REFLECTIONS ON THE BELGRADE MEETING (1977-78) 
OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION 
IN EUROPE*

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The thirty-five states that signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki in August 19751 came together on October 4, 1977 in Belgrade for the first CSCE follow-up meeting, designed to conduct a full review of the 1975 undertakings. The Belgrade meeting ended on March 9, 1978, after more than five months of inconclusive sparring among its various blocs or caucuses.

The concluding document of the Belgrade meeting was not earth-shaking or inspirational. It was little more than a short factual statement or communique. It recorded the fact that the meeting had taken place as a follow-up to the Helsinki Conference of 1975. It stated that there had been "a thorough exchange of views both on the implementation of the provisions of the [Helsinki] Final Act and of the tasks defined by the Conference."2 It reaffirmed the "resolve" of the


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1. See DEP'T STATE BULL. 323 (1975); 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1292 (1975).

participating states to "implement fully, unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally, all the provisions of the Final Act." Finally, it stated the intention of the participating states to hold "further meetings" under the aegis of the CSCE, the second of which is to be held in Madrid commencing November 11, 1980.

The Belgrade concluding document did not even mention the one aspect of the Helsinki Final Act that the United States had emphasized most -- human rights.

This unexciting finale to the Belgrade meeting -- in such sharp contrast to the "media event" of 1975 at Helsinki -- and the simple ennui of its long deliberations, have prompted some commentators to write the meeting off as a worthless enterprise. The absence of something quite tangible to show for five months of effort accounts for the uninspired public response to the Belgrade meeting; one columnist in the New York Times has even accused the Administration of suffering a "humiliation in Belgrade on human rights."

The malaise about the outcome of the Belgrade meeting is shared by some members of the United States delegation, despite the predictable public statements by the Department of State proclaiming the success of its efforts at the meeting and a unanimous joint resolution of Congress congratulating the delegation on its work. Even the delegation's chairman, Arthur Goldberg, has privately expressed some discouragement with the CSCE process.

I believe this disappointment is largely unwarranted. It is based in some measure upon unreasonable expectations of what could be accomplished at such a meeting, and some impatience with results other than the spectacular. In fact, from the perspective of a regional public order, the Belgrade meeting was a success; a moderate success, but a success nonetheless.

3. Id.

4. Id. at 1266.

There is reason to be thankful for a number of positive results. Most important of all is the survival and reinforcement of the CSCE process itself. Having met for five months, and agreed to disagree about the course of implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, the participating states settled upon the next biennial CSCE meeting. This is an achievement in itself -- a small step in the direction of establishing a permanent multilateral arena for periodic review sessions on the implementation of the broad principles embodied in the Helsinki Final Act.

There is some irony in the fact that by 1978 it is the United States, rather than the Soviet Union, which puts so much stock in achieving a degree of institutionalization and continuity for post-Helsinki activities.

The 1975 Helsinki accord, which reportedly brought tears to the eyes of Leonid Brezhnev, culminated a twenty-year Soviet diplomatic effort to achieve an authoritative international agreement confirming post-war frontiers. A careful reading of the Helsinki Final Act -- a document widely invoked but rarely read -- will confirm that the Soviet Union did not achieve its principal objectives. The Soviet bloc did not obtain a surrogate World War II peace treaty. It did not obtain renunciation of territorial claims or a commitment to the immutability of present frontiers. The Helsinki accord did not endorse the Brezhnev Doctrine on intervention in "fraternal countries" in derogation of "an abstractly understood sovereignty."6 The United States, Britain and France did not waive any Four-Power rights in Germany. In exchange for a solemn reaffirmation of principles on the sovereign equality of states, the inviolability of frontiers and non-intervention in internal affairs, the Soviet bloc accepted principles concerning respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and a range of undertakings on human contacts, the flow of

6. The Brezhnev Doctrine, asserting a broad right of Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe, was articulated in an important article in Pravda following the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1968, at 3, col. 1.
information, and cultural and educational interaction.7

Nevertheless, in 1975 it was the fond hope of the Soviet Union and the fear of State Department specialists -- amply fulfilled in time by the Western press -- that the Helsinki accord would be widely regarded as an effective post-war political settlement. Understandably, at the outset it was the Soviet Union, rather than the United States, which evinced the greatest interest in the institutionalization of the Helsinki process through such devices as a permanent secretariat and sustained follow-up conferences.

It is probably true that the Soviets achieved in the press what they had unsuccessfully sought at Helsinki. The rage of American citizens of Baltic extraction -- the outcry that they had been "sold out" by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger -- was a testament to the Soviets' successful public opinion campaign.

That victory was short-lived. The sense that the Soviets had achieved their objectives on frontiers, and that this was further evidence that detente was a "one-way street," helped to stimulate interest in securing Soviet bloc implementation of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act -- an interest greatly reinforced by dissidents and some members of national minorities in Eastern Europe who promptly embraced these provisions.

Between 1975 and 1977 the follow-up implementation conference scheduled for October 1977 and the CSCE process itself became a major object of interest to a wide assortment of persons and non-governmental organizations in this country and throughout Europe. In the United States, the interest in assuring that human rights should remain a central feature of East-West relations, and that detente not become a "one-way street," was shared by an unusually broad range of constituencies: associations representing Eastern European immigrants and their progeny (including the so-called "captive nations" groups),

academics and writers concerned about the loss of purpose in American foreign policy, organizations devoted to the problems of Soviet Jewry, liberal organizations concerned with international human rights issues, bar association study groups, and traditional conservative cold warriors, to name a few.

The extraordinary outpouring of interest in the human rights provisions of the Helsinki accord, in the public and in Congress, was received with considerable suspicion and reserve in Dr. Kissinger's State Department. An administration devoted to the notion of "linkage" -- the inherent interconnection of all major issues in Soviet-American relations -- seemed to fear the possible destabilizing effects of treating the Helsinki Final Act as a charter for a campaign for human rights in the Soviet bloc. CSCE matters were given little bureaucratic prominence in 1975 and 1976 in the Kissinger State Department; the CSCE staff remained under the wing of the NATO office in the Bureau of European Affairs.

The State Department's evident lack of interest in the "Helsinki process," and the concern of these disparate constituencies that the Department not be the sole overseer of implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, prompted the establishment by Congress in 1976 of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The legislation establishing the Commission, originally sponsored by Rep. Millicent Fenwick and Senator Clifford Case, both of New Jersey, provided for membership including six Senators, six Representatives and one member each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.

Under its chairman, Rep. Dante Fascell of Florida, the Commission quickly won a reputation as an aggressive champion of the rights of dissidents in Eastern Europe and the interests of the American ethnic constituencies connected to sectors of Soviet bloc societies. Its publicity-prone activities inevitably won the enmity of Soviet bloc states and, it is fair to say, the studied indifference, if not hostility, of the State Department. The Commission and its staff, headed by Spencer Oliver (a former official of the Democratic National Committee), were regarded as determined to take partisan political advantage of the Department's cautious approach to
the Helsinki process; until the very end of the Kissinger regime, noncooperation was the clearly-established Departmental policy toward the Commission.

The new administration made two distinctive changes in American foreign policy, each of which was promptly reflected in CSCE matters: the elevation of human rights concerns to the front ranks of policymaking, and the commitment to "open government."

These two principles of the new American foreign policy generated widespread public support in the United States and abroad for the Carter Administration. They also caused, as Karl Birnbaum of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs wrote in mid-1977, "considerable bewilderment both in official circles and in the media" in Europe. For a time, they also caused considerable bewilderment to the career Foreign Service officers who had handled CSCE matters since the days of Henry Kissinger.

The newly-found American enthusiasm for a Belgrade meeting largely designed to put the East on the defensive on human rights questions must have dampened whatever interest the Soviets retained in the follow-up process of CSCE. This new American approach to CSCE was highlighted not only by the President's avowed interest in human rights, but also by the implementation of his commitment to open government.

In CSCE matters this commitment to open government was first demonstrated in plans by the State Department for periodic briefing sessions in Washington for American non-governmental organizations with a special concern for human rights and life in Eastern Europe; human rights groups and organizations composed of Americans of East European origin were constituencies whose special interests were identified and recognized in Department planning by early 1977.

In the spring of 1977 the administration invited the members of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe to join the United States

delegation to the Belgrade meeting. In addition, the Commission's staff was added to the delegation -- a group which almost equaled in number the Foreign Service officers assigned to CSCE matters. The introduction of these new delegates, whose function in earlier times had been to second-guess State Department professionals and to claim a significant public role in CSCE matters, was clearly a sign of the changing American policy; it was also, inevitably, a source of irritation and distress to Foreign Service officers fearful of a "takeover" by single-minded "amateurs" who did not have an appreciation of the full range of U.S.-Soviet relations.

The next stage in the implementation of the open government policy in CSCE matters was the decision, taken in mid-August, apparently without consultation with officials of the Bureau of European Affairs, to expand the United States delegation to the Belgrade meeting by including some public members.

The two original invitees -- Professor Andrzej Korbonski of UCLA, a Polish-American specialist in East European politics, and I -- were proposed by Mr. Brzezinski and Secretary Vance, respectively. When Professor Korbonski and I were contacted in August 1977 and invited to join the delegation, the chairman of the delegation was scheduled to be Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher. We were informed that Secretary Christopher planned to be in Belgrade for the opening days of the meeting; for most of the rest of the three months that the meeting was expected to last the delegation would be headed by Ambassador Albert W. Sherer, a career diplomat who had served as ambassador to Czechoslovakia and had helped to negotiate much of what became the Helsinki Final Act. As far as I knew, the delegation was to consist of the usual array of State Department specialists, along with some representatives of other interested departments. It all seemed quite conventional. After all, the inclusion of public members on United States delegations to international conferences was hardly unusual, especially in the post-Versailles era.

It was understood that Professor Korbonski's total time commitment, and mine, could be limited to about two weeks in Belgrade, although he was prepared to take a leave of absence for the fall semester in order to participate in a meeting of vital importance
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to the area to which he has devoted a professional lifetime. I was informed from the outset that the total number of public members was still under active consideration.

In early September it was announced that Arthur Goldberg had been asked by the President to be the Chairman of the delegation, apparently on the recommendation of Secretary Christopher. By mid-September, when Professor Korbonski and I traveled to Washington for a luncheon meeting with Mr. Goldberg, we found that the size and character of the delegation was different from what we had imagined, and different from what the State Department's CSCE staff had originally hoped for. Some of the Foreign Service officers with whom Professor Korbonski and I met in mid-September seemed to be in a state of shock. They had not yet devised a policy of peaceful coexistence with the Commission and its staff, and now, lo and behold, they would have to deal with political commissars from the public as well!

That day's tidings had brought the news that, in addition to Korbonski and I, several other public members would be added, including Sol C. Chaikin, the president of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union; John Borbridge, a leader of the Native American Community of Alaska; and Professor Joyce Hughes, a black woman who is a distinguished law teacher at Northwestern University Law School and a vice chairman of the National Urban League.

Korbonski, Cabranes, Chaikin, Borbridge and Hughes each was a plausible member of a delegation of this sort. But taken together, in the midst of the shock and alienation produced by disclosure of the new and expanded delegation list, they proved somewhat overwhelming; they were dubbed -- promptly and inevitably -- "the ethnics."

The fears and anxieties of the Foreign Service officers in the Bureau of European Affairs were clear enough: they were worried about political and professional displacement, about the dis-organizing effects of an overwhelming number of "amateurs," and finally, about the possible transformation of the Belgrade meeting into a destructive confrontation with the Soviet bloc.
It was, all in all, exceedingly untidy, and we are told that nothing is more unsettling to ranking Soviet officials than perceived decentralization or disorganization in American policymaking.

These concerns were doubtless reinforced by the proclaimed intention of Arthur Goldberg to serve as a full-time chairman of the delegation. Unlike Secretary Christopher, who had planned to attend only the first sessions of the meeting and leave the delegation in the hands of Ambassador Sherer, Goldberg planned to stay for the whole meeting. In mid-September 1977, State Department officers clearly felt that the United States delegation had simply been taken over by the proverbial "outsiders."

In retrospect, it seems to me that they ought not to have been totally surprised by the changes made in the spring and summer of 1977. After all, these changes were merely an expression of the oft-repeated commitment of the Department's new leadership to principles of open government, a commitment which reflects, I believe, the deeply-felt convictions of that leadership, especially Secretary Vance and Deputy Secretary Christopher.\(^9\) It is also an understandable and possibly inevitable consequence of the secretiveness with which previous Administrations conducted foreign policy, and of congressional and public demands, in the aftermath of the debacle in Southeast Asia and Watergate, for closer public scrutiny of the actions of the executive branch.

Recasting the United States delegation to the Belgrade meeting had offensive and defensive significance. In one fell swoop, the Department had:

* included would-be surrogates of our principal disaffected communities and of the domestic constituencies most eager to have the United States vigorously review the Soviet bloc's implementation of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act;

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\(^9\) See, e.g., Secretary Vance's policy statement of April 18, 1977, on conferences abroad, in which he required that delegations "reflect the composition of American society." DEPT STATE NEWSLETTER, May 1977, p. 10.
embraced, and sought effectively to co-opt, its most severe Congressional critics; and

conveyed to the Soviet bloc and to others an unmistakable signal that the United States was fully prepared to make human rights the principal subject of discussion at Belgrade.

Arthur Goldberg's appointment as chairman symbolized the change of personnel and the change in the direction of United States policy. It undoubtedly reinforced the anxieties of those, at home and abroad, who feared that an aggressive and sustained American attack on the Soviet Union's human rights record would do serious harm to the process of detente. For Goldberg would clearly be the pre-eminent chief delegate at the Belgrade meeting; no one of comparable stature had been appointed by any other participating state. Goldberg's appointment would be read as a raising of the political stakes of the Belgrade meeting. He had a long and well-established record of concern for human rights and the plight of dissidents in Eastern Europe. He was a leader of the American Jewish community, which obviously is assumed to be at the forefront of public interest in the problems of Soviet Jewry. And, as a major political figure concerned with the preservation of a public reputation in these matters, he would be certain to pursue a policy of public confrontation -- a policy of "standing up to the Soviets."

Goldberg made it plain from the outset that he would certainly raise individual human rights cases in Eastern countries. Moreover, we all knew -- and all meeting participants knew -- that Goldberg was very much on his own. He had no formal instructions at the beginning of the Belgrade meeting; he did not receive any, by his own account, until the very last days, when it became necessary to take formal action on particular versions of the final document.

By the time this large and diverse delegation reached Belgrade in early October, the CSCE meeting had become, to the American press and public alike, "the Belgrade human rights conference." By March 2, when James Reston interviewed President Tito, he asked the Yugoslav leader -- of all people -- whether
he was disappointed with the "Belgrade human rights conference" for which the aging dictator was host.10

Expectations in the United States, and in parts of the United States delegation, were high. It was clearly the hope of many observers and some members of the delegation that the review of implementation of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki accord would be sufficiently disturbing to the Soviet Union and its allies to cause them to modify some of their practices, especially with respect to the treatment of human rights advocates and dissidents in the East.

Everyone in the delegation recognized that the rule of consensus, which gives every participating state a veto on decisions of the meeting, necessarily limited the direct action that the meeting could take. However, proponents of a pugnacious approach expected, at the very least, a final document that made significant references to the question of human rights and to the differing viewpoints expressed at the meeting concerning human rights implementation efforts.

On the other hand, other members of the delegation, especially career Foreign Service officers long associated with CSCE matters, were fearful that the Goldberg policy of discussing individual cases in particular countries could have a seriously disruptive effect upon the West's relations with the Soviet bloc. The possibility that the Soviet bloc would simply walk out of the Belgrade meeting was not discounted.

These concerns about the new American approach, which would include public denunciations of Soviet bloc actions in individual cases, were quite clearly shared by some of our allies and by the neutral/non-aligned bloc of states, some of which also have a vital stake in the security provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. The tension between a concern for human rights and an interest in the preservation of the Helsinki process persisted throughout the meeting, particularly among our allies, who share our values but remain skeptical about the management of our human rights policy.

盟国和中立国家同样担心，美国对政治优势的追求（主要是为了国内消费）往往会将美国置于盟国之前；当欧洲人出于战术或其他原因而在贝尔格莱德推动人权问题时，美国代表团并不吝啬于宣称自己在推动该议题方面发挥了作用。简而言之，我们的盟国和中立国都担心美国可能将欧安会进程转化为宣传战，而苏联必然对此表示不满。

艾瑟尔·戈德堡的责任是让美国代表团保持冷静，积极追求我们所声明的人权目标，同时维持西方盟国的团结，避免整个进程崩溃，因为苏联对此表现出越来越大的不耐烦。

他成功了——远远超出了我最初的期望。贝尔格莱德会议进行了成功的实施情况审查，包括人权问题。东欧国家的主要目的是通过一个短期和概括的会议来限制政治损害，会议中各党派将集中讨论安全问题，人权实施的审查将只限于各国家对其自己的记录的表达。东欧希望营造一种“积极”的氛围。他们没有得到。审查实施情况被延长了——从10月、11月到12月初；它通常涉及对个别案件的审查。

我们的一名公众成员，科博思基教授，认为美国采取了过低的“调子”，以不激怒苏联并避免破坏赫尔辛基进程，以免“让盟友高兴”。但我不同意。出现“低调”部分是由于会议的报道不足——这是自然的。”

of the fact that only the first and last weeks of the meeting were open to the press. The desultory press coverage of the meeting was a source of anxiety to Arthur Goldberg and his colleagues.

We know that the Eastern states do not believe ours was a low profile on human rights; I was informed that at one point the Soviets formally protested Goldberg's behavior in Belgrade. The neutrals and nonaligned, as well as some of our allies, believe that we were too loud and aggressive on the issue and too single-minded about the review of implementation. President Tito, for example, worried aloud about this single-mindedness; he told James Reston that "[t]he Helsinki decisions cannot be reduced to this only," and stated an intention to raise the matter with President Carter during his trip to the United States.\(^\text{12}\)

Indeed, it was probably our high profile on human rights which made impossible a final document that dealt with the subject. The United States went to Belgrade to discuss human rights and little else, and it did just that. Unlike at Helsinki, the East was not being offered anything particularly valuable in exchange for renewed assurances on human rights. We should not have expected, as President Tito observed, that the Soviet Union would "put its signature, at such a gathering, to something that it would not be able to carry out"\(^\text{13}\)-- unless, of course, we were prepared to offer something quite substantial in return.

In addition to accomplishing our major objective, a full review of implementation, the Belgrade meeting succeeded in establishing that:

*human rights conditions within a country are a matter of legitimate international concern and an integral part of the CSCE implementation review process and, therefore, a part of detente itself;*

\(^{12}\) N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1978, at A6, col. 6 (city ed.).

\(^{13}\) Id.
*in future reviews of implementation, the United States will be concerned with individual cases, as well as broad statements on human rights and fundamental freedoms; and,

*the CSCE, an element of detente, is a long-term process, which provides an arena for continuing public scrutiny of the internal order of participating states.

We should not underestimate the very real and substantial domestic benefits derived from the continuation of the CSCE process. The mere existence of the CSCE forces each participating state to react defensively to the projected implementation review, with resulting changes in domestic legislation and, in some cases, a raising of the threshold of tolerance for dissent. In the United States the recent adoption of a major change in our laws governing non-immigrant visas (the so-called McGovern Amendment)\(^{14}\) is directly attributable to our preparations for the Belgrade meeting. Our laws now require that an alien excludible from the United States by reason of membership in a proscribed organization, but otherwise admissible to the United States, be admitted unless the Secretary of State determines that his admission would be contrary to national security interests. The projected establishment of the President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies is also a direct result of our country's preparations for the Belgrade meeting.\(^{15}\) So too is the bill introduced in early March 1978 by Reps. Fascell and Fraser to establish an Institute for Human Rights and Freedom to promote respect for observance of human rights in foreign countries.\(^{16}\)

The CSCE process can stimulate unusual legislative alliances on matters relating to U.S.-Soviet relations between conservatives and liberals


in this country -- all because of a common interest in the pursuit of human rights in Eastern Europe. It also makes possible unusual and fruitful collaboration on questions of detente between members of the legislative and executive branches of government.

The Belgrade meeting was the beginning of a process that we should hope will continue indefinitely. It was a learning experience for all the participating states, not least of all the United States. There are several lessons we ought to have learned. First of all, we ought to be careful in the future to avoid misunderstanding or misstating the criteria for success of any such meeting. The measure of success is not necessarily how many individual cases are resolved to our satisfaction during a meeting or as a result of a meeting. Success must be measured by the degree to which implementation of all parts of the Helsinki Final Act remains on the East-West agenda. We should recognize, as Karl Birnbaum has noted, that "a crucial -- though not a sufficient -- condition for improvements in respect to human rights in the East is the continuation of détente itself. To safeguard the continuity of détente must therefore be the first priority of any Western policy designed to champion human rights in the Warsaw Pact countries."17

A second lesson to be learned from the Belgrade meeting is that the West should not expect at such a meeting much more than a review of implementation and a terse concluding document unless the West is prepared to make it worthwhile for the East to do more than grin and bear it. We should make sure that at the Madrid meeting (1980) there will be "something in it" for the East. That "something" may be from an area other than CSCE, but it should be perceptible. Just a little bit of "linkage" helps the medicine go down . . . .

Third, for the Madrid meeting the West should plan for a prolonged period for the review of implementation of the Final Act; however, it should not plan any extensive negotiation of the concluding document at the meeting itself. The two months spent at the Belgrade meeting -- in January, February and early March -- in haggling over a final document was

17. Birnbaum, supra note 8, at 796-7.
a complete waste of time, as Arthur Goldberg will readily testify. It also contributed to the erroneous impression that the meeting was a failure. We should take advantage of the next two years to consult with Eastern states, as well as with our allies and with nonaligned states, to develop the substance of a concluding document well before the beginning of the Madrid meeting. This will give Eastern, Western and nonaligned states a clear sense of the possible bases for agreement well in advance of the Madrid meeting; it will also avoid the suggestion that the Madrid meeting is a success or failure solely because of the final document. This would not be the first international conference, nor the last, to adopt a document which had effectively been negotiated in a series of bilateral and multilateral consultations before the conference.

Fourth, the United States should devote more attention to the unglamorous question of the rules of procedure. Its delegation should be more concerned with questions of process. The first order of business should be to institutionalize this multilateral arena and to do so in a way that will permit the press and the general public to have greater access to subsequent CSCE meetings. These important procedural objectives can be achieved only in an atmosphere relatively free of recrimination.

Fifth, the United States, and especially the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, should devote considerable attention to further implementation of the Helsinki Final Act by the United States. We should go to Madrid with our hands as clean as possible. The Commission is ideally placed to stimulate a creative alliance of conservative and liberal legislators concerned with human rights issues at home as well as abroad. In this connection, the Commission should review the ninety-odd proposals submitted at the Belgrade meeting and determine the extent to which any of them may plausibly be implemented unilaterally or bilaterally. Arthur Goldberg has spoken of the need for our own private Helsinki monitoring group, modeled on those organized in Europe.

Sixth, the United States might indicate its seriousness of purpose by limiting the use of the Madrid meeting as an opportunity for visiting
American political figures to speak out on particular pet projects or themes designed to gain favor at home. Although affording visiting members of Congress an opportunity to address the meeting is a valuable tool in forging executive-legislative bonds, it suggests to other participating states that the United States is using the meeting as part of a propaganda war against the East designed, in part, to curry favor with domestic constituencies hostile to Eastern states.

Finally, the cooperative working arrangement created at Belgrade by two previously hostile groups of specialists -- the Commission staff and the Foreign Service officers assigned to CSCE -- must be continued. There was no more impressive achievement at Belgrade, from a domestic political perspective, than the working alliance devised by these formerly antagonistic groups. Under the arrangement for an enlarged delegation the executive branch effectively co-opted its most significant congressional critics; the price paid for this co-optation was the cession to the Commission staff of a significant, though not preponderant, role in shaping the policies of the U.S. delegation. This mutually beneficial arrangement made it possible for the United States to go to Belgrade united. It was a highly successful and innovative approach to the principle of open government and should be replicated in Madrid.

Whether Congress should seek to participate in other multilateral conferences in a comparable way is a question that inevitably will arise from this positive experience. It is true that the Commission and its staff received virtually all cables and documents seen by the State Department officials, and there was not a single breach of confidentiality. This may not be a useful or desirable formula for collaboration in other areas, such as SALT. However, the model is likely to be suggested in the future. It deserves some serious consideration.