Review Essays

Some (Further) Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy

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Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control represents the latest installment in Robert Dahl's evolving theory of polyarchal democracy. It is a contribution of considerable interest: in systematically restating and extending the themes that have dominated his work at least since the mid-sixties, this book demonstrates clearly the very considerable distance that Dahl has travelled from benign celebration of American pluralist democracy in such works as A Preface to Democratic Theory and Who Governs to increasingly sharp criticism of that regime for its failure to achieve its best potentialities. It is also a contribution of considerable importance, for it invites us to follow Dahl in considering with intellectual precision and rigor some central dilemmas of democratic pluralism. It is a book which powerfully illuminates our understanding of democracy; but it is also a book which fails to pursue some important implications of its own argument, and which remains strategically silent on at least one particularly vexing set of dilemmas.

Dahl's argument is careful and complex. Section I of this review reconstructs that argument. Section II criticizes it.

I. The Problem

Dahl's central problem can be stated in deceptively simple terms. Independent or autonomous organizations are highly desirable in a democracy, at least on a large scale. Yet autonomy or independence carries with it the power to do harm. As with individuals, so with orga-
nizations: they ought to possess some autonomy, yet they should also be controlled. This, crudely stated, is the problem of pluralist democracy.

Autonomous organizations are highly desirable in a democracy for at least two reasons. First, they supply "mutual controls," or restraints, on the universal tendency towards hierarchy and domination in social life. Second, the rights required for democracy make organizational pluralism simultaneously possible and necessary, and hence both inevitable and desirable. A sense of the advantages of organizations is a defining feature of modernity, and the institutions of polyarchy impose high costs on efforts to repress this tendency. Organizational pluralism is the concomitant, both as cause and effect, of the liberalization and democratization of "hegemonic" (i.e. illiberal and undemocratic) regimes.

Two significant caveats emerge immediately from the argument. First, Dahl emphasizes much more explicitly than in the Preface or Who Governs? the distinction between organizational pluralism and democracy. Organizational pluralism, while perhaps a necessary condition of democracy (at least on a large scale), is definitely not sufficient. All polyarchal regimes are pluralist, but not all pluralist regimes are polyarchal.

Second, Dahl's central argument applies primarily to large scale democracy. Not all democratic systems are necessarily pluralist: democracy might conceivably exist on a very small scale without organizational pluralism, as Rousseau had hoped. But, Dahl argues, it is neither feasible nor desirable to dispense with representative democracy in the nation-state, which is necessarily pluralist.

While pluralism is a necessary and desirable feature of large-scale democracy, it also "appears to be implicated in"—Dahl chooses a deliberately ambiguous phrase—at least four important defects of polyarchal democracy.

1) Stabilizing political inequalities. Pluralism, while checking domination through mutual controls, can maintain inequality by freezing out unorganized interests.

2) Deforming civic consciousness. Pluralism may distort civic consciousness by promoting an emphasis upon the particularistic and short-run interests of organized groups as against the long-run best interests of society as a whole.

3) Distorting the public agenda. Pluralism may lead to the exclusion from the public agenda of alternatives which, had they been placed upon it, would have prevailed (or at least influenced policy outcomes).[^5]

[^5]: Dahl's discussion of the idea of a distorted political agenda represents his recognition of the "other face of power" emphasized by critics of his "decision-making" approach to the study of power in Who Governs?. Dahl now recognizes that power must be measured by study-
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4) *Alienation of final control*. Pluralism may, by giving organized interests final say on an important range of issues, lead to alienation of final control over the agenda by the demos.

But to what degree, Dahl asks, are these four defects the necessary consequence of pluralism as such? Alternatively, to what degree are they the consequence of other causes with which pluralism is perhaps only contingently correlated? Dahl considers four possible alternative causes of defects characteristically ascribed to pluralism as such: 1) variations of national regime (e.g., conflicts and cleavages, political institutions, inclusiveness and concentration of organizations); 2) the fact that polyarchy is an incomplete realization of democratic ideals; 3) a civic consciousness that stresses egoism rather than altruism or benevolence; and 4) the fact that polyarchy exists only in countries with capitalist economies.\(^6\)

A. National Variations

Dahl begins with an elementary but helpful demonstration that many of the defects characteristically ascribed to pluralism are instead a straightforward function of variations in national regimes. The extent of political inequality in the United States, for example, cannot be ascribed to pluralism as such, since much of this inequality has been eliminated by Scandinavian social democracies such as Denmark and Sweden—which are also clearly pluralist. Likewise, the absence of socialism from the public agenda of the United States can hardly be explained by pluralism as such, since socialism is present in every other polyarchy.\(^7\)

Clearly, however, variations in national regime cannot alone account for the full extent of the four defects afflicting pluralist democracies. We must, therefore, consider additional possible explanations.

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\(^6\) I am changing the order of Dahl's discussion.

\(^7\) Nevertheless, Dahl argues, the absence of a socialist alternative does importantly distort the public agenda of American polyarchy. But to make this point Dahl must violate his own strict counterfactual condition, since socialism surely has not unambiguously prevailed (as required by the condition) simply in virtue of its presence upon the public agenda of other polyarchies. Dahl's political insight is on this point richer than his theoretical framework.
B. More Democracy

Perhaps the surviving defects can be ascribed not to pluralism as such but to the fact that polyarchy is everywhere an imperfect realization of democratic ideals: if polyarchy were more fully democratic, policies might better represent majority preferences, and hence the common good, rather than the mere tugging and hauling of interest groups. This is almost certainly the case. But even in a perfectly democratic republic (entailing not just the democratization in detail of political life, but substantial socioeconomic equality as well), certain irresolvable antinomies of democracy—rights vs. utility, a more vs. less exclusive demos, equality among individuals vs. equality among organizations, uniformity vs. diversity, centralization vs. decentralization, concentration vs. dispersion—would persist. These antinomies would place inherent upper limits upon the possibility of resolving the defects associated with organizational pluralism through the democratization of polyarchy.

Still, the impossibility of a perfectly frictionless democratic republic, Dahl quickly adds, is no argument against the desirability of further democratization wherever feasible. What is crucial to this goal is redistribution of political resources—above all, greater socioeconomic equality.

C. Reforming Civic Consciousness

Dahl asks that we consider another possibility. Perhaps the defects associated with pluralism are instead the product of an egoism that (by definition) deforms civic consciousness, thereby distorting the public agenda and perpetuating inequality and alienation of final control. And perhaps this egoism is, further, a consequence of capitalism—and hence remediable with fundamental economic change. Perhaps, but Dahl chooses instead to emphasize the extent to which egoism flows ineluctably from the scale of modern politics and society (and, as we shall see, from the need for independent economic structures as such). In the small, simple democratic republic envisioned by Rousseau, civic virtue might flourish. But a melt-down of the nation-state is not on Dahl's agenda. Instead, he emphasizes two necessary consequences of the increasing size and population that accompany large-scale democracy: a) increasing diversity, and hence conflict, of interests (Dahl's Madisoni-anism, to which we shall return, is nowhere more in evidence); and b) the need for theoretical rather than merely practical knowledge in determining the common good. On this basis, he identifies two types of solutions to the problem of the general good. Type I solutions require that citizens i) live in small, tightly bounded communities; ii) have no
conflicts of interest, objective or subjective; iii) be steadily altruistic or (as required by the normative theory of market capitalism) completely egoistic; and iv) be proficient social theorists or philosophers. Any solution incorporating any of these requirements, he argues, would not be feasible in a democracy. Type II solutions, by contrast, recognize that i) some units must be as large as a country and some may be larger; ii) conflict of interests is certain; iii) most citizens will be neither steadily altruistic nor completely egoistic; and iv) most citizens are unlikely to be highly competent social theorists or philosophers. They represent the only feasible alternatives, at least under modern conditions, for Dahl.

Not all Type II solutions are equally desirable, however. Dahl adds the further observation that regulative structures are less satisfactory to the degree that they preserve or create long run conflicts of interest and, conversely, more satisfactory to the degree that they reduce such conflicts. Here again, Dahl argues, solutions will operate largely by promoting greater objective equality of socioeconomic condition.

As with democratization, with reform of civic consciousness we also confront inherent upper limits upon the possibility of resolving defects characteristically ascribed to pluralism through the reform of institutions and attitudes with which pluralism has historically been linked. Both arguments also, and importantly, converge in a demand for greater socioeconomic equality within these limits.

D. Redistributing Wealth and Income

The logic of Dahl's argument, then, moves us beyond considerations of politics and culture to considerations of economics. Here, too, we immediately confront another limiting factor. Polyarchy and capitalism would appear to go hand in hand: all polyarchal regimes have been capitalist, although not all capitalist regimes have been polyarchal. Perhaps, then, capitalism is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of the organizational pluralism that is in turn a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of polyarchy. Not so, argues Dahl. What is crucial to pluralism is not the legal form of ownership per se, but the degree of autonomy ceded to enterprises. There is no necessary relationship between the legal form of ownership and the degree of enterprise autonomy: a capitalist regime may be, but need not be, highly decentralized; a socialist regime may be, but need not be, highly centralized.

Having broken the nexus between capitalism and pluralism, Dahl turns to consider means by which the defects associated with pluralism—most specifically, the problem of stable inequality—could be rectified by alterations in the economic regime of capitalism. There are at
least three possibilities: 1) redistribution by selective centralization; 2) redistribution by a centralized economy; and 3) decentralized democratic socialism.

1. **Redistribution by Selective Centralization**

Through its tax and transfer policies, the welfare state can succeed in redistributing income and wealth up to—but only up to—a certain point. As it approaches this point, it encounters increasing constraints in the form of both “the well-worn problem of incentives” and, as Dahl prefers to emphasize, increasing electoral resistance to downward redistribution. Beyond this point, which may have been reached in the Scandinavian social democracies (but surely not in the U.S.), further redistribution can succeed only by more basic structural changes in capitalism as such.8

2. **Redistribution by a Centralized Economy**

A bold alternative to the tax and transfer strategy of welfare-state capitalism would be redistribution by a centralized economy combining “synoptic” (i.e. comprehensive and rational) planning with democratic control. But this ideal harbors an internal contradiction: either meaningful democracy would destroy “synoptic” planning, or the concentration and centralization of power necessary to carry through synoptic planning would destroy democracy. Pluralism and therefore polyarchy do not require capitalism as such, but they do require substantial devolution of power to relatively autonomous enterprises. And no satisfactory way has been discovered, either in theory or practice, for achieving such autonomy except through a system of market competition. Hence, any acceptable solution to the problem of pluralist democracy is limited by the requirements of i) decentralization to relatively autonomous firms and ii) a market economy.

3. **Decentralized Democratic Socialism**

These requirements could, however, be met in principle by a system of socialism based on, e.g., the Yugoslavian model combining “social” ownership, decentralized and internally democratic control of enter-

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8. Dahl needs to specify more precisely how structural change in the economy will lead to further redistribution of income and wealth. Once the point has been reached at which a rationally self-interested majority coalition opposes further downward redistribution, it seems difficult to see how—barring the kind of wholesale transformation of consciousness in which Dahl places very little faith—structural change would lead to further income redistribution. Perhaps what Dahl envisages here is structural change that would permit further redistribution in ownership and/or control of productive wealth without the damaging effects of incentives to save and invest that may inhibit further redistribution within capitalism as presently constituted. In any case, a fuller argument is required.
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prises, and markets. Such a regime could in principle preserve pluralism, and perhaps even enhance it relative to corporate capitalism. But no such system could ever altogether escape the defects associated with pluralism or the dilemmas that limit solutions: decentralization of power to autonomous enterprises, combined with market competition, would to some important degree generate inequalities, deform civic consciousness, etc. The only socialism worth having would of necessity be pluralist—warts and all.

E. Remedies

Once we have corrected for the range of alternative possible causes identified by Dahl, we discover, therefore, that organizational pluralism as such remains afflicted by certain irremediable—necessary, not contingent—defects. What then is to be done?

Dahl, like Madison in The Federalist No. 10, in effect identifies two solutions: removing causes and controlling effects. We could attempt to eliminate its characteristic defects by suppressing either pluralism or its necessary conditions, but clearly any such cure (involving as it would the suppression of polyarchy) would be worse than the disease. Therefore, we must instead control its effects—accepting as given a series of limiting conditions inherent in pluralism or necessary to its existence. For Dahl, as we have seen, these are: 1) large-scale democracy; 2) the antinomies (rights vs. utility, etc.) or even pure and perfect democracy; 3) the inevitability of Type II solutions; and 4) the need for relatively autonomous economic enterprises (and hence for markets).9 The best that we can do, in an imperfect world, is minimize the defects of pluralism within these constraints.

To exemplify this strategy, Dahl focuses his prescriptions upon that polyarchal regime in which the extant defects maximally exceed the irreducible minimum necessarily imposed by the requirements of pluralism as such—the United States. His emphasis, for reasons that we have already seen, lies most centrally upon reduction of the severe socioeconomic inequality that so seriously compounds all four defects of democratic pluralism.

The very considerable extent of economic inequality in the United States, Dahl argues, is not inherent in pluralism or polyarchy or capitalism as such (since it has been substantially reduced elsewhere), but is rather a function of the absence from American political life of social

9. It is not clear that all of these conditions are, strictly speaking, necessary for pluralism; some, e.g. large-scale democracy, would seem to represent Dahl's judgments regarding their superior feasibility and/or desirability, not their necessity to pluralism.
democratic and labor parties. The absence of socialism from our (consequently distorted) public agenda may in turn be explained in important measure by the tenacious persistence of a Lockean ideology of property rights according to which, the economy being a "private" realm, productive enterprises (and those "freely" associated within them) ought to be governed by the owners of those enterprises. But whatever the relevance of this ideology to an agrarian democratic republic, Dahl argues, large privately-owned and -controlled corporations are not private but rather social and political: their wealth is socially created, and they exercise power. Recognition of this fact, Dahl believes, will eventually force the issue of economic inequality onto the public agenda of American polyarchy.

When it does, the United States may be expected to relive European experience. An initial stage of increasing awareness of the extent of economic inequality in the United States will be followed by a catch-up stage in which income and wealth are redistributed through the tax and transfer policies of the welfare state. But, as in Europe, this strategy will eventually run its course due to the limits upon redistribution set by the interaction of polyarchy and capitalism. Hence, both as a means to further redistribution of income and wealth and as a good in itself, Dahl advocates a third stage: a "structural" change in the economic order involving democratization of power and authority in the internal governance of economic enterprises.

Dahl thus concludes his argument on a note that has dominated his political thought at least since the publication of After the Revolution.10 Because large corporations are public institutions, exercising power over market and state, and political systems in their own right, exercising power over employees (who cannot plausibly be said to consent voluntarily to these hierarchical power relationships), there is a strong case for subjecting them to democratic controls, both externally by the government of the state and internally by employees. Moreover, Dahl argues, the concept of property can and should be revised to support the claim of employees, not absentee stockholders or their managerial agents, to own and control the firms for which they labor. A democratic political economy will transfer control from owners and managers to the entire demos of the firm: "for those decisions which most affect their lives all the employees of an economic enterprise must be included in the demos. And to satisfy democratic criteria, citizens of a firm would have to possess equal votes."11

11. R. DAHL, DILEMMAS, supra note 1, at 204.
II. Criticism

This is clearly a program for radical change. Dahl is advocating a fundamental reconstitution in the power and control relationships of capitalist society—and hence a fundamental reconstitution in relationships of ownership as well. Dahl maintains, correctly, that no form of ownership is sufficient for any form of control. But whereas he previously had maintained that no form of ownership is necessary for (or necessarily inconsistent with) any form of control, he now concedes that “[a] given form of ownership may limit the terms that internal control can take,”12 and more specifically that “whether full scale self-management by all who work for an enterprise is possible with private ownership remains to be demonstrated in practice.”13 It is perhaps still the case that public or “social” ownership is not, strictly speaking, a necessary condition for full-scale self-management, since this requirement could conceivably be met by a system of employee-owned firms. But the more important point here is that, whatever the range of permissible alternatives, it is difficult to see how Dahl’s goal of full employee self-management could possibly be achieved without fundamental change in the property regime of capitalism as we know it.14

Yet Dahl remains extremely reluctant straightforwardly to embrace the radical implications of his own program. He remains hopeful that no form of ownership will in fact prove necessary to any particular control relationship, and that the program of redistribution of income and wealth, power and authority, to which he is committed will in the end prove possible within the property regime of a reformed capitalism.

Why is Dahl so reticent about outright advocacy of the democratic socialism to which his argument points? One can only speculate. One possible reason may be a residue of lingering liberal doubt regarding the compatibility of democracy and socialism. At one point Dahl notes, “it is hard to see how a general and more or less uniform structure of decentralized democratic socialism could be inaugurated or maintained without a considerable degree of centralization and concentration.”15 There is perhaps a distinction to be drawn here between “inaugurate” and “maintain,” since Dahl argues plausibly if not conclusively that a decen-

15. R. Dahl, Dilemmas, supra note 1, at 133.
centralized market socialism, once in place, need not destroy democratic pluralism. But even if this is true, or would be at least of an ideal socialism dropped like manna from the heavens, a serious problem of non-ideal theory remains: would the centralization and concentration necessary in the real world to attain such a regime undermine the decentralization and dispersion necessary to sustain it? It is hardly encouraging—though neither, of course, is it definitive—that the one regime approximating Dahl’s ideal of decentralized democratic socialism, Yugoslavia, lacks democratic political institutions.

But if Dahl remains in one sense implicitly pessimistic about the possibilities of socialist transformation, he is in another sense far too optimistic. Dahl appears seriously to underestimate the structural constraints upon “structural” change in the economic order. To be sure, Dahl identifies limits upon the possible redistribution of income and wealth by the welfare-state in capitalist society. But it is a curious feature of his argument that he identifies these limits almost entirely with electoral resistance to further downward redistribution. This is perhaps true, but it is far from the whole truth. Dahl dismisses with apparent brusque impatience (as “the well-worn problem of incentives”) the entire issue of resistance by corporate power to further income and wealth redistribution within capitalism—and, a fortiori, to the far more fundamental reconstitution in the basic power and authority relationships of capitalist society that he advocates.

This odd lacuna in Dahl’s argument suggests a certain continuing thinness in his understanding of the relationship between political and economic power. Dahl understands very clearly, as indeed he has all along, the respects in which unequal economic resources may be translated into unequal political resources. But his insights into the conversion of economic into political power remain conceptually delimited by the boundaries of pluralist theory. Almost entirely overlooked is the still more fundamental sense in which the basic parameters of pluralist politics are structurally constrained by the pre-emptive impact—flowing from the dependence of the liberal-democratic state upon a healthy process of capital accumulation—of corporate power upon the decision-making agenda of market-oriented polyarchies.

One can, but need not, turn to recent writings on the Marxian theory of the state for development of this theme. For one can find it developed—across the hall, as it were—in the recent writings of Dahl’s col-

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16. Not conclusively because the argument rests upon a precarious and potentially unstable distinction between “social” ownership, which is seen as compatible with democratic pluralism, and “state” ownership, which is seen as probably though not certainly incompatible. See generally, R. Dahl, Comment on Manley, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 386, 388 (1983).
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league, Charles Lindblom. In Politics and Markets,\(^\text{17}\) and since, Lindblom has stressed "the privileged position of business" within market-oriented polyarchy and "circularity through [class and corporate] indoctrination" in its processes of opinion formation.\(^\text{18}\) Whereas Dahl wishes to maintain the essential continuity of his changing political science, Lindblom now openly describes his recent work as an "outright departure . . . antagonistic to pluralism rather than resuscitating it."\(^\text{19}\) Dahl properly insists, with rather more exactitude than Lindblom, upon the precise criteria that must be satisfied before we can legitimately speak of alienation of final control over the agenda; and he likewise properly warns against using concepts such as the privileged position of business or circularity through indoctrination to explain too much noting that they cannot, for example, be invoked to explain the absence of socialism from the public agenda of American polyarchy, since socialism is present upon the agenda of every other polyarchal regime.\(^\text{20}\) But Dahl also appears to evade the core of hard truth in Lindblom's sometimes overstated case.

Dahl thus appears simultaneously to understate both the seriousness of the structural change to which he is committed and the seriousness of the structural obstacles to its realization. Why? Again, one can only speculate. For one thing, the less fundamental the change and the less fundamental the resistance to it, the smaller the centralization and concentration of power—about which Dahl is quite legitimately concerned—necessary to carry it through. Perhaps there is some unacknowledged sense that the brand of democratic socialism to which Dahl is committed—structural change through incremental reform—is neither pure liberal or social-democratic reformism, on the one hand, nor a more hard-nosed brand of revolutionary socialism on the other. For to the degree that both the seriousness of the change and the obstacles to its realization are emphasized, the difficulties of Dahl's via media become increasingly apparent.

The validity of Dahl's critical analysis does not depend upon his ability to produce a successful strategy for the realization of the constructive program to which he is committed—there may not, indeed, be one. Nor


\(^{19}\) Id. On continuity and discontinuity in Dahl's writings, see generally, R. Krouse, Polyarchy and Participation: The Changing Democratic Theory of Robert Dahl, 14 Polity 441 (1982).

\(^{20}\) These phenomena might, of course, manifest themselves in a uniquely powerful way in the United States; but it is precisely Dahl's point that national variations must be taken more carefully into account. These phenomena might, however, explain the failure of socialist change actually to materialize in polyarchy, despite the presence of socialism on the public agenda of all such regimes except the United States.
is it in any way obvious that his implied strategy is not, given the transparent deficiencies of the competing alternatives, the least undesirable course. To the contrary: a recognition of its difficulties is entirely consistent with the "weary conviction that incrementalism is typically the best we can do." 21 Neither, in a more hopeful mode, is it obvious that basic structural change cannot emerge from "tiresome sequences of increments"—as, for example, in the rise of the welfare state. 22 Dahl similarly now places great hope for a basic structural transformation of capitalism in schemes, such as the Meidner plan in Sweden, for the gradual socialization of ownership and control of industry. The point is not that this strategy is necessarily hopeless. It is rather that Dahl seems to side-step its difficulties—avoiding in particular the darker possibility, stressed by Lindblom, that given "overwhelmingly strong obstacles to change" we may now be "imprisoned in our existing institutions with no way out." 23 On this particularly vexing set of issues, Dahl still needs to come clean.

That Dahl’s Dilemmas can provoke still further, fundamental dilemmas of democracy is surely testimony to its power and worth. And because there is clearly more to be said, we may hope that it represents not the final statement of Dahl’s democratic theory, but simply another chapter in its evolution.

22. Id.
23. Id.