1952

Schwarzenberger: Power Politics. A Study of International Society

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This book, probably the most comprehensive treatment of international relations to come from one scholar, is a veritable tour de force. It attempts to set out descriptively and analytically the whole sweep of international relations, which are defined as "relations between groups, between groups and individuals, and between individuals, which essentially affect international society as such." Its aim is "to provide a working theory of international relations which fits the facts and main trends of international relations, past and present, and which puts the proper emphasis on the real driving forces of this turbulent society." In the opinion of the reviewer, Professor Schwarzenberger has not achieved this aim. To be sure there is a persistent theme which runs through the book, the emphasis on power as a necessary ingredient of politics in the international society as presently constituted; but this is not a "theory."

The author approaches his subject from the point of view of a positivist in search of truth who is supremely unconcerned whether his conclusions appear as optimistic or pessimistic. Concern for such matters, typical of the "evangelist school" of international relations, belongs to the "pre-scientific" era. On the other hand we must guard against "unrestrained cynicism" and the assumption that "international relations must be subject to the rule of force and cannot be organized in a community spirit and founded on the rule of law." Professor Schwarzenberger's constructive proposals, to be discussed presently, bear witness to his positive attitude. However, it is fair to point out that in a sense power politics and international relations seem to be inseparable, for the price of eliminating power politics is the transformation of the international society into a world community in the shape of a federal world State: "Far off as this goal may seem, nothing less is ultimately a commensurate alternative to world power politics in, or without, disguise."

The impressive wealth of material and analysis is organized in three parts and thirty six chapters. Part One is concerned with the elements of power politics, largely a study of the international society: its growth, its component parts (the national, the multinational, and the sovereign state), their groupings (the international aristocracy, the international oligarchy, and the minor members of the international cast), the objects, the instruments, the strategies and tactics of international politics, and finally the function of international law, morality, and institutions. Some of these titles may seem strange, but

1. P. 4.
2. P. xvi.
3. P. 715.
4. P. xv.
5. P. xxi.
6. P. 813.
the reader will meet familiar subjects under such headings as "international aristocracy," which merely refers to the States in general, or "international oligarchy," which, of course, is concerned with the great powers. Part Two is entitled “Power Politics in Disguise” and is largely devoted to international organizations, primarily the League of Nations and the United Nations, and current political problems such as Korea, Austria, Germany, Japan, etc. In Part Three the author discusses problems of international planning, revision of the United Nations Charter, and patterns of regional, functional, and federal integration.

The penetrating and lucid examination of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations constitutes the solid core of the book and is extremely useful, considering the dearth of comprehensive and comparative studies on the subject. The author is less concerned with the interpretation of articles of the Charter than with the actual working of the United Nations organs and with the policies pursued by the great powers. There is no room here for critical analysis. No doubt some experts on the United Nations Charter will wish to disagree with the author as to interpretation and conclusion. His judgment on the United Nations, though provocative, is hardly in tune with the rest of his argument. If it were true, as the author contends, that “together with Article 27, the veto clause, these two Articles (51 and 107) contain all that still matters in the United Nations system of collective security,” there would be little justification for saying that “if the United Nations did not exist, something very like it would have to be invented.”

The United Nations system in its economic, social, humanitarian, and other non-political aspects has not scored successes which command the author’s respect. Against the “gutter diplomacy” and “proletarisation of diplomatic matters” which characterize the United Nations scene along with D.D.T. (“Diplomatic Double Talk”), the author lists on the credit side of the United Nations that it offers a meeting place, that it “shames” Western powers into action in such matters as civil rights and colonial administration, and that the Eastern bloc has a unifying effect on the West.

In connection with the “United Nations Reform Pattern” there is a discussion of the Acheson Plan which, in the view of the author, “amounts to a de facto revision” of the Charter. That the concept of de facto revision “is a strange hybrid between fact and law” is frankly admitted, but this makes it hardly any more palatable. The author contends that “until the

7. P. 517.
8. P. 743.
10. See the author’s satirical _vade-mecum_ for power-politicians in disguise, pp. 716-20.
11. P. 742.
12. P. 748.
13. P. 305.
adoption of the Acheson Plan (again leaving aside the freak of the Korean War), the United Nations was incapable of making its weight felt in any major conflict between East and West. Yet one could well ask the question whether the United Nations was capable of making its weight felt after the adoption of the Acheson Plan. In the action against Communist Chinese aggression it would appear that the weight of the United Nations is not of significant magnitude.

One of the valuable parts of the book is a critical analysis and evaluation of a series of concrete nuclear patterns of functional and regional integration. In this context the author discusses the British Commonwealth, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Arab League, South Asia, the Pacific Area, the Western Hemisphere, and Europe. In most of these areas there is room for functional cooperation along President Truman's Point Four program. NATO is said to comply in form with "all the criteria of collective security." However, one of the criteria of a system of collective security is that "it must be an open system and it must not be directed against any specific power as such." It is more than doubtful that NATO is an open system in form. In reality, the author notes, NATO "is a multilateral defensive alliance against an outsider (sc. the Soviet Union)" and, moreover, its weakness, from a functional viewpoint, is its "exclusiveness on ideological grounds." Evaluating the relative political importance of Asia and Europe, the author warns: "[T]o argue that present-day Europe is any more important in terms of world strategy than any other area along the world frontier appears to be unrealistic." Even the creation of a United States of Europe, he asserts, would not "affect the bipolar character of world politics." In the context of the "great debate" on the foreign policy of the United States these warnings deserve careful scrutiny.

The combination of regional and functional approaches underlying the policy favoring European integration is not likely, we are told, to solve Europe's problems. Important factors work in the direction of European integration: the Germans, including former Nazis, political Roman Catholicism, and capitalism. For the Germans, a European federation offers "potentialities . . . for a renewed Drang nach Osten." Of political Catholicism the author writes: "All over the Continent, the Black Front has re-established itself in key positions. It has not been lost on the leaders of this power-conscious movement that Roman Catholics would have a majority in such a federation and pull very much greater political weight than their Protestant counter-

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15. P. 525.
17. P. 525.
18. P. 770.
20. P. 790.
21. Ibid.
For the capitalist a federated Europe "would show considerable anti-
Socialist majorities. Thus, a European federation looks like a safe investment
of capitalist policy." In any event, a Western European federation, without
the United Kingdom, would be dominated by Western Germany and would
in fact be merely "an inflated Western Germany." The author urges that a
genuine solution must be sought in the wider and less land-bound setting of
an Atlantic Union. The Union would consist of three units: the United States
or the Organization of American States, the British Commonwealth and
Empire, and a European Union. The obvious center of the Union would be
Washington, the provider of military and economic assistance. The Union
would be in the nature of a federation comprising a minimum of functions:
foreign policy and defense, as well as the necessary financial powers. The
Union would constitute an "inter-racial nuclear world federation which, in
due course and without pressure, might grow into a federal world State." For
the time being the Union would not displace the United Nations, though
it is not clear how the Union and its constituent units would fit into the
United Nations. In the author's view, the Union offers substantial advantages
to the United States, to the Commonwealth, and to Europe. The advantages
to the Commonwealth seem obvious enough but the alleged advantages on the
American side raise some doubt in the opinion of the reviewer. One advan-
tage, according to the author, would consist in the transformation of an "un-
wanted hegemony into institutionalized leadership among equals." What
Mr. Schwarzenberger has in mind is apparently some sort of a horizontal
relationship instead of the vertical structure which has been shaping up gradu-
ally since the end of World War II and which expressed itself in disguise,
to use the author's pet word, in such arrangements as the Marshall Plan,
NATO, and the Mutual Assistance Program. Would it be seriously considered
an advantage in Washington (particularly in the United States Senate) and
by the American people in general to give up this type of relationship for
one of a horizontal type? It would be interesting if the proposal for an Atlantic
Union were discussed by a study group of unofficial Americans and some
students of international politics and organization from the United Kingdom
and Western Europe.

Professor Schwarzenberger is a recognized authority on international law.
Although he has failed to achieve his theoretical goal and despite some
blemishes in detail, this book will establish his reputation as a keen writer
on international politics.

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22. Ibid.
23. P. 791.
25. P. 813.
27. P. 812.
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