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THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

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We are here to-night in sight of a league of peace, of what I have ever regarded as the "Promised Land." Such a war as the last is a hideous blot on our Christian civilization. The inconsistency is as foul as was slavery under the Declaration of Independence. If Christian nations cannot now be brought into a united effort to suppress a recurrence of such a contest it will be a shame to modern society.

During my administration I attempted to secure treaties of universal arbitration between this country and France and England, by which all issues depending for their settlement upon legal principles were to be submitted to an international court for final decision. These treaties were emasculated by the senate, yielding to the spirit which proceeds, unconsciously doubtless, but truly, from the conviction that the only thing that will secure to a nation the justice it wishes to secure is force; that agreements between nations to settle controversies justly and peaceably should never be given any weight in national policy; that in dealing between civilized nations we must assume that each nation is conspiring to deprive us of our independence and

1 Address delivered at the Metropolitan Opera House New York, March 4, 1919.
our prosperity; that there is no impartial tribunal to which we can entrust the decision of any question vitally affecting our interests or our honor, and that we can afford to make no agreement from which we may not immediately withdraw, and whose temporary operation to our detriment may not be expressly a ground for ending it. This is the doctrine of despair. It leads necessarily to the conclusion that our only recourse to avoid war is competitive armament, with its dreadful burdens and its constant temptation to the war it seeks to avoid.

**LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS**

The first important covenant with reference to peace and war in the constitution of the league is that looking to a reduction of armament by all nations. The executive council, consisting of representatives of the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, and of four other nations to be selected by the body of delegates, is to consider how much the armaments of the nations should be reduced, having regard to the safety of each of the nations and their obligations under the league. Having reached a conclusion as to the proportionate limits of each nation's armament, it submits its conclusion to each nation, which may or may not agree to the limit thus recommended; but when an agreement is reached it covenants to keep within that limit until, by application to the executive council, the limit may be raised. In other words, each nation agrees to its own limitation. Having so agreed, it must keep within it.

The importance of providing for a reduction of armament every one recognizes. It is affirmed in the newly proposed senate resolution. Can we not trust our Congress to fix a limitation safe for the country and to stick to it? If we can't, no country can. Yet all the rest are anxious to do this and they are far more exposed than we.

The character of this obligation is affected by the time during which the covenants of the league remain binding. There is no stipulation as to how long this is. In my judgment there should be a period of ten years or a permission for any member of the league to withdraw from the covenant by giving a reasonable notice of one or two years of its intention to do so.
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PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

The members of the league and the nonmembers are required, the former by their covenant, the latter by an enforced obligation, to submit all differences between them not capable of being settled by negotiation to arbitration before a tribunal composed as the parties may agree. They are required to covenant to abide the award. Should either party deem the question one not proper for arbitration then it is to be taken up by the executive council of the league. The executive council mediates between the parties and secures a voluntary settlement of the question if possible; if it fails, it makes a report. If the report is unanimous, the executive council is to recommend what shall be done to carry into effect its recommendation. If there is a dissenting vote, then the majority report is published, and the minority report, if desired, and no further action is taken. If either party or the executive council itself desires, the mediating function is to be discharged by the body of delegates in which every member of the league has one vote. There is no direction as to what shall be done with reference to the recommendation of proper measures to be taken, and the whole matter is then left for such further action as the members of the league agree upon. There is no covenant by the defeated party that it will comply with the unanimous report of the executive council or the body of the league.

And right here I wish to take up the objection made to the league that under this machinery we might be compelled to receive immigrants contrary to our national desire from Japan or China. We could and would refuse to submit the issue to arbitration. It would then go to mediation. In my judgment the council as a mediating body should not take jurisdiction to consider such a difference. Immigration by international law is a domestic question completely within the control of the government into which immigration is sought, unless the question of immigration is the subject of treaty stipulation between two countries. If, however, it be said that there is no limitation in the covenant of the differences to be mediated, clearly we would
run no risk of receiving from the large body of delegates of all the members of the league a unanimous report recommending a settlement by which Japanese immigrants shall be admitted to our shores or Japanese applicants be admitted to our citizenship, contrary to our protest. But were it made, we are under no covenant to obey such recommendation. If it could be imagined that all of the other nations of the world would thus unite their military forces to compel us to receive Japanese immigrants under the covenant, why would they not do so without the covenant?

These articles compelling submission of differences either to arbitration or mediation are not complete machinery for settlement by peaceable means of all issues arising between nations. But they are a substantial step forward. They are an unambitious plan to settle as many questions as possible by arbitration or mediation. They illustrate the spirit of those who drafted this covenant and their sensible desire not to attempt more till after actual experience.

COVENANT IN RESTRAINT OF WAR

The next covenant is that the nations shall not begin war until three months after the arbitration award or the recommendation of compromise, and not then if the defendant nation against whom the award or recommendation has been made shall comply with it. This is the great restraint of war imposed by the covenant upon members of the league and nonmembers. It is said that this would prevent our resistance to a border raid of Mexico or self-defense against any invasion. This is a most extreme construction. If a nation refuses submission at all, as it does when it begins an attack, the nation attacked is released instanter from its obligation to submit and is restored to the complete power of self-defense. Had this objection not been raised in the senate one would not have deemed it necessary to answer so unwarranted a suggestion.

If the defendant nation does not comply with the award or unanimous report, then the plaintiff nation can begin war and
carry out such complete remedy as the circumstances enable it to do. But if the defendant nation does comply with the award or unanimous report, then the plaintiff nation must be content with such compliance. It runs the risk of not getting all that it thought it ought to have or might have by war, but as it is asking affirmative relief it must be seeking some less vital interest than its political independence or territorial integrity, and the limitation is not one which can be dangerous to its sovereignty.

The third covenant, the penalizing covenant, is that if a nation begins war, in violation of its covenant, then ipso facto that is an act of war against every member of the league and the members of the league are required definitely and distinctly to levy a boycott on the covenant-breaking nation and to cut off from it all commercial, trade, financial, personal and official relations between them and their citizens and it and its citizens. Indeed, the boycott is compound or secondary in that it is directed against any nonmembers of the league continuing to deal with the outlaw nation. This is an obligation operative at once on each member of the league. With us the executive council would report the violation of the covenant to the President and that would be reported to Congress, and Congress would then, by reason of the covenant of the league, be under an honorable legal and moral obligation to levy an embargo and prevent all intercourse of every kind between this nation and the covenant-breaking nation.

The extent of this penalty and its heavy withering effect when the hostile action includes all members of the league, as well as all nonmembers, may be easily appreciated. The prospect of such an isolation would be likely to frighten any member of the league from a reckless violation of its covenant to begin war. It is inconceivable that any small nation, dependent as it must be on larger nations for its trade and sustenance, indeed for its food and raw material, would for a moment court such a destructive ostracism as this would be.

Other covenants of the penalizing article impose on the members of the league the duty of sharing the expense of a boycott with any nation upon which it has fallen with uneven weight
and of supporting such a nation in its resistance to any special
measures directed against it by the outlaw nation. But there
is no specific requirement as to the character of the support
beyond the obligation of the boycott, the contribution of expenses
and the obligation of each member of the league to permit the
passage through its territory of forces of other members of the
league coöperating with military forces against the outlaw
nation.

If, however, the boycott does not prove sufficient, then the
executive council is to recommend the number of the military
and naval forces to be contributed by the members of the league
to protect the covenants of the league in such a case. There is
no specific covenant by which they agree to furnish any amount of
force, or, indeed, any force at all, to a league army. The use of
the word "recommend" in describing the function of the exec-
utive council shows that the question whether such forces shall
be contributed and what shall be their amount must ultimately
address itself to the members of the league for their decision and
action. There is this radical and important difference, therefore,
between the obligation to lay a boycott and the obligation to
furnish military force, and doubtless this distinction was in-
sisted upon and reached by a compromise. The term "recom-
modation" cannot be interpreted to impose any imperative
obligation on those to whom the recommendation is directed.

INDEPENDENCE OF LEAGUE MEMBERS

By Article X, the high contracting parties undertake to re-
pect and preserve against external aggression the political inde-
pendence and the territorial integrity of every member of the
league, and when these are attacked or threatened the executive
council is to advise as to the proper means to fulfill this obliga-
tion. The same acts or series of acts which make Article X
applicable will be a breach of the covenant which creates an out-
law nation under Article XVI, so that all nations must begin a
boycott against any nation thus breaking the territorial integ-
rity or overthrowing the independence of a member of the
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league. Indeed Article X will usually not be applicable until a war shall be fought to the point showing its specific purpose. Protection against it will usually be necessary in preventing, in a treaty of peace, the appropriation of territory or the interference with the sovereignty of the attacked and defeated nation. We have seen this in the construction of the Monroe Doctrine put upon it by Secretary Seward and President Roosevelt. The former, when Spain attacked Chili and Chili appealed to the United States to protect it, advised Spain that under the policy of the United States it would not interfere to prevent the punishment by war of an American nation by a non-American nation, provided it did not extend to a permanent deprivation of its territory or an overthrow of its sovereignty. President Roosevelt, in the Venezuelan matter, also announced that the Monroe Doctrine did not prevent nations from proceeding by force to collect their debts provided oppressive measures were not used which would deprive the nation of its independence or territorial integrity. This furnishes an analogy for the proper construction of Article X.

The fact that the executive council is to advise what means shall be taken to fulfill the obligation shows that they are to be such as each nation shall deem proper and fair under the circumstances, considering its remoteness from the country and the fact that the nearer presence of other nations should induce them to furnish the requisite military force. It thus seems to me clear that the question, both under Article XVIII, and under Article X, as to whether the United States shall declare war and what forces it shall furnish, are remitted to the voluntary action of the Congress of the United States under the Constitution, having regard for a fair division between all the nations of the burden to be borne under the league and the proper means to be adopted, whether by the enjoined and inevitable boycott alone, or by the advance of loans of money, or by the declaration of war and the use of military force. This is as it should be. It fixes the obligation of action in such a way that American nations will attend to America and European nations will attend to Europe and Asiatic nations to Asia, unless all deem the situation so
threatening to the world and to their own interests that they should take a more active part. It seems to me that appropriate words might be added to the pact which should show distinctly this distribution of obligation. This will relieve those anxious, in respect to the Monroe Doctrine, to exclude European or Asiatic nations from forcible intervention in issues between American nations until requested by the United States or an executive council of the American nations framed for the purpose.

Objection is made that Great Britain might have more delegates in the executive council than other countries. This is an error. The British Empire, which, of course, includes its dominions, is limited to one delegate in the executive council. Provision is made by which upon a vote of two-thirds of the body of delegates new members may be admitted who are independent states or are self-governing dominions or colonies. Under this Canada and Australia and South Africa might be admitted as delegates. I presume, too, the Philippines might be admitted. But the function of the body of delegates is not one which makes its membership of great importance. When it acts as a mediating and compromising body its reports must be unanimous to have any effect. The addition of members therefore is not likely to create greater probability of unanimity. More than this, the large number of countries who will become members will minimize any important British influence from the addition of such dominions and colonies since they are really admitted because they have different interests from their mother country. The suggestion that Great Britain will have any greater power than other member nations in shaping the policy of the league in really critical matters, when analyzed, will be seen to have no foundation whatever.

PROPOSED SENATE RESOLUTION

A proposed resolution in the senate recites that the constitution of the League of Nations in the form now proposed should not be accepted by the United States, although the sense of the senate is that the nations of the world should unite to promote
peace and general disarmament. The resolution further recites that the negotiations on the part of the United States should immediately be directed to the utmost expedition of the urgent business of negotiating peace terms with Germany satisfactory to the United States and the nations with whom the United States is associated in the war against the German government, and that the proposal for a League of Nations to insure the permanent peace of the world should then be taken up for careful and serious consideration. It is said that this resolution will be supported by thirty-seven members of the new senate, and thus defeat the confirmation of any treaty which includes the present proposed covenant of Paris.

The President of the United States is the authority under the federal Constitution which initiates the form of treaties and which at the outset determines what subject matter they shall include. Therefore, if it shall seem to the President of the United States and to those acting with him with similar authority for other nations that a treaty of peace cannot be concluded except with a covenant providing for a League of Nations, in substance like that now proposed, as a condition precedent to the proper operation and effectiveness of the treaty itself, it will be the duty of the President and his fellow delegates to the conference to insert such a covenant in the treaty. If accordingly such a covenant shall be incorporated in a treaty of peace, signed by the representatives of the powers and shall be brought back by the President and submitted by him to the senate, the question which will address itself to the proponents of this senate resolution will be not whether they would prefer to consider a League of Nations after the treaty of peace but whether they will feel justified in defeating or postponing a treaty because it contains a constitution of a League of Nations deemed by the President necessary to the kind of peace which all seek.

PLAN OF TREATY

The covenant of Paris, which is now a covenant only between the nations at war with Germany, including the seven nations who actually won the war, is essential to an effective treaty of
peace to accomplish the purposes of the war; for the purposes of the war were to defeat militarism, to make the world safe for democracy and to secure permanent peace.

Under the informal agreement between the nations who won this war, outlined in the President's message of January 8, 1918, as qualified by the Entente Allies before the armistice, we are to create and recognize as independent states four nations forming a bulwark between Germany and Russia to prevent future intrigues by Germany to secure control of Russia. In the process we are to carve these new nations out of the great autocracies, Russia, Germany and Austria. We are to give German and Austrian Poland to the republic of Poland, to set up the Czecho-slovak state of ten million inhabitants between Germany and Austria-Hungary, as well as the Jugoslav state carved out of Austria and Hungary in the south. We are to fix new boundaries in the Balkans, with Rumania enlarged by Transylvania and Bessarabia, and to make an internationalized government at Constantinople, keeping ward over the passage between the Black Sea and the Aegean, and to establish autonomous dominions in Palestine, Syria, Armenia and Mesopotamia. This plan for the peace and the reasons for it were set out with great force and vision by Senator Lodge in a speech last January. The chief purpose of the plan is to take away the possibility that Germany shall ever again conceive and carry toward accomplishment her dream of the control of Russia and of a Middle European and Asiatic Empire, reaching from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.

The plan thus requires not only the establishment but the continued maintenance of seven new republics in Europe and several autonomies in Asia Minor. We are to create twenty nations instead of four; and we are to carve the new ones out of the old ones. The peoples of the new republics will not have had experience in self-government. They are the children of the League of Nations, as Cuba has been our child. The league must continue to be a guardian of their internal stability, if they are to serve their purpose. Their natural resentment for past oppression against the neighboring countries out of which they have been
carved and the corresponding hatred of them by the defeated peoples of those countries will at once produce controversies innumerable over the interpretation of the treaty and its application. Even the new countries as between themselves, with their natural lack of self-restraint and their indefinite ideas of their powers, have already come into forced conflict.

Unless there be some means for authoritatively interpreting the treaty and applying it, and unless the power of the league be behind it to give effect to such interpretation and application, the treaty instead of producing peace will produce a state of continued war.

More than this, in the dark background is the threatening specter of Bolshevism, hard, cruel, murderous, uncompromising, destructive of Christian civilization, militant in pressing its hideous doctrines upon other peoples and insidious in its propaganda among the lowest element in every country. Against the chaos and the explosive dangers of Bolshevism, throughout all the countries of Europe, a League of Nations must be established to settle controversies peaceably and to enforce the settlement.

LEAGUE WITHOUT UNITED STATES FUTILE

If it be said that the European nations should unite in a league to maintain these independent states and settle the difficulties arising between them and the older states in the sphere of war, as well as to resist Bolshevism, it is sufficient to say that the withdrawal of the United States from the League of Nations will weaken it immeasurably. The disinterestedness of the United States, its position as the greatest power in the world in view of its people and their intelligence and adaptability, its enormous natural resources, and its potential military power, demonstrated on the fields of France and Belgium, make its membership in the league indispensable. The confidence of the world in its disinterestedness and in its pure democracy will enormously enhance the prestige and power of the league’s earnest desire for peace with justice.
For the United States to withdraw would make a league of the other nations nothing but a return to the system of alliances and the balance of power with a certain speedy recurrence of war, in which the United States would be as certainly involved as it was in this war. The new inventions for the destruction of men and peoples would finally result in world suicide, while in the interval there would be a story of progressive competition in armaments, with all their heavy burdens upon the peoples of the nations, already oppressed almost to the point of exhaustion. With such a prospect and to avoid such results the United States should not hesitate to take its place with the other responsible nations of the world and make the light concessions and assume the light burdens involved in membership in the league.

No critic of the league has offered a single constructive suggestion to meet the crisis that I have thus summarily touched upon. The resolution of the senate does not suggest or refer in any way to machinery by which the function of the League of Nations in steadying Europe and the maintaining of the peace agreed upon in the peace treaty shall be secured. Well may the President, therefore, decline to comply with the suggestions of the proposed resolution. Well may he say when he returns with the treaty, of which the covenant shall be a most important and indispensable part, "If you would postpone peace, if you would defeat it, you can refuse to ratify the treaty. Amend it by striking out the covenant and you will leave confusion worse confused, with the objects of the war unattained and sacrificed and Europe and the world in dangerous chaos."

Objection is made that the covenant of the league is a departure from the traditional policy of the United States following the advice of Washington in avoiding entangling alliances with European nations. The European war into which we were drawn demonstrates that the policy is no longer possible for the United States. It has ceased to be a struggling nation. It has been made a close neighbor of Great Britain and France and Italy and of all the nations of Europe, and is in such intimate trade relations that in a general European war it never can be a neutral again. It tried to be in this war and failed. Whatever nation
secures the control of the seas will make the United States its ally, no matter how formal and careful its neutrality, because it will be the sole customer of the United States in food, raw material and war necessities. Modern war is carried on in the mines and the workshops and on the farm, as well as in the trenches. The former are indispensable to the work in the latter. Hence the United States will certainly be drawn in, and hence its interests are inevitably involved in the preservation of European peace. These conditions and circumstances are so different from those in Washington's day and are so unlike anything which he could have anticipated that no words of his having relation to selfish offensive and defensive alliances such as he described in favor of one nation and against another should be given any application to the present international status.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Objection is made that the covenant destroys the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine was announced and adopted to keep European monarchies from overthrowing the independence of and fastening their system upon governments in this hemisphere. It has been asserted in various forms, some of them extreme, and others less so. I presume that no one now would attempt to sustain the declarations of Secretary Olney in his correspondence with Lord Salisbury. But all will probably agree that the sum and substance of the Monroe Doctrine is that we do not propose in our own interest to allow European nations or Asiatic nations to acquire, beyond what they now have, through war or purchase or intrigue, territory, political power or strategical opportunity from the countries of this hemisphere. Article X of the constitution of the league is intended to secure this to all signatory nations, except that it does not forbid purchase of territory or power.

In some speeches in the senate intimations have been made which enlarge the Monroe Doctrine beyond what can be justified. Those who would seek to enforce a doctrine which would make the western hemisphere our own preserve, in which we may impose
our sovereign will on other countries in what we suppose to be their own interest, because, indeed, we have done that in the past, should not be sustained. Our conquests of western territory, of course, have worked greatly for the civilization of the world and for our own usefulness and the happiness of those who now occupy that territory; but we have reached a state in the world's history when its progress should be now determined and secured under just and peaceful conditions, and progress through conquest by powerful nations should be prevented.

To suppose that the conditions in America and in Europe can be maintained absolutely separate, with the great trade relations between North America and Europe, is to look backward, not forward. It does not face existing conditions.

The European nations desire our entrance into this league not that they may control America but to secure our aid in controlling Europe, and I venture to think that they would be relieved if the primary duty of keeping peace and policing this western hemisphere were relegated to us and our western colleagues. I object, however, to such a reservation as was contained in the Hague Conference against entangling alliances, because the recommendation was framed before this war and contained provisions as to the so-called policy against entangling alliances that are inconsistent with the present needs of this nation and of the rest of the world if a peaceful future is to be secured to both. I would favor, however, a recognition of the Monroe Doctrine as I have stated it above by specific words in the covenant, and with a further provision that the settlement of purely American questions should be remitted primarily to the American nations, with machinery like that of the present league, and that European nations should not intervene unless requested to do so by the American nations.

**CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS**

Objection is made to this league on constitutional grounds. This league is to be made by the treaty-making power of the United States. What does the treaty-making power cover?
The Supreme Court of the United States, through Mr. Justice Field, in the Riggs case has held that it covers the right to deal by contract with all subject matters which are usually dealt with by contract in treaties between nations, except it cannot be used to change our form of government or to part with territory of a state without its consent. The Supreme Court has over and over again, through Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, indicated that the United States was a nation and a sovereign capable of dealing with other nations as such, and with all the powers inferable from such sovereignty. It is said, however, that the league will change the form of our government. But no function or discretion is taken from any branch of the government which it now performs or exercises. It is asserted that the covenant delegates to an outside tribunal, viz., the executive council, the power vested by the Constitution in Congress or the senate. But the executive council has no power but to recommend to the nations of the league courses which those nations may accept or reject, save in the matter of increasing the limit of armament, to which the United States by its Congress, after full consideration, shall have consented. Neither the executive council nor the body of delegates in the machinery for the peaceful settling of differences does other than to recommend a compromise which the United States does not under the league covenant to obey. In all other respects these bodies are mere instruments for conference by representatives for devising plans which are submitted to the various governments of the league for their voluntary acceptance and adoption. No obligation of the United States under the league is fixed by action of either the executive council or the body of delegates.

Then it is said we have no right to agree to levy an embargo and a boycott. It is true that Congress determines what our commercial relations shall be with other countries of the world. It is true that if a boycott is to be levied Congress must levy it in the form of an embargo, as that which was levied by Congress in Jefferson's administration, and the validity of which was sustained by the Supreme Court, with John Marshall at its head. It is true that Congress might repudiate the obligation
entered into by the treaty-making power and refuse to levy such an embargo. But none of these facts would invalidate or render unconstitutional a treaty by which the obligation of the United States was assumed.

In other words, the essence of sovereign power is that while the sovereign may make a contract it retains the power to repudiate it, if it chooses to dishonor its promises. That does not render null the original obligation or discredit its binding moral force. The nations of Europe are willing to accept, as we must be willing to accept from them, mutual promises, the one in consideration of the other, in confidence that neither will refuse to comply with such promises honorably entered into.

Finally, it is objected that we have no right to agree to arbitrate issues. It is said that we might by arbitration lose our territorial integrity or our political independence. This is a stretch of imagination by the distinguished senator who made it at which we marvel. In the face of Article X, which is an undertaking to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of every member of the league, how could a board of arbitration possibly reach such a result? More than that, we do not have to arbitrate. If we do not care to arbitrate, we can throw the matter into mediation and conciliation, and we do not covenant to obey the recommendation of compromise by the conciliating body. We have been arbitrating questions for one hundred years.

We have stipulated in treaties to arbitrate classes of questions long before the questions arise. How would we arbitrate under this treaty? The form of the issue to be arbitrated would have to be formulated by our treaty-making power—the President and the senate of the United States. The award would have to be performed by that branch of the government which executes awards, generally the Congress of the United States. If it involved payment of money, Congress would have to appropriate it. If it involved limitation of armament, Congress would have to limit it. If it involved any duty within the legislative power of Congress under the Constitution, Congress would have to perform it. If Congress sees fit to comply with the report of the
compromise by the conciliating body, Congress will have to make such compliance.

The covenant takes away the sovereignty of the United States only as any contract curtails the freedom of action of an individual which he has voluntarily surrendered for the purpose of the contract and to obtain the benefit of it. The covenant creates no super-sovereignty. It merely creates contract obligations. It binds nations to stand together to secure compliance with those obligations. That is all. This is no different from a contract that we make with one nation. If we enter into an important contract with another nation to pay money or to do other things of vital interest to that nation and we break it, then we expose ourselves to the just effort of that nation by force of arms to attempt to compel us to comply with our obligations. This covenant of all the nations is only a limited and loose union of the compelling powers of many nations to do the same thing. The assertion that we are giving up our sovereignty carries us logically and necessarily to the absurd result that we cannot make a contract to do anything with another nation because it limits our freedom of action as a sovereign.

Sovereignty is freedom of action of nations. It is exactly analogous to the liberty of the individual regulated by law. The sovereignty that we should insist upon and the only sovereignty we have a right to insist upon is a sovereignty regulated by international law, international morality and international justice, a sovereignty enjoying the sacred rights which sovereignties of other nations may enjoy, a sovereignty consistent with the enjoyment of the same sovereignty of other nations. It is a sovereignty limited by the law of nations and limited by the obligation of contracts fully and freely entered into in respect to matters which are usually the subjects of contracts between nations.

The President is now returning to Europe. As the representative of this nation in the conference he has joined in recommending in this proposed covenant a League of Nations for consideration and adoption by the conference. He has meantime
returned home to discharge other executive duties and it has given him an opportunity to note a discussion of the league in the senate of the United States and elsewhere. Some speeches, notably that of Senator Lodge, have been useful in taking up the league, article by article, criticising its language and expressing doubts either as to its meaning or as to its wisdom.

He will differ, as many others will differ, from Senator Lodge in respect to many of the criticisms, but he will find many useful suggestions in the constructive part of the speech which he will be able to present to his colleagues in the conference. They will be especially valuable in revising the form of the covenant and making reservations to which his colleagues in the conference may readily consent, where Senator Lodge or the other critics have misunderstood the purpose and meaning of the words used.

This covenant should be in the treaty of peace. It is indispensable in ending the war, if the war is to accomplish the declared purpose of this nation and the world in that war, and if it is to work the promised benefit to mankind. We know the President believes this and will insist upon it. Our profound sympathy in his purpose and our prayers for his success should go with him in his great mission.