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Book Review: The Lawful Pursuit of Gain

William O. Douglas

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frequently exercised by the United States in Central America and the West Indies, including that of preventing interference or influence by any other Power in the particular territory or country. In this connection, it is interesting to note Professor Wright’s observation that the supervision of the League of Nations makes it possible for the mandates system to accept the theoretic position of the European nations, which insist through the system of imperial control on the technical superiority of advanced nations, and of the United States, which upholds the legitimate aspirations of backward peoples.6

There seems to be no immediate prospect of extending to other areas the law of the mandates system with the consequential loss of sovereignty to the administering power. On the other hand, some of the more important features of this system, including in particular that of continuous international supervision, could, perhaps, be made applicable to certain of the backward regions of the world as a whole—for instance, tropical Africa or the Pacific Islands—as part of a general plan of the League of Nations for co-operation in the handling of economic, financial, labor, land, education, public health, police, or special native problems common to the entire region.

Some work of this kind has already been done particularly in regard to public health, slavery and forced labor. Perhaps the British Labor Party had in mind some development of this kind in drafting their Memorandum of April 1928 which submitted that “the adoption of the mandate system . . . makes it necessary to consider even in the case of British Dependencies the possibility of some kind of international control. . . .” The League could perhaps bring about a greater degree of international co-operation in these backward areas than is possible in Europe, which is handicapped to a greater extent, by traditions of racial, religious, linguistic, and national conflicts.

HUNTINGTON GILCHRIST.


This collection of delightfully discursive essays is announced as one of a series dealing “with the various phases of the moral law in its bearing on business life under the new economic order,” delivered at the University of California on the Weinstock Foundation. The topics covered are: Law and the Hard Creditor; Law and the Rapacious Creditor; Law and the Dishonest Vendor; Law and the Unfair Competitor; Law and the Future of Business.

It is obvious that in such short space the author could attempt nothing but a thumb-nail sketch, both of morals and of law. It is also obvious that by so doing he could not treat adequately of either, especially since he covers many varied activities over a space of more than two centuries. Yet notwithstanding, these short chapters will prove engaging and instructive reading for both moralists and lawyers. Perhaps the reason in part is the delightful style in which they are written. But in addition, the content is suggestive, if not challenging; stimulating, if not exciting.

6 The present collaboration of the United States Government with the League of Nations in dealing with Liberia presents a parallel development which gives support to this view.
Most of the book deals with the relationship between creditor and debtor, vendor and vendee. Only casual references are made to bankruptcy. One wonders at the exclusion of that venerable institution whose progress through the centuries is a veritable pageant both of morals and of law. Yet it is obvious that morals and law impinge at so many places that a selection is necessary for such limited treatment. It might well have been in relationship to directors' purchases of shares, the treatment of minorities on reorganization, merger or consolidation, distribution of dividends, redemption of bonds, foreclosure of mortgages, and so on. The fabric of the law shows these threads appearing and disappearing throughout.

Yet from the viewpoint of those concerned with law in the technical sense the problems of morals are less acute than the problems of legal control. In fact the moral issue may not be in doubt. Yet the issue of legal control remains extremely debatable. Lawyers, courts, legislatures must face the latter. The treatment of that problem in this book is not incisive. Perhaps the reason is that it was intended primarily for laymen. But as a result it loses in its appeal to the others.

Law in the broader sense—that is, the control exercised by all groups in society (including but not restricted to courts, legislatures and other governmental agencies) on other groups and on individuals—is only touched upon slightly. Yet in lawful or even unlawful pursuits of gain it is not to be doubted that a particular activity is held up to moral standards of groups other than governmental agencies. At times the sanction of the groups may have equal or greater force than the remote, latent sanction of a court. A study of the pathological cases in courts may give an accurate picture of the reaction of certain judges to moral standards, yet it may not represent the controls under which the activity takes place. Such restraints and sanctions, moreover, seem to have a high place in “moral law in its bearing on business life.” It would have been a significant addition if that phase had been more prominently presented.

William O. Douglas.

Yale Law School.

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More than twenty years ago the American Bar Association established its Comparative Law Bureau. Unfortunately its activities, which started in a very promising way, were interrupted by the War. They have not been resumed to any considerable extent,¹ and today there is no organized effort in the field of comparative law in this country.² In marked contrast is the situation in Europe. In England, though the Society of Comparative Legislation and its journal³ have remained the only organization and the only

² The Tulane Law Review, stressing comparative law in its section on civil law, is the only periodical dealing with the subject in a systematic manner.
³ The Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, published since 1896.