PART 2  Fiduciary obligation and property entitlements

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1 Introduction

The question of how fiduciary duties should be allocated within the public corporation has been the subject of intense interest recently. Scholars and practitioners have attempted to resolve the question of whether corporate boards of directors have fiduciary obligations to corporate stakeholders other than shareholders by invoking vague, result-oriented conceptions of basic fairness and equity, as well as other, equally value-laden terms like economic efficiency and reliance.

This article starts with the widely accepted assumption that corporate fiduciary duties are valuable assets. Thus, we assume that all stakeholders, including non-shareholder constituencies, benefit from being the subject of the corporate fiduciary duties owed by directors. Unlike others, however, we do not presume that the simple fact that all stakeholders potentially benefit from fiduciary duties leads inexorably to the conclusion that such duties should be extended to all stakeholders. Rather, like other assets, corporate fiduciary duties become less valuable as they become more diffuse. Any group of stakeholders, whether they be shareholders, bondholders, or employees, will find that fiduciary duties are more valuable to them if they are exclusive than if they are shared. This is axiomatic. The interests of the widely variegated groups of claimants on firms' assets conflict in numerous ways. By strengthening the bargaining position of one group, the law inevitably weakens the bargaining position of the other, competing, groups.

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† This paper contains revisions and extensions of arguments made by one of the authors in earlier articles, particularly 'Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes' (1989) Duke LJ 173 and 'An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties' (1992) 21 Stetson LR. The authors are particularly grateful for comments received at the Corporate Stakeholder Conference held at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law on 24 and 25 April 1992. We gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of M.J. Spelliscy, Cornell Law School class of 1994.

1 See, for example, 21 no. 1 Stetson LR, which contains the special symposium issue 'Corporate Malaise - Stakeholders Statutes: Cause or Cure?'

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Building on the axiom that the corporation is a nexus of contracts, we view fiduciary duties simply as a corporate asset that will be bargained for and auctioned off among the various groups of stakeholders. A wide variety of outcomes is theoretically possible under this process. But, we will show that so long as the parties engaged in the bargaining process are rational, they will agree to stipulate that fiduciary duties will be exclusively enjoyed by one constituency if the value of such duties is greater when enjoyed exclusively than when shared with other groups.

Thus, we argue that the allocation of fiduciary duties exclusively to one group of claimants does not reflect any lack of bargaining power on the part of the groups that do not enjoy the privilege of being the beneficiary of such duties. Rather, we argue that these other groups benefit by giving up any claims they might have on such rights by more than they lose. The benefits will vary depending on the nature of the non-shareholder constituency at issue. They may take the form of higher interest rates for bondholders, higher wages or greater job security for workers, or higher taxes for local communities. Thus the recent regulatory trend towards forcing directors to expand the scope of their fiduciary obligation beyond the realm of shareholders not only makes shareholders worse off, they make other constituencies worse off as well.

For decades, state corporate law doctrine provided that the directors of both public and closely held firms owe fiduciary duties to shareholders and to shareholders alone. The applicable legal norm required directors to manage a corporation for the exclusive benefit of its shareholders. Protection for other sorts of claimants existed only to the extent provided by contract. This principle has been subjected to considerable stress as a result of recent legislative action in a majority of states that authorizes (or, in the case of one state, requires) directors 'to take into account the interests of other “constituencies” - stakeholders other than shareholders – in performing their duties, including the making of change-of-control decisions.'

Three primary criticisms have been levelled at these so-called stakeholders statutes. The first criticism is that fiduciary duties should flow only to residual claimants because the residual claimants have the greatest incentive to maximize the value of a corporation, and therefore place the highest value on the legal protection afforded by fiduciary duties. As will be seen, the premise that residual claimants ascribe the greatest value to this protection does not lead ineluctably to the

2 The Committee on Corporate Laws ‘Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion’ (1990) 45 Bus. Lawyer 2253, 2253
conclusion that they deserve to be the sole recipients of this benefit. Over a wide range of corporate decisions made by officers and directors, gap-filling responsibilities analogous to those provided by the fiduciary duties owed to shareholders under corporate law are needed to provide meaningful protection to non-shareholder constituencies such as workers, customers, and suppliers. In other words, the status of shareholders as residual claimants provides support for the argument that shareholders value receiving the benefit of directors' fiduciary duties, but it does not explain completely why shareholders should be the exclusive beneficiaries of managers' fiduciary obligations.

Nonetheless, we argue that fiduciary duties should flow to residual claimants and to residual claimants alone. This conclusion stems from a contractual analysis, under which residual claimants receive the benefits of fiduciary duties not because other groups don't value them, but rather because (1) the aggregate value of fiduciary duties to any group within a firm diminishes as those rights are shared with other groups; and (2) the shareholders value these rights more than any other group. While non-shareholder constituencies also value these rights, the very nature of their claims makes it easier for these constituencies to protect themselves from post-contractual opportunism by the firm. In addition, non-shareholder constituencies already enjoy the protection provided by judicial gap-filling and do not need the additional gap-filling protections afforded by fiduciary duties. All groups ultimately benefit from a legal regime that makes shareholders the exclusive beneficiaries of fiduciary duties.

The second criticism levelled at other constituency statutes is that they require corporate agents to serve so many masters — employees, communities, bondholders, customers, suppliers — that the costs in terms of confusion and misunderstanding on the part of courts and litigants vastly outweigh any potential benefits that such statutes might provide. This argument ignores the fact that corporations have long been able to issue multiple classes of shares with different economic and political rights, and corporate management has owed fiduciary duties to each of these classes. Thus it simply cannot be said that corporate law is incapable of reconciling the claims of a variety of competing interests. The argument that other constituency statutes will cause confusion also neglects the fact that most managers' actions are effectively protected against judicial scrutiny by the business judgment rule. Accordingly, as a practical matter, the rights being taken away from shareholders by other constituency statutes were not rights that provided much in the way of concrete benefits for shareholders in the first place.

The real problem with other constituency statutes is not that they take away something of value from residual claimants who are the only group
that has any incentive to maximize the value of the firm, because over a significant range of important corporate decisions, other constituencies such as fixed claimants or workers have the greatest stake in the decisions being made. Similarly, other constituency statutes cannot be condemned on the grounds that they upset a system of legal rules that present a pre-existing set of clearly defined behavioural guidelines for officers and directors. No such set of guidelines exists. Rather, the critical problem with other constituency statutes is that they fail to recognize that fiduciary duties are owed solely to residual claimants because they are the group that faces the most severe set of contracting problems with respect to defining the nature and extent of the obligations owed to them by officers and directors. Fiduciary duties should properly be seen as a method of gap-filling in incomplete contracts. And shareholders place a far greater value on the protection provided by this gap-filling than do the other constituencies of a corporation.

This observation, of course, raises an obvious follow-up question: if gap-filling is a useful device from the shareholders’ perspective, why not from the perspective of these other constituencies as well? Here we argue that under modern principles of contract law, courts do fill in gaps for these other constituencies: but they do so against the background of the pre-existing contracts that these groups have with the firm. Thus gap-filling on behalf of such other constituencies as employees and bondholders is done in the context of interpreting the employment contracts, collective bargaining agreements, bond indentures, and covenants that these other groups have with the corporation. Necessary gap-filling is achieved in this context.

The obvious exception to this general rule comes from the local communities in which large corporations operate. Unlike the rest of the constituencies with which a firm deals, the local community has no pre-existing agreement with the firm. As such, there simply is no gap for a court to fill. But the local community is, or should be, well represented in the political process. Any grievance felt by the local community should be taken up with local political officials.

Finally, this paper considers – and rejects – the familiar (dare we say tiresome) argument that other constituency statutes are worthwhile because they prevent inefficient wealth transfers from other constituencies, particularly bondholders and employees, to shareholders. The question is not whether such wealth transfers are theoretically possible – clearly they are. Rather, the salient issues are: (1) whether the dangers associated with such wealth transfers can be avoided by contractually negotiated covenants between the fixed claimants and the firm; and (2) whether the social costs of attempting to mitigate this wealth transfer
problem through the promulgation of other constituency statutes are greater than the social benefits. Here we argue affirmatively on both counts. It seems patently clear that the true purpose of these statutes is to benefit a single non-shareholder constituency, namely the top managers of publicly held corporations who want still another weapon in their arsenal of anti-takeover protective devices. In other words, like many other legislative initiatives, other constituency statutes do not benefit the interests or groups that they ostensibly are intended to benefit. Rather, such statutes benefit a well-organized, highly influential special-interest group, namely the top managers of large, publicly held corporations who wish to terminate the market for corporate control.

II The three criticisms of other-constituency statutes

A. THE RESIDUAL CLAIMANT ARGUMENT

Other constituency statutes are ill-advised because they make dangerous inroads on the proposition that shareholders should receive the exclusive benefit of fiduciary duties. The best-known argument supporting this contention derives from the insight of modern financial theory that 'shareholders retain plenary authority to guide the fate of the corporate enterprise because they have the greatest stake in the outcome of the corporate decision-making.' Despite the fact that corporations are merely complex webs of contractual relations - and despite the fact that shareholders do not 'own' the modern, publicly held firm in any meaningful sense - the ultimate right to guide the firm (or, more precisely, to have it guided on their behalf) is retained by the shareholders because they are the group that values it most highly.

The implication of this analysis for the allocation of fiduciary responsibilities within the firm is not entirely clear. To say that shareholders place the highest value on the rights protected by fiduciary duties is not the same as saying that shareholders are the only group that values such rights. Clearly, many discretionary decisions within the corporation harm the rights of other claimants. For example, in recent years corporations have: (1) redeemed refunding-protected debt with proceeds of an equity offering, while simultaneously borrowing for other corporate purposes at lower interest rates; (2) deliberately engineered a technical default in a private debt covenant in order to be 'forced' to retire a high coupon issue that was otherwise fully call-protected; (3) borrowed heavily

4 Ibid.
in the short-term market, and then offered bondholders a choice between amending a covenant limitation on funded debt or leaving the issuer severely exposed to interest rate fluctuations and burdened with large near-term maturities; (3) leveraged their capital structure to avoid a hostile takeover, thereby triggering a decline in the company's bond rating, notwithstanding the bondholders' longstanding assumption that the issuer desired to maintain the highest possible rating in order to minimize borrowing costs.5

Thus the interesting question is not why shareholders receive the benefits of fiduciary duties, but why they should be the exclusive beneficiaries of fiduciary duties, given that other constituencies would benefit if they had the rights created by the imposition on such duties.

But why would shareholders, as residual claimants, place the highest value on fiduciary duties? After all, once we accept the view that the firm is not an entity at all but a set of contracts or series of bargains, the organization ... decomposes into a group of identifiable participants – e.g. investors, managers, creditors, employees and suppliers – who negotiate an equilibrium position among themselves. An implication of this perspective is to deny that any one class of participants (i.e. the shareholders) have a natural right to view themselves as owners of the firm. Rather, shareholders are seen not as the firm's owners, but as suppliers of equity capital; they are the 'residual claimants,' who bring to the firm their special ability at risk-bearing, which creditors, managers, and employees tend to lack. 6

Of course, once we view the shareholders 'as simply the residual claimants who have agreed to accept a more uncertain return because of their superior risk-bearing capacity, it is far from certain that they are necessarily entitled to control the firm," that is, to have managers' and directors' fiduciary duties flow exclusively to them.

The rationale for why shareholders place the highest value on such rights is said to be that '[u]niquely the residual claimants are interested in the firm's overall profitability, whereas creditors and managers (and presumably other constituents as well) are essentially fixed claimants who wish only to see their claims repaid and who will logically tend to resist risky activities. Having less interest in the overall economic performance of the firm, creditors can bargain through contract and do not need rep-

7 Ibid. 29
presentation on the board to monitor all aspects of the firm's performance."8

Thus, fiduciary duties exist because the decisions that face officers and directors of corporations are sufficiently complex and difficult to predict. It would therefore not be feasible to specify in advance how such officers and directors should respond to a wide range of future contingencies. Fiduciary duties are the mechanism invented by the legal system for filling in the unspecified terms of shareholders' contingent contacts.

It has been argued that these duties run exclusively to shareholders because, as residual claimants, '[t]he gains and losses from abnormally good or bad performance are the lot of the shareholders, whose claims stand last in line.'9 As Easterbrook and Fischel have observed:

As the residual claimants, the shareholders are the group with the appropriate incentives ... to make discretionary decisions. The firm should invest in new products, plants, etc., until the gains and costs are identical at the margin. Yet, all of the actors, except the shareholders, lack the appropriate incentives. Those with fixed claims on the income stream may receive only a tiny benefit (in increased security) from the undertaking of a new project. The shareholders receive most of the marginal gains and incur most of the marginal costs. They therefore have the right incentives to exercise discretion (or to have it exercised on their behalf).10

A simple illustration can be used to demonstrate this point. Suppose that a firm has two classes of claimants, fixed and residual. The firm will owe $1 million to the fixed claimants at the end of period one. Suppose further that the firm has to choose between two projects; A and B. Both of these projects will require the firm to allocate one hundred per cent of its resources to that project for the relevant period. Project A has a 0.5 chance of producing a pay-off with a present value of $1 million and a 0.5 chance of producing a pay-off with a present value of $5 million at the end of period one. Thus the expected present value of project A is $3 million.11 Project B, on the other hand, has a pay-off matrix in which there is a 0.5 chance of a pay-off with a present value of $6 million, and a 0.5 chance of a pay-off with a present value of $1 million. Thus, while project A has an expected value of $3 million, project B has an expected value of $3.5 million.

8 Ibid.
9 Easterbrook and Fischel 'Voting in Corporate Law' (1983) 26 J. of Law & Econ. 395, 402-4
10 Ibid.
11 (0.5 x $1 million) + (0.5 x $5 million) = $3 million
The shareholders will prefer project B, since they are better off by $500,000 if they select that project.\(^{12}\) The fixed claimants, by contrast, are indifferent as to whether the firm selects project A or project B because under either outcome available under either project, the fixed claimants are absolutely certain to obtain the $1 million that is owed to them by the firm. Where a firm is making a decision like this, the fixed claimants clearly do not deserve a role in the decision-making process. The firm, and society, are better off if the firm selects project B, because that is the one that maximizes the firm's and society's stock of wealth. No purpose is served by giving the firm's fixed claimants any stake in the decision-making process. The only possible result from involving them would be to permit them to threaten to obstruct the firm's efforts to undertake project B in order to extract a side payment of some kind.

The sort of decision described in the above example lies behind the intuition that fiduciary duties should flow exclusively to a firm's shareholders because they are residual claimants. Because the relevant decision in this example, like so many decisions made by corporations, are infra-marginal with respect to all constituencies other than shareholders, the shareholders should be the only party with legal rights in the process leading to that decision. And, as Easterbrook and Fischel suggest, the shareholders' position within the firm is unique because shareholders are the only group with a meaningful stake in every decision made by a solvent firm.

But not all decisions made by a firm resemble the decision suggested in the above example. Suppose that the decision was between project A as described above and a third project, C. Project C has a 0.5 chance of producing a pay-off at the end of period one with a present value of $500,000, and a 0.5 chance of producing a pay-off at the end of period one with a present value of $10 million. The shareholders would prefer project C to project A (or project B, for that matter). Project C has an expected return to shareholders of $4.25 million, which compares

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12 Project A has an expected value to the shareholders of $2 million. If the project only makes $1,000,000, the fixed claimants will get all of the gains from the project, and there will be nothing left over for the shareholders. If the project makes $5 million, the shareholders will get $4 million, because the first million goes to satisfy the firm's obligations to the fixed claimants. Thus project A has an expected value to the shareholders of $2 million (0.5 x $4 million = $2 million). Project B has an expected value of 2.5 million. As before, if the project only makes $1 million, the shareholders get nothing. If the project makes $6 million, the shareholders will get $5 million, because the first million will go to the fixed claimants of the firm. Thus project B has an expected value to the shareholders of $2.5 million (0.5 x $5 million = $2.5 million).
favourably with project A's expected return to shareholders of $2 million, and project B's expected return to shareholders of $2.5 million. However, unlike project A and project B, the firm's fixed claimants are not indifferent with respect to the decision to select project C. Under project C, there is a 0.5 chance that the fixed claimants will be paid only half of the full $1 million that is owed to them. Indeed the fixed claimants would be willing to pay for the right to block project C.

It is simply incorrect to say that the shareholders are the only group with the correct incentives to decide whether to adopt project C or project A or B. Nor is it the case that the society benefits by allocating the fiduciary duties within the firm exclusively to the shareholders because the shareholders have the greatest incentives to maximize the value of the firm. It is possible to manipulate the numbers in the above examples and the actual projects selected in the real world to transfer wealth from the fixed claimants to the residual claimants while reducing rather than increasing the overall value of the firm. Imagine for example that the firm is selecting between two projects D and E. Project D presents a 0.5 chance of producing absolutely nothing and a 0.5 chance of producing a present value pay-off of $1.5 million at the end of period one. Project E presents a one hundred per cent chance of producing a present value pay-off at the end of period one of $1 million. Ex ante, the overall value of the firm is maximized by selecting project E, since that produces a present expected value of $1 million, while project D produces a present expected value of only $750,000. The shareholders, however, would prefer project D to project E, since under project E there is no chance that the shareholders will realize any pay-off at all, while under project D there is a 0.5 chance that the shareholders will realize something (that is, $500,000 after repaying the $1 million owed to fixed claimants). Thus if the shareholders are left in complete control, they will have incentives to adopt various strategies with the effect of transferring wealth from bondholders to shareholders, such as choosing risky investment projects and withdrawing assets from the firm.¹³ As the above example suggests, some of the strategies that shareholders can adopt to transfer wealth from the fixed claimants and other constituencies to themselves reduce the value of the firm, and overall societal wealth as well.

The point of this discussion is that simply describing shareholders as residual claimants to the cash flow of the modern corporation does not fully explain why fiduciary duties flow exclusively to shareholders. The shareholders' status as residual claimants provides a persuasive rationale

¹³ Ibid.
for why their interests should trump with respect to a wide range of transactions. However, it is also clearly the case that other claimants have a strong interest in having their preferences taken into account, at least to some extent, in decisions about how to allocate corporate resources, because these claimants face the realistic prospect of tangible loss if their interests are neglected.

Thus the argument that shareholders, as residual claimants, have the greatest incentive to maximize the value of the firm and therefore should be the beneficiaries of the legal protection afforded by fiduciary duties is incomplete. It does not explain why the interests of other claimants should not be respected, at least as regards those decisions that have the potential to affect their interests directly.

The reason that shareholders should be the exclusive beneficiaries of fiduciary duties does not lie in the fact that the shareholders are residual claimants, but rather in the fact that fiduciary duties are not public goods. Because fiduciary duties are not public goods, the enjoyment by one group of the rights associated with such duties necessarily diminishes other groups' ability to enjoy those benefits. This is particularly true in the case of corporate fiduciary duties where the interests of the various stakeholders' groups actually conflict.

It is well understood that a discretionary decision by directors that increases the wealth of one stakeholder group often will diminish the wealth of another group. For example, just as a decision by a corporate board of directors to increase the overall riskiness of a firm above the expected level transfers wealth from fixed claimants to residual claimants, so too a decision by the board to reduce the riskiness of the firm transfers wealth to fixed claimants from residual claimants. But the implication of this basic point has been lost on those who have supported statutes that expand the rights of non-shareholder constituencies to include fiduciary duties.

A simple example can be used to illustrate the point. Suppose that there are only two groups of stakeholders, bondholders and stockholders. The bondholders value the right to be the exclusive beneficiaries of fiduciary duties at $50, while the shareholders value the right to be the exclusive beneficiaries of fiduciary duties at $75. If fiduciary duties are shared by both groups, however, the aggregate value of the corporate fiduciary duties declines to $40 ($20 for each group). If both groups have equal bargaining power and are rational, the parties will agree that the shareholders should be the exclusive beneficiaries of the directors' fiduciary duties. The bondholders would accept some amount greater than $20 in exchange for agreeing that the shareholders will be the exclusive beneficiaries of the directors' fiduciary duties. The shareholders would pay some amount less than $55 to obtain the right to be the ex-
exclusive beneficiaries of the directors' fiduciary duties. Within this range, both groups would be better off than if fiduciary duties were shared with the other group. In other words, in this example, as long as the shareholders pay the bondholders an amount greater than $20 but less than $55, both will be better off than if the fiduciary duties are shared and no exchange is made. Thus corporate shareholders will pay other corporate constituencies for the right to have these duties inure to their sole benefit. Suppose, for example, the shareholders place an aggregate value of $10 million on the legal protection provided by a corporate governance system that allocates fiduciary duties exclusively to shareholders, while other constituents place a value of $2 million on the protection afforded by such duties, then both parties will be better off if the shareholders are permitted to compensate these other constituencies— in the form of higher interest on bonds, higher wages to workers and managers, and better prices for suppliers and customers—to acquire the right to have fiduciary duties flow exclusively to them.

Thus all constituencies will be better off by allocating fiduciary duties within the firm exclusively to shareholders because: (1) fiduciary duties are not a public good; and (2) shareholders are the group within the firm that places the highest value on such duties.

B. THE 'TOO MANY MASTERS' ARGUMENT
The second, and perhaps the most common, criticism of stakeholder statutes is that such statutes, to the extent that they effect any change whatsoever in existing law, simply confuse the legal landscape by forcing directors to attempt the impossible: pleasing a multitude of masters with competing and conflicting interests. As the Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association's Section on Business Law has argued in its position paper on other constituency statutes:

[T]he confusion of directors in trying to comply with such statutes, if interpreted to require directors to balance the interests of various constituencies without according primacy to shareholder interests, would be profoundly troubling. Even under existing law, particularly where directors must act quickly, it is often difficult for directors acting in good faith to divine what is in the best interests of shareholders and the corporation. If directors are required to consider other interests as well, the decision-making process will become a balancing act or search for compromise. When directors must not only decide what their duty of loyalty mandates, but also to whom their duty of loyalty runs (and in what proportions) poorer decisions can be expected.14

14 Supra note 2, 2253, 2269
On one view, the 'too many masters' argument is that other constituency statutes make life more difficult for corporate managers and boards of directors. In fact, the better view is that such statutes make life easier rather than harder for incumbent management of the large, public corporation. After all, these statutes enable management to justify virtually any decision on the grounds that it benefits some constituency of the corporation or other.

To illustrate the point that other constituency statutes increase rather than decrease the degree of freedom enjoyed by incumbent managers, one has only to imagine virtually any decision or transaction contemplated by a corporation. Take, for example, the issue of whether a firm should relocate its headquarters from the large metropolis that has served as its base for several years to a small town with better schools, lower labour costs, and lower taxes. While shareholders might benefit by this move, the community in which the firm is currently located clearly would suffer. Some employees might benefit by the move, others might suffer. The firm could justify virtually any decision as serving the interests of one or more of the firm's constituencies. Imagine now that the proposal to relocate the company comes not from incumbent management, but from an outside bidder who is launching a hostile tender offer for the company at a substantial premium over the current market price of the firm's shares. Now the other constituency statute can be used to justify resisting an outside offer that may be in the best interests of the firm's shareholders. This is an additional reason why other constituency statutes diminish in value when they are shared by more than one group of stakeholders.

Thus the primary beneficiaries of other constituency statutes are incumbent managers who can justify virtually any decision they make on the grounds that it benefits some constituency of the firm. Strong support for this assertion lies in the fact that not only are these statutes (with a single exception) permissive, they do not afford standing to sue to any of the other constituencies that they purportedly are designed to benefit. 15

A similar sentiment was expressed by Dean Robert Clark, who has observed that it is socially optimal for corporate law to promote the interests of shareholders in profit maximization in a rather single-minded fashion:

[A] single objective goal like profit maximization is more easily monitored than a multiple, vaguely defined goal like the fair and reasonable accommodation of

15 Steven M.H. Wallman 'Corporate Constituency Statutes: Placing the Corporation's Interests First' (November/December 1990) 11 no. 2 Bus. Lawyer Update 2
all interests ... Assuming shareholders have some control mechanisms, better monitoring means that corporate managers will be kept more accountable. They are more likely to do what they are supposed to do and do it efficiently.\textsuperscript{16}

Like the argument that other constituency statutes are ill-advised because they ignore the special status of shareholders as residual claimants, the 'too many masters' argument is not without merit. Indeed, this argument provides what is a logical explanation of state legislatures' eagerness to enact these statutes. As has been pointed out by one of the staunchest defenders of these statutes, other constituency statutes were '[b]orn principally of last decade's takeover battles.'\textsuperscript{17} Of course the winners of the takeover battles of the 1980s were corporate shareholders, while the losers were incumbent managers. Other constituency statutes give such managers the ability to obtain politically what they were unable to obtain in the marketplace - meaningful job security regardless of the quality of their performance.

The problem with the 'too many masters' argument is that it is overstated. Corporations traditionally have been able to issue multiple classes of common and preferred stock, and corporate managers and directors have owed fiduciary duties to all of these various classes of claimants simultaneously. Moreover, just as the interests of common shareholders can conflict with the interests of non-shareholder constituencies, so too can the interests of one class of equity claimant conflict with the interests of another class of equity claimant. In particular, certain preferred shareholders may have interests that more closely resemble the interests of fixed claimants than the interests of common shareholders. Such preferred shareholders may seek to discourage the firm from engaging in certain risky projects while the shareholders would support the firm's decision to undertake such projects.

Along these lines, in \textit{Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.}, the Delaware Supreme Court opined that it is permissible for a corporation to take the interests of other constituencies into account, at least when there is no ongoing auction for the firm in progress.\textsuperscript{18} And in \textit{Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.},\textsuperscript{19} Chancellor William Allen opined that directors may owe fiduciary duties not simply to shareholders but 'to the community of interests that the

\textsuperscript{16} Robert C. Clark, (1986) \textit{Corporate Law} 20
\textsuperscript{17} Wallman, supra note 13, 1
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.} 506 A.2d 173, 176-82 (Del. 1986)
\textsuperscript{19} 1991 Westlaw 277613 (1991)
corporation represents' when it is approaching insolvency. In other words, when a corporation is approaching insolvency, the directors owe a fiduciary duty to the creditors in marshalling and distributing the company's assets.

Thus under Revlon, a corporate board may take account of various corporate constituencies such as creditors, customers, employees, and the community generally when deciding how to proceed, so long as the action ultimately taken in the interests of these corporate groups meets the basic requirement that 'there be some rationally related benefit accruing to the stockholders.' And under Credit Lyonnais, a corporate board must 'recognize that in managing the business affairs of a corporation in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may arise when the right (both the efficient and fair) course to follow for the corporation may diverge from the choice that the stockholders (or the creditors, or the employees, or any single group interested in the corporation) would make if given the opportunity to act.'

In Revlon, Revlon was faced with a hostile takeover bid, and the firm's board of directors attempted to defeat the outside bid by entering into a lock-up agreement with a friendly suitor, ostensibly for the purpose of benefiting certain of the firm's fixed claimants. The Delaware Supreme Court found that, by the time Revlon entered into the lock-up, a breakup of the company was 'inevitable.' Once this happened, the managers' sole concern was to obtain the highest price for the shareholders, and management was not permitted to take the interests of other constituencies into account in deciding how to proceed. Other cases have confirmed that corporate managers may consider the interests of other constituencies, not only in their daily management of the firm, but also when deciding whether to accept or oppose an outside offer, provided that management's consideration of the interests of these other constituencies 'bears some reasonable relationship to general shareholder interests.'

Two aspects of the Delaware Court's embrace of the other constituency ideal deserve special attention. First, as the Committee on Corporate Law has observed, in no case has the Delaware Supreme Court held that directors will be permitted to prefer the interests of other constituencies

20 Ibid. n55
21 See remarks of A. Gilchrist Sparks III to the Fourth Tulane Corporate Law Institute, reported in 24 Securities Regulation & Law Report (BNA) 588 (20 March 1992).
22 Ibid. 176
23 Supra note 19, n55
24 Ivanhoe Partners v. Niumont Mining Corp. 535 A.2d 1334, 1341-2 (Del. 1987)
over shareholders or that they ought, as a normative matter, to take such interests into account.\textsuperscript{25} The Committee has reformulated the position of the Delaware Supreme Court to be that:

[D]irectors have fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders which, while allowing directors to give consideration to the interests of others, compel them to find some reasonable relationship to the long-term interests of shareholders when so doing. In Delaware, this principle is modified when the decision is made to sell the company, at which time the directors may consider only the interests of shareholders.\textsuperscript{26}

The second noteworthy facet of the Delaware approach is its recognition of the important point that over a wide range of issues, no conflict exists between the interests of other constituencies and those of shareholders. Acting to improve worker morale is good for workers and good for shareholders. Taking steps to improve relations with the local community has the same effect. Similarly, drafting strong bond covenants or developing a reputation for dealing fairly with bondholders or other constituencies benefits the shareholders in the form of lower interest costs for debt and a lower cost of doing business generally. However, as the reasoning in 	extit{Credit Lyonnais} makes clear, as a corporation approaches insolvency, the shareholders' interests become less relevant, and non-shareholder constituencies take on all of the characteristics of residual claimants.

Moreover, the Delaware approach recognizes the Hayekian argument that it generally is not possible to identify precisely which actions are in shareholders' interests and which are not.\textsuperscript{27} As such, managers require plenty of latitude for experimentation. In addition, many technological or managerial improvements to a firm's operations may well result from pure happenstance and fortuity, rather than careful strategic planning. Consequently, judicial efforts to hold managers to a strict profit-maximization standard through the palliative of ex post judicial review of corporate decisions and operations is not likely to benefit anyone other than the legal community. The obvious exception to this general rule

\textsuperscript{25} Supra note 2, 2260
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid. 2261
\textsuperscript{27} A basic tenet of Austrian economic thought, as exemplified by the work of Friedric A. Hayek, is that 'there is an unpredictability and indeterminacy with regard to human preferences, expectations and knowledge.' Israel M. Kirzner 'On the Method of Austrian Economics' in Edwin G. Dolan (ed.) \textit{The Foundations of Modern Austrian Economics} (Kansas City: Sheed & Ward 1976) 48; see also F.A. Hayek 'Economics and Knowledge' in \textit{Individualism and Economic Order} (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1952).
occurs in the case where there is a palpable conflict of interest between the actions of managers and the interests of shareholders. Where this is the case, there is, of course, an important role to be played by judicial enforcement of corporate law norms.

To the extent that managers act in ways that are sub-optimal from the shareholders' perspective, they will be disciplined, if at all, by the various markets in which such managers must operate. Because of the problems of ignorance and uncertainty in the world of business, managers often base their actions on custom, tradition, force of habit, imitating the actions of more successful competitors, or a complex set of conflicting motivations. Courts are likely to be even more inept than managers and directors in determining with any certainty which actions are in the best interests of shareholders and which are not. As noted above, over a wide range of issues, allowing managers to take the interests of a variety of constituencies into account simply recognizes the fact that ex post second-guessing of managerial decisions probably does more harm than good. Generally, it is best for all parties concerned if courts decline to second-guess managers' decisions. Only when such decisions are clearly being made self-interestedly should courts intrude on the internal process of corporate governance.

To the extent that other constituency statutes are interpreted in ways that are consistent with this general norm in corporate law, they will be beneficial, not harmful. Consistent with the approach taken by the Delaware Supreme Court, the fact that such statutes give incumbent managers more freedom is worrisome only if managers can use that freedom in ways that are inconsistent with shareholder welfare.

Thus the problem with other constituency statutes is not that they require managers and directors to serve too many masters. Under current law corporate officials must serve a shifting and highly variegated set of masters. Rather, the problem is that these statutes potentially permit such managers and directors to serve no one but themselves.

C. SHAREHOLDERS AS THE GROUP WITH THE MOST ACUTE NEED FOR FIDUCIARY DUTIES

The real reason why shareholders value fiduciary duties more than other groups and why non-shareholder constituency statutes are unproductive is that such statutes ignore the severe contracting problems faced by residual claimants. These acute contracting problems, coupled with the fact that the value of being made the beneficiary of corporate fiduciary

28 These markets include the market for corporate control, the internal and external managerial labour markets, and the markets for the products offered by the firm.
duties is not in the nature of a public good, provide the basic justification for the traditional common law rule that managers and directors owe their primary fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders.

Outside of insolvency, non-shareholder constituencies can protect themselves against virtually any kind of managerial opportunism by retaining negative control over the firm's operations. Workers, bondholders, even local communities can protect their interests by contracting for the right to veto future proposed actions by management. By contrast, the shareholders must retain positive control over the actions of the firm in order to realize the full potential value of their shares.

Merely because non-shareholder constituencies decline to contract for the right to veto certain corporate transactions does not mean that they were unable to do so. Rather, the absence of contractual protection for other constituencies may simply reflect the fact that such other constituencies were unwilling to pay for such protection in the form of lower wages or lower interest rates on debt.

Workers are perhaps the group with whom one sympathizes the most when thinking about the possible benefits associated with other constituency statutes. Unlike shareholders, who are concerned with the overall profitability of the firm in which they have invested, workers are concerned with wages, hours, and working conditions. From a contracting perspective, wages and hours present few, if any, problems. Workers potentially could protect their expectations concerning wages with pension guarantees, golden parachute contracts, stipulated cost-of-living adjustments, and other straightforward provisions. Similarly, workers can obtain credible assurances against being forced to work undesirable hours simply by stipulating the precise length of the workday. Employees can achieve guaranteed working conditions by making reference to a well-known status quo, and requiring the employer to maintain working conditions at that level or above.

The point here is not to suggest that workers have the contracting power to protect their wages, hours and working conditions. Rather, the point is simply that, unlike the situation that pertains to the shareholders, it is at least technologically possible for workers to protect themselves contractually by drafting strong contractual provisions in their favour. Moreover, to the extent that future, unforeseen contingencies arise that cast doubt on the efficacy of contractual protection, courts can protect workers by construing their employment contracts in the light of the original purposes behind the agreement. Thus, the gap-filling functions provided by modern judges in interpreting contracts provides workers with the same sorts of protection that fiduciary duties provide for shareholders.

The above arguments apply with even more force to bondholders.
First, bondholders can and do draft elaborately detailed contracts to protect themselves from transactions that upset the original understanding between bondholders and the firm regarding the sorts of transactions that are appropriate for the firm. For example, bond indentures often contain provisions that impose limitations on an issuer's ability to pay dividends, acquire stock, acquire debt or issue preferred stock, either directly or through a subsidiary, to sell assets, or to engage in transactions with affiliate companies. While these provisions would not provide much protection to shareholders (and indeed might be deleterious to their interests), they do much to protect bondholders and other fixed claimants against wealth transfers by other corporate interests.

Again, it is worth emphasizing that, for the purposes of the arguments presented in this paper, the issue is not whether bondholders have the bargaining power to obtain every contractual protection they desire when covenants and indentures are drafted. After all, bondholders, like other constituencies, are free to decline to invest in the firm if they are not satisfied with the risk-return trade-off being offered.

Instead, the relevant issue is whether it is technologically possible for the bondholders to protect themselves via contract. If it is, their only obstacle is price. Unlike shareholders, who, absent the gap-filling protection afforded by fiduciary duties, cannot obtain contractual assurances that a firm will maximize profits, bondholders can protect the present value of their fixed claims by drafting 'put' provisions that give them the legal right to force the firm to repurchase the bonds at a pre-determined price upon the occurrence of certain contingencies. Put provisions may also require the firm to adjust the payments to fixed claimants so as to compensate them for the increased risks associated with certain transactions or with downgrades in the firm's credit rating.

The put provisions accompanying bond sales generally are triggered by a merger or transfer of a substantial number of assets to another firm, a change in the ownership of the firm, a significant share repurchase by the firm, or similar transaction. Of course it would be possible to draft even more comprehensive protection for bondholders. The right to put the bonds back to the firm might be triggered any time the market price of the bonds reached a certain level in the open market. Such a broad provision would be easy to monitor and enforce, and would provide virtually complete protection for bondholders against unforeseen contingencies.

30 Winkler, Harris, Williams Cos. To Offer Bonds with "Poison Puts" Wall Street Journal 16 November 1988
cies. Thus, to repeat, the issue is not whether other constituencies can protect themselves via contract, but whether they are willing to pay for such protection.

III Gap-filling for non-shareholder constituencies

The familiar retort to the argument made in the preceding section is that shareholders and the corporate managers who serve them are endlessly creative. As such, no matter how elaborate the guarantees, non-shareholder constituencies will be unable to protect themselves without the broad-based gap-filling provided by fiduciary duties because new strategies will be devised to undermine whatever contractual protection other constituencies can devise.

An interesting variant on this argument has been made in an important article by Columbia's Professor Coffee. He argues that the hostile takeover itself is best viewed as a shareholder strategy for reneging on the original bargain between non-shareholder constituencies (particularly managers) and the firm:

[T]he hostile takeover can be seen not simply as a mechanism that compels management to accept that level of business risk that shareholders deem appropriate, but as a means by which shareholders outflank the safeguards managers obtained to protect the promises of deferred compensation and job security that shareholders have given to managers. Thus, what appears from the bidder's perspective to be a process of purging organizational slack looks from the manager's viewpoint more like deceptive reneging on the original understanding.31

The ex post reneging argument seems flawed for two reasons. First, as noted above, non-shareholder constituencies can draft contracts that protect them against the consequences of future, unforeseen contingencies. Foreseeable contingencies, such as hostile takeovers and corporate restructuring are even easier for non-shareholder constituencies to deal with contractually. As discussed in the preceding section, poison puts for bondholders and golden parachutes for workers potentially provide virtually complete protection for non-shareholder constituencies.

Second, it is simply inaccurate to suggest that absent other constituency statutes, only shareholders enjoy the protection afforded by judicial gap-filling. An impressive literature on relational contracts indicates that modern judges should and do go a long way towards filling in unstated terms and conditions in long-term relational contracts such as those

31 Coffee 'Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web' (1986) 85 Mich. LR 1, 24
forged between non-shareholder constituencies and public corporations.52 Modern courts will examine the nature of the understanding between two contracting parties and interpret legal disputes between them in the light of this understanding. Thus non-shareholder constituencies (with the exception of local communities) already enjoy a substantial degree of protection of the gap-filling sort.

To be sure, there have been notable cases, such as the suit by bondholders of RJR Nabisco challenging the $17.7 billion leveraged buy-out of that firm, in which non-shareholder constituencies have sued to vindicate implied contract terms and lost. But examples such as this illustrate only that ex post all parties have an incentive to urge courts to interpret contracts in the way that suits their interests. Courts must sift through the competing arguments to obtain the result that is most consistent with the original understanding among the parties.

For non-shareholder constituencies, the starting point for this judicial gap-filling process must be the contract itself. The contract that constitutes the starting point can take a variety of forms. It may be an employment agreement, a collective bargaining agreement, a bond indenture, or a standard form contract between a firm and its suppliers or customers. For shareholders, it is widely recognized35 that the contract between managers and shareholders establishes that managers have a duty ‘to make corporate decisions to maximize the value of [their] shares.’34 Fiduciary duties are a corporate governance device uniquely crafted to fill in the massive gap in this open-ended bargain between shareholders and corporate officers and directors.

On the basis of the preceding analysis, it should be clear that recent attempts to expand the scope of managements’ fiduciary duties to non-shareholder constituencies are misguided for two reasons that previously have gone unrecognized. First, to the extent that such duties are legally enforceable, they shift the focal point of the legal analysis of the relationship between the non-shareholder constituency and the firm away from the actual contract between the parties. In other words, allocating fiduciary obligations to non-shareholder constituencies takes the judicial gap-filling process out of its proper framework, which lies in the actual contract that exists between the constituency and the firm, and puts it on some other dimension. Removing this gap-filling from its proper frame-

33 Supra note 3, 186
34 Supra note 16, 17–8
work deprives judges of any coherent basis for allocating rights and responsibilities within the firm.

Inevitably, removing the gap-filling done by judges for non-shareholder constituencies from a contractual framework to a fiduciary duty framework creates potential conflicts between the express and implied terms of the actual bargains and the new ‘rights’ being created by corporate constituency statutes. To the extent that these new rights are allowed to trump the terms contained in a contract between a non-shareholder constituency and the firm, such statutes simply transfer wealth from shareholders to these other constituencies. The specter of such wealth transfers deprives investors of incentives to invest in public corporations, and reduces societal wealth generally. Thus, to the extent that other constituency statutes create rights for non-shareholder groups that are not expressly or impliedly contained in the actual agreements between these groups and the firm, they will impede the process of capital formation and wealth creation in the economy.

IV The local community

Local communities constitute a possible exception to the analysis presented above. Unlike other non-shareholder constituencies, local communities may have no pre-existing contractual relationship with the firm on which to base a reconstruction of the original understanding between the parties in the event of future conflict. Of course, it often will be the case that a local community will in fact enter into express negotiations with a particular firm and agree to provide certain services and infrastructure support in exchange for a decision by the firm to locate in that community. In such cases, for the reasons presented above, layering on a set of fiduciary duties to the local community in addition to express contracts between the firm and the community will only hinder the ultimate resolution of future disputes.

But often there will be no express or implied understanding between a firm and its community. Where there is no agreement, it seems clear, at least to us, that creating an amorphous, open-ended fiduciary duty running from the firm to the ‘local community’ in which the firm operates is a singularly bad idea.

Creating such a duty transforms the role of top managers of public companies from that of private businessmen into that of unelected and unaccountable public servants. A decision to elevate the interests of a local community above the interests of a firm's shareholders is nothing less than a decision about how to allocate wealth within society. There seems to be a broad consensus that 'the reallocation of wealth is a function for which directors are not especially suited and one beyond the general pale of their perceived mandate from society.'

As with other non-shareholder constituencies, expanding the scope of a firm's fiduciary duties to include local communities is simply unnecessary. This is because local communities have unique access to the political process. To the extent that the actions of a firm are genuinely harmful to a local community, the members of that community can appeal to their elected representatives in state and local government for redress. Regardless of whether one has a pluralism or a republican perspective on the governmental process, local communities should be able to mobilize into an effective political coalition to press for protection from actions by corporations that are truly harmful to such communities. Indeed, upon reflection, the better argument seems to be that corporations need protection from local communities' abuse of the political process at least as much as local communities need protection from opportunistic behavior by corporations. The political capital being made by local politicians over the strike at the New York Daily News illustrates this point nicely. There, politicians have been falling all over themselves to demonstrate solidarity with the striking Daily News employees with little or no regard for the substantive merits of the dispute.

The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act illustrates the point that local communities are able to protect themselves in the political process and hardly need any additional protection that might be afforded by a plant closing law. The statute requires that, under virtually all conditions, firms with 100 or more workers give workers and communities 60 days' notice prior to closing a plant. The bill requires that workers be paid for every day that they are deprived of notice.

36 Supra note 2, 2270; "Takeover Dangers and Non-Shareholders: Who Should Be My Brothers' Keeper?" (1988) 1 Columbia Bus. LR 326-9
38 29 USC section 2102
The argument that the fiduciary duties of officers and directors in public corporations should run exclusively to shareholders and not to other constituencies is an uneasy one. As shown above, the shareholders' unique status as residual claimants provides a persuasive rationale for allocating fiduciary duties to shareholders in some but by no means all situations. In simple terms, in those situations in which other constituencies have no meaningful stake in a particular decision, they have no constructive role to play in the decision-making process. Including them in such decisions would lead to opportunism and to a diminution in societal wealth. On the other hand, non-shareholder constituencies plainly have a significant interest in a wide range of decisions that a firm may be called upon to make. Thus the special role of shareholders as residual claimants does not provide a complete explanation for why shareholders should be the exclusive beneficiaries of corporate fiduciary duties.

It is desirable to maintain a system of corporate governance in which fiduciary duties are owed exclusively to shareholders because no suitable alternative means of protecting shareholders' claims exist other than by way of a judicially enforced regime of fiduciary duties. By contrast, the obligations owed to other claimants can be enforced by contract because they are more precisely defined than the obligations to shareholders.

Moreover, in this article we have stressed that the fiduciary duties owed to shareholders are a device that serves to fill in the implied terms of the contract that exists between shareholders and the firm. This contract requires officers and directors of corporations to maximize overall firm value for shareholders. The fiduciary duties owed to shareholders are the only gap-filling device available to protect shareholders' investments, whereas other claimants enjoy the gap-filling that courts routinely supply when interpreting the terms of their contracts with the firm. Allocating fiduciary duties to shareholders does not really give shareholders a level of protection not enjoyed by non-shareholder constituencies. Instead, the fiduciary duties owed to shareholders simply provide the residual claimants with a level of judicial protection commensurate with the nature of the firm's contractual obligations to them.

Ironically, the ostensible reason for passage of non-shareholder constituency statutes is to provide such non-shareholder constituents with the enhanced legal protections that shareholders enjoy. In fact, in the light of the pervasive conflicts of interest that exist between shareholders and managers, it seems clear that if any group within the firm is in need of additional legal protection it is the shareholders. Instead, the recent wave of non-shareholder constituency statutes has enhanced the ability
of incumbent management to justify corporate strategies that reduce the overall value of the firm on the grounds that such strategies benefit some non-shareholder constituency or other.