DID NEPA DROWN NEW ORLEANS?  
THE LEVEES, THE BLAME GAME, AND  
THE HAZARDS OF HINDSIGHT  

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ABSTRACT

This Article highlights the hazards of hindsight analysis of the causes of catastrophic events, focusing on theories of why the New Orleans levees failed during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and particularly on the theory that the levee failures were “caused” by a 1977 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) lawsuit that resulted in a temporary injunction against the Army Corps of Engineers’ hurricane protection project for New Orleans. The Article provides a detailed historical reconstruction of the decision process that eventuated in the New Orleans storm surge protection system, focusing both on the political and legal factors involved and on the “standard project hurricane” risk assessment model that lay at the heart of the Army Corps of Engineers’ decisionmaking process. The Article then offers a detailed analysis of how and why Hurricane Katrina overcame the New Orleans levee system. As this analysis demonstrates, the argument that the NEPA lawsuit played a meaningful causal role in the Katrina disaster is not persuasive. Parallel lessons are then drawn for forward-looking disaster policy. The same problems of uncertainty and complexity that confound the attempt through hindsight to attribute causal responsibility for a
disaster also confound the attempt to predict using foresight the variety of outcomes, including potentially disastrous ones, that may flow from policy choices. Focusing narrowly on any single parameter of complex natural and human systems is likely to dramatically distort environmental, health, and safety decisionmaking, whether the parameter is a “standard project hurricane” when planning a hurricane protection plan, or the equally mythical “lawsuit that sank New Orleans” when attempting to allocate responsibility for the plan’s failure some forty years later.

INTRODUCTION

“[T]here are only two kinds of levees, those that have failed and those that will fail.”

The failure of the New Orleans levees to prevent waters from Lake Pontchartrain, Lake Borgne, and the Gulf of Mexico from flooding the city during Hurricane Katrina led to one of the worst disasters in this country’s history. Although many other causes for the human suffering and economic loss that followed in the wake of Katrina have been identified and debated, no one disputes the causal connection between the flooding and the failure of the levees. Had the levees been differently designed, constructed, and/or maintained, the flooding would not have occurred. The critical question of why the levees failed, however, has generated considerable disagreement. Although the casual observer might assume that this is primarily a question for engineering experts, a complete answer may also require a careful reconstruction of the planning history of the levee system and of the role that federal budgetary policy, environmental litigation, and other public policy developments played in the system’s complex evolution.

In the heated political aftermath of Katrina, the analysis has been further complicated by the perhaps unavoidable tendency of participants in public policy debates to conflate causation with fault and to play the “blame game.” Prominently featured in Katrina’s immediate political aftermath was the claim that the levee system would have protected New Orleans had local fishermen and an

environmental group not filed a lawsuit in the late 1970s under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).\(^2\) In particular, critics argue that because a federal district court responded to this suit by enjoining the levee project pending the preparation of an adequate environmental impact statement (EIS), the United States Army Corps of Engineers ultimately abandoned its original design for the New Orleans levees and adopted instead an alternative design that is said to have been less capable of protecting the city from the storm surge created by Katrina. In other words, some commentators contend that, as a result of the lawsuit, the Corps redesigned the project in a way that failed to protect the city.

This Article evaluates the claim that the 1970s environmental lawsuit caused—in any meaningful sense—the destruction of New Orleans in 2005. Although correct answers to many engineering questions are critical to this analysis, the Article does not attempt to resolve those technical questions. It relies instead on preliminary reports produced by various groups of engineers that have analyzed the failures of particular levees. The Article also avoids, to the extent possible, other sociopolitical explanations for the levee failures that were featured in the post-Katrina blame game, such as the failure of the George W. Bush Administration and its predecessors to request sufficient appropriations to build and maintain levees and the role played by alleged mismanagement within the special New Orleans levee districts.\(^3\) Focusing exclusively on the environmental lawsuit claim, this Article attempts to probe at a deeper level the difficulty of retrospective analysis, in the hope that the discussion might prove helpful in the examination not only of the levee failures, but also of those other potentially contributing causes. Just as the “lawsuit that drowned New Orleans” turns out to be oversimplified and misleading, other attempts to pin responsibility for the Katrina levee failure on any single act or omission are likely to obscure the broader lessons of the tragedy.

In that respect, scrutinizing the role of the NEPA lawsuit in the Katrina levee failures also sheds some important light on the

challenges facing government disaster policy from the forward-looking perspective. The same problems of uncertainty and complexity that confound the attempt through hindsight to attribute causal responsibility for a disaster also confound the attempt to predict using foresight the variety of outcomes, including potentially disastrous ones, that may flow from policy choices. Thus, in order to guard against catastrophic potentialities in the future—whether of economic, environmental, or human loss—one must keep firmly in mind not only the hazards of hindsight, but also the foibles of foresight.

The next Part of this Article provides a detailed historical reconstruction of the decision process that eventuated in the New Orleans storm surge protection system, highlighting the relevant litigation brought against the Corps of Engineers by various local interests, including the environmental action group Save Our Wetlands. Part I ultimately analyzes how and why Katrina overcame the storm surge protection system. Part II then uses tort law’s but-for causation doctrine to introduce the blame game that has been played post-Katrina by policymakers, politicians, and various others. Part III considers in depth the counterfactual scenario of a levee planning process absent the NEPA lawsuit, in order to construct a hindsight analysis of the likely causal role played by Save Our Wetlands in the flooding of New Orleans. Lessons about forecasting risk and appropriately preparing for future calamities are drawn from the foregoing analysis in Part IV.

I. HISTORY OF THE LEVEE SYSTEM

Because New Orleans is situated in the delta formed at the mouth of the Mississippi River, it has long maintained a flood control system to protect it from the risks of flooding from the Mississippi River to the south, Lake Pontchartrain to the north, and Lake Borgne and the Gulf of Mexico to the east. The levee system that surrounded New Orleans prior to Hurricane Katrina provided by far the most

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sophisticated and powerful protection in the city’s long history. Katrina demonstrated, however, that an even more sophisticated and powerful flooding and storm surge protection system will be needed to protect the city in the future. In particular, because of its unique topographical setting, the city of New Orleans will always be at risk from a catastrophic failure of the levee systems that have grown up around it, if levees are to remain the city’s primary form of defense. Indeed, the risk will only increase as the city continues to subside and the protective wetlands between it and the Gulf of Mexico continue to diminish.6

In addition to its Gulf storm surge protection projects, the Corps of Engineers also designed and constructed the levee system that protects New Orleans from the periodic Mississippi River flooding that typically occurs during springtime. The risk of flooding from the Mississippi River stems largely from flood waters moving down the river as a result of rainfall events that may take place hundreds of miles to the north of the city. The primary line of defense against river flooding is an extensive system of levees and dikes that extends along the length of the river as it flows through Louisiana. That system, which contains the city’s highest levees, averaging 25 feet above sea level in height, was not involved in the Hurricane Katrina disaster.7 Although one misinformed participant in the blame game following the Katrina disaster erroneously attributed the New Orleans flooding to an environmental lawsuit involving the Mississippi River levees (200 miles upstream, no less),8 most of the critical attention to environmental litigation in the wake of Katrina has focused instead on the levee system that protects New Orleans from sea storm surge. Unlike the Mississippi River flood protection system, those levees did not perform during Katrina as they were designed to do. Accordingly, the discussion hereafter will focus exclusively on those levees, rather than the Mississippi River flood protection system.

Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne are located side-by-side to the north and northeast of the city and are separated by a narrow

6. Fischetti, supra note 5, at 78.
strip of land that allows water to flow between the lakes through two narrow passes northeast of the city at the Rigolets and Chef Menteur (see Figure 1). Although Lake Borgne is separated from developed areas of the city by a large area of open swampland, Lake Pontchartrain immediately borders the downtown and western parts of the city. The primary flood risk from the lakes occurs in the late summer and fall during tropical storms and hurricanes. Surges in Lake Pontchartrain pose the greatest risk to the downtown area, and surges in Lake Borgne primarily threaten New Orleans East and St. Bernard Parish to the east of the downtown area. An interconnected series of levees protects the city from storm surges in the lakes. These levees are considerably smaller than the ones that line the Mississippi River, ranging from 13.5 to 18 feet above sea level in height.

Figure 1. New Orleans Hurricane Protection with Hurricane Katrina Breaches and Flooding

Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; Federal Emergency Management Agency; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers


10. SEED ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-2.
Because much of the land mass of New Orleans is below sea level and continues to sink, rainwater that flows into the city must be removed not by natural drainage, but by huge pumps that force the water to move northward along three man-made canals, called “outfall” or “drainage” canals, into Lake Pontchartrain. Named for the streets that they parallel (17th Street, London Avenue, and Orleans Avenue), the canals are lined with levees and concrete floodwalls that prevent the water from spilling into the city. In some places, water flowing through the canals is nearly as high as the rooftops of houses in the surrounding neighborhoods. All of these levees were built by contractors working for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and, like all of the levees protecting the city, are maintained by various local levee districts.

In addition to the drainage canals, the Corps of Engineers during the twentieth century constructed three large and interconnected “navigation” canals to permit oceangoing vessels to move from the Mississippi River through the city north to Lake Pontchartrain, northeast to the Intercoastal Waterway that connects ports along the entire Gulf Coast, and south to the Gulf of Mexico. The Inner Harbor Navigation Canal (often referred to by the local population as the “Industrial Canal”) slices north–south across the city between the river and Lake Pontchartrain at the point where they are closest to each other. The Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet (MRGO) canal bisects the Industrial Canal at right angles and travels east–west to a point in St. Bernard Parish where it forms a “Y” with the Intercoastal Waterway. From the Y, the Intercoastal Waterway moves to the northeast and the MRGO Canal continues in a southeasterly direction to the Gulf of Mexico. Like the outfall canals, the shipping canals are all confined by earthen levees and concrete floodwalls.

The levee systems effectively divide the city and surrounding developed areas into four large protected basins called “polders,” each of which is protected by its own perimeter levee system. Thus, the land within one polder can flood while the land remaining within other polders remains protected. In the devastating Katrina flood,

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11. *Id.* at 2-1.
13. *Id.*
14. *Id.*
15. *R.B. Seed et al., supra* note 5, at 1-3. The word “polder” is a Dutch word that means “a contiguous land unit protected by a perimeter levee system.” *Id.* at 1-2.
however, levees in all of the polders failed, and some or all of the land within each was flooded. Land located in the crescent bordering the Mississippi River at the south end of the downtown area is above sea level and therefore was not flooded.

A. Levee Planning and Construction History

The system just described grew out of a reevaluation of the protections that had failed when Hurricane Betsy struck New Orleans in September 1965. Reacting to the devastating flooding which resulted from that storm, Congress authorized a massive hurricane protection improvement effort called the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project (LPVHPP) to provide hurricane protection to all of the Greater New Orleans metropolitan area. To implement this statute, the Corps of Engineers carefully studied two major options—the “high level” option and the “barrier” option.

1. The “High Level” and “Barrier” Options. The “high level” option consisted simply of raising all of the existing levees and, where necessary, constructing new levees to a height that would prevent flooding that could result from the standard project hurricane (SPH), a hypothetical hurricane that was used to guide Corps levee design and that loosely represented the most extreme hurricane that would be expected to hit New Orleans every 200 to 300 years. Although experts later determined that the model hurricane could not possibly occur in the real world, it was roughly equivalent to a fast-moving
Category Three storm on the Saffir-Simpson hurricane scale. In practice, the high level plan for protection against the SPH would have resulted in raising the levees from between 9.3 and 13.5 feet above sea level to between 16 and 18.5 feet above sea level. The assumption was, of course, that the levees would be properly designed and constructed to withstand all storm surges that did not exceed those levels.

Under the “barrier” option, the Corps would have constructed levees along the far eastern edge of Lake Pontchartrain, where it flows into Lake Borgne and ultimately the Gulf of Mexico through two relatively narrow channels at the Rigolets pass and Chef Menteur pass (see Figure 2). The Corps would also have constructed structures at the two passes containing massive gates that would have allowed water to flow back and forth between the lakes, but that would have been closed when hurricanes approached. Finally, the Corps would have built a navigation lock, rock dike, and gated flood control structure at the point at which the Industrial Canal enters Lake Pontchartrain. The gates would have been closed during hurricanes to prevent water from entering the Industrial Canal from Lake Pontchartrain. The Corps believed that the levees and the barrier structure would prevent the storm surges that precede hurricanes from crossing from Lake Bourne into Lake Pontchartrain. Consequently, the levees bordering the city along Lake Pontchartrain would be fortified, but not significantly raised as under the alternative plan. Still, like the high level option, the barrier option was designed to protect against the SPH.

2. First Choice: The Barrier Option. The high level option had several drawbacks from the perspective of Corps officials, including the need to obtain rights-of-way for additional land near the levees to


22. Id. at 22.

23. Id.

24. Id.
allow them to be widened and raised. In addition, the high level plan
would not have prevented the flooding of some industrial areas and
potentially developable wetlands located outside the existing
downtown polder between the levees and the lake to the northeast of
the city. The Corps therefore decided to implement the barrier
option. To speed the project along, the Orleans Levee Board
financed and constructed portions of the Industrial Canal floodwalls,
and this relatively inexpensive aspect of the project was virtually
completed by 1973. Work on the barrier structures and levees
running from New Orleans to the those structures, however, was
greatly delayed because the local interests who were responsible for
obtaining the rights-of-way that the Corps needed to construct the
levees did not always agree with the Corps’ construction priorities.

In 1976, a coalition of local fishermen and an environmental
group called Save Our Wetlands sued the Corps of Engineers,
alleging that the final environmental impact statement (FEIS)
prepared for the project was inadequate. On December 30, 1977, a
federal district court agreed, issuing an injunction that prevented the
Corps from conducting any further work on the barrier project until it
had prepared an adequate FEIS. The injunction was subsequently
modified to permit continued construction of the levees between the
lake and the city of New Orleans.

25. Id. at 21.
26. DONALD T. HORNSTEIN ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, BROKEN LEVEES:
27. Id.
29. HORNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 5.
30. Id.
3. Second Choice: The High Level Plan. After the injunction issued, the Corps reconsidered the costs and benefits of the barrier and high level options. It was at that time encountering additional opposition from local interests who were responsible for obtaining rights-of-way and citizens who saw the project as “a land grab that would personally enrich some of the civic leaders pushing hardest for it.” Additional opposition arose from representatives of areas on the Lake Borgne side of the barrier who likely would have been placed at greater risk of flooding during hurricanes, and who therefore felt the plan would foreclose economic development of their region.

The intense public opposition was in evidence during congressional hearings conducted in New Orleans the week after the

Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; Federal Emergency Management Agency; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

31. 1976 GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 3.
33. Id.
injunction issued. A spokesperson for the League of Women Voters argued that the Corps had never undertaken a study of the cost to taxpayers of maintaining the urbanization of wetlands that the project envisioned. She noted that the voters of New Orleans had defeated proposals to participate in financing the barrier project on three separate occasions, but had voted to approve a similar project without the barriers the previous year.\textsuperscript{34} An informal poll conducted by Representative Robert Livingston indicated that a substantial majority of the New Orleans citizens either opposed the project (38.5 percent) or favored discontinuation until the studies could be completed (23.6 percent).\textsuperscript{35} Although not known for his antipathy to federally financed public works projects in his district, even Representative Livingston expressed considerable reservations about the wisdom of this particular project. The state representative from St. Tammany Parish, part of which was on the Lake Borgne side of the barrier project, warned that the project would put his parish at risk when the gates were closed because it would deflect the surge from Lake Borgne into St. Tammany Parish.\textsuperscript{36}

By 1982, the New Orleans District of the Corps of Engineers had changed its mind. It now favored the high level plan “because it would cost less than the barrier plan” and would “have fewer detrimental effects on Lake Pontchartrain’s environment.”\textsuperscript{37} Undoubtedly, one of the factors underlying the changed cost assessment was the delay in obtaining rights-of-way from local interests who disagreed with the Corps’ construction priorities.\textsuperscript{38} The Corps made a final decision to proceed with the high level plan in 1985. Although nearly seven years had passed between the issuance of the injunction and the Corps’ ultimate decision to abandon the barrier plan, the project was substantially completed prior to Hurricane Katrina.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{34} 1978 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 11 (testimony of Charlotte H. Nelson).
\textsuperscript{35} Id. at 12.
\textsuperscript{36} Id. at 47–48 (testimony of Edward G. Scogin).
\textsuperscript{37} U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPROVED PLANNING NEEDED BY THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS TO RESOLVE ENVIRONMENTAL, TECHNICAL, AND FINANCIAL ISSUES ON THE LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN HURRICANE PROTECTION PROJECT app. 1 at 2 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 GAO REPORT].
\textsuperscript{38} 1976 GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 16.
\textsuperscript{39} HORNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 6.
B. The Levee Failures

The explanation for why the New Orleans levees failed involves a complex interaction of engineering and policy considerations. What physically happened to the levees on August 29, 2005, however, is largely a technical question. This is not to say that there is an easy explanation for what exactly happened to the levees that night, and the engineers studying that question will no doubt debate the finer points of the analysis for years. The description that follows draws primarily upon the preliminary report of a group of experts from the University of California at Berkeley and the American Society of Civil Engineers (the Berkeley/ASCE group) based upon its analysis of the situation shortly after the hurricane. The Corps of Engineers, a group from the Louisiana State University (LSU) Hurricane Center, and a panel assembled by the National Academy of Sciences are also conducting in-depth inquiries that could well come to different conclusions.

1. Lake Pontchartrain and the Outfall Canals. The water that flooded the polder containing downtown New Orleans and the French Quarter did not flow over the high level levees situated between Lake Pontchartrain and the city. As previously discussed, these levees were designed to withstand a hurricane that was roughly equivalent to a fast-moving Category Three Hurricane, and they did their job. Most of the experts have agreed that by the time it encountered Lake Pontchartrain, Katrina’s status had decreased from Category Four to the upper range of Category Three. As the surge flowed from Lake Pontchartrain up the 17th Street, Orleans Avenue, and London Avenue outfall canals, it did not overtop the levees confining those canals either. The surge did, however, cause three

40. See generally SEED ET AL., supra note 5.
43. SEED ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-5; see also Barry, supra note 41 (citing the preliminary conclusions of three post-Katrina engineering studies that the storm surge did not top the levees); Celeste Biever, Flood Walls in New Orleans were “Structurally Flawed,” NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 22, 2005, http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn8038 (last visited Oct. 5,
major breaches in the 17th Street and London Avenue levees. These breaches allowed water from Lake Pontchartrain to flood wide areas of the downtown polder. In the aftermath of the storm, the Corps of Engineers stressed that the two specific outfall levees that had breached were “fully completed” and not on the list of unfunded projects.

The Berkeley/ASCE group concluded that the levee failure on the east side of the 17th Street canal “appears to have been a stability failure of the foundation soils beneath the earthen embankment” to which the floodwall was attached. The group determined as a preliminary matter that the breach on the west bank of the London Avenue canal “occurred as a result of the sheetpile/floodwall being pushed backwards by the elevated water pressures on the outboard side, and that support on the inboard side of the sheetpile/floodwall was reduced as a result of soil failure at or beneath the base of the earthen levee embankment.” According to the group’s report “[e]vidence at both sites suggests that massive underseepage passed beneath the relatively short sheetpiles, and this may have weakened the foundation soils beneath the inboard sides of the earthen levee embankments.” In other words, the pressure that the storm surge generated from within the canal caused the weak soil in which the floodwalls were anchored to give way in some places and pushed the walls backwards into the protected polders.

Consistent with this conclusion, most experts who have examined the question have concluded that at the time the floodwalls were designed and built, the floodwalls were not anchored sufficiently deeply in the foundation soils. The leader of the Berkeley/ASCE group noted that the safety margins employed in the designs for the levees were far lower than the safety margins employed in most other

2006) (“The way that [the levees] failed was not consistent with overtopping . . . .” (quoting Paul Kemp, an oceanologist at the Louisiana State University Hurricane Center)).
44. SEED ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-5.
45. Martin & Zajac, supra note 3, at 7.
46. SEED ET AL., supra note 5, at 2-3.
47. Id. at 2-6.
48. Id.
49. Biever, supra note 43; see Eli Kintisch, Levees Came Up Short, Researchers Tell Congress, 310 SCI. 953, 955 (2005) (showing how the levees, in some areas where they were breached, were only half as deep as in other areas and descend no deeper than the layer of peat); Joby Warrick & Spencer S. Hsu, Levees’ Construction Faulted in New Orleans Flood Inquiry, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2005, at A3 (reviewing testimony of three groups of engineers).
critical engineering projects.\textsuperscript{50} The Corps of Engineers has traditionally employed a safety factor of 1.3 for levee construction projects, meaning that levees are designed to withstand pressure approximately one-third again as powerful as expected forces.\textsuperscript{51}

According to documents from the mid-1980s when the high level option was being implemented along the outfall canals (accounts of which vary somewhat), tests of the soil below the existing levees encountered a layer of peat some 15–20 feet below the surface.\textsuperscript{52} The design for the project called for sinking the pilings 17–20 feet below the surface.\textsuperscript{53} Because peat expands and softens when it becomes wet, the pilings should have been extended sufficiently far beneath the peat to provide adequate stability.\textsuperscript{54} A team of experts from Louisiana State University concluded from an examination of historical documents that the floodwalls built in the 1980s to implement the high level option were not anchored sufficiently deeply because the soils immediately below the existing levees consisted of spoil from digging the canals in the late nineteenth century and dredging them in the early twentieth century.\textsuperscript{55} This explanation is consistent with documents filed in litigation during the mid-1990s between the Corps of Engineers and a construction company that had been working on the levees. The company claimed that sections of the floodwalls were failing to line up properly because of unstable underlying soils.\textsuperscript{56} Although Corps of Engineers officials are not yet persuaded by this


\textsuperscript{52} Christopher Drew & John Schwartz, \textit{Engineers Point to Flaws in Flood Walls' Design as Probable Cause of Collapse}, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, at A17 (peat located 15 feet below the surface); Warrick & Grunwald, \textit{supra} note 42 (peat located 20 feet below the surface).

\textsuperscript{53} Drew & Schwartz, \textit{supra} note 52 (pilings sunk 17 feet below the surface); Warrick & Grunwald, \textit{supra} note 42 (pilings sunk 20 feet below the surface).

\textsuperscript{54} Drew & Schwartz, \textit{supra} note 52 (citing “[s]everal outside engineers”); see Warrick & Grunwald, \textit{supra} note 42 (noting an Army Corps of Engineers proposal to rebuild the steel pilings in the levee system completely through the weak layer of peat).


\textsuperscript{56} Warrick & Grunwald, \textit{supra} note 42. According to a spokesperson for the Corps of Engineers, a number of the documents contained in the 325 boxes of documents that the Corps has identified as being related to the construction of New Orleans levees may be withheld from the public because of “homeland security concerns.” Mark Schleifstein, \textit{Levee Team Runs into Wall}, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 26, 2005, at 1.
explanation, the design for rebuilding the floodwalls post-Katrina does call for sinking the pilings to a depth of 40 feet.\textsuperscript{57}

Other evidence suggests that the contractors who were responsible for testing the soil and building the levees along the outfall canals may have been responsible for poor construction in places where the levees breached.\textsuperscript{58} A team of engineers from LSU who investigated the levee failures at the behest of the state of Louisiana discovered that the piling extended only 10 feet below sea level in some areas, rather than the 17 foot depth that was called for in the design documents.\textsuperscript{59} Although a Corps of Engineers analysis of the same pilings rejected this conclusion,\textsuperscript{60} the LSU scientists are convinced that their assessment is correct because the measuring equipment that they used is more accurate than the Corps’ equipment.\textsuperscript{61} The Berkeley/ASCE group also heard allegations of malfeasance on the part of contractors in connection with the construction of the levees and “some field evidence” appeared to “correlate with those stories.”\textsuperscript{62} Berkeley Engineer Robert Bea worried that the outside engineering firms and contractors may have been more concerned with the bottom line than with identifying and correcting problems in the design and construction of the levees.\textsuperscript{63} Louisiana’s attorney general has opened an investigation into these allegations.\textsuperscript{64}

Finally, the Berkeley/ASCE group concluded that lax maintenance practices may have contributed to the breach of some of the levees lining the outfall canals.\textsuperscript{65} For example, large trees were

\textsuperscript{57} Warrick & Grunwald, \textit{supra} note 42.

\textsuperscript{58} See John Schwartz, \textit{Panelist on Levees Faults Army Corps Budget Cuts}, \textit{N.Y. Times}, Oct. 19, 2005, at A18 (“[S]ome functions once handled by the Corps, like soil boring and testing, are now conducted by contractors.”).


\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Tests on Key Levee in New Orleans Show Compliance}, \textit{USA Today}, Dec. 14, 2005, at A4.


\textsuperscript{62} John Schwartz, \textit{Malfeasance Might have Hurt Levees, Engineers Say}, \textit{N.Y. Times}, Nov. 3, 2005, at A22 (reporting testimony of Raymond B. Seed, leader of the Berkeley/ASCE group); Warrick & Hsu, \textit{supra} note 49 (same).

\textsuperscript{63} Schleifstein, \textit{supra} note 56.

\textsuperscript{64} Christopher Drew, \textit{Inquiry to Seek Cause of Levee Failure}, \textit{N.Y. Times}, Nov. 9, 2005, at A21.

\textsuperscript{65} Vartabedian & Braun, \textit{supra} note 50.
allowed to grow at the base of some of the levees. According to engineers, the levee wall’s integrity could have been undermined by decomposition and settlement of the soft soil supporting the levees, creating “a maze of small cavities that become channels for water to migrate from the canals,” which would further weaken the levees.66 In addition, state and local officials have admitted that they typically skipped the canal floodwalls when they were performing annual levee inspections, and that the levees they did inspect were given only cursory attention.67 The Corps of Engineers has not yet agreed with these assessments, and has instead undertaken an extensive investigation of the causes of the outlet canal levee failures.68 Nevertheless, the information and analysis revealed thus far suggest that the outlet canal walls were not overtopped and that the downtown polder would not have flooded if the walls had withstood the lateral pressure of the storm surge inside the canals, as they were designed to do.69

2. Lake Borgne. The largest storm surge to hit the New Orleans area came not from Lake Pontchartrain to the north but from Lake Borgne to the east.70 Although the Corps enhanced the levees for the polders protecting New Orleans East from Lake Borgne as part of the high level plan, the estimated 18–25 foot storm surge exceeded the height of some of the levees protecting that polder by as much as 5–10 feet.71 These levees were simply not high enough to repel the storm surge, and they were “overwhelmed” and “massively eroded.”72 Colonel Richard Wagenaar, the Corps’ head engineer for the New Orleans district, reported that the eastern levees were “literally leveled in places.”73 Large areas in this polder, which was inhabited

67. Id.
69. See Ralph Vartabedian, Study Sees Design Issue in Failures of Levees, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2006, at A4 (noting that investigators for the Army Corps had issued a report concluding that London Avenue levees failed due to erosion of the soil beneath the levee walls, much as earlier reports had concluded with respect to the 17th Street breaches).
70. SEED ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-4.
71. Id. at 1-4 to -5.
72. Id. at 1-5.
mainly by low-income residents and businesses that served local communities, were flooded. Because this surge came from Lake Borgne and not Lake Pontchartrain, it is clear that the barrier project—had it been constructed during the 1980s—would not have prevented this damage and might even have exacerbated it, by deflecting some portion of the surge from the two passes to the southern half of Lake Borgne. A protection system more massive in scope that could have slowed or prevented a storm surge into Lake Borgne—such as the huge seagate structures that are utilized to protect the Netherlands from North Atlantic storms—might in theory have provided better protection to New Orleans. No such structures, however, were contemplated as part of the original barrier plan.

3. The Navigation Canals. Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge also proceeded from the Gulf of Mexico and Lake Borgne up the MRGO Canal to the Industrial Canal in the heart of New Orleans. The MRGO Canal, which was completed in 1968, is a deep-draft seaway channel that extends for approximately 76 miles east and southeast of New Orleans into Breton Sound and the Gulf of Mexico. It was designed to shorten the distance for ships traveling from the eastern shipping lanes of the Gulf to New Orleans, but it has never lived up to its economic expectations. The storm surge overtopped the levees running along these canals at “a number of locations,” and several breaches occurred.

A post-Katrina modeling exercise undertaken by the LSU Hurricane Center concluded that the “funneling” effect of the MRGO Canal, which narrows from 2000 feet wide where it intersects the Intercoastal Waterway to 200 feet wide where it bisects the Industrial Canal, intensified the initial storm surge by about 20

74. Molly Moore, Rethinking Defenses Against Sea’s Power, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2005, at A22.
75. See Michael Grunwald, Canal May Have Worsened City’s Flooding, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2005, at A21 (stating that less than 3 percent, or less than one ship per day, of the Port of New Orleans’ cargo traffic uses the MRGO and that critics have calculated MRGO’s cost to taxpayers at more than twelve thousand dollars per vessel per day). But see Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation, Martello Castle Background Information, http://wetmaap.org/Martello_Castle/Supplement/mc_background.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2006) (suggesting that the MRGO has generated over one billion dollars a year in revenue for the city of New Orleans even though the United States Army Corps of Engineers spends about seven to eight million dollars a year to maintain the MRGO).
76. SEED ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-5.
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percent and increased the velocity of the surge from three to 6–8 feet per second.\textsuperscript{77} G. Paul Kemp, an oceanographer at the LSU Hurricane Center, concluded that the MRGO funnel was “a back door into New Orleans,” and he had little doubt that it “was the initial cause of the disaster.”\textsuperscript{78} As a result of these levee failures, large areas of flooding occurred to the south and north of the MRGO canal, within the polders containing St. Bernard Parish and the Ninth Ward, and New Orleans East.\textsuperscript{79} As with the storm surge from Lake Borgne, the barrier project would not have protected the two flooded polders from the surge that overtopped and breached the levees along the MRGO Canal, because no protection systems were contemplated to prevent the funneling effect of the canal.

The levees lining the Industrial Canal experienced a number of much smaller failures along both of the canal’s banks. Several breaches occurred along the eastern bank between the MRGO Canal to the south and Lake Pontchartrain to the north.\textsuperscript{80} These breaches allowed water to flow to the east into the New Orleans East polder. The levees along the western edge of the Industrial Canal were breached in three places located almost directly across from the point at which the MRGO Canal adjoins the Industrial Canal.\textsuperscript{81} The Berkeley/ASCE group concluded that “storm surges overtopped numerous stretches of levees along this Canal frontage.”\textsuperscript{82} The LSU Hurricane Center’s post-Katrina modeling exercise concluded that the enhanced velocity of the storm surge as it traveled up the MRGO Canal also contributed to the scouring that undermined the levees along the Industrial Canal.\textsuperscript{83} These after-the-fact analyses are consistent with the contemporaneous observations of the lockmaster on the Industrial Canal, who reported to the Corps of Engineers that the surge reached that canal before dawn and overflowed on both sides.\textsuperscript{84} The lockmaster’s observations also cast doubt on the claim that the surge from Lake Pontchartrain caused the levee failures on

\textsuperscript{77} Warrick & Grunwald, \textit{supra} note 42.
\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{79} SEED ET AL., \textit{supra} note 5, at 1-5.
\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Id} at 1-10 fig.1.4.
\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Id} at 2-9.
\textsuperscript{83} Warrick & Grunwald, \textit{supra} note 42.
the Industrial Canal because, according to the Corps of Engineers New Orleans Project Manager, the Lake Pontchartrain surge occurred much later in the morning, after the hurricane’s eye had passed east of the city and winds from the north began to force water to the south toward the city.

It is theoretically possible that the overtopping and resultant erosion of the Industrial Canal levees would have occurred even in the absence of the MRGO Canal because of the subsequent storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain. However, the conclusion that the storm surge from the MRGO Canal caused the levees along the Industrial Canal to fail is amply supported by hindsight observations of the Industrial Canal levees, hindsight re-creation of the storm surge using sophisticated mathematical models, and contemporaneous observations by at least one eyewitness.

II. THE BLAME GAME

The preceding description of the complex system of levees that was supposed to protect New Orleans at the time of Hurricane Katrina suggests that the question posed in the introduction to this article—“Why did the levees fail?—is framed too broadly or, perhaps, too simplistically. In fact, many levees failed in many places for many different reasons. Some were overtopped by floodwaters that then scoured out the levee support from inside the protected area. Others could not withstand the direct pressure of the storm surge from outside the protected area because they were not embedded sufficiently deeply in the underlying soils. Some floodwalls may have come apart during the storm surge because connections between individual wall sections failed. Future investigations will no doubt uncover still other suggested reasons for the various levee failures that occurred during the Katrina storm surge.

Because the levee systems divided the city and surrounding areas into polders, the failure of the levee system protecting one polder did not necessarily contribute to the damage caused by the failure of the levee system protecting a different polder. Some areas of the city would not have flooded had one levee system held, even if the others had failed. Other areas of the city would not have flooded had two levee systems both held, but would have flooded if either of the two failed. All of these inquiries are essentially engineering questions and

85. Id.
are best answered through detailed field investigations and complex mathematical modeling exercises. Still, although correct answers to these questions are relevant to the post-Katrina blame game, they will not by themselves be sufficient to resolve the broader issues raised by Katrina, including the prominent contention that NEPA played a causal role in the New Orleans flooding.\footnote{See, e.g., Alan Levin & Peter Eisler, Many Decisions Led to Failed Levees, USA TODAY, Nov. 3, 2005, at 3A (arguing that metal gates were never built because local officials believed the gates would have interfered with the city’s network of pump stations); Tyrell, Jr., supra note 8; John Berlau, Greens vs. Levees, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Sept. 8, 2005, http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/berlau200509080824.asp (last visited Aug. 15, 2006) (stating that Environmental Protection Agency reviews can delay projects by years); Bruce McQuain, You Can Pay Me Now or You Can Pay Me Later, THE QANDO BLOG, Sept. 17, 2005, http://www.qando.net/details.aspx?Entry=2595 (last visited Aug. 15, 2006) (arguing that the failure to satisfy federal environmental laws stopped the barrier project).}

Not long after the damage to New Orleans became apparent, a retired Corps of Engineers official, conservative pundits, and politicians began a campaign to blame the damage on a lawsuit brought against the Corps of Engineers in 1976 by local fishermen and a local environmental group called Save Our Wetlands.\footnote{See Adriel Bettelheim, Corps Controversy Builds on Gulf Coast, CONG. Q. WKLY., Sept. 12, 2005, at 2381, 2382 (reporting comments of former Representative Robert L. Livingston); Oliver A. Houck, The U.S. House of Representatives’ Task Force on NEPA: The Professors Speak, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,895, 10,897 (2005) (describing post-Katrina efforts “claiming that it was the environmentalists who drowned New Orleans”); Ralph Vartabedian & Peter Pae, A Barrier that Could Have Been, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at A1 (discussing opinion of former Corps of Engineers chief counsel Joseph Towers).} Citing that litigation and other clearly irrelevant litigation involving the Mississippi River levee system far upstream of New Orleans, conservative commentator R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr. claimed that “[f]or too long, environmentalist fanatics with no sense of a broad-based commonweal have had a veto over government and private-sector projects essential to the health and well-being of millions of Americans.”\footnote{Tyrell, Jr., supra note 8.} A columnist for FrontPage online magazine referred to the Save our Wetlands litigation as “green genocide.”\footnote{Michael Tremoglie, New Orleans: A Green Genocide, FRONTPAGEMAGAZINE.COM, Sept. 8, 2005, http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/printable.asp?ID=19418 (last visited Aug. 15, 2006).}

The chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee asked the Justice Department to investigate whether any environmental litigation might have played a role in the New Orleans flooding, and high level officials in that Department circulated an email to line
attorneys asking for information about cases in which they had
defended the Corps of Engineers from environmental claims
involving the levees protecting New Orleans. 90 The House Task Force
on Improving the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA Task
Force”)—already controversial due to its perceived heavy-
handedness and overtly politicized agenda 91—decided to add the Save
Our Wetlands litigation to its agenda as it considered possible
amendments to NEPA. 92

The plaintiffs filed Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Rush 93 in 1976,
some time after work had begun on the levees between New Orleans
and the passes at the Rigolets and Chef Menteur, but before work
had been initiated on the barrier structures. The plaintiffs claimed
that the FEIS that the Corps of Engineers had prepared for the
barrier project did not meet the requirements of Section 102 of
NEPA in several regards. In particular, they claimed that the FEIS
had not adequately addressed the potential adverse impact of the
structures on the normal tidal flows of water between Lake Borgne
and Lake Pontchartrain. In their view, the flows were critical to
maintaining the vitality of the Lake Pontchartrain fishery and the
overall integrity of the marine ecosystem.

The district court held that the FEIS was in fact inadequate. It
concluded that “the picture of the project painted in the FEIS was not
in fact a tested conclusion but a hope by the persons planning the
project that it could in fact be constructed so as to meet the
environmental objectives set out in the FEIS.” 94 The court noted that
the chief engineer for the Corps’ New Orleans Division had requested
further model studies because the studies upon which the draft EIS
relied were undertaken more than a decade earlier, and had
addressed an obsolete version of the project. The chief engineer

90. Dan Eggen, Senate Panel Investigating Challenges to Levees, WASH. POST, Sept. 17,
2005, at A10; Mitchell, supra note 19.
91. See Houck, supra note 87, at 10,896–98 (describing controversy surrounding the NEPA
Task Force).
92. Ralph Vartabedian & Richard B. Schmitt, Mid-60s Project Fuels Environmental Fight,
Policy Act, U.S. Reps to Review Environmental Reg’s Role in Affordable Energy, Post-Katrina
Development (Sept. 8, 2005), http://resoucrescommittee.house.gov/neptaskforce/press/
0809virginia.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2006).
saveourwetlands.org/77-schwartz.htm.
94. Id.
feared that the flow of water between the lakes would be far less in the new version of the project than in the earlier version. The Corps’ environmental staff initiated the requested model studies, but had not completed them when the FEIS came out. Even though more appropriate studies were on the way, the FEIS continued to rely upon the obsolete studies, and this unexplained impatience on the part of the Corps clearly troubled the court.  

The court was also troubled by the content of the analysis that the FEIS did provide and the role of upper level officials in determining that content. The biological analysis presented in the FEIS relied entirely on a single telephone conversation with a marine biologist who was asked to speculate about the impact of the project on marine organisms using the interlake flow rates predicted by the obsolete model. The Corps of Engineers official responsible for preparing the EIS expressed reservations about key statements made about the effects of the structures on marine life in the lake, and he suggested that the document’s conclusion that the project “would not” have a significant impact on lake biology should at least be changed to “should not.” That official, however, was overruled by his superiors. In addition, the assessment of the barrier project’s benefits included the benefits of further urban development on wetlands that would be reclaimed from the lake after the project was completed, but it failed to take into consideration the fact that the area had also been designated as a protected wetland. A Corps economist had pointed this out and asked that the analysis be modified accordingly. He, too, was overruled by upper level officials.  

The court concluded that in light of “the problems of which the Corps was aware with respect to the possibility of significantly decreased tidal flow through the structures,” the analysis of alternatives in the FEIS was inadequate. The court concluded that the FEIS “precludes both the public and the governmental parties from the opportunity to fairly and adequately analyze the benefits and detriments of the proposed plan and any alternatives to it.” It therefore enjoined further work on the barrier structures until the Corps had completed an adequate FEIS. The court made clear, however, that its opinion and order should “in no way be construed as precluding the Lake Pontchartrain project as proposed or reflecting

95. *Id.*
96. *Id.*
97. *Id.*
on its advisability in any manner,” and it stressed that “[u]pon proper compliance with the law with regard to the impact statement, this injunction will be dissolved and any hurricane plan thus properly presented will be allowed to proceed.”

III. HINDSIGHT ANALYSIS OF THE NEW ORLEANS FLOODING

The starting point in a hindsight causation analysis is careful historical reconstruction of the event in question. The analyst must then compare that reconstruction to a hypothetical scenario in which the act or omission alleged to be the cause of the consequence at issue did not occur. If, in this alternative state of the world, the harmful event still occurs, then the suspected act or omission is not a but-for cause of the event. Proper hindsight analysis therefore requires both an accurate reconstruction of the actual history of the event and a persuasive analysis of the appropriate counterfactual scenario. Of course, such but-for causation analysis by itself is insufficient for purposes of assigning legal or moral responsibility, given the variety of other considerations that ultimately must be brought to bear on the situation in order to move from but-for to blameworthiness analysis. Nevertheless, the but-for method of identifying contributing causes does provide a conventional starting point for the ultimate attribution of responsibility. For the post-Katrina debate over NEPA, therefore, the first important question to ask is whether, but for Save Our Wetlands, the catastrophic flooding of New Orleans would still have occurred. This Part answers that question.

A. The Lake Borgne and MRGO Levee Failures

From the engineering analysis related above, it seems clear beyond cavil that the waters that flooded the New Orleans East polder, which lies north of the MRGO Canal and west of the intersection of the MRGO Canal and the Intercoastal Waterway, came directly from Lake Borgne and indirectly from the Gulf of Mexico via the MRGO Canal. The flooding of the polder to the south of the MRGO Canal and to the east of the Industrial Canal resulted

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98. *Id.*
100. See supra text accompanying note 99.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 75–85.
when waters flowing up the MRGO Canal overtopped the levees along that canal and brought waters into the interior of the polder. This flooding took place before the eye of Hurricane Katrina passed to the east of the city and began to drive waters from Lake Pontchartrain up the Industrial Canal and the outfall canals in the downtown polder. It clearly did not result from waters entering Lake Pontchartrain from Lake Borgne at the Rigolets and Chef Menteur passes. Had the barrier project been constructed, the flooding of this area would still have occurred due to waters entering the polder directly from Lake Borgne and traveling up the MRGO Canal from Lake Borgne and the Gulf of Mexico. It is even possible that the flooding of the New Orleans East area would have been worse if the barrier plan had been implemented, given the likelihood that more of the surge would have been directed along these channels. Thus, hindsight causation analysis strongly suggests that the lawsuit was not to blame for any of this flooding, and few uncertainties cloud this analysis.

B. The Industrial Canal Levee Failures

Hindsight analysis offers a somewhat less certain answer to the question of whether the overtopping of the levees on the west bank of the Industrial Canal would have occurred had the Corps of Engineers not abandoned the barrier project. That project was designed to reduce the chance that a storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain would breach the levees along the lake and along the canals that open to that lake. It also provided for a navigation lock, rock dike, and gated flood control structure where the Industrial Canal enters Lake Pontchartrain. Had the barrier project been completed and had it functioned properly (a topic addressed in the next Section\(^\text{102}\)), it would have added to the protection of areas placed at risk from overtopping of the Industrial Canal levees, to the extent that the risk was attributable to waters from Lake Pontchartrain.

The engineers have agreed that the levees on the Industrial Canal were overtopped and that the breaches probably occurred because waters that flowed over the levees scoured out the soils behind those levees.\(^\text{103}\) Engineering analysis of the levees after the flood, hindsight modeling, and the contemporaneous observations of

\(^{102}\) See infra Part III.C.

\(^{103}\) See supra text accompanying note 49.
the lockmaster all converge on the conclusion that the waters that overtopped the levees in the Industrial Canal came from Lake Borgne and points east, rather than from Lake Pontchartrain. The fact that the Lake Pontchartrain storm surge did not overtop the levees bordering the outlet canals during Hurricane Katrina further supports the conclusion that the levees bordering the Industrial Canal, which parallels those canals, would not have been overtopped in the absence of the larger storm surge that flowed up the MRGO Canal. The fact that the storm surge that flowed up the MRGO Canal did overtop the levees bordering that canal suggests that the MRGO surge had the capacity to overtop the levees on the Industrial Canal as the surge proceeded westward. Finally, the fact that the damaged portions of the levees along the west side of the Industrial Canal were directly across from the point at which the MRGO Canal enters the Industrial Canal at a right angle is also consistent with the conclusion that the waters that overtopped the Industrial Canal levees came from Lake Borgne and the east, and not from Lake Pontchartrain.

As the prior discussion reveals, the barrier project would not have prevented the storm surge that moved westward along the MRGO Canal. Indeed, had the gated flood control structure at the entrance of the Industrial Canal to Lake Pontchartrain been closed as envisioned in the barrier project, it could have exacerbated the effects of the storm surge moving along the MRGO Canal when it arrived at the Industrial Canal by preventing water from exiting the Industrial Canal into Lake Pontchartrain. It appears, therefore, that the failure to build the barrier project did not cause the flooding that resulted from the failure of the levees along the Industrial Canal. That conclusion cannot be stated as confidently as the prior conclusion about the flooding that resulted from the failures of the levees along the MRGO Canal, because the Industrial Canal was directly connected to Lake Pontchartrain and the barrier project (had it functioned properly) would have offered protection against waters from that lake. Moreover, it is still possible—though not likely—that all of the preliminary analyses are wrong and that the contemporaneous observations were mistaken.

C. The 17th Street and London Avenue Levee Failures

There is no dispute that the storm surge that caused the 17th Street and London Avenue levee failures originated in Lake Pontchartrain. To the extent that the force of the Lake Pontchartrain
storm surge would have been reduced by the barrier project, some or all of the downtown polder may not have flooded had it been completed prior to Katrina. This is not a minor matter, because the greatest economic damage occurred in the downtown polder, and it appears that the largest number of deaths also occurred in that polder. Even if *Save Our Wetlands* did not cause all of the flooding in the New Orleans area, the claim that it caused the flooding of the downtown polder alone is an extremely serious one that bears careful analysis.

Several large uncertainties, however, complicate but-for causal analysis of the connection between *Save Our Wetlands* and the flooding of the downtown polder. First, the storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain did not overtop the levees protecting the city from the lake itself, nor were the levees breached. Moreover, all of the engineering reports that have come to light thus far have concluded that the surge flowing from Lake Pontchartrain up the outfall canals did not overtop the levees lining those canals. Like the levees along the lake, those levees were designed to be of sufficient height to resist overtopping from the SPH, and Katrina apparently did not generate a storm surge exceeding that height. Most engineers have concluded that the levees along the 17th Street and London Avenue outfall canals failed because the storm surge forced parts of the floodwalls away from the canals and into the surrounding neighborhoods. The Lake Pontchartrain storm surge did not overwhelm those levees; it simply defeated them at critical weak points. Although the engineering analysis is still clouded with considerable uncertainty, it appears that those levees were either designed or constructed in a fashion that prevented them from doing what they were supposed to do.

This conclusion, however, does not necessarily lead directly to the ultimate conclusion that the failure to construct the barrier project was not a but-for cause of the flooding of the downtown polder. Even if it is true that a cause of the failure of the outfall canal levees was improper design or improper construction, it is equally

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105. See John M. Barry, Op-Ed., *After the Deluge, Some Questions*, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 2005, at A27 (citing three preliminary post-Katrina engineering studies for the proposition that “if the levees had performed as they were supposed to, the deaths in New Orleans proper, the scenes in the Superdome and the city’s destruction would never have taken place”).
clear that neither of those factors caused the levees to fail in the absence of the storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain. More to the point, it is certainly possible that the storm surge in Lake Pontchartrain would have been much less powerful had barrier gates at the Rigolets and Chef Menteur passes been in place and closed before Katrina hit. The resulting storm surge may then have lacked sufficient force to breach the outfall canal levees even at their weakest points. Viewed somewhat differently, the barrier project may have provided a critical margin of safety for the overall system that would have prevented the flooding of the downtown polder, allowing for the possibility that the outfall canals would have been negligently constructed or maintained.

A proper hindsight analysis to test this hypothesis would have to estimate the force of the storm surge in Lake Pontchartrain under the assumption that the seagates at the Rigolets and Chef Menteur passes had been properly designed and constructed and had been properly closed prior to the time that the surge from Hurricane Katrina moved from the Gulf of Mexico and Lake Borgne into Lake Pontchartrain. The outcome of this analysis is by no means certain. For example, a spokesperson for the New Orleans division of the Corps acknowledged after Hurricane Katrina that he was not sure “how much [the barrier project] would have prevented anything.” Other reports suggest that

Corps staff believe that flooding would have been worse if the original proposed design had been built because the storm surge would likely have gone over the top of the barrier and floodgates, flooded Lake Pontchartrain, and gone over the original lower levees planned for the lakefront area as part of the barrier plan.

It is necessary to go beyond these statements, however, given that Army Corps representatives have obvious reasons for discounting the likelihood that the barrier plan would have performed better than the high level plan. A proper analysis of how the barrier plan would have fared during Katrina would require a complex modeling exercise that would in turn require the analyst to

106. Mitchell, supra note 19.
determine the height of the storm surge at the passes and compare it
to the design height of the levees and seagates. As noted previously,
the project was designed to withstand the SPH, which in New Orleans
was roughly equivalent to a fast-moving Category Three Hurricane.\footnote{John McQuaid, New Orleans Levee System Left Poor Neighborhoods Vulnerable, NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 20, 2005, available at http://www.newhousenews.com/archive/mcquaid092105.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2006); McQuaid & Schleifstein, supra note 18; Mitchell, supra note 19.}
Although the media initially reported expert conclusions that Katrina
was a Category Four Hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson scale when the
eye passed to the east of New Orleans,\footnote{Martin & Zajac, supra note 3.} subsequent analyses of the
water levels along the levees have suggested that the storm may have
weakened to Category Three status by the time the storm surge from
Lake Pontchartrain hit the city.\footnote{See supra note 19.} The Saffir-Simpson scale, in any
event, is based on wind speed and not predicted storm surge levels,
and in some circumstances it may be possible for a Category Two
storm to produce a storm surge that exceeds that of a Category Three
storm.\footnote{McQuaid, supra note 108.} Hence, even estimating the height of the storm surge at the
Rigolets and Chef Menteur passes is fraught with uncertainty.

If the storm surge would have exceeded the height of the levees
and seagates between Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne, then the
surge would have entered the lake at an attenuated level and
probably at a lower velocity. This alone, however, would not have
prevented a surge in Lake Pontchartrain because the strong
northeasterly winds produced by the hurricane still would have
caused water that was already in the lake to surge against the levees
protecting New Orleans. Some of that water would have surged up
the ungated outfall canals and that surge would have tested the
leves. Whether the seagates would have reduced the surge from
Lake Pontchartrain sufficiently to prevent the breach of poorly
designed or constructed levees is therefore an exceedingly complex
question, the answer to which would require expertise in
meteorology, hydrology, engineering, mathematical modeling, and
probably other disciplines. Certainly one cannot conclude without a
great deal of additional analysis that the barrier project as conceived
in the early 1970s—even if perfectly implemented and executed—
would have prevented the downtown polder from flooding during Hurricane Katrina.

Moreover, even if the analysts could confidently reach that conclusion, a proper hindsight analysis would also need to take into account an alternative scenario in which the barrier project was not properly implemented. If it is true, for example, that the high level project was poorly implemented, there may be good reason to question whether the barrier project would have been implemented as designed. A proper hindsight analysis would therefore factor in the possibility that the levees running from the city to the Rigolets and Chef Menteur passes or the seagates at the passes would have been breached, just as the levees along the outfall canals were breached. It might also examine the scenario in which the seagates were not properly closed in anticipation of the hurricane; given the numerous instances of official breakdown that occurred as Katrina and its aftermath actually unfolded, such a possibility is not at all farfetched. In either case, the storm surge flowing into Lake Pontchartrain from the Gulf of Mexico and Lake Borgne would have been much larger, and the surge that moved up the outfall canals might not have differed greatly from the surge that did in fact move up those canals during Hurricane Katrina.

The hindsight analysis would next have to examine the effect of Save Our Wetlands on the Corps of Engineers’ decision not to build the barrier project. Some legal analysts, including the United States Government Accountability Office, have concluded that the Save Our Wetlands injunction should have delayed the barrier option only until the Corps remedied the problems that the court had identified in the EIS.\textsuperscript{112} There is little reason to believe that the court would not have lifted the injunction as soon as the Corps of Engineers updated the EIS with adequate hydrological modeling (as requested by its own chief engineer), conducted a more thorough biological assessment, and considered a few reasonable alternatives. This may have delayed the completion of the project during the time that it took for the Corps to finish this task and defend its product in court. Although further hypothetical analysis would be required to determine whether this would have delayed completion of the barriers past August 2005, there is little reason to believe that completion would not have

\textsuperscript{112} See Houck, supra note 87, at 10,897 (“Usually the Corps rewrote its statements and proceeded, although often with environmental modifications and mitigation.”).
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proceeded at least as quickly as the high level project, which did not get started until 1985 but which was substantially completed by the time that Hurricane Katrina hit.

Of course, the Corps of Engineers did not respond to the injunction by preparing an adequate EIS for the barrier plan. Instead, it reexamined the mounting cost of the barrier project in light of the cost of the alternative high level project and decided to implement the latter project. Thus, one could argue that the litigation caused the Corps to rethink the alternatives in a manner that might not have occurred absent the litigation-induced pause to rethink.\(^{113}\) If the Corps would have forged ahead with the original barrier project despite its increasing cost and despite strong local opposition, then the lawsuit was indeed a but-for cause of the failure to implement the barrier project—albeit only in an attenuated, happenstance way. The likelihood of even that scenario, moreover, must be discounted by the probability that the Corps would have changed course at some point anyway prior to completing the project, given the variety of other considerations that began to weigh against the barrier plan.

D. From But-For to Blameworthiness

In a world of complexity and interconnection, any single event will be traceable to innumerable but-for causes that led to the event’s occurrence.\(^{114}\) With respect to the levee failures in New Orleans, for instance, potential causal contributors include not only Save Our Wetlands, which is said to have led the Corps to adopt an inferior levee plan, but also the local residents and officials who long opposed more robust protection plans out of cost concerns.\(^{115}\) Additional contributors could include the Corps officials who, after a lengthy and unexplained delay, ultimately made the decision to switch from the barrier to the high level plan; the contractors who allegedly implemented the high level plan with inadequate care; the land use planning officials whose decisions to permit massive conversion of wetlands for development rendered New Orleans much more

\(^{113}\) See David Schoenbrod, The Lawsuit That Sank New Orleans, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2005, at A18 (arguing that the Corps of Engineers cannot be expected to resume a project where it left off when that project has been halted by litigation).

\(^{114}\) See Kenneth J. Rothman, Causation and Causal Inference in Epidemiology, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S144, S145 (2005) (explaining the concept of multicausality).

\(^{115}\) 1982 GAO REPORT, supra note 37, app. 1 at 9 (noting that local interests requested study of a 100-year design hurricane rather than the more severe standard project hurricane).
vulnerable to storm surges regardless of which plan was adopted; the
government officials who were responsible for the Mississippi River
flood protection system, which also perversely made New Orleans
much more vulnerable to Gulf Coast storms. Perhaps the list would
even include the incalculable number of causal contributors to
human-induced climate change, which might in theory have played a
role in exacerbating Katrina’s intensity.116

Apportioning responsibility and fault among these many but-for
causes requires much more than simply empirical analysis and
reconstruction. It requires an assignation of blameworthiness
according to moral, political, and legal criteria. For seemingly
opportunistic reasons, a number of officials and analysts have
attempted to single out *Save Our Wetlands* for particularly severe
blameworthiness in the aftermath of Katrina. If the preliminary
engineering reports turn out to be correct, however, then the most
damaging flooding in the New Orleans area is attributable most
obviously and directly to the MRGO and to inadequate construction
and maintenance of the 17th Street and London Avenue levees, *not*
to the design of the LPVHPP.117 Analysts who wish to pin
responsibility for the Katrina disaster on NEPA must therefore offer
an account not only of how *Save Our Wetlands* led to the adoption of
the high level plan, but also how the litigation led to malfeasance in
the implementation of that plan. No serious effort has been made to
offer such an account, nor is it obvious how one could be constructed
with any degree of plausibility.

In the end, the only clear but-for consequence of *Save Our
Wetlands* was a court-imposed moment of taking stock, a moment in
which the Army Corps was asked to reevaluate a long-troubled
project in light of better information, changed circumstances, and
competing values—precisely the point of the NEPA procedure. The
Corps ultimately retained discretion to proceed with the barrier plan
after conducting a proper environmental impact assessment, and it
certainly need not have waited nearly seven years before deciding to

116. *See* Kerry Emanuel, *Increasing Destructiveness of Tropical Cyclones Over the Past 30
Years*, 436 *Nature* 686, 686 (2005) (arguing that hurricane intensity will increase as mean
global temperatures rise).
117. *See* Houck, *supra* note 87, at 10,897 n.28 (“Bottom line: the levee plan was fine, but its
faulty construction flooded the city.”).
abandon the barrier plan as it did. In short, one simply cannot account for the Corps’ behavior by focusing on NEPA and *Save Our Wetlands* alone. Instead, to appreciate why the Corps planning and implementation process for the LPVHPP took the shape that it did, one must broaden the critical focus to include the Congress, Army Corps leaders and staff, local residents and officials, scientific and engineering experts, government contractors, local and national political interests, and a variety of other key decisionmakers and influences. As the next Part describes, these numerous forces combined in New Orleans to create a policymaking process that, at least in hindsight, seems to have been especially handicapped in its ability to grapple with long-term catastrophic potentialities—the very point of natural disaster policy.

**IV. LESSONS FOR ANALYSTS FROM THE KATRINA LEVEE DEBATE**

One obvious message of the forgoing discussion is that retrospective analysis of cause and effect can be an exceedingly complex and uncertainty-laden exercise. The fact that all of the relevant facts are in the past and can, at least in theory, be accurately ascertained does not mean that retrospective analysis can avoid the speculation that is inherent in prospective analysis: the counterfactual nature of the causation exercise demands a similar task of projecting unknown states of the world in order to determine what would have eventuated in the absence of the targeted causal factor. Hindsight analysis of the Katrina disaster suggests that in a changing world, the farther removed the analysis is in time from the event under inspection, the more difficult it will be to draw confident conclusions about cause and effect. Failing memories and lost documentation can, of course, hinder attempts to reconstruct past histories. In addition, intervening events can greatly complicate the construction and analysis of counterfactual scenarios. The more relevant intervening events that are possible, the more the counterfactual narrative will become clouded by uncertainties.

In short, as one moves farther away from the available data—whether simply in terms of time, or of the number of additional

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118. Complying with NEPA following the 1977 injunction is not the only time that the Corps seems to have dragged its feet on New Orleans hurricane protection matters: in 1999, Congress appropriated money for a $12 million study to determine how much it would cost to protect New Orleans from a Category Five hurricane, but the study had not even been launched as of September 2005. Martin & Zajac, *supra* note 3.
variables or intervening events—the risk increases that one’s conclusions will be based on undefended modeling assumptions rather than on actual empirical evidence. The NEPA Task Force, many of whose members have expressed a strong desire to reduce NEPA’s procedural requirements, seems to have fallen prey to just such an undefended assumption in its haste to attribute the Katrina levee failures to NEPA litigation. Hindsight analysis of the Katrina disaster offers no support at all for legislative action aimed at repealing or amending NEPA to reduce the incidence of judicial intervention into executive branch activities under that statute. As previously discussed, the causal analysis that leads from a 1977 injunction pending the preparation of an adequate EIS to the flooding of the downtown polder in 2005 is so laden with uncertainty, and so dependant on unsupported speculation, that it simply cannot provide a rational justification for an action as momentous as overhauling one of modern federal environmental law’s keystone statutes.

Nevertheless, as this Part describes, the history of the LPVHPP planning process does offer some reliable lessons regarding the challenge of natural disaster policymaking—lessons that should guide analysts as they consider post-Katrina hurricane protection for New Orleans and other projects that guard against long-term, low-probability, high-consequence events. The rather pessimistic conclusion we have reached regarding our powers of accurate, comprehensive hindsight analysis is likewise applicable to our predictive analysis of future consequences of government interventions. The systems that drive the incidence and severity of disaster consequences—whether in the form of natural systems that give rise to extreme weather and geological events, or of socioeconomic systems that determine in part how deadly and costly the consequences of such events will be—are characterized by enormous complexity and uncertainty. What often will be required in disaster planning, therefore, is collective judgment regarding the degree of moral and political commitment that citizens desire to express, both to their fellow citizens within the present generation and to the generations to come, through public prevention and mitigation projects that may have highly uncertain long-term payoffs.

As this Part describes, through familiar tools of risk assessment and policy analysis, the LPVHPP planning process seems to have inadvertently obscured the need for precisely that brand of judgment.

A. The Standard Project Hurricane

In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, many commentators assumed that New Orleans had finally outrun its luck. As noted previously, initial reports suggested that Katrina made landfall as a storm with a severity and a path that numerous experts repeatedly had warned would someday strike the city with catastrophic results, a storm that simply overwhelmed the design standard of the LPVHPP and other New Orleans area levee systems. At least at this stage, however, engineering reports point instead to a failure of implementation, such that it is quite possible that Katrina would not have overwhelmed the New Orleans levees had they been constructed and maintained properly. Still, this more mundane and lamentable explanation of the Katrina levee failure does not obviate the need to look closely at the levee design process for evidence of significant failures in our thinking about long-term catastrophic risks. Unfortunately, the many pre-Katrina warnings that seemed so prophetic in the storm’s immediate aftermath remain urgently relevant today, both to the post-Katrina reconstruction process and to the challenge of natural disaster policy more generally.

At the heart of the LPVHPP and most other Army Corps hurricane protection projects since the 1960s has been a technical model known as the standard project hurricane (SPH). Because development of this model preceded the Saffir-Simpson hurricane scale, attempts to describe the design standard of the LPVHPP in the wake of Katrina have been somewhat confused. Depending on whether one is referring to barometric pressure, radius, wind speed, or other critical storm characteristics, the SPH can vary from a Category Two to Four storm on the now more familiar Saffir-Simpson scale, although most commentators have been describing the SPH as “roughly equivalent” to a fast-moving Category Three storm. Nor does the SPH translate smoothly into the conventional

120. See supra note 3.
123. E.g., GAO REPORT, CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 107, at 4.
return period approach of describing storms in relation to their expected interval of occurrence. Again, analysts have been describing the SPH as comparable to the worst storm that could be expected every 200 to 300 years, although in actuality the SPH bears no direct relationship to such return-period or frequency intervals. As the National Weather Service stated in a 1972 technical memorandum, “the standard project hurricane has no frequency assigned to it.”

The SPH was developed by the Corps of Engineers in the 1950s at the request of Congress “to provide generalized hurricane specifications that are consistent geographically and meteorologically for use in planning, evaluating, and establishing hurricane design criteria for hurricane protection works.” In conjunction with the U.S. Weather Bureau, the Corps compiled data on all tropical storms of hurricane intensity within specific geographic zones over the period from 1900 to 1956. Using this data, the agencies created an index representing “the most severe combination of hurricane parameters that is reasonably characteristic of a specified geographical region, excluding extremely rare combinations.”

Specifically, central barometric pressure was used as the main estimation characteristic to generate a hypothetical or model storm for project planning with respect to any given geographic area. Although the original SPH model used a 100-year return period to identify the key central pressure measure for a given area, the resulting model hurricane did not, strictly speaking, represent a 100-year storm. Instead, the 100-year pressure low was interpolated with other storm characteristics such as storm radius, wind speed, forward speed, and storm direction to generate “the most severe conditions... that are within the parameters of the SPH indices...”

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124. See supra text accompanying note 17.
125. HYDROMETEOROLOGICAL BRANCH, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., MEMORANDUM HUR 7–120, PRELIMINARY REVISED STANDARD PROJECT HURRICANE CRITERIA FOR THE ATLANTIC AND GULF COASTS OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1972).
127. GRAHAM & NUNN, supra note 126, at 3, 72–73.
129. GRAHAM & NUNN, supra note 126, at 3.
for [a particular] location, a procedure that resulted in SPH storms of varying frequency depending on location-specific criteria.

Initially, an overriding goal of the SPH appears to have been simply a desire to compare hurricane protection standards from region to region: “The standard project hurricane wind field and parameters represent a ‘standard’ against which the degree of protection finally selected for a hurricane protection project may be judged and compared with protection provided at projects in other localities.” This standardized approach, however, led to disparities within particular localities. Different parts of the New Orleans area, for instance, are at higher risk from hurricanes than others. Because suburban areas across the Mississippi River from New Orleans are not at risk from Lake Pontchartrain, they face a 1 in 500 risk of flooding from a storm surge in a given year, whereas the downtown polder fronting the lake faced a 1 in 300 risk just prior to Hurricane Katrina. Likewise, the areas in the two polders to the east of the Industrial Canal, which were at risk from a storm surge flowing up the MRGO Canal, faced an annual risk of between 1 in 200 (according to the Corps analysis) and 1 in 100 (according to an analysis undertaken by a former Corps engineer who is now a private consultant).

The Corps’ chief engineer for the New Orleans district, Al Naomi, questions the Corps’ authority to take these varying risk levels into account in planning for future storm protections. In his view, Congress has mandated that all areas in the entire region be protected from the same model storm. Thus, the levees in place throughout the city prior to Hurricane Katrina were designed to withstand a storm surge of 11.5 feet, ignoring the fact that some areas in the region are likely to encounter storm surges of that magnitude much more frequently than others. As we have discussed, the Berkeley/ASCE study concluded that the storm surge along the MRGO Canal exceeded the levees by as much as 10–15 feet, even though the storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain did not overtop any of the levees in the downtown polder. Building higher levees in the areas that are, for geographical reasons, subject to more frequent

130. Id. at 12.
131. Id. at 1; see also id. at 2 (describing the SPH as being developed “to provide generalized hurricane specifications that are consistent geographically and meteorologically for use in planning, evaluating, and establishing hurricane design criteria for hurricane protection works”).
132. See supra notes 75–85 and accompanying text.
storm surges would, according to Naomi, violate the Corps’ legal mandate. In his view, Congress would have to authorize such variation specifically in legislation before the Corps could take it into account in designing future levees.133

Deciding how to define and implement equity concerns within the natural disaster context is a daunting task.134 Should regulators seek to equalize the probabilistic risk that individuals face, or the amount of public money spent on protection per individual? To what extent should the seemingly voluntary choices of individuals to live in particularly vulnerable areas factor into the public policy assessment? How should disaster planning take account of the socioeconomic differences between, say, Trent Lott, whose historic oceanfront home in Mississippi was destroyed by Katrina, and the thousands of poverty-stricken New Orleans residents whose homes also were known to be located in areas of great vulnerability?135 These are vital moral and political questions that in Katrina’s aftermath receive little attention from the Corps or from Congress, perhaps in part because the SPH provides an unwarranted sense that relevant geographical variations already have been accounted for.

Over time, moreover, the SPH seems to have acquired an even stronger presumption of normativity, being described frequently in Corps documents and other proceedings as the most severe storm that the government “reasonably” or “practically” should guard against when designing hurricane protection projects. Thus, the SPH came to represent not only a method for comparative assessment of storm risks across geographic areas, but also a design standard that carries its own implicit assurance of optimality:

- “The SPH is intended as a practicable expression of the maximum degree of protection that should be sought as a

133. McQuaid, supra note 108.
135. See Joe Johns, Sen. Lott’s Home Destroyed by Katrina, CNN.COM, Sept. 4, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/08/30/katrina.lott (last visited Oct. 1, 2006). A recurring problem in natural disaster policy is that private insurance markets are ill-equipped to provide ex ante risk-spreading services given the enormous degree of uncertainty and loss correlation that characterize major catastrophes, while public officials are incapable of resisting the demand for ex post disaster relief and compensation. See David A. Moss, Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy Since 1803, in THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE RISK 307, 333–39 (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1999). Without a much stronger ex ante public role, therefore, the country is likely to continue to experience a cycle of imprudent (or practically involuntary) private decisionmaking followed by costly public bailout.
general rule in the planning and design of coastal structures for communities where protection of human life and destruction of property is involved.”

- “An SPH is one that may be expected from the most severe combination of meteorological conditions that are considered reasonably characteristic of the region.”

- “The project has been designed to afford complete protection from the occurrence of the largest probable storm (SPH) that can reasonably be expected in the region. . . . Probability of occurrence of hurricanes having a greater magnitude than the SPH are too remote to warrant practical consideration.”

- “The project is designed to protect against the ‘standard project hurricane’ moving on the most critical track. Only a combination of hydrologic and meteorologic circumstances anomalous to the region could produce higher stages. The probability of such a combination occurring is, for all practical purposes, nil.”

- “[The SPH] was expected to have a frequency of occurrence of once in about 200 years, and represented the most severe combination of meteorological conditions considered reasonably characteristic for the region.”

- “To identify a level of risk a given area faces, we do engineering and an economic analysis and come to an optimum solution for a level of protection.”

By tracing the SPH back to its origins, however, one finds strong basis for doubting the wisdom of this gradual normative reification of the design standard. To begin with, the SPH is obviously only as
reliable as the data it is built upon. The original SPH model, which appeared in National Hurricane Research Program Report No. 33 in 1959, was built using data on all Atlantic tropical storms from 1900 to 1956 that reached hurricane intensity at some point during their lifetimes.\textsuperscript{142} As the authors of the 1959 report acknowledged, much of the data used was unreliable, given the great imprecision of the available measurement technology. In particular, for much of the data the researchers had to extrapolate from land-based measurements in order to determine an estimate for off-shore storm pressure, because it was not until later in the twentieth century that scientists began using aircraft to measure storm pressure offshore.

Even assuming valid measurements, however, the fifty-seven-year record\textsuperscript{143} was quite limited in scope—containing only twenty-two storms in total for Zone B, the geographic area that included New Orleans—and was obviously insufficient to generate a statistically significant rendering of the overall distribution of potential storms from a multi-century perspective.\textsuperscript{144} The researchers attempted to extrapolate from the existing data by, first, calculating the cumulative number of storms that had appeared during the observation period at or below various levels of pressure (see Figure 3). This measure was then converted to a 100-year index simply by linearly stretching the data out from fifty-six to one hundred years. Finally, the data were plotted on normal distribution graph paper with the idea that, if the observed data appeared to fall into a straight line, then one could conclude that hurricane frequency follows a normal distribution and, therefore, that extrapolating to longer return periods could be accomplished simply by following the observed trend line (see Figure 4).

\textsuperscript{142} Graham & Nunn, supra note 126, at 3.

\textsuperscript{143} Id. at 1.

\textsuperscript{144} See Hydrometeorological Branch, supra note 125, at 3–4 (“Because of the manner in which the statistics of the [Central Pressure Index] were developed the 100-year CPI at any point on the Atlantic coast, say x, must be interpreted as the CPI value which may be expected to occur once in 100 years, on the average, at some point in a 300 n. mi. zone centered at x.” (internal citation omitted)). Even with respect to the data that were available, one of the more severe storms in the geographic zone containing New Orleans was listed in the table, but a footnote disclosed that the storm was not used in the construction of the SPH because the frequency index had already been calculated by the time the storm occurred.
Figure 3. Cumulative Number of Storms in Zone B at Various Pressure Levels

Figure 4. Cumulative Number of Storms in Zone B at Various Pressure Levels, Converted to 100-Year Index
There may be reason to doubt these assumptions. Looking at Zone A—which included Florida and areas east of New Orleans (see Figure 5)—one observes that, in addition to the much sharper slope of the pressure data, at least one recorded storm lies far outside the normal distribution trend. Of course, that is just one storm and it is very difficult to say whether it represents a one hundred, five hundred, or ten thousand year storm. But that is precisely the point: with such a small sample, there is really not much that empirically supports the assumption that storm intensity will follow a normal distribution. Instead, the decision to extrapolate linearly is one that depended on a relatively unexamined conviction that Gulf storm behavior follows the tidy world of classical mathematics. It may well, of course, but it may also represent what Professor Dan Farber has called the world of “probabilities behaving badly,” a world in which complex, adaptive systems are characterized not by normal probability distributions, but by power law distributions in which extreme events appear with a surprising regularity.\footnote{Daniel A. Farber, \textit{Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty}, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145, 152-55 (2003).}

\textit{Figure 5. Cumulative Number of Storms in Zone A at Various Pressure Levels, Converted to 100-Year Index}
Along those lines, consider a few facts from the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season:

- Twenty-seven Atlantic storms were named during 2005, the most on record, shattering the previous record of twenty-one from 1933. For the first time, meteorologists had to reach into the Greek alphabet for additional storm names.
- Fifteen hurricanes were observed, breaking the old record of twelve set in 1969.
- 2005 saw the most Category Five storms ever recorded in one season in the Atlantic basin (Katrina, Rita, and Wilma).
- Wilma became the strongest hurricane on record in the Atlantic basin, as measured by barometric pressure. Three of the six strongest hurricanes on record occurred in 2005.
- Hurricane Katrina made landfall with wind speeds of 125 mph and a minimum central pressure of 27.13 inches, the third lowest on record at landfall behind Hurricane Camille from 1969 and the Labor Day Hurricane that struck the Florida Keys in 1935.146
- Katrina was the costliest U.S. hurricane on record. In addition, the overall season tally for damage was the costliest in U.S. history.
- Hurricane Vince became the first known instance of a tropical cyclone making landfall in Spain.
- Hurricane Delta became only the sixth hurricane on record in December since 1851.
- Tropical cyclone Zeta became the longest-lived tropical cyclone ever recorded in January.

These data are, of course, merely suggestive, but they highlight the critical question facing disaster planners of whether the classical scientific assumption of normal distributions and predictable, linear biophysical behavior is appropriate in a world of complexity and climate change.147 Even putting aside these problems of model uncertainty, however, one still faces the basic decision of how

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146. See also GAO REPORT, HURRICANE PROTECTION, supra note 16, at 5 (reporting that at landfall Katrina had a central barometric pressure of 27.17 inches and a windspeed of 140 mph).

147. One engineer who examined the New Orleans levee system in 2002 concluded that “risks may be significantly higher than the [C]orps maintains—perhaps double—on the east side along levees protecting eastern New Orleans, the Lower 9th Ward, Arabi and Chalmette.” McQuaid & Schleifstein, supra note 18 (quoting engineering consultant Lee Butler).
Conservative to be in setting the benchmark for the SPH. The 1959 researchers focused on central barometric pressure and constructed a table reflecting the lowest central pressure index that one would expect at various geographic locations with an annual probability of 1 percent. In other words, they chose the 100-year return period for central pressure, as estimated using their admittedly limited data sample and their contestable extrapolation technique. Figure 6 shows the resulting values at various geographic locations throughout the Gulf. For New Orleans, the 100-year estimate was 27.60 inches. Again, the SPH was not equivalent to a 100-year storm, because central pressure was then interpolated with other variables in a way that tended to make the SPH more severe at any given point than a 100-year storm. How much more, however, is hard to say because the SPH depends on location-specific combinations of these variables. That is why the New Orleans levee system was frequently described as having been designed to guard against something like a 200- to 300-year storm.

Figure 6. Geographic Variation of Average Frequency per 100 Years of Hurricane Central Pressure Index, Zones A, B, and C
Still, why anchor on a 100-year central pressure index, rather than 500 or 10,000 years? As the Corps noted in its 1972 revision of the SPH, this decision to hinge determination of the SPH on a 100-year central pressure index return period was essentially an “arbitrary” one when considered from the scientific perspective. This is not to say that the original analysts were unjustified in choosing a 100-year return period for central pressure or that some other period was obviously more appropriate. It is simply to say that the question was not a purely technical one. One can find clues as to those nontechnical considerations in contemporaneous descriptions of the SPH model, where commentators describe the model as being used to project the worst storm that is “economically [] justified” to guard against. In fact, some Corps economists at the time believed that the SPH was too cautious, and that a less severe storm should be used as the benchmark for disaster planning and prevention.

This murky blending of science and policy continued in the much more elaborate and technical 1979 overhaul of the SPH. In this report, the SPH was changed so that the critical pressure parameter was derived not from the 100-year lowest expected pressure, but from the average of the seven lowest actually observed storms (see Figure 7).

148. HYDROME TEOLOGICAL BRANCH, supra note 125, at 3.
149. Even on narrow economic grounds, the choice of a 100-year return period for natural disaster planning might be questioned: Studies suggest, for instance, that a large majority (66 percent to 83 percent) of losses from floods and hurricane winds come from events with recurrence intervals less frequent than the 100-year flood. See Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster Policy: Bringing about Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Mar. 2006, at 171, 177. Again, though, it bears noting that the SPH does not strictly speaking represent a 100-year storm. See supra notes 121–30 and accompanying text.
150. Perdikis, supra note 121, at 9.
Figure 7. Critical Pressure Derived from Average of Seven Lowest Actually Observed Storms

This procedure may seem to be an improvement over the arbitrary selection of a 100-year low, but it still leaves unanswered the question, why not take the lowest five storms, or the single lowest storm, or even the single lowest storm with an additional safety margin included? In fact, the researchers did something quite the opposite in that they excluded the two worst observed storms from their seven lowest storm index: Hurricane Camille from 1969, and the Labor Day storm of 1935. The reasons provided for this exclusion are somewhat obscure in the report: “Our decision was based on the idea that these two hurricanes contained extremely low $p$, resulting in sustained wind speeds that were not reasonably characteristic of the northern gulf coast and the Florida Keys.”

151. RICHARD W. SCHWERDT ET AL., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NOAA TECHNICAL REPORT NWS 23, METEOROLOGICAL CRITERIA FOR STANDARD PROJECT HURRICANE AND PROBABLE MAXIMUM HURRICANE WIND FIELDS, GULF AND EAST COASTS OF THE UNITED STATES 143 (1979); see also id. (“These two hurricanes are much more severe than any other in the gulf and are therefore not ‘reasonably characteristic.’”); id. at 2 (“By reasonably characteristic is meant that only a few hurricanes of record over a large region have had more extreme values of the meteorological parameters.”).
To be sure, excluding outlier data is standard practice for much statistical analysis, yet the move seems inappropriate in the context of natural disaster planning. The extreme tails of a distribution in this context may be precisely the areas of most interest and concern. After all, the two storms excluded—Camille and the Labor Day storm—were the only two on record with a lower central pressure than Katrina. The subjective nature of the data-trimming judgment is implicitly acknowledged elsewhere in the technical report, when the analysts recommend use of an alternative, much more conservative measure—the probable maximum hurricane—for disaster planning “in locations where high winds, waves and storm surge could pose a threat to the public health and safety from a hurricane-induced accident at a nuclear power plant.” Why not use this higher standard of protection for projects that do not involve nuclear power plants? As one observer noted, “[t]he design of structures to provide protection against the probable maximum hurricane would, in most locations, be economically unjustified.” Thus, loaded into the SPH model again is an implicit cost-benefit calculation, one that prevents policymakers from asking directly whether an extreme event is worth guarding against simply by excluding the possibility that such an event will occur.

Marshalling support for current public investment in long-term disaster prevention and mitigation projects is a political challenge of the highest magnitude. As Professor Kenneth Boulding once wryly noted, “It seems to be very hard to organize a long-run crisis.” Given this difficulty, one advantage of the conventional return period approach to describing flood and storm protection projects is its ready accessibility to nonexpert audiences. For instance, when the Dutch

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152. Farber, supra note 145, at 155.
153. Schwerdt et al., supra note 151, at 5.
154. Perdikis, supra note 121, at 9. The new conservative approach of taking seven of the lowest storms on record did result in a further revision downward of the New Orleans SPH central pressure measure, from 27.36 to 27.30. Nevertheless, Katrina made landfall with a pressure of 27.13 inches—an intensity that was clearly foreseeable to the designers of the SPH model, as a comparison of the SPH and the Probable Maximum Hurricane estimates for New Orleans demonstrates.
156. As cognitive psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer has shown, individuals appear to process risk information much more reliably when it is presented in frequency rather than probability terms. See, e.g., Gerd Gigerenzer, The Bounded Rationality of Probabilistic Mental Models, in
suffered a devastating storm in 1953 that killed two thousand people, the nation embarked on a thirty-year plan to protect the country against the worst storm that could be expected in ten thousand years.  

Similarly, when a massive Mississippi River flood in 1927 killed several hundred individuals, displaced over five hundred thousand, and destroyed property worth some $3 billion (in 1993 dollars), Congress and the Corps developed an especially robust Mississippi River flood protection system that was designed to withstand an 800-year flood, some five hundred years more forward-looking than the LPVHPP. By most reports, the Mississippi River system performed extremely well during Hurricane Katrina despite storm surges that reached 15 to 20 feet along river stretches below New Orleans.

Did the relative opacity of the SPH prevent the development of political support for a more robust hurricane protection system along the lines of the Mississippi River system? Almost certainly not. As the GAO reported in 1982, state and local sponsors in New Orleans repeatedly “recommended that the Corps lower its design standards to provide more realistic hurricane protection to withstand a hurricane whose intensity might occur once every 100 years rather than building a project to withstand a once in 200- to 300-year occurrence.”

Still, over time, more widely comprehensible protection standards might help to overcome the apparent reluctance of political constituencies to support long-term, intergenerational disaster planning. As of 2006, the Association of State Floodplain Managers advocates a 500-year storm level of protection for urban


157. Moore, supra note 74.
158. Moss, supra note 135, at 308.
159. As one expert put it: “The city is exposed to as much as four times the risk of hurricane flooding as it is to river flooding.... That’s always been an odd issue to me. Why would the government think that water from the lake is less dangerous than water from the river[?]” McQuaid & Schleifstein, supra note 18 (quoting Louisiana State University engineering professor, Joseph Suhayda).
161. 1982 GAO REPORT, supra note 37, app. I at 9 (emphasis added).
The wisdom of such a standard depends in part on technical engineering and economic factors, but it also depends critically on the public’s attitude toward risk, uncertainty, and intergenerational obligation. Rather than highlight such concerns for public scrutiny and deliberation, the SPH seems to have buried them within a confidently expressed, but ultimately illusory assurance of “reasonableness” and “optimality.”

B. Cost-Benefit Analysis

Since the Flood Control Act of 1936, Army Corps of Engineers project funding has been limited by Congress to those projects that have demonstrated benefits in excess of costs. This early form of regulatory cost-benefit analysis was not originally associated with a perceived need for agency discipline, as it is today, but rather with a conviction that science, empiricism, and expert judgment could lead to wise policymaking. Over time, such New Deal optimism became replaced by a more skeptical view of government, and the Army Corps in particular seemed to attract scrutiny from interests all along the political spectrum who began to view the statutory cost-benefit requirement as a valuable check on the otherwise overreaching impulses of the Corps. In part for reasons such as this, a number of prominent scholars and officials today regard the use of formal cost-benefit analysis to be of critical importance to the future of environmental, health, and safety regulation.

The history of the LPVHPP planning process, however, suggests that the cost-benefit requirement may have had undesirable

162. ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, supra note 1, at 4.
distortionary effects on Corps decisionmaking. A report in the Washington Post, for instance, claimed that the critical normative judgments described in the previous Section regarding the construction of the SPH were driven in part by concern that the cost-benefit constraint facing Corps’ projects would not justify higher levels of storm protection. In fact, an Army Corps official in 1978 reported that economic cost-benefit analyses at the time were prescribing an even lower level of protection than the SPH. No doubt these economic conclusions were driven in part by the standard use of a 3.25 percent discount rate in evaluating monetized projects’ costs and benefits, a procedure that scholars have shown to reflect a clumsy and inadequate way of addressing questions of intergenerational equity, particularly in the face of very long-range planning of the sort implicated by disaster policy.

166. The article states:
The Corps was required to recommend the project with the most economic benefits—no matter who received them—compared to the cost to taxpayers. It could not consider whether the benefits would be fairly distributed, or the value of wetlands the projects might destroy, or even the value of protecting people from death. So the Corps settled on 200-year protection from storms, a sharp contrast to the 800-year protection from the river.


167. 1978 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 16 (testimony of Colonel Early J. Rush III, District Engineer, U.S. Army Engineer District, New Orleans) ("Even though economists may, and in this case, did, favor protection to a lower scale to produce a higher ratio of project benefits to project costs, the threat of loss of human life mandated using the standard project hurricane."); see also SELECT Bipartisan Comm. To Investigate The Preparation For And Response To Hurricane Katrina, A Failure Of Initiative 89–90 (2006) (quoting Col. Early Rush, Corps District Commander for New Orleans, testifying at a 1978 hearing).

168. See U.S. ARMY ENG’R DIST., supra note 137, at VIII-12.

It also bears noting that the Corps typically does not take potential loss of life into account when conducting cost-benefit analyses of its projects. According to the GAO, the Corps’ guidance (Engineer Regulation 1105-2-100) directs analysts to address the issue of prevention of loss of life when evaluating alternative plans, but they are not required to formally estimate the number of lives saved or lost as a potential effect of a project.\footnote{170} In situations where historical data exist, the analysts have the option to estimate the number of persons potentially affected by a project and include this number as an additional factor for the consideration of decisionmakers. Hence, a high cost project that has few economic benefits, but which would save many lives, may not pass the cost-benefit test because the Corps does not include the lives saved as an explicitly monetized benefit.

In practice, this exclusion of saved human lives from cost-benefit calculation may have contributed to the Corps’ apparent practice of liberally including prospects for private development as part of its flood control and hurricane protection projects. Because the Corps did not include saved human lives or ecological values in its cost-benefit analyses, the bulk of the identified benefit from hurricane protection tended to come from the safeguarding of real and personal property.\footnote{171} Thus, in order to generate a higher regulatory “budget” for project planning purposes, the Corps seems naturally to have been tempted to design projects in ways that generated easily identifiable and monetizable property protection benefits, even if that meant the earmarking of wetlands for future development that might otherwise have remained in their natural, storm surge-dampening state.\footnote{172} Indeed, a key aspect of the local opposition to the LPVHPP centered on the question of whether the Corps had gone beyond protecting existing and anticipated land developments to actively promoting new

\begin{footnotes}
\item[171] See \textsc{U.S. Army Eng'r Dist.}, \textit{supra} note 137, at title page (reporting only property damage prevention, land intensification, and redevelopment as itemized annual benefits); id. at VIII-21 (“Environmental losses were not evaluated in dollar terms.”).
\item[172] See \textit{id.} at ii (“Indirectly, the plan will hasten urbanization and industrialization of valuable marshes and swamps by providing for further flood protection and land reclamation.”); see also \textit{id.} at VIII-27 (“Several areas would be rendered more suitable for urban use as a result of the project works. This effect will be reflected in increases in value of these lands, which increases are called ‘enhancement benefits,’ since they do represent additions to the Gross National Product.”).
\end{footnotes}
development that would not have occurred but for the Corps’ activities. As one analyst noted, “[a]n extraordinary 79% [of the net benefits from the LPVHPP] were to come from new development that would now be feasible with the added protection provided by the improved levee system.”

The use of cost-benefit analysis for purposes of environmental, health, and safety regulation is, of course, highly controversial and a full treatment of the subject is well beyond the scope of this Article. Even if the Corps had included human health and environmental values within its cost-benefit calculations, theoretically and normatively difficult questions would have remained regarding how to monetize those values and how to account for their intertemporal distribution. What the Katrina planning process more narrowly seems to show, however, is yet another way in which cost-benefit analysis in practice leads to the very kinds of political and analytical distortions that the procedure is designed to guard against. For example, some observers of the regulatory process (including one of the authors of this Article) have advocated greater use of retrospective cost analysis as a check on what appear to be systematic overestimates of industry regulatory compliance costs in prospective cost-benefit analysis—a distortion that leads to unduly modest levels of investment in environmental, health, and safety regulation. Similarly, in the Katrina context, the failure to account adequately for

173. Burby, supra note 149, at 174 (citing 1976 GAO REPORT, supra note 20). This conflation of protection and promotion purposes appears to be common within flood control and hurricane protection planning. See Raymond J. Burby & Steven P. French, Flood Plain Land Use Management: A National Assessment 146–47 (1985) (finding a positive correlation between community flood controls works and the amount of new development taking place in flood hazard areas after flood control works are completed).

174. See supra note 169.

175. Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety and Environmental Regulation, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1997, 1998–2000 (2002); see also Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Validating Regulatory Analysis: 2005 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local and Tribal Entities 41–52 (2005) (using retrospective estimates to validate cost-benefit projections prepared prior to regulation). Of course, to the extent that hindsight analysis of regulatory costs involves speculation about how regulated entities would have addressed the hazards of the regulated activity in the absence of the regulatory intervention (e.g., to avoid potential tort liability), the value of retrospective cost assessments may prove illusory. It should be noted, however, that many regulatory interventions address environmental hazards, the costs of which are relatively easily externalized, and health hazards, the costs of which are unevenly internalized by tort law. In these situations, the assumption that the regulated entities would have taken little or no action to address such hazards may yield a fairly accurate regulatory cost assessment.
the lifesaving purposes of hurricane protection seems to have led the Corps not only to understate the monetary justification for hurricane protection, but also to promote private land development schemes that may well have been counterproductive from the perspective of guarding against storm surges.

C. Priority Setting

The Corps is very reluctant to participate in the process of setting priorities for its projects. Once the Corps has determined that the benefits of a proposed project exceed its costs, the Corps leaves it to Congress to decide through the appropriations process those projects that receive funding and those that do not. The Corps’ reluctance in this regard is somewhat understandable, given the agency’s desire to appear to be a politically neutral, expert-driven body, rather than the self-aggrandizing pork processor it often is depicted to be in more cynical political discussion. Yet the Corps’ relative agnosticism on priorities deprives congressional decisionmakers of crucial contextual information regarding the relative seriousness of proposed projects. As one observer noted, “[s]aving New Orleans gets no more emphasis than draining wetlands to grow corn and soybeans.”

The Corps’ agnosticism in this regard also encourages piecemeal, project-by-project congressional decisionmaking, when a more comprehensive approach is required that integrates flood control, hurricane protection, coastal restoration, ecosystem preservation, and mitigation projects within a single framework. The much-criticized MRGO Canal, for instance, might have appeared to be a far less attractive project had it been analyzed as part of a more direct and inclusive effort to balance economic development with human safety and the environment. As Professor Oliver Houck has noted, the MRGO costs taxpayers thousands of dollars per ship passing while it has destroyed 26,000 acres of cypress hardwood and marsh. As a result, “environmentalists have been trying to get [it] closed for 25

176. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, *Money Flowed to Questionable Projects*, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2005, at A1 (observing that, “more than any other federal agency, the Corps is controlled by Congress; its $4.7 billion civil works budget consists almost entirely of ‘earmarks’ inserted by individual legislators”).

177. See, e.g., id. (“Despite a series of independent investigations criticizing Army Corps construction projects as wasteful pork-barrel spending, Louisiana’s representatives have kept bringing home the bacon.”).

178. Id. (quoting Tim Searchinger, a senior attorney at Environmental Defense).
years.” Thus, for a variety of reasons beyond just its potentially risk-enhancing qualities with respect to hurricanes, the MRGO seems to represent indefensible public policy. The full egregiousness of the project, however, is difficult to perceive when its implications are analyzed only in a piecemeal fashion.

Moreover, the polder containing the Ninth Ward and parts of St. Bernard Parish that flooded during Hurricane Katrina also was inundated in 1965 during Hurricane Betsy, a fast-moving Category Three hurricane. Officials at the time suggested that the MRGO Canal had acted like a funnel, channeling the storm surge from the Gulf of Mexico into New Orleans. A *Times-Picayune* article in 2002 later noted that “[p]roponents of closing and filling in MRGO say it has evolved into a shotgun pointed straight at New Orleans, should a major hurricane approach from that angle.”

Levee analysis and sophisticated modeling exercises have led some experts to conclude that this very shotgun fired during Hurricane Katrina, with devastating results. Although it is certainly possible that the polder would have flooded even if the MRGO Canal had not existed in 1965 and again in 2005, policymakers could reasonably conclude that filling in the MRGO Canal now would eliminate a potential cause of future flooding.

In order to appreciate these multidimensional implications of the MRGO Canal, one must move beyond narrowly framed modes of policy analysis and embrace something more like the emerging sustainable development paradigm, in which the many determinants

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181. McQuaid & Schleifstein, supra note 18.

182. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.

of human well-being and environmental sustainability are treated as aspects of a single complex, but integrated public policy framework. It makes little sense, for instance, to talk about the optimal post-Katrina hurricane protection plan for New Orleans without also discussing wetlands, housing and transportation, climate change and energy, and a host of other policy areas that undoubtedly and significantly will impact the very parameters that also guide hurricane protection planning. Such decisionmaking will not lend itself to formulaic resolution. Accordingly, it is by nature pluralistic and messy. Yet it also appears to be the most reliable way that disasters such as Katrina can be anticipated and avoided in an increasingly intertwined and fragile world.

CONCLUSION

Familiar aphorisms aside, hindsight is not necessarily 20/20: The counterfactual nature of the hindsight causation analysis inevitably requires the analyst to create a hypothetical world in which alternatives are chosen that were not in fact adopted in the real world. As with the related “cause-in-fact” inquiry in tort law, this inquiry invites a great deal of speculation. When the suggested cause of a catastrophic failure is remote in time and when many other actions that are also relevant to the causal analysis intervene or could have intervened between the suggested cause and the failure, the opportunity for analysts to speculate—or manipulate—becomes very real. Accordingly, how we sort among many uncertain counterfactual worlds to identify responsible causal agents says as much about our politics and our culture as it does about our science.

In that respect, attempts by politicians and pundits in Katrina’s aftermath to pin the levee failure in New Orleans on NEPA litigation do not speak well of our politics and our culture. Hindsight analysis provides little reason to believe that a barrier project of the sort envisioned in 1976 would have prevented the Hurricane Katrina storm surge from breaching the levees along the 17th Street and London Avenue canals, as critics of NEPA have argued. Looking


forward, policymakers are well advised to examine what exactly caused the levees along the outfall canals to fail, taking action to rebuild or fortify those levees prior to investing in an expensive barrier project. Once that remedial work is accomplished, a more expansive barrier project may still be warranted, and it may even need to be substantially more protective than the project envisioned in 1976, including a seagate at the point at which the MRGO Canal intersects with the Intercoastal Waterway to provide equitable levels of protection to New Orleans East and St. Bernard Parish. Any such project, however, should only be contemplated with the same commitment to integrated, environmentally-informed decisionmaking that has characterized NEPA since its adoption in 1969.

According to some estimates, a coastal protection system capable of guarding against a Category Four to Five storm for New Orleans would cost $2.5 billion and require ten to twenty years of construction. As hindsight analysis of the LPVHPP planning process shows, deciding whether to undertake such a project can never be reduced entirely to a technocratic exercise. Just as judgment and discretion inhere in the attribution of fault for a causally overdetermined disaster, so too does the prediction of harm from inherently complex and uncertain systems always require the exercise of collective agency and responsibility. To be sure, the tools of risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis do provide vital information for public policymaking. They must, however, be deployed with a degree of sensitivity regarding their limitations and a vigilant awareness of the need for moral and political judgments that go beyond the parameters of the formalized analytical frameworks.

The LPVHPP planning process suggests that such sensitivity and awareness may have been placed in jeopardy by overzealous confidence in the powers of technical decisionmaking apparatuses.

186. McQuaid et al., supra note 183.
187. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NEW ORLEANS LEVEES AND FLOODWALLS: HURRICANE DAMAGE PROTECTION 6 (2005). These estimates are likely vastly optimistic. See Peter Whoriskey & Spencer S. Shu, Levee Repair Costs Triple, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2006, at A1 (noting that the Bush administration had raised cost estimates for rebuilding the New Orleans levee system to “federal standards” to $10 billion in light of better understanding of wetlands loss, subsidence, and hurricane frequency and intensity).
188. PORTER, supra note 164, at 8 (“[Q]uantitative estimates sometimes are given considerable weight even when nobody defends their validity with real conviction. . . . Quantification is a way of making decisions without seeming to decide. Objectivity lends authority to officials who have very little of their own.”).
In the case of the SPH, a sophisticated meteorological model tended to obscure important decisions regarding the treatment of highly uncertain but potentially catastrophic risks to present and future New Orleans residents, suggesting a degree of normative agreement lurking behind the concept of “reasonably characteristic” hurricanes that was almost certainly absent in actuality. In the case of cost-benefit analysis, the Corps’ approach to economic project evaluation seemed both to stack the deck against long-range investment in disaster prevention and mitigation, and to promote a form of “mission creep” in the Corps planning activities toward easily monetizable benefits.

In sum, neither the blame game nor the numbers game is up to the task of formulating sound and ethical natural disaster policy. Instead, analysts should set out the uncertainties of both hindsight and prospective analyses in a way that is easily accessible to decisionmakers and the public, so that the full challenge of long-term intergenerational risk regulation will be highlighted for consideration, rather than obscured from view. Focusing narrowly on any single parameter of complex natural and human systems is likely to dramatically distort environmental, health, and safety decisionmaking—whether the parameter is a “standard project hurricane” when planning a hurricane protection plan, or the equally mythical “lawsuit that sunk New Orleans” when attempting to allocate responsibility for a disaster some forty years later.