REVIEWS

PREDICTION METHODS IN RELATION TO BORSTAL TRAINING. By Dr. Hermann Mannheim and Leslie T. Wilkins. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955. Pp. vi, 276. 17s. 6d.

CRIMINOLOGISTS and social scientists are watching with interest the results of Borstal training in Great Britain. Offenders between the ages of sixteen and twenty-three may be committed at the discretion of the court to institutions operated under the Borstal system instead of to prison. Sentences range from one to three years, with supervised aftercare for set periods after release. Trades are taught and the emphasis is on rehabilitation rather than punishment. There are two general classifications known as "open" and "closed" institutions. The "open" institutions allow considerable freedom of movement, and the better security risks are assigned to them. Although Borstal institutions have operated under many handicaps, including a long period of depression and war when many adjustments and economies were necessary, the total results have been considered satisfactory.

Prediction Methods in Relation to Borstal Training is the first of a series of "Studies in the Causes of Delinquency and the Treatment of Offenders," for which research was authorized by the Criminal Justice Act, 1948. Written most objectively by a criminologist and a statistician, it throws much light on the Borstal institutions. It does not attempt to cover the causes of delinquency but reports the results of a survey of previous records and subsequent careers of 720 of the boys who were sentenced to Borstal training during the twelve months beginning August 1, 1946. The main object was to develop "experience" tables in the hope that they could be of practical value as "prediction" tables in administration and as a guide to sentencing, training, and release.

The science of prediction of future conduct from known general factors is comparatively new—is, in fact, still in the experimental stage. Studies have been confined to research in single institutions and covering relatively small groups. The first important prediction study was made by Professor Ernest W. Burgess of the University of Chicago, and published in 1928.[1] This was followed by the early studies made by Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, published in 1930.[2] The authors of the volume under review have profited from the experience of these and other pioneers in the field, but there is still no general agreement nor any one predictive criterion that has been totally successful.

1. BRUCE, BURGESS & HARNO, THE WORKING OF THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW AND THE PAROLE SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS cc. xxviii, xxx (1928).

2. GLUECK & GLUECK, 500 CRIMINAL CAREERS (1930).

The present study covers one in every three entrants to the twelve Borstal institutions in operation in 1946, the individuals averaging eighteen years of age at the time of commitment, with sentences averaging 17.7 months followed by various terms of supervision. About two-thirds of the group either admitted previous crimes or had criminal records; about twelve per cent had committed eight or more crimes. Of the 720 boys included in this study, forty-five per cent were considered "successes" in that they had no recorded reconvictions other than simple fines after release from Borstal up to the time the follow-up records were closed on August 31, 1951, and fifty-five per cent were considered "failures" in that they were known to have committed further crimes after release prior to the same date. The average period from time of release to this date was 3½ years. It was by this tenuous and questionable dividing line between success and failure that all factors were rated.

In the final analysis the prediction factors were narrowed down to seven, and came from only 385 cases in which all these factors were known. Various weights were given to each factor. The most heavily weighted against "success" was a record of drunkenness. Instability of employment was weighted variously, heavy weighting being given for a period of employment of less than one month, and the weighting decreasing in inverse proportion to the length of employment. For an employment period of eighteen months there was no weighting at all. Other factors were previous fines, commitments to prison or Home Office Approved School (which, interestingly, were weighted equally), probation, not living with parent or parents, and homes in industrial areas. Final prediction tables were used subsequently on a sample of 215 of the 1948 Borstal group and proved satisfactory.

Of the prediction factors only two were related to treatment. On the basis of the limited data it was observed that those who had been placed on probation for previous crimes were more likely to be "successes" than those who had been fined; also that the "open" Borstals were more successful than the "closed." In reaching this conclusion the authors of course gave consideration to the obvious probability that the better risks were put on probation or assigned to "open" Borstals.

Interpretation is the convincing element of all statistics, and this is governed by the thinking and bias of the interpreter. These authors have been singularly cautious about making their own interpretations, and have been very careful to give various points of view; so much so that it is difficult to draw positive conclusions from these statistics. For example, it was found that boys who were convicted of crimes at an early age more often came from families with criminal records, but observing the obvious connection between these two facts, the authors pointed out that possibly such boys were "picked up" by the police more quickly than those whose families had no crime record.[3] A similarly unbiased approach is followed throughout the entire volume.

3. P. 115.

Unfortunately, the information from which the analysis had to be made was quite limited. Information in official files was supplemented by interviews with the ex-prisoner or his relatives by an experienced field investigator, but even this method failed to produce very satisfactory material. It was impossible to classify the environmental status of the various homes. Very little with regard to the vital early years was known. No consideration was given to physical handicaps. All of these factors are important in any study of delinquency—for instance, of the eighteen typical case histories described in chapter VIII, the majority showed a combination of physical defects and poor home relationships, and one-third were mentally defective or subnormal. The authors recognized the deficiency in their material but felt that known factors may have reflected the unknown factors sufficiently for the purposes of prediction. It is known that most Borstal boys come from low-income groups, and the authors felt justified in assuming from the information at hand that the majority of the boys included in this study came from either broken or over-crowded homes. It is still regrettable that there were no data to show to what degree overcrowding, insecurity or extreme poverty affected individuals.

Even though the authors were not concerned with causes of delinquency, the facts revealed in this connection by the study are too glaringly apparent to be ignored. The large percentage of larceny cases among the crimes committed points to the importance of economic circumstances as a conditioning factor. All of the boys were born during the period between 1924 and 1930. Their formative years had been lived during a world-wide depression and war, felt most distressingly in England as we know. Over sixty-five per cent of the boys whose records were available were under sixteen at the time of their first recorded crime; and most of their first crimes were forms of stealing. Similarly, of the crimes for which the 720 boys were committed to Borstal, 674, or over ninety-three per cent, were crimes of stealing. There were only eleven assaults, four sex crimes, and two wilful damage and arson crimes, constituting less than three per cent of the total. Another seventeen boys were sent to Borstal for absconding from the Home Office Approved School, an institution to which juvenile delinquents are committed. The remaining twelve were listed under "Others [crimes] including breach of recognition."[4] Examination of the probable causal connection between the large number of crimes of stealing and the social and economic conditions of those involved is indispensable to any evaluation of this type of antisocial behavior. Such behavior might be considered fairly normal in view of the economic conditions, or it might be the beginning of the "criminal career" to which the authors so often refer. To illustrate my point, we now look lightly on the crime of poaching, once punishable by death although it was necessary for many destitute families to poach in order to exist.

There are other tantalizing hints in this volume about the causal factors of delinquency. Although there was little material about the early life of those

4. P. 82.

studied, it was found that at the time they committed the crimes for which they were sent to Borstal, 381, or over sixty-one per cent of those for whom this information was available, came from broken homes, institutions, or the armed forces, were living alone or with relatives, or had no fixed abode. But, alas, complete information is not available, so we are not told what relation these cases bear to the norm.

Occupational skills taught at the various institutions included carpentry, bricklaying, farm work, painting and decorating, shoe repairing, tinsmithing, wood machine work, saddlery, marsh reclamation, blacksmithing, cooking, and laundry. Yet, on discharge only fifty of the group went into skilled trades, 293 entered the armed forces, and the remainder, including eleven who had been engaged previously in skilled trades, entered laboring or other unskilled work. (This did not include 139 about whose employment there was no information.) The authors apparently took for granted that:

> "There is little point in showing that Borstal boys do not often have 'good jobs' since employers will seldom be prepared to accept for a 'good job' the youth who has a record. Since the great majority of Borstal boys have a crime record before entry to Borstal, the inter-association between crime and opportunity of employment will already have begun to operate. The majority of lads at entry to Borstal come from unskilled occupations and the majority return to such grades of work."[5]

Truly, it would seem that re-education of employers toward a change of attitude is essential to the success of the Borstal system.

In spite of its limitations, this study should be helpful to all correctional institutions as a guide to information that should be included in case records—complete objective data being useful, as the authors point out, as an adjunct rather than a replacement of subjective judgments. The statistical methods and materials will be a substantial addition to previous prediction and experience studies—although the authors point out that their validation would prove their value only for Borstal. Criminologists will find thought-provoking even though not conclusive data.

We will look forward with interest to other volumes of this series in the hope that there will be enlightenment and progress toward prevention of antisocial behavior. Treatment at the level of Borstal or similar institutions, progressive though it may be, may be much too late. This is one conclusion that is inescapable upon reading this book.

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5. P. 125.

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CONDUCT OF THE UTILITY RATE CASE. By Francis X. Welch. Washington, D.C.: Public Utilities Reports, Inc., 1955. Pp. xvi, 383. $12.50.

LIKE Daniel Boone, Meriwether Lewis, William Clark, and a few other notables (Davy Crockett need not take a bow in this connection), Francis X. Welch, editor of the *Public Utilities Fortnightly*, has marked a pathway through the wilderness. To be sure, Mr. Welch has blazed his trail to benefit a comparatively small group—the guild of public utility lawyers—but they should be just as grateful to him as Susanna must have been to Old Daniel when her oxen were plodding toward Cumberland Gap in the gathering dusk.

Welch's guide into the swamp, his unique vade mecum, is the recently published *Conduct of the Utility Rate Case*, and it belongs in the saddlebag of every lawyer who undertakes such a proceeding. Nor does it make any difference whether the lawyer in question represents a utility client or speaks for simmering consumers. Help is here for him, and it could be very real help in a time of trouble.

Mr. Welch's companion volume, *Preparing for the Utility Rate Case* (published in 1954),[1] was written quite as much for the utility executive, rate department head or public relations director as it was for the lawyer, but his new work is aimed directly at the legal profession. Even the seasoned veterans of rate case warfare will find valuable suggestions in it; the novice would do well to devour its every page.

Are you preparing an application for increased gas rates or a petition to intervene on behalf of a rate-paying manufacturer? Turn to chapter IV for instruction and enlightenment. You will even discover forms that might successfully be followed—with an eye, of course, on your own statutes, local rules, regulations and precedents.

Are you faced with the problem of preparing testimony to justify either an increase in rates or their revision downward? Mr. Welch gives you an outline, states the basic concepts that must be covered and lists the witnesses (by occupation) whom your client should present to the tribunal.[2] He even indicates where you might go (outside the client's organization) for the professional services required.

Or are you perturbed about cross-examining the opposition's expert witnesses? Mr. Welch has some ideas for you,[3] and if you use even one of his scalpels skilfully and effectively, a portentous but unprepared expert may go home with his reputation neatly excised. Cross-examination in such circumstances is risky business, as this reviewer can testify: on two or three occasions he would have benefited his client more if he had "stood in bed." Indeed, rebuttal testimony by other experts may afford the better technique, as both Mr. Welch and Judge E. Barrett Prettyman of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (in a recent address here at the University of

1. See Priest, Book Review, 65 YALE L.J. 118 (1955).
2. C. V.
3. Cc. X, XIII.

Virginia) have indicated. But if you *must* cross-examine an expert, listen to Mr. Welch first.

Conduct of the Utility Rate Case is a practical volume from cover to cover, fairly bristling with suggestions which lawyers for both applicants and protestants at least should examine before they make final decisions about either strategy or tactics. Furthermore, several hundred cases are cited and accurately analyzed in text and footnotes, and counsel will discover that the author's diligent scholarship has provided seven-league strides toward a complete trial brief.

Moreover, the work is as admirable for its sound philosophy as it is for down-to-earth practicality. Many of Mr. Welch's observations deserve to be quoted, but none of them better expresses his wholesome point of view than these sentences from his foreword:

> "Every public utility rate case is, or should be, in the public interest. Those who bring up a case before the regulatory authorities should think so, and be prepared to support that conviction, or else they should not bring it up. Those who resist, oppose, or question the pressing of a rate case should likewise be prepared to show that their resistance, questions, or counterproposals are also bottomed upon a conviction of public interest....
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> "Viewed in this light, the public utility rate case theoretically does not have either proponents or opponents in the strict legal sense of contesting parties. It may, and generally does, inspire differences of opinion. These differences often require careful deliberation and finely wrought decisions before they can be resolved by the regulatory authorities. But it is nevertheless fundamental to the basic concept of public utility regulation that the over-all public interest is the prime objective and the ultimate goal of every rate case."[4]
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> "[I]t is the duty of the commission, weighing all factors, to resolve the case in the light of the ultimate objective—the public interest. All thus seek a common goal and to that end the procedural rules and evidentiary requirements of a rate case have largely been shaped and directed."[5]

These admonitions are too frequently ignored in the heat of a rate case controversy, when no holds are barred and quite forgotten are the overriding interests of that uncommon man, the consumer who is entitled to the best possible service for the lowest reasonable rates. But Mr. Welch's precepts deserve to be pondered by regulatory commissions and their staffs, by utility executives, by responsible community representatives and by the lawyers themselves, on whichever side of the table they may happen to be sitting.

Just one minor flaw: typographical errors rear their spiny, ugly heads just often enough to try the patience of an old proof-reader. Was proof examined more carefully for authors of the law books of an earlier generation? Or have the years sharpened our ancient optics? Don't tell us!

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4. P. xiii.
5. P. xvi.

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THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY. By Hans B. Thorelli. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1955. Pp. xvi, 658. $8.00.

THIS book is an extremely detailed study of the genesis of the Sherman Act and developments in federal antitrust policy during the period 1890 through 1903. An "underlying postulate" is that

> "the study of public policy . . . runs the risk of becoming sterile unless a synthesis is attempted from time to time on the basis of knowledge made available and systematized by such differing social sciences as law, economics, history, political science, and the study of public opinion."[1]

Another postulate is that most of the central characteristics and problems of antitrust policy had already appeared by the year 1903, so that

> "such a comparatively broad-gauge study as is here attempted, even if somewhat narrowly confined chronologically, should help materially toward the understanding of later-day developments in the field."[2]

With these general goals in mind, the author sets forth three specific purposes:

> (a) "to push the frontiers of research concerning the federal antitrust policy somewhat further in various directions,"
> (b) "to present between two covers the materials needed for a synthesized social science interpretation of the origination and institutionalization period of that policy," and
> (c) "to make such a synthesis."[3]

Dr. Thorelli has clearly fulfilled his first two purposes. His research covered materials—such as the administrative archives of the Justice Department and organs of public opinion—not previously examined, at least in a study of antitrust policy. And he has certainly put between two covers more information on his particular subject than will be found in any other single manuscript. Part I of the book, entitled the "Genesis of Antitrust," contains a chapter on the common law background of monopoly and restraint of trade; two chapters on "Economic, Social, Constitutional and Political Background"; and an exhaustive chapter on the legislative history of the Sherman Act. Part II, entitled "From Form to Substance, 1890-1903," contains two chapters on "Economic, Social and Political Trends"; one on enforcement efforts during four presidential administrations; a chapter on judicial interpretations of the Act (apparently including every case, public and private); and a chapter on congressional activity in antitrust and related fields during the period. Not even these comprehensive titles convey fully the wealth of detail and diversity of topics that the author deals with.

Throughout the book, and especially in his final "synthesis" chapter, Dr. Thorelli draws a great many conclusions of varying significance, some of them much the same as those that other writers have reached, some different. Reviewing the common law background, he concludes that American courts,

1. P. vii.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*

while following the English courts in extending "restraint of trade" concepts from the ancillary covenant cases to cases on general restraints, made much less use of the "rule of reason" and hence developed a much stronger anti-monopoly doctrine.[4] Concerning popular opinion in the late eighties, the author believes that while the evidence is "inconclusive," the truth is somewhere in between the "traditional" position of those who thought the Sherman Act was the product of an irresistible tide of public opinion, and that of John D. Clark, who thought it was the result largely of tactical considerations of partisan politics.[5]

Examining the legislative history of the Sherman Act, Dr. Thorelli concludes that "no doubt . . . the vast majority of congressmen were sincere proponents of a private enterprise system founded on the principle of 'full and free competition.' "[6] This "norm" was so obvious that little need was felt to resort to penetrating economic analysis. Indeed, the norm had a social as well as an economic content. While the ultimate beneficiary of competition was the consumer, the immediate beneficiary of an Act that Congress thought would protect competition was the small business proprietor—hindrances to whose "equal opportunity" were to be removed.[7] The language of the Act itself was clearly intended to bring within the reach of the federal courts the body of the common law, a common law capable of changes and growth as the economy itself changed. Congress adopted broad phrases because it intended a flexible law that would reach new methods of achieving forbidden results. At the same time, it thought that this solution of the regulatory problem would be a largely self-enforcing one: general observance of a prohibitory statute would follow as a matter of course; and private parties, encouraged by the treble-damage provision, could be counted on to do most of the policing.

Reviewing the period 1890-1903, the author concludes, among other things, that a great part of the blame for the plight of antitrust enforcement can be laid to a striking apathy on the part of the administrations involved. The decision of the Supreme Court in the *E. C. Knight* (sugar trust) case[8] was a stumbling block, but even that can be blamed on poor government performance:

> "It is quite probable that if the government had shown examples of *sales* of sugar *negotiated for interstate shipment* the outcome of the case would have been entirely different. The court was never given the chance to display that willingness to move with the times which marks antitrust jurisprudence during the latter half of the period."[9]

Dr. Thorelli's ultimate "synthesis" is that by the end of 1903 antitrust was "institutionalized."[10] Executive action, under Roosevelt, had commenced in

4. Pp. 52-53.
5. Pp. 162-63.
6. P. 226.
7. *Ibid.*
8. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
9. P. 599.
10. P. 560.

earnest. A special enforcement division was created in the Justice Department, and supported with earmarked funds. Congress passed the Expediting Act,[11] and created a Bureau of Corporations, within the new Department of Commerce and Labor, to investigate and gather data on corporate enterprise. Finally, "a year later the Supreme Court decision in the famous *Northern Securities* case . . . removed all legitimate doubts as to the wide scope and great potentialities . . . of the Sherman Law."[12]

This book should prove useful as a collection of historical materials. In other respects, its merits are few. The analytical discussions are diffuse and disorganized, and such conclusions as those on the *Knight* case make one doubt the soundness of the rest.[13] What the author calls synthesis is more nearly agglomeration. Even the ultimate synthesis, that antitrust was "institutionalized" by 1903, is spongy and unconvincing. To cite but a minor point, if the *Northern Securities* case had gone the other way, as it very nearly did, the decision would have "de-institutionalized" antitrust quite considerably.

Moreover, the author's analysis rarely focuses on matters pertinent to current problems of antitrust policy and enforcement. He concludes that Congress deliberately provided for a degree of flexibility (vagueness) in the law, and at the same time expected "general observance" of its provisions; but he neither notes nor discusses the substantial inconsistency of these two points of view or the ways they might have been reconciled. He devotes but one paragraph to the appropriateness of leaving to the courts the application of broad economic policy standards—stating that some courts displayed "striking lack" of economic reasoning power, that on the other hand the Supreme Court showed no "equally disturbing" ignorance, and in sum that he is "generally inclined to disagree with those critics who claim that the courts are . . . unfit as decision-making agencies in applying public economic policy."[14]

Such observations on matters of current importance are as unhelpful as they are sparse in this volume. But even if high timeliness cannot fairly be asked of a limited historical study of this type, one could reasonably hope for a clearer, better organized and more useful analysis of materials than Dr. Thorelli has supplied.

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11. 32 STAT. 823 (1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 28 (1952).

12. P. 4.

13. In the *Knight* case, the Government alleged among other things that the products of the various sugar refineries were distributed among the several states; and the lower court found that "the object in purchasing the Philadelphia refineries was to obtain . . . control over the business of refining and selling sugar in this country," a finding that Justice Harlan emphasized in his dissent. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 3, 6, 18 (1895). It seems doubtful, to say the least, that a Court which was disposed to rule favorably to the government would not have been able to do so on this record, or that a showing of actual sales of sugar in interstate commerce would have constituted any more convincing proof of an intent to restrain such commerce (which the Court said was not proved) than the record already contained.

14. P. 607.

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REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS. By the United Nations. New York: United Nations (distributed by the Columbia University Press), 1955. 5 Vols. and an Index Vol. still to be published. Pp. xi, 742; v, 467; v, 596; v, 461; v, 417. $3.50 each.

THE fifth and—for the time being—last volume of the *Repertory* of United Nations practice has now been published. It sustains the standard set by the preceding four volumes: a standard of comprehensiveness of compilation, excellence of exposition, and selectivity in summarization that is of the highest order. Together, the volumes are perhaps the single most important contribution the Secretariat of the United Nations has made to the study of the organization that so substantially reflects and affects world life. The *Repertory* takes its place as a basic tool of research into international organization, international law, international politics, national and international economics, and human rights and welfare the world over.

The object of the *Repertory*—to provide a documented treatment of the application and interpretation that have been given the United Nations Charter in practice—is realized primarily by the presentation of "a comprehensive summary of the decisions of United Nations organs,"[1] from the time they began to function until September 1954. "A 'decision', for purposes of the Repertory, has been defined as any act of a United Nations organ adopting or rejecting, by vote or otherwise, a proposal in whatever form made."[2]

The *Repertory* comprises a series of studies of the articles of the Charter, each article being considered separately and in order. Since decisions have often related to more than one article, the *Repertory* in some instances concentrates certain materials under one article and provides cross reference to others, and in other instances treats decisions with a multiple bearing in a number of places. "The treatment of a decision as 'relevant' to a Charter question," the *Repertory* notes, "is not intended to constitute a judgement whether or to what extent the decision is a ruling on that question. In this connexion, the object of the Repertory is to present the pertinent material in an organized and coherent form and thereby enable the reader to judge such questions for himself."[3]

In general, a standard pattern of treatment is followed. An article is typically outlined initially with a table of contents. An introductory note explains the organization of the relevant materials, and their relation to those embraced by other articles. Then a general survey treats the significant broader aspects of the practice in applying an article, and this is followed by a detailed analysis of the salient cases. There are quotations from the more important resolutions. Comprehensive footnotes throughout lead the reader to the original sources and give references to lesser decisions, and these are supplemented at times by annexes that tabulate the decisions.

1. Vol. I, p. iii.
2. Vol. I, p. vi.
3. Vol. I, p. vii.

The body of the *Repertory* accordingly is illustrative rather than exhaustive. For example, in speaking of the functions that article 98 empowers certain United Nations organs to entrust to the Secretary-General, the *Repertory* notes: "The Analytical Summary of Practice does not cover every single instance in which a specific function was entrusted to, or was undertaken by, the Secretary-General but, rather, includes examples of some of the more significant functions of the Secretary-General, and of decisions which indicate the scope of his authority."[4]

As decisions of United Nations organs addressed directly to constitutional questions are rare, the *Repertory* examines United Nations discussions in order to ascertain the respects in which decisions are relevant to the Charter. The statements of United Nations delegates are grouped together by lines of argument and summarized, as a rule without attribution. This procedure, while lending a certain pallor to the proceedings, allows the exposition to be relatively unencumbered by requirements of protocol. It permits a presentation that is pithily summary and, to a very great degree, politically unexceptionable.

Yet it is not surprising that an interpretive element occasionally creeps into a summary exposition of such masses of material as the practice of the United Nations has accumulated. Internationally objective and intimately informed as such conclusions are, they are nonetheless not lacking in point. In discussing so sensitive a subject as the breadth of his own powers, the *Repertory*—which is to say, the Secretary-General—declares: "In practice, the scope of the functions of the Secretary-General has developed to a greater extent than had been foreseen by the Preparatory Commission. . . . [I]n the field of political functions, the practice of United Nations organs has established the right of the Secretary-General to intervene in the deliberations of United Nations organs and to formulate proposals to them."[5] Since the extent of the Secretary-General's right to do these things has been the subject of some dispute in the past, both in the course of United Nations meetings and behind the scenes, a conclusion such as this is not merely interpretive but perhaps may be said to be itself an element of the growing United Nations practice that in part defines the powers of the organization's organs. If such a conclusion—such a restatement of the interpretation that the subsequent conduct of the parties may be said to lend to a clause of a treaty—passes without "protest" from United Nations delegates, if it is "acquiesced in" by them, it may even be argued that the established international law doctrines of protest and acquiescence would "estop" such delegates in the future from challenging the legal right of the Secretary-General to "formulate proposals" to United Nations organs.

The purposes of the General Assembly in requesting the Secretary-General to prepare the *Repertory* were, first, to facilitate its consideration at its tenth annual session, in 1955, of the proposal to hold a general conference for the review of the Charter; and, second, to contribute to knowledge and under-

4. Vol. V, p. 123.
5. Vol. V, p. 125.

standing of the Charter as it has been applied in practice. The Tenth Assembly took up the suggestion in the Secretary-General's preface to the *Repertory*, and decided to hold a review conference at a date to be determined later; and to such a conference, the *Repertory* of course will be of great use. The second purpose has been fulfilled: the *Repertory*'s contribution to knowledge and understanding of the Charter is immeasurable. The delegate, the student, the citizen-of-the-world who is concerned to find the precedents, can find them in these volumes. For the international lawyer who is tried by research in a legal world characterized by inadequate digests and indices, incomplete reporting of cases, linguistic impediments and no shepardizing, the *Repertory* does much to bring order into the vital area of United Nations practice. And, as the Secretary-General rightly observes, "if supplemented regularly, it will become more valuable from year to year as the Organization's records increase in size and complexity."[6]

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6. Vol. I, p. iii.

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