Whither the All-Volunteer Force?

James L. Lacy*

I. Introduction

Unprecedented in ambition, uneven in experience, controversial from the outset, and facing serious challenges in the years ahead, the All-Volunteer Force (AVF), launched in 1973, remains one of the most significant and debatable developments in postwar U.S. security policy. Never before had the United States attempted to maintain so large a standing force composed entirely of volunteers.1 Few other nations rely wholly on volunteers for their military forces, and indeed none relies on volunteers on anything near the scale of the AVF.2

For some people, the answers to force composition questions depend more on political philosophy than on considerations of the nation's role in the world and the nature of external threats. What size armed force, drawn from which of the citizenry, how compensated and controlled, and whether drafted or exclusively volunteer, are enduring questions in the politics of American defense.3 The debate over the AVF is so difficult precisely because its terms cannot be separated from broader questions of domestic values.4

---

1. Before the creation of the AVF in 1973, the largest armed force the United States had assembled in peacetime without a draft was in 1947-48, when active forces totalled 1,384,500. By contrast, the modern AVF was intended to field an active force of between two and three million.

2. Among U.S. allies, Britain fields an all-volunteer force of approximately 326,000; Japan, a volunteer force of 245,000; Canada, 83,000; Australia, 72,000; and New Zealand, 13,000. INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE MILITARY BALANCE: 1984-1985, at 32, 101, 35, 96, 106 (1984). All of the Warsaw Pact countries have conscripted forces, as do most other military powers. Id. at 17, 23-28.

3. For a review of the history of military manpower procurement in the United States, see Lacy, Military Manpower: The American Experience and the Enduring Debate, in TOWARD A CONSENSUS ON MILITARY SERVICE: REPORT OF THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL'S WORKING GROUP ON MILITARY SERVICE 20-51 (A. Goodpastor, L. Elliott & J. Hovey, Jr. eds. 1982) [hereinafter TOWARD A CONSENSUS ON MILITARY SERVICE] and Eitelberg & Binkin, Military Service in American Society, in id., at 235-42.

4. Among other things, military service "pit[s] against one another traditional values of citizen obligation and individual freedom, and competing concepts of citizen-soldiers
All-Volunteer Force

The debate is also about the military effectiveness of the AVF, however, and thus speaks fairly directly to external security goals as well. Manpower procurement choices are closely linked to questions of how many and what kinds of military forces will be available and necessary for national security. It is on these security dimensions of the AVF that I will focus here.

Few subjects, it should be noted, have been studied or argued about as extensively as has the AVF in recent years. Although interpretations differ, present facts are not greatly in dispute. Such well-covered ground is only briefly revisited here. My aim in these pages is to take the military dimensions of AVF manpower procurement policy beyond current facts and fashions to a not-too-distant future, to weigh the security implications of present courses for that future, and to consider the policy choices that will arise. Present courses are set in any case, and will not be changed in the next couple of years. The current administration is resolutely confident about the correctness of its defense manpower policies. Challenges to these policies are few and far between.

The focus must instead be on the early 1990s, when a new generation of political leadership will be in office and when the objective situation of the AVF will have taken a new, more problematic turn.

5. For a recent, reasonably complete, annotated bibliography of major analyses, see SYLLOGISTICS, INC., THE DIFFERENTIAL BUDGET COSTS OF CONSCRIPTION-BASED ALTERNATIVES TO THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE, at App. D (July 23, 1986). Of course, in a strictly technical sense, it is too early to evaluate the AVF. Only when the first all-volunteer cohorts entering service reach retirement—a 20 to 30 year process—will the transition to an entirely volunteer force be complete. See Brinkerhoff & Grissmer, The Reserve Forces in an All-Volunteer Environment, in THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECADE: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 228, n.1 (W. Bowman, R. Little & G. Sicilia eds. 1986) [hereinafter THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECADE]. At this writing, members of the armed forces with more than 13 years service would have entered during the draft era. Given what is at stake, however, these technical considerations have not dissuaded searching assessments.

6. Declaring that "our manpower program today is an unprecedented success," Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger told Congress in early 1986 that "no turnaround in these past five years has been more remarkable than the improvement in personnel quality and retention throughout all components of the military services." There is no need for further policy reviews, in the Administration's judgment. According to Mr. Weinberger, "we can now focus on initiatives underway to ensure our manpower investment is well-managed." U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, FISCAL YEAR 1987, at 135, 44, 140 (Feb. 5, 1986) [hereinafter DoD ANN. REP. FY 87].

7. See, e.g., infra notes 36-38.
The choices then will involve not only judgments about how best to supply the quantity and quality of manpower required for military service (force-manning), but also decisions about what kind of force structure (particularly with respect to the balance between active and reserve forces) is best suited to link peacetime manpower procurement to military strategy and external security goals. As will be seen, decisionmakers in the 1990s will be seriously challenged on both counts: in part, because the demographic and budgetary environments for manning the armed forces will be less favorable; in part, because the early 1990s will be a time to pay the piper for manpower decisions made in the 1980s.

The challenges will emerge out of two developments. First, the armed forces are likely to be squeezed between growing demands for qualified recruits and a concomitant shrinkage in the available manpower supply. Second, by the early 1990s, the nation's force structure will be more heavily dependent on mobilizable reserves than at any time since the initial months of the Korean War. This new dependence, not widely understood at present, may well and properly call into question the entire U.S. approach to strategy and force structure. At a minimum, the growing reliance on mobilization as opposed to forces-in-being will reopen consideration of two recurrent sources of policy dispute that have been finessed in the AVF period: the optimal balance between forces-in-being and mobilizable reserves, and the adequacy of the U.S. reserve component structure.

These developments, the circumstances that give rise to them, and a prescription for navigating through them, are the subjects which I address in this article. Although it is premature to compose eulogies for the All-Volunteer Force — for reasons examined shortly, a resumption of conscription is improbable in the time frame under consideration — the AVF's prospects are neither as sure nor as reassuring as current facts might suggest. Merely to invest additional resources in creating financial incentives in force-manning — the traditional prescription for shortfalls in recruitment and retention — will accomplish little, absent a searching reexamination of the force structure and a significant overhaul of the reserve components of that structure.

II. Background

It is useful to begin with some historical frames of reference. Launched in 1973 after more than thirty nearly consecutive years of
All-Volunteer Force

military conscription — in the midst of an unpopular war and in the face of a conscription system whose reform struck many as too little, too late — the AVF was both a rejection of the past and a daring promise for the future. The past in this case was a military draft that had become increasingly selective, domestically divisive, and, in the view of AVF proponents, an unfair tax on young men which could no longer be rationalized on military, political, or economic grounds. The promise was that adequate pay could be substituted for legal compulsion in order to meet the military's needs for manpower, at tolerable additional cost, and without adversely affecting the size, missions, readiness, or demographic composition of the armed forces.

Questions about strategic policy did not figure prominently in the debate at the time. While in the 1960s it had been nearly impossible to disentangle the domestic politics of the war in Vietnam from the politics of the draft policy that was selecting men for the war, by the early 1970s the connection between the two had become attenuated. Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia had been set in motion in 1969, and would not have been affected, one way or another, by choices about military manpower procurement policy in subsequent years.

8. With the exception of the period from March 1947 to March 1948, when the nation temporarily reverted to a draft-free armed force, the draft had been a fixture of American security policy since its emergence in 1940. For its origins, wartime terms and postwar evolution, see Lacy, supra note 3, at 31-42.

9. The selectivity of Selective Service was one source of friction. Overabundance of manpower supply was the problem. In the mid-1950s, about 80% of the eligible young men were required for service in the active and reserve armed forces. By the early 1960s, the requirement had dropped to about 60%. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, AMERICA'S VOLUNTEERS: A REPORT ON THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCES 2 (Dec. 31, 1978). By the late 1960s, the requirement was about 30%. Lacy, supra note 3, at 39. A draft saddled with a mind-boggling bouquet of exemptions and deferments was another source of controversy. In 1951, House Armed Services Committee chairman Carl Vinson described the draft as written "almost like members of a state assembly [writing] a sales tax before the election." Id. at 36. Still, it was conscription as a tax-in-kind imposed on first-term service members that "never gets recorded in the budget either as revenue or as expenditure" that troubled AVF proponents the most. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE 23-28 (Feb. 1970) [hereinafter GATES COMMISSION REPORT]. "What is of questionable morality is the discriminatory form that this implicit tax takes; and even more, the abridgement of individual freedom that is involved in collecting it." Id. at 27. "This is a hidden tax which persists only because it is obscure." Id. at 28.

10. The Gates Commission, established by President Nixon to examine the feasibility of an AVF, was confident that essentially the same force produced by the draft could be provided by the AVF. GATES COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 7-9, 131. As for concerns about the racial composition of an AVF, the Commission projected little change compared to a drafted force. Id. at 150.

11. Eventual elimination of the draft, "once our involvement in the Vietnam War is behind us," had been a campaign promise of Richard Nixon in 1968. See Lacy, supra
of the draft-AVF debate tended either to ignore or to embrace similar assumptions about how U.S. forces would be used in pursuit of national security in the future, and to share similar expectations about the size of these forces. ¹²

Instead, the early debate turned almost entirely on the relative merits of the alternative means — induction or inducement — by which first-term military manpower should be acquired from the civilian population. ¹³ Questions about force structure — specifically, how much of the armed forces and their various parts should be kept active, ready to use at little or no notice, and how much should be kept at lower levels of readiness and availability in part-time and inactive reserves — were barely addressed. The dominant questions were whether enough young men and women would enlist in the existing mix of active and reserve forces absent the pressures of a draft, whether the racial composition of a wholly volunteer force would be within broadly acceptable bounds, and whether the nation could afford, or, more to the point, would be willing to pay for, such a force. ¹⁴

Thirteen years later, in the wake of a mixed experience in which recruitment and retention shortfalls in the 1970s were followed by considerable improvements in the early 1980s, the debate about the AVF continues to revolve chiefly around these questions. ¹⁵ This may be, in part, because habits of thinking are not easily shaken; in part, because considerations about meeting peacetime force-manning goals tend naturally to dominate the agenda in peacetime. No doubt, however, it is also due to a perceived transience in the AVF's fortunes. A number of significant factors in the force-manning performance of the past are undergoing change, suggesting that

¹². "A decision to use the all-volunteer force will be made according to the same criteria as the decision to use a mixed force of conscripts and volunteers because the size and readiness of the two forces will be quite similar." GATES COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 155.

¹³. Only in the two World Wars, when volunteering was banned as inefficient, did the United States come close to having a truly drafted force. In the postwar years, only a portion of first-term service members were conscripts. Volunteers, draft-induced or otherwise, typically made up one-third to more than one-half of the first-term ranks. The career enlisted force and the officer corps were entirely volunteer.

¹⁴. GATES COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 11-20.

All-Volunteer Force

whereas yesterday's results may be of limited relevance when considering tomorrow, yesterday's questions will remain pertinent. Demographic developments (low birthrates in the 1960s and 1970s) will reduce the supply of qualified manpower for military service in the next ten years, at a time when the military demand is likely to increase, and when political and budgetary pressures on defense expenditures will make overcoming these supply-and-demand problems more difficult and less palatable.16 Were this coming squeeze all that is involved, its consideration might be postponed on grounds that little can be done about it until it is closer at hand and its extent is more precisely known. But the recently overlooked matters of force structure, the other important frame of reference, intervene to complicate the situation.

Less well understood than the substitution of volunteers for the earlier mix of conscripts and volunteers is the AVF's companion “Total Force Policy” — the substitution of reserve manpower for active duty manpower to carry out basic missions and tasks. While the architects of the AVF had relatively little to say about the balance between forces-in-being and reserves, those in charge of implementing the AVF have since 1973 (and especially since 1981) steadily shifted this balance towards reserves, under the “Total Force” rubric.17

16. While some early critics of the AVF doubted that it could ever be made to work (see, for example, Califano, Doubts About an All-Volunteer Army, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 3, 1973, at 9-11), a number of contemporary analyses have tended to look at the late 1980s and the early 1990s as the time of greatest uncertainty. See, e.g., M. BINKIN, AMERICA'S VOLUNTEER MILITARY: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 29-42 (1984); Lacy, The Case for Conscript, in MILITARY SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES 195, 201-08 (B. Scowcroft ed. 1982). In large part, this is because the population of males and females of military age has been steadily shrinking since 1979, making military recruitment much more difficult in the later 1980s and early 1990s.

17. As noted earlier, the Gates Commission, the principal architect and apologist for the AVF at its creation, contemplated no change in the size or readiness of U.S. forces in an all-volunteer framework. See supra note 12. The Commission proposed no substitutions of reserve manpower for active manpower. The bulk of its discussion about reserve forces was taken up with questions of how to man them in the absence of a draft. GATES COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 97-117. The only difference envisioned by the Commission on this score was that reserve call-ups would be substituted for increased draft calls for force expansion in military emergencies once the AVF was established. In the absence of the draft, the U.S. would rely, in emergency situations, on the reserves to “provide immediate support to active forces” and on a standby draft “which can be put into effect promptly if circumstances require mobilization of large numbers of men.” Id. at 13. Still, the AVF and the Total Force Policy are intimately linked. The additional costs of active duty manpower in the AVF make attractive substitutions of less costly reservists for tasks and missions, and, absent a draft for force-bolstering in an emergency, the AVF must turn to greater investments in reserves than is necessary with a draft.
This increased dependence on reserves is evident, in the first instance, in the arithmetic of recent military expenditures. Not only did the United States concentrate its defense investments in the early 1980s chiefly on procuring hardware, foregoing all but modest increases in military manpower to operate, support and maintain that hardware when it fully enters service in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but it also made its manpower investments chiefly in the reserve components. Between fiscal years 1980 and 1987, active force personnel strength will have been increased by 7 percent; reserve strength, by 25 percent.¹⁸ If present trends continue, by 1990 over 61 percent of the available manpower in the Army, 33 percent in the Navy, 39 percent in the Marine Corps, and 28 percent in the Air Force will be in the nonactive, reserve forces.¹⁹

The dependence on reserves is also evident in the force structure that is emerging. The armed forces have created more combat forces than they can support with active personnel, turning increasingly to part-time and inactive reserves to take up the slack. The pattern is not new, but it has been accelerated in the last five years. The Army is expanding from 24 to 28 divisions without a single addition to its active duty manpower accounts. The Navy is headed from 479 ships in 1981 to 600 ships (including three additional carrier battle groups) in the 1990s with thus far limited increments in its full-time manpower (see Appendix, Table 1). Already, over 40 percent of all U.S. Army forces needed during the first thirty days of a European conflict will have to consist of reserves — necessitating a rapid mobilization and deployment unparalleled in U.S. history.²⁰ Even in less demanding contingencies, the active forces may soon be incapable of responding without a reserve activation. This is a political and military consideration of potentially enormous significance, and one that could constrain our ability to respond to emergencies at all.²¹

¹⁸. DoD ANN. REP. FY 87, supra note 6, at 136, 144.
²⁰. This percentage probably rises with the Army at 28 divisions. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, IMPROVING THE ARMY RESERVES 3 (Nov. 1985) [hereinafter CBO, IMPROVING THE ARMY RESERVES].
²¹. In recent testimony, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs provided the following assessment:
The Total Force Concept of the early 1970’s is a reality in 1986, so much so that contingency plans to counter aggression in both hemispheres cannot be effectively executed without committing National Guard and Reserve forces in the same time frame as active forces. We have increasingly staked our national security on the ability to
All-Volunteer Force

Furthermore, there is an important link between force-manning and force structure in this context. As manning the active forces becomes more difficult and costly in the years ahead, the pressures to substitute reservists for active duty manpower probably will intensify. Part-time reserve forces often cost less than full-time active forces, and lower operating tempos in the reserves reduce operating costs. In theory, at least, part-time reservists should be less difficult to acquire than full-time active duty personnel. Yet, given what we know about our reserve force capabilities, there is good reason to question whether acceptable levels of military preparedness can be preserved in the trade-off of active forces for reserves,
and whether we have fully thought through the strategic implications of the trade-off itself.

III. Manning the Peacetime Force

The confidence that many civilian and military leaders place in existing AVF manpower policies comes as no surprise in light of the experience of recent years. Recruitment and retention shortfalls that troubled defense planners in the late 1970s seem to have bottomed-out in 1979.24 The first half of the 1980s brought steady, substantial, and in some respects, dramatic improvement. By several important measures, the manpower side of the defense equation is in better condition today than at any time in over a decade.

For one thing, the services have had no difficulties meeting their recruitment goals in recent years. This meant enlisting over 300,000 new recruits for active duty in fiscal year 1985, plus 98,000 new recruits (i.e., with no prior military service) for the organized reserves. The quality of these recruits, as reflected in education levels and enlistment test scores, is remarkably high. Topping a five-year rise, 93 percent of last year's recruits enlisted for active duty had high school diplomas (compared to 75 percent of today's general youth population and 68 percent of the recruits in fiscal year 1980), and 93 percent scored average or above on the armed forces enlistment test (compared to 69 percent of the general youth population and 65 percent of 1980's recruits).25

Retention of enlisted personnel has improved as well. First-term reenlistment rates rose from 38 percent in 1980 to 48 percent in 1985. Senior enlisted personnel have also been more inclined to remain. The current reenlistment rate for career enlisted personnel is 84 percent, compared to 68 percent in 1979. The experience pro-

24. Fiscal year 1979 was by far the AVF's most difficult year. In that year, each service failed for the first time to meet its active force recruitment goal. The Army attained only 90% of its total "enlisted accession objective"; the Navy, 94%; the Marine Corps, 98%; and the Air Force, 98%. Retention was also problematic. The career reenlistment rate in FY 1979, 68.2%, was the lowest in the AVF's history. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, FISCAL YEAR 1981, at 264, 266, 269 (Jan. 29, 1980).
25. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1986) (statement of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel Chapman B. Cox) [hereinafter 1986 Manpower Posture Statement]. A similar pattern pertains in the case of new (non-prior service) recruits for the Selected Reserve forces. In fiscal 1985, 85% were high school graduates, compared to 65% in 1980; 90% scored average or above on enlistment tests. DoD ANN. REP. FY 87, supra note 6, at 137-38.

46
All-Volunteer Force

file of the force mirrors these gains. Average years of service in the enlisted force have increased from 5.5 in 1980 to 6.04 today.\textsuperscript{26}

Moreover, after a steady annual decline in active and reserve manpower levels in the 1970s, there has been some growth in the size of the armed forces. Although overall manpower levels are still smaller than in the draft era, 2.15 million men and women are now in the active forces — 100,000 more than in 1980. The Selected Reserve, composed of the organized units and individuals of the reserves and the National Guard, is at a record strength of 1,088,000 (see Appendix, Table 1). If Congress approves, the Department of Defense plans further modest increases in fiscal years 1987 and 1988. These would bring the combined active and Selected Reserve force total to nearly 3.4 million by the end of fiscal year 1988.\textsuperscript{27}

The turnabout in the AVF's fortunes in the early 1980s can be attributed to several factors. Congressionally-sponsored pay raises (11.1 percent in 1981 and an average of 14.3 percent in 1982) did much to arrest and reverse the erosion of the 1970s in military pay scales relative to civilian wages.\textsuperscript{28} Economic recession and accompanying increases in unemployment boosted military recruitment and retention prospects.\textsuperscript{29} An increase in educational benefits for military personnel at a time when general student assistance was targeted for cuts by the Reagan Administration no doubt helped. With the Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, an America generally at peace since the mid-1970s, and the infec-

\textsuperscript{26} 1986 Manpower Posture Statement, \textit{supra} note 25, at 4; DoD Ann. Rep. FY 87, \textit{supra} note 6, at 45, 139. In the officer corps, by contrast, the services continue to experience shortages, notably of pilots (of which the Navy has an aggregate shortfall of 1,100) and nuclear-trained submarine and surface officers. 1986 Manpower Posture Statement, \textit{supra} note 25, at 5.

\textsuperscript{27} FY 87 MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT, \textit{supra} note 22, at II-2, II-3. The fiscal year 1987-88 increases are displayed in Appendix, Table 3. The new total will still be less than that obtained before the AVF was instituted, however. \textit{See} Appendix, Table 6; \textit{see also} Lacy, \textit{Obligatoy Service: The Fundamental and Secondary Choices}, in \textit{TOWARD A CONSENSUS ON MILITARY SERVICE, \textit{supra} note 3, at 204, table 8.1.

\textsuperscript{28} The two catch-up raises increased military pay by roughly one-third.

\textsuperscript{29} The unemployment rate for young men increased from approximately 16\% in fiscal year 1980 to about 25\% in FY 1982. This was a significant factor for military recruiting, but how significant is a matter of some debate. \textit{See} Thurman, \textit{Sustaining the All-Volunteer Force, 1983-1992: The Second Decade}, in \textit{THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECade, \textit{supra} note 5, at 271. General Thurman argued as follows:

\textit{[U]nemployment was a significant, but not the most important factor for our success in recruiting quality. In fact, the economists' estimates of unemployment elasticities vary from less than one to about two. The changes in quality and quantity of recruits during this period can in no way be attributed solely or largely to unemployment.}

\textit{Id. at 271.
tious patriotism of Ronald Reagan in the White House, the nation seemed to shake off the last of its Vietnam hangover. Demographics helped. The United States was only just beginning to descend from a population crest at which there were more males and females of military age than at any other time in U.S. history.\textsuperscript{30} At the same time, while active duty forces were increased somewhat in overall personnel strength (see Appendix, Table 1), the military demand for new recruits for these forces actually decreased — from 389,000 in fiscal year 1980 to 330,000 in fiscal 1983 and 316,000 in fiscal year 1985.\textsuperscript{31}

For some, the experience of the early 1980s has settled all essential questions. “The experiment is over,” Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger told a manpower conference at the Naval Academy in 1983. “We know now that an all-volunteer force can succeed, and we know what it takes to make it succeed.”\textsuperscript{32} The “serious personnel deficiencies that undermined our ability to meet our defense commitments” in the past are behind us, Mr. Weinberger told Congress recently. “We now have a strong, high-quality force that not only provides for our immediate defense, but also serves as a solid foundation for our future defense needs.”\textsuperscript{33} In this view, past manning problems were due not to any fault in the concept of a volunteer force, but rather to its inadequate execution. In the 1970s, compensation for military personnel was allowed to become less competitive at a time when unemployment rates in the civilian sector declined. The catch-up pay raises in 1981 and 1982, and the resumption of payment of adequate bonuses, were all that was needed to reverse the situation. “The lesson to be drawn from this experience,” according to the President’s Military Manpower Task Force in 1982, “is that the military compensation package must be kept at competitive levels to attract and keep the kind of people the AVF must have. . . . In particular,” the Task Force added, “competi-
All-Volunteer Force

tiveness must be retained when civilian unemployment rates go down and the competition for capable people intensifies."34

To judge by the content of the current debate, it would indeed seem that basic questions have been put to rest. Alternatives to the All-Volunteer Force are now rarely given much attention. Calls for a resumption of conscription (or, at least, for planning to prepare the way), prevalent in the late 1970s and early 1980s, have been infrequently heard in recent years.35 The public is divided about returning to a peacetime draft; experts who have studied the matter have reached no agreement.36 In any case, political support for such a step is not evident at the present time.37 "National service," which might include a form of compulsory military service as part of a broader program with military and non-military options, enjoys favor in some political and academic circles. But the idea of national service is encumbered by nagging questions about costs and aims, and a groundswell of enthusiasm for its mandatory forms is not yet apparent.38

36. The most recent and comprehensive assessment of public attitudes, a 1984 National Opinion Research Center analysis, reported that 41.6% of adult Americans would favor returning to a military draft. J. Davis, J. Lasby & P. Sheatsley, AMERICANS VIEW THE MILITARY: PUBLIC OPINION IN 1982, National Opinion Research Center Report No. 131, 23-25 (1985). The last two prominent, independent panels to consider the issue reached opposite conclusions. A substantial majority of the Sixtieth American Assembly of Columbia University was "of the opinion that a return to compulsory service at this time was neither necessary nor desirable in order to correct the deficiencies in the AVF" and that "the proper course of action at this time is to dedicate ourselves to the determined application of remedies . . . within the overall framework of a volunteer force." THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, MILITARY SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES, THE SIXTIETH AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, SEPTEMBER 17-20, 1981, REPORT, at 9, 11. Less than a year later, a substantial majority of the 50-member Working Group on Military Service of the Atlantic Council of the United States completed an 18-month study with a different prescription. "Given the anticipated increase in manpower needs, the diminishing manpower pool, and the prospect of economic recovery, it is only prudent that the nation prepare now to resume a form of the draft later in the 1980s." The Atlantic Council majority recommended that "the President should prepare the ground for seeking induction authority as a supplement to voluntary enlistments. The risks of not doing so are unacceptable." ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES, TOWARD A CONSENSUS ON MILITARY SERVICE: REPORT OF THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL'S WORKING GROUP ON MILITARY SERVICE, June 1982, at 53, 57. Minorities on both panels dissented.
37. To the extent that conscription enjoys political support, it is as a submerged component in a broader scheme of national service. See infra note 38. While the subject was an issue in presidential election campaigns in 1956, 1964, and 1968, it has been notably absent from national party platforms since 1968. In this regard, see Lacy, supra note 3, at 42-43.
38. The political appeal of "national service" falls along three lines. First, because it would engage more young people than would a draft for military service alone, it
It would be a great mistake, however, to believe that this optimism about the AVF will extend much beyond immediate circumstances, or that far-reaching judgments can now be made about the conclusiveness of recent experience. Within the next several years, a number of fundamental circumstances will change. The pool of manpower qualified and available for military service will shrink. An improving economy could well mean more employment opportunities in the civilian sector for young men and women, at the expense of military recruitment. Increased numerical requirements for military manpower will ratchet upward the demand for armed forces personnel. At the same time, strong popular and political pressures to reduce the federal budget deficit are likely to constrain efforts to keep pace with the military’s manpower needs.

A. Demographics and Defense

The most certain development in the near term is the diminishing supply of manpower for military service — a “demographic depression,” in the apt characterization of Martin Binkin of the Brookings Institution.39 The postwar baby boom, which produced a significant increase in the number of eighteen-year-olds between 1964 and 1979, had been a key consideration in early calculations about the feasibility of a draft-free armed force.40 This, however, was a transient phenomenon. Dwindling birthrates in the United States brought the baby boom to an end in the mid-1960s. The progeny of the new “birth-dearth” generation began to reach military age in the early 1980s. For the next ten years, this recruitable population promises to be less selective. Second, the option to pursue non-military as well as military service in a national service program provides a greater degree of individual choice for individuals subjected to it. Third, not only are the nation’s military needs met; national service promises to respond to unmet needs in the civilian sector as well. Senator Gary Hart, who is among its advocates, has suggested that “compulsory national service may the biggest issue of the eighties.” R. Rothenberg, The Neoliberals: Creating The New American Politics 210 (1984). Other “neoliberals” whom Rothenberg identifies as supportive of national service are Senator Bradley, former Senator Tsongas, and Congressman Panetta. Id. Recently, a group of centrist Democrats also joined in promoting the idea. The Democratic Leadership Conference issued a report calling for exploring a program of universal national service — civilian and military — to meet military needs and “to rekindle a sense of citizenship.” Taylor, Military Buildup Faulted By Democratic Centrists, Washington Post, Sept. 17, 1986, at A7, col. 1. Academic and institutional support is fairly diverse. See generally R. Danzig & P. Szanton, National Service: What Would It Mean? (1986). The Danzig and Szanton volume presents the most recent and comprehensive, and arguably the most plausible, case for national service, but it too has difficulties in isolating aims and calculating total costs. See Lacy, supra note 3, at 44-46 (by way of contrast); Lacy, supra note 27, at 207-11.

All-Volunteer Force

will steadily shrink in size. Compared to 1981 levels, there will be 1.2 million fewer males aged eighteen to twenty-one in 1987, 1.4 million fewer in 1991, and 2.0 million fewer in 1995 (see Appendix, Table 2).\(^4\)

The precise implications for military recruitment are a matter of disagreement among manpower analysts. Assuming no change in either the size of the forces, enlistment standards, or the proportion of males to females in the ranks, and excluding that portion of the youth population that may be expected to enter college and stay for at least two years, Binkin has projected that the military will have to recruit about half of the men turning age eighteen between 1984 and 1988, and 55 percent in the early 1990s — an imposing prospect compared to the 42 percent of this age group required during 1981-83.\(^4\)\(^2\) Others are more sanguine, either because their projections lead them to different results, or because they do not regard the impact on recruitment as especially worrisome in any case. Robert Lockman and Aline Quester of the Center for Naval Analyses, for instance, argue that when the prime recruitment cohort is viewed as seventeen to twenty-one-year-old males, not merely eighteen-year-olds, the expected impacts are less severe.\(^4\)\(^3\) The Congressional Budget Office, for one, does not anticipate that a smaller youth population will have much effect on military recruiting anyway. In the CBO's reasoning, "as the population of youth falls, the ratio of [military] recruiters to youths will rise, thus helping recruiters contact as many people as before."\(^4\)\(^4\) Others find solace in a familiar construct:

A few years ago predictions of a return to peacetime conscription by the mid-1980s were common. Many now believe that goals for military personnel strength and quality can be achieved, provided the nation maintains its commitment to keeping military compensation, broadly construed, competitive with civilian compensation.\(^4\)\(^5\)

---

\(^4\)\(^1\) The United States is not unique in this regard. Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy also will experience declining pools of military manpower supply. Germany and Italy will be especially hard-pressed. According to current projections, the German armed forces could be short of their annual manpower accession requirements by as many as 100,000 in 1994; Italy, by nearly as many in the late 1990s. For specifics, see J. LACY & R. LAIRD, PERSPECTIVES ON DEFENSE FUTURES: NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE 59-64, 76 (1986) (Research Memorandum for Center for Naval Analyses).

\(^4\)\(^2\) M. BINKIN, supra note 16, at 33-34.


\(^4\)\(^4\) CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, QUALITY SOLDIERS: COSTS OF MANNING THE ACTIVE ARMY 10 n.3 (June 1986) [hereinafter CBO, QUALITY SOLDIERS].

\(^4\)\(^5\) Hosek, Fernandez & Grissmer, Active Enlisted Supply: Prospects and Policy Options, in THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECADE, supra note 5, at 185.
Still, there is no question that a shrinking cohort of both males and females will mean a more difficult recruiting environment than the AVF has had to date.\textsuperscript{46} Even optimists, who point to the fact that the youth population of the 1990s will be no smaller than that of the (draft-era) early 1960s, concede that the experience will be a new one for the AVF.\textsuperscript{47}

Moreover, the foregoing does not take account of likely increases in the military’s manpower demand. Currently-programmed increases through fiscal year 1988 are relatively modest (see Appendix, Table 3). These, however, already fall short of existing requirements.\textsuperscript{48} The full manpower implications of the Reagan Administration’s defense buildup remain uncertain, but guidance from the Secretary of Defense to the services in 1983 for preparation of their fiscal year 1985-89 programs provides a conservative projection. The services were instructed to reach an active force strength of 2,270,000 by 1989, about 157,000 more than in 1983.\textsuperscript{49} Adding even 157,000 to the active duty rolls would, in Binkin’s analysis, raise the average annual requirement for full-time male recruits to 390,000, or close to 60 percent of the qualified and available population in the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{50} No one expects a smaller requirement, since most of the increased demand is to man platforms, weapons and systems that already have been authorized as part of the defense

\textsuperscript{46} In 1979, the AVF’s worst recruiting year, there were more 18-year-olds than at any other time in American history. \textit{M. BINKIN, supra note 16, at 29. By 1992, there will be 20\% fewer 18-year-olds than in 1979.}

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{See, e.g., Lockman & Quester, supra note 43, at 179: “Although we have historical experience with small youth cohorts and large youthful forces, we have no experience with them in a volunteer environment.”}

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{In the Navy’s case, for instance, new ships are being added to the fleet every month in pursuit of the Navy’s goal of a 600-ship, 15-carrier battle group Navy. Actual active duty manpower authorized through fiscal year 1987 is considerably lower than the Navy considers prudent, however. In its most recent report to the Congress, the Navy cites “three serious problems”:

- The growing number of ships have been manned with fewer personnel than experience has shown are needed;
- Considerable manpower has been shifted from the shore establishment to meet sea requirements to the extent that it now jeopardizes fleet support capability and is also adversely affecting the sea/shore rotation ratio for fleet personnel; and
- The difference between the manpower requested and that authorized will result in a future shortage of trained and experienced Active duty personnel even if the Navy achieves its numerical Active goal.}


\textsuperscript{49} \textit{M. BINKIN, supra note 16, at 35, citing Halloran, Planning Memos Stress U.S. Show of Armed Force, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1983, at 1, col. 4.}

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{M. BINKIN, supra note 16, at 35.}
All-Volunteer Force

build-up of the early 1980s. The only uncertainties concern how much larger the requirement might become.51

There is also the question of quality. The complexity of military tasks has steadily increased since 1945. The effects of technological change are most evident in the shift of demand from blue-collar to white-collar skills (see Appendix, Table 4). Present trends in arms technology point to even faster-growing needs for skilled people to operate and maintain sophisticated weaponry in the years ahead. Already, there are strongly-voiced concerns that U.S. troops are finding modern weapons too complex. The armed forces’ emphasis on increasingly sophisticated weaponry, coupled with the dwindling supply of potential recruits, further sharpens these worries.52 Yet, accompanying the drop in absolute numbers of potential recruits in the next ten years is a drop in recruitable “quality.” The Congressional Budget Office projects that between 1985 and 1991 the supply of high-quality male recruits (high school graduates scoring average or above on enlistment tests) will decline roughly 18 percent.53 Binkin estimates that the number of eighteen-year-old males meeting basic enlistment standards will drop by about 10 percent between 1985 and 1995.54

Remedies involving substitution — women for men, civilians for military personnel, hardware for manpower, reservists for full-time forces — are one form of response, although, as will be seen, all such substitutions are limited in the amount of relief they can properly and realistically provide. More expenditure for military manpower has been the answer in the past; no doubt it will be the first-choice remedy for manpower shortages in future years.

B. The Budgetary Dimension

Even if additional financial incentives would be sufficient to overcome these supply-and-demand circumstances, however, there are

51. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 35.
52. See, e.g., Moore, U.S. Troops Find Weapons Too Complex, Washington Post, Aug. 23, 1986, at A1, col. 1. These trends, and their implications for military manpower, are examined at length in M. Binkin, MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND DEFENSE MANPOWER (1986). For contrasting views, see DePuy, Technology and Manpower: Army Perspective; Murray, Technology and Manpower: Navy Perspective; and Roberts, Technology and Manpower: Air Force Perspective, in THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECADE, supra note 5, at 122-66. A countervailing trend that may ameliorate some of these problems with respect to some kinds of weapons is an emphasis on “user friendly” technology that requires less technical skill for operation, maintenance, and repair by front-line forces than was the case with earlier generations of weapons.
53. CBO, QUALITY SOLDIERS, supra note 44, at 10.
54. M. Binkin, supra note 52, at 79.
reasons to question whether the requisite number of dollars will be forthcoming. In constant dollars, direct manpower costs in the defense budget have not risen appreciably since fiscal year 1981. In fact, the manpower share of total Defense Department budget authority has decreased slightly (see Appendix, Table 5).\footnote{There are, however, some accounting nuances in these figures. Up until fiscal year 1984, retirement pay to current retirees came “off the top” of the Defense budget as a manpower outlay. These are now paid out of general funds and the account of the Veterans Administration. Also, before 1984, accrual accounting for future military retirement was added to current Defense Department accounts. Under the new accounting procedures, the accrual costs of future retirement liabilities, rather than actual current payments to retirees, appear as budget authority and outlays in the defense budget and budget authority in the total federal budget. Accrual accounting is intended to show the costs of future retirement in today’s defense budget, so that retirement costs will be considered in decisions made today even though the actual expenditures will not occur for many years. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE OPTIONS, A REPORT TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE COMMITTEES ON THE BUDGET, Part II 74-76 (Mar. 1986) [hereinafter CBO, REDUCING THE DEFICIT].} Despite the dramatic catch-up raises in 1981 and 1982, the comparability of military pay to that of civilians is slipping again. Because of a 3 percent pay cap in fiscal year 1986 and 4 percent pay caps in each of the preceding three years, military pay now lags private sector pay levels by 8.3 percent, as measured by the Employment Cost Index.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 97.} As the Department of Defense points out, “recent budgets have contained pay raises lower than those needed to maintain . . . comparability.”\footnote{See, e.g., Hale, Congressional Perspectives on Defense Manpower Issues, in THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECADE, \textit{supra} note 5, at 230-37. The Administration’s proposal is for a 4% across-the-board pay increase for FY 1987. Members of the Subcommittee on Defense of the Senate Appropriations Committee recently requested the General Accounting Office to examine manpower cost savings that would be realized were conscription reinstituted. 59.\textit{Id.}} However, the post-Gramm-Rudman Congress shows little inclination to boost military compensation by any significant amount in the near future.\footnote{See, e.g., Hale, Congressional Perspectives on Defense Manpower Issues, in THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECADE, \textit{supra} note 5, at 230-37. The Administration’s proposal is for a 4% across-the-board pay increase for FY 1987. Members of the Subcommittee on Defense of the Senate Appropriations Committee recently requested the General Accounting Office to examine manpower cost savings that would be realized were conscription reinstituted.}

Two possible developments in the years ahead would compound the military pay situation. First, if the economy steadily improves, one would expect a fall in civilian unemployment. Were this to occur, recruitment and retention goals would be harder and more expensive to achieve.\footnote{Forecasts about the speed and stability of economic recovery, and the corresponding effects on unemployment, have varied widely in recent years and among forecasters. The most recent economic assumptions of the Congressional Budget Office show the annual percentage change in real GNP rising from 2.3 in 1985 to 3.2 in 1991, and civilian unemployment rates dropping from 7.2% to 6.0% in the same period. CBO, REDUCING THE DEFICIT, \textit{supra} note 55, at 4.} Second, the shrinking size of the youth cohort should itself affect the structure of civilian pay. The large number of
young workers in the 1970s led to a decline in those workers' wages relative to the average wage of the whole workforce. This trend will reverse in the next five to ten years. As the proportion of youth in the labor market declines, their wages will tend to increase relative to the average wage—particularly in the case of new entrants to the labor force.\textsuperscript{60} In such circumstances, still greater investments will be required to keep military pay comparable to civilian wages.

Yet, barring an external crisis, Congress shows no disposition to continue in the later 1980s and early 1990s the splurges in defense expenditure of the early 1980s. Defense appropriations for 1986 never came close to the 5 percent real growth called for in the 1985 congressional budget resolution. In fact, final congressional action on the fiscal year 1986 defense budget produced the first negative growth since the Reagan Administration took office. Whereas in 1985 the Congressional Budget Office assumed continued real growth in defense spending, CBO now assumes zero real growth in defense appropriations for the rest of the 1980s.\textsuperscript{61} Facing such likely constraints, neither Congress nor the Administration is likely to place active duty pay raises high on its list of priorities—especially if this means cutting, delaying, or stretching out major equipment programs that already have been approved and partly acquired.\textsuperscript{62}

IV. \textit{Force Structure and Preparedness}

One can, of course, carry too far concerns about the arithmetic of force-manning. Without men, the machines of war are useless, but not even the most pessimistic of projections envisions that the armed forces will become so riddled with manpower shortages that they will be useless. More important in this regard is the accompanying steady transformation of force structure, because it has such a direct effect on military preparedness.

\textsuperscript{60} Hosek, Fernandez & Grissmer, \textit{supra} note 45, at 187.

\textsuperscript{61} In CBO's words, "[t]his change is made on the grounds that the deficit targets in the Balanced Budget Act, as an expression of Congressional policy, supersede the future defense spending levels specified in earlier budget resolutions." CBO, \textit{Reducing the Deficit}, \textit{supra} note 55, at 6.

\textsuperscript{62} See, e.g., Hale, \textit{supra} note 58, at 236, 241; American Enterprise Institute, \textit{A Conversation With Robert Pirie: The Manpower Problems of the 1980s}, at 9-10 (1981); R. Cooper, \textit{The All-Volunteer Force: Status and Prospects of the Active Forces}, in \textit{Toward A Consensus on Military Service}, \textit{supra} note 3, at 107-08. Hale points out that the Administration generally has the lead on military pay raises; that is, Congress has generally accepted the Administration's recommended pay raises. Hale, \textit{supra} note 58, at 241.
A. The "Total Force" Structure

As envisioned by Defense Department planners, the total force to be mobilized at the start of a major conflict consists of both the active and the reserve forces, to be augmented in rapid course by a patchwork of military retirees and civilians.\(^63\) While the effectiveness of nearly every component of this mobilization scheme can be challenged on grounds of history and logic, it is the reserve element that is most pivotal, because unless it performs according to plan, the overall scheme cannot be executed.\(^64\)

The "Total Force Policy," formally embraced shortly after the adoption of the AVF, seeks to incorporate this scheme of mobilization into force-manning strategy. There is nothing new about the basic principle involved. In the Department of Defense's formulation, "in structuring our forces, units are placed in the Selected Reserve whenever feasible to maintain as small an active component peacetime force as national security policy and our military strategy permit."\(^65\) The newness, by post-World War II standards, concerns the extent to which the Total Force concept has been taken since the advent of the AVF, especially in the last five years. We now depend on part-time and inactive reserves to do what they have never done before, despite historical experience with reserve utilization which is

---

63. Reserve forces to be mobilized consist of the organized units of the Selected Reserve and individual reservists in the Individual Ready Reserve. See infra note 66. Additionally, approximately 380,000 military retirees under age 60 would be recalled, and over 260,000 additional civilians would be hired in the first 30 days after mobilization. (These estimates are the author's, based on discussions with DoD sources. In official DoD reports, 824,000 military retirees under age 60 and 254,000 new civilian hires are forecasted. FY 87 MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT, supra note 22, at II-12 to II-14.) Also, the standby draft (for which young men are required to register in peacetime) is supposed to deliver to the armed forces the first inductee 13 days after the commencement of mobilization (M-day), and 100,000 inductees within 30 days after M-day. However, inductees become a meaningful source of mobilization manpower only after they have received the legally required minimum of 12 weeks of military training. See, e.g., Dept of Defense Authorizations for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2003 (1978).

64. For a critique of the overall mobilization plan, see generally Lacy, supra note 16.

65. FY 87 MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT, supra note 22, at II-1. Compare, for instance, the War Department's statement of organizing principle in 1912:

It is the traditional policy of the United States that the military establishment in time of peace is to be a small, regular Army and that the ultimate war force of the Nation is to be a great Army of citizen-soldiers. This fundamental theory of military organization is sound economically and politically.

All-Volunteer Force

scarcely reassuring, and despite the fact that the reserve force structure has been little altered in the past half-century.

B. *The Reserve Components*

The conversion from draft to AVF, and the accompanying embrace of the Total Force Policy, did not result in the development of new kinds of reserve forces or any new organization of existing reserve forces. New missions and priorities have gradually been assigned to the reserve components, but in most respects, the reserves have changed little since reorganizations in 1952 and 1967; their fundamental structure has changed scarcely at all since the 1920s. Selected reserve units are manned and equipped to reflect or mirror

66. In overall construct, the reserves consist of six components: the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve. (The Coast Guard Reserve, a seventh component, is under the administrative control of the Department of Transportation, and falls under the operational control of the Navy in time of war or national emergency.) While all are part of the national reserve structure, the reserves and the Guard differ in that the reserves are under exclusive federal control for national defense purposes, while the National Guard components are organized by state and are under the control of state governors except when called up by the President. Broadly speaking, the missions of the two have evolved differently, with the Guard primarily focused on provision of direct combat forces in support of active forces, and the reserves heavily concentrated in the provision of combat support and combat service support. The command structures of the two are different, as are statutory provisions governing their management. While guardsmen receive federal pay for every day in uniform — even when performing a state function — Guard units and members may not, for instance, be ordered for training outside the United States without the consent of the governor of the state in which they are located — a provision with mischievous potential. See infra note 75.

In addition to being associated with one of these six components, reservists are classified according to three broad categories of readiness and availability inherited from the draft era: Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve, largest and most important for purposes here, is further divided into three categories: Selected Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and Inactive National Guard (ING). The Selected Reserve is composed chiefly of organized units (guard and reserve) whose members drill periodically and are paid. The individual ready reservists (IRR and ING) are not members of units and generally do not train or get paid. Rather, they are a pool of previously trained personnel who are technically obligated to the military and liable to individual call-up in emergencies.

The Standby Reserve and Retired Reserve have limited mobilization utility. They consist of members who were once in military service, who do not train or get paid in peacetime, and who can be called to active duty only by special congressional authorization. See M. Binkin, *U.S. Reserve Forces: The Problem of the Weekend Warrior* 4-5 (1974); Moxon, *U.S. Reserve Forces: The Achilles' Heel of the All-Volunteer Force?,* in The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, supra note 65, at 91, 98.

active units, and are programmed to deploy and fight independently of, alongside, or merged into the active forces, depending on the mission. The Individual Ready Reserve does not have a force structure, and most of its members do not have specific unit assignments. Its principal purpose is individual augmentation and casualty replacement.

However, reliance on nonactive components has increased significantly on two counts since the end of the draft. First, the reserves have replaced the draft as the principal means of expanding military forces in a national emergency. Indeed, the President can exceed the authorized military manpower ceiling on his own authority only by activating reserves. Second, whereas in the draft era the reserves were viewed primarily as a hedge against general war and were expected to enter such a war at a relatively late stage, because missions have been gradually transferred from the active forces to the Selected Reserve, the reserves by now have long since ceased to be merely "forces in reserve." The instinct to use the reserves in this manner is not new, but the actual change only came with the AVF. It is evident in a recent Department of Defense summary:

We have substantially increased our reliance on Reserve Component units for more and more complex missions. The Army relies heavily on Reserve Component units to fill out its active divisions and to provide essential tactical support to both active and reserve combat forces. Naval Reserve units form an integral part of the Total Force in most mission areas of the Navy including surface combatants, carrier air wings, maritime patrol, airlift and medical support. The Selected Marine Corps Reserve provides a division-wing team with balanced combat, combat support, and combat service support forces of the same type as active force counterpart units. Air Force Reserve Component units bear considerable responsibility for many combat and

68. The President currently has authority to recall 100,000 Selected Reservists for up to 90 days to augment active forces, a number the Department of Defense seeks to expand to 200,000. See FY 87 MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT, supra note 22, at 1-2, and infra note 75.

69. Among the early advocates of a rapid-response role for the reserves was Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. McNamara put the case succinctly in the 1960s:

In the light of the present world situation, it is essential that [the Army] reserve forces be brought as soon as possible to a state of readiness that would permit them to respond on very short notice to limited war situations which threaten to tax the capacity of the active Army. Moreover, they must be so organized, trained and equipped as to permit their rapid integration into the active Army.

Dep't of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1967: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Dep't of Defense, Comm. on Appropriations and Comm. on Armed Services, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1966).
support missions, including tactical fighter, airlift, continental air defense and aerial refueling missions.\textsuperscript{70}

The extent of this reliance has been noted earlier;\textsuperscript{71} again, by the early 1990s nearly two-thirds of the available manpower in the Army, and one-third in the Navy, will be reserve component personnel. Already, in the first thirty days of a European war, about 10 percent of all U.S. Army combat units, 60 percent of the combat support missions (such as artillery and engineering), and nearly 60 percent of the combat service support missions (such as truck companies and medical units) are programmed to come from deployed reserves. To meet this schedule, round-out reserve units with a NATO mission would have to be available for deployment in the first ten days; the remainder, in the next ten to fifteen days.\textsuperscript{72} Furthermore, if the present Assistant Secretary of Defense of Reserve Affairs is correct, few combat contingencies anywhere in the world, even those far short of general war, can any longer be met adequately, for more than a few days or weeks, without an early reserve activation.\textsuperscript{73}

These are striking developments when one considers the patchwork of reserve forces that is expected to cope with these responsibilities. Selected Reserve training requirements — normally one weekend per month and two weeks of summer training per year — are essentially the same as they were in 1952; moreover, in 1952, weapons and tactics were simpler, the reserves were not expected to be deployed early in war and certainly were not considered to be a leading force or to provide a timely response in crisis management, and much of the reserves' manpower consisted of World War II veterans.\textsuperscript{74}

Selected Reserve organization remains a mind-boggling array of separate bureaucratic compartments. In addition to an Army

\textsuperscript{70}. FY 87 Manpower Requirements Report, supra note 22, at I-4.
\textsuperscript{71}. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; supra note 21.
\textsuperscript{72}. Actual deployment schedules are classified, but these figures are consistent with Army testimony, and are employed by the Congressional Budget Office. See, e.g., Dept of Defense Appropriations For Fiscal Year 1985: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 162 (Feb. 9, 1984); CBO, Improving the Army Reserves, supra note 20, at 23.
\textsuperscript{73}. See supra note 21.
\textsuperscript{74}. Present-day Selected Reservists are recruited from two pools: those leaving active duty and willing to take on Selected Reserve affiliation, and new recruits enlisted directly from civilian life. The first, while older, already have been trained and have active duty experience. Non-prior service Reserve recruits are, as the categorization suggests, untrained civilians who undergo basic (and perhaps some advanced) training before entering the Selected Reserve. As the table below shows, the ratios of these prior-service and non-prior service entrants to the Selected Reserve have not changed significantly in recent years.
Reserve and an Air Force Reserve, the nation fields fifty Army and Air National Guards, each organized by state (although in principle subsumed in the national military structure) and each still subject to considerable state influence, even when performing purely federal training roles. In internal organization, Selected Reserve units tend primarily to mirror active units, and to respond to the active units' actual expected needs in terms of manpower and skills only incidentally. The Individual Ready Reserve may best be described as a telephone directory of people who have been in active or Selected Reserve service and who are still liable to call-up in emergency. A cohesive and credible force it is not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
<td>50/47</td>
<td>39/44</td>
<td>48/45</td>
<td>51/45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Reserve</td>
<td>26/34</td>
<td>29/46</td>
<td>31/46</td>
<td>31/47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td>3/25</td>
<td>12/20</td>
<td>11/23</td>
<td>12/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps Reserve</td>
<td>5/4</td>
<td>9/6</td>
<td>9/6</td>
<td>8/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
<td>7/10</td>
<td>5/10</td>
<td>5/9</td>
<td>7/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Reserve</td>
<td>3/10</td>
<td>3/10</td>
<td>4/10</td>
<td>4/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>94/128</td>
<td>98/135</td>
<td>108/139</td>
<td>113/147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding. 


75. Congress has provided only two statutory authorities for ordering members or units of the Army and Air National Guard to active duty for the purpose of training. 10 U.S.C. §§ 672(b), 672(d) (1982). Both condition the order to active duty on the “consent of the governor of the State or Territory . . . as the case may be.” All other statutory authorities governing the call of the National Guard to active duty pertain to a declaration of war or national emergency by Congress, a declaration of national emergency by the President, or the President’s 100,000 call-up authority to augment the active forces for an operational mission. 1986 Reserve Forces Statement, *supra* note 21, at 11-12. Political difficulties arise when a governor withholds consent. In January 1985, for example, the governor of California refused to permit 450 unit members of the California National Guard to participate in a training exercise in Honduras. In January 1986, the Governor of Maine refused to permit members of the Maine National Guard to participate in a road building exercise in Honduras and a training exercise in Panama. *Id.* at 14-15. Proposals have been offered occasionally to merge the guard and reserve forces, but with spectacular lack of success. See M. Binkin, *supra* note 66 at 36-37. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara offered one such proposal in 1965. Proposal to Realine the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve Forces: Hearings Before the Prepared Investigating Subcomm. of the Senate Armed Services Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-8 (1965). An amendment to the Fiscal Year 1974 Department of Defense Appropriations Authorization Act required a study of possible consolidation of the Air Force reserve components. See U.S. Dept't of Defense, A REPORT ON THE MERGER OF THE AIR FORCE RESERVE AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD (Jan. 1975).

76. Throughout the postwar period, the primary need in emergencies has been for individual reservists to serve as fillers, augmentees, and casualty replacements, not for whole reserve units. See Lacy, *supra* note 3, at 37-39. This has been the case throughout the AVF period. Recently, however, Congress approved funds for a one-day peacetime callup of about 70% of the IRR in order...
All-Volunteer Force

These developments are all the more striking when our past experience with actually calling up and using reserve forces is considered. This experience is unsettlingly sparse. Apart from the early months of the Korean War, U.S. reservists have been called into action on only five occasions: the Berlin crisis (1961); the Cuban missile crisis (1962); the Pueblo affair (1968); the limited Vietnam build-up (1968); and the New York City area postal strike (1970). Indeed, since the advent of the Total Force Policy, with its emphasis on reserve forces to provide immediate support to active forces in times of crisis, there have been no involuntary activations of reserve forces.

In addition, even such limited experience with reserve force activations as the nation has had is not at all reassuring when weighed against current expectations and reliances. In Korea, none of the mobilized national guard divisions had yet been deployed one year after the mobilization. In Berlin, activated Army reserve components averaged only 68 percent of required personnel, and some units took up to a year to achieve combat readiness. The Naval Reserve call-up in Berlin, while more rapid, still took four months to execute. In the Pueblo affair, the six Naval Reserve air squadrons activated on twenty-four-hour notice were still short of equipment and operational duties four months after the call-up, and none was ever actually deployed overseas. Naval reserves called up in the Vietnam build-up took four months to deploy, and then managed to do so only by cannibalizing equipment and jerry-rigging full-time manpower from "general Navy resources." Nearly half of the Army reserve units activated in Vietnam were deficient in occupational qualifications, and fully 17 percent of the activated reservists were totally unqualified for their assigned positions.
While this experience is dated, surrogate measures of current reserve readiness are not inconsistent. In the case of the Army Selected Reserve components, recent analyses by the Congressional Budget Office of the Army's own "condition ratings" ("C-ratings") of its units indicate that, on average, reserve units are much less ready than active units to perform their missions, despite the infusion of additional resources into the reserves in recent years. According to the CBO, "overall C-ratings for fiscal years 1982 through 1984 show that most active units were rated C-2 ("substantially ready") or C-3 ("marginally ready"). By contrast, most reserve units were rated C-3 or C-4 ("not ready")."\(^3\) In the case of the Individual Ready Reserve, not only does it remain short of its wartime manning requirement, but in addition, the services have been relying on it in their planning with only hazy knowledge of where these reservists are located, what their status is, and whether they would respond if mobilized.\(^4\)

C. An Acceptable Risk?

The question, at bottom, is whether such a degree of reliance on the reserves as they are currently configured presents an acceptable risk. The civilian leadership of the Department of Defense evidently thinks so.\(^5\) Others view the circumstance as an uncomfortable but

---

83. CBO, IMPROVING THE ARMY RESERVES, supra note 20, at 18-19. C-ratings reflect four categories of readiness: personnel, equipment-on-hand, equipment condition, and training. For example, to be rated C-1 ("fully ready") in the personnel category, a unit must have at least 90% of its wartime requirement, and at least 90% of these personnel must be fully trained in the jobs to which they are assigned. Generally, a unit that falls below 70% of its requirement for personnel or 60% for equipment must report the lowest rating, C-4. Id. at 16-17.

84. See supra note 77. The condition of the reserves has troubled the military leadership for some time, but seldom are the concerns aired in public. An exception was the recently leaked private letter from Major General Robert E. Wagner, commander of the Army Reserve Officers Training Corps, to his commanding officer. Commenting on the Army reserves, Wagner questioned their size, composition, command lines and organization in a scathing appraisal. According to Wagner, reserve "forces will not be prepared to go to war in synchronization with their affiliated active duty formations. The Army is deceiving itself to state otherwise." In Wagner's blunt conclusion: "The Army needs some answers because our service is literally choking on our reserve components." Halloran, General Faults Army Reserves and Training, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1986, at 26, col. 1.

85. See, e.g., Philbin & Gould, The Guard and Reserve: In Pursuit of Full Integration, in THE GUARD AND RESERVE IN THE TOTAL FORCE, supra note 65, at 43, 52, quoting statement by Defense Secretary Weinberger at the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers in August 1982:

We can no longer consider Reserve forces as merely forces in reserve. . . . Instead, they have to be an integral part of the total force, both within the United States and within NATO. They have to be, and in fact are, a blending of the professionalism of the full-time soldier with the professionalism of the citizen-soldier.
inescapable fact of modern defense: with unconstrained resources we would place our investments and reliance primarily if not wholly on standing active forces; in the constrained environment we face, however, we have no choice but to rely in large part on reserves.\footnote{86} A third view sees a virtue in the very limitations imposed in such a situation: if reserves must be activated in order to sustain active forces in anything more than limited contingencies, presidents will be less inclined (and politically less able) to become involved in military actions without extensive national debate and political consensus.\footnote{87} Others, however, cognizant of the history and present shortcomings of reserve forces, are concerned that Total Force rhetoric obscures disturbing realities that go beyond the merely uncomfortable and the politically cautious.\footnote{88}

At stake is a broader question of strategic policy. With remarkably little public discussion, the nation has been shifting to a reliance on mobilization as opposed to readiness. In the case of general war, this adjustment means tacitly accepting

the risks inherent in reliance on political (as distinguished from strategic or tactical) warning, predicated on the assumption that signs of a more aggressive Soviet policy or buildup would become evident in time to employ mobilization and reserve force assets — and that the U.S. and its allies could muster the consensus and political will to do so.\footnote{89}

In the case of other challenges and provocations, it probably means that any sustained response will be weakened, absent a reserve call-up — a step that has seldom been taken in the past due to concern that calling up the reserves would be riskily (or at least prematurely) provocative, unnecessarily arousing domestically, and too blunderbuss in terms of the psychology and machinery that would be set in

\footnote{86} See, e.g., Moxon, \textit{supra} note 66, at 112.

\footnote{87} Few express the view explicitly, but it is a detectable undercurrent in much of the reasoning behind the AVF — especially given the circumstances in which the draft was abandoned in favor of the AVF. The Gates Commission, which provided much of the rationale for the AVF, showcased the virtue of removing force expansion from the President’s sole discretion in discussing the standby draft: “If a consensus sufficient to induce Congress to activate the draft cannot be mustered, the President would see the depth of national division \textit{before}, rather than \textit{after}, committing U.S. Military power.”\textit{GATES COMMISSION REPORT, supra} note 9, at 121 (emphasis in original). The historical aversion to mobilize reservists on presidential authority alone may be similarly viewed. See \textit{infra} text accompanying note 90.

\footnote{88} See, e.g., Gold, \textit{What the Reserves Can — and Can’t — Do}, \textit{PUBLIC INTEREST} 56 (Spring 1984); Coffey, \textit{Are We Really Serious? A Critical Assessment of Manpower Policies in the Army Reserve Forces}, in \textit{DEFENSE MANPOWER PLANNING, supra} note 15, at 148.

motion. In both cases, strategic policy is being framed by choices about military manpower procurement, not the other way around. The end result is not in any case greatly reassuring.

V. The Choices Ahead

The only certain fact about the future is the advance of time. Nonetheless, there is less uncertainty about developments over the next several years with respect to the matters discussed above than in many other areas of debate. Trends already are evident: as we enter the 1990s, the AVF will be more difficult to man and harder to rationalize as a balanced, responsive force than has been the case to date. It will be more difficult to man not only because of demographic developments, but also because of pressures to constrain growth in defense spending in general, and, within defense expenditures, growth in manpower outlays. Even if additional compensation could suffice to overcome the less favorable recruiting environment of the next several years, it is questionable whether the requisite financial incentives will be forthcoming at all, let alone forthcoming in time to preclude and correct force-manning shortfalls. The AVF will be more difficult to rationalize because the gradual transformation of the force structure has yet to be accompanied by a supportive strategic concept, and flies in the face of discouraging historical and present facts. The issues of force-manning and force structure go hand in hand. The latter, however, presents the larger and more serious gap in the AVF’s circuitry.

A. Force-Manning

It is not likely that the United States will adopt any new or renewed form of conscription merely to reduce shortfalls in the quantity or quality of the armed forces. The political and social costs of any kind of draft probably would be perceived as prohibitive. Op-
ponents of a draft would point to the fact that the "demographic depression" may very well itself be short-lived, with relief on the horizon in the late 1990s, and that conscription therefore would be too radical a remedy for so limited a period of discomfort. Moreover, conscription in any form, whether the familiar selective service draft or part of some broadened concept of "national service," would be a mixed blessing. Although a draft would certainly ensure a steady supply of first-term manpower for military service, it probably would not reduce military manpower costs appreciably in the short-run. How significant and how positive an impact a draft would have on the qualitative dimensions of force-manning is uncertain. To the extent that a draft would reduce overall retention (because draftees and draft-motivated volunteers would be less inclined than "true" volunteers to remain beyond their first term of service), it might prove somewhat counterproductive in coping with the military's needs for experienced specialists and technicians. Conscription would, however, permit active force strengths to return to pre-AVF levels (see Appendix, Table 6), and would thereby reduce the present high reliance on reserves.

Reluctance to replace the AVF with mandatory military service nevertheless could evaporate in the face of a serious crisis or external provocation. The political and social costs of conscription might then be viewed as more tolerable than the costs of manpower-

---

92. "National service," when considered in this context, adds little directly to military force-manning beyond what a selective military draft would contribute; however, national service may be politically more palatable in that in most formulations it provides to individuals the option to perform non-military service in lieu of military service if they wish. See generally R. Danzig & P. Szanton, supra note 38, at 131-69; Lacy, supra note 27, at 207-08, 224-28.

93. Barring the unlikely case that first-term military compensation would be drastically cut with the introduction of a draft (a step that would serve only to fuel resistance to a new draft), the best conscription could offer would be to constrain future escalations in first-term manpower costs — a not insignificant outcome, but one with little immediate appeal to a cost-conscious Congress. Indeed, conscription could actually cost more than the AVF, were it wed to an expansive national service program.

94. Since a draft would most likely have to be "equitable" (that is, take a representative portion of the youth population), it would probably have limited effects on recruit quality compared to the present time. There would be more recruits from each of the two ends of the quality distribution, as measured by enlistment test score category — more "high quality" category I-Is and similarly more "low quality" category IVs — since the percentages of these persons are higher in the youth population at large than in recent enlistment cohorts. Syllogistics, Inc., supra note 5, at I-9.

95. M. Binkin, supra note 52, at 130. Much depends, of course, on the proportions of draftees, draft-motivated volunteers and "true" volunteers in the first-term ranks of a drafted force. Policy choices will have some effect on these proportions. For illustrative alternatives, see Lacy, supra note 27, at 215-21.

96. For other values associated with conscription, see the materials cited supra in note 36.
deficient forces. In such circumstances, but probably only in such circumstances, a resumption of conscription might well follow.97

Barring an external catalyst, therefore, policymakers of the early 1990s will have to make do with an all-volunteer force. Spending more on military manpower is one option, but, as the preceding discussion suggests, is not one that is likely to be popular with a deficit-conscious Congress or to be sufficient in itself. Simply allowing the size of the forces to steadily decline, as in the 1970s, may be inevitable, but scarcely deserves to be called a policy. The preferable recourse is to use substitutes for active military manpower, although the gains from this are likely to be small absent a fairly radical readjustment of political philosophy and military technology. Substituting civilians for military personnel may reduce the peacetime need for military members, but, given limitations on the use of civilians in activities potentially involving combat, would help little in meeting crisis and wartime requirements.98 Substituting hardware for manpower, thus deploying capital-intensive instead of labor-intensive forces, has long had an appeal, but the gains have been small in the past; given the long lead-times in fielding new weapons, platforms, and equipment, further gains from this substitution are not likely to be substantial any time soon.99 Using more reservists in place of active duty personnel is, for reasons already discussed, a singularly unattractive course. The one area where gains may be available is in greater utilization of women in the armed forces. That there are such additional gains to be made no one seriously doubts. Women comprise approximately 10 percent of the force today, compared to the 12 percent the Carter Administration had planned for in fiscal

97. It is useful in this regard to recall the fate of the first post-World War II all-volunteer force in 1947-1948. Sagging enlistments and slipping retention would not alone have animated the Truman Administration to call for, or the 80th Congress to approve, a resumed draft in 1948. The fall of Czechoslovakia to the Communists in a coup d'etat in February 1948, and the first tentative steps towards a blockade of Berlin by the Soviets in March, were the necessary and sufficient spurs. See Lacy, supra note 3, at 33-35.

98. Civilians currently account for one-third of all Department of Defense full-time manpower. DoD ANN. REP. FY 87, supra note 6, at 150. The Defense Department is now examining steps that might be taken to ensure that at least some civilians in critical overseas positions might remain available in an emergency. Id. at 231.

99. Indeed, manning requirements for a number of new platforms have been underestimated, and have had to be increased with operational experience. The DD-963 Spruance-class destroyer, for instance, "experienced substantial growth in manning requirements during its first five years in operation, jumping from an initial estimate of 224 enlisted sailors to a typical crew complement of 295 by 1980." M. BINKIN, supra note 52, at 40.
All-Volunteer Force

year 1986.\textsuperscript{100} How far the nation is willing to go in this area, and how substantial the effects on force-manning will be, are key uncertainties.\textsuperscript{101}

B. Force Structure

The connecting thread remains the balance of active forces and mobilizable reserves, and here there are no politically easy choices. To continue the present drift is to shift eventually to a strategic posture that defies both history and logic. It requires that the nation put faith in two dubious propositions: first, that a major adversary will signal aggressive intentions unambiguously and sufficiently in advance of hostilities for the United States to mobilize its reserve assets; and second, that the United States and its allies will have the political will to mobilize before hostilities commence. It also requires that we stake external security on a reserve component structure that is better explained by domestic politics than by military strategy, and that at best amounts to an unassuring compromise between the nineteenth century and the twentieth.

Yet to tackle in serious fashion the balance of the force structure will require two courses of action which previous administrations have consistently shied away from in the AVF era. The first is to check, and in various parts of the force structure to reverse, the leakage from the active forces to the reserves of combat support and combat service support missions. We are long past the time when we could rely exclusively on active forces for all or most crisis or wartime missions. The challenge ahead is to manipulate the balance back to a less risky posture. This, however, probably means adding requirements for active duty manpower at a time when providing such manpower will be especially difficult.

The second, complementary course of action is a wholesale reexamination of the organization, missions, training, and funding of the reserve apparatus of the United States. There is little doubt that, were we able to begin afresh, even the most hallucinatory of military plans would scarcely come close to producing the patchwork of reserve components we field today. Burdened with mysterious redundan-


\textsuperscript{101} The principal limitations are current bars to employing military women in assignments that might expose them to combat. For an early, but still pertinent, examination of the issues involved, see M. BINKIN & S. BACH, WOMEN AND THE MILITARY (1977).
dancies,\textsuperscript{102} heavy with undifferentiated structure, employing across-the-board training-time requirements better suited to 1939 than to 1989, and expected to function as an expeditionary force according to an unprecedented (and to many commentators, wholly implausible) deployment schedule — the reserves have become the single greatest choke-point in U.S. military preparedness.

The list of areas of useful inquiry and potential benefit in reserve reform is enormous in scope and diversity, in part because the nation's reserves have escaped critical reappraisal for most of the last fifty years, and in part because the nature of the military tasks ahead of them are more demanding than at any other time in their history. Any attempt to itemize here such areas could barely scratch the surface. If, however, one were to list the most compelling national security issues warranting urgent, sustained, and comprehensive treatment by the Administration and the Congress in office as of January 20, 1989, reserve reform should be near the top of the priorities.

To be sure, the political obstacles to any serious reexamination of the reserve side of the Total Force are imposing. Located in some five thousand separate communities, reserve units form part of an "intricate and subtle political chain that laces the country, running through village council rooms, county courthouses, and state capitols to Congress and the White House . . . ."\textsuperscript{103} Few have been eager to take on that chain in the past, given its recognized clout.\textsuperscript{104} Yet, bipartisan reappraisals have been undertaken in other politically thorny thickets, and with occasional success; perhaps a special blue-ribbon commission could at least begin to tackle the job of revising reserve force structure.

So, whither the All-Volunteer Force? The question begets a second question, not that of whether to continue the AVF in the decade ahead, but rather that of whether as a nation we can muster the resolve to make the AVF a viable tool of national security policy. Merely continuing present policies is not possible in force-manning,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{102} Why, for instance, do we require both an Army Reserve and an Army National Guard, and why does any state, let alone 50, require an Air National Guard?
\item \textsuperscript{103} Derthick, \textit{Militia Lobby in the Missile Age: The Politics of the National Guard}, in \textit{CHANGING PATTERNS OF MILITARY POLITICS} 190, 192 (S. Huntington ed. 1962).
\item \textsuperscript{104} In the words of one former White House staff member, "These citizen soldiers are so solidly entrenched politically that no one in Washington dares challenge them frontally." D. Cater, \textit{Power in Washington: A CRUCIAL LOOK AT TODAY'S STRUGGLE TO GOVERN IN THE NATION'S CAPITOL} 41 (1964). See in these regards M. Binkin, \textit{supra} note 66, at 24-32.
\end{itemize}
All-Volunteer Force

not desirable in force structure, and of increasingly dubious effectiveness in terms of military preparedness and security posture.
Appendix

Table 1: MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTH, SELECTED YEARS (Fiscal Years, End-Strength, In Thousands)\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1,570</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,547</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,322</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,081</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,040</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,071</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,097</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,123</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,138</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,151</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Selected Reserve

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Reserve</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps Reserve</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Reserve</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>922</strong></td>
<td><strong>925</strong></td>
<td><strong>823</strong></td>
<td><strong>869</strong></td>
<td><strong>917</strong></td>
<td><strong>975</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,005</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,046</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.


Table 2: PROJECTED U.S. POPULATION AGED EIGHTEEN TO TWENTY-ONE BY SEX, SELECTED YEARS, 1981-95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>8,617</td>
<td>8,356</td>
<td>17,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>8,356</td>
<td>8,014</td>
<td>16,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>13,441</td>
<td>14,521</td>
<td>28,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>14,311</td>
<td>15,401</td>
<td>29,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>15,181</td>
<td>16,262</td>
<td>31,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>16,052</td>
<td>17,133</td>
<td>33,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>16,923</td>
<td>18,014</td>
<td>34,937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>17,794</td>
<td>18,895</td>
<td>36,689</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All-Volunteer Force

Table 3: MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS:
FISCAL YEARS 1987 AND 1988
(End Strength, in Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Forces</td>
<td>2,151</td>
<td>2,167</td>
<td>2,181</td>
<td>2,192</td>
<td>+ 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected Reserve</td>
<td>1,088</td>
<td>1,186</td>
<td>1,186</td>
<td>1,219</td>
<td>+ 131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4: DISTRIBUTION OF TRAINED MILITARY ENLISTED PERSONNEL, BY OCCUPATIONAL AREA, SELECTED YEARS, 1945-85 (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White-collar</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative/clerical</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-collar</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service and Supply</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Military Skills</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET AUTHORITY FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL, FISCAL YEARS 1981-87
(Dollars in Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>36,909</td>
<td>42,875</td>
<td>45,688</td>
<td>64,866*</td>
<td>67,773*</td>
<td>67,957*</td>
<td>76,814*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired Pay</td>
<td>13,840</td>
<td>14,986</td>
<td>16,155</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower as Percent of Total Program</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 1987</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>49,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired Pay</td>
<td>18,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower as Percent of Total Program</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Constant FY 87 Dollars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>49,844</td>
<td>51,496</td>
<td>52,752</td>
<td>72,762*</td>
<td>73,182*</td>
<td>70,627*</td>
<td>76,814*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired Pay</td>
<td>18,026</td>
<td>18,315</td>
<td>18,663</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower as Percent of Total Program</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes Retired Pay Accrual.

Table 6: ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL STRENGTH, SELECTED YEARS: 1950-1987 (End-Strength, In Thousands)a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>3,675</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>3,302</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2,487</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>2,484</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2,687</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Includes officers and enlisted.
b Programmed.