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The Role of the Legal Adviser

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KEYNOTE ADDRESS: THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

This address was delivered by Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State, at 5:00 p.m. on March 25, 2010.

It is such a pleasure to be back here at the ASIL. I am embarrassed to confess that I have been a member of ASIL for more than 30 years, since my first year of law school, and coming to the Annual Meeting has always been a highlight of my year. As a young lawyer just out of law school I would come to the American Society meeting and stand in the hotel lobby gaping at all the famous international lawyers walking by: for international lawyers, that is as close as we get to watching Hollywood stars stroll the red carpet at the Oscars! And last year at this time, when this meeting was held, I was still in the middle of my confirmation process. So under the arcane rules of that process, I was allowed to come here to be seen, but not heard. So it is a pleasure finally to be able to address all of you and to give you my perspective on the Obama Administration's approach to international law.

Let me start by bringing you special greetings from someone you already know. As you saw, my client, Secretary Clinton, very much wanted to be here in person, but as you see in the headlines, this week she has been called away to Mexico, to meeting visiting Pakistani dignitaries, to testify on Capitol Hill, and many other duties. As you can tell, she is very proud of the strong historical relationship between the American Society and the State Department, and she is determined to keep it strong. As the Secretary mentioned, I and another long-time member of the Society, your former President Anne-Marie Slaughter of the Policy Planning Staff join her every morning at her 8:45 am senior staff meeting, so the spirit of the American Society is very much in the room (and the smell of the Society as well, as I am usually there at that hour clutching my ASIL coffee mug!).

Since this is my first chance to address you as Legal Adviser, I thought I would speak to three issues. First, the nature of my job as Legal Adviser. Second, the strategic vision of international law that we in the Obama administration are attempting to implement. Third and finally, the particular issues that we have grappled with in our first year in a number of high-profile areas: the International Criminal Court, the Human Rights Council, and what I call the Law of 9/11—detentions, use of force, and prosecutions.

THE ROLE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER

First, my job. I have now been the Legal Adviser of the State Department for about nine months. This is a position I first heard of about 40 years ago, and it has struck me throughout my career as the most fascinating legal job in the U.S. government. Now that I've actually been in the job for a while, I have become even more convinced that that is true, for four reasons.

First, I have absolutely extraordinary colleagues at the Legal Adviser's Office, which we call "L," which is surely the greatest international law firm in the world. Its numbers include many current lawyers and alumni who are sitting here in the audience, and it is a training ground for America's international lawyers. (To prove that point, could I have a show of hands of how many of you in the audience have worked in L sometime during your careers?) Our 175 lawyers are spread over 24 offices, including four extraordinary career deputies and a Counselor of International Law, nearly all of whom are members of this Society and many
of whom you will find speaking on the various panels throughout this Annual Meeting program.

Second, I have extraordinary clients and you just saw one, Secretary Hillary Clinton, who is a remarkably able lawyer. Of course, another client of mine, the President, is also an outstanding lawyer, as are both Deputy Secretaries, the Department’s Counselor, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and a host of Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries.

Third, each day we tackle extraordinarily fascinating legal questions. When I was a professor, I would spend a lot of time trying to think up exam questions. For those of you who are professors, this job literally presents you with a new exam question every single day. For example, I had never really thought about the question: “Can you attach a panda?” Or the question, can Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi erect a tent in Englewood, New Jersey, notwithstanding a contrary local ordinance? To be honest, I had never really thought about those questions. But rest assured, in the future, many Yale law students will.

Fourth and finally, my position allows me to play extraordinary and varied roles. Some government lawyers have the privilege for example, of giving regular advice to a particularly prominent client or pleading particular cases before a particular court. But the Legal Adviser must shift back and forth constantly between four rich and varied roles: which I call counselor, conscience, defender of U.S. interests, and spokesperson for international law.

As counselor, I mean obviously, that the Legal Adviser must play all the traditional functions of an agency general counsel, but with a twist. Like every in-house counsel’s office, we do buildings and acquisitions, but those buildings may well be in Afghanistan or Beijing. We review government contracts, but they may require contracting activities in Iraq or Pakistan. We review employment decisions, but with respect to employees with diplomatic and consular immunities or special visa problems.

But in addition to being counselors, we also serve as a conscience for the U.S. government with regard to international law. The Legal Adviser, along with many others in policy as well as legal positions, offers opinions on both the wisdom and morality of proposed international actions. For it is the unique role of the Legal Adviser’s Office to coordinate and render authoritative legal advice for the State Department on international legal issues, or as Dick Bilder once put it, to “speak law to power.” In this role, the Legal Adviser must serve not only as a source of black-letter advice to his clients, but more fundamentally, as a source of good judgment. That means that one of the most important roles of the Legal Adviser is to advise the Secretary when a policy option being proposed is “lawful but awful.” As Herman Pfleger, one former Legal Adviser, put it: “You should never say no to your client when the law and your conscience say yes; but you should never, ever say yes when your law and conscience say no.” And because my job is simply to provide the President and the Secretary of State with the very best legal advice that I can give them, I have felt little conflict with my past roles as a law professor, dean, and human rights lawyer, because as my old professor, former legal adviser Abram Chayes, once put it: “There’s nothing wrong with a lawyer holding the United States to its own best standards and principles.”

A third role the Legal Adviser plays is defender of the United States interests in the many international fora in which the United States appears—the International Court of Justice, where I had the honor recently of appearing for the United States in the Kosovo case; the UN Compensation Commission; the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal; NAFTA tribunals (where I was privileged to argue recently before a Chapter XI tribunal in the Grand River case) —and we also appear regularly in U.S. domestic litigation, usually as of counsel to the Department of
Justice in a case such as the Supreme Court’s current case of *Samantar v. Yousuf*, on which this Society held a panel this morning.

A fourth and final role for the Legal Adviser, and the reason I’m here tonight, is to act as a spokesperson for the U.S. government about why international law matters. Many people don’t understand why obeying our international commitments is both right and smart, and that is a message that this administration, and I as Legal Adviser, are committed to spreading.

**THE STRATEGIC VISION**

That brings me to my second topic: what strategic vision of international law are we trying to implement? How does obeying international law advance U.S. foreign policy interests and strengthen America’s position of global leadership? Or, to put it another way, with respect to international law, is this administration really committed to what our President has famously called “change we can believe in”? Some, including a number of the panelists who have addressed this conference, have argued that there is really more continuity than change from the last administration to this one.

To them I would answer that, of course, in foreign policy, from administration to administration, there will always be more continuity than change; you simply cannot turn the ship of state 360 degrees from administration to administration every four to eight years, nor should you. But, I would argue, and these are the core of my remarks today, to say that is to underestimate the most important difference between this administration and the last—and that is with respect to its approach and attitude toward international law. The difference in that approach to international law I would argue is captured in an emerging “Obama-Clinton doctrine,” which is based on four commitments: (1) principled engagement; (2) diplomacy as a critical element of smart power; (3) strategic multilateralism; and (4) the notion that living our values makes us stronger and safer because we follow the rules of domestic and international law: we follow universal standards, not double standards.

As articulated by the President and Secretary Clinton, I believe the Obama/Clinton doctrine reflects these four core commitments. First, a commitment to principled engagement: A powerful belief in the interdependence of the global community is a major theme for our President, whose father came from a Kenyan family, and who spent part of his childhood in Indonesia.

Second, a commitment to what Secretary Clinton calls “smart power”—a blend of “principle and pragmatism” that makes “intelligent use of all means at our disposal,” including promotion of democracy, development, technology, and human rights and international law to place diplomacy at the vanguard of our foreign policy.

Third, a commitment to what some have called strategic multilateralism: the notion acknowledged by President Obama in Cairo that the challenges of the twenty-first century “can’t be met by any one leader or any one nation,” and must therefore be addressed by open dialogue and partnership by the United States with peoples and nations across traditional regional divides, “based on mutual interest and mutual respect” as well as by acknowledgment of “the rights and responsibilities of [all] nations.”

And fourth and finally, a commitment to living our values by respecting the rule of law. As I said, both the President and Secretary Clinton are outstanding lawyers, and they understand that by imposing constraints on government action, law legitimates and gives credibility to governmental action. As the President emphasized forcefully in his National Archives speech and elsewhere, the American political system was founded on a vision of common humanity, universal rights, and the rule of law. Fidelity to [these] values makes us stronger
and safer. This also means following universal standards, not double standards. In his Nobel
lecture at Oslo, President Obama affirmed that “[a]dhering to standards, international stan-
dards, strengthens those who do, and isolates those who don’t.” And in her December speech
on a twenty-first-century human rights agenda, and again two weeks ago in introducing our
annual human rights reports, Secretary Clinton reiterated that “a commitment to human
rights starts with universal standards and with holding everyone accountable to those stan-
dards, including ourselves.” Now in implementing this ambitious vision—this Obama-Clinton
document based on principled international engagement, smart power, strategic multilateralism,
and the view that global leadership flows to those who live their values and obey the law
and global standards—I am reminded of two stories.

The first, told by a former teammate is about the late Mickey Mantle of the American
baseball team, the New York Yankees, who, having been told that he would not play the
next day, went out and got terrifically drunk (as he was wont to do). The next day, he arrived
at the ball park, somewhat impaired, but in the late innings was unexpectedly called upon
to pinch-hit. After staggering out to the field, he swung wildly at the first two pitches and
missed by a mile. But on the third pitch, he hit a tremendous home run. And when he
returned to the dugout, he squinted out at the wildly cheering crowd and confided to his
teammates, “[t]hose people don’t know how hard that really was.”

In much the same way, I learned that the making of U.S. foreign policy is infinitely harder
than it looks from the ivory tower. Why? Because, as lawyers, we are accustomed to the
relatively orderly world of law and litigation, which is based on a knowable and identifiable
structure and sequence of events. The workload comes with courtroom deadlines, page limits,
and scheduled arguments. But if conducting litigation is like climbing a ladder, making
foreign policy is much more like driving the roundabout near the Coliseum in Rome.

In this maze of bureaucratic politics, you are only one lawyer, and there is only so much
that any one person can do. Collective government decision-making creates enormous
coordination problems. We in the Legal Adviser’s Office are not the only lawyers in govern-
ment: On any given issue, my office needs to reach consensus decisions not only with all
of the other interested State Department bureaus, but then our department as a whole needs
to coordinate its positions with other government law offices, including: our lawyer clients
(POTUS/SecState/DepSecState); White House lawyers (WHCounsel/NSC Legal Counsel/
USTR General Counsel); DOD lawyers (OGC, Jt Staff, CoComs, Services, JAGs); DOJ
lawyers (OLC, OSG, Litigating Divisions-Civ., Crim, OIL, NSD); IC lawyers (DNI, CIA);
DHS lawyers, and lawyers in the Senate and House.

To make matters even more complex, we participate in a complicated web of legal processes
within processes: the policy process, the clearance process, the interagency process, the
legislative process; and once a U.S. position is developed, an intergovernmental lawyering
process. So unlike academics, who are accustomed to being individualists, in government
you are necessarily part of a team. One obvious corollary to this is that as one government
lawyer, your views and the views of your client are not the only views that matter. As Walter
Dellinger observed when he worked at OLC:

[U]nlike an academic lawyer, an executive branch attorney may have an obligation to
work within a tradition of reasoned, executive branch precedent, memorialized in formal
written opinions. Lawyers in the executive branch have thought and written for decades
about the President’s legal authority . . . . When lawyers who are now [in my office]

1 Jim Bouton, Ball Four: My Life and Hard Times Throwing the Knuckleball in the Big Leagues 30 (1970).
begin to research an issue, they are not expected to turn to what I might have written or said in a floor discussion at a law professors' convention. They are expected to look to the previous opinions of the Attorneys General and of heads of this office to develop and refine the executive branch's legal positions.\(^2\)

Now, to say that is not to say that one administration cannot or should not reverse a previous administration's legal positions. But what it does mean, as I noted at my confirmation hearings, is that government lawyers should begin with a presumption of *stare decisis*—that an existing interpretation of the Executive Branch should stand-- unless after careful review, a considered reexamination of the text, structure, legislative or negotiating history, purpose, and practice under the treaty or statute firmly convinces us that a change to the prior interpretation is warranted.

So that is what I mean when I say it's harder than it looks. And as those listening who have served in government know, it is a lot harder to get from a good idea to the implementation of that idea than those outside the government can imagine.

This brings me to my second, shorter story: about two Irishmen walking down the road near Galway. One of them asks the other, "So how do you get to Dublin?" And the other answers, "I wouldn't start from here."

In the same way, given the choice, no one would have started with what we inherited: the worst recession since the Depression, with conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and against Al Qaeda. Add to this mix a difficult and divided political environment, which makes it very difficult to get 60 Senate votes for cloture, much less the 67 you would need for treaty ratification, and such thorny carryover issues as resuming international engagement and closing Guantánamo. Not to mention tackling an array of new challenges brought to us by the twenty-first century: climate change, attendant shifts in the polar environment, cyber crime, aggression and terrorism, food security, and global health, just to name a few. To round things out, throw in a 7.0 earthquake in Haiti, another earthquake in Chile, four feet of snow in Washington, and you might well say to yourselves, to coin a phrase, "I wouldn't start from here."

But having said that, how have we played the hand we have been dealt? What legal challenges do we face? There are really five fields of law that have occupied most of my time: what I call the law of international justice and dispute resolution, the law of 9/11, the law of international agreements, the law of the State Department, and the law of globalization. Tonight I want to focus on the first two of these areas: the law of international justice and dispute resolution, and the law of 9/11. For they best illustrate how we have tried to implement the four themes I have outlined: principled engagement, multilateralism, smart power, and living our values.

**CURRENT LEGAL CHALLENGES**

*International Justice and Dispute Resolution*

By international justice and dispute resolution, I refer to the United States' renewed relationship to international tribunals and other international bodies. Let me address two of them: the International Criminal Court and the UN Human Rights Council. As President

Obama recognized, "A new era of engagement has begun and renewed respect for international law and institutions is critical if we are to resume American leadership in a new global century."

The International Criminal Court

With respect to the U.S. relationship to the ICC, let me report on my recent participation in the Resumed 8th Session of ICC Assembly of States Parties in New York, from which I have just returned. Last November, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Stephen Rapp and I led an inter-agency delegation that resumed engagement with the Court by attending a meeting of the ICC Assembly of States Parties (ASP). This was the first time that the United States had attended such a meeting, and this week’s New York meeting continued that November session. As you know, the United States is not party to the Rome Statute, but we have attended these meetings as an observer. Our goal in November was to listen and learn, and by listening to gain a better understanding of the issues being considered by the ASP and of the workings of the International Criminal Court.

Significantly, although during the last decade the United States was largely absent from the ICC, our historic commitment to the cause of international justice has remained strong. As you all know, we have not been silent in the face of war crimes and crimes against humanity. As one of the vigorous supporters of the work of the ad hoc tribunals regarding the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and Lebanon, the United States has worked for decades, and we will continue to work, with other states to ensure accountability on behalf of victims of such crimes. But as some of those ad hoc war crimes tribunals enter their final years, the eyes of the world are increasingly turned toward the ICC. At the end of May, the United States will attend the ASP’s Review Conference in Kampala, Uganda. There are two key items on the agenda: stock-taking and aggression.

In the current situation where the Court has open investigations and prosecutions in relation to four situations, but has not yet concluded any trials, the stock-taking exercise is designed to address ways to strengthen the Court, and includes issues such as state cooperation; complementarity; effect on victims; peace and justice; and universality of membership. Even as a non-state party, the United States believes that it can be a valuable partner and ally in the cause of advancing international justice. The Obama administration has been actively looking at ways that the United States can, consistent with U.S. law, assist the ICC in fulfilling its historic charge of providing justice to those who have endured crimes of epic savagery and scope. And as Ambassador Rapp announced in New York, we would like to meet with the Prosecutor at the ICC to examine whether there are specific ways that the United States might be able to support the particular prosecutions that already underway in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Uganda.

But as for the second agenda item—the definition of the crime of aggression—the United States has a number of serious concerns and questions. The crime of aggression, which is a *jus ad bellum* crime based on acts committed by the state, fundamentally differs from the other three crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction—genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity—which are *jus in bello* crimes directed against particular individuals. In particular, we are concerned that adopting a definition of aggression at this point in the Court’s history could divert the ICC from its core mission, and potentially politicize and weaken this young institution. Among the states parties we found strongly held, yet divergent views on many fundamental and unresolved questions.
First, there are questions raised by the terms of the definition itself, including the degree to which it may depart from customary international law of both the "crime of aggression" and the state's "act of aggression." This encompasses questions like, "What does it mean when the current draft definition requires that an act of aggression be a 'manifest' (as opposed to an 'egregious') violation of the UN Charter?"

A second question is, "Who decides?" The United States believes that investigation or prosecution of the crime of aggression should not take place absent a determination by the UN Security Council that aggression has occurred. The UN Charter confers on the Security Council the responsibility for determining when aggression has taken place. We are concerned by the confusion that might arise if more than one institution were legally empowered to make such a determination in the same case, especially since these bodies, under the current proposal, would be applying different definitions of aggression.

Third, there are questions about how such a crime could affect the Court at this point in its development. For example, how would the still-maturing Court be affected if its Prosecutor were mandated to investigate and prosecute this crime, which by its very nature, even if perfectly defined, would inevitably be seen as political—both by those who are charged, and by those who believe aggressors have been wrongly left uncharged? To what extent would the availability of such a charge place burdens on the prosecutor in every case, both those in which he chooses to charge aggression, and those in which he does not? If you think of the Court as a wobbly bicycle that is finally starting to move forward, is this more weight than the bicycle can bear?

Fourth, would adopting the crime of aggression at this time advance or hinder the key goals of the stock-taking exercise (promoting complementarity, cooperation, and universality)? With respect to complementarity, how would this principle apply to a crime of aggression? Do we want national courts to pass judgment on public acts of foreign states that are elements of the crime of aggression? Would adding at this time a crime that would run against heads of state and senior leaders enhance or obstruct the prospects for state cooperation with the Court? And will moving to adopt this highly politicized crime at a time when there is genuine disagreement on such issues enhance the prospects for universal adherence to the Rome Statute?

All of these questions go to our ultimate concern: has a genuine consensus yet emerged to finalize a definition of the crime of aggression? What outcome in Kampala will truly strengthen the Court at this critical moment in its history? What we heard at the Resumed Session in New York is that no clear consensus has yet emerged on many of these questions. Because this is such a momentous decision for this institution, which would bring about such an organic change in the Court’s work, we believe that we should leave no stone unturned in search of genuine consensus. And we look forward to discussing these important issues with as many states parties and nonstates parties as possible between now and what we hope will be a successful Review Conference in Kampala.

**Human Rights Council**

In addition to reengaging with the ICC, the United States has also reengaged the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. Along with my long-time friend and colleague, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Michael Posner, who has my old job, and Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Esther Brimmer, I had the privilege of leading the first U.S. delegation to return to the Human Rights Council this past September.
You know the history: In March 2006 the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to replace the flawed Human Rights Commission with this new body—the Human Rights Council. The last administration participated actively in the negotiations in New York to reform the Commission, but ultimately voted against adoption of the UNGA resolution that created the HRC, and decided not to run for a seat.

The UNGA resolution that created the HRC made a number of important changes from the commission process: it created the Universal Periodic Review process, a mandatory process of self-examination and peer review that requires each UN member state to defend its own record before the HRC every four years. The Obama administration would like our report to serve as a model for the world. Accordingly, we are preparing our first UPR report, which will be presented this November, with outreach sessions in an unprecedented inter-agency listening tour being conducted in about ten locations around the United States to hear about human rights concerns from civil society, community leaders, and tribal governments. Second, the HRC and its various subsidiary bodies and mechanisms meet far more frequently throughout the year than did the Commission, a pace that exhausts delegations. Third, the election criteria were revised. So while HRC membership still includes a number of authoritarian regimes that do not respect human rights, the election requirement of a majority of UNGA votes in often competitive elections has led to certain countries being defeated for membership and others declining to run for a seat. The rule that only one-third of membership (16 members) can convene a special session has led to a disproportionate number of special sessions dedicated to criticism of Israel, which already is the only country with a permanent agenda item dedicated to examination of its human rights practices—an unbalanced focus that we have clearly and consistently criticized.

When the Obama administration took office, we faced two choices with respect to the Human Rights Council: we could continue to stay away and watch the flaws continue and possibly get worse, or we could engage and fight for better outcomes on human rights issues, even if they would not be easy to achieve. With the HRC, as with the ICC and other fora, we have chosen principled engagement and strategic multilateralism. While the institution is far from perfect, it is important and deserves the long-term commitment of the United States, and the United States must deploy its stature and moral authority to improve the UN human rights system where possible. This is a long-term effort, but one that we are committed to seeing through to success consistent with the basic goals of the Obama-Clinton doctrine: principled engagement and universality of human rights law. Our inaugural session as an HRC member in September saw some important successes, most notably the adoption by consensus of a freedom of expression resolution, which we co-sponsored with Egypt, that brought warring regional groups together and preserved the resolution as a vehicle to express firm support for freedom of speech and expression. This resolution was a way of implementing some of the themes in President Obama’s historic speech in Cairo, bridging geographic and cultural divides and dealing with global issues of discrimination and intolerance. We also joined country resolutions highlighting human rights situations in Burma, Cambodia, Honduras, and Somalia, and were able to take positions joined by other countries on several resolutions on which the United States previously would have been isolated, including ones on toxic waste and the financial crisis. The challenges in developing a body that fairly and even-handedly addresses human rights issues are significant, but we will continue to work toward that end.

At the March HRC session, which ends tomorrow, we have continued to pursue principled engagement by taking on a variety of initiatives at the HRC that seek to weaken protections
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on freedom of expression, in particular, the push of some Council members to ban speech that "defames" religions, such as the Danish cartoons. At this session, we supported a country resolution on Guinea and made significant progress in opposing the Organization of the Islamic Conference's highly problematic "defamation of religions" resolution, even while continuing to deal with underlying concerns about religious intolerance.

The Law of 9/11

Let me focus the balance of my remarks on that aspect of my job that I call "The Law of 9/11." In this area, as in the other areas of our work, we believe, in the President's words, that "living our values doesn't make us weaker, it makes us safer and it makes us stronger."

We live in a time, when, as you know, the United States finds itself engaged in several armed conflicts. As the President has noted, one conflict, in Iraq, is winding down. He also reminded us that the conflict in Afghanistan is a "conflict that America did not seek, one in which we are joined by forty-three other countries . . . in an effort to defend ourselves and all nations from further attacks." In the conflict occurring in Afghanistan and elsewhere, we continue to fight the perpetrators of 9/11: a nonstate actor, Al Qaeda (as well as the Taliban forces that harbored Al Qaeda).

Everyone here at this meeting is committed to international law. But as President Obama reminded us, "The world must remember that it was not simply international institutions—not just treaties and declarations—that brought stability to a post-World War II world.... [T]he instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace."

With this background, let me address a question on many of your minds: how has this administration determined to conduct these armed conflicts and to defend our national security, consistent with its abiding commitment to international law? Let there be no doubt: the Obama administration is firmly committed to complying with all applicable law, including the laws of war, in all aspects of these ongoing armed conflicts. As the President reaffirmed in his Nobel Prize lecture:

Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct . . . [E]ven as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules . . . the United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war. That is what makes us different from those whom we fight. That is the source of our strength.

We in the Obama administration have worked hard since we entered office to ensure that we conduct all aspects of these armed conflicts—in particular, detention operations, targeting, and prosecution of terrorist suspects—in a manner consistent not just with the applicable laws of war, but also with the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Let me say a word about each: detention, targeting, and prosecution.

Detention

With respect to detention, as you know, the last administration's detention practices were widely criticized around the world, and as a private citizen, I was among the vocal critics of those practices. This administration and I personally have spent much of the last year seeking to revise those practices to ensure their full compliance with domestic and international law, first, by unequivocally guaranteeing humane treatment for all individuals in U.S. custody as a result of armed conflict and second, by ensuring that all detained individuals are being held pursuant to lawful authorities.
Treatment. To ensure humane treatment, on his second full day in office, the President unequivocally banned the use of torture as an instrument of U.S. policy, a commitment that he has repeatedly reaffirmed in the months since. He directed that executive officials could no longer rely upon the Justice Department OLC opinions that had permitted practices that I consider to be torture and cruel treatment—many of which he later disclosed publicly—and he instructed that henceforth, all interrogations of detainees must be conducted in accordance with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and with the revised Army Field Manual. An interagency review of U.S. interrogation practices later advised—and the President agreed—that no techniques beyond those in the Army Field Manual (and traditional noncoercive FBI techniques) are necessary to conduct effective interrogations. That Interrogation and Transfer Task Force also issued a set of recommendations to help ensure that the United States will not transfer individuals to face torture. The President also revoked Executive Order 13440, which had interpreted particular provisions of Common Article 3, and restored the meaning of those provisions to the way they have traditionally been understood in international law. The President ordered CIA “black sites” closed and directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct an immediate review—with two follow-up visits by a blue ribbon task force of former government officials—to ensure that the conditions of detention at Guantánamo fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Last December I visited Guantánamo, a place I had visited several times over the last two decades, and I believe that the conditions I observed are humane and meet Geneva Conventions standards.

As you all know, also on his second full day in office, the President ordered Guantánamo closed, and his commitment to doing so has not wavered, even as closing Guantánamo has proven to be an arduous and painstaking process. Since the beginning of the administration, through the work of my colleague Ambassador Dan Fried, we have transferred approximately 57 detainees to 22 different countries, of whom 33 were resettled in countries that are not the detainees’ countries of origin. Our efforts continue on a daily basis. Just this week, five more detainees were transferred out of Guantánamo for resettlement. We are very grateful to those countries that have contributed to our efforts to close Guantánamo by resettling detainees; that list continues to grow as more and more countries see the positive changes we are making and wish to offer their support.

During the past year, we completed an exhaustive, rigorous, and collaborative interagency review of the status of the roughly 240 individuals detained at Guantánamo when President Obama took office. The President’s Executive Order placed responsibility for review of each Guantánamo detainee with six entities—the Departments of Justice, State, Defense, and Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—to collect and consolidate from across the government all information concerning the detainees, and to ensure that diplomatic, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement viewpoints would all be fully considered in the review process. This interagency task force, on which several State Department attorneys participated, painstakingly considered each and every Guantánamo detainee’s case to assess whether the detainee could be transferred or repatriated consistently with national security, the interests of justice, and our policy not to transfer individuals to countries where they would likely face torture or persecution. The six entities ultimately reached unanimous agreement on the proper disposition of all detainees subject to review. As the President has made clear, this is not a one-time review; there will be “a thorough process of periodic review, so that any prolonged detention is carefully evaluated and justified.” Similarly, the Department of Defense has created new review procedures for individuals held at the detention facility in
Parwan at Bagram airfield, Afghanistan, with increased representation for detainees, greater opportunities to present evidence, and more transparent proceedings. Outside organizations have begun to monitor these proceedings, and even some of the toughest critics have acknowledged the positive changes that have been made.

Legal authority to detain. Some have asked what legal basis we have for continuing to detain those held at Guantánamo and Bagram. But as a matter of both international and domestic law, the legal framework is well-established. As a matter of international law, our detention operations rest on three legal foundations. First, we continue to fight a war of self-defense against an enemy that attacked us on September 11, 2001, and before, and that continues to undertake armed attacks against the United States. Second, in Afghanistan, we work as partners with a consenting host government. And third, the United Nations Security Council has, through a series of successive resolutions, authorized the use of “all necessary measures” by the NATO countries constituting the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to fulfill their mandate in Afghanistan. As a nation at war, we must comply with the laws of war, but detention of enemy belligerents to prevent them from returning to hostilities is a well-recognized feature of the conduct of armed conflict, as the drafters of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II recognized, and as our own Supreme Court recognized in *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*.

The federal courts have confirmed our legal authority to detain in the Guantánamo habeas cases, but the administration is not asserting an unlimited detention authority. For example, with regard to individuals detained at Guantánamo, we explained in a March 13, 2009, habeas filing before the D.C. federal court—and repeatedly in habeas cases since—that we are resting our detention authority on a domestic statute—the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), as informed by the principles of the laws of war. Our detention authority in Afghanistan comes from the same source.

In explaining this approach, let me note two important differences from the legal approach of the last administration. First, as a matter of domestic law, the Obama administration has not based its claim of authority to detain those at GITMO and Bagram on the President’s Article II authority as commander-in-chief. Instead, we have relied on legislative authority expressly granted to the President by Congress in the 2001 AUMF.

Second, unlike the last administration, as a matter of international law, this administration has expressly acknowledged that international law informs the scope of our detention authority. Both in our internal decisions about specific Guantánamo detainees, and before the courts in habeas cases, we have interpreted the scope of detention authority authorized by Congress in the AUMF *as informed by the laws of war*. Those laws of war were designed primarily for traditional armed conflicts among states, not conflicts against a diffuse, difficult-to-identify terrorist enemy, therefore construing what is “necessary and appropriate” under the AUMF requires some “translation,” or analogizing principles from the laws of war governing traditional international conflicts.

Some commentators have criticized our decision to detain certain individuals based on their membership in a nonstate armed group. But as those of you who follow the Guantánamo habeas litigation know, we have defended this position based on the AUMF, as informed by the text, structure, and history of the Geneva Conventions and other sources of the laws of war. Moreover, while the various judges who have considered these arguments have taken issue with certain points, they have accepted the overall proposition that individuals who are part of an organized armed group like Al Qaeda can be subject to law of war detention for the duration of the current conflict. In sum, we have based our authority to detain not
on conclusory labels, like "enemy combatant," but on whether the factual record in the particular case meets the legal standard. This includes, but is not limited to, whether an individual joined with or became part of Al Qaeda or Taliban forces or associated forces, which can be demonstrated by relevant evidence of formal or functional membership, which may include an oath of loyalty, training with Al Qaeda, or taking positions with enemy forces. Often these factors operate in combination. While we disagree with the International Committee of the Red Cross on some of the particulars, our general approach of looking at "functional" membership in an armed group has been endorsed not only by the federal courts, but also is consistent with the approach taken in the targeting context by the ICRC in its recent study on Direct Participation in Hostilities (DPH).

A final point: the Obama Administration has made clear both its goal not only of closing Guantánamo, but also of moving to shift detention responsibilities to the local governments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Last July I visited the detention facilities in Afghanistan at Bagram, as well as Afghan detention facilities near Kabul, and I discussed the conditions at those facilities with both Afghan and U.S. military officials and representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross. I was impressed by the efforts that the Department of Defense is making both to improve our ongoing operations and to prepare the Afghans for the day when we turn over responsibility for detention operations. This fall, DOD created a joint task force led by a three-star admiral, Robert Harward, to bring new energy and focus to these efforts, and you can see evidence of his work in the rigorous implementation of our new detainee review procedures at Bagram, the increased transparency of these proceedings, and closer coordination with our Afghan partners in our detention operations.

In sum, with respect to both treatment and detainability, we believe that our detention practices comport with both domestic and international law.

Use of Force

In the same way, in all of our operations involving the use of force, including those in the armed conflict with Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, the Obama administration is committed by word and deed to conducting itself in accordance with all applicable law. With respect to the subject of targeting, which has been much commented upon in the media and international legal circles, there are obviously limits to what I can say publicly. What I can say is that it is the considered view of this administration—and it has certainly been my experience during my time as Legal Adviser—that U.S. targeting practices, including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war.

The United States agrees that it must conform its actions to all applicable law. As I have explained, as a matter of international law, the United States is in an armed conflict with Al Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under international law. As a matter of domestic law, Congress authorized the use of all necessary and appropriate force through the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). These domestic and international legal authorities continue to this day.

As recent events have shown, Al Qaeda has not abandoned its intent to attack the United States, and indeed continues to attack us. Thus, in this ongoing armed conflict, the United States has the authority under international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to defend itself, including by targeting persons such as high-level Al Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks. As you know, this is a conflict with an
organized terrorist enemy that does not have conventional forces, but that plans and executes its attacks against us and our allies while hiding among civilian populations. That behavior simultaneously makes the application of international law more difficult and more critical for the protection of innocent civilians. Of course, whether a particular individual will be targeted in a particular location will depend upon considerations specific to each case, including those related to the imminence of the threat, the sovereignty of the other states involved, and the willingness and ability of those states to suppress the threat the target poses. In particular, this administration has carefully reviewed the rules governing targeting operations to ensure that these operations are conducted consistently with law of war principles, including:

- First, the principle of distinction, which requires that attacks be limited to military objectives and that civilians or civilian objects shall not be the object of the attack; and

- Second, the principle of proportionality, which prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

In U.S. operations against Al Qaeda and its associated forces—including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles—great care is taken to adhere to these principles in both planning and execution, to ensure that only legitimate objectives are targeted and that collateral damage is kept to a minimum.

Recently, a number of legal objections have been raised against U.S. targeting practices. While today is obviously not the occasion for a detailed legal opinion responding to each of these objections, let me briefly address four:

First, some have suggested that the very act of targeting a particular leader of an enemy force in an armed conflict must violate the laws of war. But individuals who are part of such an armed group are belligerents and, therefore, lawful targets under international law. During World War II, for example, American aviators tracked and shot down the airplane carrying the architect of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, who was also the leader of enemy forces in the Battle of Midway. This was a lawful operation then, and would be if conducted today. Indeed, targeting particular individuals serves to narrow the focus when force is employed and to avoid broader harm to civilians and civilian objects.

Second, some have challenged the very use of advanced weapons systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, for lethal operations. But the rules that govern targeting do not turn on the type of weapon system used, and there is no prohibition under the laws of war on the use of technologically advanced weapons systems in armed conflict—such as pilotless aircraft or so-called smart bombs—so long as they are employed in conformity with applicable laws of war. Indeed, using such advanced technologies can ensure both that the best intelligence is available for planning operations, and that civilian casualties are minimized in carrying out such operations.

Third, some have argued that the use of lethal force against specific individuals fails to provide adequate process and thus constitutes unlawful extrajudicial killing. But a state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not required to provide targets with legal process before the state may use lethal force. Our procedures and practices for identifying lawful targets are extremely robust, and advanced technologies have helped to make our targeting even more precise. In my experience, the principles of distinction and proportionality that the United States applies are not just recited at meetings. They are
implemented rigorously throughout the planning and execution of lethal operations to ensure that such operations are conducted in accordance with all applicable law.

Fourth and finally, some have argued that our targeting practices violate domestic law, in particular, the long-standing domestic ban on assassinations. But under domestic law, the use of lawful weapons systems—consistent with the applicable laws of war—for precision targeting of specific high-level belligerent leaders when acting in self-defense or during an armed conflict is not unlawful, and hence does not constitute "assassination."

In sum, let me repeat: as in the area of detention operations, this administration is committed to ensuring that the targeting practices that I have described are lawful.

Prosecutions

The same goes, third and finally, for our policy of prosecutions. As the President made clear in his May 2009 National Archives speech, we have a national security interest in trying terrorists, either before Article III courts or military commissions, and in keeping the number of individuals detained under the laws of war low.

Obviously, the choice between Article III courts and military commissions must be made on a case-by-case basis, depending on the facts of each particular case. Many acts of terrorism committed in the context of an armed conflict can constitute both war crimes and violations of our federal criminal law, and they can be prosecuted in either federal courts or military commissions. As the last administration found, those who have violated U.S. criminal laws can be successfully tried in federal courts, for example, Richard Reid, Zacarias Moussaoui, and a number of others.

With respect to the criminal justice system, to reiterate what Attorney General Holder recently explained, Article III prosecutions have proven to be remarkably effective in incapacitating terrorists. In 2009 there were more defendants charged with terrorism violations in federal court than in any year since 9/11. In February 2010, for example, Najibullah Zazi pleaded guilty in the Eastern District of New York to a three-count information charging him with conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction—specifically explosives—against persons or property in the United States, conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country, and provision of material support to Al Qaeda. We have also effectively used the criminal justice system to pursue those who have sought to commit terrorist acts overseas. On March 18, 2010, for example, David Headley pleaded guilty to a dozen terrorism charges in U.S. federal court in Chicago, admitting that he participated in planning the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India, as well as later planning to attack a Danish newspaper.

As the President noted in his National Archives speech, lawfully constituted military commissions are also appropriate venues for trying persons for violations of the laws of war. In 2009, with significant input from this administration, the Military Commissions Act was amended, with important changes to address the defects in the previous Military Commissions Act of 2006, including the addition of a provision that renders inadmissible any statements taken as a result of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. The 2009 legislative reforms also require the government to disclose more potentially exculpatory information, restrict hearsay evidence, and generally require that statements of the accused be admitted only if they were provided voluntarily (with a carefully defined exception for battlefield statements).

CONCLUSION

In closing, in the last year, this administration has pursued principled engagement with the ICC and the Human Rights Council, and has reaffirmed its commitment to international
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law with respect to all three aspects of the armed conflicts in which we find ourselves: detention, targeting and prosecution. While these are not all we want to achieve, neither are they small accomplishments. As the President said in his Nobel Lecture, "I have reaffirmed America’s commitment to abide by the Geneva Conventions. We lose ourselves when we compromise the very ideals that we fight to defend. And we honor ideals by upholding them not when it’s easy, but when it is hard." As President Obama went on to say, even in this day and age war is sometimes justified, but "this truth," he said,

must coexist with another—that no matter how justified, war promises human tragedy. The soldier’s courage and sacrifice is full of glory . . . But war itself is never glorious, and we must never trumpet it as such. So part of our challenge is reconciling these two seemingly irreconcilable truths—that war is sometimes necessary, and war at some level is an expression of human folly.

Although it is not always easy, I see my job as an international lawyer in this administration as reconciling these truths around a thoroughgoing commitment to the rule of law. That is the commitment I made to the President and the Secretary when I took this job with an oath to uphold the Constitution and laws of the United States. That is a commitment that I make to myself every day that I am a government lawyer. And that is a commitment that I make to each of you, as a lawyer deeply committed—as we all are—to the goals and aspirations of this American Society of International Law.

Thank you.