REVIEWS

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to make that force permanent (which he doubts). Moreover, it is a special virtue of this book that legal analysis is constantly enriched by an interwoven discussion of political realities. In his debate with Quincy Wright, there is much to support Stone’s claim that he, the lawyer, pays more attention to the stuff of international politics than does Wright, the political scientist.

J. ROLAND PENNOCK


Given the historical antecedents of the topic of authority and the erudition of the contributors to this symposium, one might predict that here is another academic exercise in the splitting of hairs that have been split before—often by the same authors—and that the tag called “authority” will be pinned to a fantastically varied assortment of twigs on the tree of definition. The prediction is, of course, a sure thing. Some contributors to this volume use the key term in a highly preferential sense, while others strive for designative neutralism. Some limit the meaning of authority to words; others choose some combination of words and deeds, with or without effective power. If the distinguished editor prefers to limit usage to communications “capable of reasoned elaboration,” Jerome Hall neatly calls attention to a context in which an “expert need not give his reasons; indeed, when he gives his reasons he is not functioning as an authority.”

Dozens of plausible distinctions occur throughout the book, no one of which is utterly ridiculous for some conceivable purpose, no one of which is very novel.

Mildly astonishing is the fact that no one devotes himself to a consideration of the strategy of defining such honorific bits of verbal apparatus as “authority.” What are the goals to be postulated to guide this operation? It is possible to detect, lurking in the wings of the symposium discussion, strong motives to invest the conception with formidable overtones and, by denying the claim of some system of public order that it be accepted as genuinely authoritative, to strike a blow for virtue—thus, Friedrich’s remark about “false” authority and Hannah Arendt’s declaration that “authority has vanished from the modern world.”

Is there anything new or worthwhile in this symposium? Definitely, yes. Hannah Arendt’s sweeping re-interpretation of the classical tradition proposes that the Athenians were so devoid of cultural experience with public authority that Plato and Aristotle, searching for persuasive grounds for assigning top

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1. P. 29.
2. P. 63.
3. P. 47.
4. P. 81.
position to intellectuals in the political order of Greece, found it necessary to
turn to the now famous analogies of shepherds, carpenters, physicians, and
other prototypes from the “household” sphere. Arendt argues that the Roman,
on the contrary, had in his emphasis upon the city’s founding what became
“the central, decisive, unrepeatable beginning” that gave shape and form to all
subsequent history. 5 “Thanks to the fact that the foundation of the city of
Rome was repeated in the foundation of the Catholic Church . . . the Roman
trinity of religion, authority, and tradition could be taken over by the Christian
era, with the result that the miracle of permanence, too, repeated itself . . .” 6
Arendt goes on to emphasize the lesser discoveries of the founding experience
by Machiavelli and our founding fathers.

Obviously, no interpretative exercise of this vigor is going to pass unscathed:
and George E. G. Catlin begins the assault, rather mildly it must be said, by
indicating that too much has been asked of the founding myth of states. 7

In discussing American experience, Norman Jacobson handles definitions so
that it is possible for him to characterize American institutions as something
new under the sun of politics: “. . . owing to the nature of the system they
established and the values they decided were to be privileged in the Constitu-
tion, the founders virtually guaranteed against the founding’s ever really be-
coming obscured in antiquity or clothed in tradition.” 8 If there is any “miracle”
about the survival of a system without traditional political authority Jacobson
finds it in the practice of interest politics. 9 Our distinctive approach is “proce-
dural.” He properly italicizes the proposition, “There is no unique American
image of political authority that is truly substantive.” 10

As a brief résumé of some of the other points of interest in the book: Wolfgang
H. Kraus affirms most persuasively that the huge apparatus of European
colonialism was in a new guise “a reincarnation of the authority which had be-
come obsolescent in the West.” 11 Bertrand de Jouvenel seeks to phrase a “prob-
lem for political philosophers: is there, within the process of reception [of
imperative messages], a ‘natural selection’ such that those messages which are
most conducive to the preservation and development of human cooperation are
more readily and widely received than others?” 12 David Easton proposes to
gather information about perspectives concerning authority; and Talcott Par-
sons provides some preliminary hints about the path along which he, or his
students, can move in linking the phenomena of politics with general schemes
relating to social wholes.

Among the contributors, Norman Jacobson perhaps points most creatively
to the direction that should be taken in a theory of, and inquiry into, authority.

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5. P. 99.
6. P. 104.
7. P. 141.
8. P. 120.
9. P. 121.
However, he identifies the term only with potent tradition. It is also useful to invoke this symbol on behalf of that which is "formally" accepted, in the sense partially conveyed by such approximate equivalents as "legitimate," "established," "justifiable," "reasonable." Law itself can be effectively defined as conjointly authoritative and controlling; and the quest of a preferred system of public order affirming goal values and implemented by appropriate institutional arrangements is the most challenging "product of time," notably future time, to which Jacobson alludes. The rich connotations of "authority" are assets for the shaping of the dynamic consensus characteristic of the big scale world of now.

Plainly, this symposium has overcome the tribulations that normally attend such a composite effort in sufficient degree to deserve our thanks. And it can be safely said that everyone will find in Charles W. Hendel's opening essay a masterful and polished introduction to the whole. His most arresting comment, perhaps, is about the "silent philosophical 'declaration of independence'" when the Constitution was written. "Sovereignty" was played down. "It seems that whatever constructive advance has been made in freedom and civilization within the past two centuries has come about through avoiding the notion of sovereignty, not by challenging it, but by quietly operating with the more useful concept of authority."

HAROLD D. LASSWELL


This book is a report of a conference, consisting mostly of doctors, which was held at Arden House under the sponsorship of the Planned Parenthood Federation of America and the New York Academy of Medicine. Among the thirty-nine participants many names well known in medical and demographic circles are to be found—names such as Alan Guttmacher, Harold Rosen, Abraham Stone, P. K. Whelpton, and the late Alfred Kinsey, to pick a few at random. The first 184 pages consist of the report proper, edited by Mary Steichen Calderone, medical director of the Federation. This is followed by a summary of the abortion and the birth-control laws of the United States, a discussion of abortion in Japan, Germany, Finland, and the Soviet Union, and the presentation of a few characteristics of the 5,293 women interviewed by the staff of the Institute for Sex Research as set forth in its monograph on Pregnancy, Birth and Abortion. The book concludes with a selected bibliography on the subject of the conference.

The usual law in this country permits a therapeutic abortion only to save


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