Document Type
Article
Comments
Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate Governance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act, 80 Notre Dame Law Review 951 (2005)
Abstract
This Article is about the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a political entity. The basic story is that the SEC, like other administrative agencies, is a creature of the political system, and, as such, responds in varying ways to political pressure. From this starting point, I observe that the SEC is no exception among regulatory agencies in having a keen interest in maximizing its own power and prestige. As such, the SEC is responsive to political pressures.
Date of Authorship for this Version
2005
Recommended Citation
Macey, Jonathan R., "Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate Governance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act" (2005). Faculty Scholarship Series. 1391.
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1391