FROM HERE ALL-THE-WAY-DOWN, OR HOW TO WRITE A FESTSCHRIFT PIECE

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This is the first time I have participated in the great academic exercise that is the festschrift. I was not sure how to approach this specific task. Usually when faced with such a situation, one of my first calls is to a person who has been a mentor and a friend since I became an academic. But because Heather Gerken is the honoree of this little get-together, it seemed a bit weird to ask her for advice on how to proceed. So I did what any good academic would do: research. After hours and hours of looking through festschrift articles, I found that the best all took the same three-part form. For those of you who have not spent as much time studying how to do this, I offer the following guide to writing a successful festschrift piece.

First, dole out as much fawning praise as you can muster for the honoree and her work. Go all out, as mushy as you can make it, with extra points given out for use of the terms “brilliant” or “inspiring,” and a triple word score for turning someone’s last name into an adjective. Call this the “Your Work is Perfect, Don’t Change a Thing”

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1. And among such events, this is a particularly odd one, as they are usually associated with an academic approaching the end of his or her career, whereas the subject of this festschrift is just entering the prime of her career. But both as a general and specific matter, this event makes a lot of sense. Specifically, Heather Gerken has done a career’s worth of work in a short amount of time, and there is no reason to wait. And, generally, the festschrift as a mid-career review is probably an improvement on the ordinary set-up, as it might prove useful to the subject as well as respectful. Law review editors of the world ought take heed of the great Kanye West’s admonition, “If you admire somebody, you should go ahead tell ‘em/People never get the flowers while they can still smell ‘em.” KANYE WEST, Big Brother, on GRADUATION (Roc-A-Fella Records 2007).

2. I thought about leaving a blank space after the colon to set up a game of legal academic Mad Libs. Possible answers: “Pawned it off on my research assistants,” “Wrote a new introduction for what is really a summary of an old paper,” “Missed my deadline,” etc.

3. Using one’s first ever festschrift piece to write a guide on how to write a festschrift piece is a bit presumptuous, I know. However, in the annals of these things, it requires only a tiny bit of writerly chutzpah. For instance, Martin Amis wrote the best and ballsiest first sentence of a book review of all time. “Expect a lot from the next sentence.” Martin Amis, Survivors of the Cold War, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 5, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/10/05/reviews/971005.05amisdt.html. In comparison, this is nothing.


Section. This should be the easiest one, because festschrifts are generally only done for the very best scholars — this one is **definitely** no exception — and because you agreed to do it in the first place.

Second, find a problem or a hole somewhere in the honoree’s body of scholarship; preferably a minor one, but one that suggests that her work is unfinished or that there are things that remain difficult for her. This is the “Well, Actually, Come to Think of It, There Is This One Little Thing I Have Questions About” Section. This serves to declare your independence and is necessary because you need to say something interesting and different about work that everyone has read and admires. It also suggests that the next generation of scholars, and you particularly, will be wrestling with the subject’s work for years to come.⁷

Third, argue that the problem identified in Section II, and the honoree’s work more generally, could be improved by reference and discussion of themes that appear in your own work. However you have to grease the square pegs of your work into this particular round hole, go for it. Call it the “The Only Thing That Could Make [The Honoree’s] Work Any Better Is Discussing My Work Just a Bit More” Section.⁸ Although seemingly presumptuous, this actually makes clear the author’s debt to the subject. A conclusion with a bit more praise is the cherry on top of this peculiar, and sometimes silly, but often oddly charming academic sundae.

**Using this guide,**⁹ hopefully, will make this festschrift article a success.¹⁰ So here

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¹⁰ Although mocking of its excesses, this “guide” should be understood as a celebration of the form (and certainly the subject here). I love festschrift pieces. Although they are not often the source of truly new ideas themselves, they force us to reflect on where we have been and where we are going as a field more generally. And great work ought to be celebrated and taken seriously.
Section I summarizes two lines of Gerken’s research. First, it will review her work on “here to there” problems in election law reform. Then it will turn to her work on the benefits for democratic discourse of giving actual power to national minorities and dissenters to make decisions in sub-national institutions, or as she put it in her brilliant Harvard Law Review foreward, Federalism All the Way Down. The second section in the piece discusses a problem in the Federalism All the Way Down research. It argues that, if grants of power to sub-national institutions (from states to school boards) are intended to achieve the democratic discourse benefits Gerken lays out, in practice they likely do less of it than our institutional structure suggests. The reason is that non-state mediating institutions — most notably political parties but also non-governmental organizations and businesses — that have a national scope can frustrate the ability of dissenters to exercise power at lower levels of government. That is, Gerken’s research does not show how to get from here to federalism all the way down. Section III argues that my work studying “mismatches” between constitutional or institutional goals and the levels at which law forces/allows mediating institutions to form provides a method for thinking about how to achieve more federalism all the way down. Particularly, the tools of electoral engineering could be used to promote the goals of federalism all the way down.

10. I should note that this is not a description of most festschrift articles so much as it is advice, or a normative guide to the festschrift piece. The model accomplishes a few things. If done well, it should produce pieces that are both gracious and respectful, which — again because you agreed to do it and because these are only done for people who are very, very good — should be the goal. Second, it is economical with your ideas. People sometimes waste good ideas in these pieces and given other demands, the format of a festschrift piece is not well suited to doing so. It is better to focus on what the festschrift is really about, how the subject’s work influenced the work of subsequent scholars, namely you, and what you can tell the subject.

11. This footnote will discuss admonitions from people like Mark Tushnet, Paul Horowitz and Marc DeGirolami on the perfidy of the roadmap paragraph. See Mark Tushnet, Reflections on “Art and the First Amendment,” BALKINIZATION (Apr. 12, 2012, 2:51 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/04/reflections-on-art-and-first-amendment.html; Paul Horowitz, The Roadmap, PRAWFSBLAWG (Apr. 12, 2012, 10:38 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/04/the-roadmap.html#comments; Marc DeGirolami, Roadmap to the Roadmap, PRAWFSBLAWG (Apr. 13, 2012, 8:13 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/04/roadmap-to-the-roadmap.html#comments. Tushnet notes that he “hate[s] these paragraphs” — a point that Horowitz expands upon, noting that the paragraphs are an example of “the most risible aspects of legal scholarship.” Tushnet, supra; Horowitz, supra. Horowitz even rejects their use in complex articles, as the use of such a paragraph in aiding an unclear article is “like a surgeon trying to fix massive spinal injuries by inserting a safety pin and a wad of chewing gum into the patient.” Horowitz, supra. He notes that most scholars include them because they think law review editors want to see them. Id. DeGirolami jokes that articles should include road maps to road maps (“In this section of the Introduction, I aim to explain the paper's meta-structure.”). DeGirolami, supra. I am less opposed than these critics to roadmaps as a tool to allow readers to keep track of substantial arguments, particularly if they are integrated into the introduction (as Bruce Boyden suggests in the comments to Horowitz’s post). Horowitz, supra. But as this article is not particularly complex, already has a paragraph summarizing its meta-structure, and does not need to attract law review editors, including one is pretty silly. Which is of course why I had no choice other than to include it.

YOUR WORK IS PERFECT, DON’T CHANGE A THING: SELECTIONS FROM GERKEN’S GREATEST HITS, INCLUDING FROM HERE TO THERE, AND FEDERALISM ALL THE WAY DOWN

For a scholar of her age, Gerken’s work has been remarkably varied and wide-ranging, not to mention brilliant and inspiring. I am sure other participants will focus on her important contributions to Voting Rights Act scholarship and election law and constitutional law more broadly. I will focus on her two most recent series of papers, one on how election reform might actually be achieved, and the other on the benefits diffusing power across institutions provide to democratic discourse by allowing national minorities to actually exercise power at lower levels of government.

From “Here to There”

From relatively early in her career, Gerken’s work veered from the ordinary interests and obsessions of election law scholarship to focus on a different type of question: how might election reform be achieved and implemented? An early article on partisan gerrymandering, for instance, did not focus on why or whether courts should protect competition from self-interested entrenchment, but rather looked at how the Supreme Court might develop a method for relying on local judgments about the fairness of districting. More recently, Gerken developed this into a multi-pronged argument that election law suffers from what she calls a “here to there” problem. Election law reform efforts and scholarship focus on questions of whether and how to reform things like gerrymandering, election administration, and campaign finance. But entrenched policies in these areas have withstood even the fiercest attacks of the most brilliant and acerbic critics. Blame for the failure of election reform to take hold is generally laid at the feet of the fact that election law policy is made by incumbent legislators who have incentives to manipulate the law to help themselves and/or their party. Because incumbents are the
“foxes guarding the henhouse” of election law policy-making, scholars tended to seek *deus ex machina* solutions to produce reforms, like Supreme Court decisions or referenda requiring nonpartisan election law policy-making or neutral rules. While traditional goals like entrusting districting to neutral redistricting bodies are admirable, Gerken argues this “instinct for nonpartisanship” has distracted reformers from focusing on short and medium term reforms that could be achieved through the ordinary political process. However, election law reform will not be achieved merely by asking foxes to stop eating hens; lobbying for specific changes under current conditions is simply spitting into the wind.

Instead, Gerken argues that scholars and reformers need to think about how to create the conditions that would make reform possible. To do this, they need to change the political incentives of the key actors in the system. Election law reformers should seek to develop tools that “realign the incentives of the foxes with those of the hens, to redirect competitive political energies into healthier channels.”

This is the “here to there” problem. Even if we agree that an election law system should be more neutral, more competent, and more competitive than our current system, we need a method for convincing current holders of power to adopt reform. The key, Gerken argues, is “harness[ing] politics to fix politics.” The mechanisms for doing so are the subject of Gerken’s work in the area.

For instance, take gerrymandering. In the short term, rather than inveighing against the evils of partisan or bipartisan gerrymandering, Gerken argues reformers should develop new tools to create pressure on legislators engaged in districting to behave in a fairer, more open manner. Open-source software that allows anyone to make redistricting maps forces politicians to own up to the choices they make in districting, rather than hiding behind claims to expertise. Private contests held among citizens to design the best district maps might shame politicians into following the models set by private citizens. Reform groups might model how non-partisan gerrymandering would work by creating “shadow” non-partisan panels themselves that designed maps, putting public pressure on legislators to create such panels for real. Further, the outputs of
shadow commissions could be used to judge the outputs of actual legislators. The goal of each of these proposals is to create incentives and social pressure for those in power to enact reform, or at least to be a little less biased in their districting choices. That is, they are tools to help us get from here to the “there” of better, more neutral districting.

In the longer term, even the “theres” should embrace politics in order to make reform something that sticks. Gerken endorses ideas like Sam Hirsch’s proposed baseball-style arbitration process for redistricting, which calls for both parties (and private citizens) to introduce maps in a competition to produce the “winning” map, judged according to neutral principles, and Michael Kang’s idea to have the parties propose maps to the electorate as a whole, which would choose among them in a referendum. The attraction of these policies is that they do not displace politicians — who after all do not like being displaced and would work to undermine even enacted reforms that excluded them — but rather change the ways politicians can benefit from redistricting.

This, we will see, is a central theme in Gerken’s work. Well-meaning goo-goo reformers, at least since the Founding period and certainly through the Progressive Era and on to today, have tended to take a dim view of the messy parts of politics. For them, the constant fighting, the self-interestedness, and the narrow focus of individuals and groups were the target of institutional reform. Gerken views the unseemly fracas of politics differently, as a necessary and potentially transforming part of life in a democracy. The goal of institutional reform, whether of election law or as we will discuss below, the decentralization of power, should not be to displace or bypass politics. Instead, institutional design should attempt to focus the conflict and selfishness inherent in politics in ways that produce more meaningful and useful discourse and inclusion rather than exclusion.

The central focus of Gerken’s “here to there” work has been the red-headed step-child of election law: election administration. The plumbing of the electoral system — vote counting, manning the polls, locating polling places, etc. — was always seen as a less sexy topic than things like campaign finance, voting rights and the regulation of the parties, and got less attention from scholars and reformers. At least it was a less sexy

31. Id.
32. Id. at 8–9.
34. Id. at 8.
36. Id. at 5–6.
37. Two leading figures in the field made this clear.

Ultimately our concern is with the structural aspects of constitutional law, not the regulatory arcana of elections. Approaching the law of democracy from this vantage point makes the field not a derivative and limited domain but a body of ideas that reflect [sic] the meaning and assumptions of constitutional law itself.

From Here All-the-way-down

topic until Bush v. Gore and the Florida vote dispute in 2000 more generally, bringing national attention to the inadequacies of election administration in this country. After that landmark decision, there were all sorts of efforts to make reforms — a blue ribbon commission, several congressional acts, and intense popular attention (including more than a few claims of stolen elections). Despite this, very little was actually accomplished and virtually no one thinks that our election administration system works particularly well. This is not because people do not have ideas about how it should work, but rather, as Gerken argues, because there is a “here to there” problem.

Implementing high-quality election administration, in Gerken’s recounting, faces a slew of problems. First, partisanship. State and local elected officials control election administration and are loathe to implement reforms that may harm them or their co-partisans. After all, when one thinks of the American vote counting system, the face that immediately springs to mind is Katherine Harris. Second, localism. Much of the work in election administration is done at the local level, by underfunded county and city officials that get few rewards for running an election system well and are able to export the cost of doing badly. After all, the problems with a poorly conducted presidential election will be felt in places beyond the county that does a bad job counting votes. Further, the decentralization of the system hides information from voters and officials. Even figuring out how many people voted in any given election is an extremely difficult task, as it requires getting information from huge numbers of differently run systems. While many have called for the creation of a non-partisan, national (or at least state-wide) election administration system, these calls have largely gone unheeded. Gerken argues that election administration is the perfect area for institutional tools that can harness politics to fix politics. Her answer is “The Democracy Index.” The Index would rank states (or counties) in terms of the quality of their nuts-and-bolts election administration. This numerical ranking would provide a clear heuristic guide for voters in elections for Secretary of State or county clerk about how well their officials are doing in achieving well-run elections along indisputably important dimensions, like the length of lines at voting locations, the functioning of voting machines, and the like. It would create competition among jurisdictions to rise up the Index’s ladder, engendering a race

41. Gerken, supra note 16, at 1, 3.
42. Id. at 1–2.
43. Id. at 2.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 455.
47. Gerken, supra note 16, at 1–2.
48. GERKEN, supra note 40.
49. Id. at 1.
50. Id. at 5.
to the top rather than to the bottom. Further, it would provide information to election administrators, who would be able to see who was doing well and what policies they could copy from high performers. If the Democracy Index was a success, politicians would still be in charge, but instead of politics providing incentives to stint on election administration (or worse), it would provide incentives to improve election administration.

The Democracy Index’s story is still playing itself out — a huge number of cities, states and even countries have committed to creating Indexes, and the Pew Charitable Trust has just put together a national Index. But the core of the idea is the same as the core of Gerken’s redistricting ideas: it is designed to be a tool to provide incentives to incumbent officials and information to voters in order to create the conditions for election reform. This move is one of the most important in modern election law — a move that brings the theoretical complexity and cleverness of the scholarship into the world of practical politics.

Federalism All the Way Down

Also early in her career, Gerken began working on a project about the ways American governance uses and benefits from having unrepresentative sub-national decision-making bodies, either by opinion or by demography. In Second-Order Diversity and Dissenting by Deciding, Gerken addresses at a theoretical level how to think about institutional design decisions to accommodate and address differences in the population.

In the first article, Gerken contrasts “first-order” diversity — the degree to which the population constituting a sub-national decision-making body is representative of the national population — with “second-order diversity” or the extent to which sub-national decision-making bodies drawn from the same population are different from one another. Gerken argues that second-order diversity, which allows some sub-national entities to be minority-majority while others are heavily majority dominated, provides substantial benefits. It gives a range of national minorities the ability to make decisions that matter, “turns the tables” on national majorities and thereby influences their beliefs, creates

51. Id. at 6.
52. Id.
53. Id.
55. This is extremely characteristic of Gerken’s work. She has a rare comfort of bringing the messiness and complexity of real world disputes into the scholar’s ivory tower, and a rare skill in bringing the scholar’s logic and wisdom into the politics of the real world. She not only embraces the democratic mess of real politics as a scholarly matter, her scholarship takes on the difficulties and messy contradictions necessary to contribute to real politics.
56. Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099 (2005) [hereinafter Second-Order Diversity]; Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005) [hereinafter Dissenting by Deciding]. These papers, and those that follow, are almost impossibly rich, and my efforts to summarize them will inevitably leave out a great deal — one of the great things about Gerken’s work is that page thirty-three of an article is inevitably as interesting as page three.
57. Second-Order Diversity, supra note 56, at 1102-05.
58. Id. at 1104.
diverse outcomes, and allows for cycling between a variety of results. Rather than repeating our national debates in sub-national institutions, as first-order diversity ensures, second-order diversity creates a "richer," more varied set of democratic results.

In *Dissenting by Deciding*, Gerken argues that second-order diversity provides a particular type of benefit to national minorities: the ability not only to state their differences in losing efforts, but to actually enact them in some places. These serve as examples that make their dissenting ideas more powerful in national debates. Further, it puts the onus on dissenters to make their ideas real rather than merely theoretical, which may change their (or others') views.

While there has been some discussion of things like second-order diversity and dissenting by deciding in different areas of the law, Gerken's pieces make several truly important intellectual moves. First, they discuss the benefits of second-order diversity and dissenting by deciding in a trans-substantive way, across institutions of all sorts from juries to school boards. Rather than analyzing the effects of particular institutions on particular policy areas, Gerken forces us to look at a theoretical level at how hierarchical institutional design affects politics broadly defined.

Second, the benefits Gerken highlights are different in kind from the ways these issues are generally discussed in the academic literature. The benefits of diffusing power in Gerken's work are not primarily about how diffusing power improves the fit between locals and local policy, as in scholarship following the work of Charles Tiebout, nor are they the benefits of putting decision-makers closer to the electorate. Rather, Gerken's focus is on how diffusing power affects discourse at both the national and local levels, and on how diffusing power affects the opinions and beliefs of both majorities and minorities. That is, hers is a theory of how diffusing power improves democracy at all levels of government.

Gerken then moves on to discussing how sub-national institutions might express their power. In *Sovereigns and Servants*, Gerken claims that the traditional focus in both federalism and local government law on determining what decisions smaller governments can make without interference from larger governments — state sovereignty, *imperio in imperium* local governmental power — ignores the power locals have even when they have no protection against higher levels of government or when they are implementing policies devised by higher levels of government. The key point Gerken

59. Id.
60. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. That dissenting without deciding is unsubstantial and cheap is a point well made by Arcade Fire: "When you’re hiding underground/The rain can’t get you wet/But do you think your righteousness/Could pay the interest on your debt?/I have my doubts about it." *ARCADE FIRE*, *City With No Children*, on *THE SUBURBS*, (Merge Records 2010).
64. *Dissenting by Deciding*, supra note 56, at 1748.
65. See Charles M. Tiebout, *A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures*, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (arguing that diffusing power to many local governments will produce an optimal provision of local public services under some conditions).
66. See generally *Dissenting by Deciding*, supra note 56.
makes is that when locals can propose policies or implement policies in ways of their choosing, even if they can be overruled, they have the power to force the larger government to overrule them, giving them control over the larger government's policy agenda.

Forcing the larger government to decide to overrule them gives the local dissenters the power to influence policy not only in their jurisdiction, but also beyond their borders, because the way issues are posed at the national level can affect outcomes. The fact of a local or state government's subordination to a higher power in a policy area gives the smaller government the ability to dissent as a member of a community, as opposed to merely doing its own thing entirely separately from the rest. Put in the language of the previous pieces, dissenting by deciding may be more powerful (or at least differently powerful) when made by dependent and subordinated sub-national or sub-state institutions. Further, national groups may be more willing to delegate power to institutions they can overrule.

In *Uncooperative Federalism*, Gerken, along with Jessica Bulman-Pozen, takes the insights of *Sovereigns and Servants* and applies them to debates about federalism. They argue that federalism scholars traditionally focus on two potential types of relationships between the national government and the states. When states challenge federal authority, we think of them as either "autonomous sovereigns." When they work with the federal government, we use the language of "cooperative federalism," and talk about states as dependent allies of the federal government in implementing national goals. What is left out of this is a third possibility, "uncooperative federalism," or the ways in which states can exercise power as a "dissenter, rival, [or] challenger" in areas where they implement federal policies.

When the federal government calls on states to implement federal policy (as it increasingly does), states can implement such policies according to their own wishes, either to fit their own needs or to directly challenge federal policy. Uncooperative states can use this power to gain control over the national agenda by forcing the federal government's hand. These uncooperative states can speak to national decision-makers from inside the federal policy-making universe and gain the benefit in national debates of...
providing real world examples of how dissent would work.\textsuperscript{80} The federal government may be more willing to grant power to servant states because it knows it can overrule extreme local variations.\textsuperscript{81} Various doctrines, particularly the anti-commandeering principle expressed in \textit{New York v. United States} and \textit{Printz v. United States} ignores this point, focusing exclusively on the degree to which a state is sovereign and missing entirely states’ power as “servants.”\textsuperscript{82}

The final piece (so far) in the series, one that brings together the insights of her previous work in the area, is Gerken’s 2009 Term \textit{Harvard Law Review} Supreme Court Foreword, \textit{Federalism All the Way Down}.\textsuperscript{83} Gerken argues that the rhetoric of federalism is rooted in a conception of states as sovereigns, even in areas where scholars understand that states are not sovereign or independent in any meaningful sense.\textsuperscript{84} We tend to think of states as most important when they are providing functional alternatives to the federal government, or when they can define policies all on their own.\textsuperscript{85} Scholars and judges focus on federalism as a tool for providing individuals with “exit rights:” ways for minorities to avoid national decisions in protected separate spheres or to choose policies as consumers “voting with [their] feet.”\textsuperscript{86}

While these are valid ways of thinking about the benefits of federalism, Gerken argues that federalism also empowers national minorities even when they are not sovereign and even when their powers are “contingent, limited, and subject to reversal by the national majority.”\textsuperscript{87} In addition to providing power through exit and differentiation, federalism — even when not protected against federal override — also gives national minorities a voice in national decisions by allowing them to use their local experience as a tool in national debates and as a method of forcing the hand of national power.\textsuperscript{88} That is, we should think about federalism not only as a method for providing differentiated types and levels governance at the sub-national level, but also as a method for improving democratic debate and representation at all levels of government.\textsuperscript{89}

Looking at how federalism works in areas without sovereignty suggests that many of federalism’s benefits — the benefits of second-order diversity, dissenting by deciding, and uncooperative policy-making — are provided not only by states but also by all sorts of multi-purpose and single-purpose institutions, from cities to juries to zoning commissions.\textsuperscript{90} Further, the harms we associate with federalism, particularly the difficulties created by rogue states and their refusal to implement national level decisions, are not so

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textsuperscript{80}] See id. at 1285–86.
  \item[\textsuperscript{81}] See id. at 1271–72.
  \item[\textsuperscript{82}] Id. at 1295–98; see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
  \item[\textsuperscript{83}] Gerken, \textit{supra} note 12, at 4.
  \item[\textsuperscript{84}] Id. at 6–8.
  \item[\textsuperscript{85}] Id.
  \item[\textsuperscript{86}] Id. at 6–8, 22. See also Richard A. Epstein, \textit{Exit Rights Under Federalism}, 55 \textit{LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.} 147 (1992).
  \item[\textsuperscript{87}] Gerken, \textit{supra} note 12, at 7.
  \item[\textsuperscript{88}] Id. at 53–56.
  \item[\textsuperscript{89}] Id. at 8.
  \item[\textsuperscript{90}] Id. at 28–29.
\end{itemize}
bad in areas without sovereignty.\textsuperscript{91}

Freed from the heavy costs associated with sovereignty, we might imagine that the principal-agent problem isn’t always a problem. While resistance surely has its costs, minority rule at the local level generates a dynamic form of contestation, the democratic churn necessary for an ossified national system to move forward.\textsuperscript{92}

In Gerken’s hands, “federalism all the way down” promotes democracy in a big, messy, disputatious country.\textsuperscript{93} It allows power to shift constantly among different groups and different ideas, provides minorities of all stripes with tools to make their claims in the public sphere, and is designed not to promote administrative efficiency but rather to provide an arena for political debate.\textsuperscript{94} Gerkenean\textsuperscript{95} federalism all the way down is a tool for promoting a rich, varied democracy, not merely for providing a variety of exit options for consumer-voters.

\textbf{WELL, ACTUALLY, COME TO THINK OF IT, THERE IS THIS ONE LITTLE THING I HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT: REASONS TO DOUBT WE SEE AS MUCH DISSENTING BY DECIDING OR UNCOOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AS OUR INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE SUGGESTS WE MIGHT}

Looking at these two lines of scholarship together leads to us to a question rather than an answer. If dissenting by deciding, uncooperative federalism, and second-order diversity are good things, are we sure that our current allocation of power provides them in optimal ways, balancing other needs? If we, following Gerken, believe that part of the reason we devolve power to state, local, and other institutions is to produce the benefits of dissenting by deciding and uncooperative federalism, then we might ask whether our current devolutions of power actually accomplish this goal.\textsuperscript{96} And if we actually see less

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{91} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{92} \textit{Id. at 9.}
  \item \textsuperscript{93} \textit{Id. at 43.}
  \item \textsuperscript{94} \textit{Id. at 17–20. “I thus limn the theories that make up the other half of constitutional federalism — those that emphasize the role that minority rule plays in shaping identity, promoting democracy, and diffusing power.” Id. at 20 (citations omitted).}
  \item \textsuperscript{95} Triple word score! 45 points! See supra note 6.
  \item \textsuperscript{96} This, of course, assumes that our constitutional structure is good. To the extent we think that we want less dissenting by deciding and uncooperative federalism than our constitutional structure seems to call for, then this is not a problem, but rather something to celebrate. I am going to assume that the Constitution here provides its own normative \textit{desiderata}. However, particularly with the Constitution’s leading modern scourge (the great Sandy Levinson) in attendance, we should be careful before we assume that we, you know, \textit{désiderâmus} the Constitution’s \textit{desiderata}. (I hope my middle school Latin worked out there. One can’t be sure about these things.) Another way of putting this point is with a speech from Whit Stillman’s brilliant film \textit{The Last Days of Disco} (Universal Studios 1998):

    \begin{quote}
      You know that Shakespearean admonition, “[t]o thine own self be true?” It’s premised on the idea that “thine own self” is something pretty good, being true to which is commendable. But what if “thine own self” is not so good? What if it’s pretty bad? Would it be better, in that case, \textit{not} to be true to thine own self? See, that’s my situation.
    \end{quote}

    Although I am engaging in this assumption here, it is certainly a bad, if common, practice to assume that our political order is necessarily pretty good and that we should strive to be true to it. Even if I were not, though, the point holds. For any polity attempting to achieve some quantum of federalism-based goods through institutional design, we need to ask whether the existence (or likely development) of non-formal institutions will result in achieving the ends of that institutional design.
\end{itemize}
than we might like, how do we get from here to there?

This section will show that there are strong reasons to believe we end up with less dissenting by deciding and uncooperative policy-making than our institutional structures might suggest. That is, it is pretty likely that American federalism in practice does not reliably produce the theoretical benefits touted by promoters of "Our Federalism," at least in the quantities suggested by our decisions to devolve power. The reasons are strategic and, more importantly for our purposes here, due to the development of non-state national entities from political parties to think tanks that diminish difference and responsiveness to local needs and beliefs in decentralized political units.

Strategic Reasons for a Lack of Subnational Difference: Susan Rose-Ackerman's Theories About Democratic Laboratories Applied to Dissenting by Deciding and Uncooperative Federalism

The idea of states as laboratories of democracy is one of the most frequently discussed benefits of federalism. But the extent to which state governments or other loci of decentralized power actually experiment is not really known (nor is it clear what benchmark we should judge it against). Further, states have good reasons not to experiment. Some of these reasons apply equally to dissenting by deciding and uncooperative policy-making.

In a classic 1980 article, Susan Rose-Ackerman explores two types of reasons that states might not experiment to the socially optimal level. The first is that experimentation is costly, but does not give rise to property rights in the policy. States may decide to free ride on the policy experiments of others, or refuse to experiment to the socially optimal level because they do not care about benefits to other states. As Brian Galle and Joseph Leahy note, this depends on ideas being easily copied by other states, which may not be true, and on the same ideas being good across different states. But it seems pretty likely that ideas do spread, and that the lack of property rights in them reduces the incentive to innovate in many policy areas. Second, Rose-Ackerman argues that even where innovation is optimal for the population, it may be bad for incumbent officials. Innovation is risky and most incumbents win reelection. Someone sure to win reelection is unlikely to take a lot of chances.

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98. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
100. Id. at 603-05.
101. Id.
103. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 99, at 594.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 593-94.
106. Id. at 594.
Both of these arguments apply to the types of behavior prized in Gerken's account. One of Gerken's key points is that benefits of dissenting by deciding run not only to the dissenters, but to the rest of society— we all can see how different policy choices play out in the real world when power is decentralized. But the cost of developing dissenting policies, however, is borne entirely by the state or other decentralized entity. This is the opposite of Gerken's point about cheap talk. Dissenting without deciding is cheap, in the sense that one does not have to actually live with the results of one's dissenting opinion; nor does one have to figure out how one's dissent would actually work. However, dissenting by deciding is costly, and differentially so — the dissenters have to bear the risk of trying something new and have to invest in figuring out how it would work. Dissenting jurisdictions have to come up with alternatives and methods for implementing their dissent without being able to draw on the resources of the whole, while part of the benefit flows to others. The benefits of coming up with something new may be less than the costs of merely acquiescing to some disagreeable federal policy. We may see less dissenting by deciding than we would expect given differences in the population and diffusion of power because the cost of developing good dissents is borne entirely by the dissenters.

Rose-Ackerman's point about the incentives of elected officials being more risk averse than voters also applies to dissenting by deciding and uncooperative policy-making. The cost to elected officials in sub-national jurisdictions — in lost opportunities for advancement or in sheer personal pressure — of dissenting from national orthodoxy can be quite high. For instance, a mayor who defies state policy in the name of local representation may be risking a chance at winning a statewide election. This pressure can be social as well as political. A local education official who promotes a locally popular but nationally disliked idea — e.g., creationism or Ebonics — may become a national joke.

None of this is to say that we do not see dissenting by deciding or uncooperative policy-making, but rather that merely diffusing power may not create as much as Gerken might hope.

Private Institutional Reasons for a Lack of Dissenting by Deciding: The Problem of Mismatch

Gerken's work, like many of ours, can generally be described as existing in the world of institutional or constitutional design: she makes arguments about the benefits and costs of dividing power among various governmental bodies. Theories of institutional design work from a basic assumption that the institutional set-up produces real world effects; that if you design the institutions in a certain way, there will be predictable consequences at the level of policy-making and benefits and costs for individuals. What work on institutional design frequently leaves out is the (possible) existence of non-state entities gumming up the operation of institutional designs.

When institutional designers advocate diffusing power to lower levels of democratic government because it will achieve certain policy ends, they have to make some

107. See Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 56, at 1746–53.
assumptions about how voters at the lower level of government will behave.108 Usually, their assumption is that voters at the lower level of government will use elections to express preferences about policies that can be enacted by the lower level of government and will demand accountability from officials at the lower level of government. That is to say, they expect local democracy to work.

But decades of research on voters shows that they have trouble making democracy work without help.109 As Joseph Schumpeter and Anthony Downs famously showed, becoming knowledgeable about politics is not instrumentally useful for most people.110 No one vote is likely to affect an election, and learning about politics is costly — only a rare citizen (and likely a monomaniac)111 will take the time to learn the policy positions of each person who appears on the ballot, from state senator to sheriff, never mind developing the analytical tools for determining which policies are better at a particular level of government.112 In fact, many voters know shockingly few of the facts one might need to make informed voting decisions.113

This principle is not specific to subnational elections, although voters do know less about state policies than national ones. But national elections give voters a key bit of help — useful political party labels. In our modern polarized Congress, knowing a candidate is a Democrat or a Republican will tell you almost all the useful information you need about their issue stances.114 Further, it will permit voters, as Morris Fiorina argues, to develop a “running tally” about the performance of political parties over time, attaching to parties in power whatever good or bad they notice about the world when one party or another is in power.115 As long as the parties are roughly consistent over time, divide the electorate roughly equally, and are internally coherent, these running tallies will be pretty good guides for voters.116 When aggregated across the electorate, even if most

108. Gerken makes this point clearly:

Most theories of federalism explicitly or implicitly depend on minority rule. For instance, states are unlikely to constitute laboratories of democracy or facilitate Tieboutian sorting if the same types of people are making decisions at the state and national levels. Similarly, ambition is unlikely to counter ambition if state and national actors are united in their ambitions.

Gerken, supra note 12, at 11 n.10.


111. Or even more likely a lobbyist.

112. Voter ignorance is not a problem of a benighted “they,” but rather is a problem for all of us who live in the real world with its competing demands; requirements that we feed ourselves, and the like. If you show me someone who has deeply and truly studied each choice they have to make when voting, I will show you someone who is not all that busy.

113. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 109, at 8–11.

114. Id. at 14–20.


116. Chris Elmendorf and I summarize these requirements:
voters are inert "Michigan voters," with preferences determined as a result of social forces rather than assessments of performance, the fact that some voters are engaged in running tally decision making at least some of the time can lead to "macro-partisan" efficiency, allowing the electorate to behave as if it were far more informed than it actually is. The inert types balance each other out across a national electorate (at least partially); some percentage of voters changing their minds in response to performance can produce an overall responsive electorate. While political scientists endlessly debate exactly how competent political party heuristics and "the miracle of aggregation" allow voters to be, virtually everyone agrees they improve voter competence substantially.  

But voters in sub-national elections do not have the same help. Voters in these elections suffer from what I have called elsewhere the problem of "mismatch." Our political parties are national coalitions that do not compete for the local median voter on the basis of issues specific to the corresponding level of government. That is, they are "mismatched" to local and state elections — they do not provide voters with much information about how candidates running on their platform will govern at the local level, nor do they compete for the allegiance of the median voter at the local level. But they are on the ballot nonetheless. And voters, because they do not know much about individual legislative candidates, end up using their national level preferences in local elections because it likely tells them at least something about the candidates. One result of this is that jurisdictions that are uncompetitive at the national level — say Idaho or New York City — have no partisan competition at the city council or state legislative levels. Another result is that we see less, and different, types of dissenting by deciding and uncooperative policy-making than Gerken suggests.

By this we mean (1) that learning a candidate’s party affiliation enables voters to infer the candidate’s position on most significant issues of national policy; (2) that the packaging of policy positions into party labels tracks latent preference correlations within the electorate (so that voters who favor the Democratic position on issue x are also likely to favor the Democratic stance on issue y); and (3) that the major party brands divide the electorate fairly evenly, such that roughly half of the electorate prefers the Democratic brand to the Republican brand and vice versa.

Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 109, at 5.

117. Id. at 17; see ROBERT S. ERIKSON, MICHAEL B. MACKUEN & GAMES STIMSON, THE MACRO POLIT (2002).

118. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 109, at 17.

119. See id. at 32–43; David Schleicher, I Would but I Need the Eggs: Why Neither Exit Nor Voice Limits Big City Corruption, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 277, 288 (2010) [hereinafter I Would But I Need the Eggs]; What if Europe, supra note 8, at 139 (2011); City Council Elections, supra note 8, at 419–24.

120. See City Council Elections, supra note 8, at 423–26.

121. Id. at 424.

122. Id. at 451.

123. Primaries do not help either, as voters in primaries are without any heuristic guides at all. As a result, they behave largely like they are uninformed of the ideological stances of candidates, particularly in down-ballot elections. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 109, at 27–29; David Schleicher, All Politics is National, THE ATLANTIC (July 13, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/07/all-politics-is-national/259759/.
Here is a graph prepared by political scientist John Coleman.\textsuperscript{124}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{presidential-party-seat-change.png}
\caption{Presidential Party Seat Change, US House and Lower Houses in States}
\end{figure}

As you can see, voting in state legislative elections directly tracks voting in national elections, even though many inputs to national politics (e.g. foreign policy) are not a large part of state politics, and the performance of officials can obviously differ.\textsuperscript{125} Local legislative elections are even more dramatic, with national level preferences determining almost all local legislative elections.\textsuperscript{126} Executives — governors and mayors — can become well-known enough to break out of this dynamic.\textsuperscript{127} But voting in state and local legislative elections is frequently what European political scientists call “second-order.”\textsuperscript{128} Local and state legislative elections are mostly referenda on the President and Congress.\textsuperscript{129}

In the next section, I will present some of the theories I have developed for why mismatch occurs, first in my own work, and then in work with Chris Elmendorf, and some potential ways to mitigate or fix it. But here I want to discuss what its implications are for dissenting by deciding and uncooperative federalism and localism. Clearly, when local and state elections are second-order, the degree to which local governments represent local preferences diminishes.\textsuperscript{130} Local politicians face few repercussions from passing policies disfavored by the local median voter.\textsuperscript{131} After all, if local elections are sec-

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[125.] Id.
\item[126.] See City Council Elections, supra note 8, at 436.
\item[127.] Schleicher, supra note 123.
\item[128.] Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 109, at 40 (citing Karlheinz Reif & Hermann Schmitt, Nine Second-Order National Elections — A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results, 8 EUR. J. POL. RES. 3, 8–9 (1980)).
\item[129.] Id. at 39 (citing Steven Rogers, Accountability in a Federal System (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with author)).
\item[130.] Id. at 39.
\item[131.] Id.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
ond-order, what local politicians do just does not matter very much to their election chances. However, they will likely be responsive to national level partisanship and ideology.132 Local officials win elections on the basis of their national partisan affiliation.133 They can be challenged in primaries for failure to be responsive to their stances on national level issues,134 and if they want to advance in politics, they need to do so through national level party organizations. This changes how state and local politics relate to national politics. When you see big swings in presidential years — like 1964 or 2008 — local politics will largely resemble national politics, with little dissenting by deciding based on local realities or uncooperative policy-making.135 When you see large counter-swings, like 2006 or 2010, where the party out-of-power at the national level dominates in the states, you will see more dissenting by deciding and uncooperative policy-making, with national parties using state and local governments to make national-level points.136

Either way, local realities and minorities that are not out-of-power national political parties frequently do not matter much in local and state elections. Ideological minorities that are not merely the second most powerful national political party will be less influential than their local or state numbers suggest because they do not have the tools — effective party labels — to use elections to give voice to their dissent. Many of the benefits Gerken identifies that flow from second-order diversity, from the introduction of new ideas that challenge the national ideological status quo, to the ability to see in practice ideas that we do not see emerging in the handoffs of power between Democrats and Republicans at the national level, will not emerge if there is mismatch.137 And because it causes local elections to behave like polls on national party preference, mismatch can deform the dissenting by deciding and uncooperative policy-making we do see. Allowing local and state governments to check national policy by not implementing it is a check on government power, and a form of uncooperative federalism.138 But in the context of mismatch, uncooperative federalism will frequently be used in service of achieving success at the national level for co-partisans. While uncooperative federalism in this context provides another check in our system of checks and balances, it is largely one that replicates the checks provided by having a separate legislature and executive. Uncooperative federalism gives the party that does not hold the presidency another tool for frustrating his agenda.139 This may have its benefits, but they are not the same as the benefits Gerken suggests “our federalism” provides: a rich, multi-directional give-and-take be-

132. Id.
133. City Council Elections, supra note 8, at 451.
134. A quick note on primaries. Primaries almost certainly do not do much to encourage state and local politicians to curry favor with the local median voter on local issues, even when one party is effectively 100% of the electorate. The reason is that there are no ballot labels inside primaries, making them, in effect, like non-partisan elections with a limited electorate. Voters do not have the tools to track the performance of officials or heuristics for their ideological stances. See I Would but I Need the Eggs, supra note 119; Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 109, at 29.
136. Id.
137. See Second-Order Diversity, supra note 56, at 1104.
138. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 73, at 1270–73.
139. Id. at 1270–72, 1270 n.39.
between multiple types of majorities. If political parties take a different scope (i.e. national and not local) than governmental units, they can change the likely effects of decentralizing power.

Political parties are not the only national, non-governmental institutions that suppress local dissent and change the form local dissent and uncooperative policy-making take. A problem Rose-Ackerman discusses — a lack of investment due to easy copying of state laws — is enhanced by institutions pushing national uniformity like the American Law Institute or National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. By reducing the cost of copying, they make dissenting by deciding comparatively more expensive.

The extent of copying by governments can be surprisingly large, even on the international level. A group of sociologists and international relations scholars known as the World Society School have shown that nation-states copy one another to an enormous degree, even when it makes little sense. For instance, all countries, even landlocked countries, divide their military up into army, air force and navy; countries without scientific establishments create science policy-review boards just like developed countries; and school curricula are almost identical across industrialized and non-industrialized states. When a new idea gets hot, like including “rights of the child” in constitutions, it suddenly appears in new constitutions, no matter their origin. Notably, ideas travel from poor to rich countries, as well as from rich to poor; all countries are copiers. World Society School scholars explain this “isomorphism” as the effect of a form of international peer pressure, both formal and informal, on state organization. Organizations like the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other states, grant recognition and dole out aid based on the acceptance of the basic form of the modern state.

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141. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 99, at 603–05.
144. See Schleicher, supra note 143, at 230, 235.
145. See How to Influence States, supra note 143, at 653 n.124.
146. Id. at 652.
147. Id. at 647.
148. Gerken responded to this literature in an essay in 2006. Heather K. Gerken, Legislatures in Dialogue with One Another: Dissent, Decisions, and the Global Polity, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 547, 558–63 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006). She argues that isomorphism created substantial costs and that international organizations should try to engage in “norm management” to encourage dissenting by deciding or simply differences between legislatures by not
risk-averse leaders can turn to when decisions need to be made. And sub-state entities can drive conformism. If all potential finance ministers go to the Kennedy School and study the same examples, it is no surprise that many nations end up following similar policies.

Similar things likely happen at the state and local levels inside the United States. State and local policy-makers attend national universities and law schools, are lobbied by national-level interest groups, and receive policy advice from national-level think tanks and political organizations, both left and right. The socialization of states and cities pushes them away from the de-centered, dissent and difference focused model of federalism Gerken suggests is a central goal of "our federalism."149

Even in areas where the federal government allows states to make policy and where states or localities want to dissent, frequently the optimal scope of private institutions limits their power. Because businesses frequently take national form, a few big states are able to decide policies for all other states in a number of areas. When California sets auto emissions policies,150 automakers must follow California’s policies if economies of scale mean that it is much cheaper to only produce one type of each car for the domestic market (and Rhode Island or Wyoming’s preferences for dissent will matter little). The content of high school and grade school textbooks were, for a number of years, determined almost entirely by the odd politics of Texas’s State Board of Education for similar reasons.151 Textbooks require a lot of upfront investment, but publishers can print as many as they want, creating enormous economies of scale. Ignoring the Texas market would be extremely costly, and publishers therefore catered to the State Board’s whims.152

Put together, I hope these sections show that if dissenting by deciding and uncooperative policy-making are goals of our institutional structure, we likely get less of them (and get them in different forms) than our extant institutional structure seems to ask for. Things that are not part of the institutional design of "our federalism" gum up its operation. This leaves two types of questions for Gerkenian federalism: (a) How much dissenting by deciding and uncooperative policy-making does our system of federalism, localism, and decentralization generally actually produce, given the existence of national

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149. Gerken, supra note 140.
152. California does not exert similar influence in the textbook market because it requires textbooks to be "Californiacentric," meaning that it is basically its own market for books, whereas the Texas-approved books are generalist. Id.
non-formal bodies like political parties and private groups that serve to reduce differences across the country?; and (b) How might law respond to, and attempt to shape, the scope of these non-formal institutions in service of goals like dissenting by deciding and uncooperative federalism alike? The next section will take a stab at these questions.

"THE ONLY THING THAT COULD MAKE GERKEN'S WORK ANY BETTER IS DISCUSSING MINE JUST A BIT MORE": SOLVING MISMATCH AS A METHOD OF GETTING FROM HERE TO "ALL THE WAY DOWN"

I jumped the gun on this section, as I used my work to define the "problem" in Section II. Mismatch — a misalignment between the demands of the constitutional system (federalism, localism, etc.) and the scope of political parties and other institutions — creates problems for dissenting by deciding and uncooperative federalism.153 These are not problems for Gerken’s scholarship. After all, both dissenting by deciding and uncooperative federalism continue to exist even when there is mismatch, and her work identifies, explains, and analyzes their properties. Rather, it suggests a future path for the line of thinking. Mismatch creates problems if we think that dissenting by deciding and uncooperative federalism are good things that our institutional structures were designed to provide. This creates a question: If “all the way down” is where we want to be, how do we get from here to there?

As the outline suggests, this is no time for modesty. I think my work provides an answer, or at least can help point to one. But in order to get there, I need to discuss why mismatch problems occur.

Mismatch can occur for a few reasons: parties either do not take consistent stances on local issues that divide the electorate for legal or strategic reasons, are not perceived to have taken such stances on local issues due to voter limitations, or a sufficient number of voters do not care whether they take stances on local issues that it removes incentives for local parties to care about local issues.

The classic Downsian assumptions about parties include candidates saying whatever it takes to be elected and constantly proposing policies to get the attention of the median voter.154 At the local, and, to a lesser degree, the state level, we do not see this. Parties frequently seem to do little to try to attract the median voter on issues specific to their level of government.155 In fact, they are frequently not even coherent on local issues. Trying to figure out, say, the position of the local Democratic Party branch of Washington, D.C., or New York City on zoning, schools, or policing, is extremely difficult. Instead, there are as many positions as there are Democratic Party officials, as membership in the party is defined by allegiance to national party policies, from abortion to redistributive taxation.156 The question is, why does the local minority party — usual-

153. What if Europe, supra note 8, at 139.
154. See DOWNS, supra note 110, at 107–09.
156. David Schleicher, Ain’t No Party Like a Bloomberg Party Because a Bloomberg Party Don’t Stop (Or, You Know, Have to Deal With Term Limits), PRAWFSBLAWG (May 7, 2012), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/05/aint-no-party-like-a-bloomberg-party-because-a-bloomberg-party-dont-stop-or-you-know-have-to-deal-wi.html.
ly the Republicans — fail to create a coherent set of policies on local or state issues, to attract voters away from the dominant major party?

One explanation I have offered is that election laws limit a local minority party’s ability to create differentiated local platforms. Ballot access laws ensure that the same parties that appear in state-wide elections also appear in local ones. Laws governing party-switching make it impossible for voters to be members of one party for the purpose of national elections and another for the purpose of state or local elections. Laws requiring primaries ensure that voters who have selected their party membership based on national allegiance choose candidates and frequently result in local or state primary electorates without coherent beliefs on local or state issues. The result of these laws and their interaction with simple facts about voter behavior — that voters generally do not know much about individual legislative candidates and care more about national politics than local or state when making party identification decisions — results in uncompetitive local and state elections. Voters use national party membership as a heuristic when voting because they do not have any other information about candidates (and this makes sense as long as there is any correlation between national and local policy preferences). The local minority party cannot develop a coherent policy message on issues specific to that level of government because they cannot attract a membership to choose a coherent set of candidates. And the ordinary Duvergerian limitations on third-party entry ensure that we do not see new, local-only third parties. The result is that national votes are translated almost perfectly into state and local votes with almost no attention paid to the promises or actual performance of state or local officials.

Another explanation is that even where local branches of parties do attempt to develop popular local platforms, voters find it difficult to differentiate these locally specific messages from the national party’s brand. There is substantial evidence that some state parties, for instance, have adopted messages that are in-keeping with the local median voter. Based on surveys of voters and officials, political scientists estimate, for instance, that the Massachusetts Republican Party in the state legislature has preferences that match those of the median voter. Voters in the Bay State do not seem to care very much, though; Democrats have dominated both houses of the legislature since 1946. This may be because some voters find it difficult to keep the differences between state and national parties straight in their heads. It may be because voters develop opinions retrospectively and therefore have no experience with actual minority party governance in many states (and as a result do not believe Republicans would actually

157. City Council Elections, supra note 8, at 468.
158. Id. at 425, 450–51, 468. See also id. at 450–51 n.109 (summarizing some of these laws).
159. Id. at 457–59.
160. Schleicher, supra note 123.
162. Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 109, at 44–46.
163. See id.
164. See Schleicher, supra note 123.
165. Id.
166. Id.
govern with the preferences of the median voter in mind if they ever came to power). 167
And it may be because voters care more about using state and local elections as a way to
comment on national elections, in which they favor Democrats by large majorities, than
they do about state or local governance. 168

A final story has to do with differences among voters. 169 Since the 1950s, we have
known that some percentage of voters relate to political parties in a way very different
than Downs would suggest. 170 Downs, and the literature that followed, assumed voters
made an assessment of the performance and promises of parties, and then decided which
fit their pre-existing preferences better. 171 Many voters — call them “Michigan voters”
after the political scientists that discovered this — identify with parties, and their as-
sessments and ideologies are defined by this identification, rather than the other way
around. 172 In this model, party identification is more like a membership in a religion
than an assessment of politicians; it gets passed down from parent to child and defines
one’s involvement in politics. 173 While they will periodically step out and vote cross-
party, only “realignments” can change this fundamental identification decision for these
voters. 174

If the electorate is entirely made up of Michigan voters, party democracy would
not be a very productive method of translating popular views into public policy. Howev-
er, even if large parts of the population are Michigan voters, the existence of some run-
ning tally, policy-and-performance voters can turn the electorate into a responsive one,
assuming the Michigan vote balances out between Democrats and Republicans. 175 But,
at the local or state level, there is no reason to believe the Michigan vote balances out
because the partisan vote is unbalanced. If a jurisdiction is 60/40 Republican in presiden-
tial races and half of all partisans are Michigan voters, then a Democratic candidate
would need the votes of sixty percent of the people who take policy or performance into
account at all when they vote in order to win. 176 The existence of a large, unbalanced
number of Michigan voters can make competition basically impossible.

Depending on which of these stories is right in any given situation, you can imag-
ine different policies designed to alleviate mismatch. Each of them would have interest-
ing effects on the benefits of federalism Gerken identifies. If the problem is a failure of
local or state parties to modify their platforms due to legal constraints, one can imagine
changing election laws and repealing or modifying some of the rules discussed above. A
strong form of this would be barring parties that appear on the ballot in national elections
from contesting local elections. 177 This would face a constitutional challenge, but lesser

167. Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 109, at 15–16.
168. Schleicher, supra note 123.
169. Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 109, at 43–44.
170. Id. at 11–12.
171. See, e.g., Downs, supra note 110, at 108–09.
172. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 109, at 4 (discussing the concept of “Michigan voters”).
173. Id. at 12–13.
174. Id. at 13.
175. See id. at 34–38.
176. See id.
177. I proposed this in City Council Elections, supra note 8, at 470–73, although it would surely face serious
changes, like removing restrictions on party switching, might make local parties more responsive to local considerations. We also could imagine all sorts of legal changes that encourage voters to consider local issues. We could, for instance, change how candidates are labeled on the ballot. In this example, Massachusetts state legislative candidates would run as “Massachusetts Democrats” and “Massachusetts Republicans,” to disassociate them from their national parents. We could also identify on the ballot which party controls the legislature, something voters are often confused about. And many other things as well.

If those changes did not work or were not allowed to work, an alternative could take the form of what Elmendorf and I call party substitutes. We have come up with a few ideas like this. In the context of the formally non-partisan elections used in most American cities, our simplest idea would allow the mayor or governor to make on-ballot endorsements. The intuition is pretty simple. Mayors and governors have high enough profiles to avoid being trapped by their party, as out-party governors from Republican Mitt Romney in Massachusetts to Democrat Dave Freudenthal in Wyoming and mayors like Michael Bloomberg and Richard Riordan have shown. Mayoral endorsement on the ballot would take these high-profile elected officials’ personal brands and turn them into down-ballot, quasi-party brands. Again, this would give voters access to information about candidates on state or local issues and would allow politics in a jurisdiction to turn on a different axis than national Democrats versus national Republicans.

One might imagine trying some version of this outside of the ballot process. In fact, Gerken has. The Democracy Index is, in its way, an attempt to solve the problem of mismatch. State voters know very little about the performance of secretaries of state, and hence use national party as the sole criterion for voting. The Democracy Index gives voters information specific to their jurisdiction, allowing them to engage in retrospective evaluations of officials’ performances. This would give officials reasons to try to produce locally effective policies, even if they face pressure from the national government. To the extent dissenting by deciding produces good results, it needs measure-

178. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 109, at 6–7.
179. See id. at 49–66.
180. Schleicher, supra note 123.
182. Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 109, at 56.
184. Schleicher, supra note 123.
185. For a more extensive discussion of the Democracy Index as a tool of solving mismatch problems, see What if Europe, supra note 8, at 159.
186. See GERKEN, supra note 40.
187. What if Europe, supra note 8, at 157–58.
188. GERKEN, supra note 40, at 68–69.
ment for voters to reward it. The Democracy Index would help in this regard.

If election law changes were not enough — say the problem was an excess of Michigan voters who could not be swayed by new information — one might think we need institutional design changes. We might think that mayors and governors are more likely to exercise the powers of “servants,” that is, of uncooperative federalism, than legislatures and allocate more power to them. If we might delegate more power to institutions that do not seem likely to be affected by mismatch problems, like juries. Or we might think about changing allocations of power to separate state and local democracies from federal elections. For instance, there is substantial evidence that the Seventeenth Amendment, which provided for direct election of Senators instead of having them appointed by state legislatures, was aimed in part at making voter choice in state legislative elections turn on state issues rather than national ones. We might imagine, for instance, removing from state legislatures the power to gerrymander congressional districts would give at least some voters a willingness to vote based on state issues, rather than national issues (because the state elections would have fewer federal ramifications).

This is obviously just the beginning. Gerken’s brilliant, inspiring work points us towards the benefits of federalism, localism, and decentralization beyond those that are usually discussed in debates about “our federalism.” We need to think about how we might achieve those Gerkenean benefits in practice.

189. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 73, at 1258.

190. Gerken has endorsed moving election reform to citizen’s assemblies, a version of a move like this. Heather Gerken, Citizens Must Drive Electoral Reform, ROLL CALL (Nov. 15, 2005), http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/result/congressional/pqddocumentview?accountid=69414&pId=f1abf98e-becc-4399-9e8a-951317f129e2. For what it’s worth, I am quite skeptical of moves in this direction, as assemblies have their own problems and do not deliver the type of finality and legitimacy that elections do. But they do not suffer from mismatch problems in the same way as local elections.

191. This is the subject of forthcoming paper of mine, on newsstands soon. That is, if by “soon,” one means about ten months or so and if by “forthcoming,” one means, will eventually be finished. David Schleicher, The Seventeenth Amendment and Federalism in the Age of National Political Parties (draft, on file with author, 2013).

192. Interestingly, Franita Tolson argues that giving state legislature the power to gerrymander districts is a “safeguard of federalism.” Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Federalism, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 859, 861 (2010). By these lights, the exact opposite is more likely true, at least if by “federalism” we mean something functional about the benefits of diffusing power rather than the formal powers of states. To the extent voters are partisan and care more about national elections than state ones, they might vote in state elections in order to influence national elections if state legislatures have the power to influence national politics. As most theories of the benefits of federalism turn on states making policy decisions that are responsive to the preferences of their citizens about state issues, the power to gerrymander means that state officials face less pressure to be responsive to state voter preferences on state issues. This almost certainly harms the operation of American federalism.