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Grünhut: Juvenile Offenders Before the Courts

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with all systematic thinking, ideological and utopian.\(^{24}\) Perhaps it is the result of the loss of local roots which has turned most business executives and professional men into transients,\(^{25}\) and which may be producing the kind of nomadic character structure that has always been contemptuous of the accidental momentary camp site. Whatever the reasons, we will have no decent city planning until there has been a revolution in public opinion. As we are learning in the field of desegregation, an enlightened Supreme Court is not enough.\(^{26}\)

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At the first United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held in Geneva in 1955 it was resolved that "accurate knowledge of the fields of [juvenile] delinquency prevention and treatment lags far behind the good intentions of those interested in increasing social action, and so there is need for caution in determining the social action to be taken. It is desirable to make provision for evaluation whenever new social action is undertaken."\(^{27}\) No one with any degree of knowledge in this field can doubt the truth of this only apparently harmless statement. The air is noisy with confidently asserted recommendations for the treatment of juvenile delinquents and for the development of programs of prevention; yet how slight, how very slight, is our knowledge of the success which our already existing methods of treatment and prevention achieve or fail to achieve. Without such knowledge how can we with confidence in other than our good intentions advocate changes in treatment methods? It is true today, as it was in 1933, when Michael and Adler affirmed it in their acidulous Crime, Law and Social Science, that "we know nothing about the deterrent or reformative effects of any mode or variety of treatment. It is, therefore, impossible for a proposal of alterations in the modes of treatment to be defended on the ground that the proposed mode of treatment will have greater deterrent or reformative effects. All changes in the treatment process offer opportunities for the study of their differential effects upon human behaviour. Any pro-


\(^{26}\) "If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).

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posal for a change in the treatment process can be justified only as an experiment."

But there has been this change since 1933—a shift of emphasis away from research into the etiology of delinquent behavior and towards the study of the effectiveness of our various treatment methods. We are at least seeking out this type of knowledge. The well-known works of Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck—theyir follow-up studies and their endeavor to develop prediction tables assessing the likelihood of success of different types of juvenile offenders under different types of treatment—and the valuable Experiment in the Prevention of Delinquency, the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study, by Powers and Witmer are recent examples in the United States of this search. Recent English examples of such studies are Mannheim and Wilkins' Prediction Methods in Relation to Borstal Training; Mannheim, Juvenile Delinquency in an English Middle Town; the report by the Cambridge Department of Criminal Science entitled Detention in Remand Homes; and the work under review, Dr. Max Grünhut's Juvenile Offenders Before the Court.

There is no doubt that Dr. Grünhut's work considerably increases our knowledge of juvenile delinquency in England and Wales. There is equally no doubt that it fails to answer the ultimate problem: which of our current methods of treatment are best for which types of juvenile offenders? It is unfair, however, to talk of "failure" here. The truth is that Dr. Grünhut's study does all that could possibly be expected of it to lay the foundation for further research work to begin to answer this basic question. But until we can control our experiments and subject delinquents of similar personality structures, home background and environmental circumstances to deliberately different methods of treatment, it is unlikely that we shall have more than reasonably cogent surmises in this entire field. Apparently everyone agrees that there would be injustice in determining the treatment to be accorded to individual delinquents more by the demands of a research project than by the court's surmises as to the most effective and appropriate methods of dealing with them. But we pay and will continue to pay a big price for this nicety in our sense of justice. We will continue to act at random and by personal prejudice rather than by established knowledge. Of its kind, Dr. Grünhut's study is excellent—informative, methodologically sophisticated, well written; it is the ultimate value of studies of this kind that is open to doubt.

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I shall develop this argument first by summarizing what the book under review tells us, and then considering its significance for the development of our knowledge of the different effects of various treatment methods. To do this in a deliberately carping spirit seems to me justifiable, for Dr. Grünhut’s study demonstrates throughout high statistical skill and criminological knowledge.

Dr. Grünhut begins by recounting the number of juvenile delinquents convicted by the juvenile courts in England and Wales over the three-year period from 1948 to 1950 and the relationship of delinquency during this period to the period from 1944 to 1953. Local variations in juvenile delinquency in 134 police districts in England and Wales are then carefully and precisely assessed, the figures being corrected to a proportion of the children aged 8 to 17 in each district. Areas with high delinquency rates are distinguished from areas of low delinquency and their characteristics discussed, this whole analysis being conducted with a precise understanding of the many hidden factors which condition the differences between the various districts, particularly the “dark figure” of undetected delinquencies and those delinquent acts which are dealt with by other than court processes, such as by police warnings.

“The characteristic pattern of a high-delinquency area is a big industrial town with the typical social structure of an industrial population, not a place where poverty is prevalent, but where there is a high proportion of small incomes, where there is considerable infant mortality, though not necessarily with the highest infant mortality rates.”

In these calculations information is given for four groups of children—boys of 8-13, girls of 8-13, boys of 14-17, and girls of 14-17. This section of the book illustrates “the general features of juvenile delinquency in England and Wales, both in respect of its local distribution throughout the country and of its trend from pre-war years throughout the war years to the post-war period.”

There follows a detailed discussion of the various treatment methods that the juvenile courts in these 134 police districts apply. More uniformity of treatment practice throughout the country is demonstrated than one might have suspected. There remain, however, considerable differences in the practices followed by some courts from the general average of the country as a whole. These local treatment practices are then analyzed in relation to specific forms of delinquency, by age of offender, gravity of crime and quality of home background. The following treatment methods are discussed: absolute discharge, conditional discharge, probation, committal to the care of a fit person, committal to an approval school and fines. The period under consideration, 1948-1950, antedates the development of the three quasi-punitive techniques of treatment introduced by the Criminal Justice Act, 1948: detention in a Remand Home, committal to a Detention Centre and committal to an Attendance Centre.

9. P. 52.
An analysis of the variations in sentencing practices between the various juvenile courts indicates that the total character of the delinquency problem that the court faces in its local jurisdiction is of great significance to the decision it will make in relation to a particular individual. For example, a court sitting in an industrial area with a high delinquency rate is much more likely to use fines instead of probation than is a court in a rural area with a relatively small delinquency problem, the latter being able to give more individual attention to the juvenile delinquent before it. The major change since the war in England seems to be the increasing use of fines as a technique of dealing with convicted juvenile delinquents, the proportion of children placed on probation tending to remain fairly constant.

Dr. Grünhut next discusses the success rates of the various types of treatment, based on the statistical materials elsewhere considered and buttressed by information gained from seven hundred case histories followed up in five districts. This provides "qualitative data for a comprehensive assessment of the crime situation to which the local treatment practice, ascertained from statistical sources, applied." Not surprisingly, it is found that the success rate (that is to say, the successful avoidance of a later conviction) is connected more with the quality of the home background of the delinquent child and the gravity of his offence than it is with any selection by the court of one or other of the treatment methods. Probation tends to have a higher success rate than does placement in an approved school, particularly when this figure is corrected, as it must be, for the longer period during which the convicted juvenile delinquent is "at risk" when he is placed on probation than when he is committed to an approved school. But, of course, the magistrate has selected probation partly because he does not think the case is of sufficient gravity, and the child's home circumstances sufficiently disturbed, to require the more extensive interference with the child's life that is involved in committal to an approved school, and these are factors of great significance to a success rate. He will be more reluctant to commit a child to an approved school when that child comes from a relatively secure home background—that background will itself be one of the major justifications for endeavoring to maintain the unity of the home by placing the child on probation, and it will greatly militate towards "success." In other words, a comparison of the relative success rates of probation and committal to an approved school really tells us very little about the relative success of the two treatments. There are too many unseen variables at work for this information to be of any clear value to a juvenile court judge in the future facing this same choice.

Nor can much be deduced from the fact that one court has greater success with those children that it places on probation than does another. Not only will the quality of the probation officers themselves vary, but, possibly of even greater importance, the children will return to communities of varying delinquency risk.

11. P. 87.
In sum, *Juvenile Offenders Before the Courts* tells us a great deal about the phenomenon of juvenile delinquency in England and Wales and its treatment by the courts; it gives us, however, only odd bits of information with which to supply a juvenile court judge seeking advice on how to exercise his difficult duty of choosing between varying types of treatment to effect a reformative aim. This summation accords with Dr. Grünhut's own views: "The decisive test is the after-conduct of juvenile delinquents of a comparable criminological type under different treatment practices. For reasons discussed on several occasions above, the present material allows no more than certain tentative suggestions."

I take it that since the first decade of this century, the reformative aim in children's courts throughout the world has been a primary one, and further, that that aim has been recognized to involve the individualization of treatment methods. We urge juvenile court judges to exercise their discretion to select the best weapon from their relatively limited reformative armory; yet we cannot tell them, other than in the individual case by the clinical insights of the psychologist, psychiatrist and social worker, which types of treatment seem to work best with which types of children. Dr. Grünhut is not one to seek to exaggerate the significance of the information he presents. He writes: "There is no conclusive evidence to show what would be the best treatment policy with regard to the serious forms of juvenile crime. The reason why a comparison of local experience alone does not throw sufficient light on this problem, lies probably in the complex nature of what we call serious criminality." 

Such studies as these undoubtedly gradually increase our understanding of the problems of juvenile delinquency and our skill in handling them; but it is so slight an increase. Could we not devise research projects which would expedite this vital understanding? Dr. Grünhut makes a statement germane to this question which I would like to challenge: "In the administration of justice no experiments are feasible." Why is this so? Why should we not deliberately set up an experiment to test the appropriateness of one treatment method rather than another for delinquents of a given personality type from a given environmental background?

I venture to outline such a project in the most general terms. Let our group consist of:

1) first offenders,
2) between the ages of 13 and 16,
3) convicted of minor larcenies, not being larcenies from their parents,
4) who have not been involved in persistent truancy,
5) who are of broadly average intelligence,
6) who come from homes that are not broken by death or divorce,
7) and concerning whom a pre-sentence report does not indicate considerable psychological disturbance in the child or in his home.

13. P. 117.
For such children—and they are legion—the juvenile court judge will in practice face a choice between probation, or imposing a fine, or discharging (absolutely or conditionally). How should he choose? What other factors should he take into account? Investigation will confirm that different judges in different districts, and even different judges in the same district, will have statistically different sentencing behaviors when facing this type of problem. One will generally prefer a discharge with a warning or a conditional discharge, another will favor placing the child on probation, and some will rely on fines. They will exercise their preferences with reference to much other information concerning the child and their reactions to the child and his offence. Let us suppose that over the past few years a juvenile court judge has placed fifty per cent of such children on probation, has discharged thirty per cent and has fined twenty per cent. No investigation of the later conduct of these children will assist us to know with any degree of confidence whether in the past he exercised his discretion wisely. We will only begin to have this type of knowledge when we can control, by a random process, the exercise of the discretion itself. If you object too much to the thought of chance playing its part in this field, is it not a fair reply that the chance of which judge the child comes before and in which area already plays an overwhelming part? When our judge is next sentencing a child so classified by him, the experiment will require that statistical chance be allowed to determine the sentence to be imposed.

It may be that results of such a controlled experiment would mean that a juvenile court judge of the future, who finds himself faced with the problem of exercising this discretion for a child falling within the classification I have sketched, might make his decision not solely by virtue of his own ideas as to the abstract wisdom of the alternatives, but would be assisted by the statistical information which we could give him. Let us, to salve our consciences, place the same relative number on probation, impose a fine on the same proportion and allow the same relative number a discharge as the judge previously allowed. By the operation of chance, some children who would otherwise be put on probation will not be put on probation, and some children who would otherwise be discharged will be fined, and so on; to this extent we will be interfering with human lives for the sake of experimentation. The juvenile court judge will also, to a degree, and for a period, be abrogating the discretion which was by law committed to him. There are real difficulties of a legalistic character in the last proposition; but let us pursue this hypothetical experiment and consider its possible value.

When the selection between probation, fine and discharge has been exercised by this method on a sufficient number of children for purposes of adequate statistical analysis, let the experiment cease and let the judicial chance resume the place temporarily occupied by the statistical chance. Let us then over a five (or more) year period follow up our randomly sampled cases

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and learn all we can of the later conduct of the subjects of the experiment. I would submit that from such an experiment we could begin to build up real knowledge, concerning children of that type from that area, as to what qualities of the child and what circumstances of his environment were positive indications for the application of probation treatment. There would, in other words, be developed the beginnings of knowledge on which the juvenile court judge could more rationally exercise his discretion. The knowledge thus built up would require validation, even in that same district, and could be applied to other areas only tentatively and without confidence. Nevertheless, it would be knowledge of a different character from that which we have managed to search out over the past fifty years from the exercise of this type of discretion by juvenile court judges—of a different and much more valid character.

If you reject this whole idea, are you satisfied with the alternative processes for the development of knowledge? It is my belief that Dr. Grünhut's study is an excellent example of an attempt to build up knowledge without using some such controlled experiment, and yet he is pushed in his final paragraph to this type of assessment of its result:

"Like the crime situation itself, the state of preventive policy and the facilities for treatment are the result of a coincidence of many different and sometimes divergent tendencies. Because of this, it has proved exceedingly difficult in the preceding discussion to assess the direct effect of one or the other variety of judicial treatment practice. Any statement in respect of certain types of juvenile offenders or any preference for one or the other form of treatment had to be made with due regard to all accompanying circumstances at the particular time and place. However, in the search for evidence on the direct effect of a certain way of treatment, one should not lose sight of the indirect influence of judicial treatment practice. To select the appropriate form of treatment is more than a mere technical question, and something which transcends in its importance the individual case. The spirit in which the juvenile court law is administered, the attitude which directs the choice of the measures applied, and the constant reappraisal of principles in the light of experience in respect of after-careers of former delinquents, are powerful forces which shape the climate of public opinion which in itself has a strong influence on success or failure in the treatment of juvenile delinquents."

All this is undoubtedly true; but to my mind the expense in terms of human effort and social utility of this type of gradualism exceeds the importance of our reluctance to allow planned social experimentation.

I chose to discuss the probation, fine or discharge possibilities because the Cambridge-Somerville Study, though for a variety of reasons leading to no scientifically valid conclusions, certainly threw doubt on our glib assumption of the overall advantages of probation. Such an experiment would, of course, whatever its outcome, in no way indicate that probation, or fines or discharges were in themselves wise or unwise techniques of treatment; it should, how-

ever, gradually lead to the more precise selection by juvenile court judges of preferable cases for the application of these treatment methods, and might mean that we could both decrease probation case-loads and yet increase the social value of the work of each probation officer.

Much of the thesis that I have advanced is similar to that which has supported the development of prediction tables for the purpose of assessing the likelihood of failure or success of parole, the likelihood of success of various types of offenders in institutions, or the prediction of later delinquency in young children. It has, however, this difference. This proposed experiment is built around and concentrates on the particular problem that the juvenile court judge faces in exercising his discretion between competing types of treatment. It concentrates on the particular significance of his role and endeavors to build up particular knowledge for the purpose of aiding the exercise of his discretion; its primary purpose is not to facilitate a more complete assessment of a likely criminal or delinquent breakdown in any individual. The prediction tables which have so far been developed purport to tell us no more than the likelihood of failure or success of different types of criminals or delinquents (actual or potential) subjected to a given type of treatment or lack of treatment; they do not purport to tell us of the likelihood of failure or success of a defined type of offender subjected to different treatments or lack of treatment. It is the latter type of information which one exercising the judicial function needs. He wants the breakdown rates for similar types of individuals from similar backgrounds subjected to different correctional processes.

In Law and the Modern Mind Jerome Frank wrote:

"The experimental approach would be peculiarly serviceable in law. For the practice of law is a series of experiments, of adventures in the adjusting of human relations and the compromising of human conflicts. The paradox is that where this approach is most needed it is all too frequently repudiated. In one sense it is constantly in use, for the daily job of the lawyers would fail without it. But while we lawyers use it, we discount it. We do our job with an unfortunate unconsciousness of the nature of that job or of the technique we employ." 

Surely, even the most skilled and mature juvenile court judge when imposing sentence is to be regarded as a benevolent experimenter with the few treatment methods he can order—how futile for the development of knowledge (though not necessarily for the wise adjustment of human conflicts) is a constantly repeated incomplete experiment.

The type of experimentation that I suggest is already well established in medical research. Where there is genuine doubt as to the choice between two or more treatments for a given physical condition, efficient experimentation has compelled the random application of the competing method to a controlled group of patients—the "clinical trial" or "controlled therapeutic trial." The establishment of knowledge requires that for a few patients the personal slight

preferences of the individual practitioner shall not be allowed permanently to prevent the development of knowledge.

There is, of course, but an imperfect analogy between the doctor's "treatment" and the juvenile court's "treatment." The subject of medical diagnosis is much more defined than is the social disease of delinquency, and in the former the patient consents to treatment while the delinquent does not. But the methodological analogies serve to buttress my argument for the "clinical trial" by a juvenile court, just as it is increasingly pursued in medicine. The British Medical Research Council has been prominent in this careful application of statistical methods to the assessment of therapeutic effectiveness—a fascinating account, comprehensible to the layman, is given by Dr. Marc Daniels, of that organization, on the "Clinical Evaluation of Chemotherapy in Tuberculosis," in which he tells of the first large-scale controlled trial in tuberculosis on record. The Medical Research Council arranged that "fifty-five patients with a well-defined form of pulmonary tuberculosis were treated by streptomycin and bed-rest; 52 patients with similar disease were treated by bed-rest alone." He also describes similar trials refining knowledge in this field in the United States and Sweden.

Dr. Bradford Hill, Honorary Director of the same organization's Statistical Research Unit, offers this comment, germane to sentencing by juvenile courts, in comparing the knowledge gained by developed clinical skills and by the clinical trial:

"It appears sometimes to be thought that there is some necessary antagonism between the clinical assessment of a few cases and the 'cold mathematics' of the statistically analyzed trial dealing with a larger number. It is difficult to see how in fact there can be any such antagonism. The clinical assessment, or the clinical impression, must itself be numerical in the long run—that patients are reacting in a way different from the way the clinician believes was customary in the past. In the controlled trial an attempt is made to record and systematize those impressions (and other measurements) and to add them up . . . . The result reached is, of course, a group result, namely, that on the average patients do better on this treatment than on that. No one can say how one particular patient will react. But that, clearly, is just as true (to say the least of it) of the approach via clinical impressions and two cases, as it is via a controlled and objectively measured trial and 100 cases."

Of course, for clinicians, as for juvenile court judges, to be "willing to merge their individuality sufficiently to take part in group investigations, . . . to conform to an agreed plan of treatment, and to submit results for analysis by an outside investigator involves a considerable sacrifice." Yet it is a sacrifice that.

18. See Hill, The Clinical Trial, 7 BRITISH MEDICAL BULL. 278 (1950-51), which forms a part of a valuable symposium on "Measurement in Medicine."
19. Id. at 320.
20. Id. at 321.
21. Id. at 282.
22. Daniels, in (1950) AM. REV. TUBERCULOSIS 61, 751.
sometimes has to be made if we are to move from impressions to measurement, from a rough art to a possibly less rough social science.

The clinical trial is, of course, less justified in medicine if the mortality or recovery rates of a given physical condition at a given stage of its development are reasonably well known. All that is then necessary to begin to develop knowledge is to measure if a changed method of treatment improves substantially on the already known recovery rate, correcting as far as possible for the many differences between the two relevant groups. But such knowledge is lacking concerning juvenile delinquency—if we knew the “success” rates for various categories or classifications of delinquents (personality, environment and offense) then such “clinical trials” would be unnecessary, for we could use the existing randomness of sentencing to assess which methods were more successful with each category. This type of information could be built up and would avoid the ethical and legal difficulties of the clinical trial, but at present the task would be Augean, for we lack this preliminary knowledge as to the success rate of various categories of offenders, either in general or subjected to diverse treatments.

I have chosen for the experiment I have proposed a random application of treatment methods which make no great difference to the individual liberty of the particular delinquent. A more disturbing and usually more difficult choice frequently faces a juvenile court judge who is in doubt whether it is necessary to remove a child from his home and commit him to an institution, rather than place him on probation or merely impose a fine. Then, indeed, the difference which social experimentation would make to some members of the experimental group would be very much greater than in the case which I advance; but the grounds for justifying it would be no different, and if my case is valid for one type of experiment then logically it should be valid for the other. Yet one tends to balk at this latter type of experiment. It is perhaps appropriate to confess that I am troubled by the possible implications of the type of experiment here advocated. It is only twenty-seven years to 1984, and Orwell and those novelists who have followed him have disturbed all of us. In human affairs the control of the individual for the sake of the statistical many may be seen as benevolent by the controller but never by the controlled. Nevertheless, the possible wastage in our current wide application of the services of probation officers to juvenile delinquents who may not need those services, who may even suffer because of them, and the denial of probation to those delinquents who may benefit from it seem to me such grave harms as to merit some controlled experimentation in an endeavor to find a remedy.

The experienced and wise juvenile court judge builds up understanding to guide him in selecting the appropriate treatment, and it is doubtful if the results of any experiments will much help him. But the trouble with such “understanding” is that it is not conceptual, it is not communicable, others cannot gain from it except by close personal contact with its possessor. Such “understanding” is quite different from “knowledge,” which is communicable,
which can be acquired other than by osmosis and which facilitates the development of “understanding.” It is knowledge and not surmise that such an experiment as I suggest would begin to provide. Too freely have we assumed, because our intentions towards delinquent children are benevolent and turned towards their rehabilitation and hence the community's protection, that we must necessarily achieve benevolent results. One way in which we insulate ourselves from anxiety concerning these results is to be reluctant to study them. When we do study them and find them disappointing we stress the great complexity of the problem of juvenile delinquency and point to factors relatively outside our control as being determinative—urbanization, the development of delinquency areas, the aggressive self-centered cultures from which the delinquents spring. Intellectual honesty as well as the canons of scientific methodology require that we begin more critically to evaluate one process which is clearly within our control—the exercise of the juvenile court judge's sentencing function.

“In general the chief social condition of scientific method is a widespread desire for truth that is strong enough to withstand the powerful forces which make us cling tenaciously to old views or else embrace every novelty because it is a change. . . . Fear of offending established dogmas has been an obstacle to the growth of astronomy and geology and other physical sciences; and the fear of offending patriotic or respected sentiment is perhaps one of the strongest hindrances to scholarly history and social science. On the other hand, when a community indiscriminately acclaims every new doctrine the love of truth becomes subordinated to the desire for novel formulations.”

In the application of our treatment methods in juvenile courts and in the formulation of new methods we see a blend of traditionalism and exaggerated reformism which only verifiable and modest research projects can in the long run control.

To return to Dr. Grünhut's *Juvenile Offenders Before the Courts*. It deserves the close attention of all serious students of the subject. Its precise analysis of the court aspects of the problem of juvenile delinquency in England and Wales has lessons, too, for the more diverse and numerically greater problems that face juvenile courts in the United States. As a study it is a fine example both of collaboration between the correctional philosopher, the case worker and the statistician, and of collaboration between government departments and a university research activity—and all without a grant from a charitable foundation!

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