September 11 and the Laws of War

Derek Jinks†

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 1

II. THE CENTRALITY OF THE LAWS OF WAR ................................................................................... 2

III. THE POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE “LAWS OF WAR” ........................................................................ 10

IV. COMMON ARTICLE 3 AND SEPTEMBER 11 .................................................................................. 20
   A. The Existence of an “Armed Conflict” .......................................................................................... 20
      1. The Ambiguity of the “Armed Conflict” Threshold ................................................................. 21
      2. Other Important Legal Developments in the Definition of Internal “Armed Conflict” ............ 25
         a. Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions ............................................................................... 25
         b. ICTY Judgment in Prosecutor v. Tadic (Appeal on Jurisdiction) ...................................... 27
         c. International Criminal Court Statute .................................................................................. 29
      3. Defining “Armed Conflict” : Identifying the Relevant Criteria ................................................. 30
      4. Application of the Factors to the September 11 Attacks ............................................................ 33
         a. Views of the State Party: U.S. Interpretation of the Attacks .............................................. 33
         b. Views of the Non-state Belligerent: Al Qaeda’s Intentions .................................................. 35
         c. Views of the International Community ............................................................................... 35
         e. Nature of the Actors: The Organizational Characteristics of Al Qaeda ............................... 38
   B. “Not of an International Character” ............................................................................................. 38
      1. Applicable Only in “Civil Wars” ............................................................................................... 39
      2. Applicable Only in Conflicts Wholly Confined to the Territory of One State ......... 40
      3. Applicable in All “Armed Conflicts” ....................................................................................... 41
   C. Individual Criminal Responsibility and Common Article 3 ....................................................... 42

V. CONCLUSION: THE LAWS OF WAR AND COUNTER-TERRORISM .................................................. 45

[If international law is at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is, perhaps even more conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law.

- Hersch Lauterpacht1

I. INTRODUCTION

What law applies to the September 11 terrorist attacks? Many characterize the atrocities as “acts of war” against the United States—suggesting that the “laws of war” apply. Of course, as a conceptual matter,

† Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. J.D., M.A., M.Phil., Yale University. Thanks to Laura Dickinson, Mark Drumbi, Harold Hongju Koh, Mary Ellen O’Connell, Leila Sadat, Michael Scharf, David Sloss, and especially Jack Goldsmith and Ryan Goodman, for useful comments. All errors are, of course, my own. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Association of Law Schools.

this characterization is problematic because "war" traditionally involved formally-declared hostilities between sovereign states. The attacks nevertheless resemble "acts of war" in that they were extraordinarily severe, orchestrated from abroad by an organized enemy, and directed against the United States as a whole. Critics of this view maintain that although the attacks constituted aggravated crimes (such as "crimes against humanity" or "international terrorism"), they do not implicate the laws of war. This debate involves much more than descriptive accuracy. Indeed at stake is the proper direction of transnational antiterrorism law and policy; and, more specifically, whether and to what extent the rule of law might guide the collective response to what Harold Koh has called "the globalization of terror."²

It is clear that humanitarian law governs the conduct of hostilities in non-international conflicts—even when confined to the territory of one state. The central difficulty is how best to define the scope and content of international humanitarian rules applicable in non-international armed conflict. In this Article, I argue that the September 11 attacks violated the laws of war, and that this determination has important consequences for both U.S. antiterrorism policy and international humanitarian law. The laws of war offer a proven, durable mode of imposing principled constraints on organized violence. This widely-accepted, fully articulated normative framework should guide efforts to fashion an effective, humane response to new forms of hostilities—including catastrophic terrorism.

The argument proceeds as follows. In Part II, I outline the central issue under examination: whether terrorist attacks implicate the laws of war. I also summarize many of the broader questions implicated by this inquiry including whether the contemplated U.S. military commissions have subject matter jurisdiction over the attacks. In Part III, I examine the potentially applicable laws of war and conclude that only the laws of war applicable to non-international armed conflicts could govern such attacks. I model the conditions under which this regime applies in Part IV and conclude that the laws of war govern the September 11 attacks. I also suggest that violations of these laws constitute "war crimes" subjecting individual perpetrators to criminal liability. Finally, in Part V, I offer some concluding remarks on the implications (and normative appeal) of the model proposed in Part IV.

II. THE CENTRALITY OF THE LAWS OF WAR

Debates about the direction of anti-terrorism law and policy have increasingly concerned the most appropriate means of prosecuting or otherwise meting out justice to suspected terrorists. These debates center on three related issues: (1) the most appropriate forum for prosecuting individuals responsible for the September 11 attacks;³ (2) the international legal status of

---

³ See, e.g., Laura Dickinson, Courts Can Avenge Sept. 11: International Justice—Not War—Will Honor Our Character While Ensuring Our Safety, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 24, 2001, at 66 (supporting "internationalized" trials in other national jurisdictions); Harold Hongju Koh, We Have the Right Courts for Bin-Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2001, at A39 (arguing that any such trials should be conducted in federal district court); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Al Qaeda Should Be Tried Before the World,
combatants captured in Afghanistan; and, more generally, (3) the most appropriate role for law—both international humanitarian law and criminal law—in any comprehensive strategy against international terrorism.

Naturally, the starting point in these debates is President Bush’s Military Order providing for the trial of suspected terrorists by military commissions. The Order characterizes the events of September 11 as an attack “on a scale that has created a state of armed conflict that requires the use of the United States Armed Forces.” As part of the administration’s overall response to the crisis, it authorizes the trial of non-citizens “for violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by military tribunals.”

The Order, needless to say, has occasioned no small measure of controversy. Although much of this controversy centers on the constitutional


7. Military Order, supra note 6, § 1(A).

8. Id. § 1(E).

constraints on the president’s power to issue the Order and the minimum constitutional requirements for a fair trial in these commissions. International law considerations are central to the applicability and substantive scope of the Order. By its terms, the Order extends to persons accused of violating the “laws of war,” a term of art describing the positive and customary international rules of armed conflict.

The scope of subject matter jurisdiction in commissions convened pursuant to the Order is, therefore, a function of international law. Despite their centrality, the relevant international legal considerations are poorly understood and all too often ignored. Is the “law of war” applicable to the events of September 11? If applicable, did the September 11 attacks violate any of these rules? And, assuming that applicable international rules were violated, does the “law of war” impose individual criminal liability on the perpetrators of the unlawful acts? In short, were the terrorist attacks “war crimes?”

These are questions of broad significance for law and policy. First, these issues implicate U.S. anti-terrorism policy. In a narrow sense, the applicability of the “laws of war” to these circumstances helps define the scope of the contemplated criminal proceedings against captured al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. If the attacks are outside the purview of the laws of war, then the
attacks themselves arguably could not serve as a basis for criminal charges before a military commission. It is also important to note that the limited federal habeas review of convictions under the Order, if available at all, would reach the merits of jurisdictional challenges, including whether the "laws of war" proscribe the charged conduct. In addition, the applicability of the "laws of war" to the attacks may have bearing on the legality of the U.S.

16. This proposition requires further clarification. I do not mean to suggest that U.S. law authorizes trial by military commission only for violations of the "laws of war" as such. Congress has expressly authorized military commissions to try other offenses. See 10 U.S.C. § 904 (1994) (stating that military commissions may impose the death penalty for the crime of "aiding the enemy"); 10 U.S.C. § 906 (1994) (stating that military commissions may try the crime of "spying during wartime"). Nevertheless, the question of whether the attacks violated the laws of war is central to the scope of the subject matter jurisdiction of the military commissions. First, the President's Order does not reference these other provisions as sources of authority to establish commissions. See Military Order, supra note 6, pmbl. Second, the Bush administration has repeatedly suggested that only persons accused of war crimes will face trial by military commission. See, e.g., Wolfowitz Testimony, supra note 15; Gonzales, supra note 15. Third, the other provisions recognizing military commission jurisdiction are inapplicable to the attacks. Moreover, these provisions would, in any case, only apply in the context of a war or armed conflict. See 10 U.S.C. § 904 (1994) (pertaining to "aiding the enemy"); 10 U.S.C. § 906 (1994) (applying only "in time of war"). Because the United States has been engaged in an international armed conflict since the initial airstrikes in Afghanistan, these other provisions could well authorize trial by military commission for individuals violating their terms. In fact, the "aiding the enemy" provision arguably would have authorized the trial of the "American Taliban," John Walker Lindh, before a military commission.

17. By its terms, the Order purports to preclude habeas or other appellate review. The Order states:

[M]ilitary tribunals shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to offenses by the individual; and (2) the individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual's behalf, in (i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal.

Military Order, supra note 6, § 7(b). The Order also requires the submission of the trial record and any conviction "for review and final decision" by the President or Secretary of Defense. Id. § 4(c)(8). The administration has, however, subsequently made clear that the Order does not foreclose all habeas review. See Gonzales, supra note 15 (suggesting that the "[o]rder preserves judicial review in civilian courts. Under the order, anyone arrested, detained or tried in the United States by a military commission will be able to challenge the lawfulness of the commission's jurisdiction through a habeas corpus proceeding in a federal court.") (emphasis added). This carefully crafted analysis offered by the White House Counsel suggests that the Order contemplates habeas review as envisioned in Quirin, and as limited in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).

18. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1942) (holding that the Court retains habeas jurisdiction to review whether the petitioners were lawfully subjected to trial by military commission); see also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9 (1946) (stating that Congress "has not withdrawn [jurisdiction], and the [e]xecutive branch of the Government could not, unless there was suspension of the writ [of] ... habeas corpus"); id. at 30 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority "fortunately has taken the first and most important step toward insuring the supremacy of law and justice in the treatment of an enemy belligerent" by affording rights of habeas corpus and rejecting the "obnoxious doctrine asserted by the Government").

19. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24-25 (limiting the habeas inquiry, given the scope of congressional authorization, to the determination of whether the petitioners were charged with violations of the laws of war).
military action in Afghanistan—which is predicated on the claim that the September 11 attacks constituted or foretold subsequent “armed attacks” within the meaning of the U.N. Charter. More fundamentally, the issues addressed here go to whether the rule of law and legal institutions are to play any meaningful role in the otherwise highly militarized U.S. response to terrorism. Preserving some role for legal institutions might be critical in fashioning a durable transnational coalition against terrorism. Moreover, the “laws of war” provide a widely accepted normative and legal framework within which deep political divisions can be negotiated and reconciled.

Second, the applicability of the laws of war also implicates debates about the constitutionality of the President’s Order. For example, whether the Military Order exceeds the President’s constitutional authority turns, in part, on whether the Order is consistent with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). And, as previously discussed, the jurisdictional provision of the UCMJ invoked by the President contemplates only prosecutions under the laws of war. An understanding of important post-World War II developments in the laws of war might also inform the interpretation of earlier constitutional practice and doctrine. For example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Quirin predates the United Nations Charter, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the establishment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. That is, the Supreme Court’s most significant analysis of the constitutionality of military commissions preceded many of the century’s most important developments in the laws of war. Several of these developments might shed new light on Quirin. For instance, the applicability of the laws of war no longer requires a formal declaration of war—suggesting that Quirin’s application might not be limited to these circumstances. Also,
the Geneva Conventions and the development of international criminal law clarified the scope of "war crimes" by identifying a limited number of "grave breaches" of the laws of war—suggesting that the alleged wrongdoing in Quirin might no longer constitute a violation of the laws of war.29

Third, these issues implicate important debates about the scope and content of international humanitarian law. Despite remarkable progress in the definition and enforcement of humanitarian norms,30 critical areas of ambiguity persist in the laws of war.31 As discussed below, the extent to which international humanitarian law regulates internal strife and non-state actors is unclear.32 The September 11 attacks are, then, an important case study in the application of the laws of war to acts and actors traditionally considered beyond the scope of humanitarian law.33 The importance of these issues is accentuated because this is an extraordinary moment in the development of international humanitarian law. The violations of the norms governing internal armed conflict now serve as a basis for individual criminal liability in a number of fora including national courts,34 the ad hoc international criminal tribunals established by the U.N. Security Council,35 and the International Criminal Court.36

In this Article, I examine these issues by analyzing the triggering conditions and substantive reach of the laws of war. The central inquiry of this Article therefore is whether the September 11 attacks violated the laws of war;

29. "Grave breaches" are serious violations of the law of war committed against "protected persons" under the Geneva Conventions of 1949. See Geneva Convention I, supra note 27, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, supra note 27, art. 51; Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, art. 130; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 27, art. 147.
31. See infra Part III.
32. See infra Sections IV.A., IV.C.
33. See infra Parts IV, V.
34. See infra Section IV.C.
and, if so, whether these violations constitute war crimes. United States law—as reflected in Supreme Court precedent, the UCMJ, and the Military Order itself—authorizes military commissions to try individuals accused of violating the laws of war.\textsuperscript{37} While the September 11 attacks were unquestionably serious crimes under domestic and international law, many commentators maintain that they were not violations of the law of war.\textsuperscript{38} These views are

\textsuperscript{37} As previously discussed, military commission jurisdiction extends beyond law of war violations. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 904 (1994) (stating that military commissions may impose the death penalty for the crime of “aiding the enemy”); 10 U.S.C. § 906 (1994) (stating that military commissions may try the crime of spying during wartime); Military Order, supra note 6, § 1(c) (referring to the application of “other applicable laws by military tribunals”); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 9, at 257. None of these more specialized provisions, however, seems applicable to the events of September 11. See id.

\textsuperscript{38} See, e.g., Oversight of the Dept’ of Justice: Preserving our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Neal Katyal), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=126&wit_id=72 (“The question of whether a terrorist can even qualify as a belligerent or engage the machinery of the ‘laws of war’ is itself not clear.”); id. (“My concern with regard to the legal predicate for the application of the President’s military order is that violations of the law of war—what Michael Howard refers to as ‘the jus in bello’—do not occur within a vacuum; they must by definition occur within the context of a recognized state of armed conflict . . . . [W]ith regard to the attacks of September 11th, the principal event prompting our armed response is self-defense against Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda organization in Afghanistan[,] these are clearly acts of terrorism in violation of international law, but not necessarily violations of the law of war.”); Druml, supra note 20; Robinson O. Everett, The Law of War: Military Tribunals and the War on Terrorism, FED. LAWYER, Nov./Dec. 2001, at 20 (arguing that the acts constitute violations of the law of nations but not the laws of war); Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 345, 346-49 (2002); Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2001); Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc DoD Rules of Procedure, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 677, 685 (2002) (arguing that the “al Qaeda attacks on the United States on September 11 (before the international armed conflict in Afghanistan began) cannot be privileged belligerent acts but also cannot be prosecuted as war crimes because the United States and al Qaeda cannot be ‘at war’ under international law”); Alain Pellet, No, This Is Not War!, EUR. J. INT’L L. (2001), Forum, The Attack on the World Trade Center: Legal Responses, available at http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ny-pellet.html; Gary Hart, Sept. 11 Has Scrambled Our Concept of War, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 11, 2002, at A15 (“The already fragile distinction between war and crime disappeared last September. We are now trying to fight terrorism with traditional weapons of war. But terrorism is not war; it is crime on a mass scale.”); Michael Howard, What’s in a Name?, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2002, at 8; Marc Cogen, Terrorism and the Laws of War: September 11 and its Aftermath, The Crimes of War Project, at http://www.crimesoftware.org/expert/attack-cogen.html (Nov. 7, 2001) (arguing that terrorists are not combatants and thus not covered by the laws of armed conflict); Interights, Responding to September 11: The Framework of International Law, at http://www.interights.org/ about/Projects.asp (Oct. 2001); Michael Ratner, Crime Against Humanity and Not War, Speech at the NYC National Lawyers Guild Meeting, available at http://www.humanrightsnow.org (Oct. 3, 2001); Steven R. Ratner, Terrorism and the Laws of War: September 11 and its Aftermath, The Crimes of War Project, at http://www.crimesoftware.org/expert/attack-ratner.html (Sept. 21, 2001) (“The events of September 11 . . . might be viewed as an armed attack on the United States. International law does not use the term ‘war,’ since in the past that suggested the need for a declaration of war by one or both parties. The problem with calling it an armed attack is that traditionally that term has been defined as an act committed by a state or by state agents.”); Peter Spiro, Not War, Crimes, Findlaw Legal Commentaries, at http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/commentary/20010919_spiro.html (Sept. 19, 2001); David Turns, Terrorism and the Laws of War: September 11 and its Aftermath, The Crimes of War Project, at http://www.crimesoftware.org/expert/attack-turns.html (Sept. 28, 2001) (“Individuals or groups cannot be ‘at war’ with States, for the same reason that the September 11 attacks cannot be regarded as an ‘act of war’ in any legally meaningful sense. In the parlance of international law, ‘armed conflict’ requires two or more State belligerents, or a conflict within one State, but with a high threshold of intensity.”); Surya Narayan Sinha, Terrorism and the Laws of War: September 11 and its Aftermath, The Crimes of War Project, at http://www.crimesoftware.org/expert/attack-sinha.html (Nov. 7, 2001) (arguing that the acts are not governed by the laws of war unless attributable to a state).
certainly plausible in that the non-state actors carried out the attacks outside the context of formally declared hostilities. This view reflects the conventional wisdom that "war crimes" are typically committed by state actors in the context of formal, inter-state hostilities (or, at times, in civil wars). Unfortunately, debates about the applicability of the law of war in this context have centered on two types of questions: (1) whether the attacks are properly characterized as criminal acts or "acts of war"; and (2) whether terrorist acts as such come within the purview of the laws of war. Both questions obscure more than they reveal about the scope of international humanitarian law.39

I argue that the laws of war applicable in non-international armed conflict govern the September 11 attacks and that the attacks violated these laws. Specifically, I claim that the nature and quality of the attacks, as well as the reaction these hostilities prompted in international organizations and national governments, strongly suggest that the attacks initiated or confirmed the existence of an "armed conflict" between the United States and an organized armed group, al Qaeda. Furthermore, I maintain that the substantive provisions of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions bind the parties to this conflict and that violations of these rules constitute "war crimes." On this view, the September 11 attacks violated the laws of war irrespective of whether another state was involved and irrespective of whether terrorism as such is governed by these laws.

Given this analysis, the military commissions contemplated in the President's Military Order have subject matter jurisdiction over any individual accused of violating the dictates of Common Article 3—the provision of the Geneva Conventions covering non-international armed conflicts—in connection with the attacks of September 11.40 The analysis offered here suggests, however, that the Order must be construed narrowly so as not to cover "terrorism" in general. Moreover, the case for the Order's constitutionality is strongest if military commissions only try individuals

39. I use the terms "laws of war," "laws of armed conflict," and "international humanitarian law" interchangeably. The terms are synonymous subject to one qualification. See Roberts & Guelff, supra note 28, at 1 (stating that the term "laws of war" refers to the "rules governing the actual conduct of armed conflict"). "International humanitarian law" is arguably a broader concept that includes the crimes of "genocide" and "crimes against humanity." Note that the international criminal tribunals have subject matter jurisdiction over certain "serious violations of humanitarian law," including war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. See ICTY Statute, supra note 35, art. 1; ICTR Statute, supra note 35, art. 1.

40. See infra Subsection IV.A.4. A two-step analysis is required to determine whether the conduct at issue constitutes violations of the laws of war for which, under the laws of war, individuals may be prosecuted. See Jan E. Aldykiewicz & Geoffrey S. Corn, Authority To Court-Martial Non-U.S. Military Personnel for Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law Committed During Internal Armed Conflicts, 167 MIL. L. REV. 74 (2001) (analyzing language in Article 18 of the UCMJ which establishes court-martial jurisdiction for violations of the laws of war). Aldykiewicz and Corn explain the nature of the jurisdictional inquiry for violations of the laws of war:

As evident from this language, the grant of jurisdiction is not limited by the nationality of the accused, the nationality of the victim, the military status of the accused, the parties to the conflict in which the offense was committed, or the time when the offense was committed. The only requirements to trigger this grant of jurisdiction are that the act in question must be a violation of the law of war, and the law of war must provide for individual criminal responsibility for such a violation.

Id. at 81-82.
accused of war crimes. I also maintain that the characterization of the attacks as “war crimes” supports a number of prosecutorial options—both domestic and international.

III. THE POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE “LAWS OF WAR”

Do the laws of war govern the September 11 attacks? Did the attacks constitute “war crimes”? These questions are difficult because they touch upon complex legal problems involving deep conceptual ambiguities in international humanitarian law. First, it is unclear under what conditions the laws of war apply. This ambiguity arises from the combination of two related developments in the laws of war: (1) The laws of war now govern de facto as well as de jure warfare, and (2) the laws of war now govern internal as well as international armed conflict. Under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the laws of war apply to any “armed conflict” between states, irrespective of whether either state has formally declared war.® Additionally, the Geneva Conventions, in Article 3 common to the four conventions, explicitly regulate internal armed conflicts—that is, conflict between states and non-state armed groups.® Although the regulation of de facto warfare necessarily involves subjective, case-by-case assessments, these determinations have not proven difficult with respect to inter-state conflicts. In the context of internal conflicts, however, this ambiguous threshold of application has caused acute classification problems.® The central difficulty is determining the point at which an internal disturbance becomes an “armed conflict” within the meaning of international law.

Moreover, it is unclear whether individual criminal liability attaches to all violations of the laws of war. Because the laws of war now prescribe a detailed code of conduct, perhaps only serious violations of the laws of war are considered “war crimes.”® Prior to the conclusion of the Geneva Conventions, the major international humanitarian law treaties did not designate whether violation of any particular provision constituted criminal conduct under the laws of war. The Geneva Conventions substantially clarified matters by identifying a number of “grave breaches” of humanitarian law, the violation of which would subject individual actors to criminal liability.® These provisions, however, do not explicitly cover acts committed

---

41. See Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 2.
42. The provision is referred to as “Common Article 3” because the third article of each of the four Geneva Conventions is identical. See id. art. 3.
43. See id. (making clear that the provision applies to conflicts involving only one state). Because the provision applies to “each party” in a non-international armed conflict, it also governs conflict between two non-state armed groups. See id.
47. “Grave breaches” are serious violations of the law of war committed against “protected persons” under the Geneva Conventions of 1949. See Geneva Convention 1, supra note 27, art. 49;
in internal armed conflict. Nor do they govern the means and methods of waging war as such.

International and U.S. law suggest three potentially viable sources of individual criminal responsibility under the laws of war. 48 (1) "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions, 49 (2) serious violations of the Hague Conventions concerning the means and methods of warfare, 50 and (3) violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 51 Although the September 11 attacks violated many of the substantive prohibitions of these rules, 52 the character of the hostilities arguably places the attacks outside the field of application of these legal regimes. 53 In general, the laws of war are applicable only in the context of an international armed conflict—that is, an armed conflict between two or more nation states. 54 The full protections of the Geneva Conventions, for example, apply only to cases of "armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties." 55 The "grave breach" provisions of the Geneva Conventions, therefore, arguably apply only in the context of an "international armed conflict." 56 Similarly, the

---


49. See Geneva Convention I, supra note 27, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 27, art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 27, art. 146. See also Sandoz, supra note 45.

50. See, e.g., Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 1, annexed to Convention [No. IV] Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Regulations IV].

51. Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 3.

52. The September 11 attacks involved many transgressions of the substantive prohibitions of the laws of war. For example, the attacks targeted civilians and, in this way, clearly violated the substantive prohibitions of the grave breach provisions by killing "protected persons" under the Geneva Conventions, see, e.g., Geneva Convention IV, supra note 27, art. 146, the Hague Regulations by inflicting unnecessary death and suffering on the target population, Hague Regulations IV, supra note 50, art. 23, and Common Article 3 by purposely killing non-combatants. Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 3.

53. See infra Subsection III.A.4.


55. Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 2.

56. See DETTER, supra note 46, at 419-23.
Hague Conventions (and their annexed Regulations) are applicable only "in case of war between two or more of [the Contracting Powers]." Because there is no clear evidence establishing a sufficient nexus between al Qaeda and a foreign state (nor does the United States assert this claim), the attacks on September 11 did not initiate an "international armed conflict;" and therefore do not trigger the Geneva Conventions writ large or the Hague Conventions.

Absent proof that al Qaeda acted on behalf of a state or that a state has recognized al Qaeda as a "belligerent," the only potentially applicable body of law is the law of war governing internal armed conflicts. Principally embodied in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, these rules define the minimum humanitarian norms applicable in "armed conflicts not of an international character." Although a casual reading of the provision strongly

---

57. Hague Regulations IV, supra note 50, art. 2.
59. Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 2.
60. States are not strictly liable for wrongs emanating from their territory. See Sir Robert Jennings QC & Sir Arthur Watts QC, I OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 502-03 (9th ed. 1992). The actions of non-state actors may, nevertheless, be attributed to states if the state exercises "effective control" over the private actors. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), at paras. 86-93; Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A (Judgment on Appeal) (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber July 15, 1999), paras. 137-38 (adopting an "overall control" test); Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 8, at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/State_responsibility/responsibilityfra.htm (Nov. 2001), ("The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if: the person or group of persons is in fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements of authority."). Although the United States has repeatedly suggested that the Taliban "harbor" and "facilitate" al Qaeda, these assertions do not amount to the formal attribution of al Qaeda's acts to the Taliban. See Mark A. Drumbl, Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries in the International Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1, 38-44 (2002).
61. Traditionally, the international law doctrine of "recognition of belligerency" triggered the application of the laws of war in non-international armed conflicts. See infra text accompanying notes 78-86. In its classical formulation, this doctrine transformed an internal conflict into an international conflict if a state formally recognized the non-state group. See HERSCH LAUTERPACKT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 270-72 (1947). No state has, needless to say, recognized al Qaeda; and, moreover, any such recognition would arguably constitute an act of aggression against the United States.
62. Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 3.
suggests that it governs the September 11 attacks, several complications arise in the course of sustained analysis.

Indeed, many commentators have explicitly or implicitly argued that Common Article 3 does not cover such situations. Three types of criticisms predominate. First, the events of September 11 arguably did not occur in the context of an “armed conflict” within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions. Second, Common Article 3 arguably does not govern internal armed conflict between a foreign terrorist organization and a state. Third, Common Article 3, even if applicable, arguably does not impose individual criminal liability, and thus could not serve as the basis for prosecuting the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks.

Assuming that the United States cannot demonstrate that al Qaeda acted on behalf of Afghanistan (or any other state), might the law of war nevertheless prohibit the September 11 attacks? Although the laws of war unquestionably govern the conduct of hostilities in non-international armed conflicts to some extent, the central problem is whether this regime reaches the September 11 attacks. That the laws of war cover some instances of internal armed conflict is established and reflected in numerous positive sources of law including Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, the statutes of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals established by the U.N. Security Council, the Statute of the International Criminal Court, formal U.S. military policy, and U.S. legislation prohibiting war crimes.

The weight of legal authority strongly

63. See supra note 38 (collecting citations); infra Sections IV.A., IV.B.
64. See infra Subsection IV.C.2.
65. See infra Subsection IV.C.1.
66. Id.
70. See ICC Statute, supra note 36, art. 8.
71. See Dep't of Defense, Dir. 5100.77, DOD Law of War Program (Dec. 9, 1998). The directive states, in part: “The heads of the DOD Components shall: Ensure that the members of their Components comply with the law of war during all conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and with the principles and spirit of the law of war during all other operations.” Id. paras. 5.1, 5.3; see also Timothy P. Bulman, United States Law of War Obligations in Military Operations Other than War, 159 MIL. L. REV. 152 (1999).
suggests that the applicability of humanitarian law to internal conflicts is now customary international law.\(^\text{73}\)

Much of this law, however, is arguably inapplicable, as a formal matter, in criminal prosecutions brought by the U.S. government under the laws of war. Of course, some of these sources do not purport to regulate directly the conduct at issue.\(^\text{74}\) Moreover, some of the identified treaty law is not binding on the United States. The United States is not party to either of the Protocols to the Geneva Conventions,\(^\text{75}\) nor is it party to the Statute of the International Criminal Court.\(^\text{76}\) The United States is, of course, a party to the four Geneva Conventions, making Common Article 3 of these treaties an unassailable source of the laws of war applicable in the military commissions. Indeed, the U.S. War Crimes Act specifically authorizes federal criminal prosecutions of non-nationals for violations of Common Article 3.\(^\text{77}\)

Traditionally, the laws of war did not apply to non-international armed conflicts.\(^\text{78}\) Prior to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, no international agreements purported to regulate internal conflicts.\(^\text{79}\) That is, these conflicts, even when involving sustained, organized, and intense violence, were exclusively governed by domestic law.\(^\text{80}\) Indeed, any interference by another state in such matters would have been deemed an unlawful intrusion into the internal affairs of the state\(^\text{81}\) and might have been considered an “unfriendly act.”\(^\text{82}\) There was, in fact, only one exception to this “radical separation” between international and internal armed conflicts.\(^\text{83}\) Under customary international


\(^\text{74}.\) For example, the ICC Statute entered into force in July 2002, and, by its terms does not have retroactive effect. See ICC Statute, supra note 36. In addition, neither of the ad hoc tribunals would have jurisdiction over these acts since their jurisdiction is limited territorially. See ICTY Statute, supra note 35, art. 1; ICTR Statute, supra note 35, art. 1.


\(^\text{76}.\) The United States is not a party to the ICC treaty, nor is it likely to be. See David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 12 (1999) (outlining the Clinton Administration’s objections to the ICC Statute); Sarah B. Sewall et al., The United States and the International Criminal Court: An Overview, in The United States and the International Criminal Court: National Security and International Law 1 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000).


\(^\text{79}.\) See MOIR, supra note 44, at 19 (“Before the mid-twentieth century . . . no international agreement applied to anything other than purely international conflicts.”); see also G.L.A.D. DRAPER, THE RED CROSS CONVENTIONS 16-17 (1958); Georges Abi-Saab, Non-International Armed Conflicts, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 217 (1988).

\(^\text{80}.\) See MOIR, supra note 44, at 4 (“No international restraints on conduct were applicable, and the rebels had no rights or protection in international law.”); HEATHER A. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 23-24 (1988); Richard A Falk, Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal War, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE 185, 197 (James N. Rosenau ed., 1964)

\(^\text{81}.\) See, e.g., Abi-Saab, supra note 79, at 217.

\(^\text{82}.\) See, e.g., ERIK CASTRÉN, CIVIL WAR 176 (1966).

\(^\text{83}.\) Abi-Saab, supra note 79, at 217.
law, the laws of war governed internal conflicts only if an established state recognized the "belligerency" of the non-state armed group.\textsuperscript{84} This doctrine of "recognition of belligerency," however, applied to a narrow range of internal conflicts\textsuperscript{85} and was very rarely invoked.\textsuperscript{86}

Although states resisted any international regulation of internal strife,\textsuperscript{87} the sharp legal distinction between international and internal armed conflicts belied the humanitarian reality that internal conflicts were "no less frequent, brutal, or devastating" than international conflicts.\textsuperscript{88} Moreover, the normative foundations of the laws of war were shifting in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In this period, principles of humanity and concern for human rights assumed a fundamental role in the development of the laws of war.\textsuperscript{89} This "humanization of humanitarian law" made it increasingly difficult to justify the distinction between international and internal conflicts.\textsuperscript{90}

This regulatory gap nevertheless persisted until the end of World War II despite the considerable efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Institute of International Law (IIL) to draft and promote rules applicable in all armed conflicts.\textsuperscript{91} The atrocities perpetrated by the Nazi regime before and during World War II clearly demonstrated that internal matters presented grave threats to humanitarian principles.\textsuperscript{92} The Spanish Civil War, which broke out in 1936, also made clear that the "recognition of belligerency" doctrine inadequately regulated internal armed conflicts.\textsuperscript{93}

Against the backdrop of these events and the general humanitarian trajectory of the laws of war,\textsuperscript{94} broad support for some sort of international regulation of internal armed conflicts crystallized prior to the Diplomatic Conference in Geneva.\textsuperscript{95}

The remaining questions were: (1) which internal conflicts merited international protection, and (2) how much protection those conflicts warranted. The final text of Common Article 3 reflects the preferences of states on these two issues. Proper interpretation of the text and its drafting history requires analysis of the negotiations concerning each of these

\textsuperscript{84} See Moir, supra note 44, at 3-18.
\textsuperscript{86} Moir, supra note 44, at 14-21; James W. Garner, Recognition of Belligerency, 32 Am. J. Int'l. L. 106 (1938).
\textsuperscript{87} Moir, supra note 44, at 21.
\textsuperscript{88} Abi-Saab, supra note 79, at 217.
\textsuperscript{89} See generally Meron, supra note 46 (describing this trend in detail).
\textsuperscript{90} See, e.g., Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 Am. J. Int'l. L. 239 (2000).
\textsuperscript{91} See III Commentary on Geneva Convention 31-34 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter ICRC Commentary III]; Moir, supra note 44, at 19-22; Abi-Saab, supra note 79, at 218-20.
\textsuperscript{92} See, e.g., Ratner & Abrams, supra note 30, at 5-14 (describing the importance of these events for the development of international humanitarian law).
\textsuperscript{93} See Lauterpacht, supra note 61, at 270-74; Norman J. Padelford, International Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil Strife 18 (1939); Vernon A. O'Rourke, Recognition of Belligerency and the Spanish War, 31 Am. J. Int'l. L. 398 (1937).
\textsuperscript{94} See Meron, supra note 90.
\textsuperscript{95} See, e.g., Abi-Saab, supra note 79, at 219 (stating that prior to the drafting of the Geneva Conventions, "[i]t was strongly felt that a minimum of humanitarian legal regulations should apply in all armed conflicts, regardless of their internal or international character").
concerns. Proposals submitted to the Diplomatic Conference vary along both axes; as a consequence the rejected drafts of the provision have two moving parts: (1) the field of application (to which conflicts should the provision apply); and (2) the substantive obligations applicable within this field (what rules should apply in these conflicts).

The original draft of what would become Common Article 3, as proposed by the ICRC, would have made the entirety of the Geneva Conventions applicable to all internal armed conflicts. In fact, this version was proposed not as a discrete article but rather as the final paragraph of Common Article 2 (the provision defining the Conventions' scope of application). The original ICRC draft provided:

In all cases of armed conflict which are not of an international character, especially cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion, which may occur in the territory of one or more of the High Contracting Parties, the implementing of the principles of the present Convention shall be obligatory on each of the adversaries. The application of the Convention in these circumstances shall in no way depend on the legal status of the Parties to the conflict and shall have no effect on that status.

The Diplomatic Conference rejected this “maximalist” approach because it insufficiently protected the sovereign prerogatives of states. This approach, it was argued, “would amount to [a] mandatory and automatic recognition of belligerency.” States, it was clear, were unwilling to eliminate the legal distinction between internal and international conflicts altogether. Delegations proposed two types of alternatives to the initial ICRC draft.

One approach sought to limit the application of the provision to a very narrow range of conflicts, while retaining the broad substantive scope of the ICRC draft. On this view, the normative commitments of the Conventions should apply to internal conflicts that closely resembled inter-state conflicts (such as the Spanish Civil War). A second approach sought to apply a more limited set of substantive principles to a much broader range of conflicts. On this view, certain core principles of the Conventions should apply to all armed conflicts. In short, some proposals adopted the ICRC draft’s approach on applicable rules but made these rules applicable in only the most severe internal conflicts. Other proposals adopted the ICRC draft’s approach on scope of application but identified only a few core principles applicable in these conflicts.

96. See, e.g., ICRC COMMENTARY III, supra note 91, at 31; Abi-Saab, supra note 79, at 219.
97. ICRC COMMENTARY III, supra note 91, at 31.
98. Abi-Saab, supra note 79, at 220; see also ICRC COMMENTARY III, supra note 91, at 32-33.
99. Abi-Saab, supra note 79, at 220; see also ICRC COMMENTARY III, supra note 91, at 33.
100. There were other approaches, though these proposals did not receive significant support in the Conference. See IV COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION 31-33 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY IV].
101. See II-B FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, at 34-54 (1951) [hereinafter FINAL DIPLOMATIC RECORD OF 1949]; see also MOIR, supra note 44, at 21-31; Abi-Saab, supra note 79, at 218-21.
102. Id.
The Diplomatic Conference, in the final text of Common Article 3, adopted the latter approach. It provides:

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;  
(b) taking of hostages;  
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;  
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.

This provision, the "Convention within the Conventions" or the "Convention in miniature," establishes minimum humanitarian protections applicable in "armed conflicts not of an international character." It prohibits certain acts—including murder, torture, and inhuman treatment—directed against "persons taking no active part in hostilities." Although the protections are limited and described only in general terms, the prohibitions unquestionably capture much of the most heinous conduct that has characterized armed hostilities. The provision requires that parties collect

---

103. Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 3; ICRC COMMENTARY III, supra note 91, at 31-34.  
104. Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 3.  
105. Abi-Saab, supra note 79, at 221.  
106. Id. See also Gerald I.A.D. Draper, Humanitarian Law and Internal Armed Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 253, 264 (1983).  
107. Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 3.  
108. Therefore, in one sense Common Article 3 identifies a category of "protected persons." That is, the conceptual structure of the provision is similar to that of the Conventions as a whole (which establish an elaborate code protecting certain categories of "protected persons, such as "prisoners of war" and "civilians"). This similarity prompted the United States to suggest that the "grave breach" provisions of the Conventions, which criminalize certain acts directed against "persons protected by the Conventions," are also applicable to Common Article 3 violations. See Amicus Curiae Brief presented by the United States 26-36, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T (Motion Hearing) (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia July 25, 1995) (on file with author). Despite the textual plausibility of this view, both the drafting history of Common Article 3 and many commentators suggest otherwise. See generally MOIR, supra note 44, at 31-67.  
109. See, e.g., Tom Farer, Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflicts: Toward a Definition of
and provide care to the wounded and sick. It also provides for international supervision of internal conflicts. In addition, it is important to note that the provision does not purport to regulate, in any direct way, the means and methods of warfare; nor does it proscribe "terrorism" as such.

By its terms, Common Article 3 imposes these obligations on all parties to the conflict, including non-state armed groups. Although there is no meaningful dispute on this point, the legal rationale for imputing this obligation to non-state actors may imply other limits on the type of actors subject to the provision. The difficulty is in identifying an adequate legal basis for imposing obligations directly on actors not party to the treaty—indeed, actors without international legal personality. The prevailing view is that the treaty obligations of private armed groups are derivative of the state's treaty obligations. That is, the state's consent to the treaty regime binds all actors subject to the authority of the state. Although some commentators suggest that a state's acceptance of treaty obligations binds only its nationals, this limitation seems unwarranted. The "nationality principle" is, after all, but one ground upon which a state may exercise lawful authority over individuals or organizations. For example, states may exercise criminal jurisdiction over acts committed on its territory or directed against its nationals.

The text of Common Article 3 also makes clear that its applicability in no way affects the "legal status" of the parties to the conflict. That is, the application of the provision does not constitute, as a formal matter, "recognition of the belligerency" of the armed group. Moreover, the applicability of the provision does not confer on the non-state armed group "combatant" status. As a consequence, states may subject members of the armed group to domestic criminal prosecution for mere participation in hostilities, even if the conflict is conducted in accordance with the laws of war.

110. Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 3(2).
111. Id. art. 3(3).
112. Id. art. 3.
113. See MOIR, supra note 44, at 53-54.
114. See id. at 52-53.
115. For a summary of the debate, see id. at 52-58 (summarizing the debate).
116. See, e.g., id. at 53 (characterizing this view as the "legal justification most commonly advanced").
117. The nationality and "passive personality" principles are two examples of recognized jurisdictional doctrines. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(2), cmt. a (1987) ("International law recognizes links of... nationality, Subsection (2), as generally justifying the exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe."); id. cmt. g ("The passive personality principle asserts that a state may apply law—particularly criminal law—to an act committed outside its territory by a person not its national where the victim of the act was its national.").
118. Although Common Article 3 does not preclude such prosecutions, neither does it authorize them. As a consequence, any such prosecution would be brought under domestic law and not under the laws of war. This is an important point because it suggests that the law of war applicable in internal armed conflicts does not proscribe the very act of taking up arms against the state. Therefore, absent proof of an international armed conflict, al Qaeda terrorists could not be prosecuted under the laws of war for attacking the United States as "unlawful combatants." Whether the laws of war applicable in international armed conflicts classifies such conduct as a "war crime" is, in my view, an open question. The question is whether the Geneva Convention concerning Prisoners of War (and the grave breaches regime in general) supercedes or otherwise clarifies the "unlawful combatant" regime of the Hague
The September 11 attacks clearly violated the substantive provisions of Common Article 3. Although these provisions do not prohibit "terrorism" as such, many "terrorist acts" may also be classified as violations of Common Article 3. Common Article 3 therefore provides a potentially viable basis for characterizing the September 11 attacks as war crimes. The unresolved issues are: (1) whether Common Article 3 is applicable to the attacks, and (2) whether Common Article 3 establishes individual criminal liability for the perpetrators. In this Section, I address each of these issues. I will also address several common objections to the sort of expansive reading of Common Article 3 advanced here. One conceptual difficulty is how best to characterize these objections. Most of these objections either go to the nature of the conflict (the material field of application of Common Article 3), the status of the participants in the conflict (ratione personae), or the status of the provision itself in international criminal law (the legal consequences of prohibited conduct).

Objections to the applicability of Common Article 3 often conflate—or worse yet, confuse—these distinct issues. Moreover, many common assertions of law underspecify the grounds justifying the stated conclusion. For example, the claim is often advanced that non-state actors cannot commit violations of the laws of war. This claim is difficult to parse because it could derive in part from any of the following (demonstrably false) premises: (1) hostilities involving non-state actors do not constitute "armed conflict" within the meaning of the law of war; (2) non-state actors are not accountable as such under the law of war; or (3) non-state actors are not criminally liable under the law of war.

So as to minimize confusion, I will assess the case for Common Article 3 subject matter jurisdiction through a systematic examination of the elements of such a claim. I will, therefore, address potential objections as they pertain to the existence or non-existence of an essential element of the case for Common Article 3. I will not, for example, address in just one section of this paper the relevance of non-state actors or the absence of a "civil war." Because these issues arise in a number of contexts (in slightly different form and with varying degrees of plausibility), I will organize my remarks around the affirmative case for Common Article 3 subject matter jurisdiction and address relevant criticisms as necessary.

Toward this end, I will first discuss whether the necessary conditions for the application of Common Article 3 are present in this case. Thereafter, I will discuss whether the group responsible for the attack is the sort of organizational entity governed by Common Article 3. Finally, I will assess whether individuals committing violations of Common Article 3 are subject to individual criminal liability under prevailing international humanitarian law.

Conventions. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, art. 4.
IV. COMMON ARTICLE 3 AND SEPTEMBER 11

Two contextual requirements define the field of application of Common Article 3: (1) the existence of an armed conflict; and (2) this armed conflict is "not of an international character." Although it may appear that only the first of these issues merits sustained reflection (after all, one may suggest that armed conflict—once established—must be either "international" or "not international"), this is arguably an oversimplification. Several common objections to expansive interpretations of Common Article 3 should be addressed. For example, some evidence suggests that Common Article 3 applies only to civil wars. Furthermore, textual ambiguity in the provision raises some questions about whether it applies to transnational armed conflict.

A. The Existence of an "Armed Conflict"

The first issue is whether the September 11 attacks were the initiation of an "armed conflict" within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions. Clearly, the attacks do not fit neatly in prevailing conceptions of "war" or "armed conflict." The attacks were carried out by a transnational criminal organization that does not appear to act on behalf of any state. The attacks were sporadic and infrequent, even if intense and intricately planned. The armed group responsible for the attacks does not seek to administer or control any part of U.S. territory, nor have they articulated any specific political objectives (other than the "destruction of the United States").

The difficulty of classifying the attacks is made clear by organizing these considerations under important jurisdictional categories in humanitarian law. Because al Qaeda did not act on behalf of a state, the conflict was not an "international armed conflict" on September 11. Because al Qaeda neither controls nor seeks to control territory in the United States, the conflict is not a classical "internal" armed conflict. Moreover, because al Qaeda neither challenges the legitimate authority of the United States government within its territory nor suggests that the United States exercises illegitimate dominion over any other territory, the hostilities are not part of a "war of national liberation."

In addition to the conceptual complications, characterizing the hostilities as an "armed conflict" within the meaning of humanitarian law raises serious policy concerns. Ascribing "belligerent" or "combatant" status to al Qaeda might invest members of the group with certain rights and privileges under the laws of war. The "armed conflict" characterization might also symbolically aggrandize al Qaeda by suggesting that the United States considers the armed

119. Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 3.
120. See infra Subsection IV.B.1.
121. See infra Subsection IV.B.2.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
123. See generally CASTRÉN, supra note 82, at 38-78 (providing many examples).
124. See generally WILSON, supra note 80 (describing these hostilities and the law regulating them).
group much more than a sinister criminal organization. Finally, the “armed conflict” characterization might immunize al Qaeda members from prosecution for proportional attacks directed against military targets.

Because of these considerable complications, the attacks are not easily classified under either classical conceptions of “war” or contemporary conceptions of “armed conflict.” Nevertheless, the attacks do exhibit several characteristics of armed conflict including their purpose, coordination, and intensity. It is important to note that the complications encountered in this case are arguably endemic to the de facto classification regime of the Geneva Conventions.

There is, as yet, no settled definition of “armed conflict” in international law, and unguided case-by-case analysis has often produced unsatisfying results. These problems are most acute in the context of putative internal armed conflicts (or conflicts “not of an international character”) because internal unrest is commonplace and states resist the application of international humanitarian law in domestic matters. Indeed, the coherence of the “armed conflict” concept turns on the viability of the distinction between internal disturbances or insurrections and internal armed conflicts—the former being governed by domestic law (as conditioned by international human rights law) and the latter governed by the laws of war.

In this Part, I identify and analyze several factors bearing on the classification of hostilities between a state and an armed group. These factors include: the reactions of the parties to the hostilities; the international community’s reaction; the nature and quality of the hostilities; and the organizational characteristics of the armed group. Systematic application of these factors strongly supports classifying the September 11 attacks as the initiation of an “armed conflict.”

1. The Ambiguity of the “Armed Conflict” Threshold

By its terms, Geneva law is applicable in situations amounting to “armed conflict.” Common Article 2 provides that the Geneva Conventions are applicable in all cases of international armed conflict. Common Article 3 provides that in “armed conflicts not of an international character” each party to the conflict shall observe certain minimum standards. The laws of war, however, do not provide an authoritative definition of “armed conflict.” Substantial evidence suggests, in fact, that the drafters of the Geneva Conventions purposely avoided any rigid formulation that might limit the law’s field of application. In the context of Common Article 2, this

126. See id.
127. See, e.g., id.
128. See, e.g., MOIR, supra note 44, at 67-88.
129. See, e.g., MOIR, supra note 44, at 2-3.
130. Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 2.
131. Id. art. 3.
132. ICRC COMMENTARY III, supra note 91, at 31-33; MOIR, supra note 44, at 31-34.
133. ICRC COMMENTARY III, supra note 91, at 33-35; CASTRÉN, supra note 82, at 85 (“The Convention deliberately avoids defining a conflict devoid of international character, primarily because this could lead to restrictive interpretation.”).
Hostilities between states are, for the most part, governed by the laws of war irrespective of the intensity, duration, or scale of the conflict. The application of Common Article 3, on the other hand, has proven problematic.\(^1\)

Despite the textual similarity between the two provisions, divergent patterns of state practice and sound policy concerns necessitate reading the "armed conflict" requirement of Common Article 3 somewhat more stringently. Common Article 2 purports to regulate only conflicts between two or more entities with international legal personality—namely, states and, perhaps, "recognized belligerents." Common Article 3, on the other hand, purports to regulate conflicts between states and sub-state armed groups even if the conflict is confined to the territory of one state. Because Common Article 3 purports to regulate internal matters, the conditions of its applicability should be carefully construed to extend only to matters of international concern.

Of course, there is considerable legal authority establishing that the promotion and protection of fundamental human rights are always and everywhere matters of international concern. Moreover, there has been considerable convergence between the substance of international humanitarian law and international human rights law.\(^1\) Nevertheless, defining the threshold of applicability for the laws of war presents several unique concerns because international humanitarian law differs from human rights law in several important respects. First, the humanitarian ambitions of the laws of war are far more modest than those of international human rights law.\(^1\) That is, the laws of war aspire to protect humanitarian values within the context of organized hostilities typically involving intense and sustained violence. Unquestionably, human rights law has a much more ambitious regulatory agenda. Second, the laws of war directly regulate the conduct of non-state actors.\(^1\) Although substantial evidence suggests that human rights law is evolving to cover private conduct in some circumstances,\(^1\) current human rights treaties directly regulate state action.\(^1\) Third, serious violations of the laws of war give rise to individual criminal liability.\(^1\) And, finally, violations of the laws

\(^{134}\) ICRC COMMENTARY III, supra note 91, at 23.

\(^{135}\) See Bond, supra note 44, at 80-81; Moir, supra note 44, at 31; Abi-Saab, supra note 79, at 221; Draper, supra note 106, at 264.

\(^{136}\) See Meron, supra note 90, at 266-73.

\(^{137}\) See, e.g., Jean S. Pictet, Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims 14-15 (1975); Meron, supra note 90, at 266-73.

\(^{138}\) See, e.g., Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 3; Geneva Convention I, supra note 27, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 27, art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 27, art. 146; ICC Statute, supra note 36, art. 8.


\(^{141}\) See, e.g., Geneva Convention I, supra note 27, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 27, art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 27, art. 146; ICC Statute, supra note 36, art. 8.
of war come within the subject matter jurisdiction of special national\textsuperscript{143} and international tribunals.\textsuperscript{143}

The definition of "armed conflict" in Common Article 3, as the factual predicate for the operation of the laws of war in non-international hostilities, should both reflect the Geneva Conventions' humanitarian purposes \textit{and} respect the national sovereignty of states. Balancing these often competing objectives is necessary because the international regulation of internal armed conflict is both necessary and potentially problematic. An international regime is important because of the prevalence and intensity of internal armed conflicts.\textsuperscript{144} Indeed, the "evils of war" are now most often wrought in non-international hostilities.\textsuperscript{145} The humanitarian mission of the laws of war clearly requires the inclusion of internal armed conflict in its material field of application. An international regime is, nevertheless, potentially problematic because over-application of these rules may erode the sovereign right of each state to suppress internal disturbances and maintain public order.\textsuperscript{146} Recall that the applicability of the laws of war has important legal and political consequences, including: (1) direct international supervision;\textsuperscript{147} (2) symbolic designation of an armed opposition group as a "party" under international humanitarian law;\textsuperscript{148} (3) potential displacement of domestic criminal law;\textsuperscript{149} and (4) the triggering of international criminal jurisdiction\textsuperscript{150} (including perhaps "universal" criminal jurisdiction).\textsuperscript{151} The nature of the regime and the interests it protects makes under- and over-regulation normatively unattractive.

The question, however, remains: What conflicts does Common Article 3 cover? As previously discussed, the text of the provision provides little guidance. In fact, the ambiguity of the phrase has proven frustrating for international jurists. As one noted scholar remarked: "One of the most assured things that might be said about the words 'armed conflict not of an international character' is that no one can say with assurance precisely what meaning they were intended to convey."\textsuperscript{152} Indeed, the text is useful only in

\textsuperscript{142} See infra notes 295-296.
\textsuperscript{143} See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
\textsuperscript{144} MOIR, supra note 44, at 1-2.
\textsuperscript{145} See, e.g., id. at 1.
\textsuperscript{146} See, e.g., Draper, supra note 106.
\textsuperscript{147} The Geneva Conventions provide for international supervision even in the case of non-international conflict. See, e.g., Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 3 (providing for international supervision in internal armed conflicts). Moreover, serious violations of humanitarian law may trigger more intrusive Security Council action under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. See, e.g., ICTY Statute, supra note 35.
\textsuperscript{148} Common Article 3 does not formally alter the status of the Parties, but the political implications might be more pronounced. See, e.g., Castrén, supra note 82 at 176; Draper, supra note 106 at 263-72; Farer, supra note 109 at 39.
\textsuperscript{149} Lawful combatants may be charged only under the "laws of war" for their participation in the conflict. See, e.g., Allan Rosas, The Legal Status of Prisoners of War (1976) (summarizing "combatant immunity").
\textsuperscript{150} See, e.g., ICC Statute, supra note 36.
\textsuperscript{152} Farer, supra note 109, at 43.
that it identifies the type of conflicts it does not cover—identifying its field of application as "armed conflicts not of an international character."

Moreover, the drafting history of the Geneva Conventions makes clear that the "open texture" of the provision was purposeful. The Diplomatic Conference rejected several proposed definitions of "armed conflict" on the grounds that (1) precision would risk exclusion, and (2) under-specification would encourage application of the rules in questionable cases. That is, the absence of a definition of "armed conflict" would, it was thought, push the threshold of application lower for Common Article 3. In this way, the drafting history of Common Article 3 provides some evidence of the meaning of "armed conflict"—the textual ambiguity notwithstanding. The authoritative International Committee of the Red Cross Commentary to the Geneva Conventions reinforces this conclusion. Because of the provision's humanitarian purpose, the Commentary suggests that the scope of application of Common Article 3 must be as wide as possible. The Commentary concludes that the provision applies to all organized hostilities, excluding from its material field of application "mere act[s] of banditry or . . . unorganized and short-lived insurrection[s]."

These points clarify the general character of hostilities covered by Common Article 3, but the Commentary's interpretive propositions are themselves fraught with ambiguities. Nevertheless, the guiding principles of Common Article 3 inhere in these deceptively simple propositions. First, Common Article 3 covers hostilities that constitute a severe threat to humanitarian values. Warfare in the traditional sense constituted such a threat because it involved the organized protracted and intense application of force. Similarly, organized (as opposed to "unorganized") and protracted (as opposed to "short-lived") internal hostilities pose this sort of threat. This point justifies applying Common Article 3 "as wide[ly] as possible." Second, the Commentary's statements also imply that the state's sovereign authority to suppress internal violence is the principle limiting the application of Common Article 3. States may legitimately assert the right to regulate and suppress "mere acts of banditry" and low-intensity insurrections through domestic law enforcement procedures. These points suggest that Common Article 3 has a

153. Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 3 (emphasis added).
154. Moir, supra note 44, at 32.
155. CASTRÉN, supra note 82, at 85.
156. PICTET, supra note 137, at 16-17. In fact, the ICRC, drawing on the provision's ambiguity, would eventually argue that it is applicable in all cases of civil unrest. See id.
157. See id.
158. The ICRC Commentary is widely viewed as the informal legislative history of the Conventions. See, e.g., DEP'T OF ARMY, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S HUMANITARIAN LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at 4 (["The ICRC 'Commentaries' provide critical explanations of many treaty provisions, and are therefore similar to 'legislative history' in the domestic context."]); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 9, at 258 (acknowledging that the Commentary's interpretation of the Geneva Conventions is "authoritative").
159. I COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION 50 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY I].
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Moir, supra note 44, at 33.
162. ICRC COMMENTARY I, supra note 159, at 50.
broad, but limited, field of application—the precise contours of which require further explication.

2. Other Important Legal Developments in the Definition of Internal "Armed Conflict"

Subsequent legal developments have arguably clarified the definition of non-international "armed conflicts." Three important developments merit scrutiny: Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, the judgment of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case, and the statute establishing an International Criminal Court (ICC). Each of these developments arguably offers a more rigid conception of "armed conflict;" and, as a consequence, narrows Common Article 3's material field of application. After assessing each, I conclude that these developments, although important, do not narrow, or otherwise modify, the scope of application of Common Article 3.

a. Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions

Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, pertaining to internal armed conflict, arguably resolved much of the controversy surrounding the definition of armed conflict in Common Article 3. Because of clear deficiencies in the international legal machinery regulating internal armed conflict, the ICRC and many states party to the Geneva Conventions undertook efforts to "reaffirm and develop" the scope and substance of humanitarian law. These efforts culminated in two additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions. Protocol I expanded the definition of international armed conflict to include internal "wars of national liberation," and clarified many important substantive provisions of the Geneva Conventions. In an effort to "develop and

---

163. Protocol II, supra note 68.


165. ICC Statute, supra note 36.

166. The issue is not whether these developments, as a matter of customary international law, materially alter the Common Article 3 regime. Rather, the issue is whether these developments exhibit an emergent, widely-shared interpretation of the "armed conflict" requirement in international humanitarian law.

167. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, paras. 4359-4361 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY, PROTOCOL I]; Moir, supra note 44, at 89-90; see also ICRC COMMENTARY, PROTOCOL II, supra, para. 4361 ("Although common Article 3 lays down the fundamental principles of protection, difficulties of application have emerged in practice, and this brief set of rules has not always made it possible to deal adequately with urgent humanitarian needs.").

168. See generally WILSON, supra note 80 (describing these conflicts and the rules governing them). Article 1(1)(c) provides:

The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

Protocol I, supra note 67, art. 1(4).

supplement” Common Article 3. Protocol II expanded the rules applicable in internal armed conflicts. As previously mentioned, Protocol II also arguably clarified the meaning of internal “armed conflict” by providing a more developed definition of the concept in the treaty’s text.

On its terms, Protocol II is applicable to armed conflicts between forces of a High Contracting Party and other armed forces that are “under responsible command, [and] exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.” The scope of Protocol II is further clarified in Article 1(2), which provides: “This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.” Because Protocol II purports, on its face, to supplement Common Article 3 “without modifying its existing conditions of application,” the rigidly defined field of application in the Protocol arguably clarifies as a formal matter the situations in which Common Article 3 applies. In short, Protocol II arguably provides a positive, concrete definition of “armed conflict not of an international character.”

Although this view enjoys a surface plausibility, the best reading of Protocol II is that it has a much more narrow field of application than Common Article 3. The text of the two provisions, the drafting history of Protocol II, subsequent state practice, and the consensus of commentators


172. See Protocol II, supra note 68, art. 1.

173. Article I provides in full:

1. This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of application, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.

2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.”

Id.

174. Id. art. 1(2).

175. Id. art. 1(1).

176. Compare Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 3 (applying to all “armed conflicts not of an international character”), with Protocol II, supra note 68, art. 1 (limiting field of application sharply and implying that the provision applies to some subset of non-international armed conflicts). See also infra text accompanying notes 78-104 (detailing the drafting history of Common Article 3).

177. See, e.g., Bothe Commentary, supra note 171, at 622-29 (explaining that the Conference elected to draft an expanded body of rules and make these rules applicable to a more narrow range of conflicts).
support this conclusion. As a result of the two Protocols, the Geneva Conventions now recognize and regulate four distinct categories of armed conflict: inter-state armed conflict under Common Article 2; internal "wars of national liberation" as defined in Protocol I; "civil wars" proper as defined in Protocol II; and "armed conflicts not of an international character" under Common Article 3. Common Article 3, therefore, establishes the lowest threshold of application for the laws of war.

b. ICTY Judgment in Prosecutor v. Tadic (Appeal on Jurisdiction)

Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has arguably clarified the definition of "armed conflict" in international humanitarian law. Established to prosecute individuals for serious violations of humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, the ICTY has subject matter jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. In Prosecutor v. Tadic, the Tribunal's first case, the Appeals Chamber defined the contours of the "armed conflict" requirement within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions. Specifically, the Appeals Chamber held that:

"Armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal armed conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there."

Two aspects of this definition could be understood to represent important contributions to the definition of "armed conflict." First, the definition might be read to imply that an "armed conflict" exists only if the armed group

---

178. See MOIR, supra note 44, at 100-09 (explaining that states widely view Protocol II as establishing a higher threshold of application than Common Article 3).


181. ICTY Statute, supra note 35, arts. 2, 3.

182. Id. art. 5.

183. Id. art. 4.


186. The hostilities in the former Yugoslavia were difficult to classify in that they were at various times and in various places international and non-international in character. As a consequence, the ICTY was required, early in its case law, to address the "armed conflict" threshold. See Theodor Meron, Classification of Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua's Fallout, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 236 (1998).

187. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. at 54, para. 70.
exercises control over a portion of the state's territory. Second, the definition might be read to classify internal hostilities as an "armed conflict" only if the armed violence is "protracted." Both requirements would represent important restrictions on the conditions under which Common Article 3 applies. Although this definition has proven quite influential, a careful reading of the Tribunal's reasoning makes clear that it does not narrow the scope of Common Article 3's application.

First, the Tribunal's definition does not require that armed groups exercise control over territory within the state. The Tribunal defines the circumstances in which international humanitarian law applies by carefully parsing its general material field of application (all "armed conflicts"); territorial field of application (all territory affected); and temporal field of application (from the initiation to the cessation of hostilities). In defining the territorial field of application for internal armed conflicts, the Tribunal only makes clear that humanitarian law applies (1) even in territory no longer under the control of the state and (2) throughout such territory.

Second, the "protracted" armed violence requirement, properly understood, does not restrict the application of humanitarian law in any appreciable way. The nature of the finding contemplated by the ICTY Appeals Chamber suggests that most instances of internal strife would satisfy this requirement. Whether internal armed violence is "protracted" or not is assessed by reference to the entire period from the initiation to the cessation of hostilities. Few, if any, putative internal armed conflicts would fail to satisfy this requirement so conceived. In addition, the laws of war apply to all acts committed in an armed conflict even if committed prior to the point at which the "protracted" threshold was crossed. That is, the "protracted" requirement does not immunize acts committed in the early stages of an internal armed conflict. In short, the "protracted" armed violence requirement is best understood as little more than a restatement of the general rule excluding rebellion and "mere acts of banditry" from the scope of humanitarian law. Moreover, jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) suggests that armed violence extending over only a few months satisfies the "protracted" requirement and given the

---

188. See Moir, supra note 44, at 42-45.
189. Of course, in the case of hostilities between al Qaeda and the United States, the conflict began (at the latest) on September 11 and continues to the day of this writing. Clearly these hostilities involve "protracted" armed violence.
190. The jurisprudence of the ICTR is instructive on this point. The relevant "armed conflict" in Rwanda lasted a total of six months. Applying the ICTY definition, the tribunal held Common Article 3 applicable to the conflict, finding that the "armed conflict" existed from the initiation of the hostilities even if the existence of an armed conflict could only be discerned after the violence had become "protracted." See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, paras. 619-27 (Judgment) (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Trial Chamber II Sept. 2, 1998), available at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgment/akay001.htm.
191. Consider, as an illustration, the case of Rwanda. Assume, for the sake of argument, that the hostilities are "protracted" only if sustained for at least two months. On this reading of the requirement, the hostilities in Rwanda would qualify as "protracted." See id. This would not, however, mean that atrocities committed in the first two months of the hostilities were not "war crimes" because they took place outside the context of an "armed conflict." Id.
192. See ICRC COMMENTARY III, supra note 91, at 35.
intensity of the violence, it constitutes an “armed conflict” within the meaning of Common Article 3.\textsuperscript{193}

c. International Criminal Court Statute

The International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute also provides a more elaborate definition of internal “armed conflict” than Common Article 3. The ICC Statute identifies several acts as war crimes when committed in internal armed conflict. Specifically, the Statute criminalizes “serious violations of Common Article 3” committed in “armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.”\textsuperscript{194} The Statute also criminalizes a much broader range of conduct characterized as “[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework of international law.”\textsuperscript{195} The criminal prohibitions identified in this ambitious provision apply in:

\begin{quote}
{\textls[-100]\textsuperscript{193.} See, e.g., Akayesu, 37 I.L.M. 1399, supra note 69, paras. 619-27.  \\
\textsuperscript{194.} ICC Statute, supra note 36, art. 8(2)(d).  \\
\textsuperscript{195.} Id.  \\
\textsuperscript{196.} Id. art. 8(2)(f) (emphasis added).  \\
\textsuperscript{197.} Id. art. 8(2)(d).  \\
\textsuperscript{198.} Compare id. art. 8 (2)(d), with id. art. 8(2)(f).  \\
\textsuperscript{199.} Id. art. 8(2)(f).  \\
\textsuperscript{200.} To the contrary, as the previous analysis makes clear, the identified legal developments explicitly or implicitly adopt the general approach of the Geneva Conventions.}
\end{quote}
3. **Defining “Armed Conflict”: Identifying the Relevant Criteria**

Although delegations at the Diplomatic Conference rejected the idea of defining “armed conflict” in the text of Common Article 3, review of the *travaux preparatoires* reveals several criteria that states thought relevant to the classification of hostilities. The ICRC Commentary identifies a number of “convenient criteria” drawn from proposed definitions that were favorably received at the Diplomatic Conference:

1. That the Party in revolt against the *de jure* Government possesses an organized military force, an authority responsible for its acts, acting within a determinate territory and having the means of respecting and ensuring respect for the Convention.
2. That the legal Government is obliged to have recourse to the regular military forces against insurgents organized as military and in possession of a part of the national territory.
3. (a) That the *de jure* Government has recognized the insurgents as belligerents; or (b) That it has claimed for itself the rights of a belligerent; or (c) That it has accorded the insurgents recognition as belligerents for the purposes only of the present Convention; or (d) That the dispute has been admitted to the agenda of the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations as being a threat to international peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.
4. (a) That the insurgents have an organization purporting to have the characteristics of a State. (b) That the insurgent civil authority exercises *de facto* authority over persons within a determinate portion of the national territory. (c) That the armed forces act under the direction of an organized authority and are prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war. (d) That the insurgent civil authority agrees to be bound by the provisions of the Convention.

These criteria provide a useful, if not indispensable, general framework for evaluating the applicability of Common Article 3 to any given situation. Indeed, the Commentary’s criteria have been extraordinarily influential with courts and commentators. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, for example, relied in part upon the guidelines in determining that an internal “armed conflict” had existed in Rwanda. Moreover, many commentators emphasize the importance of these criteria in defining the scope of Common Article 3.

Although a useful starting point, the ICRC criteria are nevertheless arguably under-determinative. Because few cases of internal strife will satisfy each of the criteria, some analytic ordering as between the criteria is necessary. The Commentary, however, offers no methodology to guide the systematic application of these factors. Hard cases will (and do) present difficulty precisely because they do not exhibit all the classical characteristics of “armed conflict,” and it is in such cases that the criteria are, arguably, least

---

201. ICRC *COMMENTARY IV*, *supra* note 100, at 35.
202. *See* *FINAL DIPLOMATIC RECORD OF 1949*, *supra* note 101, at 121.
203. ICRC *COMMENTARY IV*, *supra* note 100, at 35-36.
helpful. If, for example, cases satisfy some criteria (or only one criterion) and not others, the ultimate classification of the hostilities turns on whether the ICRC criteria are understood as: (1) factors to balance in determining whether to classify the hostilities as an “armed conflict”; or (2) independently sufficient grounds to establish the existence of an “armed conflict.”

The source and nature of the criteria as well as the dual purposes they serve suggest a few important interpretive guidelines. First, the Commentary makes clear that the criteria are not exhaustive and that internal hostilities may constitute an “armed conflict” even if none of the criteria are satisfied. Second, the criteria do not purport to exclude any cases from application of the Article. Recall that the Diplomatic Conference elected not to define “armed conflict” and the ICRC criteria are extracted from rejected amendments to Common Article 3. These rejected amendments could not provide a legitimate basis for excluding any situation from the scope of the Article. Third, the criteria themselves are pitched in general terms and should be interpreted broadly. In short, the criteria are best understood as independently sufficient grounds to establish the existence of an “armed conflict.” Indeed, the drafting history of Common Article 3 supports this conclusion. The list of criteria closely tracks an influential amendment offered by the Australian delegation at the Diplomatic Conference. And this amendment plainly forwarded the criteria as alternative modes of establishing the existence of an armed conflict. In addition, the criteria loosely track situations in which the laws of war were potentially applicable in pre-Geneva Conventions law and practice. For example, prior to 1949, the laws of war were arguably applicable if a de jure state engaged in sustained hostilities with a de facto state, and the first and fourth criteria reflect this well-accepted view. The laws of war were also potentially applicable if a state recognized the non-state group as a belligerent, and the second and third criteria reflect aspects of this traditional view.

More fundamentally, the criteria—read with these points in mind—also clearly reflect the dual purposes of Common Article 3: the minimization of human suffering and the respect for state sovereignty. Some circumstances pose such substantial risks to humanitarian values that international regulation is justified irrespective of the resultant constraints on state autonomy. As a consequence, two important sets of considerations pertain to (1) the intensity of the violence; and (2) the capacity and willingness of the parties to carry out sustained, coordinated hostilities. In addition, concerns about state sovereignty are not significant in circumstances where the state itself accepts or invokes

206. See ICRC COMMENTARY III, supra note 91, at 30-34.
207. See, e.g., MOIR, supra note 44, at 35 (arguing that the criteria “are merely guidelines to assist in judging the existence of internal conflict, however, and may in fact set a far higher threshold of application than is actually required by the Article itself”).
208. ICRC COMMENTARY III, supra note 91, at 30-34.
209. See, e.g., Elder, at 41-54 (documenting the drafting history on the “armed conflict” threshold); Farer, supra note 109 (describing the drafting history, and suggesting that the delegates resisted all attempts to concretize the definition of armed conflict).
210. FINAL DIPLOMATIC RECORD OF 1949, supra note 101, at 40-44.
211. Id. at 43; Elder, supra note 209, at 43.
212. MOIR, supra note 44, at 14-17.
application of the laws of war. Therefore, another important set of criteria concerns the reaction of the state to the hostilities. In addition, the reaction of the international community straddles these categories, and, as a consequence, may provide evidence relevant to both sets of criteria.

**Table 1. Existence of an “Armed Conflict”: Humanitarian Concerns and State Sovereignty**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Humanitarian Costs/ Sovereignty Costs</th>
<th>High Intensity (organized, protracted)</th>
<th>Low Intensity (disorganized, short-lived)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Asserts Sovereign Prerogative; Denies Applicability of Humanitarian Law</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Accepts Applicability of Humanitarian Law</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cases of internal strife constitute “armed conflict” within the meaning of international humanitarian law if (1) the conditions pose an aggravated threat to core humanitarian values (an objective standard); or (2) the state party to the hostilities interprets them as an “armed conflict” (a subjective standard). These two circumstances are separate methods of establishing the existence of an “armed conflict.” Therefore, any situation satisfying the objective criteria constitutes an “armed conflict” irrespective of the views of the state party to the conflict. Likewise, any hostilities characterized by the state party as an “armed conflict” should be understood as such, irrespective of the objective conditions. There is, after all, no indication that Common Article 3 was drafted so as to enable international actors to second-guess a state’s classification of internal hostilities as an “armed conflict.” To the contrary, the Article was exhaustively debated and repeatedly revised because of disagreement about the conditions under which the laws of war apply to internal conflicts despite opposition from the state.213

---

213. The most important consideration defining the “armed conflict” threshold was state sovereignty. See, e.g., Bond, supra note 44, at 52-58; ICRC Commentary III, supra note 91, at 31-33; Moir, supra note 44, at 23-26.
TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF CRITERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggravated Threat to Core Humanitarian Values</th>
<th>Limited Infringement of State Sovereignty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Intensity of the hostilities</td>
<td>1. State recognition of armed group as a “belligerent”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Organizational capacity to engage in sustained hostilities</td>
<td>2. State invokes “rights of belligerency”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Intention to engage in sustained hostilities</td>
<td>3. State submits the matter to the UN Security Council for Chapter VII action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Third party state or states recognize the armed group as a “belligerent”</td>
<td>4. State otherwise asserts applicability of the laws of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Third party state or states recognize a state of belligerency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Application of the Factors to the September 11 Attacks

The systematic application of these factors to the September 11 attacks suggests that these acts constituted the initiation or confirmation of an “armed conflict.” The attacks were coordinated applications of force resulting in enormous property destruction and an astonishing loss of life. Al Qaeda, an armed group with the organizational capacity to engage in sustained hostilities on a global scale, carried out the attacks. Substantial evidence suggests that al Qaeda considered itself “at war,” and that the attacks were part of an extended, escalating military campaign against the United States. The United States characterized the attacks as an “armed attack” and as “acts of war,” and subsequently launched an international military campaign against al Qaeda and its supporters. Moreover, the international community condemned the attacks and recognized the United States’ inherent right to self-defense against such armed aggression. These factors, considered in light of the values underlying Common Article 3, justify classifying the hostilities as an “armed conflict” within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions.

a. Views of the State Party: U.S. Interpretation of the Attacks

The United States interprets the terrorist attacks as the initiation of an “armed conflict.” Although the President’s declaration of a “war on terrorism” is in many respects a rhetorical campaign reminiscent of the “war on drugs,” this analogy mischaracterizes the U.S. policy response to the attacks. The government’s unambiguous reaction to the events of September 11 indicates that the United States considered the attacks to be a serious military threat to the national security of the country.

During the attacks, the United States responded militarily by deploying attack aircraft to intercept and destroy, if necessary, hijacked civilian airliners.214 In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the Bush administration

214. See Bradley Graham, Military Alerted Before Attacks; Jets Didn’t Have Time to Intercept Hijackers, Officials Say, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2001, at A18 (explaining that NORAD deployed F-16 interceptor aircraft to defend the United States against an apparent air attack).
described them as "an act of war." The President also invoked his emergency powers by declaring a state of national emergency. The United States actively sought U.N. Security Council action on the matter and the Security Council passed multiple resolutions condemning the attacks and recognizing the "inherent right" to self-defense in the U.N. Charter. Congress subsequently authorized the President to use force against those responsible for the September 11 attacks. Pursuant to this authorization, the President deployed U.S. armed forces against al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. From this point, the conflict between the United States and Afghanistan (and al Qaeda) has been, without question, an "international armed conflict" in which the laws of war apply. Following the initiation of hostilities in Afghanistan, the United States formally invoked before the Security Council its right to self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. And the U.S. self-defense claim was predicated on its


217. See, e.g., Christopher S. Wren, U.S. Advises U.N. More Strikes Could Come, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2001, at B5 (summarizing efforts of the United States and Britain to persuade the U.N. that strikes were justified).


219. The Congressional Authorization provides in relevant part:

[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines, planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.


221. Some commentators have suggested that the United States is at war in Afghanistan, but not with Afghanistan. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 38, at 346-50. The argument is that the United States is not at war with the recognized government of Afghanistan; in fact, the U.S. is allied with the recognized government in its conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban regime. Irrespective of the descriptive accuracy of this claim, it does not render the Geneva Conventions inapplicable in the conflict in Afghanistan. Indeed, both the United States and the Taliban interpreted the conflict as an international armed conflict. See Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 2 (providing that the recognition of hostilities by one state party triggers application of the Conventions). Indeed, the United States formally invoked before the U.N. Security Council the right to act in self defense against the Taliban. See infra note 222. Moreover, the United States has indicated that it views the Geneva Conventions as applicable to its hostilities with the Taliban. See Katharine Q. Seelye, In Shift, Bush Says Geneva Rules Fit Taliban Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at A15 (summarizing the U.S. position).


In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I wish, on behalf of my government, to report that the United States of America, together with other states, has initiated actions in exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defense following the armed attacks that were carried out against the United States on September 11, 2001.

Id.
characterization of the September 11 attacks as “armed attacks” within the meaning of the Charter.  

b. Views of the Non-State Belligerent: Al Qaeda’s Intentions

Moreover, al Qaeda intended the attacks as “acts of war” against the United States. Long before September 11, the leadership of al Qaeda had declared a “holy war” on the United States. Osama bin Laden had issued multiple fatwah instructing Muslims to kill U.S. citizens. The September 11 attacks were also part of a pattern of escalating violence linked to al Qaeda and directed against U.S. military and civilian targets including: the 1993 attacks on the World Trade Center, the 1994 killings of eighteen U.S. military personnel in Somalia, the 1996 attack on the U.S. military barracks in Saudi Arabia, the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole.

c. Views of the International Community

The reaction of the international community further supports the finding that the September attacks initiated an “armed conflict.” Following September 11, several important inter-governmental organizations took steps that expressly or impliedly interpreted the attacks as “armed conflict.” The U.N. Security Council determined that the attacks constituted a threat to international peace and security, triggering its Chapter VII powers, and recognized the right of the United States to act in self-defense consistent with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Because the Charter requires an “armed attack” as the factual predicate for the lawful exercise of self-defense, the
Security Council's invocation of Article 51 necessarily implies that it classified the September 11 attacks as such.\(^{233}\) The references to Article 51 in Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 represent an important shift in Council practice concerning terrorist attacks.\(^{234}\) For example, the Security Council made no such finding in the aftermath of the 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa;\(^{235}\) even though the United States officially invoked Article 51 as the legal justification for missile strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan.\(^{236}\) Although the Security Council did not expressly authorize the use of force,\(^{237}\) Article 51 requires no such authorization for states to act in self-defense.\(^{238}\) Moreover, the reactions of states\(^{239}\) and the U.N. Secretary-General\(^{240}\) to the U.S. strikes strongly suggest that the resolutions implicitly authorized—or at least condoned—the use of force.\(^{241}\)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also formally interpreted the September 11 attacks as “armed attacks” directed against the United States. Upon determining that the attacks were directed from “abroad,” NATO invoked the collective self-defense provision of the alliance’s founding

---


\(^{234}\) The Security Council did not explicitly characterize the September 11 attacks as an “armed attack” (as required by Article 51), describing the events instead as a “terrorist attack.” See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 218; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 218. This ambiguity is arguably important in that the Council typically links its invocations of Article 51 with an express finding of an “armed attack.” See, e.g., S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2922d mtg., at 19, para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990) (affirming “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter”) (emphasis added). This textual ambiguity suggests that the Security Council was unsure how best to classify the September 11 attacks, but nevertheless held the view that they arguably came within the ambit of Article 51.

\(^{235}\) See S.C. Res. 1189, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3915th mtg. at 110, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1189 (2001) (condemning the “indiscriminate and outrageous acts of international terrorism that took place on 7 August 1998 in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania,” but limiting its statement to the reaffirmation that “every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territories directed towards the commission of these acts”).


\(^{237}\) Charney, supra note 223, at 835.


\(^{239}\) See, e.g., Siobhan Roth, A United Front?, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 15, 2001 (citing Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf that “[t]his is a resolution for war against terrorism”); Suzanne Daley, European Leaders Voice Support, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2001 (reporting on European leaders’ support for military operations in Afghanistan).


treaty.\textsuperscript{242} By its terms, the invocation of this provision presupposes an "armed attack" directed against an alliance member.\textsuperscript{243} NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson summarized the organization's findings:

We know that the individuals who carried out these attacks were part of the worldwide terrorist network of Al-Qaida, headed by Osama bin Laden and his key lieutenants and protected by the Taliban. On the basis of this briefing, it has now been determined that the attack against the United States on 11 September was directed from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack on one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.\textsuperscript{244}

Similarly, the Organization of American States (OAS) interpreted the attacks as acts of "armed attacks," recognized the inherent right of the United States to act in self-defense; and invoked the collective self-defense provision of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.\textsuperscript{245}

d. Nature and Quality of the Acts: The Systematicity and Intensity of the Attacks

The nature and quality of the attacks support the finding that they initiated or confirmed an "armed conflict." The attacks were extremely intense and highly coordinated. They were part of a series of serious attacks directed against U.S. targets.\textsuperscript{246} The September 11 attacks alone killed more than 3000 people,\textsuperscript{247} and caused billions of dollars in economic damage.\textsuperscript{248} It is important to note that the ICRC Commentary to Common Article 3 provides only one concrete example of activities not amounting to "armed conflict": a handful of individuals rebel against the state and attack a police station.\textsuperscript{249} The intensity, coordination, and pattern of al Qaeda attacks against the United States make clear that the September 11 attacks were not simply "mere acts of banditry."\textsuperscript{250}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[243] See North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246 (referring to "an armed attack" against one or more of the members).
\item[246] See supra text accompanying notes 226-31 (listing previous attacks against the United States attributed to al Qaeda).
\item[249] ICRC COMMENTARY III, supra note 91, at 32.
\item[250] Id. at 35.
\end{footnotes}
e. **Nature of the Actors: The Organizational Characteristics of Al Qaeda**

Moreover, the organizational characteristics of al Qaeda suggest that the attacks amounted to an "armed conflict." Al Qaeda is a highly organized, well-funded entity with operational units in dozens of countries. As previously discussed, the September 11 attacks involved the coordinated application of force, and demonstrated al Qaeda's capacity to project force globally (even against sensitive military and diplomatic targets). Clearly, the organizational capacity of al Qaeda distinguishes it from "mere bandits." Indeed, al Qaeda unquestionably possessed the de facto capability to conduct sustained armed hostilities against the United States.

---

In short, application of the previously identified criteria demonstrates that the September 11 attacks constituted the initiation of an "armed conflict" within the meaning of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The scale and systematicity of the hostilities as well as the subjective assessments of the relevant actors support this conclusion. The attacks involved the coordinated application of lethal force by an organization with the capacity to engage in sustained, global hostilities. Moreover, the attacks themselves produced nothing short of a humanitarian disaster. In addition, the relevant parties to the conflict interpreted the hostilities as an "armed conflict." Al Qaeda intended the attacks as "acts of war"; the United States interpreted the attacks as an "armed attack" initiating an "armed conflict"; and the U.S. interpretation was endorsed by the U.N. Security Council, NATO, and the OAS.

B. "Not of an International Character"

By its terms, Common Article 3 applies to "armed conflicts not of an international character." This qualification of the armed conflict requirement suggests that the provision governs only a limited range of armed conflicts. Three interpretations of the provision find some support in its text, structure, and history. The plain meaning of the text suggests that the provision covers all armed conflicts not involving two or more states. The legislative history of the provision, on the other hand, provides some evidence that it applies only to "civil wars" proper. Moreover, some evidence suggests

---

251. See generally ALEXANDER & SWETNAM, supra note 228; BERGEN, supra note 224.
255. ICRC COMMENTARY III, supra note 91, at 35.
256. See BERGEN, supra note 224, at 195-235.
257. Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 3 (emphasis added).
258. See, e.g., BOND, supra note 44, at 56; Farer, supra note 109, at 44.
that the provision governs only those "armed conflicts" confined to the territory of one state. After assessing the viability of each view, I conclude that the best reading of Common Article 3 is that it applies to all armed conflicts not covered by Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions.

1. Applicable only in "Civil Wars"

Some evidence suggests that Common Article 3 was originally intended to apply only to "civil wars" proper. In its most robust form, this claim implies that Common Article 3 regulates only those internal armed conflicts that very closely resemble inter-state armed conflicts. On this view, therefore, Common Article 3 applies to a very narrow range of "armed conflicts." This interpretation is endorsed by many commentators, and finds some support in the drafting history of the provision. Indeed, the debates at the Diplomatic Conference concerning Common Article 3 are replete with references to "civil wars." Moreover, it was the atrocities of the Spanish Civil War that crystallized support for a formalized international regime regulating internal hostilities.

This view, however, does not withstand close scrutiny. First, the wording of the provision does not support this interpretation. Recall that the Diplomatic Conference eschewed all proposals to define more specifically the provision's material field of application. The Conference rejected a proposal by the U.S. delegation that would have established a similar threshold. Second, this restrictive reading frustrates the general purposes of the provision. The analysis of the "armed conflict" requirement in the previous Section strongly suggests that the material field of application of Common Article 3 should be construed more broadly. Third, a systematic reading of the provision's drafting history indicates that its field of application is not so

---

259. See, e.g., MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 619-27 (1959) (suggesting that Common Article 3 applies only to "insurgents" and "belligerents"); Jordan J. Paust, Addendum: War and Responses to Terrorism, ASIL INSIGHTS, at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm#addendum2 (Sept. 2001) (arguing that Common Article 3 applies only if the non-state armed group constitutes an "insurgency"); see also MOIR, supra note 44, at 17 ("Civil war is, after all, the very situation in which the struggle has attained such proportions as to make both parties analogous to belligerents in the international law sense.").

260. See, e.g., GREENSPAN, supra note 259; Paust, supra note 259; RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 30, at 95-97 (suggesting that provision applies in civil and colonial wars); Steven Ratner, International vs. Internal Armed Conflict, in CRIMES OF WAR 206 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff eds., 1999); Steven Ratner, Common Article 3, in CRIMES OF WAR, supra, at 207; L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (2d ed. 2000); KEITH SUTER, AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF GUERILLA WARFARE: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF LAW-MAKING 16 (1984); Bond, supra note 44, at 57-58.

261. Many of the factors considered relevant to classifying conflict suggest that the conference had in mind conflicts similar to classical civil wars. See supra text accompanying notes 202-205. See also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 9, at 258 (suggesting that Common Article 3 was designed primarily to address civil wars).

262. See, e.g., Final Diplomatic Record of 1949, supra note 101, at 53-94.

263. See, e.g., DRAPER, supra note 79, at 83; MOIR, supra note 44, at 18-21.

264. The United States' proposal emphasized several essential ingredients including the following: the insurgents must have an organization "purporting to have the characteristics of a State;" the insurgent civil authority must exercise de facto authority over person within a determinate territory; the armed forces must act under the direction of the organized civil authority and must be prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war; and the insurgent civil authority must agree to be bound by the provisions of the Convention. Final Diplomatic Record of 1949, supra note 101, at 121.
limited. The Diplomatic Conference specifically rejected a draft of the article that would have limited its application to civil wars. Specifically, the Conference rejected proposals that would have extended the full protections of the Conventions to a limited range of internal armed conflicts in favor of the final formulation that extends a limited range of protections to all internal armed conflicts.265 Finally, it is difficult to determine with any precision the meaning of casual or unexplained references to “civil war” in the Diplomatic Conference. The academic and policy literatures recognize many formal definitions of “civil war.”266 And many of these definitions equate, implicitly or explicitly, “civil wars” with any form of non-international armed conflict.267

2. Applicable Only in Conflicts Wholly Confined to the Territory of One State

Another interpretation suggests that Common Article 3 applies only to armed conflicts within the territory of one state.268 On this view, the “not of an international character” limitation renders the provision inapplicable to all armed conflicts with international or transnational dimensions. This interpretation draws on much of the same evidence supporting the “civil wars” interpretation previously discussed. That is, substantial evidence suggests that the drafters of the provision envisioned its application only in truly internal conflicts.269 In addition, the full text of the provision offers some support for this reading—the Article covers only cases of “armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”270

Despite its textual plausibility, this reading of the provision is problematic. First, this interpretation would create an inexplicable regulatory gap in the Geneva Conventions. On this reading, the Conventions would cover international armed conflicts proper and wholly internal armed conflicts, but would not cover armed conflicts between a state and a foreign-based (or transnational) armed group or an internal armed conflict that spills over an

265. The ICRC Draft included an additional paragraph in Common Article 2 that would have made the entire Conventions applicable to “civil wars,” but the draft was rejected in favor of a draft with much more modest substantive commitments and a much lower threshold of application. See ICRC COMMENTARY III, supra note 91, at 32-34.
266. See Stathis N. Kalyvas, “New” and “Old” Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?, WORLD POLITICS, Oct. 2001, at 99 (surveying current debates); CASTRÉN, supra note 82, at 26-36 (canvassing various definitions).
267. See, e.g., RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 30, at 97 (suggesting that the relevant distinction is between civil wars and internal strife that does not amount to conflict).
268. According to this interpretation, for example, 
[i]f state control is not established, the question arises whether this is an ‘internal’ conflict between governmental authorities and groups within a state. If, in the circumstances, the conflict is not considered to emanate from groups ‘within a state’ (and not therefore to amount to an ‘internal’ conflict), it may be that the events of September 11 highlight a new hybrid type of armed conflict—between organised groups and foreign States. The law governing such a scenario is unsettled. Interights, International Rights and September 11, at IV(a) (Oct. 2001), at http://www.interights.org/about/Sept%2011%20Parts%201-IV.htm (emphasis added).
269. See supra note 38 (collecting sources).
270. Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, Common Article 3, para. 1 (emphasis added).
international border into the territory of another state. There is no principled
(or pragmatic) rationale for this regulatory gap. Furthermore, ICTY jurisprudence implicitly rejects this interpretation by concluding that the
armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia included both internal and international aspects—and that the applicable humanitarian law varied
accordingly.\textsuperscript{271} Finally, this reading of the provision misconstrues the
considerations that limit the application of Common Article 3. As previously
discussed, Common Article 3 was revolutionary because it purported to
regulate wholly internal matters as a matter of international humanitarian law.
If the provision governs wholly internal conflicts, as the "one state"
interpretation recognizes, then the provision applies \textit{a fortiori} to armed
conflicts with international or transnational dimensions. The language of the
 provision limiting its application to the "territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties" serves another, more subtle purpose—specifically, to
make clear that application of the provision requires a nexus to the jurisdiction
of a state party to the treaty.

3. \textit{Applicable in All "Armed Conflicts"}

Based on the foregoing analysis, the reading of the provision most
faithful to its purpose and text is that Common Article 3 applies, as a formal
matter, to all "armed conflicts" not covered by Common Article 2—the
 provision defining international armed conflict within the meaning of the
Geneva Conventions. Moreover, as a practical matter, the provision governs
all "armed conflicts" in the sense that \textit{international} armed conflicts trigger
protections equal to, and in most areas greater than, those accorded by
Common Article 3. Therefore, because armed conflicts are either international
or "not of an international character," the minimum humanitarian protections
recognized in Common Article 3 extend to all armed conflicts. Of course, the
classification question is an important one in that the full scope of Geneva and
Hague law applies to "international armed conflicts" including the "grave
breaches" regime criminalizing serious violations of the laws of war.
Nevertheless, the important point is that armed conflicts crossing the "upper
threshold" of Common Article 3 do not fall outside the purview of the laws of
war. To the contrary, such conflicts are subject to a more robust international
legal regime.

\* \* \* \* \* \* \*

The September 11 attacks, if properly characterized as the initiation or
confirmation of an "armed conflict" within the meaning of the Geneva
Conventions, come within the material field of application of Common Article
3.\textsuperscript{272}

\textsuperscript{271} Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR72 (Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber Oct. 2,

\textsuperscript{272} Moreover, irrespective of the applicability of Common Article 3, the acts in question
arguably violated the laws of war in another respect so long as the September 11 attacks constituted an
C. Individual Criminal Responsibility and Common Article 3

The analysis thus far suggests only that the September 11 attacks contravened the substantive terms of Common Article 3; and, as a consequence, the “laws of war.” Because arguably not all violations of the laws of war constitute “war crimes,” an important question is whether violations of Common Article 3 may, under the laws of war, serve as the basis for individual criminal liability.

Do violations of Common Article 3 constitute “war crimes?” Until recently, the weight of authority suggested not. Indeed, substantial evidence supports the view that violations of Common Article 3, unlike other serious violations of humanitarian law, are not war crimes. The Geneva Conventions established a specific framework for the prevention and punishment of “grave breaches” of international humanitarian law, but this regime does not cover violations of Common Article 3. In fact, Common Article 3 includes no specific provision establishing individual criminal liability for violations of its substantive prohibitions. Interestingly, there is no analogue to the “grave breaches” regime in Protocol II either.

The text of Common Article 3, however, does not preclude the imposition of individual criminal liability; and, indeed, the wording of the provision suggests that it regulates the conduct of individuals. For example, the specific prohibitions of Common Article 3 reference the acts of armed conflict within the meaning of humanitarian law. Although “crimes against humanity” as currently defined in international humanitarian law are not violations of the laws of war, “crimes against humanity” committed in the context of and with a sufficient nexus to an “armed conflict” are arguably violations of the laws of war. See, e.g., Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff, Introduction, in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 28, at 1-2; ICRC COMMENTARY III, supra note 91, at art. 85 §2(b); ICTY Statute, supra note 35 (including crimes against humanity as a “serious violation” of humanitarian law). The elements of “crimes against humanity” no longer include a nexus with an armed conflict. See, e.g., ICC Statute, supra note 36; M. Cherif Bassiouni, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2d ed. 1999).


275. See Geneva Convention I, supra note 27, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 27, art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 27, art. 146.

276. See, e.g., Tom Graditzky, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 322 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 29 (1998). Graditzky explains the reticence of states to extend the scope of the grave breaches regime to internal conflicts:

In 1949, it was generally considered that an extension of the system of grave breaches to cover internal conflicts would be viewed as an unacceptable encroachment on State sovereignty. When the Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions were adopted, on 8 June 1977, States had not changed their stance in this respect. Furthermore, newly independent countries feared that their new partners would take advantage of any potential opening provided by the adoption of Protocol II (relating to non-international armed conflicts) to justify excessive interest in their internal affairs.

277. Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 3.

278. See Protocol II, supra note 68.

279. Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 3.
individuals; and the Geneva Conventions generally obligate states to "ensure respect" for the provisions of humanitarian law (including the law governing internal armed conflicts). Moreover, violations of humanitarian law may, as a conceptual matter, constitute "war crimes" even if they do not constitute "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions. Review of several recent developments in international criminal law make clear that violations of Common Article 3 are war crimes.

There is no question that U.S. law classifies violations of Common Article 3 as war crimes. The War Crimes Act was amended in 1997 to cover expressly all violations of Common Article 3. Every U.S. court to consider the issue has also classified violations of Common Article 3 as "serious violations of international law" and "war crimes." This view is also clearly endorsed in U.S. military law and policy. Moreover, the United States has, as a formal matter, vigorously advocated this view before the United Nations and in an amicus brief submitted to the ICTY.

In addition, several important developments in international humanitarian law confirm that violations of Common Article 3 are "war crimes." For example, the ICC Statute, perhaps the most authoritative expression of the current state of humanitarian law, specifically criminalizes violations of Common Article 3. The ICTR Statute also imposes individual

---

280. Id.
281. Id. art. 1.
282. The "grave breach" regime does not purport to exhaust the category of "war crime." The penal regime of the Geneva Conventions makes clear that "simple breaches" of the Conventions may also constitute war crimes. See, e.g., Geneva Convention IV, supra note 27, arts. 146-48.
283. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000) (amended in 1997 to replace the term "grave breaches" with "war crimes" and to include violations of Common Article 3 within the definition of war crimes). As initially passed, the War Crimes Act did not apply to crimes committed in internal armed conflicts and was limited in scope to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The 1997 amendments expanded the scope of the Act to violations of Hague Regulation IV, Articles 23, 25, 27 and 28; violations of Common Article 3 applicable to internal armed conflicts; and willful killing or causing serious injury to persons "in relation to an armed conflict and contrary to the provisions of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices... when the United States is a party to such Protocol." Id.
286. The United States has argued: The United States strongly believes that serious violations of the elementary customary norms reflected in common Article 3 [should be included in the ICC's jurisdiction]... It is good international law, and good policy, to make serious violations of at least some fundamental rules pertaining to the conduct of hostilities in non-international armed conflicts a part of the ICC jurisdiction.
288. ICC Statute, supra note 36, art. 8. Articles 8(2)(c) and 8(2)(e) of the ICC Statute cover Common Article 3 and Article 4 of Protocol II, respectively. Article 8(c) explicitly references Common Article 3 and its prohibitions, whereas Article 8(e) addresses Protocol II, Article 4, and its prohibitions by implication. All acts prohibited in Common Article 3(1) and Protocol II, Articles 4(1) and 4(2), are
criminal liability for serious violations of the provision.\textsuperscript{289} And although the ICTY Statute does not expressly cover violations of Common Article 3,\textsuperscript{290} the tribunal held that the statute’s provision concerning “other serious violations of the laws and customs of war” necessarily included violations of Common Article 3.\textsuperscript{291} Finally, the criminal law\textsuperscript{292} and military manuals\textsuperscript{293} of many other states recognize violations of Common Article 3 as war crimes. Few propositions of law enjoy such support.

\textsuperscript{289} ICTR Statute, \textit{supra} note 35, art. 4.
\textsuperscript{290} ICTY Statute, \textit{supra} note 35, art. 3.
\textsuperscript{292} \textit{See} Graditzky, \textit{supra} note 276 (collecting and discussing the criminal laws of a number of nations).
\textsuperscript{293} \textit{See id.} (collecting and discussing military manuals and handbooks from a number of nations).
TABLE 3. TYPOLOGY OF ARMED CONFLICTS
AND APPLICABLE CRIMINAL LAW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Armed Conflict</th>
<th>Material field of Application</th>
<th>Applicable Substantive Law</th>
<th>Source of Criminal Liability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geneva Convention (GC) Common Article 2: International Armed Conflict</td>
<td>(1) Armed conflicts between two or more states party to GC; and (2) Armed conflicts between a state and a “recognized belligerent.”</td>
<td>(1) “Grave breaches”; GC I-IV; and (2) Common Article 3</td>
<td>Conventional: Grave Breaches provisions in GC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Protocol (AP) I: Wars of National Liberation</td>
<td>(1) International armed conflicts; and (2) Armed conflicts in which “peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination.”</td>
<td>(1) “Grave Breaches”; GC I-IV; (2) AP I; and (3) Common Article 3</td>
<td>Conventional: Grave Breaches provisions in GC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Protocol II: Civil Wars</td>
<td>Internal armed conflicts between a state and “organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.”</td>
<td>(1) AP II; and (2) Common Article 3</td>
<td>(1) Domestic Law (2) Customary International Law</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. CONCLUSION: THE LAWS OF WAR AND COUNTER-TERRORISM

As discussed in Part II, the characterization of the September 11 attacks as violations of the laws of war has important consequences for debates about the scope and validity of the contemplated military commissions, the viability of other prosecutorial options, the legality of the U.S. military response to the attacks, and perhaps most importantly, whether international humanitarian law might play a meaningful role in the emerging global antiterrorism regime.

Nevertheless, many commentators have resisted the “war crimes” characterization. Because the September 11 attacks were, without question, criminal irrespective of whether they are characterized as war crimes, the usefulness of the characterization is unclear. Unfortunately, debates about how best to characterize the attacks have been unnecessarily tethered to collateral issues. More specifically, the “war crimes” characterization arguably (1) legitimizes the U.S. decision to use military force against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan; and (2) strengthens the case for the validity (constitutional and statutory) of military commissions. The legality of
Operation Enduring Freedom (under international law) turns in part on whether the September 11 attacks constituted "armed attacks." And the validity of U.S. military commissions turns in part on whether the attacks constituted "war crimes." To be sure, both claims have some merit. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to disaggregate these three discrete issues—the "war crimes" question, the "use of force" question, and the "military commissions" question.

The "war crimes" characterization, although important to any proper analysis of the other two questions does not settle them—in other words, it is under-determinative. First consider the "military commissions" question. Although U.S. law arguably authorizes the use of military commissions to try individuals for "violations of the laws of war," the "war crimes" characterization does not necessitate trials by military commission. Indeed, "war crimes" prosecutions could be initiated in a number of fora including U.S. federal courts and courts-martial. Moreover, the proposed commissions may be unlawful even if they have subject matter and personal jurisdiction. For instance, the commissions may fail to satisfy the minimum procedural rights guarantees established in international human rights law (and the laws of war). And, as a matter of domestic law, the President may lack the authority to establish military commissions absent a formal declaration of war by the Congress. In addition, the Military Order providing for commissions may, on its face, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and it may well offend several fundamental rules of constitutional criminal procedure.

Next consider the "use of force" issue. The "war crimes" characterization—in that it presupposes a finding of "armed conflict"—clearly supports the U.S. claim of self-defense. A valid self-defense claim, however, requires more. For instance, to justify the use of force against

294. See supra Part II.
295. The War Crimes Act provides district courts with jurisdiction to try persons for war crimes, if the perpetrator or the victim is a U.S. national or a member of the armed forces of the United States. It is also important to note that the Act defines war crimes in terms of international humanitarian law, and specifically makes clear that any conduct constituting a violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is a war crime. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000). Interestingly, the legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress did not intend to deprive military commissions or courts-martial of jurisdiction under the laws of war. Congress reiterated this intention to preserve "law of war" jurisdiction for military commissions when extending the jurisdiction of the UCMJ in 2000. See Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C § 3261(c) (2000).
296. The UCMJ authorizes trial by courts-martial of non-U.S. military personnel in only two circumstances: (1) the individual allegedly violated the laws of war; and (2) the accused is subject to the authority of the United States under the laws of belligerent occupation. See 10 U.S.C. § 821 (1994); Jan E. Aldykiewicz & Geoffrey S. Corn, Authority to Court-Martial Non-U.S. Military Personnel for Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Armed Conflicts, 167 MIL. L. REV. 74, 94 (2001) ("offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions" include non-U.S. military combatants).
297. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 38; see also Derek Jinks, International Human Rights Law and the War on Terrorism, DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL. (forthcoming 2002) (summarizing these protections).
298. See Cerone, supra note 4 (summarizing these procedural guarantees).
299. See, e.g., Katyal & Tribe, supra note 9, at 1266-77.
300. See, e.g., id. at 1298-1303.
301. See, e.g., id. at 1304-08.
302. See supra Subsection IV.A.4.c; see also supra text accompanying note 21.
another sovereign state, the U.S. had to demonstrate that the state in question knowingly harbored those responsible for the attacks. In addition, the force deployed must have been proportionate to, and immediately necessary to meet, the threat.

The applicability of the laws of war follows from the characterization of the attacks as the initiation or confirmation of an “armed conflict.” Whether the attacks constituted “international terrorism” or not is irrelevant to the proper characterization of the attacks under international humanitarian law. And although “terrorism” as such does not trigger the application of humanitarian law, the analysis offered here suggests that humanitarian law can play an important role in the struggle against terrorism. Moreover, several important policy considerations favor formally characterizing the acts as “war crimes” (irrespective of the chosen forum). As the United States seeks to build a durable and effective transnational coalition against terrorism, humanitarian law (including the laws of war) provides a stable, widely-endorsed normative framework for condemning the attacks. This contrasts sharply with the fractiousness that has characterized efforts to develop a definition of “terrorism” acceptable to most states. In fact, states strongly disagree on the proper definition of “terrorism,” and these persistent disagreements will, it appears, block the conclusion of a comprehensive anti-terrorism treaty (the events of September 11 notwithstanding). War crimes prosecutions would also set an important precedent for classifying certain acts of “terrorism” as serious violations of humanitarian law. Such a precedent would help define a meaningful role for international institutions in the “war on terrorism,” including the considerable institutional machinery of international criminal law.

In Parts III and IV, I addressed whether the laws of war are applicable to the September 11 attacks; and, if so, whether violations of these rules constitute “war crimes.” Careful scrutiny of the treaty text, structure, and history of the potentially applicable laws of war strongly supports the conclusion that the terrorist attacks of September 11 constituted the initiation or confirmation of an “armed conflict” within the meaning of international law, and that those attacks constituted “war crimes.” The dual concerns that animate the scope and content of Common Article 3—humanitarian protection and state sovereignty—are best served by this reading of “armed conflicts not of an international character.” As discussed in Part II, that the September 11 attacks violated the laws of war has important implications for international humanitarian law, national military law and policy, and U.S. antiterrorism law and policy.

303. See supra note 60.
306. See, e.g., id.
307. See supra Part II.
The attacks and the response to them strongly suggest that international humanitarian law can play a productive and important role in the fight against terrorism. If humanitarian law is to regulate intense, organized hostilities, this law should apply to much of the conduct traditionally characterized as “terrorism.” The nature and quality of the September 11 attacks demonstrate that non-international armed conflicts can be highly organized and extremely destructive—even if not protracted, and even if the private armed group controls no territory.

Common Article 3 is perhaps the most revolutionary aspect of the Geneva Conventions. In practice, states have (predictably) resisted application of international humanitarian law to “internal” hostilities—irrespective of their intensity, organization, or duration. Because Common Article 3 is cast in abstract terms, it has proven difficult to develop objective criteria for determining the existence of an armed conflict. Several important developments have, of course, elaborated the scope and content of the rules embodied in Common Article 3—including, most significantly, the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions; numerous U.N. resolutions; the statutes and jurisprudence of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals; and the statute of the International Criminal Court. Despite these developments, the threshold of application for the laws governing non-international conflicts remains unclear.

Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions remains central in the international and domestic legal regimes governing armed conflict. As previously discussed, the high threshold of application found in the Additional Protocols precludes their use in most non-international conflicts. The International Criminal Court will have jurisdiction over crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts but the Court’s founding statute offers very little to resolve the controversy surrounding the meaning of “armed conflict.” Moreover, many national jurisdictions—including the United States—have criminal provisions expressly relying on Common Article 3 to define the prohibited conduct. And, this robust legal regime is, of course, applicable only in the context of an “armed conflict.” The model proposed in this Article offers a normatively attractive framework—faithful to the text, structure, and history of the Geneva Conventions—within which to analyze the applicability of international humanitarian law in conflicts “not of an international character.”

Because the analysis in Part IV addresses persistent ambiguities in the scope and content of the laws of war, the framework proposed therein provides a model for analyzing future incidents that will likely present many of the same difficulties. Indeed, the September 11 attacks make clear that the very nature of organized violence is changing. Given the purposes of the laws of war, these new modes of projecting cataclysmic force present important challenges to both domestic and international law. As these challenges are addressed, it is important to take stock—thoroughly and sensibly—of the important recent developments in humanitarian law including (1) the regulation of non-international armed conflict; and (2) the criminalization of

---

308. See, e.g., Moir, supra note 44, at 99-103.
atrocities committed in these conflicts. These developments, motivated by the commitment to end such atrocities peacefully under the rule of law, address in part the vexing legal problems faced in the wake of September 11.