The Trickle-Down War

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"War made the state, and the state made war."
– Charles Tilly

INTRODUCTION

The history of the European nation-state, wrote political sociologist Charles Tilly, is inextricably bound up with the history of warfare. To oversimplify Tilly’s nuanced and complex arguments, the story goes something like this: as power-holders (originally bandits and local strongmen) sought to expand their power, they needed capital to pay for weapons, soldiers, and supplies. The need for capital and new recruits drove the creation of taxation systems and census mechanisms, and the need for more effective systems of taxation and recruitment necessitated better roads, better communications, and better record keeping. This in turn enabled the creation of larger and more technologically sophisticated armies.

The complexity and expense of maintaining more professionalized standing armies made it increasingly difficult for non-state groups to compete with states, giving centralized states a war-making advantage and enabling them to increasingly monopolize the means of large-scale violence. But the need to recruit, train, and sustain ever-larger and more sophisticated armies also put pressure on these

* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, and Senior Fellow, New America Foundation. Zach Klein, Georgetown Law ’15, provided first-rate research assistance and many thoughtful comments. My colleague David Cole saved me from making several errors. (Remaining errors are all mine.) More generally, this Essay also owes a great deal to conversations with Steve Vladeck, Martin Flaherty, and Mary Dudziak.

states to provide basic services, improve nutrition, education, and so on. Ultimately, we arrive at the late twentieth-century European welfare state, with its particular trade-offs between the state and its subjects.\(^2\)

By now, Tilly’s claim that “war made the state, and the state made war” is so widely accepted that it has become almost a truism—so much so that we’re apt to forget that the process of war-making and state transformation is ongoing, and not merely a matter for the history books. Today, as in the past, the state makes war—and though there is nothing deterministic or teleological about it, the manner in which the state makes war drives further changes both in the shape of the state itself and in its relationship with individuals.

The state makes war in several different senses. Most obviously, it is the state that wages war: the state chooses which wars to fight, and how to fight them. In 2001, for instance, the United States decided to go to war in Afghanistan, first relying largely on air power in conjunction with small numbers of Army Special Forces troops and CIA paramilitary personnel, then expanding the military effort until, by 2010, the U.S. force in Afghanistan consisted of roughly 100,000 troops.\(^3\) Similarly, in 2003 the United States chose to invade Iraq, launching an eight-year war; by 2007, United States troop levels in Iraq peaked at nearly 170,000. These “traditional” forms of state war-making have institutional and budgetary implications and opportunity costs, and though their long-term impact remains unknowable, they appear to fit into Tilly’s paradigm in relatively straightforward ways.\(^4\)

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5. One might argue, for instance, that the sheer cost of these two wars contributed to a spike in U.S. debt, increasing U.S. vulnerability to financial crisis and U.S. reliance on foreign creditors such as China. See, e.g., Linda Bilmes, The Financial Legacy of Iraq and Afghanistan: How Wartime Spending Decisions Will Constrain Future National Security Budgets (Harvard Univ., Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Faculty Working Paper Series RWP 13-006, 2013), https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=8956; Max Fisher, This Surprising Chart Shows Which Countries Own the Most U.S. Debt, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/10/10/this -surprising-chart-shows-which-countries-own-the-most-u-s-debt/. The military, under strain due to frequent combat deployments, pushed for and received substantial increases in compensation and benefits for service members and their dependents. Meanwhile, other federal employees saw stagnating salaries and cuts in
But the state "makes" war in other senses as well. From an institutional perspective, it is the state that decides which tasks to assign to civilian entities and which tasks to assign to the military (which we are apt to define, more or less tautologically, as that specialized state institution designated as having responsibility for the activity we call warfare). From a legal perspective, it is the state that chooses which activities will be categorized as "war" and war-related, thus determining the legal framework within which both individual rights and subsequent state uses of coercion and lethal force are evaluated.

The United States' response to 9/11 is a case in point. The 9/11 attacks might have been viewed as egregious acts of criminality, for instance, or as an armed attack of sufficient gravity to trigger an international-law right to use force in self-defense, without triggering an armed conflict. The United States opted instead to treat the 9/11 attacks and the U.S. response as an armed conflict.

This had legal consequences: once the United States categorized the post-9/11 relationship between the United States and Al Qaeda—and, later, between the United States and Al Qaeda's "associates"—as "war," a large swath of state and non-state activities were brought within the ambit of the international law of armed conflict, with its far more permissive rules for the state use of lethal benefits, potentially reshaping the nature of federal employment and shifting the civil-military balance. See Analysis of Federal Civilian and Military Compensation, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (2011), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/120xx/doc12042/01-20-compensation.pdf. At the same time, the greatly increased U.S. reliance on private military contractors in these two wars helped fuel a vast expansion of private military and security companies, further blurring the already blurry boundaries between public and private. See, e.g., Shantanu Chakrabarti, Growth and Implications of Private Military Corporations, 2 J. DEF. STUDS. 109 (2008); see LAURA DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE: PROTECTING PUBLIC VALUES IN AN ERA OF PRIVATIZED FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2011).


7. See, e.g., George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1301 (2001), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2001-09-17/html/WCPD-2001-09-17-Pg1301-2.htm; William H. Taft IV, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 320 (2003). As I have argued elsewhere, there was nothing inevitable or legally "necessary" about the U.S. decision to treat its post-9/11 relationship with Al Qaeda as an armed conflict for legal purposes. The Bush Administration could have opted to view the conflict through a different lens, but preferred not to, with far-reaching consequences. See Rosa Brooks, Duck-Rabbits and Drones: Legal Indeterminacy in the War on Terror, 26 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. (forthcoming 2014) (on file with author).
force and its far weaker protections for individual rights. The existence of a “war” on terrorism also had enormous consequences for domestic law. Historically, lawmakers have offered the executive branch far greater powers, and judges have afforded it far greater deference during wartime than during peacetime. The post-9/11 war on terror continued that trend.8

Since 9/11, the United States has continued to “make” war by placing more and more activities into the “war” category. Consider cyber security. As with terrorism, the United States had a choice. It might have decided, for example, that cyber security should be the sole province of the private sector or civilian agencies and that cyber attacks should be treated only as torts or crimes. Instead, it opted to create a military Cyber Command and recruit “cyber warriors,” in addition to giving some cyber security responsibilities to civilian agencies.9 It also chose to treat cyber attacks as potentially constituting acts of war, subject to the laws of war.

Though it takes us farther from Tilly’s original paradigm,10 this kind of state war-making can transform the state as much as the more traditional forms of state war-making.11 In the United States, for instance, the perceived need to monitor and act upon a far-flung global network of loosely affiliated non-state actors with which we are “at war” has driven state investment in new technologies designed to enable global surveillance and the cross-border use of lethal force. While it is too soon to say how this story will evolve, the increased use of these new capabilities is beginning to change the United States’ relationship with other states and to further erode traditional conceptions of sovereignty.

New forms of state war-making also have significant implications for the relationship between individuals and the state. Some of these implications are relatively obvious. Indeed, after 9/11, human rights advocates and civil libertarians were quick to point out the ways in which laws and policies purportedly necessary to the “war on terror” increased state power at the expense of transparency, accountability, and individual rights. The indefinite detention of alleged terrorists as “enemy combatants” seemed at odds with due process norms, for instance, while the use of “enhanced” interrogation methods against terror suspects at times amounted to torture. More recently, media and advocacy attention has fo-

10. Tilly’s paradigm was, in any case, historical in nature, developed to explicate the rise of the European nation-state rather than to suggest an eternal and unvarying relationship between war-making and state expansion.
cused on National Security Agency monitoring of telephone and Internet communications and on drone strikes and other cross-border targeted killings of terror suspects in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.

Most of these post-9/11 state activities have been authorized by Congress or have been largely upheld—or at least tolerated—by U.S. courts. After 9/11, the USA PATRIOT Act and similar legislation greatly enhanced the state’s domestic search-and-seizure powers in national-security-related cases, for instance. Meanwhile, the Justice Department’s invocation of the state secrets doctrine made it difficult for litigants to challenge state actions undertaken in the name of national security, and courts have relied on other judicially created doctrines to avoid ruling on the merits in most other cases challenging government activities arising out of the war on terror. Indeed, as Stephen Vladeck notes, “not a single damages judgment has been awarded in any of the dozens of lawsuits arising out of post-September 11 U.S. counterterrorism policies alleging violations of plaintiffs’ individual rights.”

The apparent erosion of individual rights stemming from the expansion of what the United States treats as “war” or war-related has been amply documented. My purpose in this Essay is not to add to that already vast literature, but rather to draw attention to some of the still more subtle ways in which U.S. practices and legal doctrines developed after 9/11 for “war-making” purposes may be altering the balance of power between individuals and the state.

Specifically, my goal in this short Essay is to draw attention to the slow trickling down of war-related legal doctrines and practices into “ordinary” law and law enforcement. This trickle-down effect is diffuse and difficult to discern—in many cases, its existence remains largely speculative. But this makes efforts to

12. The Supreme Court did impose some limits on early Bush Administration detention-related policies and efforts to remove detainees from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). Similarly, Congress sought to rein in the United States’s use of interrogation techniques amounting to torture. For the most part, however, Congress and the courts have acquiesced in the executive branch’s post-9/11 policies. Even with regard to claims of torture, federal courts have found numerous reasons to prevent lawsuits seeking damages for torture from going forward. See Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1159 (2009) (noting that none of the cases seeking damages for alleged U.S. torture have survived summary judgment).


16. Indeed, the existence of such trickle-down effects is inherently hard to prove: disentangling correlation and causation is particularly difficult, and the secrecy
document it all the more important, lest the very diffuseness and invisibility of the trickle-down effects blind us to the ongoing and profound transformation of relations between individuals and the state.

I am by no means the first commentator to note the potentially distorting effect of national-security practices and doctrines on seemingly unrelated areas of law and law enforcement. In September 2002, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (now renamed Human Rights First) published a report called A Year of Loss: Reexamining Civil Liberties Since September 11. This report—and a follow-up report published a year later—looked at the impact of post-9/11 law and policy on such areas as general government transparency, the right to privacy, the treatment of immigrants, refugees and minorities, and the criminal justice system.

More recently, legal scholars have looked at the rising use of classified evidence in criminal cases; the increased invocation of the state secrets doctrine in ordinary tort and contract litigation; the spillover of national-security related changes to qualified immunity doctrines into other areas of law; the impact of post-9/11 changes on immigration law and policy; and the importation of military and counterterrorism tactics into domestic policing, among other issues. Relatively few commentators, however, have sought to address the spillover of war and counterterrorism practices and legal doctrines into “ordinary” law and law enforcement as a distinct crosscutting problem. And to my knowledge, no one has yet sought to comprehensively assess the nature and extent of this spillover, looking across multiple areas of civil and criminal law and law enforcement.

shrouding some government activities—and even government legal arguments—makes matters all the worse.


This Essay does not seek to offer such a comprehensive assessment. Instead, it seeks to develop a preliminary and partial map of the trickle-down war, highlighting several areas in which there appear to be clear indications of a trickle-down effect. This Essay also notes a number of areas in which the existence of current or future trickle-down effects seem probable, but where the evidence is inconclusive.

A major caveat is necessary here: it is extraordinarily difficult to “prove” trickle-down. Trickle-down effects are generally gradual and subtle, rather than sudden and dramatic, making them inherently difficult to identify and measure. And it is more difficult still to determine the causes, rather than merely the correlates, of such gradual and subtle changes. My goal here is therefore not to reach definitive conclusions, but rather to outline a broader research agenda, in hopes that others will take up the challenge of comprehensively assessing the extent of the trickle-down war.

To that end, this Essay focuses on several areas in which war’s trickle-down effects may exist: domestic policing, the use of the state secrets doctrine, the use of classified evidence in criminal cases, immigration policy, First Amendment jurisprudence, privacy, and surveillance. I also identify a number of other areas for further exploration.

I. POLICING

The trickle-down effects of America’s post-9/11 wars are perhaps most outwardly visible in domestic policing. In general, American policing has become far more militarized over the last few decades. The trend towards increased militarization predates 9/11, but accelerated substantially after the attacks. Consider the use of police SWAT teams, with their paramilitary tactics and equipment. The first police SWAT teams were created after the 1965 Watts riots in Los Angeles; initially, they were used primarily for emergencies such as hostage situations and

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Theory of Emergency Powers and the “Norm-Exception” Dichotomy, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1825 (2000); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 699, 718-19 (2006); Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 Yale L.J. 1385, 1408 (1989); Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1001 (2004); see also Mary Dudziak, War Time: An Idea, Its History and Its Consequences (2012) (arguing that “war time” has never been as sharply delineated as we often assume, and that far from being exceptional, various forms of war-related actions have been the norm for the United States throughout the last century). I see this Essay as a small contribution to that important literature.

21. This problem is exacerbated by government secrecy.


23. Balko, supra note 22, at 53.
domestic terror threats. Over time, however, the number of SWAT teams expanded. SWAT teams were increasingly used in routine policing—deployed to execute search and arrest warrants in drug-related cases. Radley Balko estimates that there were roughly 3000 SWAT raids nationwide in 1980; by 2006, the number of annual SWAT raids had jumped to 50,000, and Balko believes that by 2012, there were as many as 80,000 SWAT raids per year.24

The increased use of SWAT teams in ordinary policing has been paralleled by a similar post-9/11 rise in police efforts to adopt other tactics developed by foreign militaries and intelligence services for counterterrorism purposes, the proliferation of police academy programs modeled on military basic training, the increased use of military-style battle dress uniforms for police on the streets, and the growing use by police departments of weapons and other equipment developed for military purposes—from Humvees to surveillance drones.25 Many of these weapons and equipment literally come direct from foreign war zones,


through a Defense Department program that donates unneeded military equipment to police forces. Homel

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II. The State Secrets Privilege in Civil Cases

The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary rule permitting the government to block the release of information in civil litigation if the information would reveal secrets damaging to U.S. national security interests. The privilege can be invoked by the government even in litigation between private parties, and, while courts have the power to make an independent evaluation of whether to accept government claims of state secrets, courts have generally deferred to executive branch requests.

Numerous commentators have decried the U.S. government’s frequent invocation of the state secrets privilege to prevent direct challenges to post-9/11 U.S. government policies from moving forward in the courts. Laura Donohue has


gone further examining the ways in which the state secrets doctrine has increas-
ingly been used by private litigants in areas far removed from war and national
security. Donohue examined docket records from the past thirty years and rec-
ords from the more than 1300 case holdings since 1790 that refer to state secrets,
supplementing this with an examination of “citations in pleadings, motions, briefs, memorandum opinions, judicial decisions, Headnote strings, legislative
searches, and secondary source materials.” She found that, while the state se-
crets doctrine is generally regarded as an evidentiary rule within the broader ex-
ecutive privilege doctrine, it has recently come to be used in a far wider range of
ways.

The expansive war on terror has led to increased entangling of the govern-
ment and the private sectors; the government has relied on private companies to
provide a range of support services; the government’s desire to access informa-
tion such as private Internet records has led to complex and generally secret
new relationships between the military, the intelligence community, and private
companies. As a result, more and more private actors are in possession of gov-
ernment “secrets,” increasing the number of cases with no surface connection to
national security in which private actors might nonetheless have to disclose clas-
sified information in the course of routine litigation. Thus, Donohue found that
the state secrets privilege has increasingly been invoked by private litigants in
cases relating to “breach of contract, patent disputes, trade secrets, fraud, and
employment termination . . . [w]rongful death, personal injury, and negli-
gence.”

Donohue also noted the rise of a form of “graymail,” in which corporations
that possess sensitive information as a result of government contracts seek to
pressure the government to intervene in private litigation by suggesting that, ab-
sent government invocation of the state secrets doctrine, they may be “forced” to
reveal state secrets in order to defend themselves. Even when the government
decides to intervene or when courts ultimately reject state secrets claims, the use

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Secrets Privilege, CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS (Apr. 10, 2014), https://ccrjustice.org/learn-more/faqs/100-days%3A-end-abuse-state-secrets-privilege; D.A. Jer-
emy Telman, Intolerable Abuses: Rendition for Torture and the State Secrets Privi-

35. Id. at 85.
36. See id. at 90-91.
37. Thus, an employment-discrimination case against a private contractor might re-
quire disclosure of the existence and nature of a classified program operated in sup-
port of the government, for instance. See Anjetta McQueen, Security Blanket: The
State Secrets Privilege Threat to Public Employment Rights, 22 LAB. LAW. 329, 335
(2007).
38. Donohue, supra note 34, at 87-88; see McQueen, supra note 37, at 335.
39. Donohue, supra note 34, at 88.
of the state secrets doctrine as a litigation tool can delay cases or force their removal to federal courts, severely disadvantaging undercapitalized plaintiffs.

III. CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL CASES

The state secrets doctrine is not the only way in which the protection of secret information can have a distorting effect on “ordinary” law. In the context of criminal prosecutions, parallel dangers are raised by the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA). Under Section 4 of CIPA, the government can make an in camera, ex parte submission to the court to request authorization “to delete specified items of classified information from documents to be made available to the defendant through discovery . . . , to substitute a summary of the information for such classified documents, or to substitute a statement admitting the relevant facts that classified information would tend to prove.”40 Under Section 6 of CIPA, the defendant can be excluded from a hearing during which the court “make[s] all determinations concerning the use, relevance, or admissibility of classified information that would otherwise be made during the trial.”41

CIPA is not new, but in the post-9/11 context it has a newly worrisome impact. Joshua Dratel42 and Ellen Yaroshefsky43 have argued that the government has recently been classifying (most critics would say over-classifying) documents at an unprecedented pace.44 Further, as noted above, an ever-growing number of private companies have become involved in the production and use of classified information.45 As the sheer quantity and range of classified information increases, they note, we can expect an increase in the number of ordinary criminal cases that touch upon classified national security information in a purely ancillary way,

41. See id. § 6(a).
thus also increasing the number of cases in which CIPA can be invoked by the government.

CIPA was originally intended to prevent criminal defendants who had prior access to classified information from using discovery procedures to graymail the government into dropping or reducing charges. But CIPA is also applicable in criminal prosecutions in which the defendant has no access to classified documents, but believes that classified documents exist that might be important in his or her defense case. In such contexts, the in camera and ex parte hearings permitted under CIPA can be extremely damaging to defendants. Redacted or summarized classified documents may lose context, texture, and detail that might be important to the defense, and judges may have little ability to evaluate whether classified information submitted ex parte would help the defendant and should be made discoverable.46

"The impact of secret evidence upon the adversary system has yet to be acknowledged," argues Yaroshefsky, "in large measure because of the unstated belief that [CIPA is] confined to a narrow range of terrorism cases."47 But, she asserts, "secret evidence is seeping into the criminal justice system" as a result of over-classification, the growing number of individuals and companies involved in classified activities, and the tendency of prosecutors to "overcharge" ordinary crimes under anti-terrorism statutes.48

As Yaroshefsky also notes, the "internationalization of crime and law enforcement" also increases the likelihood that information relevant to a U.S. criminal case will draw upon classified sources or methods.49 As more crime crosses international borders—for instance, drug crime, financial crime, Internet-related crime, and trafficking- and prostitution-related crime—U.S. domestic law enforcement officials are increasingly seeking the assistance of the intelligence community to gain information about foreign activities linked to U.S. criminal investigations. However, such information may come from sensitive relationships with foreign intelligence services or assets, or from classified intelligence collection methods. As a result, many domestic criminal prosecutions are increasingly intertwined with classified programs. This, in turn, can lead to the increased government invocation of CIPA in criminal cases that are themselves unrelated to national security, with the ultimate effect of depriving defendants of access to vital information.50

46. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 43, at 1070-72.
47. Id. at 1080.
48. Id. at 1081, 1082. Yaroshefsky also notes "a growing concern that CIPA is being used as a back door means for the government to withhold information otherwise subject to discovery under Rule 16." Id. at 1072.
49. Id. at 1082.
50. See id. at 1068.
IV. Immigration Law and Policy

Since 9/11, U.S. immigration law and policy have become deeply bound up with counterterrorism efforts. The 9/11 attackers were all foreigners, and the apparent ease with which they entered the United States raised obvious questions about the adequacy of U.S. border-control methods and screening programs. After 9/11, the Immigration and Naturalization Service was relocated into the newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and reorganized; most of its responsibilities shifted to DHS's new Immigration and Customs Enforcement division (ICE).51 The name change signaled a shift away from a "service" model to an "enforcement" model.

There has been an enormous post-9/11 increase in funding for immigration programs with connections to homeland security.52 In particular, as a 2011 Migration Policy Institute report documents,53 the post-9/11 era has given rise to "a new generation of interoperable databases and systems that sit at the crossroads of intelligence and law enforcement, reshaping immigration enforcement... through increased information collection and sharing."54

The original purpose of this extensive data collection—including the collection of biometric data—was the desire to identify those with connections to al-Qaeda and prevent additional terrorist attacks. Numerous U.S. government organizations gather information on resident aliens and foreigners seeking entry into the United States at airports and land borders. At least in theory, the ability to cross-check such information with information gathered by intelligence and law enforcement agencies can enable U.S. officials to prevent potential terrorist plotters from gaining entry into the United States and trace connections between foreign nationals already inside the United States and foreign terrorist organizations.

Even though only a tiny fraction of immigrants and foreign visitors have any nexus to terrorism, such extensive data collection and information sharing has become the norm for all immigrant groups and most foreign travelers to the United States. This has costs. For example, it has led to substantial post-9/11 growth in the number of annual immigrant detentions and deportations. Information sharing between law enforcement and immigration officials has increased

52. See id. at 3.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2. US-VISIT collects fingerprints and photographs for all noncitizens entering the country and stores them in the IDENT database, which is interoperable with the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System. The Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), authorized by the 1996 reforms, permits the tracking of international students. Other databases abound. Id. at 5.
the number of immigrants identified as deportable due to involvement in crimi-
nal activities (though the crimes involved are often exceedingly minor). Information
sharing between intelligence agencies and ICE has also led to increased
scrutiny of immigrants from particular countries, ethnic groups, and religious
backgrounds, leading to unequal enforcement of immigration laws.

It is impossible to say for sure whether these changes have reduced the risk
of terrorism. What does seem clear, however, is that they have made individual
immigrants and foreign nationals far more vulnerable to various forms of sur-
veillance, detention, and removal.

V. The First Amendment

In June 2010, the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a pro-
vision of the USA PATRIOT Act that criminalized the provision of material sup-
port or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations. The statute de-
defined material support broadly, to include "any property, tangible or intangible,
or service, . . . training, expert advice or assistance, . . . communications equip-
ment [or] facilities." It was challenged by the Humanitarian Law Project, which
argued that the statute's language was impermissibly vague, and could be con-
strued to criminalize its own efforts to marshal expert legal and policy arguments
for the purpose of persuading the Kurdistan Workers' Party (which the Secretary
of State had designated as a "foreign terrorist organization") to refrain from vio-
lence and pursue its political goals through peaceful means. The Humanitarian
Law Project argued that the statute criminalized mere speech.

The Court agreed that the statute might have the effect of criminalizing mere
speech, and that strict scrutiny should therefore apply. Traditionally, strict scru-
tiny requires the government to show that restrictions on individual constitu-
tional rights are necessary and "narrowly tailored" to further a compelling gov-
ernment interest. In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Court held that

Immigration Policy, UNIV. CHI. INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC (Nov. 19, 2013), https://
ihrclinic.uchicago.edu/blog/personal-security-citizens-and-non-citizens-post-911
-us-immigration-policy-paige-scheckla-11; see also SAMANTHA HAUPTMAN, THE


60. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (plurality opinion); Bd. of Air-
port Comm'r's v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 573 (1987); Cornelius v. NAACP
the prevention of terrorism constituted a compelling government interest—and rendered the requirement that the restriction on First Amendment rights be necessary and narrowly tailored almost meaningless by deferring to government assertions that the type of speech contemplated by the Humanitarian Law Project would interfere with government terrorism prevention efforts.64

As David Cole has noted, the case was not decided on national security grounds as such, but as a question of general constitutional law.62 This raises troubling questions about "the decision's potential consequences for First Amendment doctrine more generally." Cole comments:

For the first time in its history, the Court upheld the criminalization of speech advocating only nonviolent, lawful ends on the ground that such speech might unintentionally assist a third party in criminal wrongdoing. . . . The Court treated a viewpoint-based motive for suppressing speech not as grounds for invalidation, but as a justification for the law. And the Court reduced the right of association to an empty formalism, allowing the government to prohibit, under the rubric of "material support," virtually any concrete manifestation of association—such as paying dues, donating funds, volunteering one's time or services, or working together toward common ends, no matter how lawful.63

Here, the existence of trickle-down is much more speculative. Though the Court's decision in Humanitarian Law Project was clearly influenced by the counterterrorism context of the statute, the Court's holding could have significant consequences far beyond the counterterrorism context. In Humanitarian Law Project, "strict scrutiny" looked more like rational basis review—a highly deferential standard of review. As Cole notes, this raises troubling questions about the future of First Amendment rights: "[c]ould training in nonviolent mediation [for gang members] be prohibited on the ground that it might ' legitimate' the gang," he asks, "thereby making it more attractive to new members who might commit future crimes? Could peaceable environmental advocacy coordinated with Greenpeace be banned because the organization sometimes engages in illegal trespass or property damage as civil disobedience?"64

It is too soon to determine the impact of Humanitarian Law Project. Perhaps courts will find ways to limit its impact. For example, in Al Haramain Islamic


62. See id.

63. Id. at 149.

64. Id. at 157.
Foundation, Inc. v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Ninth Circuit read Humanitarian Law Project narrowly. But there is already some evidence that the material support statute and similar provisions have had a chilling effect on civil-society organizations. A 2007 report published by the International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC) notes that "in the absence of clear, sensible guidance and information from government about ... what is legally required, confusion and fear are driving the response of the nonprofit sector in the campaign against terror." Tim Morris writes:

[i]n recent decades the best practice trend in aid has been for northern NGOs to move away from service provision and to partner with local NGOs who actually do the work. However, in the current climate the risk of partner selection is so great and demands from the government so onerous that many U.S. agencies find that being a service provider is safer.

VI. PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE

The war on terror has also led the U.S. government to dramatically step up its efforts to collect and analyze a wide range of information, from cell phone metadata and Internet communications to biometric data. Meanwhile, technological advances have enabled the more effective analysis of information gathered through various forms of surveillance. Surveillance imagery can now be subjected to facial-recognition analysis, for instance, enabling an unprecedented degree of tracking. Given one photograph of an individual, facial-recognition software can sift through countless other images—whether provided by government surveillance cameras or posted by acquaintances on social media sites—to find matches.

In the national-security context, recent technological leaps in surveillance and analysis capabilities have also enabled a recent shift towards identifying and targeting "enemy combatants" who have been identified as such purely by pat-
tern analysis, with no specific information linking identifiable individuals to hostile activities. This has led to an increase in so-called “signature strikes”: drone strikes against unidentified people presumed to be targetable enemies because of their communications patterns, travel patterns, and so on.70

Domestically, fears of trickle-down seem well founded. The post-9/11 USA PATRIOT Act effectively eliminated the pre-9/11 firewall between foreign intelligence gathering and domestic law enforcement, permitting intelligence agencies to engage in the surveillance of U.S. citizens believed to be agents of a foreign power, as long as the gathering of foreign intelligence is a “significant” purpose of the surveillance.71 The PATRIOT Act also permits federal law enforcement officials to access a wide range of sensitive information (including Internet records, telephone metadata, library records, and credit and banking information of U.S. citizens) upon successful application to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Law enforcement officials need not show probable cause, however; they need only show that “there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation . . . to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”

It is easy to imagine information gained in this manner being “repurposed” by law enforcement officials. Even if such information cannot be used in criminal prosecutions, embarrassing information gleaned through data collection and surveillance might be used in other ways by law enforcement officials—for instance, to put pressure on potential witnesses or informants.72 Similarly, the sophisticated pattern-recognition technologies originally developed for military


73. See Timothy B. Lee, Here’s How Phone Metadata Can Reveal Your Affairs, Abortions, and Other Secrets, THE SWITCH (WASH. POST), Aug. 27, 2013 (11:12 AM), http://
and intelligence purposes can also easily be used by domestic law enforcement officials in ways that do not require extensive new data collection or surveillance, but that nonetheless shift away from individualized determinations in a manner that raises troubling constitutional questions.  

Beyond this, widespread surveillance and government access to personal data can have obvious chilling effects on the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. Consider, for instance, the impact on journalists, who must rely heavily on information provided confidentially by sources. "Some of our longtime trusted sources have become nervous and anxious about talking to us, even on stories that aren’t about national security," Associated Press President Gary Pruitt noted in a 2013 speech.  

"And, in some cases, government employees that we once checked in with regularly will no longer speak to us by phone, and some are reluctant to meet in person." Pruitt adds that  

[This chilling effect is not just at AP, it’s happening at other news organizations as well. Journalists from other news organizations have personally told me it has intimidated sources from speaking to them. Now, the government may love this. I suspect they do. But beware the government that loves secrecy too much."

Conclusion  

In this brief Essay, I have focused on policing, the state secrets privilege in civil litigation, classified information in criminal litigation, immigration, First Amendment jurisprudence, and surveillance issues for the simple reason that these are the areas in which I was able to find the largest amount of information suggesting a potential spillover of war into ordinary law and law enforcement. However, many other areas call out for additional research. For instance, one might wish to look more broadly at various forms of judicial deference to the executive, to see if the patterns of deference emerging from  

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74. Imagine, for instance, the use of pattern-recognition technologies to identify, investigate and potentially entrap users of prohibited drugs. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World That Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1351-52 (2004).  
77. Id.  
78. Id.
national-security-related cases are correlated with an increase in deference in other kinds of cases. Stephen Vladeck has already done some valuable work in this and related areas, looking at the political question doctrine, the availability of Bivens remedies, federal common law defenses to state-law suits against government contractors, and qualified immunity. Ultimately, he notes:

[As] "national security"-based exceptions increasingly become the rule in contemporary civil litigation against government officers—whether with regard to new ‘special factors’ under Bivens, new bases for contractor preemption under Boyle, proliferation of the political question doctrine, or even more expansive reliance upon the qualified immunity defense—the line between the unique national security justifications giving rise to these cases and ordinary civil litigation will increasingly blur.79

It would also be valuable to explore the enduring impact of 9/11 on principles of government transparency. After 9/11, many once-public government documents (such as those relating to public water management supply systems,80 blueprints of government buildings, and so on) ceased to be public due to fears that these documents might make it easier for terrorists to plan attacks. But the removal of such documents from the public domain also reduces government transparency.81 Has the post-9/11 trend towards limiting publicly available information continued? Has it spread?

One might also look at whether the increased use of ex parte and in camera proceedings in cases touching upon classified information is correlated with a greater judicial willingness to permit ex parte proceedings in other contexts not involving classified information. On a different issue, one might seek to determine whether U.S. government efforts to redefine “imminence” in the international self-defense context are correlated with similar efforts to reconceptualize imminence in domestic self-defense contexts. (The Bush Administration’s doctrine of preemptive self-defense—more or less carried on by the Obama Administration via its changed understanding of imminence—parallels the logic of domestic “stand-your-ground” laws.)

I could go on, but, in general, I share Vladeck’s suspicion that, “[f]or better or worse, one can find national security considerations influencing ordinary judicial decision making across almost the entire gamut of contemporary civil and

79. Vladeck, supra note 14, at 1330.
81. See Doherty et al., supra note 17; Doherty et al., supra note 18.
criminal litigation." To this, I would only add that national security considerations have likely also seeped into law enforcement practices, immigration policies, and a range of other non-judicial activities.

As I noted at the beginning of this Essay, trickle-down effects are inherently difficult to discern and measure, and it is also extraordinarily difficult to determine causation. Perhaps 9/11 merely accelerated pre-existing trends; perhaps it had no causal impact at all. Perhaps some or all of the trends hinted at above would have emerged with or without 9/11 and the war-making that followed. But these difficulties do not make the project of seeking to identify trickle-down effects less important.

This short Essay only scratches the surface. Nonetheless, my hope is that it will inspire additional efforts to map the trickle-down effects of the war on terror in a more comprehensive manner, challenging as that task may be. So far, most efforts to examine the spillover of post-9/11 doctrines and practices into ordinary law and law enforcement have been piecemeal and ad hoc. But thirteen years after 9/11, we may now be able to look at the phenomena more comprehensively. Given the close historical relationship between war-making and state transformation, can we afford not to?

82. Vladeck, Foreword, supra note 19, at 288.

83. Tellingly, for instance, the USA PATRIOT Act’s authorization of delayed-notice search warrants (permitting so-called “sneak and peek” searches) was motivated by counterterrorism concerns, but studies suggest that less than one percent of delayed-notice warrant cases have actually involved terrorism. The rest have involved ordinary crimes; 75 percent of delayed-notice warrants are used in drug cases. See Jonathan Witmer-Rich, The Rapid Rise of Delayed Notice Searches, and the Fourth Amendment ‘Rule Requiring Notice,’ 41 PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2226977.

84. As Vladeck notes in The New National Security Canon, for instance, “the Rehnquist and Roberts courts have systematically made it more difficult for civil plaintiffs to obtain damages in cases arising out of governmental misconduct.” Vladeck, supra note 14, at 1297; see also Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2008) (arguing that increased government surveillance is driven by accelerating developments in information technology, and that the war on terror is not its sole or most important cause); Laura K. Donohue, The Limits of National Security, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573 (2011) (charting the timelines of national-security-discourse-driven laws and suggesting that 9/11 likely just accelerated the expansion of state power vis-à-vis individuals); Parry, supra note 31, at 834-35.