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APPENDIX: THE ICONOGRAPHY OF JUSTICE .......................... 446
MANAGERIAL JUDGES

Judith Resnik*

Should you be called upon to function as a judge, do not be like the legal advisers who offer to place their juridical knowledge at the service of the litigating parties. . . . [Y]ou must remain silent and abstain from interference in the arguments. . . . Do not by even so much as a gesture seek to influence either prosecution or defense.

— Commentary on the Mishnah (Pirke Avot)¹

There are no inherently protracted cases, only cases which are unnecessarily protracted by inefficient procedures and management.

— Preface to the Manual for Complex Litigation²

I. INTRODUCTION

UNTIL recently, the American legal establishment embraced a classical view of the judicial role. Under this view, judges are not supposed to have an involvement or interest in the controversies they adjudicate. Disengagement and dispassion supposedly enable judges to decide cases fairly and impartially. The mythic emblems surrounding the goddess Justice illustrate this vision of the proper judicial attitude: Justice carries scales, reflecting the obligation to balance claims fairly; she possesses a sword, giving her great power to enforce decisions; and she wears a blindfold, protecting her from distractions.³

Many federal judges have departed from their earlier attitudes; they have dropped the relatively disinterested pose to adopt a more active, “managerial” stance.⁴ In growing numbers, judges are not only adjudicating the merits of issues

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Southern California. Bryn Mawr, B.A., 1972; New York University, J.D., 1975. My research was supported by grants from the Rand Corporation’s Institute of Civil Justice and the University of Southern California Faculty Research Program. I extend special thanks to Dennis Curtis, William Genego, Deborah Hensler, Dorothy Nelson, Margaret Radin, Dorothy Resnik, Peter Schuck, David Seidman, Michael Shapiro, and Robert Thompson, to research assistants Ellen Spindler, Gail Vendeland, and Daoud Awad, to participants in the USC faculty workshop, and to the USC law library staff.

² MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION at ii (5th ed. 1982).
³ See infra pp. 382–83; see also infra pp. 446–48 (discussing imagery of Justice).
⁴ I focus on changes in the federal courts, but similar changes are underway in many state courts. See P. Ebener, COURT EFFORTS TO REDUCE PRETRIAL DELAY (1981); L. Freedman, STATE LEGISLATION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1982).
presented to them by litigants, but also are meeting with parties in chambers to encourage settlement of disputes and to supervise case preparation. Both before and after the trial, judges are playing a critical role in shaping litigation and influencing results.

Several commentators have identified one kind of lawsuit — the “public law litigation” or “structural reform” case in which federal judges have assumed a new role. In these cases, judges actively supervise the implementation of a wide range of remedies designed to desegregate schools and to reform prisons and other institutions. Some commentators have questioned the legitimacy of judges’ dominance in what is now generally acknowledged to be a “new model of civil litigation.” Few, however, have scrutinized the managerial aspects of such postdecision judicial work. Even less atten-

5 Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Chayes, Public Law Litigation]. Professor Chayes defines “public law litigation” as litigation in which “the object . . . is the vindication of constitutional or statutory policies.” Id. at 1284. More recently, Professor Chayes has also stated that:

[T]he subject matter . . . is . . . a grievance about the content or conduct of policy — most often governmental policy, but frequently the policy of nongovernmental aggregates . . . . [The features of the litigation] press the trial judge into an active stance, with large responsibilities for organizing the case and supervising the implementation of relief.


7 But see Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 467, 510 (1980) (what is “extraordinary” about public law litigation is neither the procedures nor the remedies, but the new substantive rights recognized).


11 Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 5, at 1282.

12 For an examination of some aspects of the postdecision judicial role, see id.; Diver, supra note 10.
tion has been paid to the role judges now play in the pretrial phases of both complex and routine cases.

I believe that the role of judges before adjudication is undergoing a change as substantial as has been recognized in the posttrial phase of public law cases. Today, federal district judges are assigned a case at the time of its filing and assume responsibility for shepherding the case to completion. Judges have described their new tasks as "case management" — hence my term "managerial judges." As managers, judges learn more about cases much earlier than they did in the past. They negotiate with parties about the course, timing, and scope of both pretrial and posttrial litigation. These managerial responsibilities give judges greater power. Yet the restraints that formerly circumscribed judicial authority are conspicuously absent. Managerial judges frequently work beyond the public view, off the record, with no obligation to provide written, reasoned opinions, and out of reach of appellate review.

This new managerial role has emerged for several reasons. One is the creation of pretrial discovery rights. The 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure embodied contradictory mandates: a discovery system ("give your opponent all information relevant to the litigation") was grafted onto American adversarial norms ("protect your client zealously" and therefore "withhold what you can"). In some cases, parties argued about their obligations under the discovery rules; such disputes gen-

13 I use the term "adjudication" to describe a dispute resolution process in which judges employed by the government make decisions based upon information presented by the parties. Judges decide motions, preside at trials and hearings, and sometimes find facts. When ruling, judges are obliged to provide reasoned explanations for their decisions, and the parties, in turn, are obliged to obey. See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353 (1978); see also Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 151, 152-56 (1981) (similar description of adjudicatory process). Adjudication is distinct from — but includes elements of — other forms of dispute resolution, see M. SHAPIRO, COURTS 1-64 (1981), and is not the only task performed by judges, see Schwartz, The Other Things that Courts Do, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 438 (1981).


15 Constantino, Judges as Case Managers, Trial, Mar. 1981, at 56, 57-60; Peckham, supra note 14, at 770-73.
erated a need for someone to decide pretrial conflicts. Trial judges accepted the assignment and have become mediators, negotiators, and planners — as well as adjudicators. Moreover, once involved in pretrial discovery, many judges became convinced that their presence at other points in a lawsuit's development would be beneficial; supervision of discovery became a conduit for judicial control over all phases of litigation and thus infused lawsuits with the continual presence of the judge-overseer.

Partly because of their new oversight role and partly because of increasing case loads, many judges have become concerned with the volume of their work. To reduce the pressure, judges have turned to efficiency experts who promise "calendar control." Under the experts' guidance, judges have begun to experiment with schemes for speeding the resolution of cases and for persuading litigants to settle rather than try cases whenever possible. During the past decade, enthusiasm for the "managerial movement" has become widespread; what began as an experiment is likely soon to become obligatory. Unless the Supreme Court and Congress reject proposed amendments to the Federal Rules, pretrial judicial management will be required in virtually all cases.


17 In mediation, a third party does not impose an outcome but attempts to work a compromise between disputants. See Fuller, Mediation — Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325 (1971). In negotiation, the parties bargain with each other using economic and other forms of leverage to achieve mutually acceptable outcomes. See generally Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1976) (discussing norms and rules that author believes order private parties' behavior during negotiation). For a discussion of the issues raised by alternative dispute resolution systems, see Dispute Processing and Civil Litigation, 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 395 (1980-1981).


20 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) (Discussion Draft 1982), reprinted in Judicial Conference Excerpt, supra note 19, at 8. For an earlier version of the proposed amend-
In the rush to conquer the mountain of work, no one — neither judges, court administrators, nor legal commentators — has assessed whether relying on trial judges for informal dispute resolution and for case management, either before or after trial, is good, bad, or neutral. Little empirical evidence supports the claim that judicial management "works" either to settle cases or to provide cheaper, quicker, or fairer dispositions. Proponents of judicial management have also failed to consider the systemic effects of the shift in judicial role. Management is a new form of "judicial activism," a behavior that usually attracts substantial criticism. Moreover, judicial management may be teaching judges to value their statistics, such as the number of case dispositions, more than they value the quality of their dispositions. Finally, because managerial judging is less visible and usually unreviewable, it gives trial courts more authority and at the same time provides litigants with fewer procedural safeguards to protect them from abuse of that authority. In short, managerial judging may be redefining sub silentio our standards of what constitutes rational, fair, and impartial adjudication.

II. UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE TRADITIONAL JURIDICAL ROLE

A. Historical Foundations

1. The Adversarial Tradition in the United States. — Implicit in my proclamation of change is a vision of our traditional judicial system. Over the last two hundred years, the United States' system of adjudication developed attributes that distinguished it from others in practice as well as in theory. Our system was "adversarial" rather than "inquisitorial."
MANAGERIAL JUDGES

Parties, rather than officers of the state, controlled case preparation. The factfinder, whether jury or judge, received evidence by listening relatively passively to the evidence chosen and the witnesses rehearsed by the parties.

The limits placed on federal judges by the adversarial system comported with the views of those who drafted the Constitution. The framers, reacting against the King's autocratic judiciary, wanted both to ensure federal judicial independence from the Executive and to vest substantial adjudicatory power in the people. Hence the Constitution gave a principal role to the jury in both civil and criminal trials and permitted Congress to limit the Supreme Court's appellate review of "factual" determinations. Federal judges' power was further restricted by the "case or controversy" requirement, by congressional authority over the creation of lower courts, and by the constitutional commitment to open judicial decision-making — the "public" trial.

LIEBESNY, FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEMS (1981); J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (1969); see also Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure (pts. 1 & 2), 71 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1443 (1958) (discussing German system as example of inquisitorial process) [hereinafter cited as Kaplan].


27 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.

28 Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. VI.

29 Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; see Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical Basis, 47 MINN. L. REV. 53, 61-63 (1962) (arguing that Congress' power to create exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction was designed to protect jury decisions).


32 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment guarantees the right to a "public" trial in criminal cases; the Supreme Court has held that the first amendment and the common law provide a limited right of public access to civil trials and strengthen the public's right of access to criminal trials. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).

Although the Constitution does not expressly provide a public right to attend pretrial proceedings, some circuits have held that, absent a showing of serious harm, the public has a right to information obtained through discovery and litigants have a right to disseminate this information. See, e.g., In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
The American system was not, of course, purely adversarial.\textsuperscript{33} Inquisitorial traits included the right of the state, as personified by trial judges, to exercise some control over the evidentiary process: judges could summon or exclude witnesses and comment on testimony.\textsuperscript{34} Nevertheless, our tradition is considered more adversarial than most,\textsuperscript{35} and its basic principle is that the parties, not the judge, have the major responsibility for and control over the definition of the dispute.

2. Images of Justice. — Eighteenth century Americans were hardly the first to suggest that judges should not take sides in the controversies before them. Ancient cross-cultural symbols support this view of the judicial role.\textsuperscript{36} In the Western world, the imagery of justice\textsuperscript{37} has, with some alteration, endured over thousands of years and in varied political systems. Judicial icons, found in museums and on courtroom walls,\textsuperscript{38} provide insight into our perceptions of appropriate judicial behavior.

For centuries, Western cultures have personified the ideal judge as a goddess.\textsuperscript{39} Since the late Middle Ages, Justice has been depicted with scales and sword. During the last four

\textsuperscript{33} No system of justice is purely adversarial or inquisitorial:

The behaviour which is expected of a judge in different ages and by different systems of law seems to fluctuate between two poles. At one of these the model is the conduct of the man of science who is making researches . . . and will use all appropriate methods for the solution of problems and the discovery of truth. At the other stands the umpire of our English games, who is there . . . merely to see that the rules of the game are observed.


\textsuperscript{34} See James & Hazard, supra note 23, at 4. In federal jury trials, judges may summarize and comment on the evidence; in many states, however, judges may only summarize the evidence. See McCormick's Handbook on the Law of Evidence § 8, at 12 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCormick on Evidence].

\textsuperscript{35} Cf. J. Merryman, supra note 24, at 120-39 (discussing the inquisitorial features of the civil law system). But see Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 Yale L.J. 240 (1977) (analyzing three continental systems and concluding that they are very similar to the American system).

\textsuperscript{36} See, e.g., Chapters of the Fathers (Pirke Avot), supra note 1, ch. 1, paras. 8-9.

\textsuperscript{37} Iconography is "that branch of the history of art which concerns itself with the subject matter or meaning of works of art, as opposed to their form." E. Panofsky, Studies in Iconology 3 (1939). For a discussion of Justice's various appearances in the art of the Renaissance, see E. Gombrich, Symbolic Images: Studies in the Art of the Renaissance (1945). Scholars temper their discussions of iconography with the recognition that multiple interpretations of any given symbol are possible. For instance, Justice's blindfold may be considered either a virtue or a disability. See infra Appendix.

\textsuperscript{38} See, e.g., Court House: A Photographic Document plates 69, 264 (R. Pare ed. 1978).

\textsuperscript{39} For a discussion of the evolution of the images of justice, see infra Appendix.
hundred years, a blindfold has been added to complete the image.

The goddess herself — aloof and stoic — represents the physical and psychological distance between the judge and the litigants. Sometimes described as a virgin, Justice is unapproachable and incorruptible. The scales reflect evenhandedness and absolutism. The sword is a symbol of power and, like the scales, executes decisions without sympathy or compromise. Finally, the blindfold protects Justice from distractions and from information that could bias or corrupt her. Masked, Justice is immune from sights that could evoke sympathy in an ordinary spectator.

The idealized image of judicial behavior in the United States conforms to the symbolism implicit in these icons. The robes, the odd etiquette of the courtroom, and the appellation "your honor" all serve to remind both litigants and judges of the special nature — the essential estranged quality — of their relationship. Judges are exempt from the rules of normal social intercourse; they need not try to please litigants. Judges must decide the facts and apply the law regardless of the displeasure they incur. Stoic goddess, scales, sword, and blindfold are accurate emblems of this hard-edged, uncompromising task.

B. The Traditional Model

Olympian images of detachment, like classic Greek statueary, have an otherworldly quality. Daumier prints seem closer to reality. Like the figures in a Daumier lithograph, federal judges are ordinary mortals; from the beginning they have been very active in the world about them. During the eight-

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40 See Daube, The Scales of Justice, 63 JURID. REV. 109, 109 (1951) ("[The] symbolism of the scales expresses a deep-rooted tendency to see no shades between black and white, to admit no degrees of right and wrong, to allow no distribution of loss and gain among several litigants, to send a party away either victorious or defeated.").

41 The United States shares its imagery of justice with other cultures, all of which insist on judicial impartiality. Not all of the other systems, however, embrace the adversarial method, which has emphasized judges' disengagement as the means of achieving impartiality.


43 Historians describe early American lawyers and judges as a relatively small group of prominent men who traveled in the same circles. See, e.g., M. TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: KENTUCKY, 1789-1816 (1978); C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ch. 9 (1911). In examining activities of the federal district court in Kentucky, for example, Tachau found that Judge Harry Innes, the most influential federal judge there from 1789 until 1816, played an active role in the state's politics and possessed substantial extrajudicial knowledge about many of
teenth and nineteenth centuries, federal judges were likely to have prior, extrajudicial knowledge of both the controversies and the participants before them; like jurors, judges often came from the localities in which the controversies arose. Apparently, prior knowledge was not considered impermissible and may have been valued. But though they may have had extrajudicial contact with litigants, judges were not assigned managerial roles.

Until recently, federal judges rarely paid much attention to the filing of lawsuits. Complaints were "file stamped" by court clerks, plaintiffs' checks were credited to the United States, and marshals were dispatched to serve process on defendants. Once served, defendants were supposed to answer or seek dismissal within twenty days. The time limit was an artifice, however, because parties commonly stipulated to extend the deadline; months would pass before a defendant filed a responsive pleading. Once an answer was filed, issue was "joined"; but again, a judge would take no notice. Unless and until one of the parties requested some sort of judicial action (granting a motion for summary judgment, a date for trial, a pretrial conference), most judges did not intervene during the pretrial stage. The parties might undertake discovery, negotiate settlement, or let the case lie dormant for years — all without judicial scrutiny.

Even when federal judges were brought into cases, they were not responsible for the development of the cases. Al-
though judges occasionally conducted pretrial conferences,\(^5\)
the scope and subject matter of these conferences were limited; judges were not supposed to stress the desirability of settlement. As one court explained, for the judge to “persist” at settlement efforts and then to “hear the case and render judgment . . . inevitably raises . . . suspicion as to the fairness of the court’s administration of justice.”\(^5\)

Yet despite the absence of judges’ involvement, the vast majority of cases ended without trial.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) J. 147, 147 (1978) (“Judicial supervision of the civil docket is a relatively new phenomenon in American courts. Even in the federal courts, where it is best established, its antecedents do not go back more than a generation or so.”).

\(^2\) Given that judges’ pretrial activities are unlikely to be recorded, data on pretrial conferences and settlement efforts are sketchy. There are bases from which to infer that some judges assumed supervisory roles earlier in this century, see sources cited supra note 49, and in the 18th and 19th centuries, see, e.g., M. TACHAU, supra note 43, at 85; see also H. SCOTT, THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 43-44 (1909) (reporting that, in 17th century colonial courts in New York, judges referred especially complex cases to arbitrators, whose duty was to settle cases out of court). See generally Randall, Conciliation as a Function of the Judge, 18 Ky. L.J. 330, 340 (1930) (urging American judges to adopt “conciliation” techniques that had been “widespread . . . in foreign countries for hundreds of years”). For a 16th century description of settlement efforts, see F. RABELAIS, GARGANTUA AND PANTAGRUEL bk. 3, at 141-44 (J. LeClercq trans. 1936, ed. 1942).

\(^5\) See M. ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 210-11 (New Jersey and three other states have had some form of mandatory pretrial conferences); 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1522 (1971) (some district judges held pretrial conferences primarily to prepare for trial; settlement was discussed occasionally); Holtzoff, Origin and Sources of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1057, 1068 (1955) (a few federal district courts during the early 1940’s made pretrial conferences mandatory).

\(^52\) Krattenstein v. G. Fox & Co., 155 Conn. 609, 615, 236 A.2d 466, 469 (1967). Because pretrial conferences were more common in state than federal courts until recently, state appellate courts were the principal commentators on the proper judicial role, which they saw to be limited. See, e.g., Rosenfield v. Vosper, 45 Cal. App. 2d 365, 372, 114 P.2d 29, 33 (1941) (error for judge to instruct attorneys to tell their clients that “it would be to their best interests to settle”); Gullet v. McCormick, 421 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Ky. 1967) (pretrial conference should not be used to compel settlement); Knickerbocker v. Beaudette Garage Co., 190 Wis. 474, 481, 209 N.W. 763, 765 (1926) (judiciary should not “exalt the idea of . . . disposing of matters in litigation above the constitutional purposes for which our courts [were] created”). But see Gardner v. Mobil Oil Co., 217 Cal. App. 2d 220, 226, 31 Cal. Rptr. 731, 735 (1963) (judge who indicated his tentative conclusions and proposed a settlement figure not guilty of misconduct); Madrigale v. Corrone, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 521, 529, 258 A.2d 102, 106 (App. Div. 1968) (in case in which judge did not participate in negotiations either before or during trial, his urging both counsel to settle was not improper); Washington v. Sterling, 91 A.2d 844, 845 (D.C. 1952) (“[A] trial court ought not to force a settlement . . . but [may suggest] the advisability of settlement.”).

\(^53\) See Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: Pleadings and Parties (pt. 2), 44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1294 & n.8 (1935) (study showed that approximately 70% of all civil cases filed in federal courts did not reach a judge or jury decision).
This traditional role was not limited to nineteenth century judges. As late as 1958, Professors Kaplan and von Mehren and Judge Schaefer marveled at the vigorous efforts of German judges to convince parties to settle.\textsuperscript{54} Ironically, their description of the German judge — "constantly descending to the level of the litigants, as an examiner, patient or hectoring, as counselor and adviser, [and] as insistent promoter of settlements"\textsuperscript{55} — now seems apt for the American judge as well. Federal judges who passively await parties' pretrial requests are out of step with colleagues who have implemented a new regime of procedures designed to speed case disposition. These procedures bring cases to judges' attention shortly after filing and encourage judges both to supervise case development before trial and to manage decree implementation after trial.

III. MANAGERIAL JUDGING: A DESCRIPTION

A. The Models

I have constructed two hypothetical cases to illustrate what the new managerial role entails and how this role differs before and after trial. The contours of the first case are by now familiar; \textit{Petite v. Governor} is a thinly fictionalized amalgam of several suits aimed at ameliorating conditions in institutions such as prisons and mental hospitals.\textsuperscript{56} The second case, \textit{Paulson v. Danforth, Ltd.}, is a run-of-the-mill products liability case in its early stages of pretrial preparation.\textsuperscript{57} I elaborate

\textsuperscript{54} Kaplan (pt. 1), supra note 24, at 1223.

\textsuperscript{55} Id. (pt. 2) at 1472.


\textsuperscript{57} See, e.g., Parsons v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (automobile crash test and design information discoverable because not privileged, confidential research); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.

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and rely on the details of these hypothetical cases to demonstrate the ways in which managerial judges influence litigation. All of the details of the hypothetical cases parallel occurrences in real cases. The models I construct provide a graphic representation of the context in which management arises; they enable us to understand that, whatever is decided about its ultimate legitimacy, judicial management reflects the efforts of sincere individuals to respond to perceived needs.

1. Petite v. Governor. — *Petite* was filed in 1972 by William Petite on behalf of himself and all other inmates of Hadleyville, a maximum security state prison. Named as defendants were the warden and governor. In 1974, three months after a thirty-day trial, United States District Judge Denise Breaux found that the living conditions at Hadleyville violated the inmates' constitutional rights. Judge Breaux ordered the defendants to act "forthwith" to make incarceration in Hadleyville "constitutional." The order was affirmed in all respects on defendants' appeal; the Supreme Court denied certiorari.

In 1976, plaintiffs' counsel filed a motion for contempt. Counsel argued that defendants had done little to improve Hadleyville; conditions were worse than those found unconstitutional in 1974. Plaintiffs requested that the court revise its 1974 order to mandate specific changes and to set a timetable for their implementation.

Declining to hear argument on the motion, Judge Breaux called the parties' attorneys into her chambers and told them to resolve their differences. She rescheduled the contempt hearing for ten weeks later and ordered the parties to negotiate in the interim. Six weeks later, after plaintiffs complained that defendants would not negotiate in good faith, Judge Breaux agreed to join the discussions. She met weekly with the lawyers. At each meeting, she spoke separately with each side in a effort, which proved unsuccessful, to convince each to moderate its positions. At the opening of the third meeting, plaintiffs' counsel reported that an inmate had been stabbed to death by two cellmates. Plaintiffs requested immediate evacuation of 700 inmates so that each of those remaining could be confined in a separate cell. Judge Breaux scheduled a hearing on the request. After listening to testimony for ten days, she issued an order requiring that within thirty days the population be reduced by 300 inmates and the correctional staff be increased by twelve. One month later, when plaintiffs 286 (1980) (reversing trial court's rejection of personal jurisdiction in products liability suit).
reported — and defendants did not dispute — that the prison population had not been reduced, Judge Breaux held the governor in civil contempt and levied fines of $500 per day. Fifteen days later, the state sent 198 inmates to federal facilities. At a conference held in chambers, the state promised the judge that it would hire ten guards within the next six weeks. Judge Breaux then lifted the contempt order and directed the parties to hold weekly meetings to negotiate a revised judgment.

In 1977, unable to obtain agreement and dissatisfied with continued unsafe and unsanitary conditions at Hadleyville, Judge Breaux issued another interim order. She decreed that inmates be given three meals a day, that the first meal be served no earlier than 6:00 a.m. and the last no earlier than 4:30 p.m., that inmates be classified according to security risk and age, that any inmate accused of violent acts be immediately segregated, that four clean-up crews of at least six workers be hired to work five days per week, and that three plumbers be employed within ten days and remain employed until each cell had a working toilet and every ten men had a functioning shower. Defendants appealed. Again the appellate court affirmed. This time, the court of appeals noted its own distress with the slow pace of improvement at Hadleyville.

Since the case returned to her in 1976, Judge Breaux has spent forty-eight trial days hearing postdecision disputes and has issued ten orders. Although Judge Breaux has often expressed a desire to end her involvement, the case remains on her docket because of plaintiffs' continued reports of noncompliance with the court's orders.

2. Paulson v. Danforth, Ltd. — On July 1, 1980, Sarah Paulson bought a “Zip,” a car manufactured by the small British company Danforth, Ltd., from a dealer in Manhattan. She drove the car home to the state of Essex in the fall of 1980. On March 4, 1981, while driving at about fifty miles per hour on an interstate highway in Essex, Ms. Paulson lost control of the car and skidded into a side railing. The gas tank exploded immediately, and Ms. Paulson was badly burned. On January 4, 1982, Ms. Paulson's attorney, Robert Adams, filed Paulson v. Danforth, Ltd. in the United States District Court for the District of Essex. The complaint alleged that defective design had caused the gas tank to explode upon impact, and sought $750,000 in damages. The case was randomly assigned to Judge Edward Kinser.

Danforth's counsel in New York City received a copy of the complaint on January 15 and promptly telecopied it to Danforth's headquarters in London. Danforth retained Deb-
orah Alford, an Essex City lawyer, on January 18. On February 4, Danforth filed a motion to dismiss the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. Danforth claimed that, because its only business offices in the United States were in New York and California, it could not be sued in Essex. Ms. Paulson countered that Danforth was a commercial enterprise that voluntarily and deliberately did business with people coming from and going to Essex.

On June 10, Judge Kinser denied Danforth's motion to dismiss. On June 18, Danforth filed its answer denying liability. Thereafter, pursuant to rules 33 and 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. Adams served a set of interrogatories and a notice to produce documents. Among the fifty interrogatories were the following:

13. From 1977 until 1982, did Danforth test the gas tank on the "Zip" to learn about the tank's durability and ability to withstand impact?
14. If the tests described in question 13 above were performed, list below the names of all personnel who had any responsibility for the tests.

Plaintiff also made several document requests, including this one:

8. Provide all data on the results of any tests performed on the "Zip" from January 1, 1977, through June 1, 1982.

Plaintiff served these discovery requests on Danforth's attorney on July 10, 1982. After the thirty days that the Federal Rules permit for response had passed, Mr. Adams reminded Ms. Alford of the discovery requests. She expressed reservations about the propriety of several questions. Aware of the local district court rule requiring counsel to negotiate discovery disputes "in good faith" before filing discovery motions, the lawyers discussed the questions for several minutes but could not resolve their differences.

Twenty days later, defendant moved for a protective order. Danforth asked Judge Kinser to rule that: (1) twenty-nine of the fifty interrogatories were vague, irrelevant, or overly burdensome, or requested privileged information, and therefore need not be answered; (2) Danforth need not produce crash test data for 1977-1979 and for 1981-1982, because such statistics were irrelevant; and (3) only plaintiff's attorney could see the information produced, because of its "commercial" nature. In opposition to the motion, Mr. Adams asserted the relevance of the information and the absence of any special reason to protect the disclosure. Claiming that Danforth had
no legal basis for a protective motion, Mr. Adams requested that his client be awarded the costs and attorney’s fees incurred in opposing the motion.

After Judge Kinser read the papers on the pending discovery motion, he decided that he did not know enough about plaintiff’s theories to decide the questions presented. He called the attorneys to his chambers and asked them to explain more about the case. After listening for several minutes to the lawyers’ posturing, Judge Kinser asked whether all these legal battles were really necessary: was not settlement the least expensive, quickest, and fairest resolution of most disputes? When the attorneys insisted upon pursuing their arguments, the judge asked whether the lawyers were acting in their clients’ best interests. Had they thought about how costly the litigation would be? Did the clients know how risky trials were? That the loser would have to pay the victor’s court costs? That discovery could take years and that he, the judge, had control over the schedule?

Judge Kinser then asked Mr. Adams to leave the room so that the judge could confer privately with defendant’s lawyer. Judge Kinser explained to Ms. Alford that he had learned a bit about plaintiff’s case and that it looked “sound” to him. Did Danforth understand that a jury would surely be sympathetic to an injured plaintiff? What harm would there be in giving this injured victim some money? Had the parties talked numbers? Perhaps she could tell her client that $250,000 seemed “about right” to the judge. And perhaps she could mention that his court looked with disfavor upon uncompromising litigants.

Judge Kinser then called in plaintiff’s counsel for a private meeting. Did Mr. Adams know how hard it was to prove a products liability claim? Had he thought about how long it might take to get to trial? What numbers would his client “go for”? The judge thought that $250,000 “sounded right” and that the case looked like one that “should settle.”

Summoning both attorneys before him once more, Judge Kinser concluded the conference by announcing that he would defer ruling on the discovery motion until the parties had had time to negotiate further. He set a date to hold another conference in six weeks.

3. The New “Forms” of Litigation. — In cases like Petite, judges become enmeshed in extended relations with institutions. Many commentators have discussed the political and

58 Judge Kinser insisted on speaking to each side separately because real judges advised him to do so. See, e.g., Aldisert, supra note 18, at 251.
social ramifications of this involvement, but such ramifications are not the central concern of my analysis. *Petite's* purpose is to illustrate changes occurring within the lawsuit itself.

In public law cases like *Petite*, a new form of litigation is emerging — one that is no longer "bi-polar" or "retrospective." Judges are at the center; they are personally involved in the implementation of their decrees and in the prospective planning of posttrial relations among the parties. Judge Breaux's bargaining, frequent contact with the parties, and supervision of the minutiae of everyday life in prison contrasts sharply with our judicial customs. No longer a detached oracle, the judge has become a consort of the litigants. Moreover, judges like the fictional Breaux become openly involved in a power struggle: when defendants publicly defy or quietly evade court decrees, observers discover that judges are far less powerful than the goddess-symbol suggests.

On the other end of the litigation spectrum is *Paulson v. Danforth, Ltd.* — from its facts, an unexceptional tort case in the ordinary posture of pretrial preparation. Yet *Paulson*, like *Petite*, exemplifies the results of substantial change in the litigation process itself. Judge Kinser, like Judge Breaux, descended into the trenches to manage the case. Federal judges across the country are becoming engaged in similar pretrial managerial efforts. The new "forms" of litigation can be found in all types and phases of cases on the federal docket.

### B. The Sources of Judicial Management

It is useful in understanding the growth of managerial judging to distinguish (1) changes in the role of judges necessitated by procedural innovations and the articulation of new rights and remedies, from (2) changes initiated by judges themselves in response to work load pressures.

#### 1. The Influence of Discovery on the Pretrial Phase.

Some aspects of pretrial management are an inevitable result of the implementation of the discovery system in 1938. Before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted, parties

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60 Chayes, *Public Law Litigation*, *supra* note 5, at 1282.

61 See *id.* at 1284.


preparing for trial were generally left to their own devices.\textsuperscript{64} Creation of the new discovery rights, however, shifted the locus of pretrial preparation. Litigants became entitled to the court's help in obtaining from each other all unprivileged information "relevant to the subject matter" of the lawsuit.\textsuperscript{65} Thus, the domain of trial judges grew.

Although many have discussed and analyzed discovery,\textsuperscript{66} few have examined its effect on the work of trial judges and the relationship between judges and litigants. Consider, for instance, the contrast between Judge Kinser's role in ruling on the motion to dismiss and his role in ruling on the defendant's motion for a protective order. In the traditional passive mode, Danforth's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was Judge Kinser's first contact with the case. To rule on the motion, Judge Kinser needed little familiarity with the merits of the suit. He had only to consider Danforth's business ties with Essex to decide whether it would be fair to require Danforth to appear in the Essex federal court.\textsuperscript{67} In traditional lawsuits, motions to dismiss — even many for summary judgment — required minimal judicial involvement; judges retrospectively evaluated the acts described by the parties in light of the applicable legal standards.\textsuperscript{68} Indeed, judges often reached such decisions without ever speaking directly with the parties or their lawyers. When ruling on most pretrial motions, judges kept their blindfolds in place and their interest unpiqued.

In contrast, Judge Kinser could no longer remain distant after he was asked to rule on Danforth's motion for a protec-

\textsuperscript{64} Discovery as we know it today was unavailable for common law causes of action in the federal courts; limited discovery was allowed in actions in equity. See Millar, The Mechanism of Fact-Discovery, 32 ILL. L. REV. 444, 449 (1937); cf. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863, 869-77 (1933) (discussing state court innovations with respect to common law discovery).

\textsuperscript{65} Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), 28 U.S.C. § 5 (1940). Depositions could be taken only upon leave of the court after jurisdiction had been obtained, or without leave of the court after an answer had been served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a), 28 U.S.C. § 5 (1940). Documents were to be produced for inspection upon the motion of any party showing good cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, 28 U.S.C. § 5 (1940).


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tive order. Danforth argued that twenty-nine of Ms. Paulson's fifty questions were vague, irrelevant, or overly burdensome, or requested privileged information. To decide these issues, Judge Kinser had to learn a great deal about Ms. Paulson's theories for recovery — precisely what her claim was and how she planned to prove liability. He had to evaluate each contested interrogatory and disputed document in light of this information. Would a complete response to document request 8, which demanded 1977–1982 crash test data, have assisted Ms. Paulson in establishing Danforth's negligent design or manufacture of 1980 cars? Or should disclosure have been limited to data collected in the year 1980? Was question 14, which asked for the names of those who conducted the crash tests, so ambiguously drafted that response was impossible? Or did question 14 request so much information, including the identification of hundreds of employees, that it was burdensome?

These examples illustrate that the role of judges in ruling on discovery issues is qualitatively different from their role in the traditional model. First, judges must immerse themselves in the factual details of the case. Second, to decide discovery questions, judges must consider the parties' litigating strategies: rather than engage in the traditional task of analyzing the legal import of past events, Judge Kinser had to position himself as if he were each party's lawyer and then guess about the future course of the suit. What theories would make Ms. Paulson's questions relevant? What evidentiary problems did she face? Had she requested more information than was needed? Was Danforth's motion simply a tactic to delay this products liability case while others more favorable to Danforth moved forward? Could public disclosure of test data harm Danforth? Third, because the parties' briefs seldom yield the insights needed to make these assessments, judges often must engage in lengthy and informal conversations with the parties. Finally, by granting or denying discovery requests, judges alter the scope of suits by making some theories and proofs possible and others unlikely.

2. Enforcing Far-reaching Remedies: The Task for Posttrial Management. — Posttrial judicial management is also a creature, in part, of a shift — this time not in procedure, but in the use of lawsuits by diverse groups to assert novel legal rights. The subject matter of such litigation does not fit easily within our traditional conception of adjudication. The

69 Cf. Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 5, at 1296–97 (stressing importance of "prospective" factfinding in the remedial phases of public law litigation).

70 See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 7, at 473.

71 Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 5, at 1282.
purpose of many public law cases is to reorient the future dealings of the parties: to make wardens alter their treatment of inmates, to reorganize school districts, to reform mental hospitals. Such changes are not accomplished with a simple court order. The experience of the past three decades has been that many defendants seek to avoid court orders and, absent continuous oversight, often succeed.\textsuperscript{72}

\textit{Petite} is illustrative. After winning in 1974, plaintiffs tried for two years to obtain voluntary compliance with Judge Breaux's decree, yet conditions at the prison had continued to deteriorate. When Judge Breaux finally but reluctantly agreed to return to the case, she pressed for party-designed solutions. Judge Breaux was unable to obtain any action, however, until she held the governor in contempt. Thereafter, she found herself threatening contempt far more often than she would have liked. Finally, she replaced her general decree with a series of specific mandates: she detailed the number of guards per shift, the number of outdoor recreation hours to be provided each inmate, the date by which new plumbing had to be installed. Judge Breaux appointed three lawyers from the community to serve as her "monitors," and required the prison to admit them on one-hour notice, day or night. She made three unannounced visits herself. Further, Judge Breaux instituted a reporting requirement: once a month, the state had to file information detailing its progress toward implementation of the judge's orders.

Judge Breaux frequently questioned her involvement in \textit{Petite}. She had, after all, some sympathy for the defendants; the governor and warden were, like her, public servants trying to perform demanding jobs in a world of limited resources.\textsuperscript{73} Moreover, Judge Breaux was keenly aware of Supreme Court case law counseling her to respect the decisions of state executives.\textsuperscript{74} Judge Breaux also disliked the publicity; each time

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{73}Theoretically, the expenses defendants would incur in complying are irrelevant. See \textit{Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm}, 520 F.2d 392, 399 (2d Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court, however, has shown increased sympathy for the fiscal constraints of government defendants. See, e.g., \textit{City of Newport v. Fact Concert, Inc.}, 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (municipal defendant is immune from punitive damages liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980)). Defendants in the fictitious \textit{Petite} case, like the real defendants they mimic, would have informed the trial court about their finances. See, e.g., \textit{Rhem v. Malcolm}, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974).
\item \textsuperscript{74}See, e.g., \textit{Rhodes v. Chapman}, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); cf. \textit{Wolfish v. Bell}, 441
\end{itemize}
she issued an order, reporters telephoned, trying to pry state-
ments from her law clerks. Finally, she had 341 other cases
on her docket, many of which promised to end — if only she
could return to them.

Judge Breaux's problems with Petite exemplify those of
most judges' postdecision work. Although a few judges tackle
the problems of complex institutions with zeal, most find them-

selves enmeshed in difficulties that admit to few, if any, so-
lutions. Progress is slow; the relationship among the parties is
acrimonious; and even with oversight, only small steps toward
compliance are made.75

3. Management as a Quest for Efficiency. — (a) Experi-
mentation. — The emergence of managerial judging is not
simply an artifact of discovery (which generates pretrial su-
pervision) or public law litigation (which generates posttrial
supervision). Judges have also become concerned with prob-
lems of their own — the perception that the courts are too
slow, justice too expensive, and judges at least partly at
fault.76 Since the early 1900's, judges have attempted to re-

spond to criticism of their efficiency by experimenting with
increasingly more managerial techniques.

Turn-of-the-century critics, led by Dean Roscoe Pound,77
were dismayed by court delay, technical and antiquated pro-
cedural rules, and inadequate substantive laws. In his 1906
speech to the American Bar Association, Dean Pound urged
the bench and bar to take responsibility for weaknesses in the
administration of justice.78 The concerns of the legal estab-
lishment led to the creation of a society devoted exclusively to
the study of court administration79 and eventually to the for-

mulation of uniform procedures for the federal courts.

U.S. 526, 540 (1979) ("effective management" of prison held to be valid goal of prison
administrators).

75 See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 59; Note, "Mastering" Intervention in Prisons,

76 See, e.g., Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D. — A Need for Systematic Anticipation,
70 F.R.D. 83 (1976) (speech to the National Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (the Pound Conference)) [hereinafter
(annual report to the ABA on the State of the Judiciary). See generally D. NELSON,
problems in court management).

77 See Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906); Wigmore, Roscoe Pound's St. Paul Address of
1906: The Spark that Kindled the White Flame of Progress, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE
SOC'Y 176 (1937).

78 Pound, supra note 77, at 417.

79 See Winters, The American Judicature Society and Its Work, 19 CONN. B.J.
67 (1945).
In 1934, Congress expressly authorized the Supreme Court to write federal rules of civil procedure.80 Congress also preserved the power of all courts to " prescribe rules for the conduct of their business."81 When promulgating the new Federal Rules in 1938, the Court confirmed the power of district courts to make "local" rules,82 and established "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action"83 as the goal of all judicial rulemaking. Further, the Supreme Court by case law has confirmed trial judges' power over the pretrial phase.84

Since 1938, the case load of the federal courts has increased significantly.85 Several factors explain this growth. First, the population, and with it the number of disputants willing to go to court, has grown. Second, Congress has created and the courts have articulated a multitude of new rights and legally cognizable wrongs.86 Third, more lawyers are now available, and some of them offer legal services to litigants who previously could not obtain such services.87 Finally, Congress has provided for the payment of attorneys' fees to various classes


82 FED. R. CIV. P. 83.

83 FED. R. CIV. P. 1.


Today's federal docket is not only more voluminous, but also more complex. See Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 5, at 1284 (today, suits are more frequently multiparty, multi-issue); Clark, supra, at 129-48 (same). But see Friedman, The Six Million Dollar Man: Litigation and Rights Consciousness in Modern America, 39 Md. L. Rev. 661, 663 (1980) (questioning whether real litigation rates have increased).

86 For a general discussion of the panoply of individual rights against agencies that are recognized by the federal courts, see Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1195 (1982).

87 See Cramton, Crisis in Legal Services for the Poor, 20 VILL. L. REV. 521 (1981).
of victorious plaintiffs and has thereby created new incentives to litigate.  

In addition to increased case filings, motion practice under the discovery rules has substantially increased the burdens of the federal court system. From their promulgation in 1938 to the early 1960’s, the discovery rules enjoyed a “honeymoon” of sorts with judges and litigators. Both groups gradually learned how to use the new rules, which were hailed as a great advance over prior practice. But by the 1960’s, commentators began to worry about the uncertain scope of the discovery rules and reports of discovery “abuse.” Moreover, new technologies — photocopiers and computers — enabled litigants to accumulate, store, retrieve, and duplicate vast quantities of information. This development, in turn, increased the complexity and volume of data that could be requested and produced — or withheld.

As work load pressures grew, reformers in the 1960’s and 1970’s shifted their attention from procedural to administrative problems. Social scientists and popular writers, investigating trial courts for the first time, described growing backlogs of pending cases and “lazy” judges devoting little time to their

89 See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (“Civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark.”).
90 See, e.g., Columbia University School of Law Project for Effective Justice, Field Survey of Federal Pretrial Discovery (1965); Developments in the Law — Discovery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940 (1961). For an example of earlier concern about the problems of discovery practice, see Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 480 (1958).

92 For a discussion of the growth of recordkeeping and its relationship to litigation, see Fedders & Guttenplan, Document Retention and Destruction: Practical, Legal and Ethical Considerations, 56 Notre Dame Law. 5 (1980).

"circuit executives" to help in organizing appellate court calendars. To increase judges' accountability and improve case processing, federal courts instituted an individual calendar system, under which district judges were assigned direct responsibility for particular cases. New recordkeeping systems coupled with computer technology permitted court administrators to gather, analyze, and distribute vast amounts of information about cases. Finally, some district courts promulgated local rules that obliged litigants to submit pretrial plans, to conform to judicial timetables for trial preparation, and to seek permission to engage in extensive discovery.

(b) Normalization. — Over the past fifteen years, management advocates have persuaded many colleagues of the desirability of the new techniques. Amendments to the Federal Rules now pending before the Supreme Court would mandate pretrial management in virtually all cases. The proposed

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103 See M. Solomon, supra note 101, at 22–26. But see Cunningham, Some Organizational Aspects of Calendar Management, 4 Just. Sys. J. 233 (1978) (consistent calendar system more important to successful case management than is any particular type of system).


106 See Aldisert, supra note 18, at 248–52; Flanders, supra note 50, at 153–55; Rubin, supra note 14, at 138.

107 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 (Discussion Draft Sept. 1982). Draft rule 16(b) would require the issuance of scheduling orders within 120 days of the date of the complaint "except in categories exempted by the district court as inappropriate." According to the Advisory Committee, "logical candidates" for exemption include "social security cases, habeas corpus cases, "criminal cases, and "secured transactions."
revisions to rule 16 provide that a judge:

shall, after consulting with the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties, by scheduling conference, telephone, mail, or suitable means, enter a scheduling order that limits the time (1) to join other parties and to amend the pleadings; (2) to serve and hear motions; and (3) to complete discovery.108

Under this new regime of judicial management, discovery disputes and efforts to promote settlement would not be the only occasions upon which Judge Kinser would become acquainted with the parties' attorneys and the details of lawsuits. Rather, by virtue of rule 16, he would be obliged to issue pretrial orders within 120 days of filing of a complaint.109 To do so with any intelligence, he would need to learn a good deal about the lawsuits to which he was assigned.110

“Replaying” Paulson v. Danforth, Ltd. as if proposed rule 16 were in effect illustrates that the grant of pretrial power to federal judges would be expansive. In the hypothetical, Ms. disability matters, habeas corpus petitions, forfeitures, and reviews of certain administrative actions.” FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) advisory committee note (Discussion Draft Sept. 1982).

Other proposed amendments to the Federal Rules would also expand judges' powers. Draft rule 26(b) would permit judges to limit the frequency and extent of discovery if the information sought is "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative" or more readily available from another source, if the party seeking discovery has already had "ample opportunity by discovery . . . to obtain the information," or if discovery is "unduly burdensome or expensive" in light of the particular facts of the litigation. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (Discussion Draft Sept. 1982). Moreover, draft rule 26(g) would require attorneys to certify that their discovery requests are reasonable. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) (Discussion Draft Sept. 1982). Judges could punish attorneys who invalidly certified discovery requests by making the attorneys pay opposing parties' reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees. Id. These new rules would supplement the existing rules empowering judges to police discovery problems. Such existing rules include FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (authorizing judges to hold discovery conferences) and FED. R. CIV. P. 37(g) (permitting courts to sanction attorneys who do not "participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery plan").

108 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) (Discussion Draft Sept. 1982). 109 See supra note 107. 110 To accomplish this task, judges would have to read the parties' papers and contact the lawyers to learn enough about each case to decide the pace at which to proceed. My guess is that amended rule 16 would result in conferences in most cases despite the Advisory Committee's disclaimer, see Letter from Walter R. Mansfield, Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to Judge Edward T. Gignoux, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Mar. 9, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Mansfield Letter], reprinted in Judicial Conference Excerpt, supra note 19, at 1, 3, that the rule does not require conferences. Cf. Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 264, 281 (1979) (suggesting that judges hold "regular status conferences where the parties are required to explain and defend their overall approach to the litigation").
Paulson's attorney, Mr. Adams, filed the complaint on January 4, 1982. But suppose that, instead of promptly replying, defendant asked for an additional twenty days to respond. Plaintiff's counsel readily agreed, and the parties filed a stipulation to that effect. However, Judge Kinser refused to permit any extension beyond the time permitted by the Federal Rules — twenty days after receipt of service.\textsuperscript{111}

On May 14, Judge Kinser held a rule 16 pretrial conference. Although he had not yet decided Danforth's pending motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, rule 16 required him to issue a pretrial order "in no event more than 120 days after filing of the complaint."\textsuperscript{112} Ms. Alford argued that it would be a substantial waste of time and money for her to present discovery plans, because (she believed) the case should be dismissed on the jurisdictional ground. Mr. Adams was reluctant to discuss the case at all; he explained to the judge that, because no answer had been filed, he did not know what defenses would be raised, and he certainly did not want to suggest any.

Judge Kinser agreed that the conference was premature. He decided to postpone issuing a pretrial order (although he was not sure that rule 16 permitted the postponement\textsuperscript{113}). But he told the lawyers that the case should be resolved "quickly." "Looking down the road," the judge would neither tolerate further requests for delay nor let discovery "get out of hand." This case, like most, should be settled. He instructed the parties to return to his chambers on June 30 prepared to "talk settlement" with "real numbers."

On June 10, Judge Kinser denied Danforth's motion to dismiss. On June 18, Danforth filed its answer denying liability. A week later the parties once again met with the judge in chambers. After the attorneys reported that they had no settlement proposals to offer, the judge responded by announcing his schedule for the lawsuit. He ordered each side to inform him, by August 16, of the names of their prospective

\textsuperscript{111} FED. R. CIV. P. 6, 12(a).
\textsuperscript{112} FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(5) (Discussion Draft Sept. 1982).
\textsuperscript{113} Draft rule 16(b)(5) does not specifically permit postponement of a pretrial order: "The order shall issue as soon as practicable but in no event more than 120 days after filing of the complaint. A schedule shall not be modified except by leave of the judge . . . upon a showing of good cause." Id.

The Advisory Committee's notes do not address the issue, but the Committee's view appears to be that, although a district court may exempt a case or category of cases from the scheduling order requirement, a judge must issue an order in every nonexempted case. Id. advisory committee note at 15.
deponents. He directed the parties to exchange their first interro-
gatories by July 15, to begin taking depositions by August 25, and to finish discovery by November 30. Both sides ob-
jected, but the judge issued a pretrial order with this timetable.

Subsequently, the parties requested and obtained changes in
the original scheduling order. Experts for both sides were
unavailable for most of the summer of 1982, and a shipment of
documents disappeared in the mail and required several
months to replace. At each of the three pretrial conferences
that Judge Kinser has conducted to date, he has raised the
issue of settlement, but with little success. As a result of his
efforts, however, the parties have begun to discuss the same
"ball park" settlement figures.

Although this description of Paulson was presented as
though proposed rule 16 were in effect, the scenario is not
futuristic: under current rule 16, many federal judges manage
their cases much as Judge Kinser did in the revised hypothet-
ical. As they gain more experience with such new proce-
dures, judges are acting more forcefully. Indeed, not all judges
are as circumspect as Judge Kinser. Some warn the parties
that the judge would take a dim, and possibly hostile, view of either side's insistence on going to trial.

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114 Judge Kinser's approach was based on suggestions offered by several judges. See Aldisert, supra note 18; Peckham, supra note 14; Pollack, Pretrial Conferences, 50 F.R.D. 451 (1970); Rubin, supra note 14. Judge Pollack illustrated the boldness with which some judges manage cases when he offered the following advice on pretrial conferences to his colleagues:

[The trial judge] conducts an informal inquiry into the nature of the case and the defense. A thumbnail sketch will suffice to orient the Judge.

In many cases he will be quickly told that one or another counsel has served interrogatories. Vacate them forthwith, without prejudice. Let them be saved for a later time if they really are needed. Interrogatories have become a prime offender in abusive, burdensome, unjustified, limitless, wasteful discovery.


115 Despite occasional warnings from their colleagues, see Will, Merhige & Rubin, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, 75 F.R.D. 203, 205 (1976) ("If you coerce a settlement... that is a terrible mistake."), some judges abuse their power. Because most pretrial conferences are off the record, little documentation is available. Still, attorneys pass the word that certain judges are troublesome, and a few appellate decisions supplement the anecdotes. For example, in Webb v. McGhie Land Title Co., 549 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1977), which involved a title insurance dispute, the district judge had granted summary judgment and awarded $400,000 to plaintiff, dismissed defendant insurer's third-party complaint, and entered judgment quieting title to real property in the third-party defendant. The judge ruled orally, after a brief argument, and did not supplement his findings with a written opinion. The court of appeals, reversing and remanding to a different judge for trial, appended the...
The models demonstrate that federal judges today devote substantial amounts of time to case management. Only when informal discussions fail do judges take their places on the bench at formal trials and hearings. To illuminate this informal world, I have isolated several aspects of judge-litigant contact in case management.\textsuperscript{116}

brief transcript from the hearing on third-party defendant's motion for summary judgment. The following passages are illustrative:

\begin{quote}
THE COURT: [If I have got to go through all those depositions, you have got a rather poor start.

. . . .

THE COURT: Let's get this thing out of the way.

. . . .

THE COURT: Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted.

[PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY]: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor —

THE COURT: That is the ruling.

[DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, there are several issues in the case.

THE COURT: That is the ruling.

[PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY]: The forgery —

[DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY]: Is it granted purely on the item of forgery, your Honor? There are several issues in the case.

THE COURT: Young man, I have ruled.
\end{quote}

\textit{Id.} at 1362-63.

Because the trial judge in \textit{Webbe} had often been criticized by the appellate court, see, e.g., Eckles v. Sharman, 548 F.2d 905, 911 (10th Cir. 1977), the litigants were willing to seek his recusal and challenge his decisions. The behavior of other, less notorious judges is more likely to go unchallenged. Nevertheless, some circuits have had occasion to review and reverse district court rulings made in the name of efficiency. See, e.g., Beary v. City of Rye, 601 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1979) (trial court dismissed suit because plaintiffs had miscalculated the number of witnesses for the first day; reversed and remanded to different judge); McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393 (4th Cir. 1976) (trial court dismissed suit for failure to file amended complaint on time; reversed and remanded because magistrate's insistence on deadlines was held to have unduly burdened litigants); Peterson v. Term Taxi Inc., 429 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (trial court dismissed action upon plaintiff's failure to appear for trial at appointed time; reversed because delinquency resulted only from plaintiff's poor judgment in leaving town for the weekend without consulting his attorney). But see, e.g., Beaufort Concrete Co. v. Atlantic States Constr. Co., 352 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1955) (district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider plaintiff's affidavits, which were submitted late and without good excuse on day of summary judgment hearing), \textit{cert. denied}, 384 U.S. 1004 (1966). Justice Black, however, would have granted certiorari. See 384 U.S. at 1004 (Black, J., dissenting) ("This is another in a growing number of cases in which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been used to prevent the fair and just determination of a lawsuit on the merits.").

\textsuperscript{116} My views about aspects of case management are based on my experience as a litigator, on descriptions by judges and others of how cases are managed, see, e.g., sources cited \textit{supra} note 14, and on studies of litigation, see, e.g., M. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, \textit{supra} note 72; Diver, \textit{supra} note 10; Resnik & Shaw, \textit{supra} note 72; Note,
I. Initiation. — I believe, without the benefit of much empirical work,\textsuperscript{117} that judges initiate judicial management during the pretrial phase. After trial, judicial intervention generally comes at the parties' request.

Why do judges initiate pretrial management? First, many are dissatisfied with the adversarial process and want to reduce attorneys' control over it.\textsuperscript{118} Judges who observe specific instances of attorney misbehavior and dilatory tactics may feel that the remedy is to supervise attorney conduct more closely.\textsuperscript{119} Second, judges may believe that their intervention speeds settlement and improves the litigation process.\textsuperscript{120} Third, as judicial management becomes a method of control, it creates incentives for its perpetuation. With the individual calendar system, the publication of each judge's case load, and comparative data on judges' performance,\textsuperscript{121} judges can learn which of their colleagues dispose of the most cases. When judges who dispose of many cases lecture other judges on how to reduce backlogs, peer pressure tends to generate more vigorous management.\textsuperscript{122}

In the posttrial context, different incentives are at work. By making decisions on the merits, judges "dispose of" cases.

\textsuperscript{117} The Civil Litigation Research Project has collected substantial data on the costs and pace of lawsuits; analysis of the information is only beginning to be reported. See Dispute Processing and Civil Litigation, supra note 17; Grossman, Kritzer, Bumiller & McDougal, Measuring the Pace of Civil Litigation in Federal and State Trial Courts, 65 JUDICATURE 86 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Grossman, Measuring the Pace]; Grossman, Kritzer, Bumiller, Sarat, McDougal & Miller, Dimensions of Institutional Participation: Who Uses the Courts, and How?, 44 J. Pol. 86 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Grossman, Who Uses the Courts?]; Kritzer, The Judge's Role in Pretrial Case Processing: Assessing the Need for Change, 66 JUDICATURE 28 (1982). In one of these studies, however, the data were drawn exclusively from 1649 court records that the researchers themselves concluded could be incomplete. See Grossman, Measuring the Pace, supra, at 94-95.

Other reported research is generally restricted to examinations of one or a few aspects of judge-litigant contact. See, e.g., R. RODES, K. RIPPLE & C. MOONEY, SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1981) (analyzing use of discovery sanctions but relying solely on reported opinions for nonrandom — and probably unrepresentative — data base).

\textsuperscript{118} See M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE ch. 6 (1980).

\textsuperscript{119} See, e.g., Peckham, supra note 14, at 782; Renfrew, supra note 110, at 271, 275.

\textsuperscript{120} See TRAINING SEMINAR, supra note 99, at 135 (remarks of Rubin, J.) (judges' discussions of settlement numbers may give "lawyers some illusion of certainty").

\textsuperscript{121} See, e.g., P. CONNOLLY & P. LOMBARD, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: MOTIONS (1980).

\textsuperscript{122} See S. FLANDERS, supra note 14, at 13 (individual calendar system fosters "a spirit of competition").
Given the large time investment required for postdecision case management, judges have every reason to avoid returning to "finished" cases. Accordingly, the instigators of posttrial management are usually the "winning" plaintiffs' attorneys, who seek help in implementing decrees. Occasionally, "losing" defense attorneys return hoping to have adverse court orders modified.

Once brought into the enforcement process, however, the judge often uses informal management techniques in an effort to save time and avoid the pressures of public controversy. In *Petite*, Judge Breaux first ordered the parties to negotiate, then joined the discussions herself after the parties' private conferences proved unsuccessful. Further, she instituted reporting requirements as a technique for enforcing compliance — in a sense, initiating contact with the parties.

2. Likelihood, Frequency, and Duration. — Although it is difficult to tally the overall resources devoted to judicial management tasks, some generalizations about pretrial and posttrial management are possible. With respect to the likelihood of management's occurrence, nearly all civil cases would receive pretrial judicial attention under proposed rule 16, and many courts already engage in much of the supervision contemplated by the proposed rule.

In contrast, the occasions for posttrial management are few. Eighty-five to ninety percent of all federal civil suits end by settlement. Of those not settled, some uncalculated number are dismissed because of legal defects. In most of the remaining cases, the parties demand monetary rather than

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123 See, e.g., M. Harris & D. Spiller, supra note 72.
124 See, e.g., Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Jordan v. Wolke, 615 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1980).
125 Relying on their recent experience with implementation problems, some judges have required parties to report to them on the progress of cases. See, e.g., Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice) (staying order that required defendants to report monthly on reduction of prison population).
126 Of the 160,481 federal civil cases terminated in the year ending June 30, 1980, only 13,191, or 8.2%, were terminated by trial. 1980 DIRECTOR'S REPORT, supra note 85, at 3, 109. Some settled cases, however, return to court when the agreement is challenged. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (dispute over interpretation of settlement). Nonetheless, the number of such cases is apparently small, presumably because the relationship that enables settlement normally permits the parties to resolve subsequent disputes.
127 Failure to state a claim under *FED. R. CIV. P.* 12(b)(6) is an example of such a defect. The Administrative Office tabulates terminations by trial and other means but does not publish data on the reasons for pretrial dismissals.
equitable relief. Postdecision collection problems sometimes arise when damages are awarded. But judges can do little if the debtor is judgment proof, and in any event the judicial time required to order execution of a judgment is minimal. Thus, only a tiny fraction of all civil cases require significant postdecision judicial activity; generally such cases are like Petite v. Governor, cases in which equitable orders involving complex institutions have been made.

Unfortunately, little empirical work charts the frequency of judge-litigant contact either before or after decision. Without data, we can only guess how much time judges actually devote to management. But the very nature of the tasks involved suggests that both pretrial and posttrial intervention require large investments of judicial time and energy.

The duration of supervision, both before and after trial, may vary from a single meeting to a decade or more. Yet it is significant that pretrial supervision has a natural stopping point. In Paulson, Judge Kinser will relinquish his role as manager when the case is decided, either by settlement or by trial. In fact, the whole point of pretrial management is to end the dispute as rapidly as possible. After decision, on the other hand, judicial management has no clear-cut conclusion. In Petite, Judge Breaux may retain her role as manager indefinitely, and the questions whether and when the district court should terminate its jurisdiction may themselves be litigated.

128 Cf. O. Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction I (1978) (injunction is traditionally an "extraordinary" remedy, available only when other relief is unavailable or inadequate).

129 The small number of cases returning to judges after decision may require a disproportionately large investment of judges' time. See sources cited supra note 75.

130 Some recent studies have been undertaken. See, e.g., M. Rebell & A. Block, Educational Policy Making and the Courts (1982); Kritzer, supra note 117.

131 I believe that frequency of contact will depend on several variables, including the following: (1) the number of issues, parties, and attorneys in the case; (2) the relationships between opposing counsel and among cocounsel; (3) the attorneys' assessment of the efficacy of requesting judicial assistance; (4) the attorneys' proximity to the courthouse; and (5) the local district court's custom supporting or discouraging frequent contact with the judge before or after decision.

Once cases are studied and the variables are analyzed, researchers may be able to predict which cases will consume substantial amounts of judges' time. Researchers may also be able to verify the perception that single-claim, two-party cases pose fewer discovery problems. See Brazil, supra note 91, at 223-25. But see ABA Report on Discovery Abuse, supra note 66, at 138 (concluding that it is "not feasible" to identify in advance which cases will be prone to discovery abuse).

132 See, e.g., Aldisert, supra note 18, at 247; Flanders, supra note 50, at 149.

133 Compare, e.g., Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1979) (district court required to halt supervision because defendants were in
3. Formality of Proceedings. — Managerial meetings both before and after decision are informal and contrast sharply with the highly stylized structure of courtroom interaction. When judges preside at hearings, they evoke the image of Justice: they wear robes and sit stony-faced behind elevated benches; they receive information but rarely impart it. Pretrial and posttrial conferences, on the other hand, are informal events. The parties talk with, rather than at, each other. The conferences often take place in chambers. The participants sit around tables, and the judge wears business dress. But for the title of one of the participants — "judge" — these conferences could be confused with ordinary business meetings.

In public law cases, however, informal posttrial negotiations may fail. Posttrial disputes often lead to formal compliance and contempt hearings. Lawyers' in-chambers arguments are replaced by witnesses' in-court testimony; judicial proposals for compromise give way to formal orders; and the entire proceeding is placed in the public domain and often within reach of the appellate courts. In contrast, most pretrial conferences are not followed by formal adjudication, and judicial acts in the pretrial phase are rarely exposed to public scrutiny.

substantial compliance with decree and promised continued compliance), with, e.g., Booker v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 451 F. Supp. 659 (D. Minn.) (district court need not terminate jurisdiction, because desegregation plans had not been fully implemented), aff'd, 585 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979).

134 Judges must, however, provide reasons for their factfinding. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); cf. Fuller, supra note 13, at 366 (adjudication "assumes a burden of rationality not borne by any other form of social ordering").

135 One judge thought that his multiparty, multidistrict case would best be managed in a friendly atmosphere:

I asked [the lawyers] what their view was of coming in to see whether the court could be of any help. . . . I also suggested that it might be a good idea if we could sort of get together socially before each of these conferences.

Well, I was really surprised at the response I got. . . .

. . .

[My wife and I gave three parties. The first was] on Sunday and we had about 35 people. The weather was delightful. And these guys were calling each other by their first name.

Will, Merhige & Rubin, supra note 115, at 213 (remarks of Merhige, J.).

136 Without better data, we cannot be certain that a larger percentage of cases subjected to informal posttrial management return for formal adjudication than do cases subjected to pretrial supervision. We do know that fewer than 10% of all cases conclude with a trial; the remainder leave court dockets for a variety of reasons. But we also need information about: (1) the percentage of all cases managed informally; (2) the percentage of cases that, although not tried, end because of formal adjudication; and (3) the percentage of cases that, when returning for postdecision management, move from the informal arena to adjudication. I speculate that proportionately more cases managed posttrial end up in formal adjudication than do those managed pretrial.
4. Scope of Information. — Informal judge-litigant contact provides judges with information beyond that traditionally within their ken. Conference topics are more wide ranging and the judges' concerns are broader than either are when proceedings are conducted in court. The supposedly rigid structure of evidentiary rules, designed to insulate decision-makers from extraneous and impermissible information, is irrelevant in case management. Managerial judges are not silent auditors of retrospective events retold by first-person storytellers. Instead, judges remove their blindfolds and become part of the sagas themselves.

Consider again some details of the hypothetical Paulson case. Assume that Judge Kinser imposed a time limit for naming expert witnesses. Danforth objected: the company needed more time and information to assess the availability and desirability of various experts. Judge Kinser agreed to an extension. At a subsequent conference, Danforth asked for still more time on the ground its first and second choices for experts were "unavailable" to testify on Danforth's behalf "because of prior commitments." Relying on his past experiences as a judge and a litigator, Judge Kinser translated "unavailable" into "unwilling." He gave Danforth another twenty days to find an expert but concluded (to himself) that the company's defense was weak; he therefore redoubled his efforts to pressure Danforth to settle. By being "in" at the planning stages, Judge Kinser made a premature and perhaps ill-founded evaluation of the strength of Danforth's defense.

I believe that cases that have gone through trial, the ordering of a complex decree, enforcement difficulties, and subsequent return to court are unlikely candidates for posttrial settlement. The parties' intransigence forces judges to impose formal decisions.

Rules of evidence are designed to screen extraneous information from decision-makers, but the rules are often applied less rigorously at bench than at jury trials. See McCormick on Evidence, supra note 34, at 137. Moreover, in both judge and jury trials, judges necessarily learn some extraneous information before they rule on the admissibility of evidence.

There are at least two differences, however, between judges' receiving information at trial and their receiving information during the pretrial process. First, because most trials are recorded, a reviewing court can determine whether a judge properly admitted or rejected information at trial. Appellate courts infrequently reverse on the basis of evidentiary rulings, but this fact may simply demonstrate the degree to which the public record compels trial judges to ensure that their decisions are supported. Second, ex parte communication is banned at trials; at pretrials, it is often encouraged as a technique for enabling attorneys to "tell the judge what they really have in mind." Aldisert, supra note 18, at 248. But some of the impressions that judges form at pretrials may be based on the lawyers' misleading or inaccurate statements. Neither empirical studies nor intuition supports the notion that judges are particularly adept at divining the accuracy of information that has not been subjected to cross-examination.

See Fuller, The Adversary System, in Talks on American Law 43 (H. Fuller, supra note 18, at 248. But some of the impressions that judges form at pretrials may be based on the lawyers' misleading or inaccurate statements. Neither empirical studies nor intuition supports the notion that judges are particularly adept at divining the accuracy of information that has not been subjected to cross-examination.
Similarly, episodes in the *Petite* case demonstrate the effect of the large amounts of information available to a managerial judge. In *Petite*, Judge Breaux learned facts and opinions — information she might not have received in a more formal confrontation — that she could use to encourage settlement and bypass the adjudicatory process. At a meeting to discuss Hadleyville's broken toilets and clogged showers, defendants' attorney promised that the problems would be solved within the week. In a conference two weeks later, plaintiffs' attorney reported the continuing failures of the sanitation systems. The defense attorney was embarrassed and indicated that the governor was having "staff problems." Judge Breaux ordered that the warden attend the next conference.

At the following meeting, Judge Breaux saw what she believed to be animosity between the state's lawyer and the warden. After the meeting, she spoke in private with the attorney. She told him that she guessed the warden was "causing problems." Judge Breaux suggested that the governor might not wish to be held responsible for the health problems resulting from the lack of sanitation. She hoped the governor would see the choices before him: make the warden obey the court, replace the warden, or take the blame for the warden's misconduct.

In sum, in both the pretrial and posttrial contexts, managerial judges can acquire, test, and use knowledge in ways that judges adjudicating under the traditional model cannot.

5. Reach and Visibility. — Pretrial supervision affects fewer people than does posttrial management, and, as a result, tends to be less visible. The *Paulson* pretrial orders were felt primarily by the lawyers, who had to do the work, and by the litigants, who had to pay. Although pretrial orders occasionally affect third parties — such as Danforth's employees (who had to compile requested data) and Danforth's expert and lay witnesses (who had to appear for depositions) — such effects are generally transitory. Accordingly, pretrial judge-litigant

Berman 2d ed. 1971) (nonadversarial systems are objectionable because the decision-maker may "reach a conclusion at an early stage and ... adhere to that conclusion in the face of conflicting considerations later developed").

139 Of course, in cases like *Paulson* that implicate the standards and practices of an entire industry, the reach of pretrial management is broader. Other plaintiffs, their attorneys, and similarly situated defendants and their insurers may also be affected. If trial preparation is unduly limited, participants in the larger battle may believe that their interests have been jeopardized and may want to join the battle. For example, in the case of *In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig.*, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980), Hitachi, IBM, Sanyo, and Sears, Roebuck filed briefs amici curiae on the issue whether the litigation was too complex to be tried to a jury. Some of the companies commissioned experts to analyze the history of the jury trial right,
contacts are relatively private events. Many judges conduct “pretrials” in their chambers; typically, neither court reporters nor the public attends.\textsuperscript{140}

Posttrial management frequently affects many nonparties.\textsuperscript{141} For example, Judge Breaux’s order to increase the correctional staff at Hadleyville by twelve officers altered the seniority rights of the prison’s unionized personnel and reduced the staff resources available to other state prisons; her order to transfer prisoners caused ripples in the federal prison system, which accepted some of the overflow.\textsuperscript{142} Such orders, of course, raise important political and constitutional issues. Judicially crafted remedial schemes may require large expenditures of public funds and involve judges in the detailed administration of institutions usually run by other branches of government.

Given the import of such events, posttrial judicial activity is likely to occur with stage lights. After judgment, the call for judicial assistance may herald a breakdown in the parties’ negotiations — one side’s “going public” with allegations of the other’s failure to obey a court order. Reform cases like \textit{Petite} are especially likely to attract public attention. Contempt motions against government officials are newsworthy, and the public, concerned for its institutions and its pocket-


\textsuperscript{140} \textit{See, e.g.}, Schiller & Wall, \textit{Judicial Settlement Techniques}, 5 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 39, 40 (1981) (settlement conferences offer the advantage of confidentiality); Will, Merhige & Rubin, \textit{supra} note 115 (same). Some conferences are not even entered on court docket sheets. \textit{See} S. Flanders, \textit{supra} note 14, at 34. \textit{But cf.} Combined Communications Corp. v. Finesilver, 672 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1982) (denying mandamus that would have required trial judge to permit television cameras at pretrial negotiations because reporters and public were already allowed to attend and take notes); National Farmers’ Org. v. Oliver, 530 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1976) (granting mandamus requiring judge to hold conferences on the record when parties so requested).

\textsuperscript{141} Professor Fuller suggested that the involvement of many people and interests makes a dispute “polycentric” and hence less amenable to traditional forms of adjudication. Fuller, \textit{supra} note 13, at 394–404. Expanding on Fuller’s view, Professor Fletcher believes that courts cannot legitimately resolve nonlegal, polycentric disputes unless the political bodies that would ordinarily do so “are in such serious and chronic default that there is realistically no other choice.” \textit{See} Fletcher, \textit{supra} note 59, at 696–97.

\textsuperscript{142} \textit{See, e.g.}, \textit{Haitian Count Tops 500; Bureau Takes Alabama Prisoners}, Monday Morning Highlights (Federal Prison System, U.S. Dep’t of Justice), Sept. 14, 1981, at 1 (discussing prison population reduction order issued in Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628 (M.D. Ala. 1979)).
book, takes note when judges' orders affect schools or prisons.\textsuperscript{143}

6. Discretion. — The two hypotheticals demonstrate the broad discretion of the trial judge who assumes a managerial role. Assume, for example, that Judge Kinser imposed a timetable for pretrial preparation and denied Danforth's motion for protection from Ms. Paulson's discovery requests. Danforth's attorney, Ms. Alford, was concerned: she thought that the time Judge Kinser permitted was egregiously short and that he had erred in denying the protective order. Ms. Alford asked Judge Kinser to "certify" an appeal on the ground that the discovery questions were so important that "immediate" review would "materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."\textsuperscript{144} The judge refused because he thought the discovery rulings raised no novel points of law. Ms. Alford could have requested a writ of mandamus\textsuperscript{145} commanding Judge Kinser to issue a protective order and to liberalize his pretrial schedule. But appellate courts rarely issue such writs to district courts.\textsuperscript{146} Moreover, Ms. Alford would have risked Judge Kinser's displeasure at being named the respondent in a mandamus petition.\textsuperscript{147} Danforth's remaining path to appeal — challenging a final judgment — would open only if Danforth lost at trial or by summary judgment. Absent a final decision, Judge Kinser would enjoy unreviewable discretion.

Litigants dissatisfied with Judge Breaux's postdecision rulings in \textit{Petite} had far greater opportunities to secure appellate review. The underlying decision was tested on appeal, and the affirmation provided some guidance to Judge Breaux on

\textsuperscript{143} See, e.g., Fiss, \textit{supra} note 6, at 52–58; Fletcher, \textit{supra} note 59, at 650–52.

\textsuperscript{144} 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976); see, e.g., Pittman v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 552 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1977) (district court struck set of 90 interrogatories on ground of burdensomeness and certified the order for appeal). The federal policy against "piecemeal" appeals, however, makes it unlikely that interlocutory decisions will be certified or reviewed by appellate courts. See \textit{Id.} § 1292(b).

\textsuperscript{145} See \textit{supra} note 6, at 52–58.

\textsuperscript{146} Section 1651(a), the All Writs Act, provides federal courts with authority to issue "all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions." \textit{Id.} § 1651(a). This section is the basis for appellate courts' authority to issue writs of mandamus to district courts.

\textsuperscript{147} Mandamus is a "drastic" and "extraordinary" remedy, available only when no alternative relief exists. See, e.g., Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402–03 (1976) (denying request for mandamus to vacate discovery orders); see also Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 665 (1978) (denying mandamus and recognizing trial judge's "wide latitude" over calendar).

\textsuperscript{149} That mandamus requests are infrequent may be attributable to: (1) attorneys' fear of jeopardizing their reputations and relationships with the local bench by advertising their disagreements with a particular judge, (2) the relatively minor effect of the sanctions imposed, and (3) the broad discretion permitted trial judges by courts imposing such sanctions. Peckham, \textit{supra} note 14, at 790.
the proper scope of relief. Further, many of Judge Breaux’s postdecision orders gave injunctive relief and thus were appealable as a matter of right. Finally, even when Judge Breaux issued posttrial orders that were not appealable, public attention, described above, and institutional constraints, discussed below, confined her exercise of discretion.

7. Institutional Constraints. — An array of institutional factors are far more likely to discipline judges’ actions during posttrial management than during pretrial supervision. First, a large percentage of posttrial management occurs in public law cases, in which defendants are either federal or state officials. In these cases, federal judges are constrained by the obligation to respect the autonomy of coordinate branches of government and state executives.

Second, federal judges appreciate the limits of their posttrial enforcement powers. Decrees are enforced principally in a negative fashion — by threatening to hold the disobedient in contempt and to levy fines or impose jail terms. Judges understand that, however detailed their decrees, evasion is relatively easy; close monitoring for compliance is expensive and draining. To implement the terms of their decrees, judges need the cooperation not only of administrators and employees in defendant institutions, but also of state executives and the community.

Finally, the fact of decision must be considered. One might expect that, with the issuance of a decree, a judge would be emotionally and intellectually committed to the decree and would insist unrelentingly upon its enforcement. But overreaching and expressions of hostility toward noncomplying defendants are relatively rare. Earlier findings of defendants’...
culpability do not translate into unquestioned acceptance of plaintiffs' subsequent requests for assistance.

There are many explanations for this reticence. The issues in public law cases are complex and often depressing. Third parties may impede implementation efforts, and fiscal constraints may limit defendants' flexibility to respond promptly to court decrees. Thus, even if personally sympathetic to plaintiffs' claims, and even if angered by defendants' disobedience, judges find it politic and appropriate to exercise restraint.

In contrast, few institutional constraints inhibit judges during the pretrial phase. First, many of the parties are private individuals or businesses rather than government officials. Second, even when governmental litigants are involved, the pressures of comity are far less when judges supervise pretrial litigation strategies than when they supervise the posttrial implementation of decrees reorienting government programs and facilities. Third, the effective power of judges is considerably greater at the pretrial stage than in postdecision enforcement. During pretrial supervision, judges make many decisions informally and often meet with parties ex parte, and appellate review is virtually unavailable. The judge has vast influence over the course and eventual outcome of the litigation. As a result, litigants have good reason to capitulate to judicial pressure rather than risk the hostility of a judge who, under the individual calendar system, has ongoing responsibility for the case. During pretrial management, judges are restrained only by personal beliefs about the proper role of judge-managers.

D. Some Preliminary Conclusions

Pretrial and posttrial management share certain characteristics. In both, judges interact informally with the litigating parties and receive information that would be considered inadmissible in traditional courtroom proceedings. Management at both ends of the lawsuit takes time and increases judges' responsibilities.

Nevertheless, the two management stages are dissimilar in many respects. Predecision management is initiated usually simply do not have time to spend, as I did, nine months in hearing, six months of which was wasted by what I find now . . . to be misrepresentations by Reserve Mining Company." Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181, 185 (8th Cir. 1976). On the basis of these remarks, inter alia, the Eighth Circuit remanded the case to a different judge. Id. at 189. In contrast, most judges muffle their anger. See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 448 F. Supp. 659, 672 (D.R.I. 1978) ("The Court has made no finding of bad faith or willful intent to frustrate [its] mandate . . . . Nevertheless the Court has concluded that a coercive sanction is necessary.").
by the judge; postdecision supervision begins more often at a litigant's request. Pretrial management occurs much more frequently, but posttrial intervention tends to be more far reaching in its effects. Unlike pretrial management, posttrial activity occurs within a framework of appellate oversight, public visibility, and institutional constraints that inhibits overreaching.

Posttrial supervision thus represents a less striking departure from the American judicial tradition than does pretrial management. Because it is party initiated, visible, and reviewable, the judge's role in posttrial management is familiar. Moreover, many techniques of posttrial management, such as retaining jurisdiction and employing special masters, are not novel. In contrast, because pretrial management is judge initiated, invisible, and unreviewable, it breaks sharply from American norms of adjudication.

IV. The Results of Pretrial Management

Having explored the techniques of managerial judging and the reasons for its development, we can now evaluate its accomplishments. In Section A, I assess whether the new procedures have achieved their purported aims. In Section B, I consider the implications of managerial judging for our system of adjudication.

A. The Achievements of Management

i. The Ambitions. — Managerial judging's proponents, blurring organizational theories and utilitarianism, believe that their new system of management will permit improved allocation of judicial resources. Court services, particularly judges' time, have become scarce commodities. A continually expanding number of consumers are seeking access to the courts, but are forced to wait. One (apparent) cause for the wait is the queue — the line created by claimants

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154 See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 7, at 481–86.
156 As ordinarily understood, utilitarianism "holds that the moral worth of an action, practice, institution, or law is to be judged by its effect in promoting happiness — 'the surplus of pleasure over pain' — aggregated across all of the inhabitants . . . of 'society.'" R. Posner, The Economics of Justice 48–49 (1981) (citation omitted).
157 See Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Admin-
already waiting for judicial services. A second cause comes from some claimants, already in the courthouse, who appear to abuse their places at the head of the line by monopolizing court time. Attorneys, motivated by their own interests or those of their clients, seem to be the critical actors in the apparent misuse of court resources.158

According to proponents of judicial management, judges are the only advocates for the claimants waiting at the end of the queue and for the public, which benefits from and pays for the dispute resolution system.159 Therefore, judges should take charge of the system and allocate their time in a prudent, coherent, and fair manner.160 They should speed cases at the head of the line and discipline litigants who waste resources. The result would be an efficient court system, which (like the end of every other utilitarian tale) would in turn produce the greatest good for the greatest number of people.

2. Some Successes. — In large part, the existence of managerial judging depends upon information about case processing. To meet this need, court administrators have developed systems to gather and compile data. The result is unquestion-


160 I cannot emphasize enough that if for one moment our calendars slip from our direct supervision and control, the result will be chaos. . . . Only by maintaining an independent judiciary controlling its own calendars can we hope to achieve the best results, qualitatively or quantitatively, in our endless search for a more perfect justice under law.

ably beneficial; managerial judging has led to a wealth of new information about the federal courts.

We now know more about the number, type, and disposition of cases.\textsuperscript{161} With this information comes enhanced accountability. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts learns how many and which cases belong to each judge, whose case load is growing, and whose is diminishing. With monthly computer printouts, individual judges can no longer "lose" cases or hide behind an uncalculated morass of motions. Dissemination of the new information makes courts more visible; the very counting of cases is an event that the national media report each year. The information also provides a basis for suggestions about how to improve case processing.\textsuperscript{162} For example, researchers from the Federal Judicial Center study district courts' local rules and practices to identify ways of increasing judges' productivity.\textsuperscript{163} Further, court data may aid the judiciary in persuading Congress to create new judgeships and to augment salaries and support staff.\textsuperscript{164}

Managerial judging may also be credited with some increase in attorney accountability. Judicial control of lawsuits

\textsuperscript{161} See 1980 DIRECTOR'S REPORT, supra note 85. For the advances in recordkeeping, compare the 1980 Director's Report, id., with the ALI's 1934 study, ALI STUDY, supra note 85. In 1934, the only available national data on federal courts — other than the ALI's study — were the annual reports of the Attorney General. Id. at 19. Before 1904, no nationwide information was kept about the number of civil cases filed in federal court. See id. at 32. The ALI study itself gathered information for only 13 federal districts over a one-year period, and not all of these districts had records for all cases, id. at 28–29.

The scope and quality of information on the federal courts have improved substantially since the 1930's. For example, during the last 10 years, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts began to publish Court Management Statistics, Juror Utilization Statistics, and Reports on the Implementation of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974. In addition, the Federal Judicial Center periodically publishes studies on discrete issues of federal court management. See, e.g., S. FLANDERS, supra note 14.

\textsuperscript{162} One benefit of this new information is that it has enabled court administrators to weigh the relative burdens of different kinds of cases and to distribute complex cases more equally among judges. See generally Doane, The Effect of Case Weights on Perceived Court Workload, 2 JUST. SYS. J. 270 (1977) (providing a model for calculating workload that assigns various "case weights" to different types of cases).

\textsuperscript{163} One such suggestion is to minimize the number of written opinions. See, e.g., P. CONNOLLY & P. LOMBARD, supra note 121, at 55 (noting faster decision of motions when no opinions written); S. FLANDERS, supra note 14, at ix–x (in "fast and/or highly productive courts," "relatively few written opinions are prepared for publication").

\textsuperscript{164} The Judicial Conference's requests to Congress for more judgeships and administrative positions is based, in part, upon weighted case studies. See Additional Judicial Positions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as Additional Judgeship Hearings].
presumably forces attorneys to prepare and manage their clients' cases more rapidly and efficiently. Breaches of judicially imposed schedules could provide clients with consumer information about attorney malfeasance and give bar committees data for disciplinary proceedings.

3. The Limits of Success. — No one can oppose efforts to curtail exploitation of the judicial system, to make dispute resolution quick and inexpensive, or to increase the accountability of judges and attorneys. I do, however, question the extent to which managerial judging contributes to these worthy aims and whether it is wise to rely on judges to achieve these goals.

Proponents of managerial judging typically assume that management enhances efficiency in three respects. They claim that case management decreases delay, produces more dispositions, and reduces litigation costs. But close examination of the currently available information reveals little support for the conclusion that management is responsible for efficiency gains (if any) at the district court level, and strong reason to suspect that many of the purported efficiency gains in the district courts are illusory.

(a) Decreasing Delay. — (i) Application of the Appellate Court Experience to District Courts. — The evidence does suggest that judicial management has reduced delays at the appellate level. Court critics focused early on the circuit courts, some of which were taking more than twelve months after oral argument to render decisions. In response to criticism, most circuit courts have asserted greater control over both litigants and district judges. Circuit court rules now impose strict schedules for attorneys to transmit records, compile appendices, and brief issues. Further, some circuits have won authorization for additional judgeships and support personnel and have streamlined their procedures for assigning...
cases and writing opinions.\textsuperscript{169} These reforms appear to have been effective. Statistics indicate that the interval from filing to appeal has decreased in most circuits.\textsuperscript{170} The chief judge of one circuit proudly described his court as the “fastest” in the country; it decided virtually all appeals within six months of submission.\textsuperscript{171}

Encouraged by these gains, proponents of managerial judging may have been unduly optimistic about the prospects for improvement at the trial court level. In their rush to cure the perceived ills of the lower courts, management advocates have blurred the distinctions between the two levels of the judiciary.

Appellate work is amenable to control for several reasons. It can be divided into distinct segments, and the procedural options are few. By the time cases reach the appellate level, their essential untidiness has been reduced, or at least frozen, into a record. Further, cases on appeal often present judges with a single issue to decide. Finally, only two sets of actors must perform in appellate courts: the attorneys, who follow an established ritual in presenting the case, and the judges, who sit in panels of three. Thanks to preplanning — scheduling of arguments carefully, enforcing time limits for the filing of briefs, and asking judges to reach and report dispositions swiftly — this small group of actors has become better coordinated, a result that has enabled appellate judges to decide cases more quickly.\textsuperscript{172}

But what works for the courts of appeals cannot simply be transplanted into trial courts. Prompt action in the trial courts depends on the performance not only of judges and attorneys, but also of a large supporting cast: the parties, lay and expert witnesses, and sometimes jurors. These actors do not perform identical roles in every case. Moreover, even in a relatively simple case, the parties may follow any of several procedural routes, attempt to discover sparse or voluminous information,  

\begin{footnotes}
\item[169] See Reynolds & Richmond, \textit{Limited Publication in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits}, 1979 \textit{Duke L.J.} 807 (experience of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits with plans that effectively reduce the number of written opinions); E. Neisser, Memorandum to Lawyer Representatives to the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference (Nov. 12, 1981) (on file in Harvard Law School Library) (detailing new procedures for assignment of judges to oral argument, decisions without argument, and publication of fewer case dispositions).
\item[170] See Additional Judgeship Hearings, supra note 164, at 60–63 (statement of Wilfred Feinberg, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit).
\item[171] Id. at 62.
\item[172] Some appellate courts have also reduced the number of oral arguments, see, e.g., 3D Cir. R. 12(6)(a), and written opinions, see, e.g., Reynolds & Richmond, \textit{An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform}, 48 \textit{U. Chi. L. Rev.} 573 (1981).
\end{footnotes}
engage in brief or extended pretrial business, and present the court with few or many issues to decide. Thus, no single plan can be devised to comprehend all of the varieties of pretrial preparation.

Appellate court reforms provide an inexact model for trial courts for another reason. We can achieve, with relative ease, a shared perception of the amount of time it “should” take to prepare a record, an appendix, or a brief and the amount of time it “should” take to decide an appeal. We all know that most briefs can be prepared within a few days — weeks at the most — and that opinions can be written within a similar time frame. Moreover, the complexity of a case is unlikely to add more than a few days or weeks to any appellate timetable.

When we turn to the lower courts, however, it is more difficult to determine the “right” amount of time to prepare a case for trial. The scope of issues and the number of actors vary greatly among cases as well as throughout the evolution of any single case. Case complexity at the trial level can reasonably require postponement of deadlines not merely by days or weeks but by months or years. As of 1980, the median time for a case to move from filing to disposition in federal district court was eight months. For cases that were tried, the interval was twenty months.\(^{173}\) Given the variety of cases comprehended by these figures, I (for one) do not know whether such data should be greeted with pleasure or dismay. It is difficult to decide whether the pace of a given trial court is “wrong” (in some moral sense) or too “slow” (under some utilitarian calculus). And researchers who have studied questions of pace are unable to agree on what pace is appropriate, what pace too slow.\(^{174}\)

(ii) Difficulties of Evaluation. — If we were to assume that the pace of some civil litigation had been unduly delayed, we would encounter problems in assessing the claim that judicial management speeds case processing. Empirical investigation is hampered because data collection at the trial court level is a relatively new phenomenon and even current techniques are of questionable accuracy.\(^{175}\) Moreover, valid comparisons

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\(^{173}\) See 1980 DIRECTOR'S REPORT, supra note 85, at 81; cf. Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503 (1981) (two-year state court proceeding not too long to be characterized as “plain, speedy, and efficient”).


\(^{175}\) One tool that the Administrative Office of the United States Courts has used since 1975 to compile information is a form called the “Civil Cover Sheet.” See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 50 (1974). Plaintiffs' attorneys submit the form when they
among district courts are elusive in light of differences in case loads, local rules, and substantive circuit law. As a result, careful researchers find it difficult to sort out static observations from trends.

Even when we find that some managerial trial courts do have faster dispositions than other trial courts, we have great difficulty identifying the causes of the difference. Cases are filed, withdrawn, settled, or dismissed for a variety of reasons, including changes in legislation, new appellate decisions, shifts in business practices, and fluctuations in the availability of attorneys. Although it is theoretically possible to control for such variables, researchers are hampered by the absence of firsthand, unfiltered information about why cases conclude as they do. The participants are not likely to give frank explanations of what prolonged a case or brought it to a quick close: attorneys must respect client confidences; litigants are caught up in adversarial relationships; judges have an interest in privacy. The reports that are obtained must be discounted by the inaccuracy of memory and the narrowness of each participant's perspective. Consequently, it is difficult to isolate and weigh the actual effect (if any) of managerial judging on the speed of trial court dispositions. Few refile complaints. In 1982, the form required attorneys to provide a brief description of the cause of action and then to check one — and only one — of the form's 82 categories to describe the "nature of the suit." Clerks check the accuracy of the form but do not verify the attorney's description of the suit by comparing that description with the complaint.

The information gathered from these forms is unreliable for several reasons. First, attorneys have not been trained in coding; thus, different attorneys may categorize the same case differently. Second, a lawsuit may include both tort and contract claims, or be filed under both federal question and diversity jurisdiction, yet the form allows attorneys to classify each case in only one category. Finally, the number of categories has grown over the years from 69 to 82. In an informal check of cases filed in one district court in 1980, I found that attorneys had used 1975, 1977, and 1979 cover sheets as well as the then-new 1980 forms.

For discussions of difficulties in interpreting the statistics provided by the Administrative Office, see Hurst, supra note 93, at 407-08; see also S. FLANDERS, supra note 14, at 71-76 (measures of court work load and productivity confusing and difficult to assess); Friedman, supra note 85, at 662 ("Judicial statistics, until now, have been absolutely wretched; things have improved a bit in recent years, but there is still a long way to go." (citation omitted)). For a discussion of the even more difficult problem of interpreting state court statistics, see NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT, 1975, at 10, 39 (1979). For an example of a researcher's problems in understanding the import of the data collected, see Grossman, Who Uses the Courts?, supra note 117, at 111-14.

176 See S. FLANDERS, supra note 14, at 19.

177 See, e.g., Brazil, supra note 91, at 221 (noting limited accuracy of partisans' reports, as gathered through interviews, of adversaries' behavior).

178 In a "controlled" experiment, researchers study the effect of a variable by
searchers have even entered this thicket; management advocates rely instead on anecdote and intuition to support their claims.  

(b) Increasing the Number of Dispositions. — As a measure of judicial productivity, the number of dispositions is partly a function of disposition speed. If cases are disposed of quickly, the time saved can be used to consider more cases. Management advocates also claim that judges' efforts to channel litigation into more "efficient" methods of dispute resolution, such as settlement, have improved the administration of justice by increasing the total number of dispositions. But again empirical moorings are wanting; no data firmly support the conclusion that judicial intervention results in more settlements than would otherwise have occurred.

Comparing at least two situations that are virtually identical except that, in one, the variable under consideration is held constant and, in the second, the variable is manipulated. See A. Edwards, Experimental Design in Psychological Research ch. 2 (3d ed. 1968). Some researchers have tried to emulate this approach in collecting data on courts. See M. Rosenberg, supra note 18; L. Sipes, supra note 94. For sample research designs, see Lind, Shapard & Cecil, Methods for Empirical Evaluation of Innovations in the Justice System, in Experimentation in the Law: Report of the Federal Judicial Center Advisory Committee on Experimentation in the Law app. B (1981).

The literature on the causes of and cures for delay reveals the difficulties of analyzing court data. Several researchers believe the data demonstrate that "local legal culture" is the pivotal reason for lengthy intervals between the filing and disposition of cases. Others, however, believe that such conclusions are premature. Compare Church, Civil Case Delay in State Trial Courts, 4 Just. Sys. J. 166, 161 (1978) (both delay and backlog are the result of "local legal culture"), and Sherwood & Clark, Toward an Understanding of "Local Legal Culture," 6 Just. Sys. J. 200, 212–13 (1981) (responses to questionnaire at Detroit Civil Case Delay Symposium supported the notion of "cultural bias" as a cause of delay), with Grossman, Measuring the Pace, supra note 117, at 112 ("local legal culture" is more a convenient restatement than an explanation of the problem). As one commentator concludes, "[w]riting on court delay is voluminous, but much of it might simply be termed inspirational." Luskin, Building a Theory of Case Processing Time, 62 Judicature 115, 117 (1978).

179 See, e.g., Peckham, supra note 14, passim (relying on S. Flanders, supra note 14); Rubin, supra note 14, at 138.

180 See L. Sipes, supra note 94 (settlement rates increased in some courts as a result of case management, but not necessarily as a result of judges' settlement efforts); Rubin, supra note 14, at 138 (author's intuition, influenced by his many years as an attorney and judge, suggests that judicial control of cases produces earlier and fairer settlements, focuses the trials in remaining cases, and improves the quality of adjudication); Title, The Lawyer's Role in Settlement Conferences, 67 A.B.A. J. 592 (1981) (in one settlement program, 70% of cases that allegedly would have been tried were settled).

181 See Flanders, supra note 50, at 161 (study of six federal district courts revealed that the court "with the strongest and most vigorous settlement role has the fewest civil terminations per judgeship per year"); see also S. Flanders, supra note 14, at 37 (data suggest that "a large expenditure of judicial time [attempts to produce settlements] is fruitless"); cf. M. Rosenberg, supra note 18, at 47 (New Jersey system
Moreover, the claim that “the more dispositions, the better,” raises difficult valuation tasks; decisionmaking must be assessed not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively. On any given day, are four judges who speak with parties to sixteen lawsuits and report that twelve of those cases ended without trial more “productive” than four judges who preside at four trials? Is it relevant to an assessment of “productivity” that three of these four trials are settled after ten days of testimony? Or that, in the one case tried to conclusion, the judge writes a forty-page opinion on a novel point of law that is subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court and thereafter affects thousands of litigants? Measuring judicial accomplishment is complex. Scales designed to measure achievement in other institutions cannot simply be imported into the courtroom. \(^{182}\)

\(^{(c)}\) Reducing Costs. — Management advocates assume that judicial supervision not only saves time and produces more dispositions, but also limits the ability of litigants to impose unfair financial pressure on their opponents and of attorneys to make excuses for excessive billing. Proponents therefore conclude that managerial judging reduces courts’ and litigants’ costs of compulsory pretrials “unmistakably” did not achieve a higher proportion of settlements than did system in which attorneys could decide whether cases would be pretried); Church, \textit{supra} note 178, at 176 (study of state courts found that “[t]he most settlement-intensive courts are the slowest courts”). \textit{But see} Kritzer, \textit{supra} note 117, at 35-36 (noting evidence that settlement activities speed case disposition).

\(^{182}\) Commentators and rulemakers rely heavily on Flanders’ work for the proposition that pretrial management techniques actually promote efficiency. Perhaps the most prominent example of this reliance is found in the Advisory Committee’s notes to draft rule 16:

Empirical studies reveal that when a trial judge intervenes personally at an early stage to assume judicial control over a case and to schedule dates for completion by the parties of the principal pretrial steps, the case is disposed of by settlement or trial more efficiently and with less cost and delay than when the parties are left to their own devices.


Some commentators also rely on Flanders’ data to assert that case management does not “necessarily” diminish quality. Peckham, \textit{supra} note 14, at 783; \textit{see also} Brazil, \textit{supra} note 14, at 893 (citing Peckham and others for proposition that judicial management does not harm quality). But Flanders provides no measurement of quality; instead he assumes a “close positive relationship between speed and quality.” S. \textit{Flanders}, \textit{supra} note 14, at 69. He concedes that “no staff member on this project could be considered qualified to attempt a comprehensive evaluation of the quality of justice rendered in the several courts we observed. That evaluation is a task well left to others . . . .” \textit{Id.} at 68. For criticism of the methods used by Flanders and others, see Luskin, \textit{supra} note 178, at 177–26. For research attempting to review the effect of court efficiency programs on quality, see D. \textit{Neubauer}, \textit{supra} note 94, at 177–80, 234 (finding no effect on guilty plea rates or sentences).
But no data exist to support this conclusion. If we rely instead on intuition, it is not obvious that judicial supervision averts costly adversarial decisions or attorney misconduct. First, some lawyers use every occasion for contact with judges to argue their clients’ cases. Thus, supervision itself can present further opportunities for vigorous adversarial encounters. Second, as Danforth’s response to Ms. Paulson’s interrogatories suggests, the line between misconduct and aggressive but ethical representation is difficult to divine. Third, even with judicial oversight, lawyers may be able to hide their misconduct; procedural innovations may simply force attorneys to develop new techniques of obfuscation and avoidance, skills presumably well developed by the bar.

Moreover, judicial management itself imposes costs. The judge’s time is the most expensive resource in the courthouse. Rather than concentrate all of their energy deciding motions, charging juries, and drafting opinions, managerial

183 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee note 16 (Discussion Draft Sept. 1982); Pollack, Pretrial Conferences, supra note 114 (advocating increased management to reduce “unprofitable expenditures of time, effort, and money”).

184 See, e.g., D. HENSLER, A. LIPSON & E. ROLPH, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: THE FIRST YEAR 62-69 (1981) (unclear that California’s mandatory arbitration program conserves judicial resources) [hereinafter cited as D. HENSLER]; M. ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 28 (“At the very least, it seems clear that the efficiency of the court was reduced rather than enhanced by requiring as a compulsory matter that each case go through a pretrial conference . . . .”).

185 See Brazil, Special Masters in the Pretrial Development of Big Cases: Potential and Problems, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 287, 305-08.

186 It usually is impossible to prove that a party is deliberately holding back material that he is obligated to disclose. A party that is determined to abuse the judicial process can generally do so successfully.

. . . .[S]ome kinds of abuse result more often from good faith errors in judgment than from intentional, reckless, or negligent conduct.


188 J. KAKALIK & A. ROBYN, COSTS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: COURT EXPENDITURES FOR PROCESSING TORT CASES 64 (1982) (annual costs, including salaries, support staff, and other resources, of each federal district judge estimated at $752,000).
judges must meet with parties, develop litigation plans, and compel obedience to their new management rules. Managerial judges have more data sheets to complete, more conferences on new management techniques to attend, and even more elaborate local procedural rules to draft and debate. Even when some of these tasks are delegated to staff, administrative structures must be put into place and then supervised. And although litigants and judges can contain costs by relying on conference calls and written exchanges, they still spend substantial time and money. Further, because many cases settle without judicial intervention, management may require judges to supervise lawsuits that would have ended of their own accord, lawsuits that would not have consumed any judicial resources.

We are not yet able to reach any firm conclusions on whether and how management reduces costs. Until we have data on the number of judge-hours that management consumes and saves, as well as information regarding the effect of management on parties' costs, we cannot calculate the net costs of managerial judging and thereby learn whether we have conserved resources. And if we include in our calculation the additional costs discussed below — such as the possibility of error, the decline of ceremony, and the loss of public participation — our equation becomes even more complex.

In sum, I am skeptical of claims that management increases judicial productivity at reduced costs. Data are not available to support most of those conclusions, and intuition does not compel them. Moreover, managerial proponents have not even considered the effects of judicial management on the nature of adjudication.

B. The By-products of Judicial Management: The Erosion of Traditional Due Process Safeguards

In the rush to conquer case loads, few proponents of managerial judging have examined its side effects. Judicial man-

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189 See S. FLANDERS, supra note 14, at 60–61.
190 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) (Discussion Draft Sept. 1982); Mansfield Letter, supra note 110 (transmitting Advisory Committee's proposed changes of rule 16 and other federal rules; clarifying that proposed rule 16 requires pretrial orders, not conferences; suggesting that personal conferences will not always be necessary to develop orders), reprinted in Judicial Conference Excerpt, supra note 19, at 3.
191 Although we know how much the public spends to maintain and run federal courts, we do not know which management techniques will save money. Cf. D. HENSLER, supra note 184, at 62–69 (researchers investigating California's experiment with judicial arbitration could not, based on limited data available, conclude that arbitration saved time or resources). For a comparison of costs in several federal and state courts, see J. KAKALIK & A. ROBYN, supra note 188.
agement has its own techniques, goals, and values, which appear to elevate speed over deliberation, impartiality, and fairness. Ironically, the growth of federal judges' interest in management has coincided with their articulation of due process values, their emphasis on the relationship between procedure and just decisionmaking.\textsuperscript{192}

1. Vast New Powers. — Judges are very powerful: they decide contested issues, and they alone can compel obedience by the threat of contempt. As a result, those subject to judges' authority may challenge it only at great risk. Under the individual calendar system, a single judge retains control over all phases of a case. Thus, litigants who incur a judge's displeasure may suffer judicial hostility or even vengeance with little hope of relief.\textsuperscript{193}

Transforming the judge from adjudicator to manager substantially expands the opportunities for judges to use — or abuse — their power. In designing the pretrial schedule in \textit{Paulson}, for example, Judge Kinser did not adjudicate a "case or controversy."\textsuperscript{194} Instead, he issued a series of directives before the parties had raised problems or asked for his help. Dissatisfied, the parties tried to convince him to change his procedural blueprint, but they knew that the decisions were ultimately Judge Kinser's alone. In an effort to induce settlement, the judge held separate meetings with the parties, challenged their arguments, and proposed specific settlement figures. Although he could not dictate a compromise, Judge Kinser made full use of his position to convince the parties to capitulate.

In addition to enhancing the power of judges, management tends to undermine traditional constraints on the use of that power. Judge Kinser created rules for the lawsuit, such as discovery timetables, but was not forced to submit his ideas to the discipline of a written justification or to outside scrutiny.

\textsuperscript{192} \textit{See}, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (welfare official who was involved in case should not have participated in decision to terminate benefits). For an analysis of the Supreme Court's approach to the level of process required, see Mashaw, \textit{The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value}, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).


\textsuperscript{194} U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
His decisions were made privately, informally, off the record, and beyond the reach of appellate review.

Further, no explicit norms or standards guide judges in their decisions about what to demand of litigants. What does “good,” “skilled,” or “judicious” management entail? Judge Kinser hoped to speed pretrial preparation, because he thought quick preparation was better than slow preparation. Yet he had no guidelines, other than his own intuition, to inform him what was too slow or too fast. Judge Kinser wanted the parties to settle, because he believed that whatever outcomes settlement produced would be better — and less expensive$^{195}$ — than those litigation could achieve. But how was he to determine, for the litigants and for the system as a whole, what was “better” or less “expensive”?

Given the lack of established standards, judges are forced to draw on their own experience. Judges certainly are familiar with the problems of the courts; they were among the first to identify the need for reform. But awareness of the problems does not necessarily qualify judges to design the solutions, especially on an individual, ad hoc basis. As familiar adages discouraging self-medication by doctors and self-representation by lawyers suggest,$^{196}$ self-interest often makes professionals less objective, dispassionate, and adept at their work. Moreover, judges may well overestimate the extent of their wisdom. Many have been trial lawyers; they have some appreciation for which litigant tactics are well founded and which are dilatory. But because few have practiced in all of the diverse areas of federal court jurisdiction, they may reach ill-founded conclusions in cases about which they really know very little.

2. The Threat to Impartiality. — Privacy and informality have some genuine advantages; attorneys and judges can discuss discovery schedules and explore settlement proposals

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$^{195}$ The larger question is, “Expensive for whom?” Both parties have higher litigation expenses if a case goes to trial. On the other hand, when plaintiff recovers more at trial than defendant offered at settlement and the difference is greater than the various costs of litigation, trial has become profitable for plaintiff — and much more “expensive” for defendant.

If societal resources are included in the calculation, then for taxpayers, who provide the rooms, judges, and support staff, trial is more “expensive” than settlement. See, e.g., J. KAKALIK & A. ROBYN, supra note 188, at 87, 89 (“Expenditure differs dramatically, depending on when the case is disposed. . . . [T]rials by either judge or jury cost thousands of dollars.”). But to the extent that civil lawsuits enforce public norms, settlement of some claims may be more “expensive” for the public. Of course, the notion that trials result in the vindication of public values depends on a belief that trials yield “correct” results.

$^{196}$ H. DAVIDOFF, A WORLD TREASURY OF PROVERBS 102 (2d ed. 1961) (“A man who is his own doctor has a fool for his patient.”); id. at 236 (“He that is his own lawyer has a fool for his client.”).
without the constraints of the formal courtroom environment. But substantial dangers also inhere in such activities. The extensive information that judges receive during pretrial conferences has not been filtered by the rules of evidence. Some of this information is received ex parte, a process that deprives the opposing party of the opportunity to contest the validity of information received. Moreover, judges are in close contact with attorneys during the course of management. Such interactions may become occasions for the development of intense feelings — admiration, friendship, or antipathy. Therefore, management becomes a fertile field for the growth of personal bias.

Further, judges with supervisory obligations may gain stakes in the cases they manage. Their prestige may ride on "efficient" management, as calculated by the speed and number of dispositions. Competition and peer pressure may tempt judges to rush litigants because of reasons unrelated to the merits of disputes. For example, Judge Kinser had interests of his own when he was advising settlement: he wanted Paulson off his calendar.

In the past, such exposure to parties and issues and such a comparable interest in the proceedings might have resulted in recusal or disqualification. Despite a flexible approach to the procedural safeguards required to ensure due process,

197 The relationship between decisionmakers' prior knowledge about or involvement in controversies and their formation of bias is very complex; we are only beginning to understand the bases for the formation of opinions. See, e.g., R. Nisbett & L. Ross, Human Inference (1980). For present purposes, I assume the American legal rule, which generally disqualifies judges with extrajudicial knowledge about either the dispute or the disputants. Sorting out the ambivalence displayed by the exceptions to these rules is a subject for future articles.

198 Judge John Butzner, former Chairman of the Judicial Conference's Subcommittee on Judicial Statistics, testified before Congress that, in evaluating judgeship needs, his subcommittee assumed that judges could "terminate 400 cases per year." Additional Judgeship Hearings, supra note 164, at 49 (testimony of John Butzner, Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit). What effect does such an expectation have on trial judges?

Reported opinions reveal some evidence of judges' improperly pressing litigants to dispose of cases. See, e.g., Beary v. City of Rye, 601 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1979) (trial judge dismissed lawsuit after denying plaintiff's request for brief continuance; reversed on ground that judge elevated management interests over considerations of fairness).

the Supreme Court has consistently required an “impartial” judge—a individual with no prior involvement or interest in the dispute. Interest is broadly defined; indirect as well as direct benefits suffice to require disqualification. Statutory disqualification rules, recently amended and made more stringent, impose similar limits that disqualify judges with only a minute financial interest in the controversies before them. Nevertheless, neither the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts, nor Congress has considered the effect of judicial management on impartiality.

I recognize that case management is not the only anomaly in the rules governing judicial disqualification and recusal. Many current practices assume that trial judges can compartmentalize their minds, disregard inappropriate evidence, and reconsider past decisions in light of new information. Motions to reconsider, reduce sentences, and vacate con-
tions, as well as most appellate remands, are decided by the very judges whose prior decisions are being challenged. I find these practices inconsistent with common perceptions of impartial adjudication. Yet reconsideration by the same judge who first heard a case is far less worrisome than factfinding by the judge who managed the case. As "repeat adjudicators," judges are generally confined to the record. They rely upon traditional adversarial exchanges, publicly explain their decisions, and know that their work may be reviewed on appeal. In contrast, as pretrial case managers, judges operate in the freewheeling arena of informal dispute resolution.

378 U.S. 544 (1964) (per curiam) (government concedes error in case in which jury panel heard announcement of guilty verdict in related prior case); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir. 1977) ("[D]efendant had a constitutional right not to be tried before jurors who had sat on the previous panel . . . .").

206 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976) (postconviction relief for prisoners convicted in federal courts). Before 1977, although § 2255 did not specify that the action be heard by the same judge who presided at trial, such was the practice in most circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 337 F.2d 49, 53–54 (2d Cir. 1964) (citing cases for the proposition that § 2255 authorizes the sentencing judge to entertain and decide motions filed under that provision); Carvell v. United States, 173 F.2d 348, 348 (4th Cir. 1949) (per curiam) (judge's prior knowledge made it "highly desirable" that he pass on the § 2255 issue). But see Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1967) (a judge other than the trial judge should preside at § 2255 hearings when voluntariness of guilty plea is in question).

The Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), became effective in 1977; rule 4(a) provides that § 2255 motions be assigned to the judge "who presided at the movant's trial and sentenced him." Id. Rule 4(a) (1976). The theory behind this rule is that the judge who presided at trial has information that should be useful in deciding the motion. In a sense, the judge is a silent witness who is never cross-examined. See, e.g., Halliday, 380 F.2d at 273 (arguing that it would be preferable to call judges as witnesses in § 2255 proceedings than to allow them to be triers of fact determining their own credibility); cf. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 (1975) (permissible for state examining board both to investigate and to adjudicate merits of claims).

207 Cf. United States v. Cepeda Pena, 577 F.2d 754, 758 (1st Cir. 1978) ("[T]he judicial system could not function if judges could deal but once in their lifetime with a given defendant, or had to withdraw from a case whenever they had 'presided in a related or companion case or in a separate trial in the same case.'" (emphasis omitted)) (quoting United States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 266 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 909 (1977)). For a general discussion of disqualification for prior involvement in the case, see Ratner, Disqualification of Judges for Prior Judicial Actions, 3 How. L.J. 228 (1957).

208 I have derived the term "repeat adjudicators" from Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 95 (1974) (discussing "repeat players" and "repeat lawyers").

209 Professor Eisenberg argues that the conventional perception that the world of negotiation is norm free is mistaken because negotiation is limited by rules, principles, and precedents. See Eisenberg, supra note 17. I believe, however, that the norms that operate in most negotiations are absent when judges sit at the bargaining table.
Having supervised case preparation and pressed for settlement, judges can hardly be considered untainted if they are ultimately asked to find the facts and adjudicate the merits of a dispute.

Unreviewable power, casual contact, and interest in outcome (or in aggregate outcomes) have not traditionally been associated with the "due process" decisionmaking model. These features do not evoke images of reasoned adjudication, images that form the very basis of both our faith in the judicial process and our enormous grant of power to federal judges. The literature of managerial judging refers only occasionally to the values of due process: the accuracy of decisionmaking, the adequacy of reasoning, and the quality of adjudication. Instead, commentators and the training sessions for district judges emphasize speed, control, and quantity. District court chief judges boast of vast statistics on

Unlike most parties to negotiations, judges possess the ability to compel the outcome of the "negotiations" should talks break down.

Cf. Fuller, supra note 138, at 44 ("An adversary presentation seems the only effective means for combating . . . [the] natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known.").


This statement would not hold true, of course, if we changed our imagery to reflect our new interest in efficient management. See Daube, supra note 40, at 129 ("Recently at Cambridge a statistical laboratory has for the first time been established. Something of this kind is perhaps destined to become the symbol of modern justice in the place of a simple pair of scales.").

These speculations are based on my observations of judges and attorneys engaging in ex parte communication, caucusing in back rooms, emerging with offers of deals, then resubmerging for further negotiations. To my knowledge, however, no systematic research has been done on how litigants and the public perceive these informal procedures. Experimental designs have considered parties' preferences between adversarial and inquisitorial approaches but have not specifically addressed this issue. See Walker, Lind & Thibaut, The Relation Between Procedural and Distributive Justice, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1401 (1979) (suggesting that empirical work demonstrates that parties prefer maximum control over their own lawsuits). But cf. Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1083 (1975) (criticizing methodology used by Walker, Lind, and Thibaut in an earlier study).

For examples of references to such values, see Rosenberg, Devising Procedures that Are Civil to Promote Justice that Is Civilized, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 797 (1971); Ryan, Lipetz, Lustin & Neubauer, Analyzing Court Delay-Reduction Programs: Why Do Some Succeed?, 65 Judicature 58, 68-69 (1981).


See, e.g., Flanders, supra note 50, at 150-55 (asking primarily how fast
the number of cases terminated, the number and type of discrete events (such as trial days and oral arguments) supervised, and the number of motions decided.\textsuperscript{216} The accumulation of such data may cause — or reflect — a subtle shift in the values that shape the judiciary's comprehension of its own mission. Case processing is no longer viewed as a means to an end; instead, it appears to have become the desired goal.\textsuperscript{217} Quantity has become all important; quality is occasionally mentioned and then ignored. Indeed, some commentators regard deliberation as an obstacle to efficiency.\textsuperscript{218}

Proponents of management may be forgetting the quintessential judicial obligations of conducting a reasoned inquiry, articulating the reasons for decision, and subjecting those reasons to appellate review — characteristics that have long defined judging and distinguished it from other tasks.\textsuperscript{219} Although the sword remains in place, the blindfold and scales have all but disappeared.

V. THE RELEVANCE OF ROBES

In the preceding discussion, I have argued for reflection before we plunge headlong into judicial management. I do

\textsuperscript{216} See Additional Judgeship Hearings, supra note 164, at 49, 55, 63 (statements of chief judges).

\textsuperscript{217} Cf. In re Jensen, 24 Cal. 3d 72, 593 P.2d 200, 154 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1978) (state judge publicly censured for failure to decide cases within 90 days of submission); In re Carstensen, 316 N.W.2d 889 (Iowa 1982) (state judge suspended without pay for persistently disregarding rule requiring monthly reports of matters under advisement for more than 60 days); Additional Judgeship Hearings, supra note 164, at 55 (statement of Raymond Pettine, Chief Judge, United States District Court, District of Rhode Island) (reporting that District of Rhode Island stood “very high on a national average. We are 12th in standing on a simple caseload per judge, 13th on weighted filings, and 18th on trials completed.”).

\textsuperscript{218} I am aware of no rigorous empirical work that examines the effect of managerial tasks on judges’ attitudes toward adjudication or on their ability to maintain neutrality. Some impressionistic evaluations have been done. See, e.g., Neubauer, Judicial Role and Case Management, 4 JUST. SYS. J. 223 (1978) (interviewing unrepresentative sample of federal judges as a “preliminary” review of their attitudes toward managerial tasks).

\textsuperscript{219} For example, in Beary v. City of Rye, 601 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1979), the circuit court held that the trial court, by requiring plaintiff to rest after one day of trial because of failure to comply with a pretrial order, had erroneously permitted “its zeal for clearing its calendar to overcome the right of a party to a full and fair trial on the merits.” Id. at 63.

\textsuperscript{219} See Fuller, supra note 13, at 387.
not mean to suggest, however, that adjudication must be frozen into earlier forms or that more efficient decisionmaking is an unworthy aim. Rather, as we reorient the judicial system to accommodate contemporary demands, I believe that we should preserve the core of adjudication. To help judges remain impartial, we should limit the flow of untested information. To ensure that judges have the time and patience for deliberation, we should refrain from giving them too many distracting new responsibilities. To hold judges accountable for the quality—not merely the quantity—of their actions, we should require judges to act in public and to state reasons for their decisions.

With these goals in mind, I outline below some alterations of and alternatives to judicial management. Although I have divided my suggestions into categories for purposes of discussion, the distinctions are not ironclad: many of the proposals share similar purposes and methods. For each of these ideas, I sketch some of the problems that might arise if the idea were to be implemented. My aim is not to provide the “answers”—would that I could—but rather to channel the search for alternatives in potentially productive directions.

A. Management by Judges: Imposing Safeguards

The proposals discussed below are methods for altering management to accommodate my concerns while preserving judges’ opportunities to supervise cases.

1. Controlling Discretion. — The desire for speed and early settlement is not unique to the federal civil docket. But even on the busy criminal side, judges are expressly prohibited by rule,220 case law,221 and professional standards222 from participating in settlement—the plea bargaining process—except under carefully controlled circumstances.

Similar mechanisms could be devised to control the discretion of managerial judges in civil litigation. The Federal Rules could be amended to prohibit ex parte communications and to require judges to conduct all meetings with litigants on the

220 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e) & advisory committee note.
221 See, e.g., In re Werker, 535 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1976) (mandamus granted to prohibit judge, who promised a specific sentence in exchange for a guilty plea, from participating in plea bargaining); cf. Longval v. Meachum, 651 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1981) (judge’s attempt to persuade defendant to plead guilty because jury verdict might lead to longer jail term warranted remand and resentencing of the accused), vacated, 102 S. Ct. 3475 (1982); United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (defendant had right to reinstitute not-guilty plea after judge withdrew promise to give lesser sentence in return for guilty plea).
222 See Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 3.3(a) (1968).
record. An authoritative manual\textsuperscript{223} could be drafted to provide detailed rules for judges and attorneys concerning the types of management and settlement techniques that are acceptable. In addition, Congress could amend title 28 to permit some form of appellate review of judges’ management decisions. Such review not only would enforce the new behavioral norms, but also would permit refinement of management standards in light of practical experience.\textsuperscript{224}

This approach is not a panacea. Drafting rules to circumscribe discretion would reduce the very freedom that proponents of judicial management deem critical to its alleged success.\textsuperscript{225} Moreover, the current informal process would be replaced by a more formal one; apparently inexpensive proceedings might become more costly.\textsuperscript{226} In addition, this proposal would increase the appellate court work load at a time when the trend is to limit, not expand, appellate review.\textsuperscript{227}

Finally, the standards for action that exist in other areas, such as the American Bar Association’s standards for criminal justice,\textsuperscript{228} have never been fully implemented. The mere existence of rules does not automatically result in their enforcement, and the costs of implementation can be high.

2. Preserving Impartiality. — Even if successful, efforts to control judges’ discretion would not alter the fact that managerial judges come into close contact with attorneys and, by virtue of that contact, hear opinion, innuendo, and rumor — all of which may affect their findings of fact and their rulings of law. The problem of maintaining impartiality would remain unless we added a second set of reforms, which would prohibit a judge who manages pretrial preparation or attempts unsuc-
cessfully to mediate disputes from later adjudicating contested
issues.

One possibility would be to return the federal courts to a
master calendar system such as that used by many state
courts.\textsuperscript{229} Under that system, a new judge is assigned at each
successive stage of a lawsuit. Although many localities report
successful case processing under a master calendar,\textsuperscript{230} the sys-
tem has its disadvantages. Acquiring knowledge about the
voluminous record typical of complex cases is extremely time
consuming. To ask more than one judge to learn about a case
would lead to substantial duplication of effort. Furthermore,
judges familiar with the history and intent behind orders in a
particular case may be more willing to modify their own prior
orders when appropriate. And judges who understand the
litigants' circumstances arguably could produce better trials\textsuperscript{231}
and more realistic schedules and decrees.

Another problem with a return to the master calendar
system stems from the jurisdictional limits on federal district
courts. Because district judges are equals, they are not em-
powered to revise each other's rulings absent an order from
an appellate court. If a second district judge were assigned to
a case after the first had issued orders, could the second judge
change the first judge's rulings? It could be argued that any
revision would, in effect, be an appellate decision beyond the
jurisdiction of the district courts.\textsuperscript{232} Moreover, given the
collegiality of some federal benches, a judge assigned to adjudi-
cate a colleague's case might feel constrained to abide by the
letter of the first judge's order.

Finally, one of the major perceived advantages of the in-
dividual calendar system is that it makes a specific judge
responsible for each case; the judge becomes accountable for
case progress and, presumably, cases are disposed of more
quickly.\textsuperscript{233} Many would be loath to abandon a system that
has been credited with success.

In an effort to retain the benefits of the individual calendar
system while avoiding the pitfalls of judicial overexposure, we

\textsuperscript{229} See generally M. SOLOMON, supra note 101 (describing various kinds of case
processing systems).
\textsuperscript{230} Cf. id. at 12–13 (describing alleged strengths of master assignment system).
\textsuperscript{231} See M. ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 29–43; Rubin, supra note 14, at 143–
44.
of district courts) with id. §§ 1291–1294 (appellate jurisdiction of circuit courts). See
generally JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 23, § 11.5 (discussing doctrine of "law of the
case").
\textsuperscript{233} But cf. Cunningham, supra note 103 (consistent calendar system more important
to successful case management than is any particular type of system).
could institute some mixture of the individual and master calendar systems. Both before and after trial, one judge could handle the formal adjudication; a second could be responsible for the informal mediation and settlement work.\textsuperscript{234} Under this model, judges rather than surrogates would be in charge of cases. Yet judges who adjudicate would not receive unfiltered information that could bias their decisions. Some district judges have implemented this system in an informal manner by "swapping" cases when settlement is to be discussed.

The success of a mixed system, of course, would require that the "adjudicator" receive no impermissible information from the "mediator" and that the litigants not exploit the potential for manipulation provided by the availability of two judges. Moreover, to preserve the incentives of the individual calendar system, recordkeeping procedures would have to be adopted to hold judges accountable for the aspects of case processing within their bailiwicks.

But there are more serious flaws in this mixed-calendar proposal, which is a compromise between managerial and traditional goals. Because "mediation judges" would be insulated from adjudication, they would be deprived of the very power that supposedly enables managerial judges to increase the number of settlements. Indeed, because "mediation judges" would have to coordinate their schedules with those of the "adjudication judges," they would not even have a free hand in regulating discovery and manipulating case schedules. Finally, coordination between the two sets of judges may require the investment of more time and resources than might be saved by managerial efforts.

### B. Nonjudicial Management: Alternative Decisionmakers

Proposals to preserve a modified form of managerial judging ignore the fundamental question whether judges should manage at all. There are few data indicating that management in fact helps parties to settle or litigate cases more quickly than they can through traditional litigation.\textsuperscript{235} Perhaps scarce judicial resources should be conserved and employed only when judges' special skill — adjudication — is required. A

\textsuperscript{234} The mediator/adjudicator dichotomy is a variation on the "team assignment system" described in M. SOLOMON, supra note 101, at 13-14. Others have made similar suggestions. See, e.g., First Wis. Nat'l Bank v. Klapmeier, 526 F.2d 77, 80 n.6 (8th Cir. 1975) ("[W]here the judge sits as trier of fact, the judge should avoid recommending an actual settlement figure before or during trial."); see also Will, Merhige & Rubin, supra note 115, at 212 (when judges are careful, cases rarely need to be transferred from settlement judge to another judge for trial).

\textsuperscript{235} See supra pp. 419-22.
decision to return judges to judging, however, does not spell an end to the supervision of litigation. Management tasks could be shifted to other court personnel or taken out of the courthouse altogether.

1. Court Personnel as Case Managers. — Courts could appoint magistrates, arbitrators, specially trained mediators, or even therapists — whoever is effective — to perform the management tasks that judges now undertake.236 Once appointed, these individuals could devote all of their time to resolving disputes before trial and to implementing decrees after trial. In some cases, magistrates,237 receivers,238 and special masters239 already perform these tasks. Their work

236 An analogous form of delegation is used in the Second Circuit's Civil Appeals Management Program (CAMP), see 2D CIR. R. app., which is authorized by rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See also Kaufman, The Pre-Argument Conference: An Appellate Procedural Reform, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1094 (1974) (then-chief judge discussing the success of CAMP during its first few months in facilitating settlement and streamlining cases). Similar experimental projects have been instituted in the Ninth Circuit, see E. Neisser, Memorandum to Lawyer Representatives to the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference (Nov. 12, 1981) (on file in Harvard Law School Library), and the Seventh Circuit, see J. GOLDMAN, THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT PREAPPEAL PROGRAM 43 (1982). Under the CAMP program, staff lawyers meet with parties' lawyers to facilitate settlement. The lawyers, however, have no authority to impose any kind of settlement or to influence adjudication of the dispute should mediation efforts fail. See Lake Utopia Paper v. Connelly Containers, 608 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1979) (condemning counsel for including information in brief about discussions at CAMP conference: "staff counsel's opinions on the merits] are his own, neither influenced by nor communicated to any member of the court"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980). The principle underlying CAMP is that, in some disputes, all that is needed to achieve settlement is the assistance of a neutral third party.

With the CAMP program in effect, 411 appeals were settled and 30 cases were dismissed in 1980. These dispositions accounted for 20% of all appeals terminated in that year. See Additional Judgeship Hearings, supra note 104, at 63 (statement of Wilfred Feinberg, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit); L. FARMER, APPEALS EXPEDITING SYSTEMS: AN EVALUATION OF SECOND AND EIGHTH CIRCUIT PROCEDURES (1981). Determining the effect of CAMP on settlement or speedy dispositions is complicated by the same problems associated with measuring the effect of pretrial management on settlement and disposition speed. See supra pp. 419–22.


238 Receivers are appointed by judges and are empowered to administer property or institutions under court supervision. Judges may appoint receivers on an ad hoc basis pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 66.

239 Special masters are appointed by judges to serve a special role in a single case. Special masters may supervise discovery or develop remedies in complex cases. Judges may appoint special masters, like receivers, on an ad hoc, and possibly part-time, basis. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53. For discussions of the role of special masters, see
could be expanded. In addition, judges in civil cases could adopt the practice for implementing court orders that is followed in federal criminal cases: judges do not directly oversee sentences; instead, authority for most postconviction decisions is shifted to the Bureau of Prisons and to the United States Parole Commission. Parallel executive branch agencies could be created to implement judges' civil orders.

One disadvantage of this proposal is that, by creating some set of "others" to perform managerial tasks, it causes yet another transformation of the courts — this time into a "bureaucratic" judiciary. Commentators are already concerned that the proliferation of clerks and the delegation of duties to staff attorneys have changed appellate courts into bureaucracies in which the authority of judges has been diluted. Moreover, the delegation of managerial power provides little assurance that the power will be exercised more fairly or efficiently than it would be if judges retained such authority. If we attempted to constrain staff authority by making staff decisions appealable to trial judges, we would provide litigants with yet another administrative layer to slog through — hardly a step toward greater efficiency. Alternatively, if the decisions of


Arguably no new statutory authorization would be needed to expand the management role of such nonjudicial personnel. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1976) (magistrate may be assigned "such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States"); FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a) (definition of "masters" includes numerous roles such as "referee," "auditor," and "examiner"). Because the tasks of receivers are not defined by the Federal Rules, see FED. R. CIV. P. 66, the limits of receivers' authority are unclear. For a discussion of constitutional limits on the expansion of magistrates' powers, compare McCabe, The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343, 365–79 (1979) (arguing that a magistrate is not a discrete entity but merely a subordinate part of the article III court to whom a judge may constitutionally delegate a wide range of judicial functions), with Note, Article III Constraints and the Expanding Civil Jurisdiction of Federal Magistrates: A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J. 1023 (1979) (arguing that delegation of judicial power to magistrates is not sound policy and is inconsistent with article III).

FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 permits judges 120 days to reconsider sentencing decisions. Thereafter, virtually all decisions about a federal inmate's term and place of confinement are decided by the Parole Commission, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201–4218 (1976), and the Bureau of Prisons, see id. §§ 4041–4042. For convicted individuals on probation, federal judges have some role, but daily supervision is left to the United States Probation Office. See id. §§ 3651–3656 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).

judicial surrogates were not reviewable, the new bureaucracy could become a bastion of great and unchecked power.243

2. Beyond the Courthouse. — Congress could establish alternative dispute resolution centers.244 Workers' compensation boards are a long-standing example of such a reform.245 More recently, several state legislatures have attempted to reduce state court case loads by creating mandatory arbitration246 and medical malpractice panels. Although these alternative

243 Cf. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980) (judge who received written objections to a magistrate's report and was statutorily required to make de novo determination need not hear the oral evidence anew).

Some are concerned that adding a layer of parajudicial officials would eventually create two systems of justice, one for those who can afford to survive the pre-judge phase and the other for those who can afford only the first stage, conducted by non-article-III judges. See H.R. Rep. No. 1364, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1978) (dissenting remarks of Rep. Holtzman) (discussing drafts of bills later enacted as the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.)).


245 See generally W. DITTMAR, STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 7 (1959) (first workers' compensation act was enacted in 1908; within 12 years all but eight states had similar statutes).

246 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1141.10–32 (West 1982) (mandatory arbitration for specified civil lawsuits when amount in controversy does not exceed $15,000 ($25,000 in some counties)); see also Lambros & Shunk, The Summary Jury Trial, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 43 (1980) (describing Judge Lambros' court, in which litigants may have their cases briefly argued to advisory or "summary" juries, who then return a nonbinding verdict; arguing that this procedure may enable the parties to contemplate settlement possibilities with more insight).

Many litigation alternatives depend for their constitutionality on the consent of the parties who choose them over traditional trial procedure. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (Supp. IV 1980) (permitting judges, with parties' consent, to refer civil trial matters to federal magistrates). Other alternatives provide litigants an opportunity for complete de novo proceedings at the litigants' option. See Lambros & Shunk, supra, at 46.

For a general discussion of the Justice Department's model arbitration program, see A. LIND & J. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1981).

247 Pennsylvania, for example, instituted medical malpractice arbitration in 1979. Pennsylvania Health Care Services Malpractice Act, 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301.101–1006 (Purdon 1982); see Parker v. Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 394
schemes are sometimes replacements for traditional adjudication, they could also be used as an initial filter for disputes or as a supplement to adjudication. This suggestion would preserve a place for adjudication while augmenting the services available to disputants.

Legislatively developed alternatives to adjudication have some advantages. First, Congress is better equipped than the judiciary to weigh social needs and plan comprehensively for the future; it has the capacity to investigate and refashion systematically the dispute resolution process. Second, when designing litigation alternatives, the legislature typically provides a framework of rules that circumscribes the powers and tasks of new agencies. In contrast to the federal judiciary, which has failed to articulate the rules by which judicial management should work, Congress could at a minimum establish criteria for allocating cases to one dispute-processing scheme or another. This step would provide litigants with notice of the specific procedures affecting them. Third, the legislature provides a forum for debating reforms of the apparatus we use to vindicate our rights.

Of course, like the suggestions described above, this idea has drawbacks. Some will object that certain forms of congressional intervention in managerial judging would result in unconstitutional intrusions on the judiciary. Others will claim that judges have the necessary expertise and that legis-

A.2d 932 (1978) (upholding Act). But see Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980) (declaring unconstitutional part of Act that gave exclusive jurisdiction to arbitration, after three years of experience with the Act revealed lengthy delays in the arbitration system that burdened the right to jury trial).

248 See, e.g., Patterson v. United States, 359 U.S. 495 (1959) (when workers' compensation is available, it is typically an exclusive remedy).

249 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1141.10-.32 (West 1982) (requiring arbitration of claims not exceeding $15,000 ($25,000 in some counties); any party may elect de novo trial after arbitration).

250 See, e.g., Reynolds & Tony, Professional Mediation Services for Prisoners' Complaints, 67 A.B.A. J. 294 (1981) (describing Maryland Mediation Project, which permits inmates to elect mediation as an alternative to litigation, but permits them to switch to litigation at any point).


In contrast, judge-made management schemes contain few standards. See, e.g., Peckham, supra note 14, at 796 ("The decision to relax the requirements of the pretrial order has generally been intuitive.").

lative involvement would be unproductive. Finally, all must acknowledge that alternative institutions will not necessarily value accuracy and fairness over speed or perform their assigned tasks well. The closest present-day analogue to alternative dispute centers — agency adjudication — is often mistake ridden and hampered by a variety of institutional and bureaucratic constraints that undercut the quality of deliberation. Nevertheless, commentators and researchers are increasingly interested in experimentation with alternatives such as arbitration. A resumption of federal exploration of similar alternatives may well be in order.

C. Management by Rules

The proposals outlined above all preserve some form of case management. A different approach would be to reorient the rules by which all cases proceed to decrease the need for management.

1. Blueprints for Processing Civil Cases. — Congress could create an external timetable for the civil pretrial process akin to that in the Speedy Trial Act of 1974. Since its enactment, that Act has required that criminal cases be tried within a certain time period. The scheme is designed both to limit judges’ discretion to set strict or liberal schedules that could affect case outcomes and to protect defendants’ right to a speedy trial.

Yet experience under the Speedy Trial Act reveals that application of such a scheme to civil cases would not only prevent authoritarian excesses, but would also hamper judges’ ability to respond to the particular challenges of individual cases. Further, many complain that the Speedy Trial Act has failed to provide faster case disposition, has harmed defen-
dants, and has not eliminated management.\textsuperscript{258} Thus, although the Act does provide standards and does guide district courts in exercising their authority, it is at best a partial solution.

Moreover, designating speedy-trial rules (or any set of rules) for every type of civil lawsuit would be very difficult, if not impossible. The variety and complexity of the civil docket would invite rulemakers to craft dozens of subrules. Yet the multiplication of subrules would in turn conflict with the Federal Rules' premise that a single framework can form the basis for litigating the myriad claims brought before the federal courts.\textsuperscript{259}

It is possible, of course, that the original conception of a single, simple, and unified set of federal rules is no longer compelling. Special — and different — rules for state and federal prisoners' habeas corpus petitions became effective in 1977.\textsuperscript{260} The \textit{Manual for Complex Litigation}\textsuperscript{261} is becoming the alternative rulebook for multiparty and multidistrict cases. And individual federal district courts are experimenting with local rules to manage cases that they believe are poorly served by the Federal Rules.\textsuperscript{262} Unless local rules are crafted with care and coordination, however, the proliferation of hundreds of particularized rules would resurrect the "procedural traps for the unwary" that the uniform Federal Rules were designed to avoid.\textsuperscript{263}

\section*{2. Economic Disincentives to Litigation. —} Congress could create a series of economic sanctions and incentives to make adjudication less attractive. Federal rule 68 currently provides a small incentive for plaintiffs to settle by obliging those who win less at trial than they were offered in writing as settlement to pay a portion of the losing defendant's costs.\textsuperscript{264} Congress

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\item[\textsuperscript{259}] \textit{See} generally Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 (1975) (explaining the tensions between the use of a uniform transsubstantive procedural system and the diverse procedural needs of specific subject matters).
\item[\textsuperscript{261}] \textit{Manual for Complex Litigation} (5th ed. 1982).
\item[\textsuperscript{263}] \textit{See}, \textit{e.g.}, Cohn, supra note 105, at 295 (experiments in local rules have threatened to create "a kind of procedural Tower of Babel" (citation omitted)).
\item[\textsuperscript{264}] \textit{See} Fed. R. Civ. P. 68; \textit{cf.} Delta Airlines v. August, 450 U.S. 346 (1981) (rule applies only to judgment in favor of plaintiff-offeree). Some states have similar rules. \textit{See}, \textit{e.g.}, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998 (West 1980).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
could substantially increase the incentives of some litigants to avoid litigation by altering the so-called American rule, under which each side bears its own attorneys' fees; all losing parties could be required to pay winning parties' fees.

The interest in economic penalties is growing, and creative options, such as differential user taxes, could be explored. Using dollars to discourage the use of courts, however, is laden with difficulties. Our society values ready access to courts and jury trials. Indeed, in recent years Congress has used the cost-shifting technique to encourage plaintiffs to bring more suits to vindicate important rights. In this context, it would be anomalous to adopt economic incentives that would necessarily impose a heavy burden on parties with fewer financial resources — the very parties who are turning to the courts more now than they have in the past.

D. Minimizing the Need for Management

I have touched on ways to constrain judicial management, to assign managerial tasks to other individuals or fora, and to devise new rules to control litigants' behavior. Another alternative would be simply to abolish all forms of management in all places by taking from judges and judge surrogates the responsibility for both case propulsion and case settlement. As they have done in the past, the parties could run cases themselves. Under this traditional model, judges would enter disputes only if summoned by the parties and would decide contested issues only in the formal adjudicatory fashion.

This approach might be attractive to those who believe that the "crisis in the courts" has been overstated, that problematic uses of the courts are far less frequent than the cries of dismay suggest. Postdecision disputes are rare, and many

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265 *See* Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) ("[T]he prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser.").

266 Economists have attempted to analyze the effect of fee shifting. *See*, e.g., Shavell, *Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs*, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982) (analyzing American and British systems and considering the incentives created by each).

267 *Cf.* Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898 (3d Cir.) (upholding New Jersey's assessment of higher fees in divorce actions than in other actions), *cert. denied*, 51 U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1982); Brazil, *supra* note 185, at 318-28 (parties in complex cases pay fees of special masters appointed to oversee special needs of cases).


269 *See*, e.g., Friedman, *supra* note 85, at 661.
believe that pretrial disputes are also relatively uncommon. For example, as far as we know, the absolute number of discovery requests is small in most cases, and the demand for judicial assistance in discovery is likewise small. In the occasional case — before or after trial — in which the parties are unable to accommodate each others' needs, the party allegedly injured could seek the court's aid and the court could respond, albeit in a formal manner. And when lawyers misbehave, bar associations and consumer groups, not judges, could control and sanction the misbehavior.

Some observers might reply that this approach would be unwise. Management appears to be an inevitable response to current problems of civil litigation, especially in discovery and in the enforcement of complex decrees. Moreover, the structure of the Federal Rules, with provisions permitting liberal joinder of parties and issues, encourages the problems that in turn invite management.

To be sure, we could change the Rules to mitigate some of the problems that lead to management. We could adopt more restrictive approaches toward multiparty, multi-issue cases in the hope that simplification would decrease managerial pressures. We could streamline and limit discovery rights; if some of the procedural opportunities now afforded litigants were abolished, the need for supervision would decrease, and the courts' work load would diminish.

Redrafting the Rules to limit their liberal premises has obvious drawbacks. Multiparty, multi-issue litigation is presumed to be efficient because related claims can be resolved within a single lawsuit. Limiting discovery poses special problems. Divining which portions of discovery are expendable would not be easy. Moreover, when working well, discovery allegedly enables parties to decide when to settle and ensures that the trials that do occur are fairer and simpler. Because many commentators agree that most cases do not pose discovery problems, limiting a practice that is not the true source of the difficulty would be an unnecessary and perhaps harmful response. Finally, restricting discovery requests to, for example, thirty interrogatories (without court permission to ask more) would be unduly rigid and burdensome. Lawyers would try to imbue the thirty questions permitted with the content

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271 See id. at 18–26.
272 Cf. Chayes, Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, supra note 5, at 57 ("[T]oday even a conservative Court is reduced, perforce, to practicing public law litigation.").
VI. CONCLUSION

Ideas about statutory timetables for litigation, diverse procedural rules for different categories of cases, alternative dispute resolution centers, curtailed discovery rights, state-controlled case preparation, limitations on court access, and penalties for those who do not settle lawsuits should give us pause, for these reforms would drastically alter the civil litigation world. But equally far-reaching changes, instituted by the judiciary itself and carried out in the name of increased efficiency, are already under way. Unfortunately, these changes are being carried out piecemeal and with little reflection on their cumulative implications for the adversarial system.

If, as many of their critics assert, the courts cannot meet the demands they face, revamping adjudication may well be appropriate. But if the time to reappraise the process of adjudication has arrived, the work should not be left to the judiciary, its support staff, a handful of academics, or a few American Bar Association committees. Rather, the hard questions about pace (how quickly should lawsuits proceed?), allocation of authority (should the pace be decided by judges, the parties, or Congress?), and the continued existence of the adversary process (who should be responsible for case investigation, preparation, and presentation?) should be subjected to a more searching and free-ranging public debate.

Some may argue that, even if an inquiry into judicial management techniques is necessary, judges — joined by a select group of lawyers and scholars — have all of the expertise necessary to decide how courts should be run. But I join others who advocate a more broad-based investigation of what judges should do and which rules should govern their behavior. Although judges can and should exercise substantial authority over court procedures, the framers of the Constitution foreseen the need for Congress to play a role in structuring the nation's judicial business. The problems raised by managerial judging, problems that implicate the rights of all citi-


274 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; id. art. III, § 1.
zens, are simply too important to be left to the discretion of judges alone.

In the debate over appropriate responses to the increasingly heavy work load of the federal courts, I am concerned about preserving the uniqueness of the judicial function. Seduced by controlled calendars, disposition statistics, and other trappings of the efficiency era and the high-tech age, managerial judges are changing the nature of their work. The old judiciary was doing something different from the modern managerial ideal, something quite out of step with the world of time and motion studies. Among all of our official decisionmakers, judges — and judges alone — are required to provide reasoned explanations for their decisions. Judges alone are supposed to rule without concern for the interests of particular constituencies. Judges alone are required to act with deliberation — a steady, slow, unhurried task.

I want to take away trial judges' roving commission and to bring back the blindfold. I want judges to balance the scales, not abandon them altogether in the press to dispose of cases quickly. No one has convincingly discredited the virtues of disinterest and disengagement, virtues that form the bases of the judiciary's authority. Our society has not yet openly and deliberately decided to discard the traditional adversarial model in favor of some version of the continental or inquisitorial model. Until we do so, federal judges should remain true to their ancestry and emulate the goddess Justicia. I fear that, as it moves closer to administration, adjudication may be in danger of ceasing to be.

275 Ours is an adversary system of justice. ... In our system lawyers worry about the whereabouts of witnesses. The court does not. Lawyers worry about proof. The court does not ... [The challenged local court rule] subordinates the role of the lawyer to that of the administering magistrate, reducing counsel to the role of clerical assistants ... .


APPENDIX: THE ICONOGRAPHY OF JUSTICE

Contemporary depictions of Justice consist typically of a large female figure, draped in Greco-Roman robes. She carries scales and sword, and her eyes are covered with a blindfold. Although the sword, scales, and blindfold have been added over the centuries, the personification of justice as a woman dates to the ancient world. The earliest documentation of this image, dated about 2500 B.C.E., comes from Egyptian drawings of the goddess Ma’at. The sleek Ma’at, daughter of the sun god Ra, embodied justice, peace, order, and law. The Greeks, however, fashioned two goddesses as archetypal judges. Themis, whose name may be translated as “order,” was the elder goddess of justice; she supervised ceremonies and maintained order on Olympus. Some scholars believe that she is the Greeks’ version of Ma’at, altered to reflect the Greek aesthetic. Unlike the slender, highly stylized half-portraits of Ma’at, statues of Themis depict a large, somber, imposing woman. The second goddess of justice was Dyke, Themis’ daughter, who lived on earth rather than on Olympus. Some believe that Dyke and Themis represent the division between “earthly justice” and “divine justice.”

The Romans consolidated the Greeks’ two goddesses into one — Justitia. Like the Greeks’ goddesses, Justitia is a hulking figure, and she provides the prototype for today’s pictorial image of justice. The idea of justice as a virgin was introduced, apparently, as Dyke merged into Justitia. By the Middle Ages, virginity may have been attributed to Justice as part of the identification of law with religion, and, more specifically, as a reference to the Virgin Mary. In medieval Christian art, Justice — or Righteousness, as she is sometimes called

279 J. Beazley & B. Ashmole, Greek Sculpture and Painting to the End of the Hellenistic Period figure 146 (1932).
280 See G. Del Vecchio, Justice 6–7, 10–13 (1952).
282 Alternatively, the original association may have derived from the astral virgin of the zodiac. See J. Shaw, Images of Justice in Mediaeval Art 9 (Apr. 19, 1980) (unpublished manuscript on file in Harvard Law School Library).
— maintained her female form as she joined the three other Cardinal Virtues — Prudence, Fortitude, and Temperance, all depicted as women.283

The first recorded association of scales with justice is, again, Egyptian. As we understand Egyptian beliefs about the afterlife, at death each person was questioned by forty-two judges, known as the Priests of Ma'at. Thereafter, judges, using scales, balanced the individual’s heart against a feather — the symbol of Ma'at. If the heart was lighter than the feather, the individual was eligible for eternal life.284

The Greeks maintained the association of scales and justice; both Themis and Dyke are depicted with scales.285 The scales, however, were not unique to those goddesses; other Greek gods also carried scales.286 Whether the Roman Justitia carried scales is unclear.287 In medieval times, the scales were occasionally replaced by a rod,288 and Justicia was also portrayed with a cornucopia.289 Over time, the cornucopia and rod disappear, and the sword is shown instead.290 In today’s depiction of Justice, scales and sword are commonplace.

The blindfold is a relatively recent addition to the imagery of Justice. According to Shaw,291 the blindfold was not a standard element in the depiction of Justice until the sixteenth century.292 Before then, artists had used the blindfold as a derisive symbol; they had drawn it around pictures of synagogues as an apparent reference to the “blindness” of Judaism to the “insight” of Christianity.293 Perhaps borrowing this notion, a well-known 1494 woodcut illustrating Brant’s The
Ship of Fools depicts a fool placing a blindfold on the goddess Justice — an image generally interpreted to be sharply critical of ignorant judges, the “blind fools” corrupted by attorneys. By the end of the sixteenth century, the previously derisive interpretation of the blindfold had changed; it became a symbol of impartiality.

A final element in Justice's imagery is her garment, which may have influenced the dress of modern judges. Today's judges wear robes, dress that evokes the garments of clerics and kings. Reacting against these associations, many nineteenth century judges refused to wear robes. In some states, judges did not resume the practice until this century.

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295 According to Shaw, Justice was first represented with the blindfold as a symbol of impartiality in 1531. J. Shaw, supra note 282, at 15. Interpretations of the blindfold since the 16th century have not always described it as an advantage. See, e.g., E. Panofsky, supra note 37, at 107–08 (Cupid portrayed with blindfold to illustrate love's irrationality).

Other symbols, such as gavels and wigs, are sometimes associated with judges. These accessories, however, have not been depicted exclusively with judges. For discussions of these and other accessories commonly associated with justice, see Some Notes on the Emblems of Law and Justice, Appendix to A Description of the New Buildings, Northwestern University School of Law 55 (1926); Wigs Through the Ages, 31 N.Z.L.J. 171 (1955).