1996

The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing

John H. Langbein

Yale Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers

Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons

Recommended Citation

https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/486

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship at Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship Series by an authorized administrator of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact julian.aiken@yale.edu.
The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing

John H. Langbein*

In recent years, American law has undergone a fundamental revision of the rules that govern how trustees invest. In 1987 the American Law Institute (ALI) began working on a partial revision of the Restatement of Trusts devoted exclusively to modifying trust-investment law. The ALI approved the new Restatement at its annual meeting in 1990 and released the final text in 1992. Working from a preliminary text of the new Restatement, Illinois enacted legislation in 1991 embodying the key Restatement principles.

In 1991 the Uniform Law Commission began a three-year drafting project to codify the revised Restatement principles as a uniform law, which became the Uniform Prudent Investor Act. The Uniform Law Commission promulgated the final text of the Act in 1994. The American Bar Association approved the Act at its February 1995 midyear meeting. Already in 1995 seven states enacted the Uniform Prudent Investor Act:

---

* Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale University. This article expands upon the Tamisiea Lecture presented at the University of Iowa, November 2, 1995. Some themes of this article were sketched earlier in presentations to the 1995 annual meeting of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel, Scottsdale, Arizona, March 9-10, 1995. Although I served as the reporter for the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, I must emphasize that the views advanced in this article are mine and do not necessarily represent the views of the Uniform Law Commission. Suggestions from Edward C. Halbach, Jr., and Roger Ibbotson are gratefully acknowledged.


3. The Commission's proper name is National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).


5. Uniform acts are routinely submitted to the American Bar Association (ABA) for approval. The relevant ABA sections customarily appoint advisors to the Uniform Law Commission's drafting committees. The ABA advisor for the Uniform Prudent Investor Act was Joseph Kartiganer.
California, Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. The Uniform Act is expected to be widely enacted in the years to come. In advance of the Uniform Act, several states enacted legislation patterned on the 1992 Restatement or on the Illinois act, including Kansas, Florida, Maryland, New York, South Dakota, and Virginia. We thus have a substantial core of states, including some of the most populous, that have already enacted the Uniform Act or something like it. I should also emphasize that the Restatement and the Uniform Act did not invent the reforms that they embody, and that several states, for example, Iowa and Georgia, revised their statutes in advance of the two national law reform projects to incorporate some of the principles that now appear in the Restatement and in the Uniform Act.

The Uniform Prudent Investor Act implements a tightly interconnected set of reforms. These adjustments to the legal regime were driven by profound changes that have occurred across the past generation in our understanding of the investment function. This new learning about the investment process is called the theory of efficient markets, or more broadly, Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT). Four Nobel prizes in economics have thus far been awarded for the academic work that identified and verified the theory of efficient markets, and more will come. As I cover the main features of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, I have the occasion to point out places in which the influence of MPT is much in evidence. I have tried, however, to avoid the forbidding jargon of the efficient market literature. Lawyers and courts can understand the essential findings of MPT without mastering betas, capital asset pricing models, correlation coefficients, and the like.

This Article is meant to serve as a guide to the Uniform Prudent Investor Act. I point to the main reforms and explain what motivated them. I also attempt a look into the future, offering some predictions about how trust-investment practice is likely to change as the principles embodied in the Restatement and the Uniform Act take effect. Among the changes foreseen are greater use of equities; of pooled investment vehicles, such as mutual funds; and of relatively unconventional investments, such as foreign securities and derivatives. I also speak of the tendency to break up trusteeship and allocate its functions among specialized service providers. I suggest that, even though the Uniform Prudent Investor Act is default law that the settlor of the trust can alter or oust, the Act is likely to limit the settlor's power to impose manifestly uneconomic investment restrictions. I also explain why the new trust-investment law is likely to have unsettling effects upon the seemingly quite distinct subject of principal-and-income law, that is, upon the rules that govern the allocations that trustees are commonly obliged to make between current and future beneficiaries of the trust.

I. OLDER STANDARDS OF PRUDENT INVESTING

Before canvassing the Uniform Act, I want to cast a brief backward glance at the trust-investment law that descended into the 1980s—the law that the ALI and the Uniform Law Commission determined to reform. Bear in mind that the rules of trust investment law that we are discussing are default rules, rules that the settlor can alter by apt language in the trust instrument.

English law got off to a bad start on trust investing. In 1719 Parliament authorized trustees to invest in shares of the South Sea Company. A number of them did, and when the South Sea "Bubble" burst the next year, share prices declined by 90 percent. The Chancellors took fright and developed a restricted list of presumptively proper trust investments, initially government bonds, later well-secured first mortgages. Lord St. Leonard's Act in 1859 added East India stock, and across the decades, some dribbles of legislation approved various other issues. Only in 1961 was the English statute amended to allow trustees to invest in equities more generally, and even then the investment was subject to a ceiling of half the trust fund. That legislation remains in force, although an official revision commission has begun to deliberate on reforming it.

Some American jurisdictions had a similar history in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, developing so-called legal lists of court-
approved or legislatively-approved investments, which were initially
restricted to government bonds and first mortgages, but grudgingly
expanded in some states to include selected corporate issues.

The path of the future in American law led away from legal lists,
however, and was forged in Massachusetts. In 1830, in the celebrated case
of Harvard College v. Amory, the Supreme Judicial Court adopted what
came to be known as the prudent man rule.

Trustees, said the Massachusetts court, should “observe how men of
prudence . . . manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but
in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the
probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be
invested.” The Massachusetts rule represented a great advance26 by
abandoning the attempt to specify approved types of investment. Prudence
is another word for reasonableness, and the prudent man rule echoed the
contemporaneously developed reasonable man rule in the law of
negligence. The standard of prudent investing was the standard of industry
practice—what other trustees similarly situated were doing. Investment
practice under the prudent man rule led rapidly to judicial approval of the
use of corporate securities, both equities and bonds, in trust accounts. By
the 1940s many American states had adopted by statute a version of the
Massachusetts rule that the American Bankers Association promoted on
behalf of corporate fiduciaries. The Uniform Prudent Investor Act is
designed to replace that act.

The prudent man rule as applied by the courts came to be encrusted
with a strong emphasis on avoiding so-called “speculation,” whatever that
meant.29 (Recall the language from Harvard College v. Amory, cautioning
the trustee to invest “not in regard to speculation” and to treat “the
probable safety of the capital” as central.) As late as the 1959
Restatement we find the assertion that “the purchase of shares of stock on
margin or purchase of bonds selling at a great discount because of
uncertainty whether they will be paid on maturity” is speculative and

---

25. 26 Mass.(9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
26. Id. at 461.
27. On the history of trust investment law in the United States, see Lawrence M.
Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 Yale L.J. 547, 551-72 (1964). See generally George G. Bogert
28. See Mayo A. Shattuck, The Development of the Prudent Man Rule for Fiduciary
Investment in the United States in the Twentieth Century, 12 Ohio St. L.J. 491, 501-03 (1951).
For the text of the bankers’ model act, the so-called Model Prudent Man Investment Act, see
Id. at 508-09.
29. Bevis Longstreth, Modern Investment Management and the Prudent Man Rule 5-6
(1986).
imprudent. In some jurisdictions investing in junior mortgages, no matter how well secured, was per se imprudent. The view crystallized that an investment in a "new and untried enterprise" was inherently speculative and imprudent. Ludicrous judicial applications of the notion of speculation continued in some jurisdictions into recent times.

Trustees in the first half of the twentieth century, preoccupied with avoiding speculation and preserving capital, were inclined to emphasize long-term government and corporate bonds as the characteristic trust investment. Experience with inflation after World War II taught that bonds placed significant inflation risk on the bondholder. Investments in debt could therefore experience declines in real value as severe as in equities. We now know that, in inflation-adjusted terms, the long-term real rate of return on equities has greatly exceeded bonds. The Sinquefield/Ibbotson studies estimate the inflation-adjusted rate of return on stocks since the 1920s at about 9 percent per year, as compared to about 3 percent for bonds. Fiduciaries have adapted to this knowledge, and through the second half of the century, have tended to increase the proportion of equity in trust accounts, at least in those trust accounts that can bear the greater volatility of equities.

II. THE UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT

I turn now to the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, with a view to identifying and explaining its main reforms. As the title of the Act makes clear, the legislation retains the prudence standard. As did the 1992 Restatement, the Act takes the opportunity to unisex the prudent man, who has now become the prudent investor. The Act directs the trustee to invest "as a prudent investor would . . . ."

In giving content to the prudence label, the Act makes three great changes in the law. All three were presaged in the 1992 Restatement. First, the Act articulates a greatly augmented duty to diversify trust investments. Next, in place of the old preoccupation with avoiding speculation, the Act substitutes a requirement of sensitivity to the risk
tolerance of the particular trust, directing the trustee to invest for "risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the trust." Finally, the Act reverses the much criticized nondelegation rule of former law and actually encourages trustees to delegate investment responsibilities to professionals.

A. Diversification

A duty to diversify trust investments has been recognized in American trust law for about a century. In recent decades the importance of diversification has been increasingly emphasized among investment professionals, and accordingly, the trustee's duty to diversify has become more acute—for example, in ERISA, the 1974 federal pension legislation, a fiduciary must diversify the investments of participants and beneficiaries to minimize risk of loss unless doing so is clearly imprudent. The 1992 revision of the Restatement of Trusts integrated the duty to diversify into the very definition of prudent investing.

The Uniform Prudent Investor Act demands that the "trustee shall diversify the investments of the trust unless the trustee reasonably determines that, because of special circumstances, the purposes of the trust are better served without diversifying." The official Comment to the Act identifies two situations in which resisting diversification might be appropriate: first, when the tax cost of selling low-basis securities would outweigh the gain from diversification; and second, when the settlor mandates that the trust retain a family business. When, however, the trust investor starts with cash in hand, failing to diversify is inexcusable.

The emphasis on diversification also underlies another prominent feature of the Uniform Act, the portfolio standard of care in section 2(b), which reads: "A trustee's investment and management decisions respecting individual assets must be evaluated not in isolation but in the context of

39. Id. § 2(b).
40. Id. § 9.
41. E.g., Dickinson, Appellant, 152 Mass. 184, 25 N.E. 99 (1890); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 227 (1992). Many states have no explicit authority on point. In In re Saegere Estates, 340 Pa. 73, 16 A.2d 19 (1940), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court questioned the duty to diversify. In view of the growing emphasis on the duty to diversify discussed in the text above, I think it unlikely that Saegere would remain good law in Pennsylvania. Older New York cases resistant to, or hesitant about, the duty to diversify are collected in 3 Scott & Fratcher, supra note 32, § 228, at 505-06 n.10. A recent New York case imposes liability for a trust's excess concentration of 71% of its assets in a single blue chip stock (Eastman Kodak) which experienced a long decline in value. Estate of Jones, N.Y.U.J., Jul. 5, 1995, at 31 (Sur. Ct. Monroe Cty. 1995) (I owe this reference to Richard Covey.) The New York prudent investor act, supra note 16, mandates diversification and thus resolves the matter for New York prospectively.
42. ERISA mandates "diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so." Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (1988).
44. UPIA § 3 (emphasis added).
the trust portfolio as a whole . . . ."46 The official Comment says: "An investment that might be imprudent standing alone can become prudent if undertaken in sensible relation to other trust assets, or to other nontrust assets."

This insistence on diversifying investments responds to one of the central findings of Modern Portfolio Theory, that there are huge and essentially costless gains to diversifying the portfolio thoroughly. To understand why, begin with the obvious truth that some securities are riskier than others. Investors demand to be paid to bear the greater risk. For example, a start-up computer software company in Silicon Valley entails a far larger risk of disappointing returns or total failure than does a seasoned blue chip such as Mobil Oil or General Electric. If you are a Silicon Valley entrepreneur who wants me to invest in your start-up firm, you must offer me an expected return (that is, a combination of dividends and capital appreciation on the securities) that is higher than Mobil or GE will pay me in order to induce me to invest in your riskier venture. This calculation is called the risk/return curve: The higher expected return on the investment compensates me for bearing the greater risk of the investment being disappointing.

Modern Portfolio Theory isolates three distinct components of the risk of owning any security: market risk, industry risk, and firm risk. Market risk is common to all securities; it reflects general economic and political conditions, interest rates, and so forth. Industry risk, by contrast, is specific to the firms in a particular industry or an industry grouping. Finally, firm risk refers to factors that touch the fortunes only of the individual firm. Thus, if we take the international oils for an example, we recall that all the producers suffered from the 1973 Arab oil embargo (industry risk), but only Exxon incurred the liabilities arising from the great Alaskan oil spill of March 1989 (firm risk).

The capital market investigators have actually been able to compute the approximate weight of the three elements that comprise the risk of securities ownership. In round numbers, market risk has been reckoned at 30 percent; the risk of industry and other groupings at 50 percent; and firm risk at 20 percent.47 These numbers underlie the intense preoccupa-

45. Id. § 2(b).
46. Id. § 2 cmt. ("Portfolio standard"). The UPIA's portfolio standard of care derives from comparable language in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227(a) (1992), which states that the prudent investor rule is "to be applied to investments not in isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio and as a part of an overall investment strategy . . . ." The total portfolio standard decisively rejects the contrary strand in the older case law; that is "[t]he focus of inquiry . . . is . . . on the individual security as such, and factors relating to the entire portfolio are to be weighed only along with others in reviewing the prudence of the particular investment decisions." In re Bank of New York (Spitzer), 323 N.E.2d 700, 703 (N.Y. 1974).
47. Brealey, supra note 21, at 117. Brealey's actual numbers are 31% market risk; 12% industry risk; 37% other groupings; and 20% firm risk. The passage in the above text consolidates industry and other groupings and rounds it to 50%.
tion with diversification as the means of reducing the risk of investing. By definition, market risk cannot be eliminated through diversification, since market risk is common to all securities. But industry risk and firm risk can be reduced greatly through diversification. To continue with the example of the oil industry, contrast an investor who owned only international oil shares in 1973 with an investor whose portfolio was broadly diversified across many industries. The oil embargo damaged the international oils and the automobile and airline industries, but it triggered a boom in domestic oils, in coal stocks, in synthetic fuels, in the energy conservation firms, and in the oilfield equipment industry. We see, therefore, that industry risk is often negatively correlated. Owning stocks in these other industries would, in part, have offset the damage to the industries harmed by the embargo.

Likewise, within an industry, diversification reduces risk. Since I cannot predict the Alaskan oil spill, or any other firm-specific hazard, I can lower my exposure to such firm-specific risks by investing not only in Exxon, but also BP, Shell, Mobil, Texaco, and the others. Indeed, it commonly happens that the performance of firms in the same industry is negatively correlated—the success of one firm comes at the expense of its competitors. Efficient market theory instructs us that it is impossible to outsmart the market by predicting which securities will do better or worse.\footnote{Brealey computes that a one-stock portfolio will exhibit 40\% variability in a year. A market-matching portfolio exhibits 22\% variability in a year. Thus, optimal diversification cuts risk by almost half. Brealey, supra note 21, at 111-12 & Tbl. 7.1.} Owning many securities enhances the chances of offsetting losers with winners.\footnote{Brealey estimates that ten stocks exceptionally well-selected for diversification can achieve 87\% diversification; twenty such stocks, 93\%; 50 such, 97\%; 100 such, 98\%. Id. at 112}

In the literature of Modern Portfolio Theory, a telling expression has been coined to describe what is wrong with underdiversification: \textit{uncompensated risk}. No one pays the investor for owning too few stocks. Recall that when I spoke of the difference between the Silicon Valley start-up and Mobil Oil, I said that the greater risk intrinsic to the start-up was reflected in its expected return. The investor faced with a choice between mature blue chips and an imperiled new venture will prefer the blue chips unless the new venture offers a superior return, a risk premium. Moving out on the risk/return curve in this way, we routinely observe that the investor who bears the greater risk is compensated for it. By contrast, no one compensates the investor for having a portfolio that neglects to hold securities in enough industries and firms to achieve effective diversification. Underdiversification entails needless risk, risk that can be avoided by constructing a sufficiently large and representative portfolio.

Diversification tends to push the investor toward very large portfolios. Although much of the benefits of diversification can be achieved with a carefully selected smaller portfolio,\footnote{Brealey estimates that ten stocks exceptionally well-selected for diversification can achieve 87\% diversification; twenty such stocks, 93\%; 50 such, 97\%; 100 such, 98\%. Id. at 112} optimal diversification probably
requires a portfolio containing hundreds of issues. Relatively few investors, or for our purposes, relatively few trust funds have that much money to invest. Accordingly, an investor who seeks to eliminate the uncompensated risk of underdiversification will usually need to invest in some form of pooled investment vehicle, such as mutual funds or bank common trust funds.

B. Sensitivity to the Risk/Return Curve in Place of the Ban on Speculation

The Uniform Prudent Investor Act eliminates the old categoric restrictions on particular types of investments, such as the prohibition on junior mortgages. Section 2(e) of the Act provides: "A trustee may invest in any kind of property or type of investment consistent with the standards of this [Act]." The official Comment explains:

The universe of investment products changes incessantly. Investments that were at one time thought too risky, such as equities, or more recently, futures, are now used in fiduciary portfolios. By contrast, the investment that was at one time thought ideal for trusts, the long-term bond, has been discovered to import a level of risk and volatility—in this case, inflation risk—that had not been anticipated.51

The idea that some securities are intrinsically too risky for trust investors collides with the central findings of Modern Portfolio Theory. MPT teaches that the risk intrinsic to any marketable security is presumptively already discounted into the current price of the security. Hence, on an expected return basis, the risk is compensated risk. Thus, for example, there is no reason to think that the shares of a bankrupt company are mispriced. The securities markets are so efficient at discounting information about future profitability that today's price fully impounds the future prospects for any firm, even a bankrupt firm, on an expected value basis.

Furthermore, the risk of a high-risk investment can be materially reduced through diversification. That is why sophisticated investors who invest in start-up or otherwise fragile firms commonly employ venture capital funds, which spread the risk of failure of any single firm across a portfolio of many firms. The same logic underlies so-called vulture funds that invest in bankrupt or troubled firms. Some of the firms will fail, but many will thrive. A basket of such securities offers the likelihood of a high net return on an expected return basis.

The drafters of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act reasoned that "trust beneficiaries are better protected by... emphasis on close attention to risk/return objectives... than in attempts to identify categories of

51. UPIA § 2 cmt. ("Abrogating categoric restrictions").
investment that are per se prudent or imprudent." The heart of the Act, section 2(b), states that the "trustee's investment and management decisions" are required to "have risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the trust." The Act recognizes that investment returns correlate strongly with risk. However, as the official Comment explains, "tolerance for risk varies greatly with the financial and other circumstances of the investor, or in the case of a trust, with the purposes of the trust and the relevant circumstances of the beneficiaries." By way of illustration, the Comment observes that if the "main purpose" of the particular trust "is to support an elderly widow of modest means," that trust "will have a lower risk tolerance than a trust to accumulate for a young scion of great wealth."

Thus, the Act aspires to free trustees from the old preoccupation with avoiding speculation. Should we expect to see future trust portfolios stuffed with penny stocks, Polish zloty futures, and Czarist Russian bonds? The answer, of course, is no. For most trusts and trustees, the outer reaches of the risk/return distribution will be every bit as unsuitable as before. What has changed is that the trustee is now able to examine the risk tolerance of each particular trust and to tailor that trust's investment policy accordingly.

C. Delegation

The last of the great reforms of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act is to put the final nails in the coffin of the much criticized former rule that forbade trustees to delegate investment and management functions.

1. The Received Nondelegation Rule

The rule against delegating investment functions was a branch of the general nondelegation rule of trust law. As formulated in the 1959 Restatement, the nondelegation rule places the trustee "under a duty to the beneficiary not to delegate to others the doing of acts which the trustee can reasonably be required personally to perform." The rationale for the nondelegation rule has always been murky. The core notion is to protect the settlor's reliance when the personality of the trustee is a vital component of the settlor's intention. We can well imagine the case in
which the settlor’s decision to establish a trust is motivated by confidence in the good judgment of the particular trustee, especially when the trust bestows discretion upon the trustee in matters of distribution, that is, in allocating shares among beneficiaries. Accordingly, we can understand a rule that says that if the particular trustee accepts the trust, the trustee cannot dump it off on someone else—at least not without following the procedures for trustee resignation and trustee succession that are contained in the trust instrument or in the default law.

The traditional nondelegation rule was, however, overbroad. Courts tended to read the requirement that the trustee not delegate “acts which the trustee can reasonably be required personally to perform” as a prohibition on delegating any function that looked to be important. The courts attempted to distinguish pedestrian activities, so-called ministerial functions, which the trustee could delegate, from discretionary functions that were nondelegable. The drafters of the second Restatement perpetuated this standard even while admitting that they could identify no “clear-cut line dividing the acts which a trustee can properly delegate from those which he cannot properly delegate.” The nondelegation rule effectively forced the trustee to conduct personally all major aspects of administering the trust, necessarily including investment. The second Restatement was crystal clear about investing: “A trustee cannot properly delegate to another power to select investments.”

As the investment function has grown ever more complex, there is ever less reason to believe that nonspecialists are fit to conduct it. Especially when family members or other amateurs serve as trustees, the need for outside investment expertise is often acute. The old nondelegation rule permitted such trustees to take advice from outside specialists, but required the trustees to go through the motions of appearing to evaluate the advice and to form an independent judgment about whether or not to follow it. Often enough, this resulted in de facto delegation. “When the investment advisor ‘recommends’ and the trustee routinely ‘decides’ to follow the advice, the trustee in reality is delegating the selection of investments.”

Dissatisfaction with the nondelegation rule in investment matters

59. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 171 (1959). The second Restatement carries this language forward from the first, see Restatement of Trusts § 171 (1935).

60. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 171 cmt. d (1959). Instead of a standard, the second Restatement pointed to some illustrative factors, including “the amount of discretion involved,” the size of the assets in question, and the trustee’s ability to deal with the matter.” Id. The emphasis on distinguishing delegable ministerial functions from nondelegable discretionary functions has proved to be a labeling game, because “even the most menial of tasks involves some discretion . . . .” William L. Cary & Craig B. Bright, The Delegation of Investment Responsibility for Endowment Funds, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 207, 224 (1974) (emphasis in original).

61. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 171 cmt. h (1959).

began intense. In recent decades a variety of special-purpose statutes reversed the nondelegation rule for investment and other specialized functions, the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act in 1964,\textsuperscript{65} the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act in 1972,\textsuperscript{64} and ERISA,\textsuperscript{66} the federal pension reform law, in 1974.\textsuperscript{67} Early in the history of the mutual fund industry, it was feared that a trustee could not properly invest in mutual fund shares without violating the nondelegation rule (on the theory that the trustee was delegating the investment choices to the mutual fund manager).\textsuperscript{68} The mutual fund industry responded by securing legislation that remains in force in most states expressly authorizing trustees to invest in mutual funds.\textsuperscript{69}

2. Abrogating the Nondelegation Rule

The 1992 Restatement achieves a major reform of the nondelegation rule. Nominally, the Restatement leaves the general nondelegation principle intact, but effectively reduces it to a subrule of the duty of prudent administration and makes it easy to overcome. The new rule reads: “A trustee has a duty personally to perform the responsibilities of the trusteeship \textit{except as a prudent person might delegate} those responsibilities to others.”\textsuperscript{70} Applying that norm to the investment function, the new Restatement not only empowers the trustee to delegate investment and management powers, it provides that the trustee “may sometimes have a duty... to delegate [investment] functions... in such manner as a prudent investor would delegate under the circumstances.”\textsuperscript{71}

The Uniform Act follows the Restatement in crafting a delegation regime. Section 9(a) empowers the trustee to “delegate investment and management functions that a prudent trustee of comparable skills could properly delegate under the circumstances.”\textsuperscript{72} As replacement safeguards, the Act imposes duties of care, skill, and caution on trustees in selecting agents, in formulating the terms of the delegation, and in reviewing “the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item 7B U.L.A. 743 (1985).
\item ERISA § 402(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c)(3).
\item The pro-delegation measures in these statutes are discussed in Langbein, supra note 58, at 111-14.
\item So held in Marshall v. Frazier, 159 Or. 491, 80 P.2d 42 (Or. 1938), rejected in \textit{In re Rees}, 85 N.E.2d 563 (Ohio 1949).
\item Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 171 (1992) (emphasis added).
\item Id. § 171 cmt. j. The new Restatement makes clear that the trustee must “exercise prudence in the degree or manner of delegation. Prudence thus requires the exercise of care, skill, and caution in the selection of agents and in negotiating and establishing the terms of delegation.” Id. § 171 cmt. a.
\item UPIA § 9(a).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
agent's performance and compliance with the terms of the delegation."\(^{72}\)
The Act provides that the trustee who complies with these standards "is not liable . . . for the decisions or actions of the agent to whom the function was delegated."\(^{73}\) Instead, an aggrieved beneficiary must look exclusively to the agent, who "owes a duty to the trust to exercise reasonable care to comply with the terms of the delegation."\(^{74}\)

The official Comment explains the "tension"\(^{75}\) inherent in a permissive delegation rule. "If the trustee delegates effectively, the beneficiaries obtain the advantage of the agent's specialized investment skills or whatever other attributes induced the trustee to delegate."\(^{76}\) However, "if the trustee delegates to a knave or an incompetent, the delegation can work harm upon the beneficiaries."\(^{77}\) The requirement that the trustees use care, skill, and caution in selecting agents, in formulating the terms, and in monitoring compliance "is designed to strike the appropriate balance between the advantages and the hazards of delegation."\(^{78}\)

3. Minimizing Costs

In connection with delegation, I conclude this survey of the main features of the Uniform Act by directing attention to a seemingly unrelated provision of the Act, section 7, which deals with investment costs. It provides that "[i]n investing and managing trust assets, a trustee may only incur costs that are appropriate and reasonable in relation to the assets, the purposes of the trust, and the skills of the trustee."\(^{79}\) There is nothing novel about the trustee's duty to minimize costs in every facet of trust administration.\(^{80}\) As the official Comment remarks, "Wasting beneficiaries' money is imprudent. In devising and implementing strategies for the investment and management of trust assets, trustees are obliged to minimize costs."\(^{81}\)

\(^{72}\) Id. § 9(a)(3).
\(^{73}\) Id. § 9(c).
\(^{74}\) Id. § 9(b).
\(^{75}\) Id. § 9 cmt. ("Protecting the beneficiary against unreasonable delegation").
\(^{76}\) UPIA § 9 cmt.
\(^{77}\) Id.
\(^{78}\) Id. The Comment continues:

The trustee's duties of care, skill, and caution in framing the terms of the delegation should protect the beneficiary against overbroad delegation. For example, a trustee could not prudently agree to an investment management agreement containing an exculpation clause that leaves the trust without recourse against reckless mismanagement. Leaving one's beneficiaries remediless against willful wrongdoing is inconsistent with the duty to use care and caution in formulating the terms of the delegation.

\(^{79}\) Id. § 7.
\(^{80}\) See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 188 (1959).
\(^{81}\) UPIA § 7 cmt.
The Uniform Act foresees that practice under the Act's permissive delegation regime will be a main sphere for applying the duty to minimize costs. The official Comment observes: "The trustee must be alert to protect the beneficiary from 'double dipping.' If, for example, the trustee's regular compensation schedule presupposes that the trustee will conduct the investment management function, it should ordinarily follow that the trustee will lower its fee when delegating the investment function to an outside manager." 82

III. THE FUTURE OF TRUST INVESTING

What will the future bring under this new legal regime for trust investing?

A. Greater Use of Equities

This Article has emphasized that the new Restatement and the Uniform Prudent Investor Act are designed to liberate trust investors from the former preoccupation with "avoiding speculation." Extremely conservative investing will continue to be appropriate for trust accounts that cannot bear the volatility of riskier assets. But for trusts that can bear some exposure to the greater volatility characteristic of equities, the superior long-term returns will justify the risk. As a practical matter, therefore, the Uniform Act's invitation to trustees to tailor investments to the risk tolerance of the particular trust is likely to result in greater use of equities, apart from the most risk-averse trusts.83

Charitable trusts and foundations are particularly likely candidates for increasing their exposure to equities. The Prefatory Note to the Uniform Act observes that although the "Act is centrally concerned with the investment responsibilities" of private trusts, "the prudent investor rule also bears on charitable" trusts.84 Because charitable trusts and foundations

82. Id. § 9 cmt. ("Costs"). For more on the concern with double dipping in delegation policy, see Langbein, supra note 58, at 108-09.

83. A leading New York corporate fiduciary, Bankers Trust, has published a statement on the investment ramifications of New York's version of the prudent investor act, see supra note 16. Bankers Trust foresees as "a probable result of Prudent Investor legislation ... an increase in the proportion of equities in trust accounts." Bankers Trust New York Corp., Investment Implications of the Prudent Investor Act 3 (1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bankers Trust Statement]. The statement reasons: "Generally, a higher equity exposure produces higher variability of trust values, and therefore, more risk. However, this incremental risk can be mitigated through diversification." Id.

Using a variety of empirical data, a recent finance study concludes that the traditional prudent man standard explains the tendency of bank fiduciary investors to overemphasize the equities of large mature companies, by comparison with the greater risk-tolerance shown by mutual funds and other types of institutional investors. Diane Del Guercio, The Distorting Effect of the Prudent-Man Laws on Institutional Equity Investments, 40 J. Fin. Econ. 31 (1996).

84. UPIA, Prefatory Note ("Implications for charitable and pension trusts") (citing the 1959 Restatement for the familiar proposition that "[i]n making investments of trust funds the

**B. More Pooling, Less Individual Security Selection**

My most confident prediction is that the future will see trustees making ever greater use of pooled investment vehicles. It will be ever less common for a trustee to construct a portfolio of individually selected securities. Increasingly, the main work of the fiduciary investor will be what has come to be called asset allocation. The trustee will form a view of the needs, resources, and risk tolerances of the beneficiaries of the particular trust. The trustee will then decide what proportion of the portfolio to invest in what classes of assets. These choices will take the form of allocating the trust assets among large, diversified portfolios, primarily mutual funds and bank common trust funds. Under the Uniform Act, both the enhanced duty to diversify and the portfolio standard of care point us in that direction. As I have previously emphasized, few trusts have the resources to achieve thorough diversification without using pooled vehicles. The movement away from individual stock selection responds to the two central discoveries of Modern Portfolio Theory. One of these findings I have already discussed—the large and essentially costless returns to be had from optimizing diversification. The other great lesson from MPT is the understanding of why individual stock selection is so perilous—why, that is, investors find it so hard to pick winners and to avoid losers. For persons who are not familiar with the remarkable insights of MPT on this subject, a brief overview may be useful.

**1. Empirical Evidence on Institutional Portfolios**

Over the past generation, dozens of research projects, mostly conducted from university finance departments, have produced astonishing empirical data on the investment performance of professional portfolio managers. The early studies were based on data from investment companies, that is, mutual funds, but subsequent studies have replicated the results for other types of institutional portfolios. These studies have found that professionally managed institutional portfolios as a group actually underperformed the broad stock market averages such as the Standard and Poor's 500 stock index.\footnote{See Brealey, supra note 21, at 54-55 (summarizing data for mutual funds from 1955-1964 and for bank, insurance company, and investment managers' portfolios from 1968-77).} "The funds did not show superior

trustee of a charitable trust is under a duty similar to that of the trustee of a private trust. Restatement of Trusts § 389 (1959)."
judgment either in picking stocks or anticipating general market movements."87 Further, no individual fund outperformed the market with a consistency greater than the law of averages would predict.88 A fund that performed well one year was as likely to perform poorly the next year as it was to continue doing well.

Similar results continue to be reported. For example, across the ten years ending in 1993, the Morningstar mutual fund research organization found that "diversified U.S. stock funds returned an average 12.8%, compared with 14.9% for the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index."89 An important scholarly examination of pension fund investments in common stocks published in 1992 concluded that "pension fund equity managers seem to subtract rather than add value relative to the performance of the Standard & Poor's 500 Index."90 The authors of the study computed that managed U.S. pension equity portfolios underperform the unmanaged averages by about 1.5 percent, which translates to a loss of about $15 billion a year.91

I began learning about this empirical work on securities prices in the early 1970s as a young law teacher at the University of Chicago, which was then a hotbed of efficient market research. I still remember my initial sense of disbelief about the findings, because they were so counterintuitive. How was it possible that the sophisticated and experienced investment professionals managing the great institutional portfolios could achieve results so disappointing? These managers were the best and the brightest. They worked under compensation arrangements that gave them powerful incentives to achieve the best possible results in the portfolios that they managed. Yet the data showed that they couldn't even hit the side of the barn, in the sense that they had been unable to match the performance of the broad market averages.

In 1973 Burton Malkiel published his celebrated popularization of Modern Portfolio Theory, titled A Random Walk Down Wall Street, a book now in its fifth edition. He taunted the professionals with the claim "that a blindfolded chimpanzee throwing darts at the [stock tables in the] Wall Street Journal can select a portfolio that performs as well as those managed by the experts."92 The book caused some resentment, because as Malkiel

88. See Brealey, supra note 21, at 55.
91. Id. at 379.
later acknowledged, “financial analysts in pin-striped suits do not like being compared with bare-assed apes.”

2. Efficient Markets

What explains this astonishing evidence? Why have the professional investment managers performed so poorly? Modern Portfolio Theory supplies a crisp answer to that question. In a nutshell, the insight is that the professional portfolio managers are not incompetent bunglers, indeed, just the opposite. They are so good at what they do that they effectively cancel each other out.

To understand why, start with the basics. The price of a security represents the present discounted value of its future earnings. Further, for every buyer there must be a seller—someone who has formed an opposite judgment about the value of that future earnings stream at the security's current price. If all investors agreed that a particular security was a bargain at its current price, no one who owned the security would sell it at that price. Only an increase in price would induce sellers to sell. This is why we can say that, presumptively, any security is correctly priced at its current trading level.

To outperform the market—that is, consistently to identify undervalued or overvalued securities in advance of other investors—an investor must predict future earnings with superior speed and accuracy. But here the task becomes daunting. New information about individual companies is disseminated rapidly as a result of modern communications systems. The securities laws have largely choked off inside information as a source of advantage in trading. Economic developments, technological innovation, foreign affairs, political events, social changes—all profoundly affect the prices of securities, yet these phenomena are notoriously difficult to foresee.

Professional securities analysts are thus largely limited to interpreting information already in the public domain and available to other analysts. In order to outperform the market the portfolio manager has to be consistently better at making such interpretations than the thousands of competing professionals who are interpreting the same data. The theory of efficient markets posits that everything that is known or knowable about the price of a publicly traded security is already fully reflected in its price. The securities markets are so efficient in discounting information and pricing securities that not even the professionals can consistently identify undervalued and overvalued securities before other investors get there. The indifferent performance record of professional investment managers is, therefore, “exactly what we should expect in an efficient market.”

93. Id. at 24.
95. Brealey, supra note 21, at 55.
One response to the lesson that you cannot beat the market is that you might make a considered judgment to cease attempting it, especially if you can pocket the savings from not trying. A vast proportion of all fiduciary investing is now conducted “passively,” in so-called index or market funds. These funds undertake simply to replicate the performance of the broad market indexes. In the mid-1970s when market funds first appeared, they attracted only a few hundred million dollars, most of it from the AT&T pension funds. Today, hundreds of billions of dollars in American equities are indexed.

3. Inefficient Markets

Not all markets are efficient. The reason that Malkiel’s dart-throwing chimpanzee can outperform most of the professionals is that the chimp is throwing darts at a table of market prices. The chimp is a free rider, taking advantage of the accuracy of the information already impounded in the published prices for publicly traded securities. But some assets do not have a market price. Two such classes of assets that are prominent in family wealth, and hence tend to show up in trusts, are real estate and close corporations. There is no market price for your house. Your house is unique, hence yesterday’s trade of a house nearby does not accurately value your house. Likewise, because there is no orderly market for close corporation shares, the chimp with the darts cannot hit a market price for them.

To conclude: Modern Portfolio Theory has taught us that the game of stock picking is costly and futile for most investors, especially small investors, while emphasizing the large and essentially costless gains that are to be had from maximizing diversification. These twin insights point the fiduciary investor—that is, the prudent investor—strongly toward the use of pooled investment vehicles that are large enough to achieve high levels of diversification at reasonable cost. The investment path of the future for trusts, especially smaller trusts, is the mutual fund or the bank common trust fund.

96. The 1992 Restatement makes clear that investing in index funds is prudent. Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227 cmt. h (1992); id. reporter’s note, § 227, at 78-79.

97. It has recently been computed that the 200 largest defined benefit pension funds hold $377 billion in index funds, of which $284 billion is in domestic equities, $35 billion in foreign equities, and the rest in bonds. The 200 largest defined contribution funds hold $84 billion in index funds, $80 billion of it in equities, the rest in bonds. Pensions & Investments, Jan. 22, 1996, at 62-63. The same journal reported total domestic indexed assets of tax-exempt investors (mostly pension funds) at above $600 billion as of December 1, 1995. Indexed Assets Leap 39.9% for Year, Pension & Investments, Feb. 19, 1996, at 1.
C. International Investing

By freeing trustees from the old concern to avoid speculation, and by relieving them of the categoric restrictions forbidding particular sorts of investments, the Restatement and the Uniform Act will make it easier for the trust investor to include in the portfolio relatively novel types of assets, when such assets are likely to enhance diversification or to improve expected return on a risk-adjusted basis.

The best example of this new openness to fiduciary investing is occurring in foreign securities. Until the 1980s, it was relatively uncommon to find foreign securities in American trust portfolios. There have been a variety of quite legitimate concerns about investing abroad. The liquidity of most foreign markets is inferior to that of the American markets, transaction costs on foreign exchanges are higher, the regulatory and accounting standards abroad are often less exacting than in the United States, and currency risk introduces a further source of volatility. Nevertheless, these drawbacks pale when contrasted against the great advantages of international investing.

Foreign securities enhance diversification. As of year-end 1994, American equities constituted 35.1 percent of the capitalization of the world's equity markets. "To ignore non-U.S. markets is to ignore 64.9 percent of the total global market." Furthermore, the world's securities markets tend to move against each other rather than in alignment. Back in the early 1980s Richard Brealey showed "that a well diversified international portfolio is only about . . . two thirds as risky as a diversified portfolio of U.S. stocks." Returns so superior led Brealey to conclude: "You need a very positive reason not to invest a significant proportion of your stock portfolio overseas."

Investing abroad has boomed. Between 1973 and 1992, total international equity mutual fund assets increased from $800 million to over $43 billion. There has been a comparable increase in international investing among pension funds, charitable endowments, bank common trust funds, and other fiduciary investors. Using data from the National Association of College and University Business Officers, the New York Times...
recently reported that 7.5 percent of college and university endowments are now invested in foreign equities. For Yale University, the Times reported 12 percent of the endowment in foreign equities. Foreign holdings constituted 7.2 percent of the assets of United States pension funds as of 1993 and are projected to reach 11.5 percent in 1998.

The 1992 Restatement expressly endorses trust investment in foreign securities. The Uniform Act does not single out any asset class for special approval, but by emphasizing diversification, the total-portfolio standard of care, and the abrogation of categoric restrictions on types of investment, the Uniform Act leaves no doubt that it buttresses international investing.

D. Derivatives

Derivatives constitute another category of unconventional assets destined to become more prominent in fiduciary portfolios. Scandals connected with the use of derivatives have been front page news in recent months. Rogue traders have inflicted huge losses on the Daiwa Bank, on the Common Fund, and on the venerable but now defunct Barings Bank. Companies as sophisticated as General Electric and Proctor & Gamble are litigating about large losses sustained from investments in derivatives. Orange County, California, is in bankruptcy thanks to the county treasurer's penchant for investing in derivatives. From a distance, therefore, derivatives seem to be well worth avoiding, especially if you are a trustee charged with investing prudently for your beneficiaries.

As is so often the case, however, the headlines tell only part of the story. The scandals involve cases in which derivatives were used in a fashion that increased portfolio risk enormously. Embarrassed investors were effectively placing immense bets on the future of interest rates, or in the case of Barings, on the future price levels of the Japanese stock market.

104. Solnik, supra note 100, at 576.
105. Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227, cmts. f, i (1992); id. reporter's note, at 97-98.
106. The Bankers Trust Statement, "Investment Implications of the Prudent Investor Act," accords:

Many non-U.S. investments behave differently from U.S. equity and fixed income securities, thereby providing incremental returns without increasing risk levels. In many cases, [non-U.S. investments] can actually reduce risk. This reduction of volatility, or risk management, is the primary reason for the trend toward global portfolio management.

Bankers Trust Statement, supra note 83, at 4.
Such investments are highly unlikely to qualify in a private trust account under any formulation of prudence, because the downside risk is larger than the risk tolerance of almost any trust investor.

There are, however, risk-reducing uses of derivatives. The Uniform Act’s abrogation of categoric restrictions on types of investments allows trustees to use derivatives in such cases. George Crawford, in his intriguingly titled article, “A Fiduciary Duty to Use Derivatives?,” illustrates a particularly compelling case. Crawford posits a situation involving an elderly woman whose assets consist disproportionately of a large block of shares in the Philip Morris Company. She bought the shares decades ago, and they have appreciated hugely. She goes to the local bank and sets up a trust for herself for life, with the remainder to her siblings. She transfers the Philip Morris shares to the trust, together with her other holdings. The trust is seriously underdiversified; sixty percent of its assets are tied up in Philip Morris stock. Alas, the bank as trustee faces a difficult problem: Selling Philip Morris stock would result in a taxable gain, with perhaps 30 percent of the proceeds being lost to taxation. Under the rule that allows stepped-up basis at death, that tax liability would be completely avoided if the trust retained the stock until the settlor’s death.

In traditional trust administration, the trustee would be faced with a choice between selling the shares, thus incurring the tax cost; or holding the shares and running the risk of underdiversification. In Crawford’s parable, the trustee opts to hold and remain underdiversified. Soon thereafter, Philip Morris plunges from $78 per share to $52 per share. Crawford suggests that the trustee had a third alternative, an alternative so compelling that the trustee might be liable for breach of the duty of prudent investing for failing to have taken it. The trustee should have bought a derivative, a put option on Philip Morris common, that would have increased in value in the event that the price of the underlying common stock declined. Buying put options can be costly, but for a number of large capitalization stocks, including Philip Morris, low-cost put options called LEAPS (“long-term equity appreciations”) can be purchased. Crawford runs the numbers and shows that the advantage to holding the Philip Morris and offsetting the risk of decline by buying LEAPS is so overwhelming by comparison either with selling the shares and paying the tax bill or doing nothing and risking the loss from underdiversification that the prudence standard should compel the use of the derivative.

As Crawford’s example suggests, I think we can confidently predict that the coming decades will witness ever greater use of risk-reduction strategies employing derivatives in trust portfolios.

109. Crawford, supra note 107, at 313.
E. Reduced Deference to the Paper Trail

An odd trait of the older trust investment law in deciding whether a trustee has invested prudently has been the inclination to give great weight to the trustee’s internal procedures for investing and monitoring investments. If a corporate trustee’s file recites a plenitude of deliberation—an investment committee, a securities selection committee, and a portfolio manager for the particular trust, all busily pumping quarterly memoranda about their due deliberateness into the file—the courts have sometimes been willing to treat this paper trail as presumptive evidence of prudence.110 A practitioner treatise remarks on this phenomenon: “In cases involving the propriety of investments, the decision-making process may be as important as the decision itself, at least for purposes of determining the trustee’s responsibility.”111

I suspect that the courts have tended to fall back on evidence of seemingly sound internal procedures because the substantive standard of prudent investing has been so imprecise. Proceduralism is a common retreat in fields in which substantive law provides inadequate guidance—American administrative law is a prominent example. For the future, however, particularly as regards the intensified duty to diversify under the new Restatement and the Uniform Act, I predict that the courts will feel less need to retreat to the proceduralism of the paper trail. No amount of paper trail can excuse the five-bond or ten-stock portfolios still found in too many trust accounts.

The greater objectivity and precision of the modern standards for prudent investing manifest themselves well beyond the duty to diversify. For example, as trust investing moves toward ever greater use of broad-based portfolios, it will become easier to measure investment performance and to identify substandard returns. Many types of mutual funds and common trust funds are easily comparable. Most sponsors offer the chocolate, vanilla, and strawberry of corporate bond portfolios—short, intermediate, and long term. Most offer a comparable array of U.S. treasury bond funds. And we are now seeing ever increasing standardization of types of equity funds.

Consider, therefore, a simple case. Suppose that a trustee determines to invest twenty percent of the trust in an intermediate-term bond fund. Suppose, further, that the particular intermediate bond fund that the trustee chooses persistently underperforms other intermediate-term bond funds on account of drastically higher expense ratios. In view of the trustee’s duty to monitor,112 the burden will more easily shift to the trustee to explain why the trustee chose that particular fund. Under the

110. Perhaps the most exaggerated example is Stark v. United States Trust Co., 445 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), a gullible opinion by the normally perceptive Judge Edward Weinfeld.
112. UPIA § 9(a), supra text accompanying note 72.
prudence standard, the comparability of increasingly standardized fund types will allow trustees (and the courts who oversee trustees when beneficiaries are unhappy) greater precision in examining investment performance. The point is not that a disappointing fund or fund year is ipso facto imprudent—far from it. The point is that the growing comparability of fund types provides a more precise and objective benchmark for evaluating claims that a certain fund is so manifestly inferior to competitors that investing in it, or retaining it, is imprudent.

F. Increased Scrutiny of Uneconomic Settlor Instructions

I would also predict that the greater clarity of the new trust investment law will result in less deference to the wishes of the trust settlor in an uncommon but troubling case—the case in which the settlor attempts to impose a manifestly stupid investment restriction on the trust.

Take as the starting point the proposition, strongly endorsed in section 1(b) of the Uniform Act,113 that almost all trust law is default law, rules that yield to the contrary wishes of the settlor. Trust law presumes that the settlor has the best interests of the beneficiaries at heart when the settlor imposes restrictions on the disposition of trust property. If, for example, I leave my summer cottage on Lake Adams in trust for my children with instructions that it not be sold but kept in the family for recreational use, that instruction will be honored even if the beneficiaries would rather not set foot on the shores of Lake Adams ever again.114 Under conventional American trust law, the settlor’s property rights are indulged. As settlor, I am entitled to decide what is best for my beneficiaries, subject only to the rule against perpetuities.

There are, however, limitations. If I devise property to a trust directing that the trustee erect equestrian statues of me in public squares in Iowa, that provision will be invalidated. A private trust must be for the benefit of the beneficiaries; a charitable trust must satisfy standards of public benefit. The trust to endow Iowa with bronze, equestrian Langbeins achieves neither.115

Even when the settlor’s instruction is not manifestly loony, the deviation doctrine allows a court to alter an unwise investment restriction “if necessary to carry out the purposes of the trust.”116 The leading case

---

113. “The prudent investor rule, a default rule, may be expanded, restricted, eliminated, or otherwise altered by the provisions of a trust.” UPIA § 1(b), 7B U.L.A. 18 (Supp. 1995).
114. “If the continuance of the trust is necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust, the beneficiaries cannot compel its termination.” Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 337(2) (1959).
115. Id. § 418(c) (invalidating trusts for capricious purposes); accord id. § 124 cmt. g. Compare M’Caig v. University of Glasgow, [1907] Sess. Cas. 231 (Scotland), voiding a trust to erect statues of the testator and other family members on lands devised by the testator, discussed in 2 Scott & Fratcher, supra note 32, § 124.7, at 277-78. On the public benefit standard, the so-called doctrine of charitable purposes, see Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 368 (1959).
involved a trust set up by Joseph Pulitzer for his children, in which he forbid the trustees to sell the *New York World* newspaper. When the paper became unprofitable, the trustees received judicial approval to sell it anyhow. The reasoning in such cases is that subsequent experience has revealed a conflict between the settlor's dominant purpose, which is to benefit the trust beneficiaries; and the settlor's subsidiary purpose, which is to benefit them in a particular way—in *Pulitzer*, by keeping the *New York World* in the trust. The court is simply preferring the dominant purpose, in order to carry out the settlor's presumed intent.

Suppose, however, that the trust instrument in *Pulitzer* had foreseen and recited the danger that the paper might become unprofitable, and had directed retention of the investment in any event. I have no doubt that the court in *Pulitzer* would have ordered the trustees to sell the newspaper despite the settlor's direction to retain it. The settlor's instruction to retain the newspaper at all costs would come to resemble my instruction to litter the Iowa landscape with equestrian statues. If the settlor directs an objectively stupid investment policy, the court will direct deviation even though the settlor anticipates the circumstance. The settlor is presumed to intend to benefit the beneficiaries, but if it can be shown that a term of the trust manifestly harms their interests, the court will order deviation from it. A private trust must be for the benefit of the beneficiaries.

Now consider a type of investment instruction that is closer to reality. The settlor has worked all his life for, let us say, IBM. Through stock options and company sponsored investment plans, he has accumulated a large block of IBM common stock. He dies, leaving the block in trust with instructions not to sell it. The block is the only substantial asset of the trust, and because the settlor's death results in a stepped-up basis, selling the block incurs no tax cost. Suppose, further, that the settlor leaves a letter explaining his thinking, "I worked for IBM for 35 years, they were wonderful to me, they helped me buy the stock, and the stock zoomed in value throughout my career. You just cannot do better."

What is happening in this case is that the settlor is imposing his supposed investment wisdom on the trust in circumstances in which the investment strategy is objectively stupid and imprudent. We now know that the advantages of diversifying a portfolio of securities are so great that it is

118. *E.g.*, Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, 135 A. 555, 564 (Conn. 1926) (holding void certain restrictions as to the height of buildings to be erected on trust real estate because "the restrictions are opposed to the interests of the beneficiaries of the trust").
TRUST INVESTING

fool not to do it. I am not saying that you can never have an underdiversified trust fund. It will remain common to place a family firm or a family farm in trust, notwithstanding that such a trust will often be underdiversified. There’s nothing wrong with using a trust as part of the succession arrangements for a family enterprise. I further concede, following the official Comment to the Uniform Prudent Investor Act,\(^{120}\) that there will remain cases in which the tax cost of diversifying a low-basis asset may outweigh the gain.\(^{121}\) When, however, the trust assets are cash or cash-equivalent, in the sense that diversification can be achieved at little cost, I believe that the courts will come to view the advantages of diversification as so overwhelming that the settlor’s interference with effective diversification will be found to be inconsistent with the requirement that a private trust must be for the benefit of the beneficiary.

G. Fractionation of Trusteeship

Trusteeship entails three relatively distinct functions: investment, administration, and distribution. Investment includes not only the initial selection of securities or other assets, but also the tasks of monitoring the investments for continuing suitability, investing new funds, and voting the shares. Administration includes the range of accounting, reporting, and tax filing. The responsibility for taking custody of securities is another branch of trust administration. Unusual trust assets may require other administrative work—maintaining and leasing real estate, insuring and safekeeping the Picasso and the diamond tiara, and so forth. Distribution is sometimes mechanical, but trust instruments often bestow upon trustees the discretion to spray, sprinkle, invade, accumulate, terminate, and so forth. Distribution, therefore, requires interpreting and applying the sometimes complex language of the trust instrument; and it commonly involves contact with the current beneficiaries, in order to keep abreast of their needs and circumstances.

In former centuries, when ancestral land was the prototypical trust asset, these three functions of trusteeship were inextricably merged. The trustees were often not much more than nominees—mere stakeholders—and the family that lived on the land managed it. As financial assets have become the characteristic asset of the modern managerial trust, there is ever less reason for these three relatively disparate functions—investment, administration, and distribution—to remain consolidated in a single pair of hands. No deep connection exists between, for example, being good at working with beneficiaries on the distribution side, and being expert at investing trust funds or preparing fiduciary tax returns.

As Modern Portfolio Theory and the modernized prudent investor norm drive fiduciaries to use ever larger portfolios, there will be ever less reason to think that family trustees, and even small bank trustees, can

\(^{120}\) UPIA § 3 cmt.
\(^{121}\) But see supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
competently conduct the investment function in-house. The delegation doctrine that is legitimated under the 1992 Restatement and the Uniform Act\textsuperscript{122} facilitates the use of outside investment products and outside investment managers. Bank trust departments are making ever greater use of mutual funds.\textsuperscript{123} When the funds are internally managed, they constitute a close alternative to bank-operated common trust funds. When the bank as trustee uses externally managed mutual funds, the trustee commonly retains the asset allocation decisions for the particular trust in-house while effectively delegating detailed portfolio management to the outside investment company. This is an intermediate position between completely internalized investment management and complete delegation of the investment function.

One consequence of legitimating the delegation of investment functions will likely be a greater willingness on the part of lawyers to serve as trustees.\textsuperscript{124} Lawyers bring expertise to the interpretation of trust instruments, and the typical law firm exhibits more stable personnel practices than the perennial revolving door that has been such a troubling feature of bank trust departments. Thus, on the distribution side, lawyers and law firms have formidable comparative advantages as fiduciaries. By contrast, lawyers have no particular reason to be in the investment business—at least if the investment function entails the work of actively constructing and maintaining portfolios as opposed to making or overseeing asset allocation decisions among externally managed portfolios. The delegation doctrine may encourage more lawyers and law firms to accept trusteeships, by keeping distribution work in-house, while facilitating the delegation of detailed investment and administrative functions to specialized providers.

**H. Principal and Income**

I conclude my efforts to peer into the future of trust investing by turning to a seemingly quite distinct subject: the rules governing how trustees allocate the receipts from trust investments between principal and income. The new trust-investment law is undermining the practices that trustees have long followed for discharging their duty of impartiality to multiple beneficiaries. We are learning that the duties of prudent investing and of impartiality have had a more intimate connection than has been understood. Traditional principal-and-income concepts will not survive in the world of MPT-driven investing.

\textsuperscript{122} See supra notes 56-82 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{123} The subject has its own treatise: Melanie L. Fein et al., Mutual Fund Activities of Banks (1998).

\textsuperscript{124} I have elsewhere had occasion to point to some of the advantages that lawyers can bring to trusteeship as well as some of the dangers. John H. Langbein, Taking a Look at the Pluses and Minuses of the Practice, 128 Tr. & Est. 10 (Dec. 1989). The American Bar Association's most recent guidance on the topic is reported in Bradley R. Cook, Principles for Attorneys Acting in Other Fiduciary Roles, 6 Prob. & Prop. 6 (Mar./Apr. 1992).
Most trusts provide for multiple interests, commonly a life estate, followed by remainders—for example, to my widow for her life, remainder to my issue. Trust law requires the trustee in such cases to adhere to what is called the duty of impartiality. The Restatement version says: “If a trust is created for beneficiaries in succession, the trustee is under a duty to the successive beneficiaries to act with due regard to their respective interests.” In allocating the receipts and expenses of the trust, the current beneficiary “is entitled to, and only to, the net income” of the trust. Other investment returns, especially capital appreciation, accrue to the corpus of the trust. The Uniform Principal and Income Act and comparable nonuniform legislation regulate corporate distributions, assigning dividends and interest to income, while accruing stock splits and other capital-account transactions to the remainder interest.

In former centuries, when agricultural real estate was the typical trust asset, the concept of net income had an intuitive, largely self-defining basis, which left scant discretion in the trustee. The life tenant was entitled to the fruits and rents of the land. Difficulty in ascertaining what was income arose only at the margin, with gravel pits and timber stands and the like. As the portfolio of financial assets displaced agricultural land from the prototypical modern trust, the concept of trust income became vastly more manipulable in the hands of the trustee.

In modern circumstances, the trustee’s investment decisions largely determine the income allocation to the current beneficiary. If the trustee loads the portfolio with the shares of so-called growth companies that retain their profits for internal expansion and pay little or no dividends, conventional income will be impaired. By contrast, were the trustee to skew the portfolio toward high-yielding stocks and bonds, which tend to deliver most of their return in dividends and interest rather than to experience much capital appreciation, the trust’s investment policy would favor the current beneficiary and impair the remainder interest. At either extreme, or anywhere between, the trustee who has investment discretion effectively chooses the income level by choosing the investments. The duty of impartiality constrains the trustee by requiring “due regard” to the interests of principal and income, but within the sphere of discretion that the duty of impartiality permits, trustees commonly make investment decisions with a view to achieving the desired income level.

By distorting investment choices in order to maximize a particular form of return (whether dividends and interest or capital appreciation), conventional trust investment practices that are designed to satisfy

125. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 232 (1959).
126. Id. § 233(1)(a). Manifestly, this default regime is altered when the trust grants the trustee discretion over whether or in what shares to distribute income, or when the trust grants the trustee a power to invade corpus for the income beneficiaries.
principal-and-income concerns come into tension with Modern Portfolio Theory. Thus, for example, the trustee who is administering a trust that needs to achieve a high level of current income may feel obliged to invest heavily in bonds, even though it is known that equities outperform bonds across the long term on a total-return basis. The conventional principal-and-income rules drive that trustee to accept a lower total return in order to obtain a particular form of return—interest rather than capital appreciation. In many trust portfolios that could prudently tolerate greater risk by holding a higher proportion of equities, the trustees have refrained from investing appropriately in equities because such a portfolio commonly produces less current income.

The lesson, in the words of Joel Dobris, is that “investing should not be connected with principal and income allocation.” Instead, the trustee should first invest to maximize total return, and then, in a separate and subsequent step, “allocate the return as fairly as possible.” In a prominent article published in 1986, Jeffrey Gordon observed that skewing the portfolio to achieve a particular income/principal allocation also impairs diversification.

Our traditional notion that the current beneficiary automatically receives all the “income” has concealed from us the truth that the trustee’s investment policy largely determines how much that income will be. Accordingly, an MPT-driven regime that would allow the trustee to invest for the maximum return suitable to the trust, regardless of form, and then to allocate to income that portion that the trustee determines to be appropriate for discharging the duty of impartiality, would involve no fundamental departure from the inner functional balance of the present law. Under either scheme, the trustee decides how much of the trust’s investment return to devote to the income interest. But greater candor about the relationship between investing and allocating would allow the trustee to follow investment practices that would produce superior returns for both current and remainder beneficiaries.

Two main suggestions have been made for devising allocation

130. Id.
131. Such a portfolio “is not optimally diversified” because it has not been assembled with the objective of producing the greatest expected returns for the risk. It is easy to see why systematic exclusion of companies with low dividends but high reinvestment rates upsets a diversification scheme, but there is no assurance that a portfolio that emphasizes balance between high and low dividend paying securities will be well-diversified otherwise. The point is that the allocation of total returns between “income” and “principal” forced by settled trust law is profoundly inconsistent with the portfolio theory paradigm.

formulas to facilitate total-return investing: the unitrust, and equitable reallocation. The unitrust is common in the world of foundations and charitable trusts,132 (and in tax planning for individuals after the enactment of Chapter 14 of the Internal Revenue Code).133 Under a unitrust, all the investment gains for the accounting period are initially assigned to principal, without regard to form (that is, whether dividends, interest, or capital appreciation). Thereafter, a spending formula (for example, five percent of principal, or the inflation rate plus two percent) is used to determine the share for current-year distribution. It is no accident that the unitrust has thus far thrived mostly in the tax-exempt world of the IRC § 501(c)(3) organization, where there is no tax reward for preferring capital gains over dividends and interest, and no tax penalty for recognizing capital gains. That is to say, our rules of taxation, as well as our rules for allocating principal and income, can impede total-return investing for taxable trusts.

Under a system of equitable reallocation, the trustee would retain the conventional form-driven categories as the initial stage of principal-and-income allocation. If, however, the trustee were to determine that the outcome achieved for the particular trust by applying those form-driven rules did not correctly balance the needs of current and remainder beneficiaries, the trustee would have the duty to reallocate the returns in order to discharge the duty of impartiality.

As I write, a Uniform Law Commission drafting committee is wrestling with proposed revisions to the Uniform Principal and Income Act, including the challenge of adapting the principal-and-income rules to the world of total-return investing under the Uniform Prudent Investor Act. The committee considered unitrust solutions but is presently inclined to recommend a limited form of equitable reallocation.134 It remains to be seen whether this proposal will survive in the draft, and whether the full Commission will endorse it.

I suspect that some decades will be needed to harmonize fully the present tensions among total return-investing as facilitated by the prudent investor paradigm, recognition-based income taxation, and principal-and-income law. The Uniform Prudent Investor Act does not even address these issues. But by committing American trust-investment law to the main principles of Modern Portfolio Theory, the Act has brought awareness of these tensions onto the agenda that confronts legal policymakers and practicing lawyers in trust and estate law, and that is a giant first step.
