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Danger in the Recall

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had been mothers of illegitimate children. Again in May, 1911, I asked Mr. Houston, M. P., to move for returns showing the number of children born to all the (a) insane; (b) feeble-minded; (c) habitual inebriates; (d) degenerate females, and (e) habitual criminals at present under detention in England on one fixed day. Mr. W. Churchill replied that it was impossible to obtain such statistics, and that the cost would be very great. It would be as nothing compared with the upkeep of these poor degenerates for three months. We spend about fourteen million pounds in England in each year, upon the upkeep of degenerates.

Third.—The third class of our mental degenerates are those termed “feeble-minded.” It has been estimated that there are some 150,000 of these in England and Wales. Since medical examination of all children attending our elementary education schools has been in force, a fair means of finding out the number of those who are defective have been adopted. There are some 5,585,700 of these school children between the ages of three and sixteen years. It has been estimated that among this number there are 48,000 mentally backward children. But it will be noticed that this number does not include all feeble-minded under three years of age and over sixteen, nor does it include the idiots, imbeciles and such class. On census day 1901, there were in the United Kingdom 60,721 idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, of whom 30,672 were males and 30,049 were females, and of whom 4,819 were married, 4,359 widowed, and 41,819 single. But for educational purposes we, by the “defective and epileptic (Education) Act,” describe the mentally defective child as one who not being imbecile, and not being merely dull and backward, is, by reason of mental defect, incapable of receiving proper benefit from the instruction in ordinary public elementary schools, but is not incapable by reason of such defect, of receiving proper benefit from the instruction in the special schools or classes mentioned in the Act. It is no doubt, a kindly action to give such children a fair trial and to use the school as a sieve by means of which the “chaff” can be separated from the wheat. Yet does anyone honestly and with reason contend that such children will ever be able to fight the battle of life and to compete with normal persons? All practical experience goes to prove the reverse. No doubt they will survive if cared for in labor colonies, and there protected. But to go into the competing world and to fight their way through—this is impossible. There is a contention borne out by the results obtained by “after care associations.” Thus of 3,283 such children, only 798 were “remunerative workers,” 941 were absolutely useless to society, while only 27 per cent were “useful members of society.” It would be well if the definition to this latter term had been given, as surely all those should be both forbidden to marry, and should be sterilized.—Lawyer and Banker.

DANGER IN THE RECALL

From Address of Ex-President William Howard Taft, Before the American Bar Association, at Montreal, Canada.

“In a popular government, the most difficult problem is to determine a satisfactory method of selecting members of its judicial branch. Where ought such power to be placed? It is a great one. It is said it ought not to be entrusted to irresponsible men. If this means that judges should not be men who do not understand the importance of the function they are exercising, or the gravity of the results their decision may involve, or do not exert energy and sincere intellectual effort to decide according to law and justice, every one must concur. But if it means that judges must be respon-
sible for their judgments to some higher authority, so that for errors made in good faith they incur a personal liability, then we know from centuries of actual experience that the interest of justice, pure and undefiled, requires their immunity. Finality of decision is essential in every branch of the government, or else government cannot go on. This is as true of its judicial branches as of other branches. Therefore, somebody must have the final word in judicial matters, and the only question is who can best exercise this power. The answer to the question must be found in the real character of the function which the judges are to perform.

"There is a school of political philosophers today who say that there are no positive standards of right and justice, but that these vary with the popular will, and that we are to learn what they are from its expression.

"If right and justice are dependent on the votes of the electorate, and if what are known as individual rights are merely privileges held at the will of a majority, then the proposition that the judicial officer represents the people in the same sense as the executive officer, so that when the electorate majority differs from his judgment, he ought to be removed, has some logical foundation. So, too, in this view, the proposition that the final decision of the courts shall be submitted on review to a popular election, has reason in it.

"But I shall assume, for the purpose of this discussion, that principles of right and justice and honesty and morality are not merely conventional and have a higher source than a plebiscite."

"There is a broad field for the proper exercise of legislative power in prescribing rules of human conduct, and it is the function of the courts to interpret them. This is the duty of trained lawyers who know the theory and purpose of government, who are familiar with previous statutes and who understand legislative methods of expression. Thorough study is required to enable a judge to know and understand the whole range of legal principles that have thus to be discriminatingly adapted and applied. Work of this kind requires professional experts of the highest proficiency who have mastered the law as a science and in practice.

"Where are we to get such experts?" asked Mr. Taft. "When a man of high character, ability, and intelligence is to be selected for the chief executive office, the electorate can be safely charged with electing one from the necessarily few candidates who are sufficiently prominent. But what of the searching out in the large profession a best expert, the man with real learning, with judicial temperament, with keenness of perception, with power of analysis and nice distinction, with large technical experience? Can he be found better by election or by appointment? There can be but one answer to this query. The selection can be really popular without resorting to an election. The chief executive electd by the people to represent them in executive work does, in appointing a judge, execute the popular will. He can search among the members of the bar and inform himself thoroughly as to the one best qualified. Generally he has sources of information, both of an open and a confidential character, and if he is not himself a lawyer or personally familiar with the qualifications of the candidates he has an attorney-general and other competent advisers to aid him in the task."

Mr. Taft pointed out that for these reasons in every country of the world, except the cantons of Switzerland, and the United States the judges were appointed and not elected. Mr. Taft said that a comparison between the work of the appointed judges and of the elected judges showed that appointment in the long run secured a higher average of experts for the bench.

The principle of the short ballot which was much put forward nowadays by reformers, really limited the election by the people to
the chief executive and to legislators, and delegates to the elected executive the appointment of all other officers, including the judiciary. The executive who makes the appointments was properly held responsible to the public for the character of his selections.

Ex-President Taft said that we have many able judges from popular election. The judges, however, of great and able instances who had been placed on the bench by election were instances of the adaptability of the American people and their genius for making the best out of bad methods and was not a vindication of the system. It had though resulted in the promotion to the judicial office of other judges who have impaired the authority of the courts by their lack of strength, clearness and courage, and who have shown neither a thorough knowledge of the customary law nor a constructive faculty in the application of it. Mr. Taft added: "Paradox as it may seem, the appointed judges are more discriminately responsive to the needs of the community and to its settled views than judges chosen directly by the electorate, and thus because the executive is better qualified to select greater experts."

"The result of the recent tendency is seen in the disgraceful exhibited of men campaigning for the place of state supreme judge and asking votes, and the ground that their decisions will have a particular class flavor. This is the logical development of the view that a popular election is the only basis for determining right and justice; but it is so shocking and so out of keeping with the fixedness of moral principles which we learned at our mother's knee, and which find recognition in the conscience of every man who has grown up under proper influence, that we ought to condemn without stint a system which can encourage or permit such demagogic methods of securing judicial position. Through the class antagonism unjustly stirred up against the courts, fiery faction is now to be introduced into the popular election of judges. Men are to be made judges not because they are impartial, but because they are advocates; not because they are judicial, but because they are partisan."

Mr. Taft admitted that politics played a part in the appointment of judges, and that they were selected from the dominant party. He denied though that this had resulted in the political control of the courts or that the control of the government had naturally changed from one party to another in the course of a generation and this has normally brought to the bench judges from both sides. In addition if the judges were made independent by the character of their tenure, the continued exercise of the judicial function entirely neutralized in them any possible partisan tendency arising from the nature of their appointment.

Mr. Taft said that the judges originally were subject to recall by the king. Judicial recall was a case of atavism and was a retrogression to the same sort of tenure that existed in the time of the Stuarts until its abuses led to the act of settlement securing to judges a tenure during their good behavior.

"The states which have elective judges have gotten along somehow through the political capacity of the American people and the force of public opinion to make almost any system work. Under the present system a judge is certain to retain his position for a few years, and during that time at least he is free from interruption or the threat of popular disapproval. This certainty of tenure, though short, conduces to the independent administration of his office. As he draws near another election and hopes to have another term, it is true that his courage and his impartial attitude toward issues that have any political bearing are likely to be severely tested. Because the country has survived a judiciary largely selected in this manner does not seem to be a very strong reason why we should proceed to
increase the evil effect of the short tenure by making it merely at
the will of the plurality of those of the electorat who choose to vote.

"Other benefits from the life tenure in its effect upon the judges
who enjoy it are that it makes the incumbents give their whole mind
to their work, to learn before he can become of the always being
judges, and to take vows, so to speak as to their future conduct.
They must put aside all political ambition. One of the great debts
which the American people owe to Mr. Justice Hughes is the ex-
ample that he set in the last presidential election when the most
serious consideration was being given to making him the candidate
of the republican party. He announced his irrevocable determination
not to enter the political field because he had assumed the judicial
ermine.

"The federal judges have the power which the English judges
have. They are so far removed from politics or the fear of election
that the counsel before them exercise only the authority which their
eminence as lawyers justifies. Under state statutes, following the
tendency to minimize the power of the court, the judge is greatly
restricted in the exercise of discretion to free the issue before the
court from irrelevant and confusing considerations. The jury trial
given by the federal constitution is the trial at common law given by
a court and jury, in which the court exercises the proper authority in
the management of the trial and assists the jury in a useful analysis
and summing up of the evidence, and an expression of such opinions
as will help the jury to reach right conclusions. All this tends to
eliminate much of what almost might be called demagogic discussion
which counsel are prone to resort to in many of the local state courts
and which the state judge fears to limit, lest it be made the basis of
error and a ground for a new trial under some statute narrowing his
useful power. We must, therefore, weigh the frequent characteriza-
tion of the federal judge as a petty tyrant in the light of the contrast
between proper authority exercised by him and the control exercised
by judges in state courts, where opportunity is too frequently given
to the jury to ignore the charge of the court, to yield to the histrionic
eloquence of counsel, and to give a verdict according to their emo-
tions instead of their reason and their oaths. Why is it that every
law-breaker prefers to be tried in a state court? One of the reasons
may be found in the better organization of the federal prosecuting
system. Why is it that the federal courts are the terror of evil
doers? But is it not chiefly because the judge retains his traditional
control of the manner of the trial and of the counsel and really
helps, but does not constrain, the jury to a just verdict? Is it not
because law and justice more certainly prevail there rather than
buncombe and mere sentiment?—Lawyer and Banker.

A NEW PSYCHOLOGICAL SURVEY.

Reviewing Judge Thomas Troward of Edinburgh.

T. D. Crothers, M.D.
Hartford, Conn.

The Medico-Legal Society has always taken note of the advanced
work done in the various fields of science that had a medico-legal interest.

During the last quarter of a century there has been very startling
changes and revolutions in the old theories of the physiology and psy-
chology of brain activities.

Prof. James of this country, and other very able men abroad, have
led in the discovery of new fields of mental philosophy, and have shown
some of their practical relations, which literally made whole libraries
of discussions on mental philosophy, obsolete and useless.