% of all loyalty forms processed by the F.B.I. between March 1947 and September 1951 contained evidence warranting a full field investigation. N.Y. Times, November 10, 1951, p. 32, col. 1.

\textsuperscript{20} Lewin, Resolving Social Conflicts 107 (1948).
One unhappy respondent mentions another aspect of this same problem: "Why try to be a hero? The same man may be charged all over again on the same or slightly different grounds as it is learned that at college he signed this petition or belonged to that organization, which five, ten or twenty years later was declared subversive or was sponsored by twenty people, three of them known communists." Implicit in this remark is something that worries a number of our respondents, especially those who had been young adults during the depression years. In more general terms it can be stated thus: the climate of the times changes within the life span of one person. If their past and not their present is judged, they are accused today because of activities which were commonly accepted 15 years ago. And since for many it was the general climate rather than a personal conviction which moved them in the past, they feel helplessly driven to deny what they felt and did at the time or to defend what they never had good reason to defend since it was not a deliberate choice on their part.

These are the institutionalized pressures enforcing conformity to the new climate of thought which emerge most clearly from our interviews. Their essential import is that the hazards of being investigated—even if one is subsequently cleared—are so great that individuals are induced to limit their behavior by avoiding (or trying to avoid) anything that might conceivably arouse anyone's suspicion and thus lead to charges and an investigation. Consideration of whether such hazards can be lessened by changes within the procedures themselves depends in part on further research to determine which features of the procedures contribute to the penalizing effects of investigation per se and in part on analysis of the procedures from legal and administrative viewpoints.

Informal pressures enforcing conformity to the new climate of thought

The effects of the institutionalized pressures just described in inhibiting behavior which might possibly lead to suspicion and investigation are intensified by informal publicity about them. The institutionalized pressures having affected the climate of thought, other mechanisms operating within the climate of thought magnify their effects still further. Individuals who have felt the impact of the security situation tend—through a variety of motives and behavior—to become nuclei from which the impact spreads to others.

Individuals who themselves accept the new codes of behavior may make accusations of a sort which undermine the confidence of others not only in the effectiveness but even in the good intentions of official proceedings. In the absence of adequate objective criteria for identification of persons at whom the loyalty and security measures are directed, the most innocent behavior may arouse their suspicion on the basis of some perfunctory similarity with what is considered subversive. An example will illustrate the point. One respondent told about a friend who had been charged with having communist meetings at his house—a charge of which he was finally cleared.
In the course of the investigation it came out that a neighbor had heard songs in a strange language from the man’s house. Curious about this, he looked through the window and saw what he considered strange behavior: a group of people were sitting in a circle on the floor and singing. He concluded that since communists were strange and the scene observed was strange, the two strange elements must be identical. The result was that what was in fact a Zionist meeting was reported as communist.

It is not difficult to picture the effects of this charge both on those who heard of it from the accuser and on those who heard of it from the accused. Those who heard it from the accuser were told directly that singing songs in a strange language is cause for suspicion. Whether they reacted by accepting or rejecting the validity of the charge, they nevertheless learned the fact that, in the present atmosphere in Washington, it is at least possible that one may be suspected of disloyalty (and subjected to the discomforts of investigation) simply because people sing songs in a foreign language. Those who accepted the charges as reasonable and repeated them to others, would increase the atmosphere of suspicion; those who rejected them as unreasonable but knew that nevertheless they served as ground for an investigation might, if they talked to others, contribute to an atmosphere of fear. Persons who heard the story from the accused would be more likely to fall in the latter group. It is not difficult to imagine that the accused in this case was outraged about the matter, that he felt persecuted during the investigation, that he probably communicated his feelings to his friends and close associates, and that the final clearance might not have been sufficient to undo the feeling among his friends that it was not even safe to have a Zionist group meet at a private house and sing their songs.

Some of the newspaper publicity, regardless of the paper’s political stand, has inevitably contributed to this effect. There are those papers which give wide publicity to every case before a hearing has taken place in the hope of arousing sentiment against the large number of would-be spies they believe to be in the government service. There are others which in the declared wish to expose what they feel to be the hysteria of persecution emphasize the ridiculous nature of some of the charges and so, against their intention, help to spread the information that federal employees can get into trouble for innocuous behavior—information which may have the unintended effect of serving as a caution to federal employees that, in order to avoid trouble, they must limit their behavior to the most conventional.

The same problem appears in conversation. By lamenting what they feel to be restrictions on freedom of thought and deploring the sanctions in store for deviant behavior, opponents of such restrictions and sanctions unwittingly and against their intention help to emphasize them—thus underlining still further the hazards of deviation from the new code. A representative of the new climate of thought might say, for example, “It is necessary to prevent people from reading Marx because they might fall prey to the ideology of communism and betray our country.” Another person who differs in opinion
might be inclined to reply by reporting, with indignation, the penalties that may befall someone who reads Marx. Although he means to disagree with the assumption that people should be forbidden to read Marx, he has accepted the assumption that they are in fact forbidden to do so and thus has helped to spread the belief that one cannot read Marx while in government service—and in so doing has increased the social pressure against reading Marx (or whatever the deviant behavior in question may be).

One could, of course, ask whether the reverse pattern occurs equally frequently; i.e., whether some of the representatives of the new climate of thought spread the word that, terrible as it may seem to them, people in Washington still read Marx, while those who disagree engage in conversation explaining why it is important for our democracy that people should read whatever they like and that they indeed do so. To discover through systematic inquiry which pattern is most frequently emphasized in informal conversations—behavior and ideas consistent with the traditional American climate of thought or behavior and ideas consistent with the climate of thought reported by some of our respondents to be emerging—may well become a tool for assessing the dominant tone in the present climate of thought in Washington. For whoever emphasizes—even in disapproval or resentment—the aspects of the situation which his opponent favors has accepted the tacit assumptions of his opponent. However much he may protest his dislike for the ground on which he stands, he stands on it.

IV. CONDITIONS ENHANCING OR INHIBITING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE LOYALTY AND SECURITY PROCEDURES

In illustrating the consequences of the security situation, we have so far deliberately selected material demonstrating new trends in the climate of thought and the pressures through which they are enforced. It is hardly necessary to point out, however, that different individuals manifest different responses to the situation. This is why in planning systematic research on the subject it becomes necessary to scrutinize the exploratory material for indications of the special conditions under which the impact of the situation is enhanced or inhibited. Before presenting what the material has to suggest in this respect it may be well to demonstrate the range of responses by three brief sketches of individuals.

Three types of responses

Case A represents a person whose behavior and thinking has been effected only slightly if at all by the security measures. His position carries a GS 13 classification. Confronted with the hypothetical situation of a colleague fearful of an investigation because his next door neighbor is suspected of being a communist, he says: "If I were he I would stay on the job. That is already hysteria to run out just because a friend is being accused." If the need arose,
he would fight for his own clearance with every conceivable means. "It's
the principle of it (that would make me fight). Otherwise anyone can lose
his livelihood because of some jerk." He would advise everyone, regardless
of circumstances, to take that stand. He cannot see a need for taking special
precautions in his behavior because of the security situation, and he is sure
that he himself has not made either subtle or crude adjustments out of fear.
He regards some investigative procedures as "necessary because persons in
key positions with loyalty to another government may harm the country. If
it were not an emergency I would say they are superfluous. Yet the real
spy is never caught by this method. And psychologically it is harmful because
people feel they are not trusted. It strains relationships between people.
Individuals may be reluctant to perform their duties for fear of creating a
source of suspicion." He would oppose an anti-communist oath at universities
"because it's silly." Politically he calls himself neither a Democrat nor a
Republican. "You might call me a moderate social democrat." He has not
had occasion to observe at first hand a person under investigation.

Much in contrast to this man is Case B, a GS 12. When confronted with
the hypothetical situation of the colleague with the next-door neighbor who
is under suspicion, he advises a spontaneous call on officials of the loyalty
and security program, because "it would look well for his own protection.
You can do this in a way so as to appear to give them useful information."
He also suggests more caution in his colleague's choice of topics for conversa-
tion with neighbors. If the case got worse he should "make an effort to
clear himself; otherwise the charge would hang over him in future. This
would also restore other people's confidence in him." Mr. B. would advise
everyone in the same way. He thinks that if he were charged with disloyalty
others might be skeptical of the charges but "I don't think anyone would
lend me money or make any overt action because they might incriminate
themselves." He regards educators as a target group for unfounded accusa-
tion; also writers, speakers and commentators. He adds: "A person who is
overly inquisitive and asks too many questions, or one who is overly friendly
might be accused." He too feels that he has not changed. "I just don't think
about the investigations, much less talk about them." He considers it
reasonable, however, to take certain precautions: "A person should not be
radical, he should not get into arguments on religion, he should not be
extreme in his views on atomic theory, but he should also have ample freedom
of thought. I would not subscribe to any listed papers, and I would be care-
ful of my conversation on religion and politics." He regards the investiga-
tions as altogether beneficial, because they keep people on their toes. "People
only object because they don't know what they are objecting about. I
assume that the investigations are all good and thus they cannot be harmful.
They make people more careful of their everyday associates." Mr. B.
apparently has followed newspaper publicity on several cases. He says: "It
seems that once suspicion is cast the public is unwilling to forego first impres-
sions. It creates fear in many but the good reaction by most is that they
have confidence in the government." Mr. B. calls himself a Republican. He
too has had no personal contact with anyone under investigation.

Case C represents a reaction of still a different nature. Confronted with
the hypothetical situation this man says: "I want to advise him to stay and
wait but perhaps he should take the outside job. In normal times he would
have nothing to fear. But we know that these are not normal times. People
have had their finances ruined, their mental and perhaps physical health
impaired as a result of associations with certain individuals. Maybe only a fool
would stand up and fight without weapons. Maybe the best thing is to leave
quickly and quietly before he is accused of anything. If he resigns before an
accusation is made his loyalty will never be questioned. I can't decide. Even
if he were cleared by the board, he might have a very hard time getting
people to trust him if the charges are known. You know the business: where
there is smoke there is fire." On the assumption that the colleague has won
his case, Mr. C. comments thus on the effect of this event: "I would like
to think that the more general significance has to do with civil rights and
democracy but I don't believe it. The effect on my friend would be to keep
him constantly on guard in his associations. He would perhaps have been
forced into debts. People around him might perhaps not shun him but they
would be more anxious about themselves. . . . Perhaps people who can afford
it financially, who are well known and respected in their fields should fight."

Mr. C. notices that "when people talk of things which might have political
connotations they have a tendency to look around to make sure they're not
overheard. I've been amazed and shocked to see myself do this." Mr. C.
expects some support from his peers but none from his administrative
superiors: "They would assure me privately of their confidence but would
ask me to realize the difficulty of their position." He considers intellectuals
and academic people the most likely targets for unfounded accusations. He
says he has felt obliged to take certain precautions. "I have sometimes
wanted to see a copy of the Daily Worker but now would not be caught
within a mile of one. I believe in freedom. What bothers me is that I may
have less control over myself than I thought, and I may come to feel
that only certain politically pure books, people and statements are what I
want. I simply cannot say and do all the things I would like to. It's com-
pletely unreasonable to be this way, but that's how it is." Mr. C. believes the
investigations (apart from routine checks, to which he does not object)
should be limited to defense agencies. He thinks it would be suicide for a
government employee to disagree politically with a powerful public figure.
He sees a partisan motive behind the investigations: "There are many power-
seeking people who use the world crisis for their own ends." Mr. C. prefers
the Democratic party. While he has not had occasion to observe directly a
person under suspicion, he has heard much about several cases, some already
cleared, others still pending.

These brief sketches indicate the range of response. Only Case A shows
an almost complete absence of impact from security measures. But he is
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aware of the impact on others, and this creates in him a concern for what he feels are unfortunate developments. Cases B and C both demonstrate the impact of the situation in adjustments they are making in their behavior, voluntarily in Case B, and with resentment in Case C. Their feelings about this situation are as different as possible. Case B welcomes the new trend while Case C fears it.

Factors related to differences in response

How are such differences in response to be accounted for? Are they responses to different objective situations; that is, have individuals who respond differentially perhaps experienced different security procedures? Or are there differences in their circumstances which give differential meaning and impact to essentially the same procedure? What factors in the external situation encourage one or another response? What personality characteristics seem to be related to different types of response? Among those which suggest themselves are the degree of personal security, one's position on an optimism-pessimism continuum, the strength and direction of political convictions, and a clear conscience.

Clearly these are questions which can be answered only by extensive (and intensive) research. All that can be done here is to draw out, from the interview material, hints as to possible variables which may affect the impact of the security situation.

Our interviews contained no evidence of differences in official procedures which might account for differences in effect. This absence may be due both to limitations in our knowledge of the loyalty and security procedures and to the unsystematic selection of respondents for the exploratory interviews. In any case, it is possible to imagine differences in the procedures which might affect their impact. To mention only one possibility, it is conceivable that the consequences would be less strong or at least be of a different sort if the financial costs incurred in the defense of a person under investigation were borne by public funds.

The exploratory interviews did suggest that variations in certain other conditions affect the occurrence or intensity of consequences of the security measures. On the basis of these interviews we suggest the following hypotheses: (1) The more positive the individual's feeling about conditions and relationships within the work situation with regard to matters other than the security situation, the less intense is the impact of the security measures on his beliefs and behavior. (2) The clearer the individual's understanding of the ideological positions in the present world conflict, the less intense is the impact. (3) The impact will vary with the directness of contact to a person under special investigation in the following manner: it will be least when there is no direct contact with someone being investigated; it will be greatest when one has observed intense suffering in someone under investigation who was finally cleared; impact of a different type will appear in those
cases where a person has finally been cleared without manifesting anxiety in the process of investigation. The paragraphs to follow provide additional detail on the background for these hypotheses.

. **Conditions and relationships within the work situation. (a) Confidence in fair practices within the agency.** Working for the government is, of course, not a uniform experience but varies considerably from agency to agency. Many of the respondents have very precise views on their own and other agencies as to whether they are “good” or “bad” in their internal formal and informal organization. One respondent, for example, talking about agency X, says: “That’s a bad place. They don’t have confidence in their employees in any respect. If somebody is not at his desk at 8:30 A.M. sharply, there is hell to pay.” And in contrast a respondent describes his own agency thus: “This is a good place to work in. People are proud of the department. Those at the top know a lot of the employees of different ranks. They trust you here in your work without being after you every minute of the day.” In both cases these descriptions were provided by the respondents in the context of discussing whether or not people around them had changed their behavior in response to the security situation. In the case of the first agency the respondent guessed that mutual suspicion and exaggerated caution must be at a peak. In the case of the second agency the respondent continued: “That goes for everything. Our loyalty board, for instance, is known for its fairness in procedure.”

Many other respondents use similar terminology in talking about their loyalty boards, i.e., they distinguish between “good” and “bad” boards, pointing out that the goodness or badness is completely unrelated to the question of whether the agency is a “sensitive” one from the security point of view, but is rather a result of the reputation of the men on the board and their interpretation of administrative procedures. It is, of course, possible that the “good” boards do not act very differently from the “bad” boards, but that their “goodness” is a halo effect from the good reputation of the agency as a whole. On the other hand, it is also possible that some boards have established certain practices which tend to increase the confidence of people dealing with them.

(b) **Intimacy of the immediate work group and its climate of thought.** The very size of most government agencies suggests that a federal employee’s work morale is determined not only by his attitude of pride or dislike for the agency as a whole, but also by his relation to the immediate work group of which he is a part. We have already pointed out that there is widespread consensus among our respondents that work group relations in government departments in general are “good,” but the interpretations of “good” vary considerably. Some respondents mean by it nothing but friendly politeness at work, others speak of intensive personal social contact; some point out that social and political questions are “of course avoided,” others engage in lively discussions of these matters. Reports of this sort from a number
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of respondents make it appear that the strength of the impact of the security measures is related not only to the climate of thought of the group but also to the level of intimacy of contact and discussion which characterizes it. One respondent said that he happened to have Owen Lattimore's *Ordeal by Slander* lying on his desk. Apparently in his office controversial subjects were always meticulously avoided, but he nevertheless interpreted the lack of comment in the office about his reading of the book as a demonstrative silence; he was sure he caught people glancing at it, and felt extremely uncomfortable in the situation. Much in contrast to this is another office where all matters are openly discussed over lunch. In that office one man came in for a good deal of ridicule because he had dropped his subscription to Consumers Union out of fear.

*(c) Expectations of support from one's administrative supervisor.* But the work-relationship factor which seems, from our exploratory interviews, to influence most strongly the impact of the security measures is the relation of employees to their supervisors, a factor on which we have already commented. Academic people and federal employees agreed on the importance of support from their supervisors in shaping their own thoughts and actions with regard to the security measures. Confronted with the hypothetical situation, one respondent answered in a manner which clearly indicates the importance of the attitude of those above one in the work hierarchy. He said: "In our department I'd advise him to stay and fight, and I'd be confident of a good chance of winning. I trust the head of the department; he would support me. But that's the only thing on which I base my advice. In every other case, no matter who the suspect is, however honest, outstanding and competent, I'd advise him to run as quickly as possible. In our place there is no need to change. But I don't believe in being a martyr. Everywhere else I might act differently."

This comment and several similar ones suggest that within a hierarchically organized group those on top are credited with the power to determine the nature of the tacit assumptions on which members of the group base their social behavior. This power might be expected to be an even stronger factor in countering the impact of the security measures where the supervisor makes known his attitudes and what action he expects to take if one of his employees comes under investigation.

Which aspects of the conditions and relationships within the work group affect the impact of the security measures, and their relative importance, can, of course, be determined only through further and more rigorous research.

*Clarity of ideological position and strength of conviction.* It has been pointed out before that tacit assumptions—precisely because they are tacit—are easily lost sight of, with the result that people sometimes discover suddenly and with dismay that they have shifted ground unwittingly. This consideration suggests that where hitherto tacit assumptions underlying the practice of freedom of thought, assumptions which are incompatible with some of the
consequences of the loyalty and security programs, are made explicit, these consequences might not occur. There is some evidence in the interviews which strengthens the plausibility of this hypothesis.

All respondents were asked whether they were in favor of introducing an anti-communist oath at universities. The answers revealed considerable differences in clarity about both the democratic and the communist value systems. Some respondents took issue with the overt purpose of such an oath, i.e., to eliminate communists from teaching positions. The answers of those who accepted this purpose, however, revealed considerable difference in opinion about communism as an ideology. For example, some said that communists would be the first to take such an oath while others believed that the oath would achieve its purpose. With this latter view about communism seems to go a lack of clarity about democracy, or at least an absence of reference to democratic principles in comments about the security situation, and a corresponding readiness to change one's beliefs and behavior in response to security measures.

Those, however, who indicated their awareness of traditional American values appeared to be least changed by the security situation. These values appeared throughout the interviews in phrases such as "rugged individualism," "dislike against being pushed around," "individual rights," fighting back," "the right to think what you want, to read what you want and to associate with whom you want," "stubbornness in resisting infringement of freedom of thought," etc.

One case in which these traditional American values were made explicit at every turn suggests the way in which their recognition counteracts changes even where an individual is exposed to a difficult situation. The respondent had been temporarily suspended from his work because of a charge that he was a member of a sports team which also included a communist. He was finally cleared and reinstated. He described his reaction to the event not as being frightened or unhappy but mainly as being "very angry." He dealt with the charge without denying the facts but by questioning the inferences from them. He told the board that he recognized the possibility of being exploited by communists for their ends but, except for this, he would not hesitate to back things in which he believed simply on the grounds that communists backed them too. He did not deny his knowledge of the communist affiliation of a member of his team but said that he did not feel that this implied anything about his own views. As it happened, he said, he had always been anti-communist, and had a clear concept of what communism stood for. The main strength for his defense came apparently from his dislike of being pushed around and being told what to do.

Another respondent said he would fight any charge, "just out of stubbornness," however attractive an alternative job offer. He actually knew a case similar to our hypothetical situation and felt that everybody's morale had been considerably strengthened by this demonstration of "stubbornness."
In other cases, clarity about one's own adherence to the principles of democracy and of the rights and duties in government service seems to lend the respondent an inner security which makes him reject completely pressures for change. One man, for example, elaborates on the proper conduct of government employees, emphasizing that "government employment carries with it a very high degree of responsibility for general good conduct, not only with regard to loyalty." He stated that he is not aware of any change in himself: "I like to feel that I have conducted myself generally within the framework that I have suggested as a rule for government employees under all circumstances. In my own conscience, I feel that I have."

Several respondents suggested that, in view of the nature of the international crisis which is the background for the security situation, clarity about the principles of democracy is important in strengthening the democratic cause, quite aside from its function in appraising security measures and determining one's own behavior.

The exploratory interviews, then, suggest both that certain views about communist ideology are likely to be accompanied by a corresponding lack of clarity about democratic principles, and that clarity with regard to those principles operates to reduce some aspects of the impact of the security program. The correctness of these hypotheses must of course, be put to further test.

Contact with "cases." In discussing the penalties which accompany and follow involvement in loyalty or security charges we have already indicated that persons in contact with those who have been investigated, often appear to be influenced to change their ways of life as a result of the procedures which they observe. The question arises whether the reverse of this pattern is also true, namely that persons without contact with "cases" subjected to special investigations are less likely to abandon old codes of behavior for new. Among our respondents changes in behavior seem less frequent—though by no means entirely absent—among those who have not been in contact with a "case." Two or three respondents felt unable to give advice in the hypothetical situation of the colleague with the suspected communist neighbor, in fact refused to consider it seriously, because they were utterly convinced that such a situation could not occur in this country. Neither of them had ever been close to a person under investigation, nor had they followed the newspaper publicity accompanying hearings and trials. They maintained that they were completely unaffected by the situation, saw no reason for precautions, were not anxious and did not feel under pressure. This same impression is reported by a number of respondents who, though clearly affected themselves, expressed strong convictions that the majority of federal employees were completely untouched by the security measures.

Those who have observed a case at first hand seem to reflect in their own attitudes the reaction of the person under investigation. One aspect of this process—the contagion of fear—has already been referred to. But there
is another aspect to be considered, where the stand taken by the accused clearly serves the function of counteracting rather than strengthening the conformity pressures. Among our academic respondents there was ample evidence for this effect in their discussion of the oath controversy at the University of California. The non-signers became for many both a symbol of the traditional values of American democracy and academic freedom, and a source of strength and high morale. In our interviews with federal employees indications of this pattern are scarce. Its apparent importance for the academic group, however, suggests that it ought to be further explored.

V. SUMMARY AND PLAN FOR RESEARCH

The purpose of the foregoing analysis has been to suggest a framework of concepts and ideas within which meaningful questions can be asked about the impact of the complex of official and unofficial procedures and programs which we have called security measures. Let us briefly review the formal structure for research which we have presented.

We have started with the assumption that every social action has consequences of various kinds. Some of these consequences are intended, that is, they coincide with the deliberate purpose for which the social action was set in motion; others are unintended. Some of the unintended consequences may be desirable, others undesirable. We have singled out the social-psychological consequences of the security measures as the main focus of our analysis, without here making the distinction between those which are intended and those which are unintended. To make this distinction is primarily the task of those responsible for the conception and the administration of the measures. However, if and when the full range of consequences of the measures is known, everyone will be in a position to distinguish in terms of his own values the desirable from the undesirable.

Whenever appropriate we have here tried to establish a connection between the social-psychological consequences hypothesized and specific administrative problems. Only in as far as one is able to establish such links between aspects of the social action under discussion and their consequences, is one entitled to regard the consequences as causally related to the social action. The administrative difficulty inherent in the attempt to identify persons to whom the standards established in the executive order apply and the implications of this difficulty for the potential development of new marginal social groups characterized by susceptibility to unfounded accusations illustrates the efforts to establish such links in the foregoing analysis. Similarly, the discussion of social pressures reinforcing the new climate of thought—the penalties incurred during investigation and the lack of relief from such penalties following clearance—illustrates the dependence of some of the consequences on what appear to be institutionalized features of the security procedures.
The attempt to structure the social-psychological consequences of the security measures so that questions can be raised which are amenable to research has led us to distinguish between how people perceive the situation and how they act in response to this perception. Here our analysis was guided by what has been established in one research area in social psychology; the area of social perception. It is by now generally recognized that human behavior is dependent not only on external stimuli, but on the manner in which these stimuli are perceived by individuals.

Accordingly we have noted that the federal loyalty and security programs do not present a single isolated set of administrative measures to which people respond but that they are seen as an integral part of a whole host of related activities. Because these activities are perceived as interrelated, the purposes which are attributed to measures other than the official federal programs color the perception of the official purposes. For future research this analysis means that the perception of the situation and of the purposes for which it has been created will have to be regarded as a crucial variable in the study of its consequences.

In the search for concepts suitable for the descriptive analysis of the impact of the security measures we have suggested the somewhat vague notion of climate of thought. At least three elements bearing on this concept can be distinguished and defined in such a way that they are usable in social research. These elements are: (1) the content and the level of specificity of the code of behavior (sometimes referred to as group standards or social norms); (2) the emotional coloring in interpersonal relations on the confidence-suspicion continuum; and (3) the isolation of socially distinct groups on the basis of the fact that they are regarded as targets for unfounded suspicion. These three elements provide criteria for measuring the impact of the security measures in the systematic research to follow.

The fact that the impact of the situation shows such a vast range even in our small and unrepresentative group of respondents raises a crucial question for future research, namely, what are the conditions under which some persons react in one way rather than another? Here it will be necessary to study people under different work conditions and with different group morale; people whose personality structure predisposes them to one or another type of response; and people for whom security measures have acquired high saliency through close contact with them as well as people for whom they are relatively remote.

The purpose of more systematic research will then be to establish the frequency under different conditions of different reactions to security measures. To fulfill this purpose it will be necessary to select a representative sample of whatever populations are studied so that meaningful quantitative statements can be made. In view of the crucial place that we assign in the research plan to the discovery of specific conditions enhancing or inhibiting the consequences of the security measures it is necessary to design the study
in a manner which will permit a comparison of different conditions. However this is not the place to go into the technical details of the most suitable research design for this purpose. It is only necessary here to point out the tremendous importance of using the best possible scientific tools for a systematic study of these problems.

If such a study should confirm the hypotheses suggested here, it would indicate that as an unintended consequence of their operation Federal loyalty and security measures are undermining the great traditions of American democracy which they should seek to preserve.
APPENDIX

Interview Schedule

Introduction: I am _______; Mr. X has given us your name. The Research Center for Human Relations at New York University is planning to conduct a study on what people think about the loyalty and security investigations. At present we are trying to find out whether such a study is at all feasible, and whether the results will add to our knowledge of contemporary problems. We want your help on two levels; first, I'd like to get your own opinions; and then I'd like to get your view as to whether you think the study can be done on a larger scale and would come out with worthwhile results. Whatever you say will, of course, be treated in strict confidence. That's to say, your name will nowhere appear; and the results will be summarized for various groups of people, so that not even your best friend could find out whether or not you have contributed to the inquiry.

I. Think of one of your colleagues at work whom you know well enough to be convinced of his loyalty. I want to ask you a number of questions with regard to this colleague. Don't answer in general terms, but take his special situation and characteristics into account. Suppose that this person comes to you, obviously worried, to ask for your advice. He thinks that his loyalty is suspected. He has just discovered that his neighbor with whom he is on friendly visiting terms has been accused of being a communist. Your colleague wonders what to do. The situation is complicated by the fact that he has just been offered a job outside the Government which is reasonably attractive, although he wouldn't ordinarily accept it. He is pondering the following alternatives:

(a) Which of these three courses of action would you advise him to take?
(b) Why? (If 1, Take outside job): Why?
    (If 2, Talk to security officers about it): What should he say? (Promise to curtail his contacts with accused, provide evidence against accused, explain nature of contact with accused as harmless, or what? Reasons.)
    (If 3, Stay and wait): What do you suppose will happen in such a case?
(c) (Whatever respondent's answer): Suppose he has decided to wait and see what will happen, and shortly afterwards he receives a letter from the loyalty board or security officer inquiring about his association with a communist. The outside job is still open. What would you advise him to do?
    (1) Take outside job
    (2) Stay and answer letter of inquiry
(d) (If 1): Why?
    (If 2): What should he say?
(e) (Whatever respondent's answer): Suppose the letter of inquiry is followed by a charge and suspension from work. The outside job is still open. What would you advise him to do?
    (1) Take outside job
    (2) Deal with the charge
(f) (If 1) Why?
    (If 2) How?
(g) Suppose your colleague has fought the charge and succeeded in being cleared. Obviously he would feel satisfied with the outcome. But apart
from such understandable satisfaction, what is the more general significance of fighting for clearance rather than taking another job: (1) for your colleague as a person, and (2) for the people around him? (Probe for values involved and impact on general atmosphere.)

II. (a) Your first response was . . . (quote answer to I a). Would you advise all your colleagues in the same way or does that hold only for the particular colleague you had in mind?
(b) (If not for all) What about a person would lead you to give different advice? (Probe for concern with status; competence; group membership, particularly minority groups, ethnic and religious; political views; family responsibilities; etc.)
(c) What about yourself? Would you take your own advice? (as given in answer Ia). (If not, probe for reasons.)

III. What you have said so far has given some indications of the general atmosphere at your place of work. I would like to know a bit more about this. By and large are the relations between people at your office good or bad, or how would you describe them? (Probe for relations to peers, superiors, and subordinates; Restricted to office or much social contact outside? Are there differences of opinion on work procedure and content? How are they handled? Differences of opinion on political questions? How are they handled? Do people feel free to ask each other for help, borrow money, etc.?)

IV. If you were in a situation where your loyalty was questioned, how do you suppose your colleagues, your superiors and your subordinates would react? (Probe for expected changes in social relations; for support—moral, financial; demonstration of confidence or the opposite; offers to be witness; etc.)

V. What sort of persons, if any, do you think are the most likely targets for unfounded accusations of disloyalty? (Probe for respondent's ideas on whether socially defined groups—Jews, foreign-born, liberals, etc.—are more threatened than "awkward" persons, those who are not popular, etc. Get a list of groups or personal attributes which provoke accusations.)

VI. Have you ever been in a position to observe closely someone who was under suspicion and investigated? (Select for further elaboration the case with which respondent is most familiar.) Please describe the situation. (Status, position, group memberships of persons involved; charges; outcome; accused's attitude; attitude of his friends and colleagues. What social factors, if any, played a role in the course of events?)

VII. What about people not immediately exposed to accusations: have you noticed in them any change in behavior and outlook in response to the current investigations? (Probe for illustrations; for distinctions, if respondent is willing to make them, between deliberate and "unconscious" changes.)

VIII. Do you know some people who haven't changed at all? What do you see as the conditions which cause some to react strongly while others seem to ignore the matter? (Probe especially for conditions of resistance among those belonging to groups which the respondent has previously—in V—identified as threatened.)

IX. On the whole, do you think it reasonable that government employees should take certain precautions? If yes, what precautions? (Probe for: avoiding conflicts of opinion in discussions at work; selection of friends; selection of casual contacts outside work; not reading or subscribing to certain magazines and papers; revising one's voluntary group associations; care in all casual conversation; etc.)
X. What about yourself in this respect: have you changed, deliberately or almost imperceptibly, in any of these or other matters? If so, does this hold for all situations or only in special cases?

XI. By and large, do you consider the investigations as necessary or superfluous, harmful or beneficial? Specify which aspect of the programs you approve of or disapprove of.

XII. If you look at the loyalty and security programs, and their parallel numbers in private investigations, what purpose do they serve in the larger context of American life and politics? How does this purpose link up with other factors in the country's political situation? (Probe for respondent's views on political trends and their strength and support in the country.)

XIII. Have you followed the newspaper publicity on some of the major cases under investigation? What do you consider the impact of such publicity to be? (Take Lattimore as an example unless respondent brings up a case spontaneously.)

XIV. Would you be in favor of instituting a non-communist oath at all universities? Reasons.

XV. Please describe briefly your general political outlook and any changes in this respect you may have undergone. If you have a preference for one of the existing political parties, which?

XVI. Some background data:
- Age (Approximately)
- Sex
- Income (approximately)
- Occupation and status
- Length of present employment
- Chances for promotion
- Secure job or insecure
- Family responsibilities
- Place of birth (if U.S.A., what generation)

XVII. What do you think about the feasibility of such a study on a large scale?